

CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL
HANDBOOK
TO
THE GENERAL EPISTLES
OF
JAMES AND JOHN.

BY
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EDINBURGH:
T. & T. CLARK, 38 GEORGE STREET.
MDCCCLXXXII.

THE TRANSLATION OF
THE EPISTLE OF JAMES

HAS BEEN EXECUTED BY
PATON J. GLOAG, D.D.

THE EPISTLES OF JOHN

BY
REV. CLARKE H. IRWIN, M.A.

CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL
COMMENTARY
ON
THE NEW TESTAMENT.

BY
HEINRICH AUGUST WILHELM MEYER, TH.D.,
OBERCONSISTORIALRATH, HANNOVER.

From the German, with the Sanction of the Author.

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DÜSTERDIECK ON REVELATION

will not be translated in the meantime, as the Publishers have received no encouragement from the Subscribers.

PREFACE.

IN the new revision of this Commentary the following works have been chiefly examined. II. Bouman, *Comment. perpet. in Jac. ep.*, ed. 1863, the exposition of the Epistle by Lange (second edition, 1866) in Lange's *Bibelwerk*, and the third edition of de Wette's exposition edited by Brückner. Whilst in the first of these works a deep and thorough examination of the thoughts of the Epistle is wanting, the work of Lange is too defective in exegetical carefulness, which alone can lead to sure results. In order to comprehend the Epistle historically, Lange proceeds from the most arbitrary hypotheses, which often mislead him into very rash, and sometimes strange explanations. It is to be regretted that, with all his spiritual feeling and acuteness, he has not been able to put a proper bridle upon his imagination. The second edition of de Wette's Handbook, containing the exposition of the Epistles of Peter, Jude, and James, had been previously prepared by Brückner. When in the preface to the third edition he says that he has subjected this portion of the Handbook to a thorough revision, and, as far as possible, has made the necessary additions and corrections, this assertion is completely justified by the work. Although the remarks of Brückner are condensed, yet they are highly deserving of attention, being the result of a true exegetical insight. It were to be wished that Brückner had been less trammelled by "the duty to preserve the work of de Wette as much as possible uncurtailed." Of the recent examinations on the relation of the Pauline view of justification to that of James, I will only here mention the familiar dissertation of Hengstenberg: "the Epistle of James," in Nos. 91-94 of the *Evangelical Church Magazine*, 1866; and the explanation of Jas. ii.

24–26, by Philippi in his *Dogmatics*, vol. I. pp. 297–315. Both, without assenting to my explanation, agree with me in this, that there is no essential difference between the doctrines of Paul and James. Hengstenberg arrives at this result by supposing, on the assumption of a justification gradually developed, that James speaks of a different stage of justification from that of Paul; whilst Philippi attributes to *δικαιοῦν* with James another meaning than that which it has with Paul. I can approve neither of the one method nor of the other; not of the former, because by it the idea of justification is altered in a most serious manner; nor of the latter, because it is wanting in linguistic correctness, and, moreover, thoughts are by it given which are wholly unimportant. I will not here resume the controversy with Frank, to which I felt constrained in the publication of the second edition, only remarking that after a careful examination I have not been able to alter my earlier expressed view of James' doctrine of justification, the less so as it had not its origin from dogmatic prepossession, but was demanded by exegetical conviction. Moreover, I am no less convinced than formerly that in the deductions made by me nothing is contained which contradicts the doctrine of the church regarding justification.—With regard to the question whether the author of this Epistle, the brother of the Lord, is or is not identical with the Apostle James, I have not been able to change my earlier convictions. If in more recent times the opposite view has been occasionally maintained, this is either in the way of simple assertion, or on grounds which proceed from unjustified suppositions. This present edition will show that I have exercised as impartial a criticism as possible with regard to my own views, as well as with regard to the views of others.

The quotations from Rauch and Gunkel refer to their reviews of this commentary published before the second edition; the one is found in No. 20 of the *Theol. Literaturblatt* of the *allgem. Kirchenzeitung* of the year 1858; and the other in the *Göttingen gel. Anz.*, Parts 109–112 of the year 1859. I have occasionally quoted Cremer's *biblisch-theol. Wörterbuch des neutest. Griech.* The more I know of the value of this work, the more I regret that it does not

answer to its title, inasmuch as those words are only treated which the author considers to be the expressions of spiritual, moral, and religious life. A distinction is here made which can only with difficulty be maintained. I have quoted Winer's *Grammar*, not only according to the sixth, but also according to the seventh edition, edited by Lünemann.

I again close this preface with the hope that my labour may help to make the truly apostolic spirit of the Epistle of James more valued, and to render its ethical teaching more useful to the church.

J. ED. HUTHER.

WITTENFÖRDEN, Nov. 1869.

THE EPISTLE OF JAMES.

INTRODUCTION.

SEC. 1.—JAMES.



THE author of this Epistle designates himself in the inscription *Ἰάκωβος, Θεοῦ καὶ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δούλος*, and thus announces himself to be, though not an apostle in the narrower sense of the term, yet a man of apostolic dignity. From this, as well as from the attitude which he takes up toward the circle of readers to whom he has directed his Epistle (*ταῖς δώδεκα φυλαῖς ταῖς ἐν τῇ διασπορᾷ*), it is evident that no other James can be meant than he who, at an early period in the Acts of the Apostles, appears as the head of the church at Jerusalem (Acts xii. 17, xv. 13 ff., xxi. 18); whom Paul calls *ὁ ἀδελφὸς τοῦ κυρίου* (Gal. i. 19), and reckons among the *στύλοις* (Gal. ii. 9), and whom Jude, the author of the last Catholic Epistle, designates as his brother (Jude 1); the same who in tradition received the name *ὁ δίκαιος* (Hegesippus in Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* ii. 23, iv. 22), who was regarded even by the Jews as an *ἀνὴρ δικαιοσύνης* (Joseph. *Antiq.* xx. 3. 1), to whom a higher dignity than that of the apostles is attributed in the Clementines, and who, according to the narrative of Josephus, suffered martyrdom about the year 63; according to that of Hegesippus (Euseb. ii. 23), not long before the destruction of Jerusalem.¹

¹ No certain decision can be come to on this difference, especially as the narrative of Hegesippus (comp. Lange's *Komment.*, Einleitung, p. 13 f.) bears unmistakable mythical traces; and in the relation of Josephus: *παράγων εἰς αὐτὸ (τὸν ἀδελφὸν Ἰησοῦ, τοῦ λεγομένου Χριστοῦ, Ἰάκωβος ὄνομα αὐτῷ καὶ) τινὰς (ἱεῖρας) . . . παρίδωκε λευσθησομένους*, the genuineness of the bracketed words is at least doubtful; Clericus, Lardner, Credner assert their spuriousness.

As regards the question whether this James is to be considered as identical with the Apostle James the son of Alphaeus, as is maintained in recent times by Lange, Bouman, Hengstenberg, Philippi, and others, or as a different person, the data given in the N. T. are more favourable to the idea of non-identity than to the opposite opinion. 1. When mention is made in the N. T. of the ἀδελφοί of Jesus, they are represented as a circle different from that of the apostles. Thus they are already in John ii. 12 distinguished from the μαθηταῖς of Jesus; the same distinction is also made after the choice of the twelve apostles (Matt. xii. 46; Mark iii. 21, 31; Luke viii. 19; John vii. 3), and in such a manner that neither in these passages nor in those where the Jews mention the brethren of Jesus (Matt. xiii. 55; Mark vi. 3¹) is there the slightest indication that one or several of them belonged to the apostolic circle: rather their conduct toward Jesus is characterized as different from that of the apostles; and, indeed, it is expressly said of them that *they* did not believe on Him (John vii. 5). Also after the ascension of Christ, when His brethren had become believers, and had attached themselves to the apostles, they are expressly, and in the same simple manner as before, distinguished from the Twelve (Acts i. 14; 1 Cor. ix. 5). 2. In no passage of the N. T. is it indicated that the ἀδελφοί of the Lord were not His brothers, in the usual meaning of the word, but His cousins; and, on the other hand, James the son of Alphaeus is never reckoned as a brother of Jesus, nor is there any trace of a relationship between him and the Lord. Certainly the Mary mentioned in John xix. 25 (ἡ τοῦ Κλωπᾶ) was the mother of the sons of Alphaeus (Matt. xxvii. 56; Mark xv. 40), as Ἀλφᾶϊος and Κλωπᾶς are only different forms of the same name (עֲלִי); but from that passage it does not follow that this Mary was a sister of the mother of Jesus (see Meyer *in loc.*). 3. According to the lists of the apostles, only one of the sons of Alphaeus, namely James, was the

¹ According to the *Receptus*, the names of the brothers of Jesus are James, Josès, Judas, and Simon. Instead of Ἰωσὴς in Matthew, Lachmann and Tischendorf have adopted, according to preponderating authority, Ἰωσὴφ; in Mark they, however, read Ἰωσῆς; yet here also the Codex Sinaiticus has Ἰωσὴφ. It remains doubtful which is the correct name. Comp. Meyer on the passage in Matthew.

apostle of the Lord. Although the Apostle Lebbaeus (Matt. x. 3), whom Mark calls Thaddaeus (Mark iii. 18), is the same with 'Ιούδας 'Ιακώβου in Luke (Luke vi. 15; Acts i. 13), yet he was *not* a brother of James; for, on the one hand, if this were the case he would have been called so by Matthew, who expressly places the brothers among the apostles together; and, on the other hand, ἀδελφός is not to be supplied to the genitive 'Ιακώβου in Luke,—contrary to all analogy—but υἱός (see Introduction to *Commentary on Jude*, sec. 1). According to Matt. xxvii. 26 and Mark xv. 40, Alphaeus, besides James, had only *one* other son, Joses. If the apostles Judas and Simon were also his sons, his wife Mary in the above passages would have been also called their mother, especially as Joses was not an apostle. From all these data, then, the brothers of the Lord, James, Judas, and Simon, are not to be considered as identical with the apostles bearing the same names. 4. There are, however, two passages, Gal. i. 19 and 1 Cor. xv. 7, which appear to lead to a different conclusion. In the first passage εἰ μὴ appears to indicate, as many interpreters assume, that Paul, by the addition for the sake of historical exactness, remarks that besides the Apostle Peter he saw also the Apostle James. But on this supposition we cannot see why he should designate him yet more exactly as τὸν ἀδελφὸν τοῦ Κυρίου, since the other Apostle James was at that time dead. The addition of this surname indicates a distinction of *this* James from the apostle. Now εἰ μὴ does certainly refer not only to οὐκ εἶδον (Fritzsche, *ad Matth.* p. 482; Neander, Winer), but to the whole preceding clause; still, considering the position which James occupied, Paul might regard him, and indeed was bound to regard him, as standing in such a close relation to the real apostles that he might use εἰ μὴ without including him among them.¹ It is evident that Paul did not reckon James among the original apostles, since in Gal. ii. he names him and

¹ Meyer (*in loc.*) supposes that James is here reckoned by Paul among the apostles in the wider sense of the term. But it is also possible that the words εἰ μὴ κ.τ.λ. are not to be understood as a limitation to the thought before expressed, ὕστερον δὲ κ.τ.λ., but as a remark added to it, by which Paul would lay stress upon the fact that besides Peter he has also seen James, the brother of the Lord, thus the man who possessed not only an apostolic dignity, but to whom the opponents of Paul directly appealed.

Cephas and John together, not as apostles, but as οἱ δοκοῦντες εἶναί τι, οἱ δοκοῦντες στυλοὶ εἶναι.¹ — In the other passage, 1 Cor. xv. 7, the word πᾶσιν may be added by Paul, with reference to James formerly named, in the sense: “afterwards Christ appeared to James, and then—not to him only, but—to *all* the apostles,” from which it would follow that James belonged to the apostles. But this reference is not *necessary*, as πᾶσιν may as well be added in order simply to give prominence to the fact that *all* the apostles, without exception, had seen the Lord.² 5. All the other reasons for the identity, which are taken from the N. T., as adduced by Lange, are too subjective in character to be considered as conclusive; as, for example, that Luke in Acts xii. 17 would have felt himself obliged to notice that the James mentioned by him here and further on, is not the same with the James whom he had called an apostle in Acts i. 13;³ that only an *apostle* could have written such an epistle, and have attained to that consequence which James possessed in the Church;⁴ and that it is improbable that, besides the Apostles James, Judas, and Simon, there should be three of the brothers of Jesus bearing the same names.⁵

¹ That James is reckoned by Paul among the στυλοὶ, has certainly been adduced as an argument for the opposite opinion; but that Paul does not reckon those named as στυλοὶ because they were *apostles*, is undeniable; and that only apostles could be considered as στυλοὶ, is an unwarranted assumption. Bouman thinks that a *mere private person* could not attain to such an importance; but he overlooks the fact that James, as the most prominent of the *brothers of the Lord*, who are named alongside of the apostles, was more than a mere private person.

² Otherwise Meyer (*in loc.*), who here also understands the expression ἀποστολὴν in the wider sense, which certainly receives a justification from the fact that the original apostles had before been designated by Paul as οἱ δούλοισιν.

³ Against this it is to be affirmed, that Luke might certainly assume such an acquaintance on the part of his readers with the circumstances, that in speaking of James in Jerusalem he did not deem it necessary to remark which James he meant. He even names Philip (viii. 5) without saying whether he was the apostle or the deacon. Bleek (*Einl. in N. T.* p. 545) explains the matter differently; that as the Acts of the Apostles is not to be considered an independent work of Luke, we may suppose that he retained the simple designation James as he found it in his document, without making any remark on the relation of this James to Jesus and to James the son of Alphaeus.

⁴ The important position of James in Jerusalem was not founded on the apostolate, as that office points rather to missionary activity than to an episcopal superintendence of a church.

⁵ This similarity ceases to be remarkable, when we consider how frequently

The testimonies of the post-apostolic age are much too uncertain to decide the controversy; for whilst Clemens Alexandrinus (Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* ii. 1: δύο δὲ γεγόνασιν Ἰακώβοι εἰς ὁ δίκαιος . . . ἕτερος δὲ ὁ . . . κατατομηθεὶς) and Jerome declare for the hypothesis of identity, the Apostolic Constitutions (ii. 55, vi. 12, 14; in the latter passage, after the enumeration of the twelve apostles, there are yet named: Ἰάκωβός τε ὁ τοῦ κυρίου ἀδελφὸς καὶ Ἱεροσολύμων ἐπίσκοπος καὶ Παῦλος ὁ τῶν ἐθνῶν διδάσκαλος) and Eusebius (commentary on Isa. xvii. 5 in Montfaucon, *coll. nova patr.* II. p. 422; *Hist. Eccl.* i. 12, vii. 19) definitely distinguish the brother of the Lord from the apostles. The statement of Hegesippus (in Euseb. iv. 22), to which Credner appeals *against*, and Kern and Lange *for* the identity, is not in favour of it;¹ also the extract of Jerome from the Hebrew gospel cannot with certainty be quoted for it (Hieron. *de vir. illustrib.* chap. ii.); and still less the passage in the Clementine Homilies, xi. 35, where the words τῷ λεχθέντι ἀδελφῷ τοῦ κυρίου μου annexed to Ἰακώβω admit of the explanation that the designation ἀδελφ. τ. κύρ. was his familiar surname. The opinions of the later Church Fathers are evidently of no weight either *for* or *against* the identity.

On the assumption of identity, the word ἀδελφός cannot be understood in its usual sense. The opinion, obtaining most favour since the time of Jerome, is that the so-called ἀδελφοί

the same names are given to different persons in the N. T.; we have only to adduce the names Mary, Simon, Joseph, Judas, etc. On the supposition of the identity of these three apostles with the three brothers of Jesus, then in the passages Matt. xii. 46 (Mark iii. 31; Luke viii. 19) and John vii. 3, 5, only *one* brother of the Lord, Joses (or Joseph), could be referred to, particularly as sisters could not be included in the idea of brothers, as Lange, it is true, thinks is the case in Acts i. 13, 14.

¹ The passage is: μετὰ τὸ μαρτυρῆσαι Ἰάκωβον τὸν δίκαιον, ὃς καὶ ὁ κύριος ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ, πάλιν ὁ ἐκ θείου αὐτοῦ Συμεὼν ὁ τοῦ Κλωπᾶ καθίσταται ἐπίσκοπος· ὃν προΐεντο πάντες ὄντα ἀνιψιὸν τοῦ κυρίου διύτερον. In this passage the translation of αὐτοῦ, of πάλιν, and of διύτερον is doubtful. Kern and Lange refer αὐτοῦ to ὁ κύριος, connect πάλιν directly with ὁ ἐκ θείου αὐτοῦ, and refer διύτερον to ἀνιψιὸν τοῦ κυρίου. But αὐτοῦ may, as Credner remarks, also refer to Ἰάκωβον, and πάλιν be connected with καθίσταται ἐπίσκοπος, and διύτερον with ὃν προΐεντο. If αὐτοῦ is referred to Ἰάκωβον, then James is designated as the *real* brother of Jesus, since in another passage (Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* iii. 22) Simeon the son of Clopas is called by Hegesippus the son of the uncle of Jesus; if, on the other hand, it is referred to ὁ κύριος, nothing is said regarding the relationship of James to Jesus;

were the *cousins* of Jesus, namely, the sons of the sister of His mother, who was also called Mary, and was the wife of Clopas (= Alphaeus). This view is supported by the interpretation of John xix. 25, according to which the words *Μαρία ἡ τοῦ Κλωπᾶ* are taken in apposition to the preceding *ἡ ἀδελφὴ τῆς μητρὸς αὐτοῦ*; and so the passage is explained by Theodoret: *ἀδελφὸς τοῦ κυρίου ἐκαλεῖτο μὲν, οὐκ ἦν δὲ φύσει . . . τοῦ Κλωπᾶ μὲν ἦν υἱός, τοῦ δὲ κυρίου ἀνεψίος· μητέρα γὰρ εἶχε τὴν ἀδελφὴν τῆς τοῦ κυρίου μητέρας*. The correct interpretation of that passage removes all ground for this opinion. Accordingly Lange (in Herzog's *Real-Encyclopädie*, and repeated in his *Commentary*, Introduction, p. 10), instead of this view, has advanced the theory, that as Clopas, according to Hegesippus, was a brother of Joseph, the so-called *brethren* of Jesus were properly His *step-cousins*, but after the early death of Clopas were adopted by Joseph, and so actually became the brothers of Jesus. But this opinion is destitute of foundation; for even although the narrative of Hegesippus is correct, yet tradition is silent concerning the early death of Clopas and the adoption of his children by Joseph, and as little "does history know that the sons of Alphaeus formed *one* household with the mother of Jesus, and were *prominent* members of it," as Lange maintains. By the denial of identity, *ἀδελφός* is to be understood in its proper sense. Thiersch (*Krit. d. neu. test. Schriften*, pp. 361, 430 ff.) adopts the opinion contained, accord-

it thus depends on the interpretation of *πάλιν* and *δεύτερον*. It cannot be denied that *πάλιν* is more naturally connected with *καθίσταται ἐπίσκοπος* than with the words which immediately follow, as in that case it would clearly mean that Simeon became bishop a second time; but *δεύτερον* may at least as well be connected with *ὃν προέβλεπον* (in the sense: "whom all appointed the second bishop") as with *ὄντα ἀνψ. τ. κυρίου*.—Thus, then, the explanation of Credner is not inferior to that of Kern and Lange, but rather appears to be the more probable, as Hegesippus elsewhere designates James simply as the brother of the Lord, and never indicates that he was an apostle; rather in the words: *διαίχεται δὲ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν μετὰ τῶν ἀποστόλων ὁ ἀδελφὸς τοῦ κυρίου Ἰάκωβος, ὁ ὀνομασθεὶς ὑπὸ πάντων δίκαιος . . . Ἐπὶ πολλοὶ Ἰάκωβον ἐκαλεῖντο*, he seems at least to distinguish him from the apostles. According to Hegesippus, Clopas was a brother of Joseph (Euseb. iii. 4), and thus Simeon as the son of Clopas was *ἀνεψίος τοῦ κυρίου*. Whether this is correct must indeed remain uncertain; it finds no support in the N. T., as there the sons of Clopas (= Alphaeus) are only James and Jesus. From these remarks it follows how unjustifiable is the assertion of Lange: "We learn from Hegesippus that James the brother of the Lord was a brother of Simeon, and that both were the sons of Clopas."

ing to his conjecture, in the Gospel of the Hebrews, and already advanced by Origen (on Matt. xiii.), that the *brothers of Jesus* were the children of Joseph by a former marriage; but against this Wiesinger rightly insists on the fact that this opinion of Origen "was by no means prevalent in his time." It owed its origin apparently to a delicacy to deny the perpetual virginity of Mary, as Thiersch confesses that "it is not to him a matter of indifference whether the mother of the Lord remained ἀεὶ παρθένος." The evangelists, however, have not this feeling, for otherwise Matthew and Luke would not have said of Mary: ἔτεκε τὸν υἱὸν αὐτῆς τὸν πρωτότοκον, which points to the birth of later children not only as a possible, but as an actual fact. If it were otherwise, there would be some indication in the N. T. that Joseph was a *widower* when he married Mary, or that the ἀδελφοὶ Ἰησοῦ were not her children. According to the N. T., the brothers of Jesus, to whom James belonged, are the children of Mary born in wedlock with Joseph after the birth of Jesus; as is correctly recognised by Herder, Credner, Meyer, de Wette, Wiesinger, Stier, Bleek, and others.

In what the evangelists relate of the brothers of Jesus, James is not particularly distinguished. Accordingly we are not to consider his conduct as different from that of the rest. Although closely related by birth to Jesus, His brothers did not recognise His higher dignity, so that Jesus with reference to them said: οὐχ ἔστι προφήτης ἄτιμος, εἰ μὴ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ αὐτοῦ (Matt. xiii. 56). Lange incorrectly infers from John ii. 12, where the brothers of Jesus are first mentioned, that "even at the commencement of the ministry of Jesus they were spiritually related (that is, by faith) to the disciples;" for at that time the brothers had not attached themselves to the *disciples*, but went with them from Cana to Capernaum that they might accompany Mary. At a later period we find them separated from the disciples (see Mark iii. 21; Matt. xii. 46; Luke viii. 19);¹ they go with

¹ This event, according to the united testimony of the Synoptists, occurred after the choice of the Twelve; Mark makes it to follow directly upon it. In ἔλεγον γάρ, ver. 21, Lange finds an "artifice" on the part of those belonging to Jesus to rescue Him from the death which threatened Him (!). — Meyer supplies to ἔξλθεν, "from Nazareth;" but it is probable that the family at this time

Mary to the house where Jesus is, because, thinking that He was mad, they wished to bring Him home with them, which was evidently no sign of their faith, but rather of their unbelief.¹ After the miracle of the loaves, when the feast of Tabernacles was at hand, they are with Jesus in Galilee; but that even at this period they did not believe on Him, is expressly asserted by John (vii. 5). Only after the ascension do we find them as disciples of the Lord in close fellowship with the apostles. We are not informed when this change took place, but from the fact that Jesus on the cross resigned His mother, as one forsaken, to the care of John, we may conjecture that even then they did not believe. It is probable that our Lord's appearance after His resurrection to James (1 Cor. xv. 5) decided his belief, and that his conversion drew his brothers along with him, as may be inferred from the force of his character. So Bleek, *Eint. in d. N. T.* p. 546. James at an early period obtained in the church of Jerusalem such a position that he appears as its head (about A.D. 44); yet this position is not that of a bishop in distinction from presbyters, but he was one of the presbyters (Acts xv. 22, 23), whose loftier dignity was not derived from any special official authority, but only from his personality. In the conference at Jerusalem (in the year 50, Acts xv.) James not only took an important part, but his voice gave the decision. We cannot call his advice, in accordance with which the definite resolution was arrived at, a compromise; for the question whether believers among the Gentiles were obliged to be circumcised could only be affirmed or denied. James decided the question in the negative, grounding his opinion not on his own experience, nor on the communications of Paul and Barnabas, but on the divine act narrated by Peter, wherein he recognised the commencement of the fulfilment of the definite *λόγοι τῶν προφητῶν*. When he imposed upon the Gentile Christians *ἀπέχεσθαι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλισγημάτων τῶν εἰδώλων καὶ τῆς πορνείας καὶ τοῦ πνικτοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἵματος*, he

dwelt no longer in Nazareth, but in Capernaum; for in Mark vi. 3 the inhabitants of Nazareth say *only* of the *sisters*, but not of His mother and brothers, that they dwelt with them (comp. also Matt. xiii. 55).

¹ Lange also, it is true, finds in the demand of the brothers a sign of unbelief, but of the unbelief of an enthusiasm which had not yet risen to self-sacrifice!

does so, not in *the* same sense as that in which the Judaizers imposed on them the observance of the law; and when as a reason he appeals to the reading of Moses every Sabbath in the synagogues even of Gentile cities, he intimates that he wished to draw *the* boundary to the freedom of the Gentile Christians, within which they must keep themselves, if it were to be possible for the Jewish Christians to live in brotherly fellowship with them. That James not only recognises Gentile Christianity, but also the ἀποστολή of Paul, is apparent from Gal. ii. 7 ff.; yet it does not follow that he entered entirely into Paul's views. According to Gal. ii. 12, the persons there called *τινὲς ἀπὸ Ἰακώβου* were offended because Peter and the other Jews did eat *μετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν*. We are not told in the narrative of Paul that these did not come directly from James, but only from Jerusalem, at least that they had not been sent by James, or that they had expressed themselves more strongly than the views of James warranted. The influence which they exerted on Peter, and even on Barnabas and the other Jewish Christians at Antioch, would rather seem to indicate that their words were regarded as those of James, who, when he declared himself against *συνεσθίειν μετὰ τῶν ἐθνῶν*,¹ did not contradict his view expressed in the convention at Jerusalem. It is clear from Acts xxi. 17-26 that James attached great importance to the point that every ἀποστασία of the Jews from Moses should be avoided, and that the Gentile Christians should remain by that fourfold ἀπέχεσθαι; he even demanded from Paul a proof that he had not ceased to observe the law (τὸν νόμον φυλάσσειν). From the fact that Paul complied with this demand, it follows not only that he was not hostilely opposed to the view of James, but that he respected it, and recognised in it nothing essentially opposed to his own principles. He could not have done so had James insisted on the observance of the law in the same sense as did the Judaizing Christians, against whom Paul so often and so decidedly con-

¹ If Paul by *τὰ ἔθνη* (Gal. ii. 12) means not Gentiles, but, as is certainly the usual view, Gentile Christians, we must suppose, with Wieseler (*Komm. über d. Br. an d. Gal.*), that the Gentile Christians at Antioch no longer kept the rules established at Jerusalem, otherwise Peter would have had no reason to separate himself from them at their meals. — Yet it is doubtful if we are justified in assuming this, as the presupposed fact is not in the least indicated by Paul.

tended. According to James, the law was not a necessary means of justification along with and in addition to faith, but the rule of life appointed by God to the people of Israel, according to which *believing* Israel has to conform in the *free obedience of faith*. Thus James was and continued to be in his faith in Christ a true *Jew*, without, however, denying that Christianity was not only the glorification of Judaism, but also that by it the blessing promised to Israel was imparted to the Gentiles without their being subject to the law of Israel.¹ The position of James toward the Mosaic law was accordingly different from that of Paul. For whilst the latter was conscious that in Christ he was dead to the law (*μὴ ὦν ὑπὸ νόμον*, 1 Cor. ix. 20), so that he felt himself at liberty to be *ὡς Ἰουδαῖος* to the Jews but *ὡς ἄνομος* to the *ἀνόμοις*, though always *ἐννομος Χριστῷ*, the former esteemed it to be a sacred duty in Christ to observe the law which God had given to His people through Moses.² In this legal obedience James showed such a strict conscientiousness, that even by the Jews he received the name of "the Just." And considering this his

¹ Weiss is wrong when he maintains (in the dissertation "James and Paul" in the *deutsche Ztschr. f. christl. Wissenschaft*, 5th year, 1854, No. 51) that James was a stranger to the distinction between the fulfilment of the law from a motive of duty and from the impulse of a new principle, and that in this he was in opposition to Paul; that while, according to the latter, the law leads to sin and death, according to the view of James it produces righteousness and deliverance from death, and that he cherishes the idea, supposed by Weiss to be contained in the O. T., that he only can be declared righteous by God who is actually perfectly righteous. In opposition to the first two positions it is to be urged, that James in chap. ii. speaks not of the O. T. law as such, but of the N. T. *νόμος τῆς ἐλευθερίας*; and against the third position, that the O. T. recognises distinctly a *forgiveness* of sins, as well as that James regards *δικαιοσύνη ἐξ ἐργῶν* as a work of *grace*, since he does not deny the existence of sin among true believers, and in ii. 11 presupposes that it is only possible to stand in the judgment inasmuch as that judgment is *merciful*. It is to be observed that Weiss advances the same view of James in his *bibl. Theologie*.

² Paul and James before their conversion to Christ certainly occupied different positions with regard to the law. The former regarded it—conformably to his Pharisaism—as the means of procuring righteousness, and accordingly in his strivings he experienced it as a *ζυγός*; which weighed him down; James, on the other hand, was certainly one of those pious persons to whom, in the faith of the covenant which God made with His people, the law, as the witness of this covenant, was the word of divine love, and therefore in it he had found his joy and consolation (comp. Ps. cxix. 92, xix. 8-11). Paul found his peace, when he recognised himself in Christ free from the law; James, when he experienced in Christ strength to obey the law.

peculiar character, it is not at all to be wondered at that the Judaistic Christians leant chiefly on him, and that Judaistic tradition imparted additional features to his portrait, by which he appeared as the ideal of Jewish holiness. According to the description of Hegesippus (Euseb. *Hist. Eccl.* ii. 23), he was by birth a Nazarite, he led an ascetic life, he never anointed with oil nor used the bath, he never wore woollen but linen clothes, he was permitted to enter into the sanctuary, and he prayed constantly on his knees for the forgiveness of the people, and continued in his devotions so long that his knees became hard as camels'. This description may contain a few genuine traits, yet, as will be generally admitted, it cannot be acquitted of "suspicious exaggeration" (Lange). The statements of the Ebionites proceed further; in the Clementines, James is raised above all the apostles, and exalted to the episcopacy of all Christendom; indeed, according to Epiphanius (*Hæres.* xxx. 16), his ascension to heaven was a matter of narration; and Epiphanius himself thinks that he not only went yearly into the holy of holies, but that he also wore the diadem of the high priest.

SEC. 2.—THE READERS OF THE EPISTLE.

The contents of the Epistle prove that it was addressed to *Christians*. Not only does the author—who by the designation *κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ δούλος* plainly announces himself to be a Christian—address his readers throughout as his "brethren" (also as his "beloved brethren"), but in several places he distinctly affirms that they stand with him on the same ground of faith; in chap. i. 18 he says that God has begotten them (*ἡμᾶς*) by the word of truth; in chap. ii. 1 he reminds them of their *πίστις τοῦ κυρίου Ἰ. Χριστοῦ τῆς δόξης*; in chap. ii. 7 he speaks of the goodly name (that is, the name of Jesus Christ) which was invoked upon them; in chap. v. 7 he exhorts them to patience, pointing out to them the nearness of the coming of the Lord; and in chap. ii. 16 ff. he evidently supposes that they had one and the same faith with himself. Add to this, that if the author as a *δούλος* of Christ had written to *non-Christians*, his Epistle could only have had the intention of leading them to faith in Christ; but of such

an intention there is not the slightest trace found in the Epistle, so that Bouman is completely unjustified when he says: *vult haec esse epistola estque revera christianae religionis schola propaedeutica*. Certainly the designation of the readers, found in the inscription of the Epistle as αἱ δώδεκα φυλαὶ αἱ ἐν τῇ διασπορᾷ, appears at variance with this view, as such a designation properly applies to *Jews* dispersed among the Gentiles beyond the boundaries of Palestine. By this name cannot be meant *Christians in general* (Hengstenberg), inasmuch as they are the spiritual Israel (in contrast to ὁ Ἰσραὴλ κατὰ σάρκα, 1 Cor. x. 18; comp. Gal. vi. 16), and still less the *Gentile Christians* (Philippi), because it stamps the nationality too distinctly (much more than the expression ἐκλεκτοὶ παρεπίδημοι διασπορᾶς, 1 Pet. i. 1), particularly as nothing is added pointing beyond the limits of nationality. The apparent contradiction is solved by the consideration of the view of James, according to which the Christians to whom he wrote not only had not ceased to be Jews, but it was precisely those Jews who believed in the Messiah promised to them and manifested in Jesus who were the *true* Jews, so that he regarded *believing* Israel as the true people of God, on whom he could therefore without scruple confer the name αἱ δώδεκα φυλαί,¹ pointing to the fathers to whom the promises were made; and, besides, it is not to be forgotten that the sharp distinction between Christianity springing up in Judaism, and Judaism called to Christianity, did not at first arise, but was only gradually developed by subsequent historical relations; yet it is not — on account of the above adduced reasons — to be inferred, as Bouman and Lange assume, that the Epistle was not only written to the converted, but also to the unconverted Jews.² The destination of the Epistle to Jewish

¹ The solution is unsatisfactory, that "James writes to the Jews with whom he has access as a servant of Jesus Christ, and on whom as such he has influence."

² It is true that the author directly addresses the *rich*, who were hostilely disposed to the Christians; but it does not follow from this that the Epistle was in any proper sense directed to them; it is rather to be explained from the liveliness with which he writes. The author sees those who had exposed the readers of his Epistle in a twofold manner to temptation (πειρασμοί) as present before him, and therefore for the sake of his readers he addresses them directly; as also the prophets often did in their denunciations against the enemies of Israel.

Christians follows from chap. ii. 2, where the place of assembly of the congregations is called *συναγωγή*; from ii. 29, where Monotheism is prominently brought forward; from v. 12, where swearing according to forms customary among the Jews is forbidden; and from v. 14, where the custom of anointing with oil is mentioned. But, besides, all the ethical faults which the author reproves are of such a nature that they have their root in the carnal Jewish disposition (Wiesinger, Schaff, Thiersch, and others¹). — The indolent reliance, prevailing in the congregations, on a faith without works, cannot be adduced as a feature opposed to the Jewish character; for in its nature it is nothing else than the pharisaical confidence on the superiority over all other nations, granted by God through the law to the people of Israel. As the Jews thought that in their law they had a guarantee for their salvation without the actual practice of the law (comp. Rom. ii. 17 ff.), so these Christians trusted to their faith, though defective in works.² That in later times the Jews also placed a false confidence on their knowledge of God, Justin testifies when he says: *οἱ λέγουσιν, ὅτι κὰν ἁμαρτωλοὶ ᾧσι, Θεὸν δὲ γινώσκουσιν, οὐ μὴ λογίσηται αὐτοῖς ἁμαρτίαν* (*Dial.* p. 370, ed. col.). — It is true it is not prominently mentioned in the Epistle that the readers were solicitous about a scrupulous observance of the rites of the Mosaic law, but a false estimate of an external *θρησκεία* was, according to i. 22 ff., not wanting among them, with which also was united, as among the Jews, a fanatical zeal (*ὄργη*). — The condition of these Jewish-Christian congregations, as described in the Epistle, was as follows: They were exposed to manifold temptations (*πειρασμοῖς ποικίλοις*), whilst their members as poor (*ταπεινοί, πτωχοί*) by reason of their faith (chap. ii. 5, 6) were oppressed by the rich. But they did not bear these persecutions with that patience which assures the true Christian of the crown of life; on the con-

¹ When Brückner thinks that the description of the readers as *αἱ δώδεκα φυλαί* does not require that they were merely Jewish Christians, but only that they who came over to them from the Gentiles must have submitted to the ordinances of the Jewish national life, it is to be observed that *circumcised* Gentiles were no longer regarded as Gentiles, but as Jews.

² "What James had in view is simply a Jewish orthodoxy which asserted itself among the Jewish Christians in the form of a dead unfruitful faith in God and the Messiah," Thiersch.

trary, these persecutions gave rise to an inward temptation, the blame of which, however, they sought not in themselves, in their ἐπιθυμία, but in God. Instead of praying in faith for the wisdom which was lacking to them, they gave way to doubt, which placed them in opposition to the principle of Christian life. Whilst they considered their ταπεινότης as a disgrace, they looked with envy at the glitter of earthly glory, and preferred the friendship of the world to that of God, in consequence of which, even in their religious assemblies, they flattered the rich, whilst they looked down upon the poor. This worldly spirit, conducive to the friendship of the world, was likewise the occasion of bitter strife among them, in which they murmured against each other, and in passionate zeal contended with violent words. These contentions were not "theological discussions" (Reuss) or "doctrinal dissensions" (Schmid), for the Epistle points to none of these, but concerned practical life, especially the Christian's demeanour in the world.¹ As the Jews imagined that it belonged to them to be the ruling people of the world, to whom all the glory of the world belonged, so also many in these congregations wished to possess even on the earth in a worldly form the glory promised to Christians, and therefore they quarrelled with "the brethren of low degree," who on their part were carried along in passionate wrath against those of a proud disposition. In serving the world they certainly did not wish to cease to be Christians, but they thought to be certain of justification (δικαιούσθαι) on account of their faith, although that faith was to them something entirely external which produced among them a fanatical zeal (as the law among the Jews), but not that *work* of faith which consisted, on the one hand, in τηρεῖν ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου, and, on the other, in the practice of compassionate love. Yet all were not estranged in this manner from the Christian life; there were still among them disciples of the Lord who were and wished to be ταπεινοί; yet worldliness was so prevalent in the midst of them that even they suffered from it. Hence

¹ The observation of Reuss (§ 144) is misleading: "The supremacy of systems and philosophy of faith was to the simple-minded and unphilosophical author as much opposed as the supremacy of money and fine clothes," since the λαλοῦν against which James contends has nothing to do with "systems and philosophy."

the admonitory and warning nature of the Epistle to all, yet so that it is addressed chiefly sometimes to the one party and sometimes to the other, and is in its tone now mild and now severe. All, however, are addressed as ἀδελφοί, except the *rich*, who are distinctly stated as those who stand not inside, but outside of the congregations to whom the Epistle was addressed. These faults in the congregations were the occasion which induced James to compose his Epistle. The Epistle itself is opposed to the opinion of Lange, that its occasion can only be understood when it is recognised that the Jewish Christians were infected by the fanaticism of the Jews, in which the revolutionary impulse of independence and revenge was united with enthusiastic apocalyptic and chiliastic hopes, and which was excited by the antagonism of the Gentile world to Judaism; in the Epistle only in an arbitrary manner can references and allusions to these "*historical conditions*" be maintained.

The churches to which the Epistle is addressed are, according to the inscription, outside of Palestine, chiefly in Syria and the far East, whilst in the West there were hardly any Jewish Christian churches; yet it is possible that the author also included, by the expression employed, the churches in Palestine only outside of Jerusalem (Guericke).

SEC. 3.—CONTENTS AND CHARACTER OF THE EPISTLE.

The Epistle commences with a reference to the πειρασμοί which the readers had to endure, exhorting them to esteem them as reasons for joy, to prove their patience under them, to ask in faith for the wisdom which was lacking to them, to which a warning against doubt is annexed. To the *rich* the judgment of God is announced; whilst to the lowly, who endure patiently, the crown of life is promised (i. 1-12). Directly upon this follows the warning not to refer the internal temptations which arose from their own lusts (ἐπιθυμία) to God, as from God, on the contrary, cometh every good gift, especially the new birth by the word of truth (i. 13-18). To this is annexed the exhortation to be swift to hear, slow to speak, and slow to wrath. This exhortation forms the basis for the following amplifications. The first, "swift to hear," is more precisely defined: to receive with meekness the word

which is able to save the soul, in such a way as there shall be no failure in the doing of the word by works of compassionate love, and by preserving oneself from the world (i. 19-27). With special reference to the flattery of the rich and the despising of the poor occurring in their assemblies, the sin of respect of persons is brought before the readers and pressed upon them; that whosoever shall transgress the law in *one* point, he is guilty of all, and that to the unmerciful a judgment without mercy will be meted out (ii. 1-13); whereupon it is strongly affirmed that it is foolish to trust to a faith which without works is in itself dead. Such a faith does not profit; for by works a man is justified, and not by faith only, as also the examples of Abraham and Rahab show (ii. 14-26). — Without any transition, an earnest warning follows against the vain desire of teaching, which evidently refers to “slow to speak, slow to wrath.” The warning is founded on the difficulty, indeed the impossibility, of bridling the tongue. Heavenly wisdom is then commended in contrast to the wisdom of this world, which is full of bitter envy (iii. 1-18). The author severely reprimands his readers for their strifes arising from the love of the world, and exhorts them to humble themselves before God, and not to judge one another (iv. 1-12). He then turns to those who, in the pride of possession, forget their dependence on God, points out to them the fleeting nature of human life, subjoins a severe apostrophe against the rich, to whom he announces the certain judgment of God (iv. 13-v. 6), and, pointing to the Old Testament examples, exhorts his readers to a persevering patience in love, as the coming of the Lord is at hand (v. 7-11). After a short warning against idle swearing (v. 12), the author gives advice as to how the sick are to behave themselves, exhorting them to mutual confession of sin, and, referring to the example of Elias, to mutual intercession; he then concludes the Epistle by stating the blessing which arises from the conversion of a sinner (v. 13-20).¹

¹ On the train of thought in the Epistle, see “The Connection of the Epistle of James,” by Pfeiffer, in *theol. Stud. u. Kritiken*, 1850, Part I. In this dissertation the importance of i. 19 for the construction of the Epistle is correctly recognised; only the two members *βραδύς ἐστὶ τὸ λαλῆσαι* and *βραδύς ἐστὶ ἐργῆν* are too much separated from each other, and accordingly the commencement of a third division of the Epistle is placed at iii. 13, where, however, the reference to the *ἐργῆν* in the preceding paragraph is evident.

This Epistle was not addressed to a single church, but to a circle of churches (namely, to the Jewish-Christian churches outside of Palestine or of Jerusalem), on which account, when received into the canon, it was classed among the so-called *ἐπιστολαῖς καθολικαῖς*, by which, however, nothing is determined concerning its peculiar design.¹ For, even although the seven Catholic Epistles received this name with reference to the already existing collection of the Pauline Epistles, yet the opinion of Kern (*Commentary*, Introduction), that the collection of these epistles under that name indicates an *internal* relationship with reference to the doctrine and tendency of Paul, is not justified. As an encyclical epistle, the Epistle of James considers only congregational, but not personal relations. With regard to its contents, it is decidedly *ethical*, not dogmatic, and that not merely because it treats only of the ethical faults in the congregations referred to, but also because it contemplates Christianity only according to its ethical side.² It is peculiar to this Epistle that the gospel—the word of truth by which God effects the new birth, and of which it is said that it is able to save the soul—is designated *νόμος*. This *νόμος*, more exactly characterized as *τέλειος ὁ τῆς ἐλευθερίας*, is certainly distinguished from the O. T. *νόμος*, which only commands, without communicating the power of free obedience; but, at the same time, in this very designation the conviction is expressed of the closest connection between Judaism and Christianity, whilst the same *νόμος βασιλικός*, which forms the essence of the law in the O. T. economy, is stated as the summary of this N. T. *νόμος*. Taking these two points together, it follows, according to the view of the author, that, on the one hand, the Christian by means of *πίστις*, which is implanted in his mind by the word of truth, has stepped into a new relation with God (and in so far Christianity is a new creation); and, on the other hand, the

¹ Concerning the name *ἐπιστολαὶ καθολικαί*, see Introductions to the N. T. The most probable opinion is, that *καθολικός* is synonymous with *ἡλικύλιος*. The reason why 1 and 2 John are included, is that they belonged to the First Epistle, and were appended to it. See also Herzog's *Real-Encyclopädie*, article "katholische Briefe."

² Also "the mystical element" (Brückner, Gunkel) is not wanting, as appears from i. 18; but this is only indicated in a passing manner, without James further entering upon it.

chief point of Christianity consists in this, that in it such a *ποίησις* is possible, by which a man is *μακάριος*, and may be assured of future *σωτηρία* (and in so far Christianity is glorified Judaism). Hence the author can ascribe no importance to a *πίστις* which is without *ἔργα*, and hence it is natural to him to place all the importance on the *ἔργα*, that is, on the works which proceed from faith; yet he does this neither in the sense that man by his *ἔργα* is placed in this new relation to God, for it is only *in* this relation that he can do these works, nor yet in the sense that by them he can *merit* *σωτηρία* or *δικαιούσθαι* in the judgment (*ἐν τῇ κρίνεσθαι*), for James does not deny that the believer continues a sinner, and that therefore he can only be acquitted in judgment by the *mercy* of God. — The reticence on christological points is another peculiarity of this Epistle. Yet there is not wanting in it a decidedly Christian impress. This is seen in two ways: First, ethical exhortations are enforced—though not, as is often the case in other N. T. Epistles, by a reference to the specific points of Christ's salvation—by a reference both to the saving act of regeneration by the gospel, and to the advent of the Lord, so that as the foundation of the Christian ethical life subjectively considered is *πίστις*, so objectively it is the redemption of God in Christ. Secondly, the same dignity is attributed to Christ in this Epistle as in the other writings of the N. T. This is seen from the fact that the author calls himself a *δοῦλος* of God and of the *Lord* Jesus Christ. It is here to be observed that God and Christ are placed in juxtaposition, and that the same name is given to Christ as to God, namely *κύριος*, by which He is placed on an equality with God, and specifically distinguished from man. The circumstance that the author directly unites the divine judgment with the coming of the Lord, indeed designates the Lord Himself as the Judge, also points to this higher dignity of Christ. See Dörner, *Lehre von der Person Christi*, 2d ed. part I. p. 94 ff.; Kern, *Komment.* p. 40; Schmid, *Bibl. Theol.* part II. § 57. 1. Nor are christological points wanting in the Epistle; though the fact that they are more repressed than is the case elsewhere in the N. T., and that specific acts of redemption, as the incarnation of Christ, His death, His resurrection, etc., are entirely omitted,

forms a peculiarity of this Epistle which distinguishes it from all the other writings of the N. T. The view of the author is directed less to the past than to the future, as this corresponds to his design, which aimed at the practical bearing of Christianity; see i. 12, ii. 5, 14, iii. 1, v. 1, 7, 9. See on the contents of the Epistle, *Weiss, Bibl. Theol. des N. T.* pp. 196–219. — It is undeniable that there is a connection between this Epistle and Christ's Sermon on the Mount; Kern calls it a counterpart of the same, and Schmid (*Bibl. Theol.* ii. § 60) says that James had it for his model. Yet this is not to be understood as if the Sermon on the Mount, as transmitted by Matthew, was influential for the conception of this Epistle; it is not even proved that the author was acquainted with that writing; and not only do we find in each of these two writings many references which are foreign to the other, but also where they coincide there is a difference of expression in the same thoughts. The relationship consists rather in the fact that the ethical view of Christianity, as seen in the Epistle, is in perfect accordance with the thoughts expressed by Christ in the Sermon on the Mount, as well as in His other discourses, and which, before they were reduced to writing, were in their original form vividly impressed on the Church by oral tradition. Embued with the moral spirit of Christianity announced in these words of Jesus, the author of the Epistle regards Christianity chiefly as a moral life, so that even the person of Christ, in a certain measure, steps into the background; just as Christ Himself, where He treats of the ethical life, is comparatively silent with reference to His own person. The parallel passages from the Sermon on the Mount are the following: chap. i. 2, Matt. v. 10–12; chap. i. 4 (ἵνα ἡτε τέλει), Matt. v. 48; chap. i. 5, v. 15 ff., Matt. vii. 7 ff.; chap. i. 9, Matt. v. 3; chap. i. 20, Matt. v. 22; chap. ii. 13, Matt. vi. 14, 15, v. 7; chap. ii. 14 ff., Matt. vii. 21 ff.; chap. iii. 17, 18, Matt. v. 9; chap. iv. 4, Matt. vi. 24; chap. iv. 10, Matt. v. 3, 4; chap. iv. 11, Matt. vii. 1 f.; chap. v. 2, Matt. vi. 19; chap. v. 10, Matt. v. 12; chap. v. 12, Matt. v. 33 ff. There are also parallel passages from the other discourses of Jesus: chap. i. 14, Matt. xv. 19; chap. iv. 12, Matt. x. 28. Compare also the places where the rich are denounced with Luke vi. 24 ff. — But as these parallel passages do not prove

the use of the synoptical Gospels, so neither is a use of the Pauline Epistles demonstrated.¹ The few places where the author coincides with the First Epistle of Peter are to be explained from an acquaintance of Peter with this Epistle. On the other hand, it is worthy of remark that not only is there frequent reference to the expressions and historical examples of the O. T., but that the idea "of the contrast, running through the spirit of Israel, between the externally fortunate but reprobate friendship of the world, and the externally suffering but blessed friendship of God" (Reuss), pervades this Epistle. — Several passages are evidently founded on corresponding passages in the Apocrypha of the O. T.

As, on the one hand, the Epistle is a letter of comfort and exhortation for the believing brethren, so, on the other hand, it is a polemical writing; but its polemics are directed not against dogmatic errors, but ethical perversions. Only one passage, chap. ii. 14-26, appears to combat a definite doctrine, and that the doctrine of justification of the Apostle Paul. But whatever view may be taken of this, the polemics are here introduced for the sake of ethical Christian life, namely, only with the object of showing that Christians are not indolently to trust to a *πίστις* without works, but are to prove a living faith by good works, so that the proposition *ἐξ ἔργων δικαιούται ἄνθρωπος, καὶ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνον* is by no means employed to confute the Pauline principle, *οὐ δικαιούται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, in the application in which Paul made the assertion. Here, then, as everywhere, we see that the author is a man whose attention is entirely directed to practical life, and who both for himself and for others has in view, as the aim of all striving, a *τελειότης* which consists in the perfect agreement of the life with the divine will, which the law in itself was incapable of producing, but which to the Christian is rendered possible, because God, according to His will, has by faith implanted His law as an inner principle of life, and therefore is to be aimed at with all earnestness.

In recent times, the peculiar tendency of this Epistle has often been designated as that of a Jewish Christianity. It is

¹ Incorrectly, Hengstenberg thinks that chap. i. 2, 3 refers to Rom. v. 3; chap. i. 25, ii. 12, to Gal. iv. 5; and chap. i. 22 to Rom. ii. 13.

true that there is not the slightest trace of an agreement with the view expressed in Acts xv. 1 : *ἐὰν μὴ περιτέμνησθε τῷ ἔθει Μωϋσέως, οὐ δύνασθε σωθῆναι*; neither is circumcision, nor the ritual observances of the Mosaic law, anywhere mentioned; but the supposition of the unity of the Old and New Testament law which lies at the foundation of the Epistle, as well as the peculiar importance assigned to *ποιήσις τοῦ ἔργου*, with the reticence on the christological points of salvation, point certainly to a Jewish-Christian author, who occupies a different position to the law from that of the Apostle Paul. So far, there is nothing to object to in this designation; only it must not be forgotten that, apart from the heretical forms into which Jewish Christianity degenerated, it might assume, and did assume, special forms different from that presented in this Epistle. If, in later Jewish-Christian literature, there are many traces of a relationship with the tendency of this Epistle, yet there is to be recognised in this fact not less the definite influence of the person of the author than its Jewish-Christian spirit.

As regards the *style and form of expression*, the language is not only fresh and vivid, the immediate outflow of a deep and earnest spirit, but at the same time sententious and rich in graphic figure. Gnome follows after gnome, and the discourse hastens from one similitude to another: so that the diction often passes into the poetical, and in some parts is like that of the O. T. prophets. We do not find logical connection, like that in St. Paul; but the thoughts arrange themselves in single groups, which are strongly marked off from one another. We everywhere see that the author has his object clearly in sight, and puts it forth with graphic concreteness. "As mild language is suited to tender feeling, so strong feelings produce strong language. Especially, the style acquires emphasis and majesty by the climax of thoughts and words ever regularly and rhetorically arrived at, and by the constantly occurring antithesis," Kern (*Commentary*, p. 37 f.). — Also the mode of representation in the Epistle is peculiar: "The writer ever goes at once *in res medias*; and with the first sentence which begins a section (usually an interrogative or imperative one), says out at once, fully and entirely, that which he has in his heart; so that in almost every case the first words of each

section might serve as a title for it. The further development of the thought, then, is regressive, explaining and grounding the preceding sentence, and concludes with a comprehensive sentence, recapitulating that with which he began" (Wiesinger).

SEC. 4.—THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE EPISTLE.

According to the inscription, the Epistle is written by James, who styles himself *δοῦλος* of God and of the Lord Jesus Christ; but this designation is neither in favour of nor against the apostolate of the author. Still it is evident from the whole contents of the Epistle, addressed to the Jewish-Christian churches of the Diaspora, that no other James is meant than "the brother of the Lord," who is not identical with the Apostle James (see sec. 1). Eusebius expresses himself uncertainly concerning its authenticity; he reckons it among the *Antilegomena* (*Hist. Eccl.* iii. 25), and says of it: *ιστέον ὡς νοθεύεται μὲν*, that not many of the ancients have mentioned it, but that nevertheless it is publicly read in most of the churches (*Hist. Eccl.* ii. 23). Of the ancient Fathers, Origen¹ is the first who expressly cites it (tom. xix. in *Joan.*: *ὡς ἐν τῇ φερομένῃ Ἰακώβου ἐπιστολῇ ἀνέγνωμεν*); in the Latin version of Rufinus, passages are often quoted from the Epistle as the words of the Apostle James (ed. de la Rue, vol. ii. Hom. viii. in *Exod.* p. 158: "sed et Apostolus Jacobus dicit;" comp. pp. 139, 191, 644, 671, 815). The Epistle is not mentioned in the writings of Clemens Alexandrinus, Irenaeus, and Tertullian; yet, according to Eusebius (*Hist. Eccl.* vi. 14), it was known and commented on by Clemens Alexandrinus. Dionysius Alexandrinus expressly mentions it; and Jerome (*Catalog.* c. iii.) directly calls James, the Lord's brother, the author of the Epistle, yet with the remark: *quae et ipsa ab alio quodam sub nomine ejus edita asseritur*. It is of special importance that this Epistle is found in the old Syriac version, the Peshito, in which are wanting the four smaller Catholic Epistles and the Apocalypse. Guericke (*Eintl.* p. 442) with truth remarks: "that this testimony is of the greater importance, as the country from which the Peshito proceeded closely bordered on that from which the Epistle originated, and as that testimony

was also repeated and believed in by the Syriac Church of the following age." The early existence of the Epistle appears by many similarities to single passages in the earliest writings. The agreement which subsists between some passages of First Peter and this Epistle is undeniable; compare 1 Pet. i. 6, 7 with Jas. i. 2, 3; 1 Pet. ii. 1 with Jas. i. 21; 1 Pet. iv. 8 with Jas. v. 20, and 1 Pet. v. 5-9 with Jas. iv. 6, 7, 10. (See author's *Comm. on First Peter*, Introd. sec. 2.) That Clemens Romanus, in his *Epist. ad Corinth.* chap. x. xii. xvii. xxxviii., alludes to corresponding passages in this Epistle, is not so certain as Kern (in his Commentary), Guericke, Wiesinger, and others assume; for that Clemens in chap. x. adduces, among the pious men of the Old Testament, Abraham, referring to Gen. xv. 6, is not surprising; also the words *ὁ φίλος προσεγορευθείς* do not prove an acquaintance with the Epistle, as Abraham was already so called by Philo; his offering of Isaac is indeed mentioned, but not as an *ἔργον*, on account of which he was justified. Similarly with reference to the mention of Rahab, of whom it is said in chap. xii.: *διὰ πίστιν καὶ φιλοξενίαν ἐσώθη 'Ραάβ, ἡ πόρνη*, whereupon follows the history.¹ Still less is the connection between chap. xvii. and Jas. v. 10, 11. It seems more certain that Jas. iii. 13 lies at the foundation of the words in chap. xxxviii.: *ὁ σοφὸς ἐνδεικνύσθω τὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῦ μὴ ἐν λόγοις ἀλλ' ἐν ἔργοις ἀγαθοῖς*. Some similarities to the Epistle likewise occur in Hermas; thus III. *simil.* 8: *nomen ejus negaverunt, quod super eos erat invocatum* (comp. Jas. ii. 7); yet here the discourse is not concerning the rich and an invective upon them. Further, the passages II. *mand.* xii. 5: *ἐὰν οὖν ἀντιστῇς αὐτὸν (τὸν διάβολον), νικηθεὶς φεύγεται* (comp. Jas. iv. 7); and II. *mand.* xii. 6: *φοβήθητι τὸν κύριον, τὸν δυνάμενον σῶσαι καὶ ἀπολέσαι* (comp. Jas. iv. 12). Of greater importance than this coincidence in single expressions is the fact that, with Hermas, a view generally predominates which agrees in many respects with that of the Epistle; Christianity is also with him mostly considered in its ethical sense; the christological points step into the back-

¹ Even Guericke admits that this passage of the example of Rahab, according to its actual contents, is a reminiscence rather of Heb. xi. 31 than of Jas. ii. 25. But it is possible that Clemens had neither the one passage nor the other in view.

ground; the distinction of rich and poor is strongly emphasized; and in the exhortation to prayer, *πίστις* is expressly insisted on, and *διψυχία* (II. *mand.* 9) is warned against; so that an acquaintance of the author of this writing with the Epistle can scarcely be denied. Also the Clementine Homilies, apart from their speculative contents, exhibit an acquaintance with the tendency of this Epistle. Kern has collected a great number of parallel passages, yet it cannot be denied that in individual cases both the connection and the expression of thought are different. In Irenaeus (*adv. haer.* iv. 16. 2) the union of the words: *Abraham credidit Deo et reputatum est illi ad justitiam*, with those which directly follow: *et amicus Dei vocatus est*, points to Jas. ii. 23; also, in Clemens Alex. *Strom.* vi. p. 696, ed. Sylb., a similarity to Jas. ii. 8 can scarcely be denied; whilst the designation of Abraham in Tertullian (*adv. Judaeos*, cap. 2) as *amicus Dei*, proves nothing. Cyrill of Jerusalem (*Catech.* iv. c. 33) reckons all the seven Catholic Epistles among the canonical writings; and since his time the Epistle has been unhesitatingly reckoned an apostolic writing belonging to the canon.¹

According to the above data, a certain dubiety undoubtedly prevailed in tradition, which, however, proves nothing against the authenticity, as it is easily accounted for from the peculiar nature of the Epistle. For, on the one hand, James the Lord's brother had, it is true, obtained an apostolic importance, so that Paul numbered him among the pillars of the church; yet he was not an apostle, and the more closely the Jewish-Christian churches attached themselves to him, so the more estranged must he have become to the other churches; and, on the other hand, the Epistle was directed *only* to the Jewish-Christian churches, and the more these, by holding to the original type, distinguished and separated themselves from the other churches, the more difficult must it have been to regard an epistle directed to them as the common property of the church, especially as it appeared to contain a contradiction to the doctrine of the Apostle Paul. These circumstances, as Thiersch (*Krit.* p. 359 f.) and Wiesinger have rightly remarked, would hinder the universal recognition of the Epistle; but the

¹ Only Theodorus Mopsuestius is said to have rejected it, according to the statement of Leontius Bysantius (*contra Nest. et Eut.* iii. 14).

more this was the case, so much the more valuable are those testimonies of antiquity, although isolated, in favour of its genuineness.

Whilst, in the Middle Ages, the canonicity of the Epistle was not questioned, in the sixteenth century objections to it of various kinds were advanced. It is well known that Luther did not regard the Epistle as apostolical. In his preface to it (1522) he thus expresses his opinion: "In my opinion, it was some good pious man who got hold of and put on paper some sayings of the disciples of the apostles, or perhaps another has made notes from his preaching." In the preface to the N. T. (1522) he calls the Epistle, compared with the *best* books of the N. T. (which he names as the Gospel and First Epistle of John, the Pauline Epistles, particularly the Romans, the Galatians and the Ephesians, and First Peter), "a right strawy Epistle, for it has in it no true evangelical character." In his sermons on the Epistles of Peter (1523), Luther says that one may discern that the Epistle of James is "no genuine apostolical epistle;" and in his *Kirchenpostille* (delivered in the summers of 1527 and 1528), he again says that it "was neither written by an apostle, nor has it the true apostolic ring, nor does it agree with the pure doctrine" (Luther's *Works*, edited by Plochmann, vol. VIII. p. 268). So also, in a sermon on the day of Epiphany, he says, "James and Jude many think are not writings of the apostles." The reasons with which Luther supports his depreciatory judgment of the Epistle, and which he gives in his preface to it, are the following:—(1) That it "proclaims the righteousness of works, in flat contradiction to Paul and all other scripture;" it is true "a gloss (or explanation) of such righteousness of works may be found; but that the Epistle adduces the saying of Moses (Rom. iv. 3), which speaks only of Abraham's faith and not of his works, in favour of works, cannot be defended." (2) That it "makes no mention of the sufferings, the resurrection, and the Spirit of Christ." Besides, he objects to the Epistle, that this James does nothing more than urge men to the law and its works, and "confusedly passes from one subject to another."¹

¹ Also in the *Table-Talk* (Plochmann's edition, vol. LXII. p. 127) the same opinion is expressed: "Many have endeavoured and laboured to reconcile the Epistle of James with Paul. Philip Melancthon refers to it in his *Apology*, but

Assuming that some passages are borrowed from First Peter, and that chap. iv. 5 is from Gal. v. 17, he comes to the conclusion, that as James was put to death by Herod before Peter, he could not be the author of the Epistle, but that the real author must have lived long after Peter and Paul¹ — With the opinion of Luther agree the *Magdeburgh Centuries*, Hunnius, Althamer, and others; and also Wetstein.² On the other hand, with evident reference to this opinion, Calvin defends the Epistle; in his introduction to his commentary he says: Quia nullam ejus (epistolae) repudiandae satis justam causam video, libenter eam sine controversia amplector; he repudiates the assertion that the Epistle contradicts the Apostle Paul; against the reason: quod parcior in praedicanda Christi gratia videtur, quam apostolo conveniat, he asserts: non est ab omnibus exigendum, ut idem argumentum tractent; and he then gives his own judgment: Nihil continet Christi apostolo indignum; multiplici vero doctrina scatet, ejus utilitas ad omnes Christianae vitae partes late patet. On the other hand, the Epistle did not remain unattacked even in the Catholic Church; not only Erasmus, but also Cajetan (on account of the unapostolic salutation, chap. i. 1), expressed doubts of its apostolic origin. But neither these doubts nor the attacks of Luther deprived the Epistle of its ecclesiastical authority; on the contrary, it was regarded in the Protestant not less than in the Catholic Church, as the work of the Apostle James

not with earnestness; for 'faith justifies' and 'faith does not justify' are plain contradictions. Whoever can reconcile them, on him will I put on my cap (*Barett*), and allow him to call me a fool." This saying, as well as the expression in the *Kirchenpostille*, proves that Luther, even in his later years, continued firm to the opinion expressed in his preface to the Epistle of 1522, and in his preface to the N. T. of the same year, although in the later editions of the N. T. the whole conclusion, in which he treats of the distinction between the books of the N. T., is omitted (see Flochmann, vol. LXIII. p. 114).

¹ This opinion of Luther, that the supposed author is James the son of Zebedee, is surprising, as in the tradition of the church of his own and of the preceding time, not James the son of Zebedee, but James the son of Alphaeus, was regarded as the author; yet in some mss. of the Peshito it is ascribed to the former.

² Wetstein's opinion is as follows: Meam sententiam nemini obtrudam, tantum dicam, me epistolam Jacobi non existimare esse scriptum apostolicum, ob hanc rationem: primo, quia directe contra Paulum et omnem scripturam operibus justificationem tribuit; denique, Jacobus ipsa ita confundit omnia ac permiscet, ut mihi vir bonus aliquis ac simplex fuisse videatur, qui arreptis quibusdam dictis discipulorum apostolicorum ea in chartam coniecerit.

the Younger, who was considered as identical with "the Lord's brother." — Afterwards Faber (*Observatt. in Ep. Jac.*, Coburg 1770), Bolten (*Uebers. der neut. Briefe*), Schmidt (*Einl. ins N. T.*), and Bertholdt advanced the untenable opinion, that the Epistle of James was originally written in Aramaic, and afterwards translated by another into Greek; de Wette, in his Introduction to the New Testament, asserted that the composition of this Epistle by the Lord's brother—whom he also regarded as the same with James the son of Alphaeus—was doubtful. De Wette advances the following reasons for his doubts:—(1) That we cannot see what should have induced James to write to all the Jewish Christians in the world; (2) that the *misplaced* contradiction to Paul seems unworthy of James; (3) that if ii. 25 is to be regarded as a reference to Heb. xi. 31, this would betray an author of a later day; and (4) lastly, that it is incomprehensible that James should have attained to such a use of the Greek language. If de Wette at a later period somewhat modified his opinion, still he remained true to his doubts, which he did not deny even in his *exeget. Handbuch*. Against these reasons it is to be observed,—1. The occasion of the writing is clearly to be recognised from the Epistle itself, namely, the ethical faults in the churches referred to; that only the Jewish Christians in Palestine had separate churches for themselves, is an unfounded assumption of de Wette. 2. The opinion of a contradiction to Paul is destitute of all sure exegetical reasons; see explanation of ii. 1-4 ff. 3. It cannot be proved that the example of Rahab is taken from the Epistle to the Hebrews. 4. It cannot be perceived why James should be less skilled in the Greek language than must be assumed from this Epistle. — When de Wette in his *exeget. Handbuch* thinks that the author has appropriated to himself from Paul (out of his Epistles) the free moral spirit, but not his contemplative believing view, and that it is very doubtful whether he ever *reached* such a standpoint, it is to be observed that such subjective suppositions form no sure basis for criticism. — Schleiermacher (in his *Introduction to the N. T.*, edited by Wolde) judges of the Epistle even more unfavourably than de Wette. He not only agrees with Luther that the author "is confused," and is destitute "of the true evangelical character," but he also

objects that the transitions are "either ornate and artificial, or awkward;" that the artificial character of the diction shows that the author was a stranger to the Greek language; that much therein is bombast. Schleiermacher, indeed, acknowledges that the Epistle is addressed to Jewish Christians, that possibly, in the section ii. 14-26, "no reference to the Pauline theory lies at the foundation;" that, if the writing is to be placed in the canonical period of the apostolic writings, it must be put at an early period, as there is no reference to the relation between the Jewish and the Gentile Christians; that it indicates a view of Christianity out of which afterwards Ebionite Christianity may have arisen. But, on the other hand, in opposition to these admissions, Schleiermacher thinks that if the Epistle belongs to the early period, it could not have been addressed to churches outside of Palestine; that we would expect it to have been written in Aramaic; that, considering the idea of Christianity which predominates in it (namely, that it is the fullest development of monotheism), we can with difficulty imagine that "this James was the same person who was the immediate disciple of Christ and the apostles, who afterwards became bishop of Jerusalem, and was so earnest (?) for the diffusion of Christianity among the Gentiles." — Finally, Schleiermacher arrives at the conclusion that the Epistle is a later production and fabrication, *i.e.* not founded on fact, and not intended by its author for any particular circle of readers. The explanation of the origin and composition of the Epistle which he most favoured was, that "some one wrote it in the name of the Palestinian apostle James, and collected reminiscences from his discourses not in the happiest manner, and in a language which was not familiar to him." This criticism wants a sure ground to rest upon, as much as the criticism of de Wette. — Also the recent Tübingen school, in conformity with their view of the development of Christianity, have denied the authenticity of the Epistle. They place its origin in the period when the two antagonistic principles of Jewish Christianity and Paulinism already began to be reconciled, in order to be united together in Catholicism. Baur, both in his *Paulus* (p. 677 ff.) and in his *Christenthum der 3 ersten Jahrhunderte* (p. 96 f.), has attempted to prove that the Epistle belongs to a period when Jewish Christianity had already

made an important concession in relinquishing the necessity of circumcision to Gentile Christianity, and that it proves itself to be a product of the post-Pauline period, in that it opposes *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐξ ἔργων* to the Pauline *δικαιοῦσθαι ἐκ πίστεως*, but, on the other hand, does not deny the influence of Paulinism; for, in accordance with the Pauline idea of making the law an inward thing, "it not only speaks of the commandment of love as a royal law, but also speaks of a law of liberty." — Schwegler (*das nachapost. Zeitalter*, vol. I. p. 413 ff.) has attempted to justify this view of Baur by an examination of particulars. The following are the reasons which he assigns for the composition of the Epistle in the *post-apostolic* period:—1. Its want of individuality; 2. The want of acquaintance of Christian antiquity with it, and its late recognition as a canonical writing; 3. The form of a mild Ebionitism which pervades it; 4. The internal congregational relations presupposed; 5. Its acquaintance with the Pauline Epistles, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Gospel of the Hebrews. The *Ebionitical* character of the Epistle is proved—(1) from the name of James attached to it; (2) from the designation of the readers as the *δώδεκα φυλαὶ κ.τ.λ.*, by which not the Jewish-Christian churches, but entire Christianity is meant; (3) from the retention of the old Jewish name *συναγωγή* instead of *ἐκκλησία*; (4) from the statement of the Christian life as the fulfilling of the law, united with reticence upon the doctrine of the person of Christ; (5) from the relation of the Epistle to the *Shepherd* of Hermas and the *Clementine Homilies*; (6) from the use of the Apocrypha; (7) from the polemic against the Pauline doctrine of justification; and (8) lastly, from the antagonism to the Gentile Christians, who under the name *πλούσιοι* are put in opposition to the Jewish Christians, *i.e.* to the *πτωχοῖς*. The conciliating tendency seeking an adjustment of the antagonism is alleged to be manifest—(1) from the antagonism of the rich and the poor being discussed with the design of paving the way for an approximation of these parties by influencing the former (the Gentile Christians, regarded as the rich) (!), and by bringing about a change of sentiment in them (toward the Jewish Christians, regarded as the poor); (2) from there being found in the Epistle a doctrinal approximation to the Pauline ideas

and principles, particularly in the idea of the law as νόμος ἐλευθερίας, of Christianity as a new creation, of πίστις as "an internal and confident apprehension of the doctrine of salvation," and even in the matter of justification itself; whilst to the Pauline doctrine is not plainly opposed the δικαίωσις ἐξ ἔργων, but the δικαίωσις ἐξ ἔργων, οἷς ἡ πίστις συνεργεῖ, or the δικαίωσις ἐκ πίστεως, ἣ τελειοῦται διὰ τῶν ἔργων; and (3) from the fact that by the words: σὺ πιστεύεις, ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς εἰς ἐστὶ καλῶς ποιεῖς, the agreement of the Gentile-Christian and the Jewish-Christian tendencies in this principal and fundamental doctrine of Christianity is prominently brought forward. Schwegler has evidently most carefully searched out and employed all those points which can in any way be made to support his hypothesis; but it is perfectly clear that many of the points adduced by him are pure fictions, and that from others the most arbitrary inferences are drawn. The result is a view which is manifestly self-contradictory. Whilst Schwegler adopts the fancy that by the "rich" are meant the Gentile Christians, he subjoins to this the inference that the *Gentile-Christian* cause (i.e. the cause of the πλούσιοι) represents itself to the Ebionitic writer as "a proud conceit of wisdom," as "loquacious controversy," as "the love of the world and its lusts, covetousness, insolence, uncharitableness," as "a false and perverted tendency," and that "to attack on all sides these tendencies in their forms, disguises, and appearances is the object of the Epistle;" but in spite of this, he says at the conclusion of the inquiry: "Thus, then, it is with a call to εἰρήνη that the author turns himself to the opposite Gentile-Christian faction, such is the watchword and leading practical thought of his Epistle." The most glaring internal contradiction of such a criticism would not hinder us from placing the most arbitrary fiction in the place of history.¹ Ritschl (*d. Entst. der altkathol. Kirche*, p. 150 ff.) occupies a

¹ Reuss (§ 146, note) correctly observes: The character of the Epistle given by the Tübingen criticism goes beyond every sure reason, when it places it far back into the second century, and makes it grow from recent sources. That the πλούσιοι are the Pauline Christians, is a postulate of this criticism for which there is no proof. The numerous references to the Pauline Epistles, the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Gospel of the Hebrews, Hermas, Philo, exist only in the imagination of the critic, and cause the extreme simplicity and originality of this Epistle to be overlooked.

different position with reference to the Epistle than Schwegeler. He asserts expressly that the similarities and points of contact between the Epistle and the *Clementine Homilies* are too vague to declare that, on account of them, the Epistle must be regarded as post-apostolic, or that a continuity of design in these writings can be discerned. He considers, indeed, that the Epistle belongs to the Jewish-Christian tendency, particularly on account of its polemic against the Pauline doctrine of justification; but it is a matter of surprise to him that there is in it no reference to the principles according to which the intercourse of Jewish with Gentile Christians was arranged (namely, the compliance of the latter with the four prohibitions expressed in the decree of Jerusalem), and also that the view of the Epistle is pervaded by an element essentially Pauline (namely, by the idea of the new birth; but which is understood, in a manner entirely original, as an implantation of the law). Thus Ritschl is constrained to confess that the Epistle, viewed on every side, remains as a riddle in the development of the *oldest* Christianity. This unsatisfactory result points to the incorrectness of his suppositions. Ritschl does not only over-estimate the importance of the decree of Jerusalem in the view of James (he likewise overlooks the fact that James, in an Epistle addressed to *Jewish Christians*, had no occasion to refer to the necessity of keeping to the articles of that decree), but he is also wrong in deriving the ideas of the law and regeneration, contained in this Epistle, from Paul: as if these ideas were not contained in Christianity itself. Ritschl also, as Schwegeler, maintains that chap. ii. 14–26 is not designed to combat a perversion of Paul's doctrine; and in this he is correct; but he assumes too hastily that the polemic is directed against Paul. Ritschl's judgment on the Epistle contains the correct decision, that the reasons adduced by Schwegeler do not contradict its authenticity. Kern had already, in a treatise in the year 1835 (*Tübinger Zeitschr.*), partially adduced the same arguments against the authenticity; but at a later period he regarded them as unsatisfactory, and asserted this in his commentary in the year 1838—of which fact Schwegeler, who often appeals to him, takes not the slightest notice. After a careful review of the historical relations, Kern, in his commentary, says not only that the Epistle bears

internal evidence that it originated rather in the apostolic age than in any other period, but also that he cannot but consider it as the production of him to whom it is ascribed in the inscription—of James the Lord's brother, who is called, along with Peter and John, a pillar of the church, and under whose superintendence the church of Jerusalem was placed. Kern arrived at this conclusion even although he regarded ii. 14-16 as a direct attack upon the Pauline doctrine of justification. But this opinion is at variance with the authenticity of the Epistle. For how can it be supposed that James—after he had declared himself on the side of Paul in the transaction at Jerusalem (Acts xv.), or, if the narrative of Luke regarding that transaction cannot be reckoned as true, after he had given to Paul the right hand of *κοινωνία* (Gal. ii. 9¹)—could have argued, not against an objectionable application of the doctrine of Paul, but against that doctrine itself? Add to this, that such an attack, in a writing devoted to Jewish Christians, was certainly not necessary in their case. It is true Kern thinks that "James might consider it possible that his Epistle might come into the hands of Gentile Christians, with whom the Jewish Christians were at variance upon the doctrine;" but this is a mere arbitrary hypothesis: in the Epistle there is not the slightest indication that the author, in ii. 14, addresses others than those to whom he directed his Epistle. But if the polemic of the Epistle is not directed against the Pauline doctrine of justification, there are no reasons, either external or internal, which constrain us to deny that James was the author, and to consider it as the production of a later period. The late recognition of the Epistle, as has already been remarked, is sufficiently explained from the position of the author and his readers: the want of personal references; from the encyclical form of the Epistle; the frequent references to the Old Testament and to examples there represented, as well as to the Apocrypha; from the individuality of James; and, lastly, the facility in the use of the Greek language from the acquaint-

¹ Meyer, *in loco*, with truth observes: "According to the representation of vv. 7-9, the apostles recognised the twofold *divine call to apostleship*; but a merely external and forced agreement, *without any acknowledgment of the principles of Paul*, would have been as little compatible with such a recognition as with the apostolic character generally."

ance with the Hellenistic idiom which prevailed in Palestine. The organization of the Church does not here appear such as was only appropriate to a later period; if Paul, in his first missionary journey, made it a point to establish the office of presbyters in the then existing Gentile churches (Acts xiv. 23), and if, at a still earlier period, such an office was formed at Jerusalem (Acts xi. 30), its existence in the Jewish-Christian churches, to which the Epistle is directed, cannot certainly be regarded as anything surprising; and the function which is here attributed to the presbyters entirely corresponds to the relation in which they stood to individual members of the church. The opinion that chap. ii. 15 refers to the Epistle to the Hebrews, and chap. v. 12 to the Gospel of the Hebrews,¹ is anything but certain; and as little is a use of the Epistle to the Romans made out from chap. i. 2 (compared with Rom. v. 3), chap. i. 18 (compared with Rom. viii. 23), chap. i. 21 (compared with Rom. xiii. 12), chap. i. 22 (compared with Rom. ii. 13), chap. iv. 1 (compared with Rom. vii. 23), chap. iv. 4 (compared with Rom. viii. 7), chap. iv. 12 (compared with Rom. ii. 1), for the agreement is found here only in single expressions, which would as naturally present themselves to James as to Paul (comp. Brückner in de Wette's *Commentary*, p. 188 f.). It may certainly appear surprising, that in the Epistle the permanent importance for the readers of the Mosaic law, according to its ritual side, is not prominently brought forward, especially as James was such a careful observer of it; but this objection is completely removed when we consider that no doubt of that importance was supposed to exist among the readers. James here proceeds in the same manner as Christ, who, although He Himself observed the law of His nation, yet did not inculcate on His disciples so much the observance of its separate ritual enactments, as point out to them the way by which the law was observed in its innermost nature. Thus, then, there is no reason in the Epistle to assign its origin to the post-apostolic age, or to ascribe it to another

¹ In the Gospel of the Hebrews (see *Clement. Hom.* iii. 55, xix. 2) the prohibition of oaths is as follows: ἴστω ὑμῶν τὸ ναὶ ναὶ, καὶ τὸ οὐ οὐ· τὸ γὰρ περισσὸν τούτων ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ ἴσται; the second clause is in accordance with Matt. v. 37, the first with Luke v. 12. But this only indicates a different form of expression in the tradition, not the use of a written record.

author than to him who is named in the superscription. Reuss (sec. 146) with truth observes: "His official importance gave to James the right to come forward as the common leader of all the Christians of the circumcision; and what we know or conjecture of his religious disposition is strikingly in unison with the contents of this Epistle."

The authenticity of the Epistle, in spite of the supposition of a difference between the doctrine of justification of James and that of Paul, has in recent times been generally recognised.¹ Reuss, indeed, expresses himself very cautiously, that the genuineness of the Epistle is not raised above all doubt because a definite ecclesiastical tradition does not exist; however, he grants that nothing can be inferred from this against its authenticity. Other critics and interpreters have, however, expressed themselves more decidedly in favour of the authenticity of the Epistle, agreeing with one another that the authorship is to be ascribed to James, "the Lord's brother," who stood at the head of the Church of Jerusalem, and only differing in this, whether he is *identical with* (so Hottinger, Schneckenburger, Theile, Guericke, Lange, Bouman, and others) or *different from* the Apostle James (so Credner, Kern, Neander, Thiersch, Schaff, Brückner, Wiesinger, Bleek, and others). — The *integrity* of the Epistle in its separate portions has never been doubted; only Rauch (Wiener and Engelhardt's *neues krit. Journal der theolog. Lit.* 1827, vol. VI. part 3) has thought that the conclusion, chap. v. 12–20, proceeds from another author; but the reasons which he assigns for this have already been refuted by Schneckenburger (*Tüb. Zeitsch. f. Theol.* 1829, part 3), Kern (in his *Kommentar*), Hagenbach (Winer's *krit. Journ.* VI. 395 ff.), and Theile.

¹ For the same reasons as those of Luther, the authenticity of the Epistle is denied by K. Ströbel. In the *Zeitschr. f. d. luth. Theol.* of Rudelbach and Guericke, 1857, part II. p. 365, he says: "Let the Epistle of James be understood as you please, it is ever in contradiction to the whole sacred Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, and therefore cannot be reckoned of canonical authority; with its well-meaning but otherwise completely unknown author, identical with none of the names of the N. T. persons, the capacity of teaching falls short of his good intention." So also, in a review of this commentary (1st edition) in the same magazine, 1860, part I. p. 162 ff., Kahnis (*d. luth. Dogmatik*, vol. I. pp. 533–536) agrees with the opinion of Luther on the contents of this Epistle, but does not express himself on its authenticity.

SEC. 5.—PLACE AND TIME OF WRITING.

The *place* of composition is not mentioned in the Epistle; but from the position which James occupied to the Church of Jerusalem, and from the fact that he has addressed his Epistle to the churches in the *diaspora*, it cannot be doubted that this is Jerusalem. The supposition of Schwegeler, that the actual place of composition was Rome, requires no refutation. It is more difficult to determine the *time* of composition. It is only certain that it must have been before the destruction of Jerusalem; but it is a matter of dispute whether it was written before or after the ever-memorable labours of Paul among the Gentiles, or, more precisely, whether it was written before or after the council at Jerusalem recorded in Acts xv.¹ If there is in the Epistle a reference to the Pauline doctrine of justification,—whether the attack be directed against the doctrine itself, or a perversion of it,—then it could only be written after that transaction, as Bleek, among others, assumes. But on the other supposition, both opinions are possible. Schneckenburger, Theile, Neander, Thiersch, Hofmann, Schaff suppose it to be composed *before*, and Schmid and Wiesinger *after* the council at Jerusalem.²—The former opinion is the more probable; for after that time the Pauline proposition, that man is justified not ἐξ ἔργων, but only ἐκ πίστεως, was not only generally known, but so powerfully moved the spirits in Christendom, that it seems impossible to suppose that James could have in perfect ingenuousness asserted his principle: ἐξ ἔργων δικαιούται ἄνθρωπος, καὶ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως κόνου, without putting himself in a definite relation to the doctrine of Paul, whether misunderstood or not. Wiesinger, for the later composition of the Epistle, appeals “to the form of the Christian

¹ Lange infers from the political circumstances which, according to his view, were the occasion of this Epistle, that it was composed “at the latest period of the life of James, perhaps about the year 62.” For one who calls in question the supposition of Lange, this statement of time is destitute of all reason.

² Brückner, indeed, denying the assigned polemics, but supposing that the formulæ δικαιῶσθαι ἐκ πίστεως, δικ. ἐξ ἔργων were first brought into vogue by Paul, and then were used of an earlier existing habit of thought, which James combats, comes to the conclusion that the Epistle indeed belongs to a comparatively early period of the apostolic age, but is not to be transferred to the earliest period of apostolic life.

life of the readers," whilst, on the one hand, they are treated "as those who are mature in doctrine," and, on the other hand, "the faults censured in their conduct are such as can only be understood on the supposition of a lengthened continuance of Christianity among the readers." But, in opposition to this view, it is to be observed that a Christian church without such *maturity* as is indicated in i. 3, ii. 5, iii. 1, iv. 1, can hardly be imagined; and that in Jewish-Christian churches such faults as are here represented in the Epistle would arise at an early period from the unsubdued Jewish carnal disposition, especially as the transition to Christianity, particularly among the Jews, might easily occur without any actual internal transformation. The inquiry of Wiesinger: Where, outside of Palestine, before the apostolic council, shall we look for the Jewish-Christian churches which will satisfy the postulates of the Epistle? is of less importance, as it cannot be proved that Wiesinger is correct in his undemonstrated assertion, "that the Jewish-Christian church, precisely in the ten years after that council, both inside and outside of Jerusalem, obtained a *great accession* to their numbers." That during this period it extended its limits is certainly to be granted, but it cannot be proved that at that period it first gained such an extension that James could only then write to *ταῖς δώδεκα φυλαῖς ταῖς ἐν τῇ διασπορῇ*. On Wiesinger's view, that James was acquainted with the Epistle to the Romans, but wrote ii. 14–26 without reference to the doctrine of Paul, James must bear the reproach of having at least acted very inconsiderately in using the Pauline mode of expression *known to him*, and in enunciating propositions which in form expressed the opposite of what Paul taught, with the design of saying something which had no reference to Paulinism, which contained neither an antithesis against it nor an agreement with it, and which was directed neither against Paul himself nor against Paul misunderstood. If the reasons assigned by Wiesinger for the later composition of the Epistle were convincing,—if, particularly, an acquaintance of James with Paul's mode of thought and expression, and especially of his doctrine of justification, followed from the points of similarity to the Epistle to the Romans, or from chap. ii. 14–26,—it would result from this, that James in his polemics had this in view, and that thus Wiesinger's denial

of any reference to it is unjustifiable. If, then, we are not to involve ourselves in contradiction, we must in this denial maintain that the Epistle was composed before the apostolic council; and to this view nothing in the Epistle stands opposed.

Ἰακώβου ἐπιστολή.

IN several codd. the superscription is more fully expressed, whilst to ἐπιστολή the word καθολική is added, and to Ἰακώβου the words τοῦ ἀποστόλου, also τοῦ ἁγίου ἀποστόλου, and in one τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ Θεοῦ.

CHAPTER I.

Ver. 3. Instead of *Rec.* τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως, after A B* C G K \aleph , etc., several vss. (Lachm. Tisch. 7), Buttm. reads, after B** some min. etc., τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν without τῆς πίστεως. The addition τῆς πίστεως, it is true, is suspicious, as it may be derived from 1 Pet. i. 7 (de Wette), but the testimonies for its genuineness are too important to declare it spurious. — Instead of δοκίμιον there is also the reading δοκιμετῶν, and in three min. δοκίμων. — Ver. 7. Instead of ὁ ἄνθρωπος, Buttm. reads simply ἄνθρωπος, a reading which Tisch. 7 leaves entirely unnoticed. — The same is also the case in respect of ἀδελφός, ver. 9; \aleph has the article in both places. — Ver. 11. B omits after προσώπου the demonstrative αὐτοῦ. — Instead of πορείαις, A, 40, 89, 98, ed. Colinaei, read πορίαίς, a reading on which Theile rightly remarks: familiari librariis τοῦ εἰ et permutationi debetur; there is no word πορία = ἐμπορία in the Greek language. Codex 30 apud Mill. reads ἐμπορίαίς evidently as an interpretation. The conjecture: ἐμπορίαίς, which has been proposed by Hammond, Castalio, and Junius, is arbitrary. — Ver. 12. Instead of ἀνὴρ, A, some min. and vss. read ἄνθρωπος; an unnecessary change. — After ἐπηγγέειλατο the *Rec.* has ὁ κύριος, after G K, etc. (instead of which some min. and vss. read ὁ Θεός; C: κύριος), which, however, after A B \aleph , etc., is to be regarded as an insertion (Lachm. Tisch. de Wette, Wiesinger; on the other hand, Theile, Reiche, Bouman, Lange consider ὁ κύριος as the correct reading). — Ver. 13. \aleph alone reads ἐπὶ instead of ἀπὸ. — The article τοῦ before Θεοῦ is, according to almost all authorities, to be obliterated as spurious. — Ver. 19. Instead of the *Rec.* ὥστε, after G K, several min. and vss., B C (\aleph : ἵστω, corrected ἵστε), several min. Vulg. and other vss. read ἵστε: A: ἵστε ὅς; Lachm. has adopted the reading ἵστε; Tisch. now

(7) reads ὥστε; whilst Theile, Lange (ἵστε δέ) consider the reading ἵστε as the original, de Wette, Wiesinger, Reiche, Bouman have rejected it from internal reasons; as, however, on a careful consideration (see exposition), no internal reasons exist *against* its genuineness, and the external testimonies are *for* it, it merits the preference. — Instead of ἵστω, *Rec.*, after G K, etc. (Tisch. 7) Lachm., reads ἵστω δέ, after B C, \aleph . Codex A has καὶ ἵστω (Lange). — Ver. 20. The *Rec.* οὐ κατεργάζεται (Tisch.), after C* G K, *et al.*; Lachm. has adopted οὐκ ἐργάζεται, after A B C*** \aleph , *et al.*; de Wette, Wiesinger, Bouman consider the compound, and Lange the simple verb, as the correct reading. On the distinction of these modes of reading, see exposition. — Ver. 22. Μόνον, which the *Rec.*, after A C G K \aleph , many min., places before ἀκροαταί, stands after it in B, some min. etc.; so read Lachm. and Tisch. It is possible that the reading of the most of the codd. is a correction, because one united μόνον according to its meaning with μή; still the *Rec.* must be regarded as the original reading from authorities. — Ver. 25. ὅστος, which the *Rec.*, after G K, many min. and vss., has before οὐκ ἀκροατής (Tisch. 7), is wanting in A B C \aleph , etc.; Lachm. has omitted it; it is difficult to consider it genuine, for not only is the testimony of the most weighty authorities against it, but also the addition from the following ὅστος is not difficult to be explained from the want of a connecting particle after παραμείνας; whilst de Wette hesitates, Wiesinger, Bouman, Lange are for its retention. — Ver. 26. After εἰ δέ is found in C (Lachm.), which, however, appears to be inserted only for the sake of a closer connection of the verse with the preceding. — The words ἐν ὑμῖν after εἶναι are to be obliterated (after A B C \aleph , with Tisch. Lachm. Reiche, and others). — Ver. 27. Tisch., after C** G K, etc., has omitted the article τῷ before Θεῷ; the weightiest authorities, A B C* \aleph , corrected, etc., however, are in favour of its retention (Lachm.).

Ver. 1. Address and greeting. James calls himself a “servant of God, and of the Lord Jesus Christ.” Oecumenius correctly: Θεοῦ μὲν τοῦ πατρὸς, κυρίου δὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ; some expositors have incorrectly taken Θεοῦ καὶ κυρίου together as applied to Ἰησ. Χρ. There is here no combination of the Old and New Testaments in this conjunction (against Lange). It is to be observed that in the apostolic addresses our Lord’s name is always given in full: Ἰησοῦς Χριστός. — Δοῦλος] is here an official appellation, which, however, belongs not only to the apostles, but to every possessor of an ecclesiastical office received from the Lord; comp. particularly Phil. i. 1: Παῦλος καὶ Τιμόθεος, δούλοι Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, and Jude 1.

In this name the consciousness is expressed that the office is a service in which not our own will, nor the will of other men, but only of God or of Christ, is to be fulfilled. Occumenius: ὑπὲρ πάντων δὲ κοσμικὸν ἀξίωμα οἱ τοῦ κυρίου ἀπόστολοι τὸ δοῦλοι εἶναι Χριστοῦ καλλωπιζόμενοι, τοῦτο γινώρισμα ἑαυτῶν βούλονται ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ λέγοντες καὶ ἐπιστέλλοντες καὶ διδάσκοντες. — Ταῖς δώδεκα φυλαῖς ταῖς ἐν τῇ διασπορᾷ] A designation of the people of Israel living outside of Palestine, and dispersed among the Gentiles. On αἱ δώδεκα φυλαί it is to be observed, that although this appellation of the people of Israel after the exile does not occur in the Apocrypha, yet the people who returned were still regarded as the twelve tribes (1 Esdr. vii. 8, 9); as the people of the twelve tribes are the covenant people, to whom the promises given to the patriarchs refer; from which it is to be explained that in the N. T. the number *twelve* is particularly emphasized (Matt. xix. 28; Rev. vii. 4–8, xxi. 12), and that James designates by this name the people to whom the promise was fulfilled. On τῇ διασπορᾷ, see Deut. xxx. 4; Neh. i. 9; Ps. cxlvii. 2; 2 Macc. i. 27 (Jer. xv. 7); John vii. 35; Winer's *Realwörterbuch*, article "Zerstreuung." Whether this designation is to be understood in a literal or symbolical sense, see Introduction, sec. 2. Laurentius, Hornejus, Hottinger, Pott, Gebser, Kern, Schneckenburger, Neander, Guericke, Schmid (*bibl. Theol.*), Wiesinger, and others correctly consider the Epistle as addressed to *Jewish Christians*; only it is to be observed that with the early composition of the Epistle these are not here to be considered as contrasted with the *Gentile Christians*. Had the author been conscious of such a contrast, it would have been elsewhere indicated in the Epistle itself. — χαίρειν] *sc. λέγει*; see 1 Macc. x. 18, 25, xv. 16; 2 Macc. i. 1; and in the N. T. Acts xv. 23, xxiii. 26 (2 John 11). It is to be observed that this very form of greeting, elsewhere not used in the N. T. Epistles, occurs in the writing proceeding from James, Acts xv. 23 (Kern); the pure Greek form of greeting is more fully: χαίρειν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ εὖ πράττειν, 2 Macc. ix. 19.

V. 2–12. Exhortation in reference to the endurance of temptations.

Ver. 2. James begins with the hortative words: πᾶσαν χάραν ἡγήσασθε] *esteem it complete joy*. πᾶσα χάρα, *complete*

joy = nothing but joy. Luther: "Esteem it pure joy." Many old expositors incorrectly explain *πᾶσα* = *μεγίστη*, summum, perfectum gaudium;¹ it is more correct to resolve the adjective here by the adverb *πάντως*, ὅλως (Carpzov), with which the explanation of Theile coincides: *rem revera omnique ex parte laetam.* The meaning is: the *πειρασμοί* are to you a joy which is *entire joy*, excluding all trouble. See Hom. *Od.* xi. 507. *πᾶσαν ἀληθείην μυθήσομαι*, i.e. "of Neoptolemus I will declare to thee the whole truth" (i.e. nothing but the truth, which excludes all falsehood). — *χαρά*, a metonymy = gaudendi materia, res laeta; see Luke ii. 10. — It is not improbable that James by this exhortation to joy refers to the *χαίρειν* in ver. 1; comp. vv. 5, 19 (Wiesinger). — The address *ἀδελφοί μου* (or *ἀδελφοί* alone, iv. 11, v. 7, 9, 19; also *ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί*, i. 16, 19, ii. 5), which is James' constant form, expresses the consciousness of fellowship, namely, the fellowship in nationality and belief (Paraeus), with the readers.² — *ὅταν πειρασμοῖς περιπέσῃτε ποικίλοις*] *περιπίπτειν* involvit (a) notionem *adversi*, (b) notionem *inviti* atque *inopinati* (Theile); it is synonymous with *ἐμπίπτειν* (see Luke x. 30 compared with ver. 36), but has a stronger meaning: *to fall into something, so that one is entirely surrounded by it*; thus in the classics it is particularly used of misfortune: *συμφοραῖς*, Plato, *Lcg.* ix. 877c; *ζημίαις καὶ ὀνείδεσι*, Isocrates, i. 39. — By *πειρασμοί* are commonly here understood the *θλίψεις*, which are prepared for Christians on account of their faith by an unbelieving world (comp. Luke viii. 13: *καὶ ἐν καιρῷ πειρασμοῦ ἀφίστανται*; in connection with Matt. xiii. 21: *γενομένης θλίψεως ἢ διωγμοῦ διὰ τὸν λόγον, εὐθύς σκανδαλίζεται*); and undoubtedly James had these in view. Yet there is nothing in the context which necessitates us to such a limitation; rather the additional epithet *ποικίλοι* justifies us to extend the idea, and to understand by it all the relations of life which might induce the Christian to withdraw from the faith, or to become wavering in it. When Lange explains *πειρασμοί* specially of "the allurements and threats

¹ Winer (p. 101 [E. T. p. 138]) explains *πᾶσα χαρά* as "all (full) joy." This would signify such a joy as wants nothing; which, however, does not suit the context.

² Incorrectly Semler: Hoc nomen praecipue de *doctoribus* intelligo.

by which the Gentiles on the one side, and the fanatical Jews on the other, and also the Ebionites, who were already in the field, sought to draw the readers to their side," he founds this particular statement on his erroneous view of the tendency of the Epistle. To refer the idea *only* to *inward* temptations (Pfeiffer) is the more erroneous, as it is even questionable whether James had these in view at all. — On *ποικίλοις*, see 2 Cor. vi. 4 ff., xi. 23 ff. The adjective does not allude to the different sources from which the *πειρασμοί* sprung, but is to be referred to their manifold forms. In a far-fetched manner, Lange finds in *ποικίλοις*, according to its original meaning, "an allusion to the manifold-dazzling glitter of colours of the Jewish-Christian and Jewish temptations, in which they might even represent themselves as prophetic exhortations to zeal for the glory of God." — Inasmuch as the Christian has to rejoice not only *in* the *πειρασμοίς*, but *on account* of them, Oecumenius strikingly observes: τὴν κατὰ Θεὸν λύπην καὶ τοὺς πειρασμοὺς τούτους καὶ ἐπαινετοὺς οἶδε καὶ χαρὰς ἀξίους· δεσμός γὰρ οὗτοί εἰσιν ἀρραγής, καὶ αὐξήσις ἀγάπης καὶ κατανύξεως . . . οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἐκτὸς γυμνασίων οὔτε κοσμικῶν οὔτε τῶν κατὰ Θεὸν στεφάνων ἀξιωθῆναι. With reference to joy in *θλίψεις*, see Matt. v. 11, 12; Acts iv. 23 ff., v. 41; Rom. v. 3; also Eccles. ii. 1 ff.; particularly comp. the parallel passage 1 Pet. i. 6.

Ver. 3. *γινώσκοντες*] whilst ye may know ("in the consciousness," de Wette). The participle, when closely connected with the imperative, participates in its meaning; see author on 2 Tim. ii. 23; comp. 1 Cor. xv. 58; Col. iii. 24, iv. 1; Heb. x. 34, and other passages. It is neither simply the imperative: Luther, "and know ye," nor simply a confirmation, so that it may be rendered by *γινώσκετε γάρ* (Pott). — *ὅτι τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν (τῆς πίστεως). τὸ δοκίμιον* (only here and in 1 Pet. i. 7) = *τὸ δοκιμείον*, is properly the means of proving: quo quid exploratur (Pott); quo rei, quae sub examen vocatur, manifestatur sinceritas eaque probatur omne id intrinseca virtute possidere, quod extrinsecus specie ac nomine prae se fert (Heisen): thus = *κριτήριον*; so in Dionysius Halicarnassus, *rhctor.* 11: δεῖ δὲ ὥσπερ κανόνα εἶναι καὶ στάθμην τινὰ καὶ δοκίμιον ὠρισμένον πρὸς ὃ τις ἀποβλέπων ὀνηρήσεται τὴν κρίσιν ποιεῖσθαι; yet generally

to the idea of proving is attached that of purification and verification. Theile = *probamentum*; thus Herodian, ii. 10, 12 : δοκίμιον δὲ στρατιωτῶν κάματος ἀλλ' οὐ τρυφή; and the LXX. Prov. xxvii. 21 : δοκίμιον ἀργυρίῳ καὶ χρυσῷ πύρωσις; comp. Prov. xvii. 3; Ps. xii. 7; Ecclus. ii. 5. Many expositors, as Semler, Pott, Hottinger, Schneckenburger, Theile, Bouman, adhere to the import of *means*, whether of proof or of purification and verification,¹ whilst they understand thereby the above-mentioned *πειρασμοί*. In this case τὸ δοκίμιον stands for τοῦτο τὸ δοκίμιον (Pott); but the necessity of supplying τοῦτο is decisive against this interpretation; besides, δοκίμιον in 1 Pet. i. 7 cannot have that meaning. In that passage δοκίμιον is = *the verification effected by proof*; see author *in loco*: and thus it is probable that this import is also here to be retained (Oecumenius = τὸ κεκριμένον, τὸ δεδοκιμασμένον, τὸ καθαρὸν); τὸ δοκίμιον then is = δοκιμή in Rom. x. 4. The distinction, that in that passage δοκιμή is designated as the *effect*, but in this as the *cause* of ὑπομονή, is not against this view, for, as Tirinus well says: duae res saepe sibi invicem sunt causa.² Most expositors, both ancient and modern, however, explain δοκίμιον here by exploratio, probatio, proof in an active sense; thus Didymus, Bede, Calvin, Laurentius, Beza, Piscator, Paraeus, Serarius, Paes, Hornejus, Baumgarten, de Wette, Kern, Wiesinger, Lange, etc. Then is valid what Bede says in reference to Rom. v. 4: Verborum differentia non sensuum in his sermonibus esse probatur Apostolorum, since there θλίψις, here *proof* by θλίψις, is named as the cause of ὑπομονή. Though there is nothing against this idea, this explanation is wanting in linguistic accuracy.³ The meaning is, in essentials, the same, whether we read τῆς πίστεως or not; for the δοκίμιον

¹ Theile: Calamitates, quae natura sua virtutis *πειρασμοί*, eam sub examen discrimenque vocant, accedente demum hominis strenua opera ejusdem virtutis fiunt δοκίμιον eam purgantes, firmantes, commonstrantes.

² Wiesinger incorrectly maintains: "It is an erroneous idea that verification (τὸ διδοκιμάσθαι) produces ὑπομονή" (so also Rauch in his *Review*); for the Christian always obtains more ὑπομονή, in which only he can reach the goal of perfection, not because he is tried, but because he stands the test and is thus verified.

³ Cremer (see δοκίμιον) is hardly right when he maintained that "the means of proof are not only, e.g., the touchstone itself, but also the trace of the metal left thereon, therefore τὸ δοκίμιον τῆς πίστεως (Jas. i. 3) is the result of the contact of πίστις with *πειρασμοί*;" for we are to consider the *πειρασμοί* not as a *touch-*

of Christians consists in nothing else than that of their faith, by which they are Christians. — *πίστις* is here not used objectively = *id cui fides habetur, ipsa Jesu Christi doctrina* (Pot), but subjectively, assured confidence in the gospel, whose contents are Jesus Christ, as the necessary foundation of Christian conduct. — *κατεργάζεται ὑπομονήν*] *κατεργάζεσθαι* is distinguished from *ἐργάζεσθαι* in that it expresses the *actual accomplishment* (Meyer on Rom. i. 27). — *ὑπομονή* is faithful endurance (*μένειν*) under (*ὑπο*) the temptations (*πειρασμοῖς*). Baumgarten: “enduring constancy;” Theile: “steadfastness,” *perseverantia, quod majus est quam patientia*.¹ The importance of *ὑπομονή* for Christians is evident from Matt. x. 22, xxiv. 13; comp. also Jas. v. 7 ff. On the connection of *ὑπομονή* with *ἐλπίς*, see Cremer under the words *ἐλπίς* and *ὑπομονή*.

Ver. 4. The verification of faith effected by the *πειρασμοί* produces *ὑπομονή*, and on this account temptations should be to the Christian an object of joy, as it depends on them that *ὑπομονή* is of the right kind. This is indicated in this verse. Oecumenius rightly observes: *σκοπεῖ οὐκ εἶπε τὴν ὑπομονὴν ὀριστικῶς, ὅτι ἔργον τέλειον ἔχει, ἀλλὰ προστακτικῶς ἐχέτω· οὐ γὰρ προϋποκειμένην ἀρετὴν ἐξαγγέλλει, ἀλλὰ νῦν ἐγγινομένην, ὡς χρὴ γίνεσθαι νομοθετεῖ.* — *ἡ δὲ ὑπομονή ἔργον τέλειον ἐχέτω*] The emphasis is not placed on *ἔργον*, — that *ὑπομονή* has an *ἔργον* is understood of itself, — but on *τέλειον* (Wiesinger). James wishes that the *ἔργον* of *ὑπομονή* among Christians be *τέλειον*, in order that they may be *τέλειοι*: as he, moreover, strongly emphasizes *τέλειον εἶναι*. In explaining the thought, de Wette confounds the abstract (*ὑπομονή*) with the concrete (*ὁ ὑπομένων*), and understands by *ἔργον τέλειον* “the active virtue which the patient man

shows, but as a test by fire. However, Cremer explained the whole idea correctly by “*the verification of faith.*” His remark on *δοκιμή* is to be noted: that in it we are not to distinguish between the active and passive signification; that it has rather a *reflex* sense, either the having proved true or the proving true.

¹ Cicero, *de inv.* ii. 54: *Patientia est honestatis aut utilitatis causa rerum arduarum ac difficilium voluntaria ac diuturna perpessio; perseverantia est in ratione bene considerata stabilis et perpetua permansio.* Schneckenburger strikingly observes: Si submissionem (*τὸ ὑπο...*) urges, patientiam ac tolerantiam malorum, sin *τὸ μένειν*, constantiam et firmitatem, perseverantiam ac calamitatum ferendarum fortitudinem ab illecebris desciscendi inconcussam hoc vocabulo habebis expressam.

must perfectly have." This explanation of de Wette agrees in essentials with the explanations of Erasmus, Calovius, Morus, Pott, Augusti, Gebser, Kern, Schneckenburger, according to which ἔργον τέλειον is distinguished from ὑπομονή, and the moral activity which the Christian has to exercise with his ὑπομονή indicated. Thus Erasmus: quemadmodum in malis tolerandis fortis est et alacris, ita in bonis operibus exercendis sibi constet. Pott: perseverantiae fructus sit perfectum virtutis studium. This interpretation is, however, incorrect; it not only gives rise to unjustifiable changes of meaning, as that of ὑπομονή into ὁ ὑπομένων, or of ἐχέτω into παρεχέτω (Pott), or into κρατείτω (Schulthess), but gives also a thought which with the following ἵνα κ.τ.λ. would be tautological. Most expositors (even Brückner,¹ in opposition to de Wette) refer ἔργον τέλειον to ὑπομονή itself; ἔργον = work, *realization* (Wiesinger); comp. 1 Thess. i. 3: τὸ ἔργον τῆς πίστεως; for the ὑπομονή of the Christian is not only a suffering, but even more a doing. This doing is to be τέλειον, that is, not only, as many interpreters explain, *enduring to the end* (Luther: "patience is to continue steadfast to the end;") Calvin: haec vera erit patientia, quae in finem usque durabit; similarly Jerome, Serarius, Salmero, Estius, Gomarus, Piscator, Piraeus, Hornejus, Carpzov, Semler, Hottinger, etc.), but *complete*, and that not only in respect of its *internal condition*,—so that it is wanting in no essential points of true ὑπομονή,—but also in respect of its *activity* (Lange²), so that it in no way yields to the πειρασμοῖς, which yielding occurs when a man by the temptations is determined to something which does not correspond with the principle of faith. Bouman: Haec ὑπομονή consummatum opus habet, quando ita se gerit, in quo habitat, homo, ut universam per vitam et animum et linguam et pedes regat ac moderetur. That ὑπομονή in this manner has an ἔργον τέλειον is necessary, in order that Christians may be perfect and entire, which as Christians they should be. This James indicates in the following words: ἵνα

¹ "Nothing else can be meant than the perfect work of endurance, particularly as different stages of this are conceivable."

² Lange here arbitrarily understands by ἔργον τέλειον specially: "the unreserved acknowledgment of their Gentile-Christian brethren, the open rupture with Jewish pride of faith and fanaticism."

ἦτε τέλειοι καὶ ὁλόκληροι] ἵνα is not here ἐκβατικῶς (which Baumgarten and Pott regard as possible), but τελικῶς, *in order that*. De Wette and Wiesinger incorrectly refer it to the future judgment. — τέλειοι and ὁλόκληροι are synonymous terms; τέλειος is properly “that which has attained its aim,” ὁλόκληρος “that which is complete in all its parts, is entire.” Both expressions are found in the LXX. as the translation of מִשְׁנֶה (Gen. vi. 9; Ezek. xv. 5); besides this verse, ὁλόκληρος in the N. T. only occurs in 1 Thess. v. 25 (ὁλοκληρία, Acts iii. 16).¹ It is true that both τέλειος (in the LXX. and in the classics) and ὁλόκληρος (particularly in Philo, but not in the LXX.) are used with special reference to sacrifice; to which, however, there is here no allusion (against Kern). Still more arbitrary is the interpretation of Storr: qui superiores e certamine discedebant. — ἐν μηδενὶ λειπόμενοι] the negative expression added for strengthening the two positive expressions; as in ver. 5: ἀπλῶς καὶ μὴ ὀνειδίζοντος, and in ver. 6: ἐν πίστει, μηδὲν διακρινόμενος. As regards the expression itself, ἐν μηδενί is not to be taken, with de Wette, as a supplement to λειπόμενοι, as the supplement to this verb is always in the genitive; therefore the expression has been correctly translated by Wiesinger and in this commentary, not by wanting nothing, but by wanting *in* nothing (which Lange has overlooked). The question, however, occurs, can λειπόμενοι be explained as = *wanting*? This idea is not contained in the verb by itself, and therefore can hardly be attributed to it when it stands absolutely, as here. It is therefore safer to take λείπεσθαι in its usual meaning, and thus, with Lange, to explain λειπόμενοι by *coming short of*, namely, short of the goal marked out to the Christian. It is incorrect, with Pott, to say: tota loquendi ratio ab iis qui cursu . . . relinquuntur et seperantur (so also Lösner, Krebs, Storr, Augusti); for although the verb in classical writers has often this reference, yet there is here no mention of a relation to others, and accordingly the appeal to Polybius, p. 1202, ed. Gronov.: ἐν τῇ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους εὐνοίᾳ παρὰ πολὺ

¹ A limitation of this idea to *moral* perfection is not required by the context. Lange has the following strange remark: “The Jew was a symbolical κληρὸς of the household; as a Christian he was to become a real κληρὸς, and thus ὁλόκληρος.”

τάδελφού λειπόμενος, does not suit. According to the meaning here given, λειπόμενοι forms a strong contrast to τέλειοι.

Ver. 5. εἰ δέ τις ὑμῶν λείπεται σοφίας] is chiefly connected with ἐν μηδενὶ λειπόμενοι. εἰ is not = quoniam, quandoquidem (Estius, Laurentius), but the thought is hypothetical; εἴ τις = ὅστις; see Wahl on the word εἰ. — λείπεται σοφίας is to be explained as κτεάνων λειφθεὶς καὶ φίλων, in Pindar i. 2. 11, "without wealth and friends," properly "left behind of, or falling short of;" accordingly *without wisdom*. Usually the meaning *wanting, lacking*, is given to λείπομαι, which, however, is not linguistically justified. James by σοφία, as Wiesinger correctly observes, does not mean "an arbitrary part of Christian perfection," but the essential foundation of Christian conduct, τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ τελείου ἔργου (Oecumenius); for σοφία is here the *living* insight, rooted in the πίστις, i.e. the insight compelling to action in what is the Christian's duty, both in whole and in its particular parts, especially in the πειρασμοῖς (ver. 2) (comp. the praise of wisdom in the Proverbs of Solomon, in the Wisdom of Solomon, and in the Book of Ecclesiasticus). Wisdom can only be given by God (κύριος δίδωσι σοφίαν καὶ ἀπὸ προσώπου αὐτοῦ γνώσις καὶ σύνεσις, Prov. ii. 6), and as a divine χάρισμα it has an impress definitely distinguishing it from the wisdom of the world; see chap. iii. 15, 17.¹ The connection does not constrain us, with Bouman and others, to conceive the idea of σοφία only in reference to the πειρασμοί (ver. 2), and to understand by it only the doctrine concerning the Christian conduct in the πειρασμοῖς, expressed in ver. 2 (Calvin: Sapientiae nomen ad circumstantiam praestantis loci restringo, acsi diceretur: si haec doctrina ingenii vestri captu altior est, petite a Domino, ut vos Spiritu suo illuminet), or that conduct itself. The idea of σοφία is rather to be understood in its completeness (Theile, de Wette, Kern, Wiesinger). The reason why James here mentions it is because it was especially necessary to the Christian in his πειρασμοῖς; Brückner: "James thinks here of wisdom (in itself of a more general acceptation), inasmuch as it is necessary rightly to estimate and rightly to resist the

¹ The *Etymologicum magnum* thus gives the distinction between σοφία and γνώσις: γνώσις μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ εἰδέναι τὰ ὄντα· σοφία δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰ ὄντα γινώσκειν, καὶ τὸ τὰ γνωστὰ πράττειν.

trial, in order that it might not be converted into an internal temptation, instead of being the path to perfection."¹ — αἰτείτω παρὰ κ.τ.λ.] the same construction in Matt. xx. 20; Acts iii. 2; 1 John v. 15. — τοῦ δίδοντος Θεοῦ] instead of τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ δίδοντος, as Codex A reads. By the selected order of the words here, not only is the idea of giving emphatically placed near to the request, but also the participle almost becomes an attributive adjective; God is indicated as the Giver absolutely. Accordingly—as Baumgarten, Gebser, and others correctly remark—no definite object as τὴν σοφίαν (Bouman) is to be supplied. — πᾶσιν and ὑπλῶς are added as a more detailed statement; τοῖς αἰτουσιν is from the context to be supplied to πᾶσιν (Calvin, Estius, Piscator, Laurentius, etc.); or, better still, οἷς δίδωσι. The adverb ὑπλῶς, only here in the N. T., is either to be understood as an ethical additional statement of δίδοναι = ἐν ὑπλότῃτι (Rom. xii. 8) (so Pott, Hottinger, Kern, Theile, Bouman, uncertainly Wiesinger), or = *simply, without further ceremony* (so de Wette).² In the latter case it is prominently brought forward that God in the giving had only this in view. It is incorrectly rendered *benigne* (Bede, Vorstius, and others), *affluenter* (Erasmus, Grotius, and others), or as equivalent to συντόμως, καθίπαξ (Hesychius). By μὴ ὀνειδίζοντος — as καί shows — ὑπλῶς is not more closely defined, but a new point in the mode of the divine giving is added, *and so that He does not reproach him to whom He gives, does not abuse him.* ὀνειδίζειν is generally taken in the more special sense of upbraiding (Luther: "and upbraideth no man"); for which the expression in Demosthenes is appealed to: τὸ τὰς ἰδίας ἐνεργεσίας ὑπομινύσκειν καὶ λέγειν μικροῦ δεῖν ὁμοίον ἐστι τῷ ὀνειδίζειν; still more surely does Plutarch, *de aud.* 33, speak for this meaning: πᾶσα ὀνειδιζομένη χάρις ἐπαχθῆς καὶ ἄχαρις; also in Eccles. xviii. 18, xx. 15, xli. 22, the word

¹ Lange, indeed, defends the explanation of Calvin, but he interprets the idea of σοφία differently from Calvin, defining it as "the right perception of the signs of the times, and of the christological fulfilment of the theocracy in the church as well as in the faith of individuals."

² Both of these explanations come essentially to the same thing, for "he that giveth with simplicity will simply give; it will be a pure, unmingled giving, *without any admixture*" (Stier). Lange, without reason, maintains that in this commentary ὑπλῶς will refer not to the giving, but to the gift.

appears to have this more special reference.¹ Still there is no proof that James did not take it in its more general sense. Semler: non tantum significat molestam commemorationem beneficiorem, sed etiam qualemcunque reprehensionem (so also Schneckenburger, de Wette).² It is incorrect to explain *ὀνειδίζειν* as equivalent to aliquem ignominiose cum repulsa dimittere (Morus, Zachariae, Carpzov, Storr, Augusti, Stolz, Hottinger); the refusal of a petitioner may be considered as a *καταισχύνειν* of the same, but *ὀνειδίζειν* never occurs in this sense, not even in Ecclus. xx. 15. The reason why James subjoins the particular statement *ἀπλῶς κ.τ.λ.* is by it to encourage to *αἰτεῖν* (Zwinglius: ut mentes alliciat, ut ad hunc unum in omni necessitate adcurrant); perhaps also with "a side glance to the rich" (ver. 10, chap. v. 9 ff.), who do not give *ἀπλῶς*, and when they do give, give only *ὀνειδίζοντες* (Wiesinger). — *καὶ δοθήσεται αὐτῷ*] impersonal: "it shall be given him;" namely, what he asks; here, wisdom. It is erroneous directly to supply *ἡ σοφία* to *δοθήσεται* as the subject (Lange), because James here evidently wishes to emphasize the relation of the giving to the asking, and accordingly the object is suppressed; comp. on this thought particularly 1 Kings iii. 9–12 (2 Chron. i. 10–12).

Ver. 6. A more particular statement how prayer must be made; *αἰτείτω δὲ ἐν πίστει*] With *αἰτείτω* the *αἰτείτω* in ver. 5 is resumed; *δέ* indicates the carrying out of the thought. — The prayer, if it is to be heard, must be a *εὐχὴ τῆς πίστεως*, chap. v. 15 (comp. Ecclus. vii. 10: *μὴ ὀλιγοψυχῆσης ἐν τῇ προσευχῇ σου*). — *ἐν πίστει*] that is, *in the confident assurance of being heard*; on what this is founded is not here expressed. The explanation of Calvin: *fides est quae Dei promissionibus freta nos impetrandi, quod petimus, certos reddit* (similarly Baumgarten), expresses what is in itself true, but is not here indicated by James. Some ancient commentators incorrectly supply to *πίστει* as a more definite

¹ In this sense *exprobare* is used in Latin, e.g. Cicero, *de amic.*: *Odiosum sane genus hominum officia exprobantium.*

² Eustathius: *ὀνειδίζουν οὐ μόνον τὸ εὐεργεσίας ἀναφέρειν τοῖς εὐεργετημένοις . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπλῶς ἀνοστά τινα καὶ ἐπίμομφα λέγειν.* The assertion of Lange is unfounded, that James, according to this exposition, would utter an untenable sentiment, "because God, notwithstanding those who ask, often inflicts injuries on men." Lange has not considered that the passage treats only of *asking*.

statement Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.—The object of the prayer (namely, τὴν σοφίαν) is not here named, where only the necessary condition of prayer is treated of. The remarks made by many expositors on the manner in which the Christian should ask for *external* good things are here inappropriate. — μηδὲν διακρινόμενος] expresses the same idea as ἐν πίστει, only in a negative form; μηδὲν is here, as frequently, adverbial = *on no account*, *nulla ratione*. διακρίνεσθαι is, according to N. T. usage, *to doubt*; compare besides Acts x. 20, xi. 12: particularly Matt. xxi. 21: εἰ ἔχητε πίστιν, καὶ μὴ διακριθῆτε; Rom. iv. 20: οὐ διεκρίθη τῇ ἀπιστίᾳ; Rom. iv. 23; it is not = ἀπιστεῖν (Luke xxiv. 21), or ἀπειθεῖν (John iii. 36), but includes in it the essential character of ἀπιστία; while πίστις says “Yes” and ἀπιστία “No,” διακρίνεσθαι is the conjunction of “Yes” and “No,” but so that “No” has the preponderance; it is that internal wavering which leans not to πίστις, but to ἀπιστία. The deep-lying ground of it is *pride*, and so far Theophylact is right in saying διακρινόμενος δὲ ὁ μεθ’ ὑπεροφίας αἰτῶν, ὑβριστῆς ὁμολογουμένως, ὁ διακρινόμενος; whereas Oecumenius, in the words: λέγων ἐν σεαυτῷ, ὅτι πῶς δύναμαι αἰτησαί τι παρὰ τοῦ κυρίου καὶ λαβεῖν, ἡμαρτηκῶς τοσαῦτα εἰς αὐτόν, brings out a point which belongs not to διακρίνεσθαι, but to a yet weak faith.¹ Comp. with this passage Hermas ii. 9: tolle a te dubitationem et nihil omnino dubites petens aliquid a Deo.—The following words: ὁ γὰρ διακρινόμενος κ.τ.λ., are annexed to the preceding διακρινόμενος, more clearly explaining it (in figurative language) with reference to the exhortation αἰτείτω κ.τ.λ.; but the reason of this exhortation is given in ver. 7. The first γάρ, accordingly, has the meaning of *namely*, whereas the second has that of *for*. According to

¹ As weak faith is to be distinguished from διακρίνεσθαι, so also is the doubt, of which the believer is conscious as a trial. Calvin strikingly remarks: Fieri quidem non potest in (hac) carnis infirmitate, quin variis tentationibus agitemur, quae sunt veluti machinae ad labefactandam nostram fiduciam: ita nemo reperietur, qui non sensu carnis suae vacillet ac trepidet. Sed oportet ejusmodi tentationes fide tandem superari, quemadmodum arbor, quae firmas radices jecit, quatitur quidem venti impulsu, sed non revellitur, quin potius suo loco stabilis manet.—Whilst the διακρινόμενος, according to the proper meaning of the term, will not believe, it is the longing of the tried to be confirmed in the faith.

this interpretation, the relation of the thoughts expressed in vv. 6 and 7 is more correctly recognised than when we say that the first γάρ assigns the reason why we should pray nothing doubting, but that this thought is only brought to a conclusion in ver. 7 (Wiesinger, and so in the earlier edition of this commentary, where it is said that the sentence taken together would read: ὁ γὰρ διακρινόμενος, εἰκὼς κλύδωνι . . . μὴ οἰέσθω, ὅτι λήμψεται τι κ.τ.λ.). Lange incorrectly supposes that the first γάρ has a more limited meaning, whilst it declares the διακρινόμενος as incapable of praying aright; whereas the second γάρ refers in a wider sense to the unbelieving condition of the man to God, and therefore is to be rendered by *also*. — εἰκε] only here in the N. T. and in ver. 23. — κλύδων θαλάσσης] only here in the N. T. and in Luke viii. 24 (κλυδ. τοῦ ὕδατος); usually κύμα. The verb κλυδωνίζεσθαι occurs in Eph. iv. 14; Isa. lvii. 20, LXX. The point of comparison is contained in the subjoined words: ἀνεμιζόμενῳ καὶ ῥιπιζόμενῳ] The verb ἀνεμίζεσθαι is entirely an ἁπαξ λεγ. occurring nowhere else, equivalent to ἀνεμοῦσθαι, found in classical language (see Hegesippus 6 : ἁλὸς ἡνεμωμένης) = *agitated*, i.e. agitated by the wind. The verb ῥιπίζειν (only here in N. T.) is also elsewhere used to denote the agitation or excitement of water by the wind; see Dio Chrysostom, xxxiii. p. 368 B: δῆμος ἄστατον κακὸν καὶ θαλάσση πάνθ' ὅμοιον, ὑπ' ἀνέμου ῥιπίζεται; Philo, *de mundi*: πρὸς ἀνέμου ῥιπίζεται τὸ ὕδωρ. Heisen incorrectly explains ῥιπίζεσθαι as equivalent to calefieri et accendi; the word never has *this* meaning, although used of the kindling of fire.¹ The two expressions (which Lange incorrectly denies) are synonymous, and are placed together only for the sake of strengthening the idea. The opinion that ἀνεμίζ. refers to agitation coming from *without*, and ῥιπιζ. to agitation coming from *within* (Bengel), is without foundation; also the assertion that the former

¹ Theile correctly rejects this explanation, saying: "Hoc, quamquam undae spumantes ventis revera incallescunt Latinisque etiam ebullire aestusque dicuntur, longius tamen petitum est."—The verb ῥιπίζειν comes either from ῥιπίς = (1) *foliis* (a bellows); (2) *flabellum*, having the meaning both of kindling (the fire) and of fanning (for the sake of cooling); or from ῥιπή = vibration, which is also used of wind; thus ῥιπή Βαρίας, *Il.* xv. 171; ῥιπαὶ ἀνέμων, Sophocles, *Ant.* 137; also ῥιπή = storm, *Pind.* P. ix. 49. The original import of the German verbs *schwingen*, *bewegen*, is thus entirely equivalent to ἀνεμίζειν.

word denotes the *cause* and the latter the *effect* (Theile, Wiesinger) is not entirely correct, as *ἀνεμίξεσθαι* itself expresses the effect. — By this image the mind of the doubter is characterized as unsteady and wavering, to which a calm and sure rest is wanting.¹ Comp. Isa. lvii. 20, 21, LXX.: οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι κλυδωνισθήσονται καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι οὐ δυνήσονται, οὐκ ἔστι χαίρειν (πῶς) τοῖς ἀσεβέσιν.²

Ver. 7. μὴ γὰρ οἰέσθω] On γάρ, see ver. 6; it is neither the simple particle of transition (Pott), nor equivalent to ergo (Calvin), nor is it to be explained, with Winer [E. T. 558], according to its derivation from γε and ἄρα, by *thus indeed*; but is the reason for the exhortation in ver. 6; hence *for*. — The warning: μὴ οἰέσθω, supposes the fancy of the doubter, that he will receive something from God in answer to prayer; similarly Matt. iii. 9: μὴ δόξητε. — ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος] refers back to ὁ διακρινόμενος. Although not in ἐκεῖνος (in itself), yet in the whole mode of expression, there is something disparaging. — By λήμψεται,³ instead of δοθήσεται (ver. 5), is not intended to be indicated, that the fault of not being heard lies not with God but with man; rather he receives not, because God gives not. — τί naturally refers to what the doubter asks; thus *scil. αἰτουμένων*. The definite object (wisdom) above spoken of is not here meant; for the particular thought is founded on a general declaration. By κύριος Christ is not to be understood, but, as in chap. iv. 10, v. 4, 10, according to O. T. usage, *God*. — The designation of God as the Lord naturally suggested itself to James, because he was here speaking of the power of God manifested in giving or not giving; it is not, as Lange thinks, chosen in order to characterize God as “Jehovah the living covenant-God, who has now fully manifested Himself in Christ.”

Ver. 8 contains neither the subject to λήμψεται (Baumgarten), nor is it to be understood as an exclamation = vae

¹ “A doubtful petitioner offers not to God a steady hand or heart, so that God cannot deposit in it His gift,” Stier.

² Lange supposes that James has used these expressions with a conscious reference to the O. T. symbols, according to which the sea is “the emblem of the national life, agitated hither and thither in pathological sympathies,” whilst in his time “these waves of the sea” had already begun to roar.

³ The form λήμψεται, for which *ms.* authorities decide, is not classical Greek; the Ionic form is λάμψομαι.

homini inconstanti (Pott). Many expositors consider *ἀνὴρ δίψυχος* as the subject and *ἀκατάστατος* the predicate, wanting the copula (Luther: "a doubter is unstable;" so Calvin, Schneckenburger, de Wette, Lange, and others); but according to this construction the idea *δίψυχος* falls too much into the background, and also the train of thought would be too unconnected. It is better to take both *ἀνὴρ δίψυχος* and *ἀκατάστατος κ.τ.λ.* as in apposition to *ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος*. It is true that the character of the doubter has already been given in ver. 6 by *ἔοικε κ.τ.λ.*, but, on the one hand, only figuratively, and, on the other hand, without giving prominence to his ethical character, which James now introduces in order strongly to confirm the thought expressed in ver. 7; which exposition is far from being "a feeble tautology" (Lange). Less stress is to be put on the want of the article (Schneckenburger, de Wette), as it would be here hardly suitable. Correctly Winer, p. 497 [E. T. 670]: "he, a double-minded man;" so also Wiesinger, Brückner, Bouman, and others. Only according to this construction is the full meaning given to the idea *δίψυχος*. The word is not to be taken merely as another expression for *διακρινόμενος* (Luther, Beza, Grotius, Cremer, and others; Luther directly renders it "a doubter"), but it characterizes the inward nature of the doubter. According to the mode in which *δισώματος*, *δικάρδιος*, *δίγλωσσος*, and similar words are formed, *δίψυχος* (which occurs neither in the classics nor in the LXX. and the Apocrypha, but besides here only in chap. iv. 8, and the Church Fathers) properly denotes *having two souls*; it thus describes the doubter as a man who has, as it were, two souls contending against each other: one of which is turned to God, and one of which is turned away from God (thus to the world); who, accordingly, will be at the same time *φίλος τοῦ Θεοῦ* and *φίλος τοῦ κόσμου*, although *φιλία τοῦ κόσμου* is *ἔχθρα τοῦ Θεοῦ* (chap. iv. 6).¹ This double-mindedness (or what is the same thing, division of soul) expresses the

¹ Oecumenius limits the idea too specifically to a care divided about the present and the future: *δίψυχον ἄνδρα τὸν ἀνεπίριστον, τὸν ἀστήρικτον λέγει, τὸν μήτε πρὸς τὰ μέλλοντα παγίως, μήτε πρὸς τὰ παρόντα ἀσφαλῶς ἠδρασμένον, ἀλλὰ τῇδε πακίσει ἀγόμενον καὶ περιφερόμενον, καὶ ποτὶ μὲν τῶν μελλόντων, ποτὶ δὲ τῶν παρόντων ἀντεχόμενον*. In the classics related ideas are *διάνδιχα μιμνῆσθαι*, Hom. *Il.* i. 189,

wavering to and fro, between *πίστις* and *ἀπιστία* generally, so particularly also in prayer; therefore it is called, *Constitut. Ar.* vii. 11: *μὴ γίνου δίψυχος ἐν προσευχῇ εἰ ἔσται, ἢ οὐ*, and Clemens Romanus: *ταλαίπωροι οἱ δίψυχοι, οἱ διστάζοντες τὴν ψυχὴν*; comp. Ecclus. i. 28: *μὴ προσέλθῃς αὐτῷ (κυρίῳ) ἐκ καρδίας δίσση*. — *δίψυχον εἶναι* is to be understood neither as the reason (Wiesinger) nor as the result (Lange), but as the characteristic nature of *διακρίνεσθαι*. — The word *ἀνὴρ* is here as in Matt. vii. 24; Ps. xxxii. 2, LXX. Lange thinks that James used it because the dangers of which he warns them are more especially the dangers which threaten the *men* among the Jews. — As a second apposition James adds: *ἀκατάστατος ἐν πασαῖς ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτοῦ*] for where there is a want of unity in the internal life, it is also wanting in the external conduct. The *δίψυχος*, being actuated sometimes by one impulse and sometimes by another, is *unsteady* and *inconstant* in his intentions and actions (*ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτοῦ*; comp. Ps. xci. 11; Jer. xvi. 17; Prov. iii. 6, etc.); he walks not on *one* path, but as it is said in Ecclus. ii. 12: *ἐπιβαίνει ἐπὶ δύο τρίβους*.¹ The word *ἀκατάστατος* is found only again in chap. iii. 8 and in the LXX. Isa. liv. 11 as the translation of *רָגַב*; the substantive *ἀκαταστασία* occurs in chap. iii. 16, besides in Luke and in the Epistles to the Corinthians. — The reason why the doubter is not heard is accordingly the disunion in which he is with himself, both in his internal and in his external life; God gives the heavenly gift of wisdom, which according to its nature is *ἀγνή*, only to him who *ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ* (Matt. xxii. 37), has given to God an undivided disposition.

Vv. 9, 10. James subjoins to the idea that the doubter

and frequently: *διάνδιχα θυμὸν ἔχειν*, Hesiod, *O.* 13; *ψυχὴ ἀνάρμοστος*, *Phaed.* 93 c (opp. *ψυχὴ ὁμονοητική*, Pl. *Resp.* viii. 554), etc. In the Hebrew, *בָּלָב בָּלָב*, so in 1 Chron. xii. 33, where *בָּלָב בָּלָב* is equivalent to *בְּלִבָּב שֹׁלֵם*, ver. 38; that expression has another meaning in Ps. xii. 3.

¹ Schneckenburger incorrectly explains *ἀπεκατάστατος* here of the *fate* of the doubter: *parum constantiae experitur in omnibus, quae ipsi contingunt, sua culpa sorte varia confluetur*, and *ὄζος* = *fortuna*; also Heisen at least includes this idea: *omnia vitae consilia ac facta quin et fata*. This certainly is a possible explanation in itself, but it does not suit the context. The meaning attached to the word by Lange, “*seditions disturber*,” cannot be proved to be correct by iii. 16.

should not think that he should receive anything, the exhortation to the lowly brother; δέ non solum apponendo, sed opponendo gravius hortatur (Theile). At first view the natural sense is, with de Wette, Wiesinger, and most expositors, to take ὁ ἀδελφός as the general idea, which is specified by ὁ ταπεινός and ὁ πλούσιος. According to this view, ταπεινός is not equivalent to ταπεινὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ, Matt. xi. 29, but, in opposition to πλούσιος, must be taken in its *proper* sense: afflictus, particularly poor; on the other hand, ὁ πλούσιος is the *earthly rich*, equivalent to opulentus, fortunatus, affluens rebus externis. The *exaltation* (τὸ ὕψος), in which the brother of low degree is to glory, can naturally only be the *heavenly* dignity, which the Christian by his faith in Christ possesses, and whose future completion is guaranteed to him by the promise of the Lord; and, corresponding to this, by ταπεινώσις is to be understood the lowliness, which “belongs to the rich man as a Christian through Christ” (Wiesinger), which is essentially the same with his exaltation. There is nothing against this idea in itself; the same *oxymoron* would be contained in the expression, were we to say, according to 1 Cor. vii. 22: “the δούλος rejoices in his ἐλευθερία, and the ἐλεύθερος in his δουλεία.” But the context is against this explanation: not only because the distinction of Christians into rich and poor would be here introduced quite unexpectedly, but also because vv. 2 and 12 show that the connection of the ideas in this section is the reference to the πειρασμοί which Christians have to endure. Several expositors have assumed *this* reference in the idea ταπεινός; thus, among moderns, Theile, whilst to the explanation of Morus: carens fortunis externis omninoque calamitosus, he adds: πειρασμῶν περιπεσών, ver. 2; δεδιωγμένος ἔνεκεν δικαιοσύνης, Matt. v. 10; πάσχων διὰ δικαιοσύνης, 1 Pet. iii. 14; but by this the simple contrast between ταπεινός and πλούσιος is destroyed; for then ὁ πλούσιος must be taken as *the rich* Christian who had not suffered persecution, which would be evidently meaningless. If, on the other hand, the rich man who shares the lot of persecution with the poor is to be understood (as Laurentius explains it: dives, sc. frater, qui ipse erat una cum paupere fratre in dispersione, direptionem bonorum suorum propter Christi evangelium passus; similarly Erasmus, Hornejus, and

others), such a reference is not to be found in the idea *ταπεινός* in itself; if one puts it into the idea *ταπείνωσις*, so that by this is to be understood the suffering condition of persecution, in which the *πλούσιος* is placed, or by which he is threatened (Gebser: "he rejoices in his lowliness, into which he may be brought by persecution"), then there is no reason to find in *ταπεινός* the idea of *poverty* expressed. Thus, then, in *this* view the train of thought, referring it to *πειρασμοί*, becomes indistinct and confused; and yet this reference is required by the context. But also what directly follows is against the idea of considering the *πλούσιος* as well as the *ταπεινός* as a Christian (*ἀδελφός*); for, apart from the fact that such a rich man would require no such pressing intimation of the perishableness of riches as is contained in the following clauses, it is carefully to be observed that in the words *ὅτι . . . παρελεύσεται*, and in ver. 11: *οὕτω καὶ κ.τ.λ.*, the subject is *ὁ πλούσιος* and not *ὁ πλούτος*, as that explanation would render necessary; Winer: *dives non habet, quo gloriatur, nisi ab humilitate sua, nam divitiarum mox periturae sunt*; so also de Wette, Theile, Wiesinger, and others. This change of the subject is evidently unjustifiable. James says, not of *riches*, but of the *rich man*, *παρελεύσεται, μαρανθήσεται*, which evidently is only valid of the rich man who forms a contrast to *ταπεινός ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ*. Brückner, in order to avoid the change of subject, explains it of "the rich man according to his external relations;" but this reference is not only arbitrarily introduced, but it weakens the train of thought. That such a bad sense should be given by the author to the idea *ὁ πλούσιος*, is evident both from chap. ii. 6, 7, where he represents the *πλούσιοι* as the persecutors of the Christians, and from chap. v. 1-6, where they are threatened with condemnation; besides, the word is elsewhere used in the sacred Scriptures in a bad sense; comp. Luke vi. 24-26; Isa. liii. 9, where *רַשָׁע* is parallel with *רַשָׁעִים*; Eccclus. xiii. 3: *πλούσιος ἡδίκησε . . . πτωχὸς ἡδικηται*; xvii. 18: *τί κοινωνήσῃ λύκος ἁμνῷ*; οὕτως ἁμαρτωλὸς πρὸς εὐσεβῇ . . . τίς εἰρήνη πλουσίῳ πρὸς πένητα. If *ὁ πλούσιος* stands in relation of contrast to *ὁ ἀδελφός ὁ ταπεινός*, then the Christian condition cannot be understood by *ταπείνωσις*, or scarcely with Bouman: *animi, nihil sibi arrogantis, modestia*; but only the

destruction described in the following words: *ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*, into which the rich man on account of his pride has fallen; comp. Luke vi. 24–26.¹ The verb to be supplied is neither *αἰσχυνέσθω* (Oecumenius, Estius, and others) nor *ταπεινούσθω*, but *καυχᾶσθω* (comp. Winer, p. 548 [E. T. 777]). This certainly does not appear suitable, but the expression of James has its peculiar pointedness in this, that the *ταπείνωσις*, to which the rich man is devoted, is indicated as the only object of his boasting.² To this irony (if it be called so)—which already the author of the commentary on the Lamentations in Jerome's works, and after him Lyra, Thomas, Beza, and others have recognised in our passage—less objection is to be taken, as this was so natural to the deeply moral spirit of James, in opposition to the haughty self-confidence of the rich man opposed to the lowly Christian. — For a more exact explanation of these two verses, the following remarks may suffice. The connection of ver. 9 with the preceding is as follows: let the brother of low degree glory *amid his temptations* in his exaltation (Gunkel). The idea *καυχᾶσθαι* is neither exhausted by *laetari*, *ἀγαλλιᾶσθαι*, 1 Pet. i. 6, Matt. v. 12 (Gebser), nor by *commemorare*, *praedicare* (Carpzov); it indicates rather glorying, proceeding from the confident assurance of superiority; Theile: *notio gloriandi involvit notas 1 gaudendi, 2 confidentiae, 3 externe expressi.* — *ὁ ἀδελφός*, according to the above explanation, refers only to *ὁ ταπεινός*, not to *ὁ πλούσιος*, which rather forms the contrast set over against that idea. By *ὁ ταπεινός* is not indicated a kind of *ἀδελφοί*, but is the characteristic mark of true Christians. It is incorrect to take *ταπεινός* here as entirely equivalent to *πτῶχος*; it goes beyond the idea of *πτῶχος*, indicating the Christian according to his entire lowly condition in the world, which also is not in-

¹ According to Lange, the expressions *ὁ ταπεινός* and *ὁ πλούσιος* are to be taken in a prophetic-symbolical sense, so that the first "designates the Jewish Christian and the Jew absolutely in their low oppressed theocratic condition as contrasted with the heathen world and the secular power, or still more exactly the theocrat, inasmuch as he deeply feels his condition;" the second, "again, designates the Jew and the Jewish Christian, inasmuch as he sees the hopeless situation of the Jewish people in a brilliant light, inasmuch as he is not only rich in the consciousness of his Jewish prerogatives, but also in chiliastic and visionary expectation," etc. This interpretation requires no refutation.

² A similar connection is found in Phil. iii. 19: *ἡ δοξα ἐν τῇ αἰσχύνῃ αὐτῶν.*

applicable to him who is perhaps rich in worldly wealth, especially as these riches have no true value for him. Comp. moreover, 1 Cor. i. 26 : οὐ πολλοὶ δυνατοί, οὐ πολλοὶ εὐγενεῖς. Ταπεινός is the Christian, in so far as he is despised and persecuted by the world (τεταπεινωμένος καὶ κατησχυμμένος, Ps. lxxiv. 21, comp. 1 Cor. i. 27), is inwardly distressed (ἐν παντὶ θλιβόμενος, ἔξωθεν μαχαί, ἔσωθεν φόβοι, 2 Cor. vii. 5), and walks in humility before God; the opposite of all this is comprehended in πλούσιος. On ὕψος, Theile rightly remarks : sublimitas . . . non solum jam praesens sed etiam adhuc futura cogitari potest = ζωή illa, quae in coelis perficienda in terris jam est. Incorrectly, de Wette understands by this "present exaltation;" as little also does ὕψος indicate only "the stedfast courage of the Christian" (Augusti); and still less is it equivalent to divitiae, as Pott thinks, who finds only the thought here expressed : ὁ ταπεινός dives sibi videatur. — By ἐν is not to be understood the condition *in which* (Schneckenburger), but, according to the prevailing linguistic usage of the N. T., the object *upon which* the glorying is to take place; comp. Rom. v. 3. — The words ὅτι ὡς ἄνθος χόρτου παρελεύσεται announce wherein the ταπείνωσις of the rich consists. As regards the construction, it forms one simple sentence. Baumgarten incorrectly construes παρελεύσεται with ὁ πλούσιος, and considers ὅτι ὡς ἄνθος χόρτου, *sc. ἐστι*, as a parenthesis, by which an epigrammatic sharpness is conveyed to the preceding sentence. The figure, which is further drawn out in ver. 11, is of frequent occurrence in the O. T., whilst with the quickly fading grass and its flower is not only man generally (comp. Job xiv. 2 : ὥσπερ ἄνθος ἀνθῆσαν ἐξέπεσεν; Ps. ciii. 15 : ἄνθρωπος ὡσεὶ χόρτος . . . ὡσεὶ ἄνθος τοῦ ἀγροῦ οὕτως ἐξανθήσει; Isa. xl. 6, 7 : πᾶσα σὰρξ χόρτος, καὶ πᾶσα δόξα ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἄνθος χόρτου· ἐξηράνθη ὁ χόρτος καὶ τὸ ἄνθος ἐξέπεσε; comp. 1 Pet. i. 24), but also specially, as here *the ungodly*¹ (comp. Ps. xxxvii. 2 : ὡσεὶ χόρτος ταχὺ ἀποξηρανθήσονται, καὶ ὡσεὶ λάχανα χλόης ταχὺ ἀποπεσούνται; see also Ps. xc. 6), compared. — ἄνθος is here, not as in Isa. xi. 1, LXX. translation of גֶּמְלָה = germen, surculus (Hottinger),

¹ Lange observes : "This is not here the image of the ungodly, but is to be understood as a historical figure with reference to the decay of the O. T. glory!"

but *the flower*; however, the combination פָּרַח פָּחַח is not found in Hebrew; in Isa. xl. 7 it is פָּחַח פָּרַח . *Παρέρχεσθαι*, in the meaning of destruction, often occurs in the N. T. (so also in the Hebrew עָבַר); also in the classics: Soph. *Trach.* 69: *τὸν παρελθόντ' ἄροτον*.

Ver. 11. A further expansion of the image. The aorists *ἀνέτειλε*, *ἐξήρανε*, etc., do not precisely stand for the present (Grotius, Piscator, Hottinger, and others), but represent the occurrence in a concrete manner as a fact which has taken place, by which the description gains in vividness (comp. Isa. xl. 7), which is still more vividly portrayed by the simple succession of finite verbs. See Winer, p. 248 [E. T. 346, 347] and p. 417 [E. T. 590]; A. Buttmann, p. 175. It is only confusing to convert *ἀνέτειλε . . . ἐξήρανε* into *ἀνατείλας* or *ἐὰν ἀνατέλλῃ . . . ἐξήρανε*. — By the word *καύσων* is often in the LXX. (comp. besides Ezek. xvii. 10, xix. 12, Hos. xiii. 15: Jer. xviii. 17; Jonah iv. 8; where *ἄνεμος* or *πνεῦμα* is added, particularly Job xxvii. 21; Hos. xii. 1) meant the hot east wind (קִיץ), which, blowing over the steppes of Arabia, is very dry and scorching to vegetation (see Winer's *Reallexicon*: word, Wind); *here*, however, as in Isa. xlix. 10 (כִּי־עָשׂ closely united with עָשׂוּ), Eccus. xviii. 16 (comp. also Eccus. xliii. 3, where it is said of the sun: *καὶ ἐναντίον καύματος αὐτοῦ τίς ὑποστήσεται*), Matt. xx. 12, Luke xii. 55, it has the meaning "*heat, burning*" (against Grotius, Pott, Hottinger, Kern, Schneckenburger, Winer, Wahl, Lange, Bouman, and others), as the parching effect is attributed not to the *καύσων* as something different from the sun, but to the sun itself.¹ It is arbitrary to explain it as if it were written: *ἡγέρθη γάρ, ἅμα τῇ ἀνατεῖλαι τὸν ἥλιον, ὁ καύσων*; as Gebser says: "the burning wind rising with the sun is the image." Laurentius incorrectly understands by the sun "Christ," and by the rising of the sun "the day of the Lord;" thus the whole is an image of the judgment destroying the rich, yet so that the individual parts are to be retained in their appropriate meaning.² — *καὶ*

¹ Neither the article before *καύσωνι*, nor the observation that "with the rising of the sun and the development of its heat the vegetation is not forthwith imperilled," forms a valid reason against this explanation (against Lange).

² That "with the sun of a finished revelation was developing the hot wind of

ἐξήρανε κ.τ.λ.] The same expressions in Isa. xl. 7.—ἐκπίπτειν, i.e. not simply the withering (Isa. xxviii. 1, 4, LXX.), but the actual falling off of the flower, is a consequence of the blighting of the plant.—ἡ εὐπρέπεια] the opposite of ἀπρέπεια is used in the classics chiefly of external appearance; in the N. T. it is an ἅπ. λεγ. — τὸ πρόσωπον = פָּנִים, Ps. civ. 30; comp. Luke xii. 56; Matt. xvi. 3: species externa. αὐτοῦ refers, not as the first αὐτοῦ, to τὸν χόρτον, but to τὸ ἄνθος, on which the emphasis rests (comp. ver. 10, de Wette, Wiesinger, Bouman).¹—οὕτω] thus quickly, thus entirely (Wiesinger); καί is not purely superfluous (Wiesinger), but, referring back to the image, heightens the comparison.—ὁ πλούσιος . . . μαρανθήσεται] It is to be observed that here also ὁ πλούσιος and not ὁ πλοῦτος is the subject. μαραίνεισθαι, in the N. T. an ἅπ. λεγ., is found in the LXX. as the translation of מָרַח, Job xv. 30; in the same meaning in the Wisdom of Solomon ii. 8. The figurative expression is explained by what goes before.—ἐν ταῖς πορείαις αὐτοῦ] not “on his journeys” (Laurentius, Piscator, Herder), also not “on his journeyings of fortune” (Lange); but = ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτοῦ, ver. 8 (comp. Prov. ii. 8, LXX.). The prominent idea is that the rich man, overtaken by judgment, perishes in the midst of his doings and pursuits, as the flower in the midst of its blossoming falleth a victim to the scorching heat of the sun. Luther’s translation: “in his possession,” is explained from the false reading πορίαις. See critical notes.

Ver. 12. Whilst the rich man is condemned in the judgment, the ἀδελφὸς ὁ ταπεινός, who suffers the πειρασμόν proceeding from the rich man, is blessed. This blessedness forms the conclusion of the series of thought begun at ver. 2. Το μακάριος ἀνὴρ (see Ps. i. 1, and frequently in O. T.) not ἔστω, but ἐστί is to be supplied. No special emphasis is to be put on ἀνὴρ; comp. vv. 8, 20; incorrectly Thomas: beatus vir, non mollis vel effoeminatus, sed vir; and not less incorrectly Lange, who explains ἀνὴρ here as he does in the law, which scorched the glory of Israel” (Lange), is a remark which is here the more inappropriate, as according to it the sun and the hot wind are indicated as two different powers opposed to each other.

¹ Lange, on the other hand, observes “that a fallen flower is still to lose its beauty” cannot be imagined; but is it then to be imagined that the grass when it is withered and the flower has fallen from it is still to lose its beauty?

ver. 8. — ὃς ὑπομένει πειρασμόν] is not = ὃς πειρασμοῖς περιπίπτει or ὃς πειρασμόν πάσχει (Hottinger); comp. ver. 3; it is the man who does not succumb to the temptations which he has to endure. Laurentius: aliud est ferre crucem, aliud preferre. To supply ὅταν περιπέσῃ (Wiesinger) is unnecessary. — The following sentence beginning with ὅτι adduces the reason of the μακαρισμός: *for being approved, he will receive the crown of life.* By δόκιμος γενόμενος] is given not so much the *condition* as the *cause*, why he that endureth temptation will receive the crown of life; the being approved is the consequence of ὑπομένειν πειρασμόν. — δόκιμος is not, with Krebs, Lösner, Augusti, Pott, and others, to be referred as a figurative expression to the trial preceding the contests of athletes; but if a conscious figurative reference is to be assumed at all (which de Wette, Brückner, and Wiesinger not without reason consider as doubtful), it is to be referred to the purification of metals by fire (Hornejus, Gebser, Schneckenburger, Theile, and others¹). In τὸν στέφανον τῆς ζωῆς] (“not the crown which is peculiar to eternal life, *i.e.* which is imparted to it,” Gunkel) τῆς ζωῆς is not the genitive of possession (Lange), but of apposition: *ζωή, i.e. the eternal blessed life*, is itself the crown of glory with which he that endures is adorned; comp. Rev. ii. 10; 1 Pet. v. 4; 2 Tim. iv. 8. It is at least doubtful if there is here any allusion to the reward of the victor in the Greek games,—which is maintained by Zwingli, Michaelis, Hensler, Pott, de Wette, Wiesinger, and others, and contested by Semler, Augusti, Schneckenburger, Hottinger, Theile, Brückner, and others,—as even among the *Jews*, without any reference to a contest, a crown or diadem is regarded as the symbol of peculiar honour; comp. besides Ps. xxi. 4 (Brückner), especially Wisdom of Solomon v. 16, 17: δίκαιοι εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα ῥῶσι . . . λήψονται τὸ βασιλεῖον τῆς εὐπρεπείας καὶ τὸ διάδημα τοῦ κάλλους ἐκ χειρὸς κυρίου; with Paul, on the other hand, such an allusion frequently occurs. The certainty of receiving this crown of glory is founded on the divine promise: ὃν ἐπηγγείλατο (ὁ κύριος) τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν] If ὁ κύριος is the correct

¹ Lange asserts that this figurative reference is so far incorrect, as “that figure presupposes the idea of refining, which, although contained in the trial or proof, is not identical with it;” but the identity is not maintained.

reading, we are to understand not Christ (Baumgarten, Schneckenburger), but God (Gebser, Theile, Wiesinger). — The expression τοῖς ἀγαπῶσιν αὐτόν (comp. 1's. xcvii. 10, cxlv. 20; Rom. viii. 28, etc.) intimates that ὑπομένειν πειρασμόν is a proof and testimony of love to God, and is accordingly a proof how careful James was to designate love as the essence of true faith (so also Lange); therefore the repetition of the same addition in chap. ii. 5. On the whole passage, comp. particularly 2 Tim. iv. 8.

Ver. 13. Το ὃς ὑπομένει πειρασμόν James opposes ὃς πειράζεται;¹ whilst the former gains ζωή, the end to which the latter approaches is θάνατος (ver. 15). — First James disclaims a vain justification of the latter, and then describes the process of πειράζεσθαι. The vain justification is introduced with the direct words of the πειραζόμενος: ὅτι ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι, and then disclaimed by the expression: ὁ Θεὸς ἀπειραστός ἐστὶ κακῶν κ.τ.λ. — By the direct transition from the preceding to this verse, it is supposed that by the πειραζόμενος spoken about, in contrast to ὃς ὑπομένει πειρασμόν (ver. 12), is to be understood the person who does not endure the temptation, and consequently is not *proved* by it, but who succumbs under it, whilst he suffers himself to be enticed to falling away—to sin. Pott: qui tentatione vincitur, ad peccandum vincitur; Theile: agit Jacobus de turpi tentatione per tristem (tentationem); so also Olshausen, Schneckenburger, Kern, and others. This connection is denied by others; thus Calvin says: de alio tentationes genere disserit; and Wiesinger in the strongest manner: “this appears as the design of the apostle: to distinguish as much as possible those πειρασμοὺς and this πειράζεσθαι, to place the latter as totally different from the former.” But the close connection with the preceding constrains us to the opinion that James has considered both in reference to each other, the πειρασμοί occasioning the πειράζεσθαι which takes place when ἐπιθυμία is excited by it.” It is arbitrary to take the verb

¹ When Lange meets this with the question: “How could any one endure the temptation without having first been tempted?” he only shows that he does not understand the explanation here given.

² It is to be observed that James designates the trials, on which he thinks in ἔσταν πειρασμοὶς πειρασμοῖς, ver. 3, as πειρασμοί. It may be said that they are not

πειράζεσθαι in the clause: *μηδεὶς πειράζόμενος*, in another sense than in the following clause: *ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι*, as Hottinger asserts: hic verbum *πειράζεσθαι* bis dicitur sensu diversi; priori loco simpliciter: adversa pati; posteriori: malis sollicitari ad defectionem (similarly Grotius, Semler; also Lange); for, according to this interpretation, the excuse: *ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*, would not correspond to the supposition contained in *μηδεὶς πειράζόμενος*. In justification of this view, Matt. viii. 30 cannot be appealed to, where the same word (*νεκρόν*) is used in the same sentence in different meanings, namely, in a proper and figurative meaning, as here the relation is entirely different. — Some expositors (Pott, Schneckenburger, and others), without reason, paraphrase *λέγεται* by “cogitet, sibi persuadeat.” Since the *words* which immediately follow are introduced in the direct form, it is better to retain the usual meaning of *λέγειν*, by which it is in itself evident that the external speaking presupposes an internal, on which it is here natural to think. — James makes the *πειράζόμενος* thus briefly express the excuse, by which he would justify himself: *ὅτι ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι*, by which he transfers the guilt from himself to God.¹ *ὅτι* is the form of quotation frequently occurring in the N. T., except with Paul. *ἀπὸ Θεοῦ* is emphatically placed first. *ἀπό* is not equivalent to *ὑπό*; the former points to the more distant, the latter to the nearest cause, though by later writers *ἀπό* with passive verbs is sometimes used as equivalent to *ὑπό*. Here, however, the usual signification of *ἀπό* is to be retained, for the *πειράζόμενος*, introduced as directly speaking, would certainly not stigmatize God as the *direct* tempter (comp. Matt. iv. 1). See Winer, p. 332 [E. T. 464]. James does not with these words

this in themselves, but only in so far as the Christian is yet a sinner, and can thus be enticed by them into sin; when this happens, then the *πειράζεσθαι*, of which James here speaks, takes place. Stier: “That there is a necessity for our all being tested and approved through trial, springs from our sin; the tempting element in our trial, the evil in it, springs therefore from that and not from God.”

¹ He might find a justification of this in the fact that *πειρασμοί* actually spring from God. See Meyer on Matt. vi. 13, and on 1 Cor. x. 13. Lange introduces inappropriate matter, maintaining in favour of the concrete relations supposed by him, that the Jews and Judaizing Christians with this word would justify their fanaticism against the Gentiles, particularly their separation from the Gentile Christians, as an affair of God (for His glory)!

refer to any particular doctrine of religion and philosophy, perhaps to the doctrine of the Pharisees and Essenes on *εἰμαρμένῃ* (Bull, Ittig, Schneckenburger, and others), or the doctrine of Simon Magus (Calovius), but only considers generally the peculiar bias of the natural man to charge God somehow with the blame of *πειράζεσθαι*, recognisable in the answer of Adam to the question of God.¹ — James grounds the rejection of the idea contained in *μηδεὶς . . . λεγέτω* that the *πειράζεσθαι* proceeds from God, by a sentence comprising two members: *ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς . . . οὐδένα*. The word *ἀπειράστος*, an *ἅπαξ λεγ.* in the N. T., has in classical Greek—in which, however, the form *ἀπείρατος* (*ἀπείρητος*) almost always occurs—either the passive meaning *untempted*, that is, what is not tempted or proved, or the active meaning: he who has made no trial, equivalent to *inexperiented*. Some expositors take the word in the second meaning; thus Schulthess: *in Deum nulla malorum experientia*; de Wette, Brückner, and others.² But, on account of the close connection with *πειράζειν*, the word has here, as most expositors assume, an ethical meaning. Yet it is incorrect to explain it actively, with Luther (God is not a tempter to evil; Vulgate: *intentator*), because this clause would then be tautological with the following. It is rather to be taken passively: *untempted of evil*, by which the idea passes from *tentatus* to that of *tentabilis*; Winer, p. 175 [E. T. 242, 243]. By the Church Fathers God is often named simply *ὁ ἀπειράστος*; so Ignat. *ad Philipp.*: *τί πειράξεις τὸν ἀπειράστον*; Photius, *contra Manich.* iv. p. 225: *πειράζειν ἐπιχειρήσασι τὸν ἀπειράστον*. By this predicate the holiness of God, which is raised above all temptation to evil, is indicated, and is the motive likewise to the following thought.³

¹ Many expressions in Greek authors show how natural this is to man; comp. *Il.* τ. 86: *ἰγὼ δ' οὐκ αἰτίος ἑμὶ ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς, καὶ μοῖρα*; Plaut. *Aulul.* iv. 10. 7: *Deus impulsor mihi fuit*; Terent. *Eunuch.* v. 2. 86: *Quid, si hoc voluit quispiam Deus?* — Such an excuse suggested itself to the Jews the more as it appeared justified by the language of the O. T. Comp. Ex. xx. 16. On the contrary, Philo (*Quod. deter. pot.* 177 D) remarks: *οὐ ὡς ἔνιοι τῶν ἀσιβῶν, τὸν θεὸν αὐτὸν τῶν κακῶν φῆσι Μωϋσῆς*. Still more fully in Schneckenburger.

² Buttmann, p. 148 [E. T. 170], contests this meaning, which rather belongs to the word *ἄπειρος*. But passages, as Hom. *Il.* ad Ven. v. 133: *ἀδμήτην μ' ἀγάγων καὶ ἀπιρήτην φιλόπητος*; Theognis, 772: *πολλοὶ ἀπιρήτοι δόξαν ἔχουσ' ἀγχιῶν*, show that *ἀπείρατος* actually has that meaning.

³ Lange maintains, in reference to the interpretation given above, that in this

— *κακῶν* is not masculine, but neuter; not *miseria* (Oecumenius), but *evil*.¹ — *πειράζει δὲ αὐτὸς οὐδένα*] expresses the consequence of the preceding and the pointed contrast to *ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι*. *πειράζει* is placed first for the sake of emphasis. By *αὐτός*, which most interpreters pass over, is brought forward not God's action in contrast to "being tempted" (Theile: *ipse quoque non tentat idem ille Deus, qui tentari nequit*; Wiesinger: "He, self-active;" so also Lange), but shows that the *πειράζειν* indeed takes place, but from another cause (*ἢ ἴδια ἐπιθυμία*) than from God. The meaning of the whole verse is as follows: Let no man, when he is tempted (inwardly enticed) to evil, say, From God I am tempted: for God suffers no temptation; but (*δέ*) as to the temptation, *He* (God) tempteth no man: but every man is tempted, etc.² As regards the apparent contradiction of this with other passages of the Holy Scriptures, where the sins of men are referred to God as their reason (Gen. xxii. 1; Deut. viii. 2, etc.), Calvin correctly remarks: *Quum Scriptura excoecationem vel obdurationem cordis tribuit Deo, neque illi initium assignat, neque facit mali auctorem, ut culpam sustinere debeat. In his autem duobus solum Jacobus insistit.*

Ver. 14. That "*πειράζεσθαι* proceeds not from God," is the thought of ver. 13. Whence comes it then? The answer is given in this verse: "*Every man is tempted, when he is drawn out and allured by his own lust.*" The words *ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδ. ἐπιθυμίας* belong not to *πειράζεται* (Theile, Wiesinger), but to *ἐξελκόμενος καὶ δελεαζόμενος* (Luther, Baumgarten, Semler, Knapp, Grashof, Hottinger, de Wette, Brückner, Lange,

commentary *ἀπίρ. κακ.* is explained as equivalent to "God has no experience of evil," and that it is said that the passive construction: "not tempted," "not temptable," is against grammatical usage and the connection! In a very strange manner he thinks it is here designed to strengthen the warning: *Let no man say*; for this *saying*, like all fanaticism, was a tempting God, and therefore vain and impious, because God does not suffer Himself to be tempted.

¹ Inapposite uniting of various explanations by Theile and Morus: *ἀπίρ. κακ.* dicitur, partim quoniam nullae miseriae possunt evenire Deo, partim quoniam per eas non potest inclinari ad peccandum, ad cupiditatem aliquam exercendam; Deus igitur est expers miseriae omnis atque etiam peccati vel pravae cupiditatis, et quia est, neque tentatur a malis ipse, neque alium tentat.

² The passage in Eccles. xv. 11, 12, 20, is especially to be compared: *μὴ εἴπῃς ὅτι διὰ κύριον ἀπίστην, μὴ εἴπῃς ὅτι αὐτός με ἐπλάνησεν. Οὐκ ἐνιστάται οὐδὲν ἀσεβῆναι καὶ οὐκ ἴδωκεν ἄνθρωπος οὐδὲν ἁμαρτάνειν.* See also 1 Cor. x. 13.

and others), as otherwise these ideas would drag too much, and would receive their closer reference only by supplying something, as *ὑπ' αὐτῆς* (Wiesinger). James will describe *πειράζεσθαι* according to its process; he therefore places the idea first, and then gives in what follows how it occurs, consequently the construction *πειράζεται . . . ἐξελκόμενος* requires not to be altered into *πειραζόμενος . . . ἐξελκύεται* (Schneckenburger). — *πειραζόμενος*, as is evident from what goes before, is to be supplied to *ἕκαστος*; it corresponds to *οὐδένα*, ver. 13. The attribute *ιδίας* is emphatic, expressing the contrast to *αὐτός* in ver. 13. It is brought prominently forward because *ἐπιθυμία* has its ground not in God, but belongs to man. — By *ἐπιθυμία* is not denoted "innocent sensuousness," but it occurs here, as *everywhere* in the N. T. (except where its specific object is named, as in Luke xxii. 15; Phil. i. 23; 1 Thess. ii. 17), even without the addition of *κακή, σαρκική*, or some similar adjectives, *in sensu malo*; yet it is not to be understood as *original sin*: "the sinful tendency, the same as Paul calls *ἁμαρτία* in Rom. vii. 7" (Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* I. p. 469; Wiesinger); rather *ἐπιθυμία* here is the same as in Rom. vii. 7, namely, lust for the forbidden action springing from original sin (which Paul designates as the *ἁμαρτία* which *χωρὶς νόμου* is "*νεκρά*," but by the commandment revives, and *πάσαν ἐπιθυμίαν κατεργάζεται*). So also Brückner.¹ — James does not here speak of the origin and development of sin in general, but he wishes to mention, in contrast to *ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι*, by what sinful man is tempted to the definite act of sin, so that he had no occasion to refer to

¹ According to Hofmann's explanation, the form of expression of James would be diametrically opposed to that of Paul; for what Paul calls *ἁμαρτία*, James would call *ἐπιθυμία*; and what Paul calls *ἐπιθυμία*, James would call *ἁμαρτία*! And how objectionable is it to say, with Wiesinger: *ἐπιθυμία*, when stirred up, produces those *ἐπιθυμίας σαρκός* in Gal. v. 16, 24, that *ἐπιθυμῶν* and that *ἐπιθυμία* in Rom. vii. 7, 8. It is also incorrect, with Lange, to understand by *ἡμῶν ἐπὶ* "original sin itself in its concrete activity," or "the folly which the individual encounters externally, over against which the lust belonging to him is objectively placed," and to determine the same more definitely as the totality of those "glittering, variegated, visionary expectations which seductively met both the Jews and the Jewish Christians, which had sprung from the matter of the chilastic, world-lusting, spiritual pride." James does not here speak of *ἐπιθυμία* as attacking an individual from outside, but *only* of that which is within him.

original sin. — With regard to the form of expression, Pott correctly says: ἐπιθυμία, ἁμαρτία et θάνατος personarum vim habent; imaginem meretricis suppeditant voces συλλαβεῖν, τίκτειν, ἀποκύειν, nec non et ἐξέλκειν atque δελεάζειν. The two words ἐξέλκειν and δελεάζειν sind verba e re venatoria et piscatoria in rem amatoriam et inde in nostrum tropium translata (Schneckenburger); this at least is valid of δελεάζειν. The meaning: protrahere in littus (Pott, and also de Wette), does not here lie at the root of the idea ἐξέλκειν (ἅπαξ λεγ. in N. T.), for then it would require to be placed after δελεάζειν (as also Wieseler, Brückner, and Lange observe); Schulthess more correctly explains it: elicere bestias ex tuto ubi latent in locum hannis retibusque expositum; but it is probable that James had not the original figure so definitely before his eyes. Many interpreters (Menochius, Grotius, Laurentius, Pott, Hottinger, Baumgarten, Theile, and others) supply a *bono* to ἐξέλκ. and a*l malo* to δελεάζ., or something similar; yet incorrectly, as the idea is rather that ἐπιθυμία as a harlot entices man, that is, his *will*, to herself; the ἐξ in ἐξέλκ. is thus to be explained, that man, enticed by the allurements of ἐπιθυμία, is enticed to forsake his former position (as the place where he remained hitherto concealed); Schneckenburger: statu quasi suo et loco se extrahi et dimoveri ipse patitur. It is incorrect to explain ἐξέλκειν as equivalent to προσέλκειν, or as an intensified form instead of ἔλκειν.¹ The being taken captive by ἐπιθυμία is indicated by δελεαζόμενος.² δελεάζειν, in the N. T. used here only and in 2 Pet. ii. 2, 14, 18, is also among classical writers used figuratively only in *sensu malo*; comp. particularly, Plato, *Tim.* lxi. 6: ἡδονὴ μερίστων κακῶν δέλεαρ; Plut. *de scr. Num. Vind.*: τὸ γλυκὺ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥσπερ δέλεαρ ἐξέλκειν (ἄνθρώπους).

Ver. 15. Continuing the image used in ver. 14, James in this verse describes what is the fruit which proceeds from δελεάζεσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἐπιθυμίας: *Lust having conceived*

¹ See Athenaeus, i. 3, c. 8: διὰ τὴν ὁμιλίαν τοὺς ἱμῶτας προσελκυσσάσθαι. Ael. N. An. vi. 31: ὑπὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἰλκόμενος.

² Lange: "To draw off and to allure—German: *Ablocken* and *Anlocken*; the man is first drawn out from his inward self-control and fortress, and then attracted (drawn to) by the allurements of the harlot."

(i.e. become pregnant) *bringeth forth sin, and sin when it is completed bringeth forth death.* The object of this representation is not to give a doctrine of sin,—its origin and its end,—but by indicating the *fruit* of *πειράζεσθαι*, to demonstrate that it is not from God. By *εἶτα* the *result* of *πειράζεσθαι*, namely *τίκτει ἁμαρτίαν*, is indicated as directly following upon it; *συλλαβοῦσα* forms the transition to it, which occurs by *ἐπιθυμία* taking the will of man captive; it, as it were, becomes pregnant, so that it bears sin. — *συλλαβοῦσα τίκτει*] corresponds to the Hebrew *הָלַךְ הָרָחָל*, which is uniformly in the LXX. translated by *συλλαβοῦσα ἔτεκε* (Gen. iv. 5, 17, xxx. 17, and other passages). By *ἁμαρτία* without the article, the fruit of *ἐπιθυμία*, according to its quality, is indicated in an entirely general manner. Sin born by lust again carries in itself its own fruit (*κύημα*), which, having come to completion, (*ἀποτελεσθεῖσα*), is brought forth out of itself (*ἀποκύει*). According to de Wette, by *ἁμαρτία* in the first clause is to be understood “the resolution or *internal act*,” but in the second clause (*ἡ ἁμαρτία ἀποτελεσθεῖσα*), “sin accomplished in the *external act*,” thus acts of sin. This, however, is incorrect, as —(1) by *ἡ δὲ ἁμαρτία* the *ἁμαρτία* already mentioned is again taken up, and therefore must have the same meaning; and (2) *ἀποτελεῖν ἁμαρτίαν* cannot mean “sin accomplished.”¹ Wiesinger, with regard to *τίκτει ἁμαρτίαν*, correctly observes: “*ἁμαρτία* is sin, but whether the internal or external act is not stated;” yet *ἀποτελεσθεῖσα* added in the following clause shows that James considered *ἁμαρτία* as something gradually developed, for *ἀποτελεῖν* is not equivalent to *τίκτειν* (so that *ἀποτελεσθεῖσα* would be = *τεχθεῖσα*, Baumgarten: “sin brought or produced into the world in such a manner”), but *completed*: thus *ἡ ἁμ. ἀποστ.* = “sin which has attained to its complete development.” It is not entirely corresponding to the idea of James when Calvin (with whom most recent critics—

¹ De Wette incorrectly appeals to the expression *ἀποτελεῖν ἐπιθυμίαν* in Plato, *Gorg.* p. 503 D, and *τελεῖν τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν*, as there *ἐπιθυμία* and *ἁμαρτία* are not similar, but different ideas. When Wiesinger, against the explanation of de Wette, says that *συλλαβοῦσα* indicates that “the will consents to the demand of the desire, which is the resolution or internal act,” it is, on the contrary, to be observed that these two are by no means identical, as the resolution is an act of the will, and thus is actually sin, whilst by *συλλαβοῦσα* is indicated a point preceding *τίκτειν ἁμαρτίαν*.

Kern, Schneckenburger, Theile, Wiesinger, and others—agree) explains it as “the entire sinful life” (non unum aliquod opus perpetratum, sed cursus peccandi completus; vita impia et scelerata). As James considers ἁμαρτία itself personified, it is ἀποτελεσθεῖσα when it has grown to such fulness of power that it rules man’s whole life. According to this idea, it is indeed correct when several interpreters explain ἀποτελ. by adulta; thus Bouman: peccatum, quum ad adultam pervenit aetatem; yet, linguistically, this explanation is not to be justified, as ἀποτελεῖσθαι is not equivalent to adolescere. The explanation given in the earlier edition of this commentary, that by ἁμαρτία is meant the *act* of sin, is erroneous, because such a limitation of the general idea is not indicated; on this account it is not correct to think on ἐπιθυμία and ἁμαρτία as a single definite lust and sin. — Brückner considers the addition of ἀποτελεσθεῖσα is made only “in order that ἁμαρτία, which was at first represented as a child, might again be *represented* as a mother.” This, however, is incorrect; the origin and growth (or, more correctly, the completion) of sin by no means occur “in reality together at one moment;” sin bears death, which it carried in itself at the first, only when it is not interrupted in its development by a higher life-power, but has attained to its complete form. — By θάνατος, by which James indicates the fruit of *completed* sin according to its nature, is to be understood, not only *temporary* death (Pott: homines peccando mortales factos esse omnes consentiunt N. T. scriptores), but, as the opposite of the ζωή which God has promised, and will give to them who love Him, *eternal* death; see Rom. vi. 23: τὰ ὀψώνια τῆς ἁμαρτίας, θάνατος· τὸ δὲ χάρισμα Θεοῦ, ζωὴ αἰώνιος. If, therefore, nothing but θάνατος is the end to which πευράζεσθαι conducts, this cannot possibly have its reason in God, who works ζωή, and therefore it is absurd to say ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πευράζομαι (ver. 13). — The expression ἀποκύνει (only here and in ver. 18 in the N. T.) is distinguished from τίκτει only in this, that it indicates more definitely that ἁμαρτία from the beginning is pregnant with θάνατος. By the explanation: meretur mortem (Bede, Laurentius, and others), a relation is introduced foreign to the context. On the mode of writing ἀποκυεῖ and ἀποκύνει, see Winer, p. 80 [E. T. 107]; Schirlitz, p. 184 f.

Ver. 16 introduces the statement which follows as one particularly important. Not only the exhortation: *μὴ πλανᾶσθε*, but also the added address: *ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί*, shows how important this observation appeared to the author. A *new* line of thought, unconnected with the preceding, does not indeed begin with this verse; *μὴ πλανᾶσθε* must not therefore be considered, with Hornejus, Gebser, and others, only as the concluding formula to what goes before. Theile correctly observes: *ubi antecedentia respicit, nunquam finit cohortationem, sed ita interpositum est, ut continuet ac firmet, nunc illustrando, nunc cavendo.* The same formula is found in 1 Cor. vi. 9, xv. 33; Gal. vi. 7 (similarly 1 John iii. 7); in all those places it precedes a thought certain to the Christian conscience, by which a preceding expression is confirmed in opposition to a false opinion: this is also the case here. Grotius inserts an entirely foreign reference when he says: *hoc vult: ne putate vestrum studium sufficere sine precibus*; see Luke xviii. 1. There is here no reference whatever to prayer.

Ver. 17. The sentiment in this verse, introduced by ver. 16, is designed for the complete rejection of *ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι*; the *good* comes from God, therefore *πειράζεσθαι* cannot come from God. The idea of the *good* is indicated by two synonymous expressions: *δόσις ἀγαθῆ* and *δώρημα τέλειον*. By *δόσις*, which has here not an active, as in Phil. iv. 5 (Bouman, Lange), but a passive signification (as frequently in classical Greek and in the Apocrypha), and by *δώρημα*, the same thing is indicated—in contrast to *ἰδία ἐπιθυμία*, ver. 14—as something given and presented, which thus proceeds not from man himself. By *δώρημα τέλειον* the idea already contained in *δόσις ἀγαθῆ* is heightened, *δώρημα* more definitely indicating the gift (*δόσις*) as a *free present* (which Gunkel incorrectly denies; see Rom. v. 16, where *δώρημα* is parallel with *χάρισμα*), and *τέλειον* the idea of the good (*ἀγαθῆ*) as *morally perfect*.¹ It is arbitrary to refer the two

¹ Whilst de Wette finds the emphasis only in the adjectives, Theile correctly remarks: *Et substantiva et adjectiva differunt ita, ut posterius priore sit definitius ideoque majus.* So also Wiesinger and Brückner. Lange by *δώρ. τέλ.* understands "the gift of God completed in Christianity;" and by *δέσ. ἀγ.* "everything which served to prepare this completed gift, especially in the old covenant."

expressions to *different* gifts, and by *δόσεις* to understand the gifts of the kingdom of nature or of the present life, and by *δώρημα* those of the kingdom of grace or of the future life. Also *ἀγαθή* is not, with Didymus, to be restricted to the idea of the useful. Several interpreters (Raphelius, Stolz, Rosenmüller, Bengel, Augusti, Pott, Hottinger, and others) put an exclusive force on *πᾶς*, as if it were = *non nisi*, "nothing but;" but the thought is weakened thereby. James designs to say not only—in contrast to the derivation of *πειράζεσθαι* from God—that *only* good (thus not evil) gifts come from Him, but likewise that good gifts all come only from God (thus from none else) (Stier); *πᾶς* is accordingly to be taken in its usual meaning; but *ἀγαθή* and *τέλειον* are to be emphasized. Schneckenburger arbitrarily explains it as if James had written: *πᾶσα δόσις καὶ πᾶν δώρημα ἄνωθεν καταβαῖνον τέλειόν ἐστι.*¹ — *ἄνωθεν*] = *οὐράνοθεν* (Acts xiv. 17, xxvi. 13; *ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*, John vi. 32, 33), is put first for the sake of emphasis. — *ἐστι καταβαῖνον*] are not, with Wolf, Bengel, Kern, Bouman, and others, to be separated, so that *ἐστι* is to be joined to *ἄνωθεν*, and *καταβαῖνον* is added as an epexegetis; but to be united, and are put instead of *καταβαίνει*, only that by the participle the quality of the verbal idea is more brought out; see chap. iii. 15; so also Wiesinger and A. Buttmann, p. 266 [E. T. 310]; Winer, p. 311 [E. T. 438], and Schirlitz, p. 317, on the other hand, regard the expression as entirely equivalent to *καταβαίνει*. — The expression *καταβαῖνον* is explained from *ἄνωθεν*. The explanation of Laurentius: *non cadens, sed descendens, quia ordinariè bona sua dona dat*, is far-fetched. — *ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν φώτων*] an epexegetis to the preceding. By *τὰ φῶτα* is to be understood neither spiritual light, whether knowledge (Hornejus), or joy (Michaelis), or goodness, wisdom (Wolf: *omnis perfectio, bonitas, sapientia et prosperitas*), or something similar, nor the spirits of light (*Schol. ap. Matt.*: *ἦτοι τῶν ἀγγελικῶν δυνάμεων ἢ τῶν πεφωτισμένων ἀνθρώπων*; Lange: "the whole series of organs of revelation from Abraham to Christ, as the representatives of all good spirits"). Nor is there here any allusion to the Urim and Thummim

¹ On the accidental hexameter which the words *πᾶσα . . . τέλειον* form, see Winer, p. 564 [E. T. 793].

of the high priest (Heisen); but by it are meant, as almost all modern expositors recognise, *the heavenly bodies* (see LXX. Ps. cxxxv. (cxxxvi.) 7; Jer. iv. 23) = *φωστῆρες*, LXX. Gen. i. 14. God is designated as the *πατήρ* of these, because He is their Creator and Preserver. This designation, for which Job xxxviii. 28 cannot be appealed to, is surprising, as it is without analogy either in the O. or N. T. (otherwise with profane writers and Philo). It has, however, its ground in this, that James considers the light of the heavenly bodies as a reflection of the essential light of God. Since God is the Father of light, the symbol of the holy ones (Wiesinger), so He Himself must be light, and thus nothing dark (consequently not *πειράζεσθαι*), but rather only all that is light, can proceed from Him. As the Father of lights, God, however, outshines these: their light is changing; His, on the contrary, is without change. The following words: *with whom there is no variation nor shadow (in consequence) of change*, express this idea; i.e., whilst with the stars a *παραλλαγή* or *τροπῆς ἀποσκίασμα* occurs, there is nothing similar to this with God.¹ According to Grotius, with whom various expositors agree, these expressions are *termini technici* of astronomy. But, in opposition to this, it is to be observed that *παραλλαγή* never occurs as an astronomical term (see Gebser *in loco*), and the astronomical signification of *τροπή* = solstitium, solstice (*τροπαὶ θεριναί* and *χειμεριναί*; comp. Wisd. vii. 18: *τροπῶν ἀλλαγάς*), is not here suitable, as the sun is not mentioned specially, nor is an *ἀποσκίασμα* effected by the solstice. James here uses not the language of astronomy, but that of ordinary life (Wiesinger). — *παραλλαγή* is to be understood quite generally, *variation*. James adds to this general idea, in order to bring prominently forward that the essential light of God is not, as is the case with the stars, obscured by anything, the more definite idea *τροπῆς ἀποσκίασμα*. *ἀποσκίασμα* has not an active (de Wette: “casting a shadow”), but a passive signification, *being shaded*

¹ Flatt (*Spicil. obserratt. ad ep. Jacobi*): Auctor siderum nitidorum ipsis etiam nitidior et nitoris, nullis unquam tenebris interrupti, majori constantia fulgens. Similarly it is said of Wisdom: ἵστί γάρ αὕτη ὑπερτίστέρα ἡλίου, καὶ ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀστέρων τίσιν, φωτὶ συγκρινόμενη εὐρίσκειται πριτίτῃ, Wisdom of Solomon vii. 29.

(so Brückner); and τροπής assigns the reason (ἀποσκίασμα quae oritur e τροπή, Schneckenburger): thus the shadowing of the stars, which is effected by *their changeable position*:¹ for that James has founded his idea in a change in the stars themselves is not probable.² Luther's translation: "the change of light and darkness" (similarly Stolz: "changing obscuration"), is only justified if it were said τροπή ἀποσκίασματος. Deviating entirely from the above explanation, the Greek interpreters take ἀποσκίασμα = ἔχνος; Oecumenius: ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐδὲ μέχρις ὑπονοίας τινὸς ὑποβολή; Suidas: ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀλλοιωσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς ἔχνος καὶ ὁμοίωμα φαντασίας; and following them several recent writers; Morus: ne tantillum mutationes; Rosenmüller: no shadow of change; so Hensler and others. But in this signification ἀποσκίασμα never elsewhere occurs; also the here *essential* idea of obscuration (Bengel: ἀποσκίασμα, *opponitur luminibus*) would be lost. — The form ἐνι (besides here in the N. T. in 1 Cor. vi. 5; Gal. iii. 28; Col. iii. 11) is not, with Buttmann, II. 375; Winer, p. 74 [E. T. 96]; Schirlitz, 171, and others, to be taken as a peculiar form of ἐν, but is the abbreviation of ἐνεστι (A. Buttmann, p. 64 [E. T. 72]); comp. 1 Cor. vi. 5: οὐκ ἐνι ἐν ὑμῶν σοφὸς οὐδὲ εἷς (see Meyer *in loco*). ἐνι, however, is not, with Pott, to be explained as precisely equivalent with ἐστιν, yet the meaning of the preposition ἐν is so weakened, as the verb could be construed with any other preposition, as here with the preposition παρά, which here, as frequently in the N. T., stands for "what spiritually belongs to another, is in another's possession;" Demosthenes, *de cor.* p. 318, 13: εἰ δ' οὖν ἐστι καὶ παρ' ἐμοί τις ἐμπειρία τοιαύτη.

Ver. 18. Most interpreters subordinate the thought contained in this verse to the preceding, regarding it either as an *example* (Laurentius: loquitur Ap. in his verbis de gene-

¹ Incorrectly Lange explains the expression: "of the obscuration of the earth effected by the diurnal phenomenal revolution of the sun, moon, and stars." And the proper idea which James has in view is, according to Lange, that God "makes no revolution with the Old Testament which would cast a night-shadow on the New, nor does He suffer the New Testament to cast a night-shadow on the Old!"

² Without reason, Baumgarten, Schneckenburger, and others assume that James here alludes to the astrological superstitions of the Jews.

ratione spirituali ut sit quasi exemplum aliquod istorum donorum spiritualium, quae sunt desuper) or as a *confirmation* and a *proof* (thus Gebser, Kern, Wiesinger, Bouman; also Lange¹); on the contrary, according to Theile and de Wette,² its relation is that of co-ordination. But in both explanations the peculiar significance which this verse has in the context is mistaken. It is to be recognised as a *principal thought*, not only because the succeeding exhortations flow from it, but also because the preceding development only comes to its close in it; whilst only in βουληθεὶς ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς is not only the assertion ἀπὸ Θεοῦ πειράζομαι completely refuted, but also all the earlier mentioned assertions have their sure foundation. It is accordingly not a confirmation of ver. 17, but rather a *special* inference from the *general* idea of that verse. — βουληθεὶς ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς] The verb itself testifies that here the discourse is of the new birth, and not of natural birth, for ἀποκύειν is synonymous with γεννᾶν; but the man γεγεννημένος ἐκ Θεοῦ (1 John iii. 9; see also 1 Pet. i. 23) is not man in himself, but man born again. Unsatisfactorily Pott explains ἀποκύειν = *facere, efficere*, since by this the specific idea of the verb, that the foundation of the life of him who is born again lies in God, and that he is *θείας φύσεως κοινωνός* (2 Pet. i. 4), is lost. — ἡμᾶς] not *us* as men, nor *us* as *Jewish* Christians, but *us* as Christians. — The verse emphatically commences with βουληθεὶς, by which is expressed not a contrast to the merit of human works (Bede: non nostris, sed beneficio suae voluntatis; similarly Calvin, Hornejus, Grotius, etc.), nor to “the Jewish claims of righteousness” (Lange), but it is designed prominently to bring forward the thought that the new birth rests on the divine *will*—the work is that which God has peculiarly *willed*. But if this be the case, how can πειράζεσθαι proceed from Him? Without sufficient reason, Bengel, Kern, Schneckenburger, Wiesinger, and others put the additional idea of *love* in βουληθεὶς.³ — λόγῳ ἀληθείας] The instrument of ἀποκυνῆσαι

¹ Lange strangely designates the new birth as the effect of the *ἔρχμα πίπτον* which came down from heaven.

² Theile: Deus, luminum pater, *etiam* parens est generationis nostrae. De Wette: In place of all good gifts, the gracious gift of the Christian salvation is *likewise* mentioned as a proof that God can be no tempter.

³ Bengel: voluntate amantissima. Schneckenburger: non merum volendi actum sed benignam et benigna voluntate ortam volitionem exprimit. The

is the *λογος ἀληθείας*, that is, the gospel,¹ which is so called because "*ἀληθεία* in its entire reality is inherent in it" (Harless on Eph. i. 13). The words: *εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἡμᾶς ἀπαρχὴν τινα τῶν αὐτοῦ κτισμάτων*] express the aim of this new birth, by which is not indicated what Christians, as those who are born of God, ought to *become*, but what they *are*, according to the intention of God.² By *τινα* added to *ἀπαρχήν* the mode of expression is indicated as figurative, for, as Calvin correctly remarks, *τινα* similitudinis est nota, nos quodammodo esse primitias (so also Gebser, Hottinger, Kern, Wiesinger, and others). Also Bengel recognises this, but he puts therein a false reference, observing: *quaedam* habet *modestiam*, nam *primitiae* proprie et absolute est Christus. Still more incorrect is it, with Lange, to explain *τινα*, that James considered the angels of God as a different kind of first-fruits of creation. Laurentius correctly says: *ἀπαρχή* allusio est ad ritum legalem in Vetum Testamentum de consecratione primogenitorum, frugum, jumentorum et hominum (so also Calvin, Hornejus, Wiesinger, and others; unsatisfactorily de Wette: "chosen and holy"). The word has here, as everywhere in the O. T., and predominantly among the classics, a religious signification, namely, "*the first-fruits dedicated to God*;" so that James by this expression indicates Christians, as a fruit dedicated to the service of God. But *ἡμᾶς* emphatically repeated shows that James does not here state the nature of Christians generally, but what the position is which he and those Christians occupy who, according to Rom. viii. 23, possess *τὴν ἀπαρχὴν τοῦ πνεύματος* (see Meyer *in loco*). They are a kind of first-fruits of God's creatures, because they, as being born of God, are dedicated to God *first* among all His creatures. The glorification, which is destined for the whole world, was first

view of Occumenius is evidently entirely perverted: τὸ βουλευθεὶς εἶπεν, ἐπιστομίζων τοὺς αὐτομάτως ὑποστῆναι τὸς τὸ πᾶν ληροῦντας.

¹ If the want of the article should constrain us to translate *λόγος ἀληθείας* "a word of truth," that is, a word whose nature is truth (see Meyer on 2 Cor. vi. 7), yet by this word of truth here the gospel can only be understood; but it is more probable that the article is omitted because *λόγος ἀληθείας*, as an idea definite in itself, did not require the article to designate it.

² According to Lange's supposition, "this teleological mode of expression is chosen in order to indicate that the *Jews* should *become* what *Christians* already *are*." This is purely arbitrary, as such a distinction is not indicated in the very slightest degree.

imparted to Christians then living.¹ In the N. T. *ἀπαρχή* is sometimes so used that the religious signification steps into the background (thus in 1 Cor. xv. 20, 23; Rom. viii. 23, xvi. 5; 1 Cor. xvi. 15; otherwise in Rom. xi. 16 and Rev. xiv. 5); and accordingly several expositors explain the expression of James as equivalent to οἱ πρῶτοι τῶν κτισμάτων αὐτοῦ. But against this is, on the one hand, the added *τινα*, and on the other hand, the existing necessity of conceiving as added to κτισμάτων an attribute, as νέων or καίνων, since the expression τὰ κτίσματα Θεοῦ is not taken by itself, those who are born again, but generally, *the creatures of God*. It is still more arbitrary to take ἀπαρχή as equivalent to πρῶτοι, in the sense of τιμιώτατοι (Oecumenius; Morus: omnium creaturarum carissimi et dignissimi; the favourites among His creatures), and then to refer the verse to the dignity of man generally, as the Scholiast explains: τὴν ὀρωμένην κτίσιν φησίν, ἧς τιμιώτερον τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔδειξεν.² By αὐτοῦ (Lachmann and Buttmann, αὐτοῦ; Tischendorf, ἐαυτοῦ), emphatically added, the creatures are indicated as God's property.

Ver. 19. To ver. 18 is annexed at first the exhortation to *hear*, and then in ver. 22 the more extended exhortation, not only to be hearers, but also doers of the word. By the reading ὥστε, the connection with the preceding is evidently expressed, ὥστε being with the following imperative, as in 1 Cor. iii. 21, Phil. ii. 12 = *itaque, therefore*. This reading is, however, suspicious, as not only predominant authorities declare for the reading ἵστε, but also ἵστε might be easily changed into ὥστε, in order to mark the thoughts in this verse as an inference from ver. 18. It is true the δέ after ἔστω, conjoined with this reading (in B and C), appears to be harsh; but it may be explained from this, that the sentence ἔστω . . . ταχὺς

¹ It is, however, also possible that James by *ἡμῶς* has had in view, not the distinction between the then existing and the later Christians, but only the distinction between Christians and the other creatures, since Christians of all ages form the ἀπαρχὴ τῶν κτισμάτων, until the commencement of the world's glorification. Lange with truth brings forward the idea that if Christians are ἀπαρχή, they are sureties for the future glorification of the world; but that the first believers of Israel in their unity are sureties for the future conversion of the nation, is an introduced idea which is not indicated by James.

² Thus Schulthess: divino rationis et orationis munere, ejus ex tot animalium generibus atque naturis homo solus est particeps, principatum dignitatis ei datum cernimus.

εἰς τὸ ἀκοῦσαι κ.τ.λ. is introduced as being almost a proverbial expression. The reading of A: ἔστε δὲ . . . καὶ ἔστω, appears to be a correction, in order to unite this verse more closely with the preceding. ἔστε may be either indicative (comp. Heb. xii. 17; usually οἶδατε) or imperative; it is at all events to be referred, not to what goes before,¹ but to what follows, as otherwise τοῦτο, or something similar, by which it would be referred back to ver. 18, would require to be added. Semler explains it as an indicative, paraphrasing it: non ignoratis istud carmen; Eccus. v. 11: γίνου ταχὺς ἐν ἀκροάσει σου κ.τ.λ. As, however, the sentence in question is here expressed in different words, so it is not to be assumed that James would here refer to that passage in Ecclesiasticus. It is thus better to consider ἔστε as an imperative, as it then corresponds to μὴ πλανᾶσθε (ver. 16), and serves strongly to impress the following sentence on the readers, in favour of which also is the address ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί, added here as well as there; see also chap. ii. 5: ἀκούσατε, ἀδ. μ. ἀγ. — The sentence is entirely general: *let every man be swift to hear, slow to speak, slow to wrath.* Whilst Laurentius and others consider this as a *sententia generalis*, which stands in no internal connection with the preceding, but is pressed upon the readers in its entire generality, most interpreters supply to ἀκοῦσαι directly taken from the preceding τὸν λόγον ἀληθείας; thus Estius, Gataker, Gomar, Piscator, Hornejus, Baumgarten, Rosenmüller, Pott, Hottinger, Gebser, de Wette, Wiesinger, and others; but this is arbitrary, particularly as πᾶς ἄνθρωπος points to the universality of the sentence. However, the intention of James is not to inculcate it on his readers in its general sense, but he wishes rather that they, as Christians, should apply it to their Christian conduct; so that for them ἀκοῦσαι certainly refers to λόγος τῆς ἀληθείας (Heisen, Schneckenburger,² Theile). ὑμῶν is therefore not to be supplied to πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, still we may say with Semler: pertinet ad Christianos, quatenus sunt Christiani; but the expression is, as

¹ De Wette explains it: "Ye know this, namely, that He has regenerated us;" but this, as he himself confesses, gives a wholly unsatisfactory sense.

² Schneckenburger: quamvis de sensu dubitari nequeat, nempe de addiscendo λόγῳ ἀληθείας caveas tamen vocem hanc λόγον putes grammaticè subaudiendam; sed Jacobus regulam istam generalem . . . ita hic subnectit, ut eam ad rem christianam imprimis valere moneat.

part of the general sentence, likewise to be retained in its general meaning; but what holds good of all men, in a peculiar manner holds good of Christians. — The ideas *ταχύς* and *βραδύς*, in the N. T. only here (in Luke xxiv. 25, *βραδύς* has a different meaning), form a direct contrast; as in Philo, *de conf. ling.* p. 327 B: *βραδύς ὠφελεῖσαι, ταχύς βλάψαι* (see *Dio O.* 32). By *βραδύς εἰς ὀργήν* added to the second clause, James announces what kind of speaking he means, namely, speaking *ἐξ ὀργῆς*.¹ But from ver. 20 it is evident that by *ὀργή* —which, as Cremer correctly remarks, denotes not the passive affection, but active displeasure directed toward any one—is to be understood sinful and passionate zeal. *βραδύς* is to be taken in both clauses in the same sense, which—as is often the case with expressions in figurative language—goes beyond the literal and direct idea of the word, as Hornejus correctly explains it in reference to the *second* clause: *ita jubet tardos ad iram esse, ut ab eo nos prorsus retrahat*. Several expositors refer both clauses, others at least the second chiefly or alone, to the conduct toward God, with or without an express reference to ver. 13.² But this is incorrect; the *ὀργή* to which James alludes is rather carnal zeal, which will censure its neighbour, whose fruit is not *εἰρήνη*, but *ἀκαταστασία* (chap. iii. 16). The warning is addressed to those Christians who misuse the gospel (the *λόγος ἀληθείας*) as the Pharisees did the law, not for their own sanctification, but for the gratification of their censoriousness and quarrelsome temper; see chap. iii. Although James with this exhortation has specially in view

¹ The circumstance is in favour of this close connection of these two last clauses, that if *λαλῆσαι* is here taken in a wider sense (as Gunkel thinks), then a different signification must be given to *βραδύς* in the two clauses, as *ἐργή* here, as the following verse shows, must be taken in a bad sense. Lange thinks that James does not absolutely reject *ἐργή*; but whilst he understands by *ἐργή* eagerness of passion to which one is led from eagerness in speaking by warmth, he evidently understands this as something to be entirely rejected. According to Bouman, the anger here is meant to which one is inflamed by the *αλλήλων* of another.

² On *βραδ.* *εἰς τὸ λαλ.* Bengel remarks: *ut nil loquatur contra Deum, nec sinistre de Deo*; and on *ὀργή*: *ira sive impatientia erga Deum, iracundia erga proximum*. Gebser explains *ἐργή* = anger, displeasure at God on account of the persecutions. Calvin also has this reference in view when he says: *certe nemo unquam bonus erit Dei discipulus nisi qui silendo eum audiat*; . . . *non enim Deus nisi sedato animo audiri potest*, as is evident from the note: (Jacobus) *vult proterviam nostram corripere, ne . . . intempestive obstrepamus Deo*.

the conduct of Christians in their assemblies, yet λαλήσαι must not be restricted to the idea of mere *teaching* (Bede, Hornejus, Hottinger, de Wette, Brückner, and others). λαλήσαι is a more comprehensive term than διδάσκειν, which is included in it.

Ver. 20 gives the reason of the exhortation βραδὺς εἰς ὀργήν: *for the wrath of man works not the righteousness of God.* The preponderance of authorities decides against the reading κατεργάζεται, and in favour of ἐργάζεται. From the fact that δικαιοσύνην is twice in the N. T., namely Acts x. 35 and Heb. xi. 33, joined with the simple verb, it does not follow that ἐργάζεται is a later correction (against de Wette, Wiesinger), especially as κατεργάζεσθαι is also found united with abstract substantives, as in Rom. i. 27 with τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην, in Rom. ii. 9 with τὸ κακόν, and in Rom. vii. 18 with τὸ καλόν. With the reading ἐργάζεται, — and also with κατεργάζεται, when this latter, as is frequently the case (see especially Rom. ii. 9, 10), is synonymous with the former, — δικαιοσύνη is equivalent to τὸ δίκαιον, as is frequently the case in the O. and N. T.; see Acts x. 35 above referred to, and the frequently occurring phrase: ποιεῖν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, Gen. xviii. 19; Isa. lvi. 1; Matt. vi. 1; 1 John ii. 29, iii. 7, 10; Rev. xxii. 11. Θεοῦ is added in contrast to ἀνδρός for the sake of a more exact statement, so that δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ is *the righteousness willed by God*¹ (similar to τὸ δίκαιον ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ, Acts iv. 19; Luther: “the wrath of man works not that which is right before God”); so Beza, Hornejus, Wolf, Bengel, de Wette, Bouman, and others correctly explain it. The opposite of δικαιοσύνην Θεοῦ ἐργάζεσθαι is ἁμαρτίαν ἐργάζεσθαι, chap. ii. 9 (comp. Matt. vii. 1: ἐργαζ. τὴν ἀνομίαν; 1 Macc. ix. 23: ἐργαζ. τὴν ἀδικίαν; also comp. Rom. ii. 10: ἐργαζ. τὸ ἀγαθόν; Gal. vi. 10). James was the more constrained to give prominence to this idea, as ὀργή itself and the words flowing from it were considered by the pharisaical disposition of

¹ It is true the expression δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ occurs not elsewhere in this sense; but this can be the less an objection to it, as the relation in which the genitive Θεοῦ is placed to δικαιοσύνη is not entirely opposed to the genitive of relation, as is evident if we designate the δικ. Θ. as that δικαιοσύνη which is actually so according to the determination of God.

Christians, against whom this warning is directed, and of whom it was said: *ζῆλον Θεοῦ ἔχουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν*, Rom. x. 2, as something that was pleasing to God. With the reading *κατεργάζεται* this verb may also be equivalent to effect, to bring about (as ver. 3). Gebser, Grashof, and others understand, in accordance with this view, by *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*: "the condition of justification before God;" but, on the one hand, an unsuitable thought is expressed by this, and, on the other hand, a mode of expressing the idea *δικαιοσύνη τοῦ Θεοῦ*, peculiar to Paul, is without ceremony ascribed to James. But as little is it to be justified when Wiesinger, following Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* I. ed. 1, p. 548 f.), finds expressed in the words of James, that "one by wrathful zeal effects not *on others* the *δικ. Θεοῦ*, i.e. that state of righteousness in which God begets men by His word of truth."¹ Though *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* can denote the righteousness wrought by God, yet this idea is here unsuitable, since no man could entertain the opinion that his wrath could do what can only be effected by God. Also in this case James would only emphasize an impossibility of *ὀργή*, whereas he was required to bring prominently forward its rejection; moreover, *on others* is inserted into the text.² The same reasons are also decisive against the explanation of Brückner ("the wrath of man works not the righteousness which God accomplishes — this generally stated both in respect to the *ἀνὴρ* and in respect to others on whom one strives to work"), in which a twofold reference is arbitrarily assumed. Brückner correctly rejects the explanation of Lange, that James speaks against "the delusion of wrath, which imagines to administer

¹ In the second edition (p. 628), Hofmann has indeed altered the words, but not the thought, in the explanation given in the first edition. When he defines the distinction in the use of the idea *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ*, in Rom. i. 17 and here, to consist in this, that Paul speaks of justification, in James of regeneration, the untenableness of his explanation is the more evident, for that *ὀργή* produces regeneration could occur to no one.

² Contrary to the Biblical use of language, Occumenius explains the expression *δικαιοσύνη* as equivalent to *ἔξις ἐν ψυχῇ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκάστη ἀπονημητική*. Pott wholly arbitrarily refers the verse to the teachers of the Christian religion, paraphrasing it: *iratus nequit docere religionem christianum prout fas est Deoque probatur*. — Several commentators (also Kern) to this verse cite Ecclus. i. 21: *οὐ δυνήσεται θυμὸς ἄδικος δικαιοῦναι*; but incorrectly, since *δικαιοῦναι* has an entirely different meaning from *κατεργάζεσθαι δικαιοσύνην Θεοῦ*.

and accomplish in the world the righteousness of God especially against unbelievers," because there is no reference to this in the context; it is, moreover, linguistically unmain-
tainable, as ἐργάζεσθαι does not mean "to administer and accomplish." — ἀνδρός stands here as in vv. 8 and 12; it forms a contrast neither to the *child* (Thomas: ira fortis et deliberate non dicit pueri, qui cito transit), nor to the *woman* (Bengel: sexus virilis maxime iram alit), nor to ἄνθρωπος, ver. 19 (Lange).

Ver. 21. James infers (διό) from the thought in ver. 20 the exhortation ἐν πραύτητι δέξασθε τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον, with evident reference to ἀπεκύησεν ἡμᾶς λόγῳ ἀληθείας (ver. 18). He places before this exhortation the participial clause: ἀποθέμενοι . . . κακίας] *laying aside all filthiness and abundance of wickedness*, i.e. *all filthy and abundantly prevalent wickedness*. The word ῥυπαρία (ἄπ. λεγ. in the N. T.) is here figurative (synonymous with ἀκαθαρσία in Rom. vi. 19 and other places), as ῥυπαρός and ῥυπαρεύω, Rev. xxii. 11 (ῥυπαρός occurs in its literal sense in chap. ii. 2: ῥύπος in 1 Pet. iii. 21). Several interpreters (Calvin, Rosenmüller, Baumgarten, Hornejus, Bouman, Lange, and others) take it here as standing alone, equivalent to *moral uncleanness* (see 2 Cor. vii. 1: πᾶς μολυσμὸς σαρκὸς καὶ πνεύματος), either generally "every immoral disposition," or specifically as avaritia (Storr), or scortatio (Laurentius), or vitia intemperantiae, gulae et lasciviae (Heisen), or "filth in a religious theocratical sense" (Lange); but it is better to join ῥυπαρίαν with κακίας (Theile, de Wette, Wiesinger, and others), so that the ethical judgment of the author on the κακία is thereby expressed (comp. Acts xv. 20; Rev. xvii. 4), equivalent to πᾶσαν κακίαν ῥυπαράν, or less exactly ῥυπαίνουσιν τὸν ἄνθρωπον (*Schol. on Matt.*); only the idea is more strongly brought forward by the substantive than by the adjective. The word περισσεία, united to ῥυπαρίαν by the copulative καί (not as Schneckenburger thinks exegetical; in the cited passages, John i. 16 and 1 Cor. iii. 5, the position of καί is entirely different), foreign to classical Greek, has in the N. T. the signification *abundance*, properly: "abundance flowing over the measure," which Lange incorrectly renders "outflow, communication of life;" see Rom. v. 17; 2 Cor. viii. 2, x. 15. Nevertheless

the word has been here taken in a meaning corresponding to *ῥυπαρία*, and has been explained as = *περίσσωμα* excrementum (Beza, Piscator, Erasmus, Schmid, and others), or also *growth* (Lösner, Pott, Hottinger, Kern, Schneckenburger, de Wette). But both meanings are arbitrary. The defenders of the second explanation indeed appeal to the passage in Philo, *de vict. off.* p. 854 B: *περιτέμνεσθε . . . τὰς περιττὰς φύσεις* (fortasse *ἐμφύσεις*, de Wette) *τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ*; but from this passage it does not follow that *περισσεία* can be explained *de ramis in vite vel arbore abundantibus falceque resecandis* (Lösner). It is equally unjustifiable when Küttner, Michaelis, Augusti, Gebser, Bouman, and others explain *περισσεία κακίας* as "*κακία* surviving from earlier times," and thus take *περισσεία* as synonymous with *περίσσευμα* (Mark viii. 8). Against all these arbitrary views Theile, Wiesinger, Brückner correctly retain the word in the same sense which it has elsewhere in the N. T., so that *περισσεία κακίας* is the *abundance of κακία*, i.e. the abundantly existing *κακία*; only *ἐν ὑμῖν* is hardly to be supplied as if James had only his readers specially in view (Theile: *quod lectoribus peculiare erat*). — *Κακία* is not here synonymous with *πονηρία* (1 Cor. v. 8) = *vitiositas* (Semler, Theile, and others), but, according to the context, in contrast with *ἐν πραύτητι*, as in Eph. iv. 31, Col. iii. 8, Tit. iii. 3, 1 Pet. ii. 1, a more special idea, namely, the hostile disposition toward our neighbour which we call *malignity* (Cremer: *malevolence*, as *social faultiness*). Wiesinger inaccurately takes it as equivalent to *ὀργή*, as *that* is only one of the proofs of *κακία*; incorrectly Rosenmüller: *morositas*.¹ On *ἀποθέμενοι*, comp. Eph. iv. 25; 1 Pet. ii. 1; Heb. xii. 1.² The participle precedes as a subordinate thought to *δέξασθε*, because in consequence of man's sinful nature room can only be made for the good by the rejection of the

¹ Meyer's translation: *malice* (Rom. i. 29), *malicious disposition* (Col. iii. 8), would also not be entirely suitable, but too special. How Luther has understood the idea cannot be determined from his translation *wickedness* (*Bosheit*): since he thus constantly renders *κακία*, it may be taken in a general or in a special sense; the word *badness* (*Schlechtigkeit*) does not occur with him.

² To the assertion of Lange, that *ἀποτίμωμι* is not to be rendered *putting off*, because the reference is not figuratively to the putting off of filthy garments, but *removing*; the passages Rom. xiii. 12 (*ἀποτίμωμι* . . . *ἰδυστάμι*) and Eph. iv. 22, 24, and the etymology of the word are opposed.

bad. Also, where similar sentences are co-ordinate, the exhortation to ἀποτίθεσθαι precedes; comp. Rom. xiii. 12, Eph. iv. 22, 23, and also the exhortation of Christ: μετανοεῖτε καὶ πιστεύετε, Mark i. 15. — In the positive exhortation: ἐν πραύτητι δέξασθε τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον] ἐν πραύτητι emphatically precedes, in contrast to the κακία from which flows ὀργή. πραύτης (= πραότης) denotes a loving, gentle disposition toward our neighbour; comp. 1 Cor. iv. 21, 2 Tim. ii. 25, Tit. iii. 2, and other passages; the opposite is ὀριλότης (Pape's *Gr. Wörterb.*); incorrectly Calvin: hoc verbo significat modestiam et facilitatem mentis ad discendum compositae. ἐν πραύτητι does not therefore mean docili animo (Grotius, Rosenmüller, Hottinger), nor "with a modest disposition, which recognises the good deeds of Christianity" (Gebser). Also ἐν πρ. δέξασθε is not a pregnant construction, as if the sense were: monet . . . illo λόγῳ duce πραύτητα exerceant (Schneckenburger); but James exhorts to the reception of the word ἐν πραύτητι, in contrast to those who hear the word in order to use it as a weapon of hatred (condemning others). — Δέξασθε (opp. to λαλῆσαι, ver. 19) corresponds to ἀκοῦσαι, but expresses more than that, namely: "the inner reception, the taking hold of it with the heart;" comp. 1 Thess. i. 6. The object belonging to it: τὸν λόγον ἔμφυτον, can only be the same as what was called the λόγος ἀληθείας in ver. 18 (Wiesinger); it is neither "the reason innate in man" (Oecumenius: τὸν διακριτικὸν τοῦ βελτίονος καὶ τοῦ χειρόνος· καθ' ὃ καὶ λογικοὶ ἐσμὲν καὶ λεγόμεθα; see *Constit. Apost.* viii. 12: νόμον δέδωκας ἔμφυτον), nor the so-called *inner light* of the mystics, nor the gospel "in its subjective form of life" (Lange). The verb δέχεσθαι is opposed to these explanations. James designates the gospel a λόγον ἔμφυτον, inasmuch as it was no longer strange to the hearts of his readers as Christians; also because it was not merely transmitted (Hottinger: ἔμφυτος = traditus), but *implanted*.¹ The verb δέξασθε does not conflict with this, as the word by which the new birth is effected among Christians is to them ever proclaimed anew, and must by them be ever received anew, in order that the new life may be preserved and

¹ Lange incorrectly explains the ἐν ὑμῖν to be supplied to ἔμφυτον "in and among you," referring it to the Jewish Christians and the Jews.

increased in them. It is therefore not necessary, against the use of language, to change the idea: *verbum quod implantatum* or *insertum est*, into: *verbum quod implantatur* or *inseritur*, or to assume here a prolepsis, as is undoubtedly the case in 1 Cor. i. 8, Phil. iii. 21 (see Meyer *in loco*), and 1 Thess. iii. 13 (Lünemann *in loco*), and with Calvin to explain it: *ita suscipite ut vere inseratur* (similarly Semler, de Wette,¹ and others). The mode in which the adjective is united with the substantive is opposed to a prolepsis, which would be only imaginable were it said: *τὸν λόγον ἔμφυτον ταῖς καρδίαις ὑμῶν*, or something similar. — For the strengthening of the exhortation expressed, James annexes to *τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον* the clause *τὸν δυνάμενον σῶσαι τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν*, by which, on the one hand, the value of the *λόγος* is prominently brought forward, and, on the other hand, is indicated what result ought to arise from the hearing of the word. By the verb *δυνάμενον* not the freedom of the human will (Serrarius: *quod potest* salvare, *ut arbitrii libertas indicetur*), but the *power* of the word is emphasized; it is, as Paul says, *δύναμις Θεοῦ εἰς σωτηρίαν πάντι τῷ πιστεύοντι* (Rom. i. 16). But if it has this power, man must receive it, and that in a right manner, so that it may prove its efficacy in him and save his soul. It is to be observed that James says this of his readers, whom he had previously designated as born again (ver. 18). Thus, according to James, Christians by the new birth do not as yet possess *σωτηρία* (the future salvation), but its obtainment is conditioned by their conduct. — Instead of *τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν*, James might simply have written *ὑμᾶς*, but Schneckenburger correctly warns: *cave pro mera sumas circumscriptione personalis*; *animi enim proprie res agitur*; see chap. v. 20.

Ver. 22. The exhortations given in ver. 19 form the

¹ De Wette expresses himself doubtfully: "Either the adjective is used proleptically, or, which I prefer, it is the word implanted by the second birth; but by this also, on account of *ἄξιον*, a prolepsis occurs, 'receive the word of truth, that it may grow in you by that new birth.'" But opposed to this, it is to be observed that the word is not implanted by the second birth, but that the second birth is the fruit of the implanted word. In conclusion de Wette remarks: "It must be taken rather as a reference to the whole of Christendom than to individuals: the word implanted in us Christians." But the individual is only a member of the church by having the word of God implanted in him. Brückner has given the correct explanation.

starting-point for what follows. The next section, to the end of chap. ii., is attached to the thought *ταχὺς εἰς τὸ ἀκοῦσαι*, which is continued in *δέξασθε τὸν ἔμφυτον λόγον*. The word must be so heard and received that it produces a corresponding activity. James first expresses this thought briefly and definitely: "Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only, deceiving your own selves." The verb *γίνεσθε* is neither intended to express the *successionem perpetuam horum exercitiorum* (Semler), nor to indicate that hitherto the readers had not been *ποιηταὶ λόγου*; this indication is contained in the whole exhortation, but not in the verb, which is to be translated not by *become*, but by *be*; comp. chap. iii. 1; Matt. vi. 16, x. 16, xxiv. 44; John xx. 27; Rom. xii. 16.¹ The particle *δέ* unites this verse with the preceding as its completion. The readers ought to be *ποιηταὶ λόγου*, namely, of the *λόγος ἔμφυτος* (ver. 21), or of the *λόγος ἀληθείας* (ver. 18), the gospel, inasmuch as it requires a definite Christian conduct, and on this account in ver. 25 is expressly called a *νόμος*. On *ποιηταί*, comp. Jas. iv. 11; 1 Macc. ii. 67; Rom. ii. 13 (John vii. 19: *ποιεῖν τὸν νόμον*); in the classical language, *ὁ ποιητὴς νόμου* is the lawgiver. Theile correctly observes: *substantiva plus sonant quam participia*; the substantive expresses the enduring relation.—In the reading *μὴ ἀκροαταὶ μόνον, μόνον* is closely united with *ἀκροαταί*: not such who are *only* hearers. The word *ἀκροατής*, in classical Greek "an attentive hearer," occurs in the N. T. only here and in Rom. ii. 13, but both times without that additional meaning. On the thought, comp. besides Rom. ii. 13 (where the same contrast is expressed), Matt. vii. 21 ff.; Luke xi. 28; John xiii. 17. — *παραλογιζόμενοι*] belongs to the subject contained in *γίνεσθε* (de Wette, Wiesinger), *deceiving your own selves*, and not as a more exact definition of *ἀκροαταί*, "hearers who deceive themselves" (Stolz, Gebser, Schneckenburger, Lange). The import of the word (besides here in the N. T. only in Col. ii. 4, in the O. T. Gen. xxix. 25, LXX.; synonymous

¹ Meyer certainly explains the imperative *γίνου, γίνεσθε*, uniformly by "become thou," "become ye;" but this meaning is frequently retained in a manner more or less forced; comp. especially John xx. 27. The N. T. usage, to consider *γίνου* as equivalent to *ᾤσθι*, is explained from the fact that the Christian must yet ever more become that which he is as a Christian is.

expressions are found in ver. 26; Gal. vi. 3; 1 John i. 8) is *to draw false inferences, to deceive by sophistical reasoning*. The warning is directed against such who deceive themselves by sophisms on the utility of mere hearing.

Ver. 23. This exhortation is confirmed by a comparison. *Therefore*: ὅτι, which is not superfluous (Pott). This verse expresses the similitude; ver. 24 the *tertium comparationis*. A hearer, who is not a doer, is to be compared to a man who contemplates his bodily form in a glass. Hornejus, Rosenmüller, Semler, Pott, and others, attach to the word κατανοεῖν the additional meaning of a *transitory* observation, against the etymology and the linguistic use of the word (comp. Luke xii. 24, 37; Acts vii. 31, 32, xi. 6). The point of transitoriness, or, more correctly, of transitory contemplation, is contained not in the verb, but in the situation, which in ver. 24 is prominently brought forward by καὶ ἀπελήλυθεν. On the rhetorical usage of again resuming the foregoing subject (which is here expressed by εἴ τις κ.τ.λ.) by οὗτος, see Winer, p. 144 [E. T. 199]; A. Buttmann, p. 262 [E. T. 347]; on εἰκοσε, see ver. 6; ἀνδρί, as in ver. 8, and frequently with James.¹ — τὸ πρόσωπον τῆς γενέσεως αὐτοῦ] By πρόσωπον is here meant not the whole form (Baumgarten, Heusler, Pott, Schneckenburger), but the *face*. By τῆς γενέσεως is "more plainly indicated the sphere of mere material perception, from which the comparison is taken, as distinguished from the ethical sphere of ἀκροᾶσθαι" (Wiesinger). γένεσις denotes not so much the natural *life* as the natural *birth*, so that the phrase is to be interpreted: the *countenance which one possesses by his natural birth*. See Eustathius in *Od.* ix. p. 663, 25.²— Whether αὐτοῦ belongs to the whole idea, or only to the genitive, is uncertain. Winer, p. 212, leaves it undecided; Wiesinger is for the first rendering; but the union here (as well as in Col. i. 13) with the genitive appears to be more natural.

Ver. 24. With this verse begins the explanation of the

¹ The remark of Paes, approved of by Lange, is curious: *viri obiter tantum solent specula intueri, mulibre autem est, curiose se ad speculum componere*.

² Lange argues against this explanation, whilst, mingling in a most confused manner the image employed with the thing itself, he explains πρέσωπον as "the image of the inner man's appearance according to his sinful condition."

image given in ver. 25 (therefore γάρ), whilst κατανοεῖν τὸ πρόσωπον τ. γεν. αὐτοῦ is again resumed by κατενόησεν ἑαυτόν. By ἀπελήλυθεν the point of the mere transitoriness of the contemplation in the glass only before presupposed is brought forward, and by ἐπελάθετο the result of such a contemplation is added, by which the points of application, which James employs, are brought out. The emphasis lies on ἀπελήλυθεν and εὐθέως ἐπελάθετο. The form of representation is here the same as in ver. 11. It is not a particular instance which may occur (Wiesinger), but a general statement which is here introduced in the form of a single incident, as the contemplating oneself in the glass is always only a temporary and not a permanent state. The hearing of the word answers to κατανοεῖν; the averting of the mind from what is heard to ἀπέρχεσθαι; and the being unconcerned about what is heard, by which the realization of the word in the life is prevented, to εὐθέως ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι. James can only think on man according to his ethical condition in relation to the demands of the divine will, as corresponding to πρόσωπον τ. γ. or ἑαυτόν in the application. It is true that he does not definitely state this; but from this it does not follow that James, overlooking all other considerations, has had only in view generally the *contents* of the word, because the comparison of the word with a glass, which gives to him who looks in it to see *his own image*, would be without meaning.¹ On the use of the perfect (ἀπελήλυθεν) between the aorists, see Winer, p. 243 f. [E. T. 340].—On ὅποιος ἦν, Wiesinger correctly remarks, “namely in the glass.”

Ver. 25 does not give the simple application of the image, but rather describes, with reference to the foregoing image, the right hearer, and says of him that he is μακάριος ἐν τῇ ποιήσει αὐτοῦ. In this description the three points named in ver. 24 are carefully observed: παρακύψας εἰς κ.τ.λ. answers to κατενόησεν (ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ), παραμείνας to ἀπελή-

¹ According to most interpreters, “the depravity of the natural man” is chiefly to be thought on; but this is not entirely suitable, as James addresses Christians who as such are no longer natural men. In a wholly arbitrary manner is the reference inserted by some in κατενόησεν, to spots which disfigure the face. Wolf: de tralatitia speculi inspectione loquitur Apostolus; talis vero efficit, ut maculas non perspicias atque adeo de iis abstergendis non cogites; similarly Pott and others.

λuben, and οὐκ ἀκροατῆς ἐπιλησμονῆς to ἐπελάθετο. The sentence consists of a simple combination of subject and predicate; γενόμενος is not to be resolved into the finite verb γίνεται (Pott). The predicate commences, after the subject is summed up, in οὗτος with μακάριος. — This is also the case with the *textus receptus*, where a οὗτος is put before οὐκ ἀκροατῆς; for, since with this reading the first οὗτος is simply resumed by the second οὗτος (before μακάριος), equivalent to hic, inquam, the words οὐκ ἀκροατῆς . . . ἔργου only serve to give a more exact designation of the subject, παρακύψας . . . καὶ παραμείνας being thus more clearly defined. Thus these words begin not the apodosis or principal sentence, as if James would here, in contrast to ver. 24, show that the right hearing and appropriation leads to the doing, (and thereby) to the blessedness of doing (against Wiesinger). Were this his object, he would have been obliged to put the finite verb instead of the participle γενόμενος, and a καί after ἔργου. The subject is accordingly: *but whosoever looks into the perfect law of liberty and continueth therein, being not a forgetful hearer, but a doer of the work, this man.* — The aorist participles are explained from the close connection of this verse with the preceding, where the same tense was used. There is no copulative καί before the participial clause οὐκ ἀκροατῆς κ.τ.λ., because the doing of the law is the necessary consequence of the *continued* looking into it, and it would otherwise have the appearance as if παρακύπτειν and παραμένειν could take place without ποιεῖν following.¹ The verb παρακύπτειν (properly bending oneself near an object in order to view it more exactly, Luke xxiv. 12; John xx. 5, 11; 1 Pet. i. 12; Eccles. xiv. 23, xxi. 23) refers back, indeed, to κατανοεῖν, but is a stronger idea. James has fittingly chosen this verb as verbum ad imaginem speculi humi aut mensae impositi adaptatum (Schneckenburger; see also Theile, Wiesinger). Luther inaccurately translates it: *looketh through*. As the accent is on παρα, the verb παραμείνας is used afterwards. By εἰς is

¹ Lange agrees in essentials with this explanation, but he thinks that by it "the full energy of the idea is not preserved;" it should rather have been said that "the παρακύψας and παραμείνας, as such, is ποιητῆς ἔργου γινόμενος;" but the looking in and continuing is evidently in themselves not identical with the doing of which James speaks, however necessarily the latter results from the former.

expressed not only the direction *to* something, but the intensity of the look into the inner nature of the law. *παραμείνας* (not *continueth therein*, as Luther translates it, but *thereat*) is added to *παρακύψας*,—without the article, because the two points are to be considered as most closely connected,—indicating the continued consideration of the νόμος, from which action necessarily follows. Schneckenburger incorrectly gives to the verb *παραμένειν* here (appealing to Acts xiv. 22; Gal. iii. 10; Heb. viii. 9) the meaning to “*observe* the law;” but the subject treated of here is not the observance, but “the *appropriation* which leads to action” (Wiesinger), or “the remaining in the yielding of oneself to the object by contemplating it” (Lange). By νόμος τέλειος ὁ τῆς ἐλευθερίας¹ is meant neither the O. T. law, nor *lex naturalis* (Schulthess), but λόγος ἀληθείας (ver. 18), thus the gospel, inasmuch as it places before the Christian—by reason of redemption—the rule of his life. This evangelical νόμος, indeed, resembles the O. T. νόμος in expressing no other will of God, but differs from it in that it only is the νόμος τῆς ἐλευθερίας, the νόμος τέλειος. It not only confronts man as enjoining, but, resting on the love of God, it creates the new life from which joyful obedience springs forth voluntarily and unconstrained; it gives ἐλευθερία, which the O. T. νόμος was not able to give, and thus proves itself as the *perfect* law in contrast to the imperfect law of the Old Covenant. It is true that even in the O. T. the sweetness of the law was subject of praise (Ps. xix. 8–11), but the life-giving power belonged to the law only in an imperfect manner, because the covenant on which it rested was as yet only one of promise and not of fulfilment. It is accordingly incorrect to explain the additional attribute as if James considered the O. T. law, according to the Pauline manner, as a ζυγὸς δουλείας (Gal. v. 1), for of this there is no trace.² Many expositors understand by νόμος τέλειος κ.τ.λ. the gospel, as the joyful message of salvation, or the doctrina

¹ Kern incorrectly maintains that this expression is formed according to the Pauline phraseology: νόμος τοῦ πνεύματος τῆς ζωῆς ἐν Χρ. Ἰησοῦ, Rom. viii. 2; νόμος τῆς πίστεως, Rom. iii. 27; νόμος Χριστοῦ, Gal. vi. 2; as if James must have borrowed the designation of what was to him the cardinal point of Christian life from another, and could not himself originate it.

² It is to be observed that even in the so-called apostolic council at Jerusalem James did not, as Peter, call the law a ζυγός.

evangelii, or simply gratia evangelii, namely, in contrast to the O. T. economy, which, however, corresponds neither to the language of James nor to his mode of contemplation.—In the additional participial sentence, the ideas ἀκροατῆς ἐπιλησμονῆς and ποιητῆς ἔργου are opposed to each other. ἀκροατῆς ἐπιλησμονῆς (the word, foreign to classical Greek, is in the N. T. a ἁπ. λεγ.; it is found in Ecclus. xi. 27; among classical writers: ἐπιλήσμη, ἐπιλησμοσύνη) is = ἀκρ. ἐπιλήσμων, a hearer to whom forgetfulness belongs. To ποιητῆς, ἔργου is attached in order to make still more prominent the idea of activity, which indeed is already contained in ποιητῆς. The singular does not properly stand for the plural (Grotius: effector eorum operum, quae evangelica lex exigit), but “is designed to import that it here results in something, in the doing of work” (Wiesinger). Those ideas, which appear not to correspond, yet form a true antithesis, since the law is inoperative on the forgetful hearer, but incites him who is an attentive hearer to a corresponding activity of life. James says of him who is thus described: *he (οὗτος) is blessed in his deed.* ποίησις in N. T. ἁπ. λεγ., in Ecclus. xix. 20: ποίησις νόμου. The preposition ἐν is not to be exchanged with διὰ, for by ἐν the internal connection of doing and blessedness is marked; Brückner: “the blessing innate in such doing is meant.” ἔσται is therefore not to be referred to the future life; but it is by it announced what is even here directly connected with the ποίησις; James, however, certainly considered this μακαριότης as permanent. The thought here expressed refers to the last words of ver. 21, completing them, showing that the λόγος has the effect there stated (σῶσαι τὰς ψυχάς) in him who so embraces it that it leads him to ποίησις.¹

Ver. 26. Whilst James—in contrast to the hearers who fail in proof by works—will describe the true θρησκεία (ver. 27), he first refers to the false θρησκεία of those who—slothful in action—are ταχεῖς εἰς τὸ λαλῆσαι (ver. 19). *If any*

¹ Laurentius adds to the last words of the verse: sc. non ex merito ipsius operis, sed ex promissione gratuita; but this is a caution foreign to the context. Lange inappropriately intermingles ideas, when he reckons to this ποίησις particularly confession, and thinks that James above all things indicated that the Jews should confess Christ, and that the Jewish Christians should fully confess their Christian brethren from the Gentiles.

one thinks to serve God, not bridling his tongue, but deceiving his heart, his worship is vain. — εἴ τις δοκεῖ] δοκεῖ here denotes (as in Matt. vi. 7, xxiv. 44; 1 Cor. iii. 18; otherwise in 1 Cor. vii. 40) the *false* opinion which one has of something; it is not = *videtur* (Calvin, Gataker, Theile, and others); Luther correctly translates: “if any one imagines.” — θρησκος εἶναι] θρησκος, which elsewhere occurs neither in the N. T. nor in the classics (the substantive besides here and in ver. 27, in the N. T. in Col. ii. 18 and Acts xxvi. 5), is not equivalent to εὐσέβεια, inasmuch as it refers to *external* worship, the manifestation of εὐσέβεια, without, however, having in itself the secondary idea of *mere* externality. Incorrectly Theile = religiosus singulatum ejus nimia, nimis externa est religio, superstitiosus. In an arbitrary manner, Schneckenburger infers from the adjectives καθαρὰ καὶ ἀμίαντος (ver. 27) that it is here said of θρησκεία, quam in accurata illustrationum observatione constantem putabant Judaei ac Judaeochristiani,¹ of which there is no trace in the whole Epistle. The following words: μὴ χαλιναγωγῶν τὴν γλῶσσαν αὐτοῦ, indicate in what the θρησκεία of the readers consisted. It is incorrect, with Rosenmüller, Theile, and others, to supply *exempli causa*, and, as most interpreters do, to resolve the participle by *although*; James will blame those who reckon zeal in speaking as a sign of θρησκεία.² The verb χαλιναγωγεῖν, in the N. T. only in James, is also found in classical language only in the later classics; comp.³ the expression in Plato, *de legg.* ii.: ἀχάλινον κεκτημένοι τὸ στόμα. — By the second participial sentence: ἀλλὰ ἀπατῶν καρδίαν αὐτοῦ, James expresses his judgment—already indicated by the expression μὴ χαλιναγωγῶν—on the opinion of serving God by λαλεῖν ἐν ὀργῇ. Pott correctly: sc. eo quod nimian docendi licentiam et linguae extemperantiam

¹ Some Catholic interpreters, Salmero, Paes, and others, refer the expression to the observance of the so-called *consilia Christi*, particularly to voluntary circumcision for the sake of the kingdom of heaven.

² Rauch also thinks that “the participles must certainly be resolved by *although* ;” but by this explanation all indication is wanting of that on which those blamed by James rest *θρησκεία* ; also what follows (ver. 27), where the nature of true *θρησκεία* is given, forms no appropriate antithesis to this verse. Brückner explains it : “whosoever seeks worship in striving by teaching to work on others ;” here the participle is correctly resolved, but the full meaning is not given to the verb. Correctly Lange : “those who by their fanatical zeal wanted to make good their pretensions of being the true soldiers of God.”

pro vera *θηρσκειά* habet. The clause belongs not to the apodosis (Schneckenburger), but, as in form so in meaning, is closely connected with the preceding participle. The expression *ἀπατῶν καρδίαν αὐτοῦ* corresponds to *παραλογίζεσθαι ἑαυτὸν* (ver. 22), but is a stronger form, although it does not indicate only the consequence resulting from zeal (Lange); comp. *Test. Naphth.* III. p. 665: *μὴ σπουδάζετε . . . ἐν λόγοις κενοῖς ἀπατῶν τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῶν*. Erasmus incorrectly explains *ἀπατῶν* by *sincere* aberrare. The apodosis, which emphatically begins with *τούτου*, declares that such a *θηρσκειά* is not only without fruit (Baumgarten), but without actual contents, is thus foolish and vain, corresponding to the thought: *ὁργὴ δικαιοσύνην Θεοῦ οὐ (κατ)εργάζεται* (ver. 20).

Ver. 27. To *θηρσκειά μάταιος* is opposed *θηρσκειά καθαρὰ καὶ ἀμίαντος παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ*. *Καθαρός* and *ἀμίαντος* are synonymous expressions (Pott, Theile, and others); the second word does not add any *new* idea to the first. Some expositors (Baumgarten, Bengel, Knapp, Wiesinger) arbitrarily refer the first word to what is internal, and the second to what is external. The second word *ἀμίαντος* (which occurs only here and in Heb. vii. 26, xiii. 4; 1 Pet. i. 4), corresponding to its connection with *μιαίνω, μιάσμα*, brings more vividly forward purity as a being free from that by which the holy is defiled. The purity of true *θηρσκειά* is, by the words *παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ κ.τ.λ.*, marked as absolute. *παρά, in the judgment of*, equivalent to *ἐνώπιον*, as in 1 Pet. ii. 20; comp. Winer, p. 352 [E. T. 493]; Schirlitz, p. 340. That by this "the attitude of a servant before the face of the commanding lord" (Lange) is indicated, is a pure fiction. To *τῷ Θεῷ* is emphatically added *καὶ πατρί*, by which *the* relation of God, which the author has chiefly in view, is expressed: that of love. God, by reason of His love, can only esteem *that* worship as pure which is the expression of love. The contents of pure worship is given in the following infinitive clauses, according to its positive and negative side; still James evidently does not intend to give an exhaustive definition, but he merely brings forward—in reference to the wants of his readers—two chief points. *Hermas*, I. 2, *mand.* 8, gives a description of these two sides of worship, comprehending as much as possible all particulars. The first point is: *the visiting of the widows and the fatherless*

in their affliction, as a manifestation of compassionate love. If it is said that the particular here stands for the universal (the species pro genere, Hottinger, Theile, and others); yet it is to be observed that elsewhere in the Holy Scriptures compassion is adduced as the most direct proof of love. The verb ἐπισκέπτεσθαι here, as in Matt. xxv. 36, 43, Jer. xxiii. 2, Zech. xi. 16, Eccclus. vii. 35, refers to the *visiting* of the suffering, in order to help them. By the explanation: "to be careful of them" (Lange), the view of a concrete instance is introduced; ὀρφανοί are placed first, in close connection with πατρί,¹ as God in Ps. lxviii. 6 is expressly called ὁ πατὴρ τῶν ὀρφανῶν; see also Eccclus. iv. 10: γίνου ὀρφανοῖς ὡς πατὴρ. — The words ἐν τῇ θλίψει αὐτῶν are not an idle addition, but mark the condition in which the orphans and widows are found, to show the necessity and object of ἐπισκέπτεσθαι. — In the second infinitive clause, which is added with rhetorical emphasis, ἀσυνδετῶς,² to the first, ἄσπιλον stands first as the chief idea. The same expression is in 1 Tim. vi. 14; 2 Pet. iii. 14 (in its proper sense, 1 Pet. i. 19). The addition ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου, more exactly defining ἄσπιλον τηρεῖν, is neither dependent merely on τηρεῖν (Ps. xii. 8, cxli. 9) nor merely on ἄσπιλον, but on the combined idea. The sense is: to preserve himself from the world (ἀπό = ἐκ, John xvii. 15; comp. also the form προσέχειν ἀπό, Matt. xvi. 12), so that he is not polluted by it (so also Lange). By κόσμος not merely earthly things, so far as they tempt to sin (Schneckenburger), nor merely sinful lusts (Hottinger), nor δημώδης καὶ συρφετὸς ὄχλος, ὁ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῆς ἀπάτης αὐτοῦ φθειρόμενος (Oecumenius; according to Laurentius and others, the homines mundani atque impii), are to be understood; but the idea κόσμος comprehends all these together; it denotes the whole earthly creation, so far as it is cut off from fellowship with God and stands under the dominion of

¹ The combination ὀρφανοὶ καὶ χεῖραι is found only here in the N. T.; it often occurs in the O. T. and Apocrypha, where sometimes ὀρφανοί and sometimes χεῖραι are named first.

² The asyndeton is thus explained, that James considered the visiting of the orphans, etc., as keeping oneself unspotted from the world, being in contradiction with the peculiar charms of the world. Lange observes: "the two clauses are not simply co-ordinate, but the second is the reverse side or sequence of the first, its pure antithesis."

ἀρχῶν τοῦ κόσμου (1 John v. 19); thus especially the men who serve it in and with their sinful lusts—but also all earthly possessions by which sinful lust is excited, and to which it not only conforms itself, but converts them into the instruments of its activity.—Christians by means of their divine birth, effected by the word of truth (ver. 18), are indeed taken out of the κόσμος, they are no longer members of it; but, on the other hand, both by the sin which is still in them (chap. iii. 2) and by their external intercourse, they stand in connection with the world, on which account they have to preserve themselves from its contaminating influence. This preservation, as it is a work of God (John xvii. 15), so it is likewise a work of man (1 Tim. v. 22), and therefore a task which believers must continually strive to perform.

CHAPTER II.

VER. 2. The genuineness of the article *την* before *συναγωγὴν* (*Rec.* after A G K \aleph , corr. Tisch.) is, since B C \aleph , pr. omit it (Lachm.), at least doubtful. — Ver. 3. Instead of the *Rec.* *καὶ ἐπιβλέψητε*, after A G \aleph , several vss. Oecumenius, Bede (Lachm.), Tisch. has, after B C K, etc., adopted *ἐπιβλέψητε δέ*; which reading is the original cannot be determined. — The *αὐτῶν* of the *Rec.* (after G K) is already rightly omitted by Griesb.; A B C \aleph , etc., do not have it; it was inserted for the completion of the expression (against Reiche). In the second clause of the verse the *Rec.*, after C** G K \aleph , reads *στῆθι ἐκεῖ ἢ κάθου ὧδε*; in A C* *ὧδε* is wanting (Lachm. Tisch.); B reads *στῆθι ἢ κάθου ἐκεῖ*. The latter reading is recommended by the sharper contrast of *στῆθι* to the preceding *κάθου*; but it is also possible that in this lies the reason of its origin; if *ἐκεῖ* belongs to *στῆθι*, *ὧδε* after *κάθου* could be easily inserted, partly from the preceding *κάθου ὧδε καλῶς*, partly to introduce the antithesis to *ἐκεῖ*; but, on the other hand, the original *ὧδε* might also be omitted as superfluous (on account of the following *ὑπὸ τοῦ ἵππου*). Nothing can with certainty be decided. — For the addition of *μου* before *τῶν ποδῶν*, adopted by Lachm., only A and the Vulg. chiefly speak. Almost all other authorities are against it. — Ver. 4. According to the *Rec.* this verse commences with *καὶ οὐ διεκρίθητε* (thus G K, etc., Tisch. 7); in A B** C \aleph , many min. and vss. *καὶ* is wanting (Lachm. Tisch. 2); *οὐ* is also wanting in the original text of B: the omission of *καὶ* may indeed be more easily explained than its insertion, on account of which Reiche and Bouman consider it as genuine; but the most important authorities are against it; the reading in B is to be considered as a correction (Buttmann). — Ver. 5. *τοῦ κόσμου (τοῦτου)* is a reading evidently explanatory (against Reiche, Bouman), instead of *τῷ κόσμῳ*, whose genuineness is, moreover, attested by A* B C* \aleph ; the same also with the reading *ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ*. — Ver. 10. Instead of the reading *τηρήσει . . . πταίσει*, attested almost only by G K, the conjunctives *τηρήσῃ . . . πταίσῃ* are to be read, with Lachm. and Tisch. (against Reiche and Bouman). Ver. 11. The *Rec.* *εἰ δὲ οὐ μοιχεύσεις, φονεύσεις δέ*, found only in K, several min. Theoph., Tisch. and Lachm. read the present

μοιχεύεις, φονεύεις; thus A C 8; according to Tisch. also B, but according to Buttm. B has μοιχεύεις, φονεύσεις. Reiche and Bouman retain the *Rec.* as the original reading. — Ver. 13. The *Rec.* ἀνίλ.εως (after G, etc.) is, after A B K 8, very many min. Oecumenius, to be changed with the certainly entirely unusual form ἀνέλ.εος (Lachm. Buttm. Tisch.); in the mode of writing this word there is, however, great variation, the forms ἀνήλ.εος, ἀνίλ.εος, ἀνείλ.εος, ἀνήλ.εως, ἀνήλ.ιος occurring in different MSS. It is surprising that no MS. has the classical form ἀνήλ.εής or ἀνείλ.εής. — According to the *Rec.* κατακαυχᾶται is connected with the preceding by καί, which, however, is found only in min.; A, some min. etc., have instead of it, after κατακ. the particle οὐ (Lachm. ed. min.), which, however, appears only to have been inserted to avoid the asyndeton. There are many variations of κατακαυχᾶται; A has κατακαυχάσθω; C*: κατακαύχασθε, readings which owe their origin to the difficulty of the thought. — Instead of ἔλεος (after κατακαυχᾶται), *Rec.*, after A B (ed. Mai) 8, etc. (Lachm. Tisch. Buttm.), C G K and B (apud Bentley), and many min. have the form ἔλεον, a nominative form which occurs indeed in the classics, but not in the N. T. — Ver. 14. Instead of the *Rec.* τί τὸ ὄφελος, attested by A C** G K 8, almost all min. Theoph. Oecumenius, Lachm. has adopted τί ὄφελος, after B C. On the distinction, see exposition. — Whether after the *Rec.* we are to read, with Tisch., λέγει τις, or, with Lachm., τις λέγει, cannot with certainty be decided; B G K 8 attest the former, A C the latter reading; yet the latter appears to be a correction. — Ver. 15. After εἰς the particle οὐ is omitted in B 8; since its later insertion is not easy to be explained, the *Rec.* is to be retained as the correct reading. After λειπόμενοι Lachm. (after A G, etc.) reads ὥσιν, which, however, is a later addition. — Ver. 16. Also here Lachm., after B C*, has omitted the article τὸ before ὄφελος. — Ver. 17. Instead of the *Rec.* ἔργα ἔχῃ, ἔχῃ ἔργα is to be read, with Griesb. Lachm. Tisch. etc., after almost all authorities. — Ver. 18. The *Rec.* ἐκ τῶν ἔργων is attested by too few authorities (G K, some min.) to be considered as genuine; Griesb. has consequently correctly adopted χωρὶς τῶν ἔργ., attested by A B C 8, etc. Almost all recent critics and interpreters, also Bouman, retain χωρὶς as the original reading; Reiche and Philippi certainly judge otherwise. With the reading ἐκ falls also the pronoun σου after ἔργων, which Lachm. and Tisch. have correctly omitted; it is wanting in A B 8, several min. vss. etc., whilst C G K, etc., have it. — Also after τὴν πίστιν Tisch., after B C 8, etc., has rightly omitted the pronoun μου (A G K, Lachm.); it appears to be added in order to bring more prominently forward the contrast to the first τὴν πίστιν σου. — Ver. 19. The *Rec.* is ὁ Θεὸς εἰς ἐστὶ; so G. In the

most important MSS., however, $\epsilon\tilde{\iota}\varsigma$ stands first; so in A B C \aleph in favour of this reading is also the line of thought; yet the difference is found that $\epsilon\sigma\tau\iota$ in A \aleph precedes (Lachm.), and in B C follows $\acute{\iota}$ $\Theta\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ (Tisch.); which reading is the original cannot be decided, yet the former appears to be a correction. B omits $\acute{\iota}$ before $\Theta\epsilon\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$. — Ver. 20. Instead of the *Rec.* $\nu\epsilon\kappa\rho\acute{\alpha}$, after A C** G K \aleph , several min. vss. Theoph. Oecumenius, Lachm. and Tisch. have adopted $\acute{\alpha}\rho\gamma\acute{\eta}$, after B C* etc., which is preferred by Wiesinger, Brückner, Lange; whereas Reiche and Bouman prefer the *Rec.* It is possible that, in order to avoid the frequent repetition of $\nu\epsilon\kappa\rho\acute{\alpha}$ (see vv. 17, 26), the word $\acute{\alpha}\rho\gamma\acute{\eta}$ = $\acute{\alpha}\sigma\epsilon\rho\gamma\eta$, as corresponding to $\chi\omega\rho\iota\varsigma$ $\tau\tilde{\omega}\nu$ $\epsilon\rho\gamma\omega\nu$, was substituted; but it is also possible that the reference to that verse occasioned the displacement of $\acute{\alpha}\rho\gamma\acute{\eta}$; it is difficult to arrive at a sure decision. — Ver. 24. The particle $\tau\omicron\iota\acute{\nu}\nu$ after $\acute{\omicron}\rho\alpha\tilde{\iota}\tau\epsilon$ is already correctly omitted by Griesbach, being wanting in A B C \aleph , etc. — Ver. 25. Instead of $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, C G, etc., have $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\sigma\kappa\acute{\omicron}\pi\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, which, however, is evidently borrowed from Heb. xi. 31.

Ver. 1. In close connection with the thought contained in chap. i. 27, that true worship consists in the exhibition of compassionate love, James proceeds to reprove a practice of his readers, consisting in a partial respect to the rich and a depreciation of the poor, which formed the most glaring contrast to that love. — After the impressive address $\acute{\alpha}\delta\epsilon\lambda\phi\omicron\iota$ $\mu\omicron\upsilon$, he first expresses the exhortation with reference to that conduct, that their faith should not be combined with a partial respect of persons. Schneckenburger regards the clause as interrogative, remarking: interrogationis formam sensus gravitas flagitat et contextus (so also Kern); incorrectly, for although the interrogation with $\mu\acute{\eta}$ may not always require a negative answer, yet it is only used when the interrogator, with every inclination to regard something as true, yet can scarcely believe that it is actually the case; comp. Winer, p. 453 f. [E. T. 641]; Schirlitz, p. 366. This is inadmissible here, as the fact mentioned in what follows, the $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\omega\pi\omicron\lambda\eta\psi\acute{\iota}\alpha$ of the readers, was undoubtedly true. $\mu\acute{\eta}$. . . $\epsilon\chi\epsilon\tau\epsilon$ is thus imperative, as i. 16, iii. 1. — The plural $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\omega\pi\omicron\lambda\eta\psi\acute{\iota}\alpha\iota\varsigma$ is used because the author thinks on individual concrete instances in which the general fault manifested itself (Hornejus: multiplex illud malum in vita est); comp. Col. iii. 22; 2 Pet. iii. 12. For the explanation of $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\omega\pi\omicron\lambda\eta\psi\acute{\iota}\alpha$ (only here and in Rom. ii. 11; Eph. vi. 9; Col. iii. 35), foreign to classical Greek, see Matt. xxii. 16;

Luke xx. 21; Gal. ii. 6 (see Meyer *in loc.*); from the O. T. Lev. xix. 15; Deut. i. 17, and other places (the verb *προσωποληπτέω*, Jas. ii. 9; the adjective, Acts x. 34). The phrase *ἐν προσωποληψίαις ἔχειν τ. πίστιν* is not, with Pott, to be explained according to such expressions as *ἔχειν τινα ἐν ὀργῇ, ἐν αἰτίαις, ἔχειν ἐν ἐπιγνώσει* (Rom. i. 28), for James intends not to reproach his readers, that they have a partial faith, or that they convert faith into the object of partiality, but that they hold not themselves in their faith free from *προσωποληψία*. Also *ἔχειν* does not stand for *κατέχειν*, whether in the meaning *prohibere* or *detinere* (Grotius: *detinere velut captivam et inefficacem*); but *ἔχειν ἐν* expresses the relation of internal connection thus: *Have not your faith, so that it is as it were enclosed in προσωποληψίαις, i.e. combined with it.* Thus was it with the readers, who in their very religious assemblies made a distinction of persons according to their external relations. — De Wette's opinion is incorrect, that *πίστιν ἔχειν* here is to be understood of "the management of the concerns of faith." — Faith is more exactly described as *ἡ πίστις τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τῆς δόξης*]. Most expositors (particularly Schneckenburger, Kern, de Wette, Brückner, Wiesinger) take *τοῦ κυρίου* as a genitive of object, and make *τῆς δόξης*, as a second genitive (besides *ἡμῶν*), dependent on *κυρίου*; thus: "the faith in our Lord of glory, Jesus Christ." Neither the appellation of Christ as the Lord of glory (comp. 1 Cor. ii. 8; Ps. xxix. 3: *ὁ Θεὸς τῆς δόξης*), nor the dependence of *two* genitives (*ἡμῶν* and *τῆς δόξης*) on *one* substantive (*κυρίου*), see Winer, p. 172 [E. T. 238], has anything against it; yet this construction cannot be held to be correct, because the name *Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, which follows *τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν*, so entirely completes the idea that a second genitive can no longer depend on *κυρίου*; if James had intended such a combination, he would have written either *τὴν πίστιν Ἰησ. Χριστοῦ, τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν τῆς δόξης*, or *τ. π. τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν τῆς δόξης, Ἰησ. Χριστοῦ*.¹ It is evidently an entire mistake to construct *τῆς δόξης* with *προσωποληψίαις*,

¹ The genitive, indeed, not unfrequently is separated from the word which governs it; see Phil. ii. 10; Rom. ix. 21; and Winer, p. 172 [E. T. 238]; but in that case the intervening word is *never* in apposition with the preceding idea, with which it is completely concluded.

whether it be taken as = opinio (Calvin: dum opum vel bonorum opinio nostros oculos perstringit, veritas supprimitur) or = gloria (Heisen: quod honorem attinet). Some expositors make τῆς δόξης depend on Χριστοῦ; thus Laurentius, who explains it the Christus gloriæ = gloriosus; so also Bouman; also Lange: "the Messiah exalted in His glory above Judaistic expectations." Decisive against this construction are—(1) the close connection of Ἰησοῦ and Χριστοῦ, as when those two names are so directly united as here, Χριστοῦ is purely *nomen proprium*; (2) the N. T. mode of expression does not admit of a more exact statement of being after Χριστοῦ by a genitive dependent on it; also in this case the article τοῦ before Χριστοῦ would not be wanting. In this commentary hitherto (former editions) τῆς δόξης was explained as a genitive of the object dependent on τὴν πίστιν, and τοῦ κυρίου ἡμ. Ἰ. Χρ. as the genitive of the subject, in the sense: "faith in the glory springing from our Lord Jesus Christ,—founded on Him," namely, τὴν μέλλουσάν δοξαν ἀποκαλυφθῆναι εἰς ἡμᾶς, Rom. viii. 18. This construction, although grammatically possible, is unmistakably harsh. It seems simpler, with Bengel, to regard τῆς δόξης as in apposition with Ἰησοῦ Χρ.; still the idea δόξης is too indefinite. The passages cited by Bengel, Luke ii. 32, Eph. i. 17, 1 Pet. iv. 14, Isa. xl. 5, are of another kind, and cannot be adduced in justification of that explanation. Perhaps it is most correct to unite τῆς δόξης as a genitive of quality, not with Χριστοῦ only, but with the whole expression τοῦ κυρ. ἡμ. Ἰησ. Χρ., by which δόξα is indicated as the quality of our Lord Jesus Christ which belongs to Him, the exalted One. Similar expressions are ὁ οἰκονόμος (Luke xvi. 8), ὁ κριτής (Luke xviii. 6), τῆς ἀδικίας. At all events, τῆς δόξης is added in order to mark the contrast between the προσωποληψία paid to passing riches and the faith in Jesus Christ.

Vv. 2, 3. In these verses the conduct of the readers, which occasioned the exhortation of James (ver. 1), is described; hence the confirming γάρ. Both verses together form the protasis, on which ver. 4 follows as the apodosis; whilst they in form appear by their connection with δέ (according to the *Rec.* by καί) as co-ordinate sentences, in thought ver. 2 is subordinate to ver. 3; ver. 2 assigning the circumstances under

which the conduct described in ver. 3 occurred. — Hammond, Homberg, Baumgarten, Michaelis, and Herder assign even ver. 4 to the protasis; but incorrectly, as in that case the conjunctive would be required in that verse as in vv. 2, 3. As regards the matter itself, the fault is not directed against *the rulers of the congregation*,—the presbyters and deacons (Grotius, Pott, Schulthess, Hottinger),—but, as the address *ἀδελφοί μου* (ver. 1) shows, it is entirely general. It was not the custom in the time of James for the deacons to point out places to those who entered their assemblies (*Constit. Apost.* ii. 56, 58). — The instance (ἐάν) which James states is, as regards the matter, not a hypothetical assumption, but a fact; and certainly not to be regarded as a solitary instance which only once took place, but as something which often occurred, that even in their religious assemblies the rich were treated with distinction, and the poor with disdain. It is not surprising that James in the description employed the aorist, since he generally uses that tense to represent that which is habitually repeated as a single fact which has taken place; see chap. i. 11, 24. — The words *εἰς τὴν συναγωγὴν ὑμῶν* show that it is an entrance into the religious assemblies of the congregation that is here spoken of. It cannot be inferred from the usual signification of the word *συναγωγή* that a *Jewish* synagogue is here meant (Semler, Schneckenburger, Bouman); opposed to this is *ὑμῶν*; besides, the Christians would certainly not have the right to show seats to those who entered into such a place of worship; but, on the other hand, by *συναγωγή* here is not to be understood the *religious assembly* (de Wette). The whole description, both *εἰσέλθῃ* and the pointing out of seats, shows that *συναγωγή* denotes the *place* where the Christian congregation assembled for worship.¹ That James calls this by the word which was appropriate for Jewish places of worship, cannot be regarded in *his* mouth as anything surprising. Hammond, Baumgarten, Storr, Herder, and others most arbitrarily understand by *συναγωγή* the judi-

¹ The word *συναγωγή* occurs in the N. T. in both meanings; usually it designates the religious *place of meeting* of the Jews; but that it also denotes the *assembly*, Acts xiii. 43 shows; see also Rev. ii. 9. In the Apocrypha of the O. T. it has only the last meaning, and, indeed, in a general sense; see Wahl, *Clar. Apocryph. συναγωγή*.

cial assemblies of the congregation and their elders. According to Lange, the name of the Jewish place of worship is here a symbol "of the religious fellowship of the entire Jewish Christian dispersion;" this opinion is not less unjustifiable than the view connected with it, that "a literal understanding of what follows cannot be thought of." — The rich man is here described as ἀνὴρ χρυσοδακτύλιος ἐν ἐσθῇτι λαμπρᾷ, and the poor man as πτωχὸς ἐν ῥυπαρᾷ ἐσθῇτι, the difference between them being represented to the eye in their clothing. — χρυσοδακτύλιος] a purely ἁπ. λεγ. = χρυσόχειρ (Lucian, in *Tim.*: πόρφυροι καὶ χρυσόχειρες περιέρχονται; in *Nigrin.*: τῶν δακτυλίων πλῆθος ἔχων). On λαμπρός, used of clothes, see, on the one hand, Luke xxiii. 11 (comp. with Matt. xxvii. 28), and, on the other hand, Rev. xv. 6. Raphelius: nullum certum colorem declarat, sed splendidum, clarum, nitidum seu rubrum seu album sit, seu alius generis. The counterpart of the ἐσθῆς λαμπρά is the ἐσθ. ῥυπαρά of the poor man. — ῥυπαρός] in its proper meaning only here in N. T.; in Zech. iii. 3, 4, it is also used of garments. Are Christians or non-Christians meant by these incomers? Most expositors consider them to be Christians only, whether they belonged to the congregation or came there as ξένοι (guests). But the following reasons decide against this view:—1. They are distinguished by James from the brethren addressed, and are not indicated as brethren, which yet, particularly in reference to the poor (ver. 5), would readily have suggested itself as a strong confirmation of their fault. 2. In vv. 6, 7, the rich are evidently opposed to Christians (ὑμῶν, ὑμᾶς, ἐφ' ὑμᾶς), and reprimanded for their conduct towards Christians (not merely toward the poor), which if rich Christians had been guilty of, would certainly have been indicated as an offence against *their Christian* calling. That those who were not Christians might and did come into the Christian religious assemblies is a well-known fact; see 1 Cor. xiv. 22, 23. The view of Weiss (*Deutsch. Zeitschrift f. christl. Wissensch.* etc., 1854, No. 51), that the rich man was not a Christian, but that the poor man was a Christian, is supported by no feature in the description; in *that case* James would certainly have indicated the dissimilarity of relation; then "must ver. 5 ff. bring it forward as the gravest offence, that the brother chosen by God is

slighted for the sake of the rich who were not Christians" (Wiesinger¹).

Ver. 3 describes the conduct of the church toward the two incomers. Many ancient expositors understand this as a figurative representation of the preference which was generally given in the congregation to the rich; this is arbitrary. The whole description points rather to something which James has actually in view; but in reprimanding this, he condemns partiality generally, which certainly showed itself in many other ways. By the descriptive words ἐπιβλέψετε . . . τὴν λαμπράν, which precede εἶπητε (in reference to the poor there is only εἶπητε), is indicated in a lively manner the admiring look at the external glitter; ἐπιβλέπειν, emphatice sumendum est (Pott); the rich man is characteristically described as ὁ φορῶν τὴν ἐσθ. τ. λαμπράν; the splendid garment is that which attracts the eye, the character of the man is entirely overlooked; φορεῖν, a secondary form of φέρειν, is also in Matt. xi. 8 used of garments; by the article before λαμπράν this idea is strengthened as the chief idea.—The contrast is sharply expressed in the different address to the one and to the other; already they are distinguished from one another by σὺ . . . σύ, and then κάθου and στήθαι, ὧδε and ἐκεῖ, καλῶς and ὑπὸ τὸ ὑποπόδιόν μου, are opposed. The form κάθου (instead of κάθησο) is foreign to classical Greek; see Winer, p. 75 [E. T. 98].—καλῶς refers to comfort (Wiesinger); it is not = honorifice (Wahl); and still less is it to be resolved into "Be so good as" (Storr). A place is pointed out to the rich man, where he can be comfortably seated, whilst to the poor man it is said *stand* there. The second clause, separated from the first by ἢ, is not a special address, but the two clauses form *one* saying, whilst after ἢ a thought is to be supplied, as "If thou wilt rather sit;" by the addition of these words the depreciation of the poor is yet more strongly marked.—ὑπὸ τὸ ὑποπόδιον] means not *under*, but *below my footstool* (Wiesinger), by which the floor is pointed out as the fitting

¹ Lange considers the mode of expression symbolical; by the rich man is meant the Jewish Christian, who, as wearing a gold ring, boasts of his covenant rights; and by the poor man is meant the Gentile Christian. According to Hengstenberg, the meaning is precisely the reverse. Both opinions are unjustified.

place for the poor to sit (Bouman). "The expression involves contempt: as it were under one's feet. Not *on* the footstool" (Lange). The word *ὑποπόδιον* (not *unicum*, as Wiesinger asserts) belongs only to the later classics. Often in N. T., and also in LXX.

Ver. 4 forms the apodosis to vv. 2 and 3, and rebukes what is blameable in the conduct described. Expositors greatly differ in the explanation of this verse, according as they explain the verb *διεκρίθητε*, and understand *οὐ* as a pure negation, or as an interrogative particle. It is best to take *διεκρίθητε*, in form indeed passive, in meaning as the aorist middle, as in Matt. xxi. 21, Mark xi. 23, Rom. iv. 20, and to give to the verb here the same meaning which it has constantly in the usage of the N. T.; so that it denotes the doubt, which consists in the assertion of thoughts at variance with faith; see on chap. i. 6. But then the sentence must be taken as interrogative: *Did you not then doubt among yourselves?* i.e., Have ye not fallen into a contradiction with your faith (ver. 1), according to which external glory and riches are nothing, whilst ye by your conduct have attached a value to them? To this question the second is added, to which the preceding *οὐ* is also to be referred: *and became ye not* (thus) *judges of evil thoughts?* This second question indicates the direct consequence of *διακρίνεσθαι*. James calls them *κριταί*, because in their conduct they expressed their judgment on the rich and poor. The genitive *διαλογισμῶν πονηρῶν* is not the genitive of object,¹ but of quality. *διαλογισμοί* is here, as predominantly in the N. T. *in malam partem* (see especially Luke v. 21, 22), thoughts of *doubt and unbelief*; the bad meaning is here heightened by *πονηρῶν*.

Other explanations are as follow:—

(1) *διακρίνεσθαι* = separate: then the sentence is interrogative; *ἐν ἑαυτοῖς* = *ἐν ἀλλήλοις* (Gebser, Schulthess, Senler, Erasmus Schmid, etc.); the verb being either passive: *nonne inter vos ipsos estis discreti ac separati?* or middle: *nonne vos discernitis inter vos ipsos?* "Do you not separate, divide yourselves among yourselves?" (Lange).

¹ Elsner: *iniquas istas cogitationes approbastis*; Bengel: *judices approbatores, malarum cogitationum* i. e. *divitum, foris splendentium, sed malis cogitationibus sentientium*.

(2) διακρίνεισθαι = discrimen facere. (a) The verb *active*—(a) *interrogative*: nonne discrimen fecistis apud vos ipsos? (Laurentius, Grotius, Wolf, Hottinger, Knapp). In this explanation ἐν ἑαυτοῖς = ἐν ἀλλήλοις; Schneckenburger, however, explains ἐν ἑαυτοῖς = in animis vestris; but then the meaning: discrimen facere, would pass into an act of the judgment, “statuere.” (β) *Negative*: “Then partly ye would not have distinguished (according to a sound judgment) among yourselves, and partly also ye would have judged after an evil manner of thinking (thus an error of the understanding and of the heart)” (Grashof).—(b) The verb *passive*: dupliciter peccatis, primo: inter vos ipsos non estis discriminati h. e. cessat piorum et impiorum differentia (Oeder).

(3) διακρίνεισθαι = judicare. (a) The verb *active*—(a) *interrogative*: nonne judicastis, deliberastis ipsi? “Are ye not yourselves persuaded how wrong this is?” (Augusti). (β) *Negative*: non discrevistis justa dubitatione, considerantia et aestimatione, quid tribuendum esset pauperi potius vel certe non minus, quam diviti (Bengel). Luther combines this rendering with that under 2: “And ye do not well consider, but ye become judges, and make an evil distinction.” Here also comes in the explanation of Occumenius: τὸ διακριτικὸν ὑμῶν διεξοίκατε, μηδεμίαν συζήτησιν ποιήσαντες πότερον τιμητέον . . . ἀλλ’ οὕτως, ἀδιακρίτως, καὶ ἐν προσωποληψίᾳ τὸν μὲν ἐτιμήσατε . . . τὸν δὲ ἡτιμάσατε.—(b) The verb *passive*—(a) *interrogative*: Nonne vos in conscientiis dijudicati h. e. convicti estis? Paraeus; so also Bouman: nonne igitur in vestris ipsorum jam judicati estis animis? (β) *Negative*: et dijudicati inter vos ipsos non estis ut judicastis secundum prava ratiocinia vestra (Heisen). Differently Cajetanus: haec faciendo non estis judicati in vestibus et divitiis et paupertate; laying the chief stress on ἐν ἑαυτοῖς.

(4) διακρίνεισθαι = dubitare, to entertain doubts. (a) *Interrogative*: et non dubitastis apud vosmet ipsos? et facti estis iniqui iudices? “Should you not yourselves have entertained doubts? Should you actually have passed evil-minded judgments?” (Theile). (b) *Negative*: non dubitastis apud animum, ne subiit quidem haec cogitatio, id factum forte malum esse, certo apud vos statuistis id jure ac bene fieri.

All these explanations are untenable, because they proceed upon a meaning of διακρίνεισθαι foreign to the usage of the N. T. Besides, several require arbitrary completions, and many do not correspond to the context. Brückner, de Wette, and Wiesinger have also here correctly maintained the meaning *to doubt*. De Wette: “Have you not then become doubtful in your faith?” Wiesinger: “Have you not

forsaken the law of faith, which recognises only one true riches?" With the reading of B (omitting *οὐ*) the thought is the same; the interrogative (*οὐ*), however, serves for the heightening of the thought, the readers themselves being thereby charged to pronounce the judgment. The *καί* of the *Receptus* stands as in Mark x. 26, Luke x. 29, 1 Cor. v. 2, with the question suddenly introduced. Or, since in the N. T. no other passage is found where *καί* is placed before a question forming the apodosis of a protasis beginning with *ἐάν* (on 2 Cor. ii. 2, see Meyer), it is to be explained from the fact that one would make ver. 4 a part of the protasis; see above.

Ver. 5. With this verse the proof of the reprehensibleness of the conduct found fault with commences: James showing that the conduct toward the poor is in contradiction with the mercy of God directed to the poor, and that the conduct toward the rich is in contradiction with their conduct toward Christians. The impressive exhortation to attention precedes *ἀκούσατε* with the address *ἀδελφοί μου ἀγαπητοί*; see chap. i. 16, 19. The proof itself (as in ver. 4) is expressed in a lively manner in the form of a question: *Has not God chosen those who are the poor of the world (i.e. accounted as such) to be rich in faith, and heirs of the kingdom which He has promised to them that love Him?*—The verb *ἐξελέξατο* is to be retained in its usual acceptation, in that which it has in 1 Cor. i. 27. Wiesinger, without sufficient reason, will understand it here as equivalent to "God has so highly honoured the poor;" and Lange incorrectly maintains that "the word here rather signifies calling with reference to ethical good behaviour to the divine revelation."—The correct reading: *τοὺς πτωχοὺς τῷ κόσμῳ*, is to be explained in the same manner as the expressions *ἀστέιος τῷ Θεῷ*, Acts vii. 20, and *δυνατὰ τῷ Θεῷ*, 2 Cor. x. 4 (see Meyer on these passages, and Winer, p. 190 [E. T. 265]; Al. Buttmann, p. 156 [E. T. 179]). The world esteems those as poor who possess no visible earthly riches. Wiesinger prefers to explain the dative as the dative of reference, thus "poor in respect of the world;" yet the former explanation, which also Brückner and Lange adopt, in which *ὁ Θεός* and *τῷ κόσμῳ* form a sharp contrast, is more appropriate, and more in correspond-

ence with the meaning of the word κόσμος with James. In the *Receptus πτωχὸς τοῦ κόσμου* the genitive is to be understood as in the expression τὰ μωρὰ τοῦ κόσμου, etc., 1 Cor. i. 27; see Meyer *in loco*.—πλουσίους ἐν πίστει] is not in apposition with τοὺς πτωχὸς (Luther, Baumgarten, Semler, Hottinger, Gebser, Bouman, Lange, and others),¹ but the completion of ἐξελέξατο, stating to what God has chosen the poor (Beza, Wolf, Morus, Knapp, Storr, Schneckenburger, Kern, Theile, de Wette, Wiesinger, and others); see 2 Cor. iii. 6.—By ἐν πίστει, as in the expression πλούσιος ἐν ἐλεί, Eph. ii. 4 (see 1 Cor. i. 5; 2 Cor. ix. 11; 1 Tim. vi. 18), the object is not stated wherein they are rich (Luther: “who are rich in the faith”), but the sphere within which riches is imparted to them; similarly Wiesinger explains it: “rich in their position as believers.” James wished primarily to mark the contrast that the *poor* are appointed to be *rich*, namely, so far as they are believers; the context gives the more exact statement of their riches: riches in the possessions of the heavenly kingdom is meant; this the following clause indicates.—Calvin: non qui fidei magnitudine abundant, sed quos Deus variis Spiritus sui donis locupletavit, quae fide percipimus.²—The expression ἡ βασιλεία occurs also elsewhere, without the addition of τοῦ Θεοῦ or similar terms, as a designation of the kingdom of God, *c.g.* Matt. xiii. 38. No stress rests on the article τῆς (= ἐκείνης), as the relative ἧς referred to it. The relative clause serves not for a more definite statement of the idea βασιλεία, as if by it *this βασιλεία* was to be distinguished from another, but the statement ἐξελ. . . κληρονόμους τ. βασιλείας is confirmed, as a kingdom founded on the promise of God.—From the expressions κληρονόμος and ἐπηγγείλατο of the relative clause, it is evident that James considered here βασιλεία as the future perfected kingdom of God, not “the joint participation in the *υἰοθεσία* of the Jews” (Lange). On ἧς ἐπηγγείλατο κ.τ.λ. see the remark on i. 12. The addition of this clause shows

¹ If πλουσίους is taken as in apposition, then here riches in faith forms the reason of the choice; but by this the keenness of the thought contained in the oxymoron is entirely blunted: it is also arbitrary to separate the two ideas πλουσίους and κληρονόμους united by καί.

² Kern: ἐν πίστει indicates that it is faith itself which makes the Christian inwardly rich.

that with James faith and love to God are most closely connected. — James puts *τοὺς πτωχοὺς*, to whom *οἱ πλούσιοι* are opposed, as the object of *ἐξελέξατο*. He accordingly (the article is not to be overlooked) divides men into these two classes, the poor and the rich, and designates, not the latter, but the former, as those whom God has chosen and appointed to be rich in faith,¹ namely, to be heirs of the kingdom; not as if *all* the poor received the *κληρονομία*, but his meaning is that those whom God has chosen belong to *this* class, whereas those belonging to the class of the rich had not been chosen. James did not require to point out the truth of this statement; the Christians, to whom he wrote, were a living testimony of it, for they all belonged to that class; and although some among them were *πλούσιοι*, yet, on the one hand, what Christ says in Matt. xix. 23–26 holds good, and, on the other hand, 1 Cor. i. 26–28 is to be compared. — With this divine choice the conduct of his readers stood in direct contradiction when they treated a poor man—thus one who belonged to the class of those chosen by God—contemptuously, and that on account of his poverty. What directly follows expresses this contradiction.

Ver. 6. *ὁμεῖς δέ*] contrast to *Θεός*. — *ἡτιμάσατε*] contrast to *ἐξελέξατο*. The aorist is used with reference to the case stated in vv. 2, 3, which is certainly of a general character (Wiesinger).² — *τὸν πτωχόν*, not = *pauperem illum*, but, to be understood generally, the *poor man as such*. That we are here specially to think on the *Christian* poor, is an incorrect supposition. — With *οὐχ οἱ πλούσιοι*] James turns to the rich as the class opposed to the poor, in order to point out from another side than he had already done the reprehensibleness of the conduct denounced. Already from this opposition it is intimated that not the Christian rich, but the rich generally

¹ It is to be observed that *ἐξελέξατο* does not here refer only to *πλουσίους*, as if *πίστις* were to be considered as the condition on which the *πτωχοί* were chosen to be *rich*, but to the combined expression *πλουσίους ἐν πίστι*, so that also *πίστις* is to be considered as an effect of the divine choice. The same view lies at the foundation of what Paul in 1 Cor. i. 30 (see Meyer *in loco*) and elsewhere often expresses.

² According to Lange, the aorist is used to point to “the historical fact in which Judaizing Jewish Christians have already taken part with the Jews, namely, the dishonouring of the Gentile Christians.”

—not exactly only “the rich Gentiles or the Romans” (Hengstenberg)—are meant. This is also evident from what is said of them, and by which their conduct is designated as hostile to Christians (ὑμῶν) who belong to the poor.¹ *καταδυναστεύειν*] only here and in Acts x. 38, frequently in the LXX. and Apocrypha (see particularly Wisd. of Sol. ii. 20), means “to use power *against* any to his hurt.” Related ideas are *κατακυριεύειν* and *κατεξουσιάζειν*, Matt. xx. 25. This exercise of power against the Christians might take place in various ways; what follows: *καὶ αὐτοὶ ἔλκουσιν ὑμᾶς εἰς κριτήρια*, mentions one chief mode. — *καὶ αὐτοί*] emphatically put first—even *they* (Theile). — *ἔλκειν*] indicates the violence of the conduct (so in the classics). The courts of judgment (*κριτήρια*, as in 1 Cor. vi. 2, 4) may be both Gentile and Jewish; certainly not Christian. It is arbitrary, and not corresponding to the expression *ἔλκειν*, to think here on a process *quibus pauperes propter debita in judiciis vexabant* (Hornejus; also de Wette and others). — Since James so strongly contrasts *αὐτοί* and *ὑμᾶς*, the former cannot possibly be regarded as a part of the latter.

Ver. 7. The description of the conduct of the rich is still continued; they not only do violence to Christians, but they even revile the holy name of Christ. *Do they not (even) blaspheme that fair name which has been called upon you?* The pronoun *αὐτοί* is put here as in ver. 6; incorrectly Theile = *hi* potissimum. — The expression *τὸ ὄνομα ἐπικαλεῖται ἐπὶ τινι*] is borrowed from the O. T., where it often occurs, and in the sense that one becomes the property of him whose name is called upon him; particularly it is said of Israel that the name of God was called upon them; see Deut. xxviii. 10 (where instead of *ἐπὶ* the dative is put); 2 Chron. vii. 14; Jer. xiv. 9, xv. 16; Amos ix. 12; see also Gen. xlviii. 16; Isa. iv. 1. Accordingly, by the name which is called upon Christians is not meant the Christian name (Hensler: *nomen fratrum et sororum*), also not the name *πτωχοί*, but the name of Him only to whom they as Christians belong—the name of Christ (de Wette, Wiesinger, Bouman, Lange, and

¹ If James had the Christian rich in view, he certainly would not have omitted to point to the contrast between their conduct to the poor and their Christian calling.

others); from which, however, it does not follow (as Wiesinger correctly observes) that James here alludes to the name *Χριστιανοί*. — By the addition of the attribute *καλόν* the shamefulfulness of *βλασφημεῖν* is still more strongly marked. — In support of the hypothesis that the rich are Christians, many expositors (also Brückner and Wiesinger) here arbitrarily explain *βλασφημεῖν* of indirect blasphemy, *i.e.* of such as takes place not by words, but by works; but *βλασφημεῖν* is never thus used in the Holy Scriptures; not one of the passages which Wiesinger cites proves that for which he adduces them; *βλασφημεῖν* always denotes blasphemy by word.¹ — This word also proves that the rich who are not Christians are here meant (thus also Lange, who, however, will understand particularly the Judaists); which is also evident, because James otherwise would rather have written *τὸ ἐπικληθὲν ἐφ' αὐτούς* instead of *τὸ ἐπικλ. ἐφ' ὑμᾶς*. — By the thought in this verse James indicates that Christians, by showing partiality to the rich, not only acted foolishly, but were guilty of a violation of the respect due to the name of Christ.

Vv. 8, 9. With these verses James meets the attempt which his readers might perhaps make to justify their conduct toward the rich with the law of love; whilst he, granting to them that the fulfilment of that law is something excellent, designates *προσωποληπτεῖν* directly as a transgression of the law. This explanation, which among ancient expositors, particularly Calvin, Cornelius a Lapide, Laurentius, Hornejus, and among the moderns Hottinger, Theile, Wiesinger have recognised as the correct one, is justified both by the particle *μέντοι* and by the phrase *καλῶς ποιείτε*. — *μέντοι* has in the N. T., where besides the Gospel of John it only elsewhere occurs in 2 Tim. ii. 19 and Jude 8, always the meaning *yet, nevertheless*; but this meaning is not here suitable, as ver. 8 contains no contrast to what goes before.² It is therefore to be retained in

¹ Were it here asserted that the blaspheming of the name of God or of Christ was occasioned by the wicked works of Jews or Christians, this would be indicated not by the active verb, but by the passive with *ἔσθ*; see Rom. ii. 24; Tit. ii. 5; 2 Pet. ii. 2; Isa. lii. 5. Moreover, even then blasphemy (namely, of the Gentiles) could only be expressed by words.

² Brückner finds the contrast in love being the reverse of partiality; but *μίνται* does not simply express the opposite, but the adversative meaning of the particle in the N. T. is of this nature, that it only occurs when the sharp con-

its original classical meaning, *assuredly, certainly*, and points out that James grants something to his readers, having, however, in view the contrast which he expresses in the following *εἰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.*¹ This is also indicated by the expression *καλῶς ποιεῖτε* (see ver. 19), which is evidently too feeble for an earnest enforcement of the law of love. Wiesinger correctly observes that the hypothetical dilemma carries in itself unmistakably an ironical character.² James calls the law *ἀγαπήσεις κ.τ.λ.*, which is cited from Lev. xix. 18, *νόμον βασιλικόν*, because it is the most excellent of all laws, *ceterarum legum quasi regina* (Knapp; so also Theile, Wiesinger, de Wette, Bouman, and others), inasmuch as all other laws are contained in it; see Rom. xiii. 8–10; Gal. v. 14 (1 Tim. i. 5; Matt. xxii. 39). It is far-fetched to explain the attribute *βασιλικόν*, because it was given by God the great King (Raphelius, Wetstein, Wolf, Baumgarten), or by Christ (Grotius), or because it applies to kings (Michaelis), or *quia reges facit* (Thomas; Lange combines all these explanations); also Calvin's remark is to be rejected as too artificial: *regia lex dicitur, ut via regia, plana scilicet, recta et aequabilis, qui sinuosis diverticulis vel ambagibus tacite opponitur*. — *νόμος* is here (see also ver. 9), as in Jer. xxxi. 33 (Heb. viii. 10, x. 16), used of a single commandment, instead of *ἐντολή* (which Lange wrongly denies). The expression *τελεῖν νόμον* is found only here and in Rom. ii. 27; it is a stronger expression than *τηρεῖν νόμον* (ver. 10). — *κατὰ τὴν γραφήν*] is not to be combined with *βασιλικόν*, nor is the mode of *τελεῖν* thereby stated, but it is the simple formula of citation.

Ver. 9 is in sharp contrast to ver. 8, calling the conduct of his readers, in opposition to their pretext, by its true name, and designating it directly as *sin*. The verb *προσωποληπτεῖν* is a complete *ἀπ. λεγ.*; James uses this word with reference to the exhortation in ver. 1. On *ἁμαρτίαν ἐργάζεσθαι*, see

trast to an "although" is to be filled up or expressed; it is arbitrary to explain it as equivalent to "on the contrary."

¹ Some interpreters explain *μᾶλλον* here, contrary to linguistic usage, as equivalent to *igitur*.

² When de Wette, against this explanation, says: "How could those blamed appeal to this law for their partiality?" it is to be observed that they seek thereby to justify only their conduct to the rich, by which certainly they leave their conduct to the poor unjustified.

Matt. vii. 23; Acts x. 35; Heb. xi. 33. Theile: *gravius fere est quam ἁμαρτίαν ποιεῖν, ἁμαρτάνειν*. For the sake of heightening this judgment, James adds the participial sentence ἐλεγχόμενοι κ.τ.λ.: *being convicted by the law as transgressors*. If the προσωποληπτοῦντες appealed to a law, it is precisely the law by which they are convinced as transgressors, so that they are without excuse. By ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου is meant not a single commandment, neither the above-mentioned law of love, nor specially a commandment forbidding respect of persons, as Deut. xvi. 19 (Lange), but the law generally; so also παραβάται is general: not as transgressors of *one* commandment, but of the law generally.

Ver. 10. Confirmation of the last expressed thought: *For whosoever kept the whole law, and yet sinned in one (commandment), he is guilty of all (commandments)*. The conjunctives τηρήσῃ, πταίσῃ, certified by authorities, are not to be considered as an error of the scribe (as Winer, 5th ed. p. 356, was inclined to assume); but the particle ἂν is here, as frequently in the N. T. contrary to classical usage in hypothetical sentences, omitted when ὅστις stands, because "the universality was already sufficiently indicated by the pronoun (Buttmann, p. 197 [E. T. 229]).¹ ἀνθρώπῳ is not, with Schulthess, to be supplied to ἐν ἐνί, but νόμῳ, with Theile, de Wette, Wiesinger, Lange, and others, "from the preceding collective idea νόμος." The following πάντων forbids us, with Schneckenburger and Kern, to understand ἐνί as neuter. It is in entire conformity with the character of the thought as a general sentence to take ἐνί quite generally, and not, with Theophylact, Oecumenius (τοῦτο περὶ ἀγάπης εἴρηκε), Schol. Matthaei, p. 188 (ἐν ἐνί πταίσειν ἐστὶ, τὸ μὴ τελείαν ἔχειν ἀγάπην), and some recent critics (Semler: in *hanc* unam et primam), to refer it to a definite commandment, particularly to that of love.² By this general sentence James seeks to confirm the thought that respect of persons

¹ Winer, p. 275 [E. T. 386], explains the omission of ἂν, because in the writer's conception the case is altogether definite; but then the future indicative would be put; also the case here stated, namely, that one may transgress *one* commandment and yet keep the *whole* law, is a case which cannot be imagined.

² Still more arbitrarily, Grotius, Morus, Stolz, and Jaspar limit the general expressions ἐνί and πάντων to such commandment, to the transgression of which the punishment of death is assigned.

includes in itself the transgression of the whole law, although it appears to be directed only against a single commandment. — The word *πταίειν* is found in the N. T. only in a figurative sense; the construction with *ἐν* is only in this place; in chap. iii. 2 the reference of *ἐν* is different. By *γέγονεν πάντων* (sc. *νόμων*) *ἔνοχος*, James declares the transgressor of *one* commandment to be guilty of the transgression of all. — *ἔνοχος*] is here, as in 1 Cor. xi. 27, used with the genitive of the thing against which one sins, in the guilt of which one is thus involved.¹ The same thought is also found in the Rabbinical writings, e.g. *Cod. Talm. Schabbath*, fol. lxx. 2; R. Johanan: Quodsi faciat omnia, unum vero omittat, omnium est singulorum reus; see Wolf.²

Ver. 11. The truth of the above thought is founded on the fact that *all* commandments proceed from *one* lawgiver. — *ὁ γὰρ εἰπὼν μὴ μοιχεύσης, εἶπεν καὶ μὴ φονεύσης*] Baumgarten finds the reason why James adduces these two commandments, *μὴ μοιχεύσης* and *μὴ φονεύσης*, in this, because "the transgression of these two was punished with death;" Wiesinger, on the other hand, because "*μοιχεύειν* was never laid to the charge of the readers, whereas *μὴ φονεύσης* had the command of love as its essence;" and Lange, because "to 'the Israelite the prohibition of adultery was likewise the prohibition of apostasy to heathenism, and the prohibition of murder was likewise that of uncharitableness towards our neighbour." But the reason is rather because these two commandments are the first of those which refer to our duties to our neighbour (thus Brückner). That *μὴ μοιχεύσης* precedes the other has its reason in ancient tradition; see on both points Mark x. 19; Luke xviii. 20; Rom. xiii. 9 (see Meyer *in loc.*); Philo, *de decal.* xii. 24, 32. With the words that follow: *εἰ δὲ οὐ μοιχεύεις κ.τ.λ.*, James draws the inference from the preceding. The negative *οὐ* after *εἰ* with the indicative is

¹ The punishment with *ἔνοχος* is usually in the genitive, with Matt. xxvi. 66, Mark iii. 29, xiv. 46; yet also in the dative, Matt. v. 21. In classical language, the thing against which one sins is with *ἔνοχος* only in the dative, whilst the crime itself of which the man is guilty, as well as the punishment which he has to suffer, is added in the genitive.

² Köster (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1862, 1) to this passage cites the corresponding expression of Livy (*Hist.* xxxiv. 3) referring to the lawgiver: *unam tollendo legem ceterae infirmitur*.

not surprising in the N. T. usage, the less so as here only a part of the conditional sentence is denied; see Winer, p. 423 ff. [E. T. 601]; Al. Buttmann, p. 296 ff. [E. T. 346 f.¹]. With the apodosis *γέγονας παραβάτης νόμου* James refers to ver. 9; consequently not *ἔνοχος*, as in ver. 10, but *παραβάτης* is put. — The reason of the judgment here expressed is contained in *ὁ εἰπὼν . . . εἶπε καί*. Since the law is the expression of the will of Him who gave it, the transgression of a single portion is disobedience to the one will, and consequently a transgression of the whole law. Bengel: unus est, qui totam legem tulit; ejus voluntatem qui una in re violant, totam violant. James might indeed have confirmed the idea by the internal connection of all commands, and by pointing out that the transgression of *one* commandment reveals a want which makes the fulfilment of the other commandments impossible;² but as he does not do so, these considerations are not to be arbitrarily introduced into his words.

Ver. 12. To what has hitherto been said the general exhortation is annexed: *So speak ye, and so do, as they that shall be judged by the law of liberty*. A new section does not here begin, as Wetstein, Semler, and others assume; but with this and the following verse the course of thought commenced at ver. 1 is concluded; not until ver. 14 does the thought take a new turn. The connection with what has gone before

¹ According to Buttmann, the negative *οὐ* here, even according to classic usage, is the more necessary, "when to the negative predicate another, still in the protasis, is immediately so appended with an adversative particle that the entire emphasis falls upon this second part" [E. T. 346]. It is indeed said in Thuc. i. 32: *εἰ μὴ μετὰ πακίας, δόξης δὲ μᾶλλον ἀμαρτίας . . . ἑναντία τολμῶμεν*; but here the relation is different, as the contrast *δόξης π.τ.λ.* could be left out without injury to the thought, which is evidently not the case with James.

² Augustine, in his Epistle to Jerome on this passage (*Opera Hieronymi*, Francf. iv. p. 154 ff.), says: Unde fiet omnium reus, si in uno offendat, qui totam legem servaverit? An forte quia plenitudo legis charitas est, qua Deus proximusque diligitur, in quibus praeceptis charitatis tota lex pendet et prophetae, merito fit reus omnium, qui contra illam fecit, in qua pendent omnia? Nemo autem peccat, nisi adversus illam faciendo.—Ticinus thus well expresses the unity of the law: *lex tota est quasi una vestis, quae tota violatur, si vel unam ex ea partem demus; quasi harmonia, quae tota corrumpitur, si vel unica vox dissonet; and Gataker: quasi catena aurea, quae tota rupta est, si unicum nexum abrumpas*. What Gunkel says is indeed correct: "The solidarity consists in this, that God has given with the equal obligation the one as well as the other commandment;" but the point of equal obligation is not here brought forward by James.

is to be thus explained, that ver. 13 evidently points to the respect of persons with regard to the poor, and refers to chap. i. 27. — οὕτως] “is not to be referred to what precedes, but to the following ὥς, thus: so as is necessary for those who,” etc.; thus in former editions. But by this explanation the thought is too abruptly introduced; therefore it would be more correct to refer οὕτως to what precedes (οὕτως, *i.e.* according to the rule stated in ver. 10 f., Brückner), and to take ὥς not as an explication, but as “a confirmation” (Lange). — James takes up not only the doing (ποιεῖτε), but also the speaking (λαλεῖτε), to which not only the conduct of his readers, specified in ver. 2 ff., but their sinful volubility of tongue generally led; see i. 19, iii. 1–12. The repetition of οὕτω serves for the heightening of the thought; διὰ here is the same as in Rom. ii. 12; see also John xii. 48, v. 45; correctly Wiesinger: “the law is a means because a measure;” incorrectly Kern: *vi ac jure leges*. The νόμος ἐλευθερίας is also here not the gospel, as the publication of the grace of God, or the Christian religion (Semler, Pott, Gebser), also not specially the νόμος βασιλικός mentioned in ver. 7 as a single command, but it is the same as is mentioned in chap. i. 25.¹ The demand which James here expresses is that Christians as such, who shall be judged by the νόμος ἐλευθερίας, must regulate by it the whole course of their lives. From what has directly gone before, one might infer that James wishes particularly to warn against the pretext combated in ver. 10, but ver. 13 shows that he has rather in view the want of compassionate love, forming the heart and pulse of the νόμος ἐλευθερίας, which was renounced by his readers in their ἀτιμάζειν τὸν πτωχόν (ver. 6).

Ver. 13 refers back to chap. i. 27, and concludes the section, appending to διὰ νόμου ἐλ. κρίνεσθαι a closer definition: *for the judgment is unmerciful against those who exercise no mercy; mercy rejoices against judgment.* — That which in the judgment passes sentence on Christians, who shall be judged διὰ νόμου ἐλευθερίας, is thus mercy. Against the

¹ Kern: “James, by the expression διὰ ν. ἐλ., reminds them that the νόμος for Christians is indeed according to form a new one, being converted into a willing impulse, but that it does not on this account cease, according to its nature, to be the rule of moral action, and thus also of judgment.”

unmerciful the judgment will be unmerciful. On the form *ἀνέλεος*, see critical notes; in Rom. i. 31 it is *ἀνελεήμων*; thus also in LXX. Prov. v. 9, xi. 17. Luther incorrectly translates it: "it will pass an unmerciful judgment;" *ἀνέλεος* is not an attribute, but a predicate. — Many expositors incorrectly explain *ἔλεος* = *ἀγάπη*; the former is a species of the latter, although James puts the chief stress upon it; see chap. i. 27. — The concluding sentence is subjoined *ἀσυνδέτως*; see chap. iii. 2, iv. 12. "Asyndeton dicti pondus auget." In the verb *κατακαυχᾶται* (only here and in chap. iii. 14 and Rom. xi. 18), *κατα*, on which the genitive *κρίσεως* depends, expresses the opposite tendency. *Κρίσις* according to its nature threatens to condemn the sinner (thus the believing Christian does not cease to be a sinner), but mercy has the joyful confidence (*καυχᾶται*) that it will overcome the threatening power of judgment.¹ — By a conversion of the abstract idea *ἔλεος* into the concrete, "the merciful man," the peculiar impress is taken from the expression, and a lax interpretation is introduced. On the sentiment, see Matt. v. 7; Prov. xvii. 5; Tob. iv. 7–11. Several expositors (Calvin, Cappellus, Wolf, Laurentius, Baumgarten, Bengel) incorrectly supply the genitive *Θεοῦ* to *ἔλεος*, by which a thought is introduced entirely foreign to the context.

Ver. 14. After James, proceeding from the exhortation to receive the word (*τὸν . . . λόγον τὸν δυνάμενον σῶσαι τὰς ψυχάς*) in meekness, had enforced the necessity not only to be hearers but also doers of the same, and with reference to the respect of persons practised by the readers had designated the exercise of compassionate love as true *θρησκεία*, he now, in close connection with the preceding, opposes the opinion that *πίστις* which has no works (*χωρὶς ἔργων*) can save (*σῶσαι*). The section from ver. 14 to ver. 26 treats of this; for the correct understanding of which it is to be held fast that James considers *πίστις* as the necessary ground of *σωτηρία*, which is evident from chap. i. 18–21, but of course

¹ The explanation of Wiesinger, that James intends to say "that mercy has nothing to fear, rather that she confounds the terrors of the judgment by her confidence with which she is assured of grace beforehand, and glories in it," is not entirely suitable, inasmuch as an objective idea (*κρίσις*) is thus converted into a subjective (the terrors of the judgment).

that *πίστις* which is not without works. In combating the above delusion, James adopts his characteristic mode of first stating in clear and well-defined language the fundamental thought on which all the rest depends, and he does so by the introduction of brief interrogative sentences which reject that false opinion. He commences with the words *τί τὸ ὄφελος*; see ver. 16 and 1 Cor. xv. 32. The article is not superfluous: *What is the use which arises from it, if, etc.*; without the article (according to B and C) it means: What kind of use is it = what use is it? thus frequently with the classics. With regard to the construction with *εἰάν*, see Matt. xvi. 26; 1 Cor. xiii. 3. The following words: *εἰάν πίστιν λέγει τις ἔχειν*, show that James had in view one who trusts for *σωτηρία*, because he has faith, although works are wanting to him. Many expositors place the emphasis on *λέγει*, as if it was thereby indicated that this assertion was a mere *pretext*, the person introduced as speaking not in reality possessing faith. Gataker: emphasis *hic est in voce dicendi*; intelligit istos fidem quidem jactare, non tamen habere; similarly Vorstius, Piscator, Wolf, Baumgarten, Pott, Gebser, Hottinger, Kern, Wiesinger, Stier, Lange, Philippi (*Glaubensl.* I. p. 298 ff.); also de Wette translates *λέγει* by "*pretends*." This is incorrect, for the sequel does not give the lie to this *λέγειν*, but, on the contrary, it is granted that the man may have faith without having works. Besides, it is self-evident that James did not require to say that a faith, which one has not, cannot save him. That it is not simply said *εἰάν πίστιν τις ἔχει*, is explained from James' lively mode of representation, by which he introduces his opponent as appealing to his *πίστις*.¹ It is also incorrect to emphasize the want of the article before *πίστιν* (Schneckenburger: *recte articulo caret* = to have faith, *quum revera non habeat τὴν πίστιν*, ver. 1; *ita omissio articuli jam quodammodo scriptoris judicium est*). The article is here wanting, as is often the case in the N. T. where the word expresses something definite in itself (thus Brückner), particularly when it is to be brought forward according to its quality. Also *πίστιν* must not be precisely explained as =

¹ *λίγην* is the more appropriate, as a faith without works, as James indicates in ver. 18, is something which cannot be proved, of which he who possesses it can only give information by *λίγην*.

nuda notitia, nor hardly = *nuda* professio; for those whom James combats could not possibly think that they by their faith possessed only the so-called theoretical faith, but rather they considered it the whole and complete faith. Also this faith was not defective in point of confidence, which Lange should not have denied, for they thought to be saved thereby; although this was not true confidence, but an *empty reliance* on Christ;¹ they indeed believed, but they did not receive Christ in themselves as a principle of a new life; the object of their faith remained to them purely external, and thus they wanted those works which spring from living faith.² — ἔργα δὲ μὴ ἔχῃ] ἔργα is here indeed entirely general, but according to the context *those* works are meant which are proofs of living faith, by which the νόμος ἐλευθερίας is fulfilled on the ground of πίστις. — After ἔχῃ a simple comma (Gebser) is not to be put, but a note of interrogation; the verse contains two questions, the second interrogative sentence μὴ δύναται κ.τ.λ. confirming the judgment contained in the first, that it profits nothing to have faith without works. Some expositors incorrectly put a special emphasis on the article before πίστις (Bede: fides *illa*, quam vos habere dicitis; or, *that* faith which has no works; so also Lange). The article here has not vim pronominis demonstrativi, but is used because there is a resumption of the previous idea (πίστις); see chap. i. 3 and iv. 15. It is also incorrect to supply out of what goes before the more precise definition of faith: quae non habetur revera sed dicitur tantummodo et jactatur (Theile), or to supply μόνη (Pott), or to understand by πίστις here bare notitia. Recourse has been had to these explanations, because it was thought that James otherwise denied to faith its saving power, which is not to be assumed. But the force of αὐτόν has been overlooked. If this pronoun be taken into con-

¹ It was otherwise with them than with those Christians who indeed considered the teaching of the gospel as true, and did not doubt to be saved, but who rested their hopes not on Christ as the object of faith, but on their supposed righteousness, i.e. on their good works; for James entirely denies good works to them, and never indicates that they appealed to their supposed good conduct.

² For the view here rejected an appeal is incorrectly made to ver. 19, as those thought to have in their faith the guarantee of their σωτηρίᾱ, whilst their faith only produced φρίσσειν to the demons.

sideration, it is evident that James does not affirm generally that faith cannot save, but that it cannot save *him* whose faith, on which he trusts, is destitute of works; for *αὐτόν* refers back to the subject *τις*, that is, to the person whom James has introduced as speaking — *σῶσαι*] as in i. 21, is used here of the attainment of *future* salvation; the expression is explained from the fact that eternal condemnation belongs to sinful man as such, and thus requires a *deliverance* in order to be saved. The idea *σωτηρία* generally signifies in the N. T. the *future* salvation; see besides other passages, particularly 1 Thess. v. 8, where *σωτηρία* is designated as the object of *ἐλπίς*. Certainly the present state of salvation of Christians may also be called *σωτηρία*, but it is evident from the connection with what precedes that James has not that in view, but the complete salvation (against Lange).

Vv. 15, 16. James illustrates the idea that faith is dependent for its proof on works, otherwise if these are wanting it is dead and profits nothing, by an example of compassion, which also, if without the corresponding works, is dead and can profit nothing. The representation of this similitude has the same form as the description of the case mentioned in vv. 2 and 3: first, the statement of the circumstances, and then of the conduct. The particle *δέ* (Lachmann, Tischendorf) is not merely transitional (*metabasis*, Wiesinger), but is to be explained from the fact that in this verse the argument against the opponent brought forward commences (Schneckenburger, de Wette). — Those requiring help are by the name *ἀδελφὸς ἢ ἀδελφή* characterized as members of the Christian community, in order to bring out more strongly the obligation to active assistance. — By the words *γυμνοὶ . . . τροφῆς* their destitute condition is described. There is no need to interpret *γυμνός* by *male vestitus* (Laurentius, Wolf, Baumgarten, Gebser, Hottinger, Schneckenburger, de Wette, Theile, Wiesinger); it is rather *nudus*, *naked*, but is certainly also so used when there is no absolute nakedness, but when the clothing can hardly be considered as clothing. On *λειπόμενοι*, see chap. i. 4, 5. — *ἐφήμερος*] in the N. T. *ἅπ. λεγ.*, is neither *diurnus* (Morus: quod in unum diem sufficit) nor *hodiernus* (Hottinger); but *ἡ ἐφήμερος τροφή* is = *ἡ καθ'*

ἡμέραν ἀναγκαῖα τροφή (Pott, Gebser, Schneckenburger, Wiesinger).

Ver. 16 describes the conduct towards those requiring help. — *τις ἐξ ὑμῶν*] is to be taken generally, and is not, with Grotius, to be limited to those *qui fidem creditis sufficere ad salutem*. — The address: *ὑπάγετε ἐν εἰρήνῃ*] expresses a friendly wish at departure; similar to *πορεύεσθε ἐν εἰρήνῃ*, Acts xvi. 36; Judg. xviii. 6. *ὑπάγειν εἰς εἰρήνην* (Mark v. 34; Luke vii. 50, and other places) is somewhat different, where *εἰρήνη* and *ὑπάγειν* are not yet conceived as united. — With *θερμαίνεσθε* with reference to *γυμνοί*, warming by clothing is specially to be thought of (see Job xxxi. 30; Hag. i. 6); but it is inaccurate to explain the verb itself as equivalent to *vestiri* (Laurentius, Baumgarten, Pott, Bengel, Gebser, Hottinger, Theile). — *θερμαίνεσθε* and *χορτάζεσθε* are not imperatives of the passive, and to be taken in an optative sense (Hottinger: *utinam aliquis beneficens vobis vestimenta largiatur*; similarly Grotius, Morus, Theile), but imperatives of the middle: *Warm yourselves, satisfy yourselves*; only thus does the contrast appear pointed and definite; that they are not properly to be considered as commanding, but as exhorting, is of itself evident. The plural *μὴ δῶτε δέ* is explained from *ἐξ ὑμῶν; τὰ ἐπιδηδεια* (ἄπ. λεγ.) = *τὰ ἀναγκαῖα* (Gloss.: *τὰ πρὸς τροφήν ἀρμόδια*; Suidas: *ἀφορμαὶ εἰς τὸν βίον*; see Herod. ii. 174; Thuc. ii. 23; Cicero, *Off.* i. 8: *necessaria vitae praesidia*); the things necessary for the support of the body, namely, clothing and food. The question *τί τὸ ὄφελος*; brings forward that such a sympathy which is *χωρὶς ἔργων* profits nothing, has no efficacy; to this neither *egentibus* (Hottinger) nor *dicentibus* (Gomar, Baumgarten, Semler) is to be supplied.

Ver. 17. Application of the similitude. The verse forms one sentence, of which *ἡ πίστις* is the subject and *νεκρὰ ἐστίν* is the predicate; neither after *πίστις* (Pott) nor after *ἔργα* (Michaelis) is a colon to be put. After *ἔχῃ* the idea *continually* (Baumgarten) is not to be supplied. *πίστις* has here the same meaning as in ver. 14. — From the fact that James calls faith *dead* if it has not works, it is evident that by these works is not meant something which must be added to faith, but something which grows out of faith; the *ἔργα* here treated of are works of faith, in which are the germs of faith. *νεκρά*

is here not to be explained by *operibus destituta*, but = *inanima*, equivalent to a dead body;¹ correctly, de Wette: "*dead*, that is, without the power of life; thus not *primarily* to be referred to its effects, but to be understood as its internal nature;" however, James thus designates a faith without works to prove that it *οὐ δύναται σωσαι* and *οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖται*. — The more precise statement *καθ' ἑαυτήν* has been variously understood. Grotius considers it as simply pleonastic; some critics separate it from *νεκρά* and take *κατά* = against (Möller = *καθ' ἑαυτῆς*, *i.e.* *sibimet ipsi repugnat*; Augusti: *contra semet ipsam*); others unite it with *πίστις* (Knapp = *fides sola*; Baumgarten: "in so far as faith is alone"). But *καθ' ἑαυτῆς* belongs evidently, as its position shows, to *νεκρά* (de Wette, Schneckenburger, Wiesinger, Lange). It is thus emphatically stated that a faith without works is not only dead in reference to something else, but dead in reference to itself. It serves for the intensification of the idea *νεκρά*, yet not so that by it the existence of a *πίστις* without works was denied (against Schneckenburger).

Ver. 18. The words *ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις*, with which this verse begins, apparently introduces an objection, as in 1 Cor. xv. 35; by which under *τις* a certain one is to be considered as an opponent of the thought above expressed, who with *σύ* addresses James, and by *ἐγώ* denotes himself. But against this explanation the sentiment itself is opposed; for as James reproaches those, against whom he argues, that they have indeed faith but not works, he could not possibly put into the mouth of his opponent, that the same had works, but he (James) had faith. The opinion of Pott, that *σύ . . . ἐγώ* = *ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος*, cannot be justified (so also Bouman: *hic . . . ille*). By that explanation it would require to be said: *σύ ἔργα ἔχεις, ἐγὼ πίστιν ἔχω*, namely, in the sense: If *thou* place all stress on works, *I* am not the less entitled to place all stress on faith. Kern attempts to remove the difficulty by taking the first sentence: *σύ πίστιν ἔχεις*, as a hypothetical

¹ The comparison of faith without works to a dead body is found among the old interpreters in such a manner that it formed a controversy between Catholic and Protestant interpreters; whilst Lorinus says: *mortuum corpus verum corpus est, ut sine operibus et charitate fides, Laurentius remarks: sicut homo mortuus non est verus homo, ita nec fides mortua vera fides.*

protasis, and the second, on the other hand, *καὶ γὰρ ἔργα ἔχω*, as the apodosis, and explains it: "If thou hast faith, so have I also works, because, as thou sayest, faith and works cannot be separated." But to this explanation is opposed not only the fact that James has not in what has gone before properly expressed the inseparableness of faith and works, but has only presupposed it; but also that the opponent should appeal to *works*, whilst James considers him as a person who has no works.¹ With these difficulties it is not to be wondered at that almost all expositors have decided for the view that *ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις* is not here to be taken as the form of an objection, and that by *τις* not an opponent of James is meant, but a "*vir sapiens et intelligens*," to whom James assigns the part of carrying on the argument in his stead against his opponent. Wiesinger: "*ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις* cannot here be possibly taken, as in 1 Cor. xv. 35, Rom. ix. 19, as an objection, for, as *σὺ πίστιν ἔχεις* already shows, the person introduced as speaking is on the side of James, and like him combats faith without works." Accordingly, with *σύ* the same opponent is addressed whom James had hitherto in view, and with *καὶ γὰρ* the person called *τις* designates himself as agreeing with James. But against this explanation there are many objections. 1. It cannot be denied that the words *ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις* have most decidedly the character of an objection. 2. If they are not so understood, then *ἀλλ'* is not only an interruption, but inexplicable; Hottinger, indeed, maintains: *ἀλλά hic non adversativum esse per se patet*; but who will agree with him in this? De Wette assumes that by *ἀλλά* here is expressed not primarily the contrast with what immediately precedes, but with the error already combated. Wiesinger has, however, correctly rejected this opinion, which is the less to be justified "as the error has not yet been *per se* expressed." *ἀλλά* must at all events be referred to what directly precedes. According to Schneckenburger, it refers ad negationem, quam notitio *νεκρός* involvit, quasi dictum foret: *ista fides non est*

¹ The explanation of Knapp, that the first words are interrogative: *tunc quia ipse fide cares, propterea eam contemnis?* and to which the answer is then given: *immo vero plus habeo, quam quantum tu et habes et postulas, fidem videlicet cum factis conjunctam*, is correctly relinquished by himself, as it is too artificial to be considered as correct.

fides, *sed* dicat aliquis; but that πίστις, if it has not works, is not πίστις at all, is so little the opinion of James that he ascribes a πιστεύειν to the devils (ver. 19); νεκρά is here arbitrarily explained as = nulla, and not less arbitrarily is it observed on πίστιν ἔχεις: "interlocutor ad hominis errorem descendens fidem, quam profitetur, eum habere *sumit*," since James does not the least indicate that the words σὺ πίστιν ἔχεις are to be understood in the sense: "I will even assume that thou hast faith." The opinion of several critics, that ἀλλά is here (= quin etiam) "a correction of the preceding judgment, heightening it" (Wiesinger), and indicates "that the opinion that a faith without works is dead is here surpassed" (Gunkel), is of no avail, as the opinion contained in this verse on faith without works is evidently not, as Brückner falsely thinks, stronger than that which is expressed in ver. 17 with νεκρά ἐστίν.¹ Accordingly, all attempts at the explanation of ἀλλά do not attain their object.² 3. With this explanation it is entirely uncertain how far the speech of τις extends, and where James again resumes; and accordingly the greatest uncertainty here occurs among expositors. 4. Lastly, it cannot be perceived why James should express his own opinion in the person of another who is designated by the entirely indefinite term τις. Wiesinger and most expositors do not touch on this point at all. Baumgarten thinks that James speaks here in the words of a stranger, in order the better and the more freely to convey the notion of erroneousness in severer terms. But this is a pure fiction; that James did not shun from expressing himself freely and strongly the whole Epistle is a proof.³ These objections are too important

¹ Wiesinger observes: The person introduced as speaking not only confirms what was said before, but goes beyond it; not only that such a faith is dead, but that it cannot even prove its existence without works: *it is nothing*. But with these last words Wiesinger inserts a thought into the words which they by no means contain, the same thought which, according to Schneckenburger, is contained in νεκρά ἐστίν.

² The pointing ἀλλ', ἐστὶ τις, σὺ κ. τ. λ. (Schulthess, Gebser, Rauch) does in no way remove the difficulty, and has also this against it, that the closely-united formula ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τις is thus disunited.

³ Lange thinks to remove the difficulty by ascribing to the words "a grand prophetic character," whilst by τις is meant "the Gentile-Christian world," which has proved "by its works of faith that it has had the true faith, whereas Ebionism, with its want of consistency in Christian works of love, has proved that

to permit us in spite of them to rest on the above explanation. But, on the other hand, the difficulties which arise if ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις is taken as a form of objection appear to be invincible. They are only so, however, when it is assumed that the person introduced with σὺ as speaking means James, and with ἐγώ himself. But this assumption is by no means necessary. Since James introduces τις as speaking, so both words σὺ and ἐγώ can be understood as well from the standpoint of James as from that of the speaker; that is to say, that with σὺ *the opponent* with whom James argues, and against whom he asserts that πίστις without works is dead, is meant, and with ἐγώ *James himself*. The meaning, then, is as follows: But some might say in answer to what I have just stated, defending thee,¹ *thou* (who hast not the works) hast faith, and *I*, on the other hand (who affirm that faith without works is dead), have works; ² my one-sided insisting on works is no more right than thy one-sided insisting on faith. By this explanation, which has nothing linguistically against it, not only is the nature of ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις preserved, but it expresses a thought entirely suited to the context, whilst the following words give the answer by which this objection is decidedly repelled. This answer is in form not directed to the person introduced as speaking, but to the opponent with whom only James has properly to do, and whom he in his lively style can now the more directly address, as the objection made was the expression of his soul. The meaning of this answer is as follows: Hast thou actually, as that person says, faith, and if this is to be of use it must

its orthodoxy was not a living faith." But, apart from the arbitrariness of this interpretation, ἀλλὰ is by it referred not to the preceding declaration, but falsely to the erroneous opinion of τις (ver. 14).

¹ The view of Stier, that by the speaker a Pharisaical Jew is to be understood, who takes occasion from the inoperative faith of Christians to mock the Christian faith in general, has been rightly rejected by Wiesinger. If James had meant by τις a Jew, he would have called him such.

² This is a form of expression which frequently occurs. Thus, if one speaks with Charles, and says to him: Henry says *thou* hast found the book which I have lost. Brückner, indeed, thinks that this example is not appropriate, but he does not give his reasons for saying so. Lange calls the explanation here given artificial, but he does not say in what its artificial character consists. The objections which Lange brings against it are founded on his having read erroneously defending *himself* instead of defending *thee*.

manifest itself, but this without works is impossible; thou canst not even show thy faith without works; as for myself, who have works, these are a proof that faith is not wanting, for without faith I could do no works. On *δείξον*, Schneckenburger correctly remarks: *vide ne verbo tribuas significationem exhibendi et manifestandi (per vitam)*, sed retine primam et simplicem *comprobari* quasi ante judicem. — *τὴν πίστιν σου* is said because the opponent ascribed faith to himself (ver. 14); thus “the faith which thou sayest thou hast” (Wiesinger). — With the reading of the *Rcc.* *ἐκ τ. ἔργων* (instead of *χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων*) the words are to be taken as ironical (so also Lange), as the supposition is that works are wanting to him. — With these words not faith generally, but living faith which saves is denied to the opponent; if the same is not proved by works, it is dead. — In what James says of himself, *ἔργα* are the works which proceed from faith, as these could not otherwise authenticate it. It is to be observed that in the first clause *τὴν πίστιν*, and in the second *ἐκ τῶν ἔργων*, stand first, because these ideas are the points on which the whole turns.

Ver. 19. James shows, in the faith of demons, with whom it produces trembling, how little faith without works effects salvation. With *σὺ πιστεύεις*, which is not, with Lachmann and Tischendorf, to be taken as a question, it is granted to the opponent that he possesses faith. From the fact that what is specifically Christian is not named as the object of faith, it is not to be inferred, with Calvin, that in this entire section not the *Christian* faith (*de fide*) is spoken of, but only *de vulgari Dei notitia*. Expositors correctly assume that this one article of faith is only adduced as an example. The selection of precisely this article on the unity of God is not to be explained because “the Jewish Christians were particularly proud of it, so that it kept them back from fully surrendering themselves to the Christian faith” (Lange), but because it distinguished revealed religion from all heathenism. However much the position of the individual words vary (see critical notes), yet the unity of God appears in all as the chief idea; comp. particularly, Deut. vi. 4; Neh. ix. 6; Isa. xlv. 6, xlv. 6; Matt. xxiii. 9; Mark xii. 29, 32; Rom. iii. 30; 1 Cor. viii. 4, 6; and, in this Epistle, chap. iv. 12. In *Hermas*, I. 2, *mand.* 1,

it is said: *πρῶτον πάντων πίστευσον, ὅτι εἷς ἐστὶν ὁ Θεός.* — De Wette, with whom Philippi coincides, thinks that by the construction with *ὅτι* the faith which the opponent has is characterized as merely *theoretical*; but it is, on the other hand, to be observed, that a construction with *εἷς* or *έν* here, where the unity of God is to be adduced, could hardly have been used (so also Brückner). — James grants, by the words *καλῶς ποιεῖς*, that this faith is something in itself entirely good (see ver. 8). Several expositors, as Calvin, Semler, Hottinger, Schneckenburger, Theile, Wiesinger, Bouman, find in the expression a trace of irony, which others, as Laurentius, Baumgarten, Grotius, Pott, Gebser, de Wette, deny. Though not in the statement by itself, yet in the whole expression there is something ironical (Lange, Brückner), which, in the combination of *πιστεύουσιν καὶ φρίσσουν* (as Wieseler remarks), rises to sarcasm. This sarcasm is, moreover, to be recognised in demons being placed in opposition to the opponent. — *καί* before *τὰ δαιμόνια* is not to be explained by *ἀλλὰ καί* (Pott), or *atque* (Theile); by the insertion of a contrary reference the peculiar severity of the expression is only weakened. That James, in his reference to the *unity* of God, mentions the demons, is in accordance with the view that the heathen divinities are demons; comp. LXX. Deut. xxxii. 17; Ps. xcv. 5, cv. 37; 1 Cor. x. 20; and Meyer *in loco*: As these are the occasion of polytheism, so they are hostilely opposed to the *one* God; but, in their usurped lordship over the heathen world, they tremble before the one God, who will again rescue the world and *judge* them. It is wholly arbitrary to take *τὰ δαιμόνια* = *daemoniaci* (Wetstein), or to think on the demons in the possessed (Semler, Gebser, Schneckenburger). Pott incorrectly paraphrases the *καί* between *πιστεύουσιν* and *φρίσσουν* by *καὶ ὁμως*; the simple copulative meaning of the word need not here be altered. *φρίσσειν*, an *ἄπ. λεγ.*, is used particularly of the hair standing on end (Job iv. 15), and is therefore a stronger expression than *δεδοικέναι* and *τρέμειν*.

Ver. 20 introduces the following proof from Scripture, that faith without works is dead, and accordingly cannot have *δικαιοῦσθαι* as its consequence. The question *θέλεις δὲ γινῶναι* expresses the confident assurance of victory over the opponent;

the address *ὦ ἄνθρωπε κενέ*, deep indignation at him. *Κενός* does not here indicate intellectual defect (Baumgarten = stupid, incapable of thinking; Pott = short-sighted), but the want of true intrinsic worth, in opposition to the imaginary wealth which the opponent fancies he possesses in his dead faith. The word is only here used in the N. T. of persons. The *ὦ*, placed first, which is frequently used in reproof,—see Matt. xvii. 17; Luke xxiv. 25; Rom. ix. 20 (Winer, p. 165 [E. T. 228]),—intensifies the censure. The thought is essentially the same whether *νεκρά* or *ἀργή* is read. — *ἀργός*] equivalent to *idle*, *vain*, that which profits and effects nothing,¹ is also used of a capital sum which lies idle, and therefore bears no interest, thus is a dead capital. Not because *ἀργή* “deserves the preference with a view to the sense” (Wiesinger), but only because it is difficult to consider it as a gloss, is it to be considered—against the authorities which testify for *νεκρά* (see critical note)—as the original reading. — As *χωρίς τῶν ἔργων* stands here instead of *ἐὰν μὴ ἔργα ἔχῃ* (ver. 17), the article *ἡ* is not to be supplied before *χωρίς* (against Beza, Baumgarten, and others).

Ver. 21. The testimony to which James first appeals is what happened to Abraham. The reference to Abraham is completely explained from his historical importance, and which is also indicated by *ὁ πατὴρ ἡμῶν*. — *ἡμῶν*] because both James and his readers belonged to the nation of Israel sprung from Abraham. By the question with *οὐ* the thought is characterized as such to which all—thus all the opponents—must assent: *Was not Abraham our father justified by works?* The participial sentence which follows declares what works procured for him justification: *when he offered Isaac his son upon the altar?* — The reference to the doctrine of the Apostle Paul, and especially to his declaration in Rom. iv. 1 ff., has misled expositors into many arbitrary explanations of this verse, and particularly of the word *ἐδικαιώθη*. In order to have a sure foundation for interpretation, two things are to be examined,—(1) the context, and (2) the linguistic usage.

¹ It is inaccurate to take *ἀργός* as equivalent to *ἄκαρπος* (Frank: unproductive); as *this* indicates the condition, *that*, on the contrary, the conduct of the subject. They are united together not as identical, but only as related ideas, in 2 Pet. i. 8.

(1) As regards the context, the question treated in this whole section is, How the Christian is saved; ¹ comp. the question in ver. 14: *μὴ δύναται ἡ πίστις σῶσαι αὐτόν*; and the connection of that section with the preceding, where the discourse is about the divine judgment (ver. 12: *κρίνεσθαι*; ver. 13: *ἡ κρίσις*). As James appeals to Abraham for his assertion that faith *without works* cannot save, it is evident that by *ἐδικαιώθη* he cannot mean something which happened to Abraham from himself, but only something which happened to him from God; so that the meaning cannot be, "Abraham justified himself by his works," but only that "God justified him on the ground of his works." ² (2) As regards the linguistic usage, *δικαιοῦν* corresponds to the Hebrew *הִצְדִּיק*, which, as a *judicial* term, has the meaning: *to declare one צָדִיק by an acquittal from guilt*, and is opposed to *הִרְשִׁיעַ* (LXX.: *καταγινώσκειν, καταδικάζειν*) = *to declare one רָשָׁע by a sentence of condemnation*; comp. Ex. xxiii. 7; Deut. xxv. 1; 1 Kings viii. 32; 2 Chron. vi. 23; Prov. xvii. 15; Isa. v. 23, l. 8, liii. 11; in the Apocrypha, comp. Ecclus. x. 29, xiii. 22, xxiii. 11, xxxiv. 5, xlii. 2. *δικαιοῦν* has also the same meaning in the N. T., where, especially (besides the passages treating of the Pauline doctrine of justification), Matt. xii. 37, Rom. ii. 13, Luke xviii. 14 are to be compared. This judicial meaning of the word is here to be retained. It is true, as *δικαιοῦν* (similarly the English word "to justify") occurs not only in the judicial sense, but, also more generally, as also *הִצְדִּיק*, in the sense "set forth as righteous" ³ (comp. Matt. xi. 19; Luke vii. 29;

¹ Philippi erroneously maintains that the question here treated, is to prove that faith has to manifest itself by works if it is to be regarded as true faith. But James designates the faith of his opponents as *νεκρά*, not merely because it has no works, but because it cannot effect the *σωτηρία* which they expected from it.

² Correctly, Wiesinger: "In *ἐδικαιώθη* the passive sense is decidedly to be retained, and, indeed, a Deo . . .; not of the human judgment is the discourse here and in ver. 23, but of the divine; as it treats of the proposition in ver. 14, that only an active faith can save." This is the more to be maintained, as the thought, that faith has to justify itself *before men* as living, is so void of importance that James could not lay such stress upon it.

³ This is the prevailing meaning of *הִצְדִּיק*, which is differently modified according to the different circumstances to which it is referred. It is chiefly used of a judicial sentence, whether of God or of a human judge, by which one is declared *צָדִיק*; yet it also occurs in another reference, namely, of every agency

Rom. iii. 4 ; 1 Tim. iii. 16), the passage has been explained : " Abraham has been proved righteous," or, " has proved himself righteous " (so already Calvin, and, in recent times, Philippi). But this explanation is unsuitable, since, according to this view, justification did not happen to Abraham from God (as must be conceived according to the context), but from his works ; thus it was Abraham who justified himself by his works, *i.e.* proved himself to be righteous.¹ If we hold fast to the judicial meaning, then it is to be observed that, in the conception of the word, *neither anything about the disposition of him who is the object of the declaration of righteousness, nor about the ground of justification* (whether it rests in the judge or in the conduct of him who is justified), is indicated. For this reason the explanation of Wiesinger: a Deo justus agnitus, is incorrect, as the idea of a *ratifying recognition* of the already existing condition is not contained in the word. As little is it to be vindicated when Hofmann thinks that δικαιούσθαι here imports: " to become a δίκαιος, inasmuch as he then answered to the will of God relating to him ; " for, on the one hand, by this a meaning (namely, being made a righteous person) is ascribed to the word which it has not ; and, on the other hand, no one can make himself a righteous person by his works, but only can prove himself to be such.²

which causes one to appear as righteous, whether that agency is exercised by the person in question or by others. The N. T. δικαιούν corresponds to this usage. Strictly taken, it is accordingly not correct to translate δικαιούν by " proved to be righteous," or " approved to be righteous," as the ideas *proving* and *approving*, according to their proper and strict meaning, are not contained in it. Comp., however, the excellent treatment of the word in Cremer's dictionary.

¹ Philippi explains the words : Abraham was justified *before men* by works, *as a justified man before God by faith*. But here there are evidently introduced into the idea δικαιούσθαι a series of more precise statements which are not contained in it. The explanation of Brückner is simpler, who considers *δικαιώθη* to indicate : " that moral righteousness which displays itself on the ground of the activity of faith ; " but also this interpretation is not to be considered correct for the reasons above stated. The unsuitableness of this and similar interpretations is particularly evident from ver. 24. It is also to be observed, that in these explanations the passive is converted into the middle voice. In the O. T., it is true, the hithpacl of צדק is translated in the LXX. by the preterite passive of δικαιούν (see Gen. xlv. 16) ; but in the N. T. the passive of this verb never occurs in this meaning ; the middle import is here rather expressed by the active with the reflex pronoun ; comp. Luke x. 29, xvi. 15.

² The following explanations are also incorrect : " he was loved as a righteous man " (Grotius) ; " he was made a partaker of the favour of God and of all the

James says nothing else than that Abraham *was declared righteous* (by God) ἐξ ἔργων. By ἐξ ἔργων the reason is specified, on Abraham's part, on account of which a declaration of righteousness was granted to him. By these works are to be understood not *all* the works which Abraham has done, nor his whole pious life, but, as the clause ἀνεύγκας Ἰσαὰκ κ.τ.λ. shows, *the actual offering of his son Isaac on the altar*. The plural ἐξ ἔργων is used because the category, at first entirely general, is specified which here comes into consideration. It may appear surprising that James here should emphasize precisely that offering as the reason of the declaration of righteousness, since in the O. T. narrative (Gen. xxii.) a δικαιούσθαι of Abraham is not mentioned. What James has in view is not "the judgment of God there; Gen. xxii. 12 comp. with ver. 16 ff." (Wiesinger); for in these words, which, moreover, only serve as an introduction to the declaration which follows, nothing is addressed to Abraham, but only it is testified of him that God in his action has recognised his fear of God. Not in this, but only in what God addresses to him on account of it, because He has recognised him as a God-fearing man, can James have found the declaration of Abraham's righteousness. This is the bestowal of the promise (vv. 16-18) by which it is expressly said, "*because thou hast done this thing*" (ver. 16), and "*because thou hast obeyed my voice*" (ver. 18); by which is definitely brought forward that the promise was granted on account of his obedience—that is, on account of his works. What importance, with regard to the promise, the obedience of Abraham had in the eyes of God is clearly brought out from Gen. xxvi. 5, where God ratifies this same promise with Isaac in these words: "*Because that Abraham obeyed my voice and kept my charge, my commandments, my statutes, and my laws;*" and not less is it to be observed when it is said in Ecclus. xlv. 20: ὃς συνετήρησεν νόμον ὑψίστου . . . καὶ ἐν

blessings springing from it" (Theile); "his justification was ratified by man" (Baumgarten). The translation: "he was pardoned" (Pott), is inaccurate, because the idea of pardon always supposes a crime, which δικαιούν does not. Also the explanation of Lange is arbitrary: δικαιούν, in the N. T. deeper sense, denotes that "God declares righteousness in the theocratical forum before the theocratical congregation conceived as permanent;" for how can the precise statement be contained in the simple verbal idea, *before whom* the declaration of righteousness was made?

πειρασμῷ εὐρέθη πιστός· διὰ τοῦτο ἐν ὄρκῳ ἔστησεν αὐτῷ κ.τ.λ. It is true that the same promise was made to Abraham at an earlier period, and that before he had done anything (Gen. xii. 2, 3); but the difference is, that after the offering of his son it was imparted to him as an *inalienable blessing on account of this action*, and that *at the close of his theocratic historical life*. In this James could rightly recognise a formal declaration of Abraham's righteousness on the part of God. — On the construction ἐδικαιώθη ἐκ, comp. Matt. xii. 37: ἐκ τῶν λόγων σου δικαιωθήσῃ, where the λόγοι are reckoned as that on the ground of which acquittal (or condemnation) takes place. — The words: ἀνεέγκας . . . ἐπὶ τὸ θυσιαστήριον] are not, with Luther, to be translated: "when he had sacrificed his son upon the altar;" for ἀναφέρειν joined with ἐπί, with the accusative, is not to *sacrifice*, but to *bring as a sacrifice to the altar* (comp. 1 Pet. ii. 24); it is therefore incorrect to supply the idea *will* (Estius: cum obtulisset = offere voluisset). Hottinger falsely explains ἐπὶ τ. θυσ. = *before* the altar. To the name Ἰσαάκ is emphatically added τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ; comp. Gen. xxii. 16.

Ver. 22. The direct inference from the preceding. Since the necessity of *faith* to the attainment of salvation was not contested by those with whom James disputed, but only the necessity of *works*; and since James (ver. 21) had adduced the example of Abraham to prove that only a faith which is not ἀργή and χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων profits: in this verse it can only be intended to represent how important to Abraham were his *works*, but not how important to him was his *faith*. This thought is thus clearly and evidently expressed in the second hemistich: καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων κ.τ.λ. On the other hand, the first hemistich: ὅτι ἡ πίστις συνήργει τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ, has been generally understood by expositors as if the necessity of *faith* was intended to be brought forward. In this meaning Bengel says: duo commata, quorum in priore, si illud, *fides*, in altero *operibus* cum accentu pronunciaveris, sententia liquido percipitur, qua exprimitur, quid utraque pars alteri conferat. According to this, James would have expressed in the first hemistich, that *faith* was not wanting to Abraham, that rather it was this from which his works sprung, that accordingly Abraham was justified ἐξ ἔργων, because they

were works of *faith*. The same explanation is given by Erasmus, Tremellus, Beza, Baumgarten, Gebser, Pott, Kern, and others; also by Hofmann and Wiesinger. But the context is against it, as *this* thought does not follow as a consequence from ver. 21. Those expositors have accordingly understood the passage more correctly who find in the words in question the meaning that the *πίστις* of Abraham was not *dead* but *operative*; Estius: *operosa fuit, non otiosa, non mortua* (so Calvin, Laurentius, Hornejus, and others), although their interpretation is inaccurate in particulars. — *συνήργει*] If *συνεργεῖν* is taken in its strictly literal sense: “to be a *συνεργός*, to labour or to work along with” (1 Cor. xvi. 16; 2 Cor. vi. 1), and is translated: “faith wrought with his works,” the idea of James (according to the usage of the word *συνεργεῖν* in this meaning) would be, that whilst works wrought, faith participated in their work.¹ But this thought does not correspond with the context, and is, moreover, not in itself to be vindicated, since faith and works are not two principles working along with one another. — Kern, with whom de Wette coincides, takes *τοῖς ἔργοις* as the dative of reference, and explains it: “faith wrought to his works, *i.e.* was the operative principle for the production of works.” This gives, indeed, a suitable enough thought, but linguistic usage is against the explanation; besides, it is not the case that “*συν* has only a vague reference, or, to speak more correctly, no reference at all” (Hofmann). On this account other interpreters, as Hofmann, Wiesinger, Brückner, also Philippi, correctly take *συνεργεῖν* here in the meaning of: to *help* (Rom. viii. 28; 1 Macc. xii. 1). The support which faith gave to works is to be found in this, that as it operates to their production, so also to their accomplishment in correspondence with the will of God.² By this explanation a special emphasis

¹ In the first edition of this commentary it is said: “Faith was the *συνεργός* of his works—that is, it operated not by itself, but with his works. James will here make prominent that with Abraham both were combined, the emphasis, however, according to the context, being placed on *τοῖς ἔργοις*.” This explanation, which has found favour with von Oettingen and Rauch, is, however, not tenable, as, on the one hand, linguistic usage is against it, and, on the other hand, it was not insisted on by James that the faith of Abraham wrought not alone, but that it was no inactive (inoperative) faith.

² The explanation of Hofmann (with whom Wiesinger and Brückner coincide):

is placed on the expression *συνήργει*, it being thereby brought prominently forward that the faith of Abraham was not *ἀργός* (*ἀ-εργός*), but exercised an activity, namely, the activity mentioned as helpful to works. Against Lange's explanation: "faith manifested itself operatively at one with the works," besides not being linguistically justified, Brückner rightly remarks that here the discourse is not concerning a co-operation of these two points. — The *second hemistich* is not in anti-thesis with the first, but constitutes its complement; whilst the faith of Abraham aided his works, faith itself received by works its completion. — *ἐτελειώθη*] is by many interpreters understood as declarative; Gomarus: *fides est causa, opera effectus*; *causa autem non perficitur a suo effectu, sed perfecta declaratur*, ut fructus boni arborem bonam *non efficiunt*, sed *indicant*. The same explanation is adopted by Calvin, Laurentius, Baumgarten, Gebser, Bengel, Philippi,¹ and others. Also Wiesinger indicates the same meaning with the remark: "faith could not be *proved* complete if it were not already so in itself, for the complete work presupposes the complete faith;" but *τελειοῦσθαι* does not signify to be *proved*, but to be *completed*.² Certainly the meaning of James cannot be, that faith hitherto incomplete was completed by works, as something which was externally added to faith, since faith is the impulse to the works; but as little is it his meaning, that faith is already complete (*τέλειος*) before works, and is by works only

"that his action would not have been what is represented in an act of willing obedience, unless faith had assisted to its performance," has this against it, that the principal thought would not thereby be expressed, but must be added. Philippi correctly: Abraham's faith was no inert faith, but was helpful to his works, namely, to their production and accomplishment, *i.e.* it assisted him to the performance of good works.

¹ Philippi incorrectly appeals for this meaning to 1 John ii. 5, and to *ἐστίν* in Luke vi. 35.

² Also Hofmann's explanation: "The *τελειώσις* of his faith consisted not in this, that it attained from incompleteness to completeness, but in this, that by the action, in which it proved itself, it attained to its complete formation—to its historical accomplishment," cannot be reckoned as appropriate, because *τελειοῦσθαι* never means "to be completely formed," if by this expression a becoming complete is not intended. Lange agrees with the above remark, only he introduces something strange when he says: "Abraham by his faith-offering attained typically and ideally the *τελειώσις*, which the Jewish Christians were to attain by the full proof of Christian brotherly love out of faith, and which with them all Israel was to attain."

proved or demonstrated to be so ; but faith and works are in his view so closely connected, that faith only when it produces works or by works (ἐξ ἔργων) becomes ever more completely that which it should be according to its nature and destination, and in so far only by works attains to its completion ; for as the power of love grows and is completed by the practice of works of love, so does faith grow and is completed by the practice of works in which it manifests itself.¹ Thus was Abraham's faith only completed when he stood the severest test, and brought his son as an offering upon the altar.²

Ver. 23. Since what was said of Abraham in the preceding appears to conflict with the Scripture, Gen. xv. 6, James was obliged to solve this apparent contradiction, therefore he adds to what he has said : *and (thus) the Scripture was fulfilled which says, " But Abraham believed God, and it was reckoned to him for righteousness ; and he was called a friend of God."* Most expositors (also von Oettingen) explain πληροῦν by comprobare, confirmed, and find here the thought expressed, that by Abraham being justified ἐξ ἔργων, the scripture : " that faith was reckoned to Abraham for righteousness," received its confirmation. But in this explanation of the word πληροῦν there is an arbitrary weakening of the idea. πληροῦν signifies neither in the N. T. nor in classical usage : " to confirm," but always " to fulfil " (see Cremer) ; with regard to a saying, the realization of the thought expressed in it by an action following is indicated by πληροῦν, whether that saying be in the

¹ Luther (in his introduction to First Peter, published by Irmischer, vol. lxx. p. 223 f.) says of the fruits of faith : " Although they belong to our neighbour, that he may be profited thereby, yet the fruit is not external—faith *becomes stronger thereby*. It is an entirely different strength than that of the body, for this decays and is consumed ; but this spiritual strength, the more one uses and exercises it, the stronger it becomes ; it decays when one does not exercise it." See also the appropriate remarks of Hengstenberg (*Evang. Kirchenz.* 1866, p. 1124 ff.).

² When it is objected against this explanation, that faith must already have been perfect in order to produce the perfect work, it is to be observed, that it is in the nature of living faith always to be becoming stronger, in and with the production of works, and thus to perfect itself in its nature more and more. Brückner, indeed, grants that the practice of works has a strengthening reflex efficacy on faith, but observes that by this cannot be meant that faith was not before already sufficient to justify Abraham. But to this it is to be observed, that James does not derive the justification (meant by him) of Abraham from his faith preceding works, but from his faith made perfect by works.

form of a prediction or not. This meaning of the verb is also here to be recognised, and indeed so much the more as James uses *the* formula with which not only in the N. T. but also in the O. T. (1 Kings ii. 27; 2 Chron. xxxvi. 22; 1 Macc. ii. 55) generally the fulfilment of a proper prediction, and always the real proof of an earlier spoken thought, is expressed. — The scripture which was fulfilled is Gen. xv. 6, where it is said not only that Abraham believed Jehovah, but that He (Jehovah) reckoned it to him for righteousness. James (as also Paul in Rom. iv. 3; Gal. iii. 6; see also 1 Macc. ii. 52) cites the passage according to the LXX., where the passive ἐλογίσθη is used instead of the active ἠγάπησεν; whilst he only deviates from the Greek text in this, that he (as also Paul in Rom. iv. 3) uses ἐπίστευσεν δέ instead of καὶ ἐπίστευσεν; it is to be observed that in the corresponding passage, Ps. cvi. 31, the passive ἠγάπησεν is also in the Hebrew. — Instead of the expression used in these passages, the form: ἠγάπησεν ὁ ᾧ, is also found in the O. T. Deut. xxiv. 13 and vi. 25 (where the LXX. incorrectly translate ἠγάπησεν by ἐλεημοσύνη). The contrary of this is indicated by the expression: ἠγάπησεν ὁ ᾧ, Prov. xxvii. 14. — All these expressions import a judgment which God pronounces to Himself on a definite conduct of man, by which He either reckons it for righteousness or for a curse; with Abraham it was his faith on account of which God declared him a righteous person. — But in what does James see the fulfilment of this scripture, that testifies this judgment of God on believing Abraham? Evidently in what he had already said, namely, that Abraham ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη, and which he indicates by what follows: καὶ φίλος Θεοῦ ἐκλήθη; for these words—since they belong not to the scripture—are co-ordinate not with καὶ ἐλογίσθη, but with καὶ ἐπληρώθη κ.τ.λ. It is true God regarded Abraham as His φίλος (φίλος Θεοῦ is not, as Hofmann and Philippi think, God's friend, who loved God, but *God's friend whom God loved*¹) the instant he reckoned his faith to him for righteousness; but he was *called* so at a later period, namely, only at the time that he was *declared* righteous by God on account of his *works*. The expressions ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς

¹ Lange comprehends both; but at all events, according to the context, the reference given above is to be recognised as the prevailing one.

δικαιοσύνην and ἐδικαιώθη are not regarded by James as equivalent, but according to his representation the former was imparted to Abraham *purely* on account of his faith (ἐπίσταν), but the *latter* only when his faith was completed by works, thus on account of his works (ἐξ ἔργων), so that thereby that scripture was fulfilled. It is true this scripture is abstractly no promise; but as it notifies facts which point to later actions in which they received their full accomplishment, James might consider it as a word of promise which was fulfilled by the occurrence of these later actions.¹—The appellation of Abraham as a φίλος Θεοῦ is not indeed found in the LXX.; but in 2 Chron. xx. 7, Jehoshaphat calls him in his prayer ἡγαπημένος σου (LXX.: ὁ ἡγαπημένος σου), and in Isa. xli. 8 God Himself calls him ἡγάπησα (LXX.: ὃν ἡγάπησα); comp. also *Gcs. Asar.* v. 11: διὰ Ἀβραάμ τὸν ἡγαπημένον ὑπὸ σοῦ; also it was not unusual for the Jews to call him φίλος Θεοῦ; to Gen. xviii. 17, the LXX. have added to ἀπὸ Ἀβραάμ the words τοῦ παιδός μου, for which Philo puts τοῦ φίλου μου. It is evident from what has preceded that we cannot, with Grotius, Hornejus, Pott, and others, explain ἐκλήθη = factus est, fuit.

REMARK.—When de Wette explains πληροῦν by *realized*, this is so far inappropriate, as πληροῦν does not directly refer to the fact itself, but to the saying of scripture, and as neither of πιστεῦν of Abraham, nor of ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικ., can it be said that it “was something not yet wholly real, but the full realization of which occurred only at a later period.” For although both point to a later period, yet there was in them something which had actually taken place, as Lange correctly adduces. Hofmann also gave an incorrect reference to the word, explaining it: “In the offering of Isaac it was proved that God had rightly estimated the faith of Abraham when He counted it for righteousness;” for, on the one hand, there was no need of a proof that God had rightly estimated something, of which there is no indication in James, and, on the other hand, πληροῦν has not the meaning of confirming or proving.² In opposition to the explanation

¹ Namely: the faith with which Abraham received the promise of God points to the later obedience, and the divine reckoning of his faith for righteousness points to the declaration of righteousness imparted to him by God at a later period after proof of his obedience.

² Also in Brückner's explanation: “Both the fact that Abraham believed God, and that this faith was reckoned to him by God for righteousness, was confirmed and proved in the offering of Isaac, leading to this that Abraham ἐξ

of Philippi: "the scriptural expression concerning Abraham's justification by faith was, because His justification by faith is in itself a thing invisible as it were, an unfulfilled prophecy, until it became visible through proof by works," it is, apart from the unjustifiable insertion of "*as it were*," to be observed that Abraham's act of obedience, happening at a later period, confirmed indeed his faith (thus that ἐπίστευσεν τῷ Θεῷ), but not the righteousness adjudged to him on account of his faith (that ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικήν), and accordingly ἐπληρώθη would be suitable only for the first half of the scriptural expression. It is peculiar that, according to the explanation of Philippi, the same meaning: "to be proved," is in essence ascribed to the three words—δικαιοῦσθαι, τελειοῦσθαι, πληροῦσθαι.

Ver. 24. An inference universally valid from the adduced example of Abraham: "*Ye see that by works a man is justified (declared righteous), and not by faith alone.*" — ὁρᾶτε] is not imperative (Erasmus, Grotius), but indicative; Griesbach, Schott, Schulthess incorrectly understand the sentence as a question, which it is as little as in ver. 22. — ἐξ ἔργων] is emphatically placed first, because the chief stress is upon it. — δικαιοῦται] has the same meaning as in ver. 21. James thus infers from the foregoing that the declaration of man's righteousness proceeds ἐξ ἔργων, and, with special reference to his opponents, he adds: οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνον.¹ The chief emphasis is on μόνον; for as little as James in ver. 14 has not said that faith cannot save (σῶσαι), so little will he here say that a man is not justified ἐκ πίστεως (rather πίστις is to him the presupposition, without which the attainment of salvation cannot be conceived, as without it the ἔργα, ἐξ ὧν δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος are impossible); but that the faith, which justifies, must not be χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων. μόνον is therefore not to be united with οὐκ (Theile: appositionis lege explenda est oratio: non solum fide, sed

ἔργων ἰδικαιώθη," the idea πληρῶν receives not its right meaning. Lange has here in essentials adopted the correct meaning.

¹ Philippi, according to his explanation of ἰδικαιώθη, ver. 21, must find here the thought expressed, that "faith alone without works cannot *prove* a man before men to be a believer, and justified by faith;" but this thought is in fact so self-evident, that James would not have thought it necessary to state it as a consequence from the history of Abraham. The idea opposed to ἐξ ἔργων should not be ἐκ πίστεως, but must be ἐκ λόγων (comp. λίγη, ver. 14); moreover, the simple δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος cannot possibly denote: "a man is justified as a believer whom God, on account of his faith, has justified."

etiam operibus . . . nempe cum fide conjungendis), but with *πίστεως* (Theophylact, Grotius, Knapp, Hottinger, Wiesinger, and others); comp. 1 Cor. xii. 31; 2 Cor. xi. 23; Gal. i. 23; Phil. i. 26. The declaration of righteousness, which James intends, is not that by which the believer on account of his faith receives the forgiveness of his sins, but, as is evident from the connection of the whole section, that which occurs to the believer, who has proved his living faith by his works, at the judgment (*ἐν τῇ κρίσει, ἐν τῷ κρίνεσθαι*), and by which he receives *σωτηρία* (ver. 14). When James, in reference to this, appeals to what happened to Abraham, there is nothing unsuitable, for why should not that which God has done in a definite instance be regarded as a type and testimony of what He shall do at the future judgment? Moreover, this is completely appropriate, since to Abraham, by the address to him after the offering of Isaac, the promise which was before made to his faith, was *rendered unchangeably firm at the close of his theocratic life*. The present *δικαιούται* is explained, because the thought was to be expressed as a universal sentence.¹

Ver. 25. To the example of Abraham, that of Rahab is added: *But was not in like manner Rahab the harlot justified by works?* The form of the sentence is the same as in ver. 21. — *ὁμοίως δὲ καί*] does not signify “even so” (as Frommann explains it in the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1833, p. 97), but by *ὁμοίως* the *similarity* of what Rahab became a partaker with what happened to Abraham is brought forward, whilst by *δέ* the *diversity* of the relation is indicated. This diversity is noted by the addition *ἡ πόρνη*. Rahab, namely, was a

¹ See remarks by the author in the April number of the *Erlang. Zeitschrift für Protest.* Frank, in his reply (in the same, p. 220), combating the reference of *δικαιούται* to the final judgment, says: “If there was in the life of Abraham a justification by works, which may be considered as the type and testimony of the final acquittal, so there occurs also in the life of Christians such acts of justification by works, that they may also be regarded as a testimony and type of their future justification before the judgment-seat of God.” To this it is to be replied, that *such* an act of justification is here treated of by which the accounting of his faith for righteousness already imparted to the believer comes to its termination, as was here the case with Abraham. But this act, as concerns Christian believers, occurs not in their earthly life, but only at the judgment. Philippi also incorrectly says that the reference to the judgment is not indicated, since it is sufficiently indicated by the whole context; see remarks on ver. 14.

πόρνη; nevertheless, on account of the works which she did (namely, her works of faith), she was declared righteous. Thus, by the addition of this example, the truth that a man is justified ἐξ ἔργων is yet further confirmed.¹ The article ἡ is not, as some expositors think, demonstrative *illa*; and πορνή means neither mulier cibaria vendens, nor caupona vel hospita (Lyranus, Grotius), nor idololatra (Rosenmüller). — ὑποδεξαμένη τοὺς ἀγγέλους κ.τ.λ.] This participial sentence mentions the ἔργα, on account of which Rahab was justified. The correctness of the assertion, that Rahab was justified on account of her works, consists in this: that, according to the narrative contained in Josh. ii. and vi., life was on account of them granted to her, she was formally delivered from that punishment which befell Jericho; see Josh. vi. 24. Thus James could with right appeal for the truth of what was said in ver. 24 to this fact, since also the future declaration of righteousness will be an acquittal from punishment. — In Heb. xi. 31 the deliverance of Rahab is ascribed to her πίστις, but so that her action is likewise mentioned as the demonstration of it. Theile explains ὑποδεξαμένη = clam excepit; but Wiesinger correctly observes: "The secondary meaning *clam* is not contained in the word, but in the circumstances;" see Luke x. 38, xix. 6; Acts xvii. 7. In the Epistle to the Hebrews the simple verb δεξαμένη is used, and the ἄγγελοι² are there more exactly designated as κατάσκοποι. ἐκβάλλειν is not simply *emittere* (Schneckenburger), but has the secondary meaning of force = *thrust out*; comp. Luke viii. 54; John ii. 15; Acts ix. 40. It denotes the pressing haste with which she urged the messengers to go out of the house.

¹ Bede assigns as a reason why Rahab is here adduced as an example: ne quis objiceret Abrahamum ejusque fidem excelsiorem esse, quam et quis christianus imitatione eam adsequi possit. Grotius thinks: Abrahami exemplum Hebraeis ad Christum conversis sufficere debebat, sed quia etiam alienigenis scribit, adjunxit exemplum feminae extraneae (similarly Hofmann); and Schneckenburger observes: novum additur exemplum e sexu muliebri sumtum. All these meanings are, however, arbitrary, as there is no indication of them in the words before us. This holds also good against Lange, according to whose opinion Rahab is here to be considered "as a representative of the Gentile Christians in their works of faith."

² Lange strangely supposes that James has chosen this expression "in allusion to the fact that the Gentiles of his time were ready to receive the messengers of the gospel."

ἐτέρα ὁδῶ] *i.e.* by another way than from that by which they entered the house, namely, διὰ τῆς θυρίδος, Josh. ii. 15. For the local dative, see Winer, p. 196 [E. T. 273].

Ver. 26 is added as a reason (γάρ), primarily indeed, to what directly goes before (ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη), but thereby likewise to the universal sentiment contained in ver. 24. James here repeats the same judgment which he has already expressed (ver. 17) on πίστις χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων; yet heightens it by the comparison with σῶμα χωρὶς πνεύματος: *for as the body without the spirit is dead, so also faith without works is dead.* — τὸ σῶμα χωρὶς πνεύματος] By σῶμα is to be understood the human body, and by πνεῦμα the vital principle animating it, by which it lives; whether James has contemplated πνεῦμα definitely as the intellectual spirit of man (as “the principle of the morally-determined and God-derived life peculiar to man”), or generally as the breath of life proceeding from God (see Gen. vi. 17, LXX.: πᾶσα σὰρξ ἐν ᾗ ἐστὶ πνεῦμα ζωῆς; Rev. xi. 11, xiii. 15), remains uncertain. With the body without the spirit, which is νεκρός, James compares (οὕτως is not “the sign of assurance = even so certainly,” Baumgarten) faith without works (the article τῶν denotes works as those which belong to πίστις, its corresponding works), which is also νεκρός. This comparison appears so far incongruous, as the relation of ἔργα to πίστις does not correspond with that of πνεῦμα to the σῶμα, since ἔργα are the fruit, and not the source of πίστις.¹ Therefore some interpreters have by ἔργα understood not works themselves, but love (Theile), or “the innermost life of faith in its outwardly operative and visible manifestation” (Frank); but such an exchange of ideas is not to be justified. Already some of the older expositors, as Gomar, Piscator, Laurentius, Wolf, and others, and recently Philippi (Theile is undecided), explain πνεῦμα = breath. This, however, is even linguistically objectionable, as πνεῦμα in the N. T. occurs in the meaning of breath proceeding out of the mouth only in 2 Thess. ii. 8, a passage in accordance with the O. T.; but also in sense this explanation is not justified, for although “the breath is the proof of the existence of life in the body” (Philippi), yet the

¹ Lange denies the apparent incongruity, because “the spirit also, in virtue of its actuality, effects the *higher* visibility of the body!”

ideas breath and works have too great disparity between them to be parallelized with each other. It is more natural, with de Wette, Kern, Hofmann, Wiesinger, and Weiss, to assume that James intends not to compare the single members with each other (*σῶμα* with *πίστις*, and *πνεῦμα* with *ἔργοις*), but to make prominent that a faith which is *χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων*, is thereby proved to be like to *the* body, in which the *πνεῦμα*, the source of life, is wanting—which is thus only a dead body. With this sentence, in which the idea expressed in ver. 17 is strongly confirmed, James closes this section, as from this it is self-evident that faith without works cannot effect justification for man, and consequently not *σωτηρία*, and therefore profits nothing (ver. 14).

1. The doctrine of James in this section is according to expression in opposition with that of the Apostle Paul (James: *ἐξ ἔργων δικαιούται ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνον*; Paul, Gal. ii. 16: *οὐ δικαιούται ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἔργων νόμου, ἐὰν μὴ διὰ πίστεως*; James asks: *Ἀβραάμ οὐκ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη*; Paul, in Rom. iv. 2, says: *εἰ Ἀβραάμ ἐξ ἔργων ἐδικαιώθη, ἐχέει καύχημα, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸν Θεόν*). It is asked whether also the sentiment of the one contradicts that of the other. Until the time of Luther, the conviction prevailed that the two agreed in thought. This is maintained in recent times by Neander, Thiersch, Hofmann, Wiesinger, Lange, Hengstenberg, Philippi, and others. Luther, on the contrary, was of opinion that the doctrine of James decidedly contradicted that of Paul; and the same view has been expressed in recent times by de Wette, Kern, Baur, Schwegler, and others, also Rauch. (There is a middle view, that there is indeed a diversity of doctrine between Paul and James, but that this does not exclude a higher unity; thus Schmid, Weizsäcker (Reuter's *Repert.* Oct. 1855), Lechler, and others. — Already Theophylact, Oecumenius, Bede have, for the sake of harmonizing the difference, asserted that the *ἔργα* of James are different from those of which Paul speaks; Paul intends *opera legis* (Oecumenius: *τὰ κατὰ νόμον σαββατισμῶν καὶ περιτομῆς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀγνισμῶν*); James, on the contrary, *opera fidei* (Oecumenius: *ἔργα τὰ πιστὴν βιβανδύτα*). This is indeed true. Paul has to do with Judaizing opponents who maintained the necessity of circumcision, and consequently of all legal works; but James, with such Christians who trusted to simple *πίστις*, and thought that this would secure their salvation, although destitute of corresponding works. Paul had thus to prove that *ἔργα κατὰ νόμον* were not necessary; James, that *ἔργα τῆς πίστεως* were necessary. Nevertheless, this recognition of the different

relations does not suffice to an actual harmonizing of the difference; for it has with truth been maintained that, according to the doctrinal system of Paul, a justifying efficacy is denied not only to works of *law*, but also to works of *faith*, since these last do not *precede*, but *follow* justification.—Accordingly a different meaning of the term πίστις has been adopted, and it has been maintained that by πίστις χωρὶς ἔργων James understands only *bare speculation* (Oecumenius: ἡ ἀπλὴ συγκατάδοσις), the frigida et nuda notitia, or indeed even the falsa professio fidei. This is certainly not entirely suitable, though Paul does not know by name a πίστις νεκρά. But although it were correct, yet the recognition of this distinction does not suffice to reconcile the difference; for Wieseler is decidedly right when, against Schmid, Olshausen, Neander, and others, he remarks, that it is one thing to say, *To be justified by faith which is proved by works*, and another thing, *To be justified by works in which faith is proved*. Already by Calvin, Calovius, Gerhard, and others, and in recent times particularly by Hofmann, Wiesinger, Brückner, Lange, Philippi, and others, the wished-for reconciliation has been attempted to be brought about, by ascribing a different meaning to the word δικαιώσθαι in James from what it has in Paul; that James speaks not *de actu*, but *de statu* justificationis. But either thereby a meaning is assigned to the word which it *never* has, or there results from it in James an idea inappropriate to the connection; see exposition of the verses in question. Hengstenberg (*Brief des Jakobus* in the *Evang. Kirchenz.* 1866, No. 91–94) correctly maintains that δικαιώσθαι has with Paul and James the same meaning; but when he attempts to prove the agreement of the two modes of expression by the supposition that, as there are different stages of faith, so there are different stages of justification, and that James speaks of a more perfect justification than Paul in the passages in question, this cannot be admitted, since it contradicts the nature of divine justification to conceive it as advancing from an imperfect to a more and more perfect stage. Even the justification at the last judgment is in itself not more perfect than that by which God in this life absolves the believer from his sins; the distinction consisting only in this, that by the former he obtains salvation as a present blessing, and that in all its fulness, which by the latter was conferred on him as a blessing yet future.¹

¹ It is incorrect when Hengstenberg says: “If by faith is understood genuine living faith, and by works genuine works proceeding from faith, justification by faith and justification by works can be taught without contradiction;” since the justification of which Paul speaks is the reason and not the consequence of works of faith: on which account even Riggenbach (“On Justification,” etc., in

The exposition given in the above pages has shown that the idea of the word *δικαιοῦσθαι* with James is none other than what it is with Paul, but that by it James has in view the justification that places believers at the last judgment in the full enjoyment of salvation, whereas Paul denotes by it the justification that puts believers already in this world in a gracious relation toward God. Only on this supposition does James say what he designs to say; for if *δικαιοῦσθαι* (so also *σώζειν*, ver. 14) refers to the judgment of God still in the future for believers, the proof that it has *ἐργα* for its essential condition effectually hits the opponent who thought to be able to obtain *σωτηρία* by an inoperative faith.—That the doctrine of James so understood is in agreement with that of Paul follows from the following remarks:—(1) James here evidently says nothing against the Pauline doctrine of justification, since his *ἐξ ἐργων* does not refer to being placed in a new relation to God, of which there is no mention. The inquiry, by what this is conditioned, is not discussed by James in his Epistle at all; yet it is to be observed that to him the foundation of the Christian life is *πίστις*, and that he designates the new birth (chap. i. 18) as a work of God, which only takes place through the will of God, and indeed so that God implants the word of truth in man. That James in this asserts something which is not in contradiction, but in agreement with Paul's doctrine of justification, requires no proof. (2) The doctrine of Paul concerning the future judgment of believers does not conflict with what James says of *δικαιοῦσθαι*, although he does not use that expression in reference to it (except in Rom. ii. 13). It is to be observed, that Paul very definitely distinguishes the justifying act of God, by which the forgiveness of sins is adjudged to the believer for the sake of Christ, from the judicial act of God by which *σωτηρία* will either be adjudged or denied to the justified. Justification (so called by Paul) is conditioned on the part of man only by *πίστις*; the future *σωτηρία* will only be adjudged to him in whom *πίστις* has proved itself to be a working principle. As, on the one hand, it is incorrect to affirm that, according to Paul, he only is justified by *πίστις* with whom it does not remain inactive; so, on the other hand, it is incorrect to think that according to him no reference is taken of *ἐργα* in the judgment of God.¹ Wiesinger, in proof that

the *Stud. u. Krit.* 1868, Part II.) has not been able to approve of this assertion of Hengstenberg. It is also no less incorrect when Hengstenberg, in spite of *ἐξ ἐργων . . . οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνον*, ver. 24, thinks that "in James also faith alone is represented as justifying," since James does not give the name of justification to God's act of grace which is effectual in man only through faith.

¹ By this it is not intended to be denied that Paul often combines the two

Paul denies the *justifying* (the word taken in his sense) efficacy of an inoperative faith, adduces the passages, Rom. viii. 4, 13, xiii. 8-10; 1 Cor. vi. 7-11, 13; Gal. v. 6, 19-21; Eph. ii. 8-10; Col. i. 10; Tit. ii. 14; but it is, on the contrary, to be observed that in none of these passages (except Eph. ii. 8, in the words *ἵστε σεσωσμένοι διὰ τῆς πίστεως*) is the discourse of being justified (*δικαιοῦσθαι*, in the sense of Paul). All these passages, however, prove that Paul makes the attainment of *σωτηρία*, or the *future* inheritance of the kingdom of God, conditioned on the *ἔργους* of the justified. It is to be observed that in Gal. v. 6, *πίστις δι' ἀγάπης ἐνεργουμένη* does not (as is almost universally assumed) refer to *δικαιοῦσθαι*, but to *ἀπεκδέχεσθαι ἐλπίδα δικαιοσύνης*, thus to the *hope* of those who are *σεσωσμένοι διὰ τῆς πίστεως*. Further, in 1 Cor. vi. 11, the Christians, to whom Paul says *ἀπελούσασθε, ἡγιασθήτε, ἰδικαιώθητε*,¹ are exhorted to consider that the *ἄδικοι* shall not inherit the *βασιλεία Θεοῦ*; also, in Gal. v. 25, it is indicated that the *ζῆν πνεύματι*, which is peculiar to believers, must also be a *στοιχεῖν πνεύματι*; and lastly, Paul in 2 Cor. v. 10 says expressly that *we* all (that is, Christians who as such are *δικαιωθέντες*) must appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, *ἵνα κομίσωται ἕκαστος τὰ διὰ τοῦ σώματος πρὸς ᾧ ἔπραξεν, εἴτε ἀγαθόν, εἴτε κακόν*. From these passages, which might be greatly multiplied, it is not to be denied that Paul, as he definitely excludes every co-operation of human works in justification,² so he no less definitely represents the future salvation as conditioned by the practice of *ἔργα τῆς πίστεως* (see Hengstenberg, *Evangel.*

acts as *one* act of divine salvation, and also that he frequently refers the final salvation (not less than justification) purely to the *grace* of God. The problem is rather this, that, on the one hand, the final salvation is represented as a pure act of God's grace, but, on the other hand, the final judgment is as definitely represented as an act carried into effect *κατὰ τὰ ἔργα*; as by Paul, so in the Scriptures generally. The solution of this problem, however, belongs not to our present subject.

¹ By *ἡγιασθήτε* and *ἰδικαιώθητε* a change of man's disposition is not in itself designated, but the change of his relation to God effected by God. Meyer *in loco* incorrectly gives to the word *δικαιοῦσθαι* a meaning (namely, "to be made righteous") which it has elsewhere neither with Paul nor in any other passage of the N. T.

² Even with the recognition of this undeniable fact, Paul's doctrine of justification by faith is not always understood in strict precision. This is particularly the case when it is said, that according to Paul faith justifies, so far as it is a principle of new life, whereas it is rather the case that, according to him, *faith is a principle of new life, because it justifies*. Only when this is misunderstood can it be said, on the supposition that Paul and James understand by *δικαιοῦν* the same divine act, that between them there is no *fundamental*, but only an *unessential* contrast. See remarks of the author in the *Erl. Zeitschr.* April number, 1862, p. 214 f., where among other things it is said: "The reason of justification is not the ethical nature of faith, but solely and entirely

Kirchenztg. 1866, p. 1119 ff.).¹ But if this is the case, then in reference to this point there occurs a difference between Paul and James, not in *thought*, but only in *expression*; namely, Paul denotes by the word *δικαιοῦν* that declaration of righteousness or acquittal by God, by which the believer is placed in a new filial relation to God; whilst James means that declaration of righteousness or acquittal by God, by which he who is born again as a child of God receives the *σωτηρία* imparted at the judgment; but with both *δικαιοῦν* means "to declare righteous," "to acquit," but not "to prove one righteous," or "to convert him into a righteous man." So also, in what both say concerning Abraham, there is no difference in sentiment; the only difference is that *ἐλογίσθη αὐτῷ εἰς δικαιοσύνην* and *ἐδικαιώθη* are considered by James as two points, whilst Paul considers the second to be equivalent to the first.

2. If from what has been said it follows that the doctrine of James is not in contradiction with that of Paul, then every reason for the opinion that James wrote his Epistle with reference to Paul falls to the ground. The employment of the same expressions by both is indeed surprising, but it is to be observed that these expressions have their origin neither in Paul nor in James, but already occur in the O. T. Paul uses the expressions *δικαιοῦσθαι*, *δικαιοσύνην*, *δικαίωσις*, chiefly in a relation foreign to the O. T., to which, however, he was led by the words *ἐλογίσθη εἰς δικαιοσύνην*. James, on the contrary, uses them not in the application peculiar to Paul, but in the manner in which they are used in the O. T. Also the reference to Abraham by James is not to be explained on the ground that Paul confirms his doctrine of justification by what happened to Abraham; for, since James designed to appeal for his assertion to an O. T. type, it was entirely natural that his glance should first fall on Abraham; also the distinction is to be observed that James used Abraham only as an example, whereas Paul, as Schleiermacher correctly observes, "referred to him his entire peculiar system of doctrine, whilst he would trace back to him the special covenant of the people with God."—From all this it follows that James neither designed an attack upon the Pauline doctrine itself, for in this case he would have been obliged to demonstrate the necessity of *ἔργα νόμου*, nor also an attack upon

the merit of Christ or Christ Himself with whom faith, that is, faith in Christ, places us in connection. We are not justified *for the sake* of faith, but *through* faith (*διὰ τῆς πίστεως*) *for the sake* of Christ: thus it holds good for the justification which is by faith alone, that *every* reference to works is entirely excluded."

¹ The objection of Philippi, that the declaration of righteousness in the judgment takes place not *ἐκ τῶν ἔργων*, but only *κατὰ τὰ ἔργα*, is contradicted by the word of Christ, Matt. xii. 37.

a misunderstanding of it, for then he would have been obliged to show that his readers could only regard themselves as *δικαιο-
δύντες*, when their faith was to them an impulse to the practice of good works;¹ rather the Pauline doctrine was unknown to him, since otherwise he would necessarily have conformed to Paul's mode of representation. By this likewise the opinion is confirmed, that the composition of the Epistle belongs not to the later, but to the earlier apostolic times; see on this Sec. 4 of the Introduction, and the treatise of Weiss mentioned above; also his *bibl. Theol.* p. 124 f.

¹ How the deductions of James are to be directed against a misunderstanding of the Pauline doctrine, if *δικαιοῦνται* has with him the meaning of "to be proved," is in fact not to be understood, so much the less as the justifying power of faith assuredly does not depend on its being proved by works *before men*.

CHAPTER III.

VER. 3. Instead of the *Rec.* ἰδοὺ, found only in some min., Griesbach has, after C, many min. etc., adopted ἴδε; however, εἰ ὁἱ is to be read, with Lachm. Tisch. Wiesinger, de Wette, and others, after A B G K s, many min. vss. etc. Not only does the preponderating weight of authorities testify for this, but also its difficulty. — Instead of πρὸς τὸ πείθεσθαι, Lachm. and Tisch. (approved by de Wette, Wiesinger, not by Bouman) have adopted εἰς τὸ π. (so B C s). — Lachm. has retained the *Rec.* αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν, after B G K s, etc.; Tisch., on the contrary, reads ἡμῖν αὐτοὺς, after A C. — Ver. 4. Instead of σκληρῶν ἀνέμων (A G, etc.), Lachm. and Tisch. read ἀνέμων σκληρῶν, after B C K s, which according to authorities is to be considered as the correct reading. — Ver. 5. Lachm. and Tisch. 7 read μεγάλη αὐχεῖ (A C*) instead of the *Rec.* μεγάλη αὐχεῖ (Tisch. 2); attested by B C** G K s, almost all min. — Whether we are to read, with the *Rec.*, ὀλίγον πῦρ, or, with Lachm. and Tisch., ἥλιον πῦρ, cannot with certainty be decided by authorities, since A* C* G K, etc., are in favour of the former, and A** B C s of the latter reading. The latter reading, however, merits the preference, as it is not to be understood how ὀλίγον, suitable for the thought, should be exchanged for the difficult reading ἥλιον; without sufficient reason, Kern, Theile, Wiesinger, Bouman¹ would retain the reading of the *Rec.* — Ver. 6. Before the second ἡ γλῶσσα the *Rec.*, after several min. etc., has ὅπως, which already Griesbach considered suspicious, and, after A B C K s, etc., is according to Lachm. and Tisch. to be erased; it was evidently inserted in order to lighten the difficult construction; also de Wette, Wiesinger, Bouman, and others consider it spurious; Reiche decides otherwise. — After γείσεως s only has ἡμῶν, which is evidently an interpretation. — There is great variation with regard to the sequence of the words δόξαται ἀνθρώπων θαμάσαι (thus the *Rec.* after G; retained by Tisch.); B C, etc., read θαμάσαι δόξαται ἀνθρώπων (Lachm.), and A K s, etc., read δόξαται θαμάσαι ἀνθρώπων. It is evidently indifferent for the sense. — Instead

¹ Bouman thinks that ἥλιον arose from the following ἡλίον; but it is more correct to assume that even on this account it was changed for the easily understood ὀλίγον.

of the *Rec.* ἀκατάσχετον after C G K, etc., probably should be read, with Lachm. and Tisch., ἀκατάστατον, after A B \aleph , etc. (approved by Wiesinger and Lange, rejected by Reiche and Bouman). — Ver. 9. The *Rec.* τὸν Θεόν after G K, etc., is to be changed for the better attested reading τὸν κύριον, after A B C \aleph , etc., Lachm. Tisch.: the alteration is easily accounted for.¹ — Ver. 12. According to the *Rec.* the last clause begins with οὕτως, after C** G K \aleph , some min. and vss., which already Griesbach considered suspicious; it is, according to the testimony of A B C, to be erased as an insertion. — The words which follow in the *Rec.* (after G K, etc.) are οὐδεμία πηγὴ ἀλυκὸν καὶ γλυκὺ ποιῆσαι ὕδωρ. This reading, whose spuriousness was already recognised by Griesbach, is, as a correction for the sake of explanation, to be changed for οὕτε ἀλυκὸν γλυκὺ ποιῆσαι ὕδωρ; attested by A B C, etc., and adopted by Griesbach, Lachm. Tisch. and others. \aleph reads οὐδέ. — Ver. 13. Whether after ἐν ὑμῶν a comma is to be placed, with Lachm. and Buttm., or, with Tisch. and the *Rec.*, a note of interrogation, see the explanation of the verse. — Ver. 14. Instead of ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ, \aleph has the plural ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις. — In the same MS. τῆς ἀληθείας instead of after ψεύδεσθε stands after κατακαυχᾶσθε. — Ver. 16. After ἐκεῖ, \aleph has inserted καί. — Ver. 17. The καί of the *Rec.* between ἀδιάκριτος and ἀνυπόκριτος is, according to A B C \aleph , etc., to be erased as an insertion; so also in ver. 18 the article τῆς before δικαιοσύνης, according to A B C G K \aleph , etc.

With chap. iii. James passes to the treatment of a new theme, to which the conduct of the Christians, to whom this Epistle was directed, likewise gave occasion. It is that which was already indicated by βραδὺς εἰς τὸ λαλῆσαι in chap. i. 17, and by μὴ χαλιναγωγῶν γλῶσσαν αὐτοῦ in chap. i. 26. The more unfruitful faith was in works corresponding to it (especially the works of compassionate love), the more did “the loquacious teaching and ruling of others” (Wiesinger) prevail. Words had taken the place of works. This section, which is closely united with the preceding, treats of this; yet without “any hidden indication contained in it that it was the doctrine of faith which was an object of controversy” (de Wette); for in the whole Epistle there is not the slightest indication of controversies in the churches in question. The fault refers to the same with which Paul in Rom. ii. 17 ff. blames the Jews, only that with *these* Christians πίστις, which

¹ Bouman erroneously thinks that Θεόν was changed for κύριον in order that a mention of Christ might once take place.

was to them something entirely external, took the place of νόμος. The moral relation was essentially the same. The warning (as in chap. ii. 1) stands first, and the reason assigned for it follows: "*Be not in great numbers teachers, my brethren, considering that we will receive a heavier judgment.*" Calvin, Piscator, Laurentius, Baumgarten, and others arbitrarily refer this warning to the unauthorized judging and condemning of each other; by this explanation the idea διδάσκαλοι does not receive its proper meaning. On the other hand, we are not to think of persons rushing into the proper *nunus docendi* (Bede, Semler, Pott, Gebser, Hottinger, Schneckenburger, and others), but on the free teaching in the congregation which was not yet joined to a particular office, but appertained to every one who felt himself called to it. — πολλοί belongs not to γίνεσθε (πολλοὶ γίγνεσθαι = multiplicari, Gen. vi. 1; Schneckenburger), but is either the subject (de Wette, Wiesinger, Bouman) or forms the predicate united with διδάσκαλοι. In the first case, however, γινέσθωσαν would more naturally stand instead of γίνεσθε; also from the second construction a more important thought arises; therefore it is to be explained: "Be not many teachers," that is: "Be not a multitude of teachers" (Lange). It is inaccurate to explain πολλοί = πάντες (Grotius); it is false to explain it = nimii in docendo (Baumgarten: "be not excessive, vigorous judges"). The verb γίνεσθε has here the same meaning as in chap. i. 22. — With εἰδότες κ.τ.λ.] James points to the reason of μὴ . . . γίνεσθε; yet εἰδότες being closely joined to the imperative is itself hortatory: *considering*. In the phrase κρίμα λαμβάνειν, κρίμα has in the N. T. usage undoubtedly the meaning *condemnation*; comp. Matt. xxiii. 13 (Mark xii. 40; Luke xx. 47); Rom. xiii. 2; but also elsewhere the word occurs in the N. T. almost entirely in this meaning, which Lange incorrectly denies (see Cremer). Because James includes himself, many expositors have been induced to take κρίμα here as *vox media* (so also Lange), but it is to be considered that James does not use this expression as if the sentence of condemnation could not be removed (see chap. ii. 13); only this is evident to him, that the severer (μείζον) the condemnation, so much the more difficult is it to be delivered from its execution. The comparative μείζον (not = *too great*, Pott) is

explained from a comparison with others who are not teachers.

Ver. 2. The reason (γάρ) of the preceding; yet not so much of the warning: μὴ . . . γίνεσθε (Schneckenburger),—this is conditioned by εἰδότες κ.τ.λ.,—as rather of the thought μείζον κρίμα ληψόμεθα; namely, so that the first clause refers only to κρίμα ληψόμεθα, and only that which follows to the idea μείζον; whilst in the expression εἴ τις κ.τ.λ. the idea is contained, that as οὐ πταίειν ἐν λόγῳ conditions τελειότης, sinful man is thus not in a position to bridle the tongue. Brückner incorrectly considers the clause εἴ τις κ.τ.λ. as the explanatory reason of the directly preceding sentence: “we all offend frequently, *for* whosoever offends not in word he only preserves himself from πολλὰ πταίειν.”—The words πολλὰ πταίμεν ἅπαντες] are to be taken in their widest sense (Wiesinger, Brückner); by ἅπαντες (a stronger form than πάντες) neither the διδάσκαλοι simply are meant, nor is it = *plerique* (Grotius), and πταίειν points not expressly to errores, qui docentibus obvenire possint (Grotius), or to “speech which is used in teaching” (de Wette), but it comprehends all and every moral error of whatever kind it may be.¹—πολλά] is adverbial, as in Matt. ix. 14.—To this first thought that which follows is annexed ἀσυνδέτως.—εἴ τις] see chap. i. 5, 23, 26 = ὅστις.—ἐν λόγῳ] is not to be limited to teaching proper (Pott = ἐν διδασκαλίᾳ), but is equivalent to ἐν τῷ λαλῆσαι, chap. i. 19; ἐν denotes the sphere within which the οὐ πταίειν occurs; otherwise in chap. ii. 10. On οὐ after εἰ, see on chap. ii. 11.—To οὗτος τέλειος ἀνὴρ, ἐστι is to be supplied; οὗτος is emphatic; what follows δυνατὸς κ.τ.λ. is in apposition to τέλ. ἀνὴρ; the word ἀνὴρ is used here as in chap. i. 8.—The meaning is: Whosoever offends (sins) not in speech, and thus is able to bridle his *tongue*, proves himself thereby to be a perfect man who is able to rule also *the whole body*, that is, all the other members, so that it is subject to his will. James here places the body in opposition to the man “as a relative independent power

¹ Brückner correctly asserts, against de Wette, that the subject in ἅπαντες has experienced an extension, and that the circumstance that in what follows ἐν λόγῳ πταίειν is particularly brought forward, requires for πταίειν here a more universal meaning.

which offers moral resistance to the will of the Ego" (Wiesinger), which it is his task to bridle. The καρδία, indeed, is the fountain of evil deeds (Matt. xv. 19), but the lust which is rooted therein has so thoroughly appropriated the members of man, and as it were fixed its dwelling in them (Rom. vii. 23), that they appear as lasting subjects, and may be represented as such in lively concrete language. By such explanations as ὅλον τὸ σῶμα, equivalent to "the whole connection of the actions and changes of man" (Baumgarten), or = reliquae peccandi illecebrae (Pott), or = tota vita (Schneckenburger), the idea lying at the foundation does not receive its full meaning. Even the remark of de Wette, that τὸ σῶμα denotes "not only all organs proper, but even the affections," is not to be retained; on which account Brückner adds: "the latter only in so far as they are expressed by the former." The explanation of Lange is also arbitrary, that the body here denotes the organ and symbol of all other modes of human action, with the exception of speech. Laurentius rightly observes: nihil obstat, quo minus per totum corpus intelligamus caetera corporis nostri membra: manus, pedes, etc.

Vv. 3, 4. Two comparisons by which the thought εἴ τις ἐν λόγῳ κ.τ.λ. is illustrated and confirmed. It is incorrect when it is assumed that "James, with vv. 3 and 4, will primarily explain and establish by examples the importance, maintained in ver. 2, of power over a little thing, as the tongue, for the government of the whole" (Wiesinger), and that the *tertium comparationis* is "a little thing does much" (Gunkel); for neither in ver. 2 is the smallness of the tongue mentioned, nor in ver. 3 is the smallness of the bridle brought forward. The examples adduced, which are closely attached to the preceding, are rather designed to prove how by the mastery of the tongue that of the whole body is possible; it is, James will say, even as one rules the horse by the guidance of the bridle, and the ship by the guidance of the helm. Only in the second image does the smallness of that by which the steersman rules the great ship appear to James as something important, so that he dwells upon this point in what follows (so also Lange).

Ver. 3. *But if we put bridles in the mouths of horses, we*

turn also their whole body. The clause καὶ ὅλον κ.τ.λ. forms the apodosis to the protasis beginning with εἰ (Pott, Wiesinger, Brückner, Lange, Bouman). Many expositors incorrectly attach this clause to the protasis, whereby Theile regards ver. 5 as the apodosis belonging to it, whilst others supply a thought as the apodosis; according to de Wette, this thought is, that "the tongue is not so easily tamed as a horse," which is wholly unsuitable.¹ — The particle δέ is not, with Theile, to be explained as closely connecting this verse to the following,² for here and in ver. 4 nothing else than a contrast to ver. 2 is to be expressed; it is rather used here even as in chap. ii. 15, simply distinguishing the case adduced for comparison from that for the sake of which it is introduced (Wiesinger). By τῶν ἵππων standing first, the view is at once directed to the object by which the sentiment expressed is to be illustrated (comp. ver. 4). The genitive depends not on τοὺς χαλινούς (Theile, Lange, and others), but on τὰ στόματα (Oecumenius, Hornejus, Pott, Gebser; Bouman wavers), for on this word the emphasis rests. τοὺς χαλινούς points back to χαλιναγωγῆσαι, ver. 2, by which apparently this image was suggested to James. — On the phrase: εἰς τὰ στόματα βάλλειν, comp. in Aelian: χαλινὸν ἵππῳ ἐμβάλλειν. — The words εἰς τὸ πείθεσθαι ἡμῖν αὐτούς are for the purpose of accentuating the governing of the horse by the bridle put into its mouth. The apodosis καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα κ.τ.λ. corresponds to χαλιναγωγῆσαι καὶ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα, ver. 2. — μετὰγειν] in the N. T. only here and in ver. 4, is = circumagere. The *tertium comparationis* lies in εἰς τὰ στόματα; for, as Bengel correctly remarks: in ore lingua est, and οὐ πταίειν ἐν λόγῳ, is identical with the bridling of the tongue in the mouth.

Ver. 4. The second comparison is emphatically indicated by ἰδοὺ. καί is either *also* or *even so*. Wiesinger prefers the second meaning, which certainly gives to the thought a

¹ Bede supplies: quanto amplius decet, ut nobis ipsis frenum continentiae in ora mittamus; Lorinus: si hoc in equis contingit, simile quid oportet circa linguam procurari; Hottinger: eodem modo qui linguam coercere potest, toti corpori facile moderabitur.

² Theile says: Ita a difficultate linguam moderandi transitus fit ad necessitatem: in memoriam vocatur, exigua saepe esse, quibus ingentia moveantur non solum in bonam (vv. 3, 4), sed maxime etiam in malam partem.

peculiar emphasis. The participles ὄντα . . . ἐλαυνόμενα are to be resolved by *although*. Both participial sentences bring forward the difficulty of guiding the ship, in order to cause the power of the small helm to be recognised. It is possible that in the second clause: καὶ . . . ἐλαυνόμενα, there is an allusion to the lusts moving man (Bede: venti validi . . . ipsi appetitus sunt mentium), or “to the temptations (πειρασμοί) of the world, coming from without” (Lange). — σκληρός] is also used of the wind in Prov. xxvii. 16 (so also Aelian, *de animal.* v. 15, ix. 14; Dio Chrysostom, iii. p. 44 C). — The verb μεταγεται united with τὰ πλοῖα is the same as in ver. 3. The words ὑπὸ ἐλαχίστου πηδαλίου] mention by what this guidance takes place. On ὑπό, see chap. i. 14. By the addition of ἐλαχίστου a new point is introduced which is retained in what follows. The superlative is for the purpose of bringing more strongly forward the smallness of the πηδάλιον in contrast to the *great* ship (τηλικαῦτα ὄντα). The counterpart is the *little* tongue (ver. 5). — The addition: *whithersoever the desire of the steersman willeth*, is not superfluous; it expresses—in opposition to ὑπὸ ἀνέμων ἐλαυνόμενα — the free mastery of him who steers the ship, which he exercises over it by means of the helm, and corresponds to εἰς τὸ πείθεσθαι κ.τ.λ., ver. 3. — ὅπου] (instead of ὅποι, which does not occur in the N. T.) is found also in the classics united with verbs of motion, particularly with τιθέναι, but also with βαίνειν; Sophocles, *Trach.* 40: κείνος ὅπου βέβηκεν. By ὁρμή is not to be understood the external impulse, or “the pressure which the steersman exercises” (Erasmus, Semler, Augusti, Stolz, Pott, Theile, Wiesinger), also not “the course of the navigator kept in action by the helm” (Lange); by both of these interpretations a meaning is imposed upon the word foreign to it. It rather indicates, as in Acts xiv. 5 (see Meier *in loco*), *the eager will, the desire of something* (in Plato, *Phil.* p. 35 D, it is used as synonymous with ἐπιθυμία); thus Bede, Calvin, Grotius, Baumgarten, Gebser, de Wette, and others. — The participle ὁ εὐθύνων indicates him who sits at the helm and directs the ship; it is thus not ὁ εὐθυντήρ (Grotius, Pott, Schneckenburger). Luther correctly translates it according to its meaning: “whether he wills who governs it.” — For corresponding

passages from the classics, see in Wetstein, Gebser, Theile ; particularly Aristotle, *Quacst. mechan.* ii. 5.

Ver. 5. Application of the comparison, particularly of the second illustration, *μικρόν* pointing back to *ἐλαχίστου*. — *μεγαλυνεῖν*] which expresses the contrast to *μικρόν*, is not = *μεγάλα ἐργάζεσθαι* (Oecumenius, Theophylact, Calvin, Laurentius, Pott, Bouman, and others), for the idea of *doing* is precisely not contained in the word, but it denotes proud conduct in word and behaviour, which has for supposition the performance of great things, and is always used in a bad sense. This certainly does not appear to suit *οὕτως*, as in the preceding the discourse is not about talking, on which account Lange prefers the reading *μεγάλα αὐχεῖ*; but also this expression = “boasteth great things,” does not exclude, but includes that secondary meaning, for why would not James otherwise have written simply *μεγάλα ποιεῖ*? But *οὕτως* is so far not unsuitable, as the performance of great things—as they are spoken of in the foregoing—forms the reason of the boasting of the tongue. On a mere *inanis jactatio* it is not natural here to think. This first clause already points to what follows, where the *destructive* power of the tongue is described. This description begins with a figure: “*What a fire kindles what a forest.*” In justification of the reading *ἡλίκον* (instead of *ὀλίγον*), de Wette (with whom Brückner agrees), translating *ἡλίκον πῦρ*: “what a *great* fire,” observes, “that the burning of the forest is contemplated in its whole extent.” But the verb *ἀνάπτει*, as Wiesinger correctly observes, is opposed to this explanation; also this clause forms the transition from the foregoing to what follows, and therefore must still contain the reference to *μικρόν*, which certainly is afterwards laid aside. This does not, however, constrain us to the rejection of the reading *ἡλίκον* (against Wiesinger and Bouman), since this word, which indeed chiefly emphasizes greatness, can also be used to give prominence to smallness; see Pape. The older expositors, according to its meaning, correctly explained the *quantus* of the Vulgate by *quantulus*; thus Cajetan., Paes, and others; the same explanation by Lange. If Brückner thinks that it is not appropriate to take *ἡλίκον* here in this signification, owing to the following *ἡλίκεν*, it is, on the contrary, to be

observed that precisely the opposition of the same word in a different signification is entirely in accordance with the liveliness of the sentiment. — On the use of ἡλίκος in the interrogative explanatory sense, see A. Buttmann, p. 217 [E. T. 253]. Erasmus, Laurentius, Grotius, Baumgarten, Augusti explain the word ὕλη by materia, lignorum congeries, as it has in Ecclus. xxviii. 10 the signification of *fuel*; but the image is evidently much more lively and graphic when ὕλη is retained in its usual meaning: *forest*. Corresponding descriptions in Homer, *Il.* xi. 155. Pindar, *Pyth.* iii. 66; see also Ecclus. xi. 32. Philo, *de migr. Abrah.* 407 A. In Stobaeus it is said: Parva facula cacumen Idae incendi potest.

Ver. 6. Application of the image: *Also the tongue is a fire, the world of unrighteousness; the tongue sets itself among our members, as that which defileth the whole body and kindleth the wheel (of life) revolving from birth, and is kindled of hell. As a (little) fire setteth a forest in conflagration, so also the tongue kindleth the whole life of man. Such is the destructive power of the tongue, that whosoever knows how to bridle it may with truth be called a perfect man (ver. 2).—* Several interpreters divide the first clause: καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα πῦρ, ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας, into two corresponding parts, supplying the idea ὕλη to ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας; thus Morus: igni respondet lingua, materiae seu silvae respondet mundus improbus. Manifestly wholly arbitrary; rather the words ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας form an apposition to ἡ γλῶσσα, by which the power of the tongue similar to destructive fire is explained. κόσμος has here the same meaning as in LXX. Prov. xvii. 6: ὅλος κόσμος τῶν χρημάτων;¹ thus the multitude comprehending the individual: consequently ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας is *the fulness of unrighteousness*. The tongue is so called because, as the organ of ὀργή, it includes a fulness (not exactly the sum-total) of unrighteousness which from it pervades the other members (ὅλον τὸ σῶμα). Calvin correctly, according to the sense: acsi vocaret mare vel abyssum (Luther inaccurately: "a world full of wickedness"). This is the explanation of most expositors. Bouman correctly explains the definite article: famosus iste mundus iniquitatis. The following are other

¹ It is to be observed that the LXX. often translate the Hebrew כִּסְפִּים by κόσμος; see Gen. ii. 1; Deut. iv. 19, xvii. 3; Isa. xxiv. 21, xl. 26.

explanations :—(1) Oecumenius takes *κόσμος*=*ornament*, and explains : ἡ γλῶσσα κοσμεῖ τὴν ἀδικίαν διὰ τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων εὐγλώττου δεινότητος ; similarly Wetstein, Semler, Elsner, Rosenmüller, Storr, Lange¹ (Wahl is doubtful). But *κόσμος* never signifies in an active sense that which puts an ornament on another, but always the ornament itself, that wherewith a person adorns himself (or another). (2) Bretschneider likewise takes the word as equivalent to ornament, but supplies ὥς, and explains : ut ornatus (mulierum) inhonestus sc. inquinat mentes, sic lingua deprehenditur inter corporis membra id quod totum corpus inquinat ; yet evidently more arbitrarily than the foregoing explanation. (3) Theile retains the usual meaning of the word *world*, and explains : lingua (est ignis), mundus (vero est) improbitatis i. e. improbitate plenus, nimirum ob illam ipsam linguae vim ; but apart from the inadmissible supplements rendered necessary, and the harshness contained in this combination of the genitive, this explanation is to be rejected, because by it the words would contain an assertion on the nature of the world, instead of on the nature of the tongue. (4) Estius, indeed, is right in his comprehension of the idea, but he arbitrarily understands it as causative : quia (lingua) peccata omnigena parit ; so also Herder : “ the mainspring and the cause of all unrighteousness.” Gebser introduces something foreign into the explanation, taking *κόσμος*=the wicked world. Clericus, Hammond, Eichhorn, Kuinoel, and Hottinger, without any sufficient reason, think that the words are to be expunged from the text as spurious. — Whilst almost all expositors refer ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας to what precedes (to which, according to the reading of the *Rcc.* which has οὕτως before the following ἡ γλῶσσα, it necessarily belongs), Tischendorf has put a point after πῦρ but not after ἀδικίας ;² and Neander translates : “ As a world full of unrighteousness, the tongue is among our members ;” so also Lange construes

¹ Lange, indeed, grants that *κόσμος* is not an active idea, but he yet thinks that we must return to the original signification of the word, and he then explains it : “ the tongue is the form of the world, worldliness, or worldly culture, because it is that which sophistically, etc., gives to unrighteousness its worldly . . . and even splendid form.” But is not the idea so explained taken in an active sense ?

² Lachmann and Buttmann have, by leaving out the punctuation, left the pointing to the expositor.

it. But this construction is not only difficult, but isolates too much the first thought *ἡ γλῶσσα πῦρ*, which only has a correct meaning when it is closely connected with what follows. — The new clause accordingly begins with *ἡ γλῶσσα*, and *καθίσταται* has its necessary supplement in what follows: *ἡ σπιλοῦσα κ.τ.λ. — καθίσταται*] can neither here nor in chap. iv. 4 mean *it stands*: the perfect only has this meaning, but not the present; it means: *it sets itself, it appears* (Wiesinger). Also the explanations are false: "it is so placed" (Pott); *collocata est* (Beza, Piscator, Schneckenburger); "it becomes (such)" (de Wette, appealing to Rom. v. 19), and "it rules" (Lange, appealing to Heb. viii. 3). Theile arbitrarily completes the idea: *haud raro*. The words which follow mention how the tongue appears among the members—*as that which defileth the whole body*. The idea *σπιλοῦν*, to which certainly *πῦρ* is not suited, is suggested by the apposition *ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας*. Only with the following participle does James carry on the image of fire; it is artificial to assume in *σπιλοῦν* a reference to it. Bengel: *maculans, ut ignis per fumum*; comp. on this passage Eccles. v. 5. Neither the double *καί* (for how often the several *καί* succeed each other in a simple copulative sense!) nor the omission of the article before the two participles (comp. chap. iv. 11, 14) proves that the participles which follow *καὶ φλογίζουσα* and *καὶ φλογιζομένη* are subordinated to *σπιλοῦσα* (Wiesinger). This construction could only be considered as correct if the two participles analyzed the idea *σπιλοῦσα ὅλ. τ. σῶμα* into its individual parts or confirmed it; but neither of these is the case here; they rather add to this idea two new points. The object *τὸν τροχὸν τῆς γενέσεως*, belonging to *φλογίζουσα*, has found very different explanations. The word *τροχός*, according to its etymology, denotes something *running*, and, although used of other rotatory orbs, as particularly of the potter's wheel, it is especially used as a designation of a *wheel*, 1 Kings vii. 30 ff.; Ezek. i. 15, 19, 20. The word *γένεσις* can here be only in the same sense as in chap. i. 23; the compound idea: *the wheel of birth*, i.e. "the wheel revolving from birth," is a figurative designation of human life; comp. *Amacreon*, *Od.* iv. 7: *τροχὸς ἄρματος γὰρ οἷα βίος τρέχει κυλισθείς*. Thus Gebser in particular correctly explains it:

“the wheel which is set in motion from our birth, *i.e.* a poetical description of life;” so also Brückner and Boumau. The explanations of Oecumenius (τροχός ὁ βίος ὡς εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνελιπτόμενος), Calvin, Laurentius, Hornejus, Pott, Neander, amount to the same thing. Also Estius, Grotius, Carpzov, Michaelis understand life, only deriving this idea in a different manner. They explain τροχός (for which Grotius would read τρύχος) = *cursus*, γένεσις = *natura*, and *cursus naturae* = *vita*; by this explanation, however, the figurative nature of the expression suffers. Wiesinger (with whom Rauch agrees), deviating from this explanation, prefers to understand by it the whole body (ὅλον τὸ σῶμα), τροχός denoting either the *wheel* (by which, then, τροχός τ. γεν. would be the revolving wheel of existence, of life, namely, of that to which the tongue belongs), or (which Wiesinger prefers) the *circumference* (thus τροχ. τ. γεν. would be the circumference of being, *i.e.* the circumference belonging to the tongue from birth, native to it). But, on the one hand, it is not to be supposed that James, after using the *ordinary* expression ὅλον τὸ σῶμα, should express the *same thing figuratively* without the least indication of the identity of meaning; and, on the other hand, it is opposed to the *first* interpretation that the *body* is not to be represented as a *wheel*, and to the *second* that τροχός is taken in a sense which it never has, for it never means the circumference, but at the most the *round* border which incloses something. Other expositors go beyond the restriction of the expression to the life of the individual,—which is evidently required by the foregoing ὅλον τὸ σῶμα,—either, with Wolf, appealing to the Hebrew מַחְצִית חַיִּים, explaining it: *indesinens successio hominum aliorum post alios nascentium* (thus Lambert, Bos, Alberti, Augusti, Stäudlin),¹ or taking τροχός = κύκλος, γένεσις = κτίσις, and accordingly τροχ. τ. γενέσεως = “the circle of creation;” thus de Wette, and among the earlier interpreters Beza (in the edition of 1565), Crusius, Coccejus. All these ideas are foreign to the context. If the first explanation drags something “foreign” into it, the second bears besides “a monstrous character” (Wiesinger). Still less is the explanation of Lange to be justified: “the wheel of the

¹ Already the Syriac version translates: *incendit proventus generationum nostrarum, quae currunt sicut rotæ.*

development of life, primarily of the Jewish nation, and then further of all mankind," since *γένεσις* never denotes *development of life*.

The following are other explanations which are refuted by their arbitrariness and rarity:—(1) that of Semler, who explains it *ordo generandi*, according to the expression occurring in Plutarch: *ποταμὸν τῆς γενέσεως ἐνδεδιέχων*; (2) that of Bengel *rota sive sphaera superior est ipsa natura humana rationalis; gehenna vero est pars profundior cor; lingua in medio ex inferioribus inflammatur et superiora inflamat*; (3) that of Meyer (*Observatt. ad ep. Jacobi*), who takes the expression = *sanguinis orbis seu circulato*; lastly, (4) that of Kypke, who assumes the *rota poenalis* is figuratively meant *cujus radii illigabantur rei*, and accordingly *φλογίζειν τὸν τροχ. τ. γενέσεως* means: *augere vitae hujus cruciatus*.

The verb *φλογίζειν* is in the N. T. *ἀπ. λεγ.*; in the LXX. it is found in Ex. ix. 24; Num. xxi. 14; Ps. xcvii. 3, and other places. The figurative expression, which refers back to *πῦρ*, indicates the fatal effect which the tongue, from which the pollution of the whole body proceeds, exercises on the life of man, whilst it pervades the same by its passionate heat. James so presents it, that being *ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας*, and thus concentrating in itself (or in word) a fulness of unrighteousness, it forms, as it were, the axle round which the wheel of life moves, and by which it is set on fire. Morus incorrectly understands *φλογίζειν* "de damnis, quae lingua dat;" but the discourse is not concerning the injury which man suffers, but concerning his moral conduct; still less corresponding is the explanation of Michaelis, according to which *φλογίζειν* = to inflame, and that in the words of James the thought is contained: "lingua saepe alii excitantur, ut insano studio mala ingrediantur." The representation that the tongue defiles the whole body and sets the life on fire is, as Wiesinger correctly remarks, not to be justified by the remark that all sins have their foundation in the sins of the tongue, but rests on the observation that *ὁργή*, before it manifests itself in other ways, first and foremost appears in word, and thus the tongue is its most direct organ.¹ The second participial sentence

¹ The view that James considered the tongue as the source of *all* sin is erroneous, since he, however prominently he brings forward the destructive

states whence the tongue receives this destructive power (*φλογίζειν*), by which also the idea that it is *κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας* finds its justification. The participle *φλογιζομένη* is to be retained in the sense of the *present*; it has neither the meaning of the *perfect*, as if the tongue had been only once set on fire by *γεέννα*, nor is it, with Grotius, Mill, Benson, Semler, Storr, Rosenmüller, to be taken as *future*, and to be referred to future punishment. The expression *γεέννα*, except in the Synoptics, is only found here; in Matt. v. 22, xviii. 9, Mark ix. 47, it is used for a more exact description of the genitive *τοῦ πυρός*. The thought that the tongue is set on fire of hell is not to be explained away either by *ex inferno* being paraphrased by Theile by *igne diabolico*, and this by *igne foedissimo ac funestissimo*; or by being explained with Morus: *tantus est ille ignis, ut ex geennae igne videatur esse incensus*. James means that as *ἐπιθυμία* (or more precisely *ὀργή*), whose most direct organ is the tongue, has its origin from the devil, it is thus from hell (see ver. 15). Also in the O. T. the injurious effects of the tongue are described; see Ps. lii. 4, cxix. 3, 4, Prov. xvi. 27, and other passages (Ecclus. v. 13 ff., xxviii. 11 ff.); yet in all these passages the discourse is only on the evil which is inflicted by it on others, or on the punishment which befalls the man who misuses it. This peculiar thought of James has its counterpart in no passage of the O. T.

Vv. 7, 8. In these verses the untameable power of the tongue is adduced. The particle *γάρ* here indicates neither simply the transition (Pott), nor is it to be referred to *μεγαλαυχέι* (Wiesinger), separated from it by vv. 5, 6, nor only to the last thought, *φλογιζομένη κ.τ.λ.* (Lange); but it is used as a logical particle, whilst the truth expressed in these verses substantiates the judgment contained in vv. 5, 6. The relation of these two verses to each other is, that ver. 8 contains the principal thought, and ver. 7, on the other hand, a thought subordinate to it, which is only added in order to make that thought more emphatic. The meaning is: Whereas man tames all animals, yet he cannot tame the tongue. By *φύσις*

power of the tongue, yet never asserts this. The restriction to *ὀργή* is justified by the Epistle itself. See i. 19, 20, 26, ii. 9, 10, 13 (the opposite is *πραύτητι σοφίας*), 14, etc. According to this, in this edition the text in some places has been rectified.

is to be understood not the genus (Augusti, Gebser, Bretschneider, Schneckenburger), but the *qualitas naturalis*, and in such a manner that James has in view not the relation of the *individual* man to the *individual* beast, but the relation of *human nature* to *animal nature* in general, however this may differ in the different kinds of animals. The totality of beasts is expressed by four classes, which are arranged in pairs, namely, *quadrupeds and birds, creeping beasts and fishes*. — *θηρία*] are not “beasts generally” (Pott), nor specially “wild beasts” (Erasmus, Vatablus, Piscator, Baumgarten, Theile, Bouman). — *τὰ ἔρπετά*] are neither terrestrial animals generally (Pott, Hottinger), nor only serpents (Luther, Calvin, Grotius, and others), but it is used here in the same meaning as in Gen. i. 24, 25 (LXX. *ἔρπετά*, as the translation of עֲרָפָה); see Acts x. 12; Rom. i. 23. — *ἐνάλια*] (*ἄπ. λεγ.*) denotes either fish simply, or likewise all worms living in the water; Luther incorrectly translates it “sea wonders,” and Stier “sea monsters.” There is here the same classification as in Gen. ix. 2 in the LXX. (which may have been before the mind of James): *τὰ θηρία τῆς γῆς, τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, τὰ κινούμενα ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, οἱ ἰχθύεις τῆς θαλάσσης*. The dominion of human nature over the brute creation is expressed by the verb *δαμάζειν* (i.e. so to subdue, that what is subdued submits to the will of the subduer), because it supposes the subjection of something resisting (see Mark v. 4). That James only thought on *wild* animals does not follow from this. The perfect *δεδάσται* is added to the present *δαμάζεται* in order to represent the present taming as that which had already taken place in the past. It is incorrect to resolve *δαμάζεται* into *δαμάζεσθαι δύναται* (Hottinger, Schneckenburger), for it treats not only of the possibility, but of the actuality. — *τῇ φύσει τ. ἀνθρ.*] is not the dat. *commodi*, but the dative used with the passive, instead of the construction with *ὑπό*. *φύσις* has the same meaning as before; accordingly not *ingenii solertia* (Hornejus, Hottinger, Schneckenburger).

Ver. 8. The chief thought is marked by *δέ*, as a contrast to the foregoing. With *τὴν γλῶσσαν* is meant not the tongue of *others* (Estius, Grotius, Hornejus, Baumgarten), but one's *own* tongue (according to Lange, both are indicated, the last primarily). The remark of Bengel is also unsuitable: *nemo*

alius, vix ipse quisque. The words οὐδεὶς δύναται ἀνθρώπων δαμάζειν (or more correctly, after B C: οὐδεὶς δαμάσαι δύναται ἀνθρώπων, because the accent is on δαμάσαι) are to be understood in all their sharpness; the weakening completion of the *Schol.* in Matthaei: εὐκόλως δηλαδή καὶ ἄνευ πόνου, is false. By this thought, what was said in ver. 2 now receives its full light. The moral earnestness of the author urges him at the close to the exclamation: ἀκατάστατον κακόν κ.τ.λ.; hence the independent form of this addition (see Winer, p. 471 [E. T. 668]). By ἀκατάστατον (*unsteady, restless*, see chap. i. 8) the unrest of the passions is indicated, not simply with reference to what follows, *unsteadfastness* (de Wette); comp. *Hermas, Past. II. mand. 2*: πονηρὸν πνεῦμά ἐστιν ἡ καταλαλία, καὶ ἀκατάστατον δαιμόνιον. This reading is to be preferred to that of the *Rec.* ἀκατάσχετον (not to be tamed), "because it adds a new idea after οὐδεὶς δαμάσαι δυν. ἀνθρ." (Wiesinger). — The image of the poisonous serpent lies at the foundation of the second exclamation: μεστή ἰοῦ θανατηφόρου; comp. Ps. cxl. 4.

Vv. 9, 10 are closely connected with the foregoing; but not as if "the unstedfastness of the tongue is further described" (de Wette), nor as if the duplicity of the tongue is added as a new point (Lange), but for the purpose of prominently showing how the tongue, although it praises God, yet proves itself to be an ἀκατάστατον κάκον, μεστή τοῦ θανατ. It is to be observed that this expression, as the first person plural shows, refers to Christians among whom the εὐλογεῖν τὸν κύριον occurs. James does not hesitate to include himself, knowing that naturally he was entirely the same as others.¹ James first places beside each other, by a simple copulative conjunction, the two contradictory acts which man performs by the tongue, namely, the εὐλογεῖν τὸν κύριον and the καταρᾶσθαι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. The preposition ἐν is instrumental, as in Luke xxii. 29 and elsewhere. By the repetition of ἐν αὐτῇ in the second clause, the antithesis is yet more strongly marked. εὐλογεῖν

¹ Lange finds a difficulty in James including himself, "which is to be solved either by taking the second clause as a question expressive of surprise, or by hearing James speak as the representative of his people in the name of the guilty people." But both suppositions are equally impossible; the context contradicts the first, and the fact that James could have no reason to consider himself as the representative of the Jewish people contradicts the second.

and *καταρᾶσθαι* are correlate expressions, since the former, as the translation of the Hebrew בָּרַךְ, has properly the meaning "to bless;" in reference to God, as here, it means *laudibus celebrare*, to praise; comp. Ps. cxlv. 21, and other passages. — The combination of *τὸν κύριον καὶ πατέρα* (instead of the *Rec. τὸν Θεὸν κ. π.*) as a designation of God (for by *κύριος* is not here to be understood Christ) is unusual; comp. chap. i. 27. This twofold name designates God on the side of His power and on the side of His love (comp. Matt. xi. 25). — In the second clause the important description: *τοὺς καθ' ὁμοίωσιν Θεοῦ γεγονότας*, is annexed to *τοὺς ἀνθρώπους*, by which the contradiction of the action described still more pointedly appears. The thought and expression agree with Gen. i. 26. Also, according to this, sinful man is still a being created after the image of God. Were the expression merely to be referred to what man originally was, but which he has ceased to be, the point of James' saying would be broken. Bengel correctly observes: *remanet nobilitas indelebilis*. Benson, Pott, Gebser, and Semler arbitrarily restrict the contents of this verse to the conduct of those who set themselves up as teachers.¹

Ver. 10. First a repetition of the saying in brief expressive combination, by which the accent is placed on *αὐτοῦ*. With the words *οὐ χρὴ ταῦτα οὕτως γίνεσθαι*, James adds the condemnation of the conduct described. — The impersonal verb *χρὴ* is in the N. T. ἅπ. λεγ.; the usual word is *δεῖ*, from which it does not differ in meaning. — *ταῦτα οὕτως*] The union of these two words serves for the sharpening of the idea; *ταῦτα* designates the contents; *οὕτως*, the form of the action; incorrectly Bengel: *ταῦτα bona; οὕτω adjunctis malis*.

Ver. 11. Illustration of the unnaturalness of the conduct mentioned by an image taken from nature: *Does the fountain from the same hole send forth the sweet and the bitter? — ἡ πηγή*] The article is not here for the sake of liveliness (Schneckenburger: *articulus fontem quasi ante oculos pingit*),

¹ Semler's view is very strange: *hi inter publicas Dei laudes, etiam execrationes et tristia omnia praecibant in Romanis!* It is equally a mistake when Lange refers the expression chiefly to Christians, and specially to Jewish Christians, "in whom the likeness of God, that is, the actuality and visibility of the image, has reappeared."

but is used because *πηγή* is generically considered. — *ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ὀπῆς*] *ὀπή*, the hollow, Heb. xi. 38, Ex. xxxiii. 22, Obad. ver. 3, is here the hole from which the water of the fountain streams forth. *ἡ πηγή* refers to man; *ἡ ὀπή*, to the mouth. The chief accent is on *αὐτῆς*, which points back to *ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ στόματος*, ver. 10. — *βρύειν*] an *ἄπ. λεγ.*, properly to sprout forth, then to overflow, is here used transitively, *to cause to flow forth*. — *τὸ γλυκύ* and *τὸ πικρόν* indicate, indeed, the two different kinds of *water*, yet linguistically *τὸ ὕδωρ* is not to be supplied; the former refers to *εὐλογεῖν*, and the latter to *καταρᾶσθαι*. With this verse James says only that happens not in nature, which occurs in the case of man, out of whose mouth proceed blessing and cursing. The following verse first expresses the impossibility.

Ver. 12. This verse shows, by examples taken from nature, that from *one* principle opposite things cannot be produced, but that any cause can only bring forth that which corresponds to its nature. Semler incorrectly paraphrases the first question: *μὴ δύναται συκῇ ἐλαίας ποιῆσαι*: an fieri potest, ut ficus, cujus est *dulcis* natura, producat *amaras* oleas; for that *here* the contrast of sweet and bitter (which only the last clause of the verse resumes) is not designed to be expressed, is evident from what immediately follows: *ἡ ἄμπελος σύκα*, where James would otherwise have mentioned the olive instead of the vine. The idea is rather that nothing can bring forth that which is not corresponding to its nature.¹ Consequently the opinion of de Wette, that here *thistles* (according to Matt. vii. 16), or something similar, instead of *ἄμπελος* would be more appropriate, is incorrect. — To the question follows as its conclusion the negative clause: *οὔτε ἄλυκόν γλυκὺ ποιῆσαι ὕδωρ*, which is so construed as if the former sentence, not only in meaning, but also in form, was a negative one; *οὔτε* (κ: οὐδέ) and the omission of *δύναται* are thus to be explained.² — *ἄλυκόν* is the subject, and *γλυκὺ*

¹ Comp. Arrian, *Epikt.* ii. 20: πῶς γὰρ δύναται ἄμπελος μὴ ἀμπελικῶς κινεῖσθαι ἀλλ' ἐλαϊκῶς, ἢ ἐλαία πάλιν μὴ ἐλαϊκῶς ἀλλ' ἀμπελικῶς; ἀμήχανον, ἀδιανόητον; comp. also Plut. *de tranq. an.* p. 472 E.

² Buttmann (p. 315 [E. T. 367]), following Lachmann, *praef.* p. xlv., assumes a corruption of the passage.

ὕδωρ the object; ποιῆσαι is used in the same signification as before; thus: *Nor can bitter bring forth sweet water.* The opposite ideas ἀλυκόν and γλυκύ are emphatically placed beside each other. James hereby indicates, that if from *one* mouth the bitter (namely, the κατάρρα) and also the sweet (namely, the εὐλογία) proceed, this is not only morally reprehensible, to which ver. 10 points, but is something *impossible*; accordingly, the person who curses man, who is made after the image of God, cannot also bless (praise) God, and that thus if the mouth yet express both, the εὐλογεῖν can only be mere seeming and hypocrisy (Lange).¹

Ver. 13. With this verse apparently begins a new section, which, however, stands in close connection with the warning in ver. 1, whilst the true wisdom is here contrasted with the false wisdom of which the readers boasted, and by which they considered themselves qualified to teach. Also here in the words: τίς σοφὸς καὶ ἐπιστήμων ἐν ὑμῖν, the chief point is again placed at the beginning. These words are usually understood as a direct question (Tischendorf and Winer, p. 152 [E. T. 211]); on the other hand, Lachmann has only placed a comma after ὑμῖν, which is approved by Al. Buttmann (p. 217 [E. T. 252]); an *inversio structuræ* then here takes place; whilst "the direct interrogative form, owing to the construction which follows, passed naturally over into the meaning of the kindred relative clause." Certainly in the N. T. the direct question is frequently used instead of the indirect, indeed instead of the relative pronoun; also in the usual meaning "the disruption of the clauses, as well as the asyndetic transition to δειξάτω without any subject," is surprising. But, on the other hand, the discourse by the direct question evidently gains in liveliness, as it is, more-

¹ Gunkel incorrectly thinks that ver. 12 only discloses the unnaturalness of the conduct denounced in ver. 10, for μὴ δύναται evidently expresses *impossibility*. It is also to be observed, that in the last clause of ver. 12 ἀλυκόν (ὕδωρ) is considered as the fountain which cannot bring forth γλυκύν ὕδωρ, and accordingly points to the bitter disposition, from which only that which is bitter (namely, the bitter κατάρρα), but not that which is sweet (namely, the εὐλογία), can proceed. Lange correctly observes, "that the multiplying of examples has the effect of illustrating the general application of the law of life here laid down;" but he strangely supposes that "the individual examples have a symbolical meaning;" the fig-tree, the symbol of a luxurious natural life; the olives, the symbols of spiritual life, etc

over, peculiar to the diction of James; see, however, Ecclus. vi. 34, to which Schneckenburger appeals in support of the incorrect opinion that *τις* is here the indefinite pronoun. — σοφός καὶ ἐπιστήμων] The same combination of these two words is found in Dent. i. 13, iv. 6, LXX., as the translation of the Hebrew וְיָבִין וְחָכָם; comp. also Hos. xiv. 9. If James here considered these two synonymous ideas as different, σοφός is to be referred to the general, and ἐπιστήμων to the particular. Wiesinger refers the former to the intelligence, and the latter to the practical insight into the correct judgment of any given case; others differently. — That whosoever is actually wise is to show it by action, is the chief thought of the following sentence. The construction of δείξάτω with ἐκ and the object following on it, reminds us of chap. ii. 18: δείξω ἐκ τῶν ἔργων μου τὴν πίστιν, but the relation is not entirely the same. In that passage πίστις is the invisible, which is to manifest itself as the visible by ἔργα; but here both ἡ καλὴ ἀναστροφή and τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ are visible; the former is the general, the latter is the particular, which as individual special manifestations proceed from it. The verb δείκνυμι means here, as there, not to *prove* or *demonstrate*, but to *show*. The addition ἐν πραύτητι—which is to be connected neither with τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ nor with τῆς καλῆς ἀναστροφῆς, forming *one* idea, but belongs to δείξάτω, more exactly defined by ἐκ τῆς . . . αὐτοῦ—has the principal accent, as πραύτης σοφίας, *i.e.* the meekness springing from wisdom, and therefore peculiar to it (opposite of ὀργή), is the necessary condition under which the showing forth of works out of a good conversation alone is possible. The mode in which the individual ideas of the sentence are united together is certainly somewhat surprising, but it is explainable from the fact that James placed together all the points which occurred to him as briefly as possible. James might have put τὴν σοφίαν αὐτοῦ as the object belonging to δείξάτω; but instead of this he puts τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ, in conformity with the importance which works have to him, in which as faith (ii. 10) so also wisdom manifests itself. He then makes the idea σοφία to follow in the adverbial addition ἐν πραύτητι σοφίᾳς. The sentence might also be divided by a point after ἀναστροφῆς; then the first clause would mean: *let him show it out of a good con-*

versation ; and the second clause might either be taken as an addition dependent on *δειξάτω* (so Neander: "works performed in meekness suitable to wisdom"), or a verb would have to be supplied. However, the detachment of the second clause decides against this construction. *ὡς σοφοῦ* is not, with Schneckenburger, Theile, Wiesinger, to be supplied to *αὐτοῦ*, as the reference to wisdom is contained in the additional clause ; but also *αὐτοῦ* must not be referred to *σοφός* (his works, that is, of the wise man), but it refers to the subject contained in *δειξάτω* (thus Lange and Brückner). The whole idea *πραύτης σοφίας* is neither to be resolved into *πραεῖα σοφία* (Beza, Grotius, Baumgarten, Semler, Gebser, Hottinger, Schneckenburger), nor into *πραύτης σοφῆ* (Laurentius), but to be explained: "the meekness which is proper to wisdom, and proceeds from it" (Wiesinger), or "in which *σοφία* evidences itself" (Lange).¹ With the emphasis on *πραύτης* James passes on to *βραδὺς εἰς ὕργην* (chap. i. 29), of which what follows is a further explication.

Ver. 14. As meekness belongs to wisdom, so he who has in his heart *ζήλος πικρός* and *ἐριθεία* boasts of wisdom without any right. As this was the case with his readers, James now directly addresses them: *εἰ δὲ . . . ἔχετε*] *Τὸ ζήλος*, *zeal*, — which is here, as frequently, used in a bad sense, — is added the adjective *πικρός* for the sake of strengthening it, perhaps with reference to vv. 11 and 12 (Grotius, Pott, Gebser). — *ἐριθεία*] has in the N. T. the meaning controversial spirit, or, more definitely, *partisanship* ; comp. Rom. ii. 8 ; 2 Cor. xii. 20 (see Meyer on both passages) ; Gal. v. 20 ; Phil. i. 17, ii. 3 ; in 2 Cor. xii. 20 and Gal. v. 20 *ζήλοι* and *θυμοί* are united together as plurals. — *ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ὑμῶν*] in contrast with the *word* of his readers, boasting of their wisdom. — In the apodosis: *μὴ κατακαυχᾶσθε καὶ ψεύδεσθε κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας*] neither the first nor the second verb is to be converted into a participle ; certainly *κατα* in the first verb refers to *κατὰ τῆς ἀληθ.*, and so far already contains the idea of lying, but James designed prominently to bring forward this, and therefore he adds *καὶ ψεύδεσθε* to *κατακαυχᾶσθε*. On *κατακαυχᾶσθε*, comp. chap. ii. 13 (see

¹ Luther inaccurately translates the passage: "who shows with his good conversation his works in meekness and wisdom."

Winer, p. 417 [E. T. 590, note 1]). In *κατακαυχᾶσθε* the reference is to others, in *ψεύδεσθε* to one's own conscience (Lange). In order to avoid the tautology in *ψεύδεσθε* and *κατὰ τ. ἀληθείας*, Wiesinger understands by *ἀληθεία* "truth in an objective Christian sense—the Christian truth, by the possession of which they fancied themselves σοφοί."¹ But, on the contrary, it is to be considered that that which, logically considered, appears as mere tautology, receives another import, when not only the understanding but also the disposition is recognised as a factor of the construction: so it is here; compare, moreover, Isocrates, *de pace*, p. 165: *διαψεύδεσθαι τῆς ἀληθείας*.

Ver. 15. The character of the σοφία from which bitter zeal and partisanship proceed. — οὐκ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ σοφία] αὕτη is not to be separated from ἡ σοφία, but forms along with it the subject. Luther incorrectly translates: "for this is not the wisdom," etc. By αὕτη ἡ σοφία is meant that wisdom by which man has ζῆλον πικρόν in his heart, or that from which it springs; the predicate to it is: οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνωθεν κατερχομένη. — οὐκ ἔστιν] emphatically precedes, and the participle takes the place of an adjective (de Wette, Wiesinger, Winer, p. 313 [E. T. 439]). Gebser, Pott, Schneckenburger incorrectly explain ἔστιν κατερχομένη = κατέρχεται. On the idea ἄνωθεν κατέρχ. comp. chap. i. 17. — As an *ungodly* wisdom it is characterized by three adjectives which form a climax: ἐπίγειος, ψυχική, δαιμονιώδης. — ἐπίγειος] expresses the sharpest contrast to ἄνωθεν κατερχομένη, that wisdom being designated as such which belongs not to heaven, but to *earth*. That it is *sinful* ("taking root in a whole life of sin," Kern, Wiesinger) is not yet expressed. James calls it ψυχική] inasmuch as it belongs not to the πνεῦμα, but, in contrast to it, to the earthly life of the soul; see Meyer on 1 Cor. ii. 14, and author's explanation of Jude 19. These two first ideas are abstractly not of an ethical character, but they become so by being considered in contrast to the heavenly and the spiritual. It is otherwise with the third idea: δαιμονιώδης. This word (ἄπ. λεγ.) = *devilish*, betokens both the origin and the nature, and is to be taken not in a figura-

¹ According to Lange, the theocratic truth is to be understood which the Jewish zealots professed to protect.

tive, but in its literal sense; comp. ver. 6, chap. iv. 7; incorrectly, Hottinger: *impuro genio magis quam homine digna*. — The explanation of Hornejus contains arbitrary statements: *terrena*, quia avaritiæ dedita est, quæ operibus terrenis inhiat; *animalis*, quia ad animi libidines accommodatur; *dæmoniaca*, quod ambitioni et superbiæ servit, quæ propria diaboli vitia sunt; and equally so that of Lange, who finds here characterized "Judaistic and Ebionite zealotism," and refers ἐπιγ. to "the chiliastic claims to the dominion of the earth."¹

Ver. 16. Reason of the judgment expressed in ver. 15. With the introductory words: ὅπου γὰρ ζήλος καὶ ἐριθεία, James points back to ver. 14; with the following words: ἐκεῖ κ.τ.λ., he names the fruit of ζήλος and ἐριθεία; these are ἀκαταστασία and πᾶν φαῦλον πρᾶγμα; ἀκαταστασία] is uproar, disorder; comp. Prov. xxvi. 28; στόμα ἄστεγον ποιεῖ ἀκαταστασίας. An uproarious disorderly nature proceeds not from God: οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἀκαταστασίας ὁ Θεός, ἀλλ' εἰρήνης, 1 Cor. xiv. 33. — To this special idea, which is particularly brought forward on account of the condition of those to whom James writes, the general idea: *every evil deed*, is added, in order to lay stress on the fact that zeal and partisanship bring along with them the corruption of the whole moral life. Of a wisdom which effects this, it must naturally hold good what is said of it in ver. 15. — The supposition of Kern (*Tüb. Zeitschr.* 1835, II. 59), to which de Wette assents, that the here presupposed controversies between Jewish and Gentile Christians are alluded to, is properly rejected by Brückner.

Ver. 17. The character of the true wisdom, which (in contrast to ver. 15) is designated as ἡ ἄνωθεν σοφία] comp. with this expression, Prov. ii. 6; *Wisd. of Sol.* vii. 25, 26; Philo, *de profug.* p. 571: σοφία ἄνωθεν ὁμβρηθεῖσα ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ; *de nom. nat.*: οὐράνιος σοφία. — πρῶτον μὲν ἀγνή ἐστιν] By πρῶτον μὲν this characteristic is distinguished from the rest, which are introduced by ἔπειτα, because it belongs to its nature, "designates its *internal* quality" (Kern). It is ἀγνή] i.e. καθαρὰ καὶ ἀρνηπαρὸς, μηδενὸς τῶν σαρκικῶν ἀντεχομένη (Oecumenius); thus free from all impurity. Lange explains ἀγνή by *consecrated*; incorrectly according to

¹ Without any justification, Schwegger finds here an allusion to the wisdom of the Gnostics.

N. T. usage; even in the classics, the reference to the gods sufficiently often steps into the background. — In the series of characteristics following after *ἔπειτα*, which describe *σοφία* according to its *manifestations* (Kern), the first three are named which indicate the contrasts to *ζῆλος* and *ἐριθεία*: *εἰρηνική*] *peaceful* (comp. *εἰρηνοποιός*, Matt. v. 9): *ἐπιεικής*] *fair, mild*; see on 1 Tim. iii. 3 (not = *yielding*): *εὐπειθής*] *ἄπ. λεγ.* (opposite *ἀπειθής*, Tit. iii. 5): *easy to persuade*, that is, pliant, not contending in party-strife. — Then follows *μετὴν ἐλέους καὶ καρπῶν ἀγαθῶν*] by which it is described as rich in active love: *ἐλέους* is particularly mentioned, because compassion is the most direct proof of love; comp. chap. i. 27, ii. 13; *καρπῶν ἀγαθῶν* forms the contrast to *πᾶν φαῦλον πρᾶγμα*. — The series closes with two words—united by similarity of sound—*ἀδιάκριτος*, *ἀνυπόκριτος*, which express the contrast to everything of an uncertain and hypocritical nature. *ἀδιάκριτος*] is differently explained according to the different meanings of the root *διακρίνεσθαι*; Luther renders it *impartial*; Lorinus, Hornejus, Grotius ("sine partitione, nempe iniqua"), Baumgarten, Estius, Schulthess, Hottinger, Kern, Schneckenburger, Lange ("not separatistic, not sectarian"), and others understand it in the same sense; Beza explains it by "quae non discernit homines;" similarly Gebser *undivided*, that is, those who have the true wisdom do not separate from each other; the explanation of Pott: *pacíficus*, agrees with this; the Vulgate, on the other hand, renders it *non judicans*; and Semler: *nec temere judicans de aliis Christianis, qui suo more vivunt*. It is best to start from the meaning of *διακρίνεσθαι* as it occurs in the N. T., *to doubt*, and accordingly, with de Wette and Wiesinger, to take *ἀδιάκριτος* = *expers omnis cujuscunque ambiguitatis et dubitationis* (similarly Wetstein = *non duplex*).¹ *ἀνυπόκριτος*] is *unhypocritical, upright*; see Rom. xii. 9; 2 Cor. vi. 6. — These two characteristics are also added with special reference to the state of things among the readers. On *ἀδιάκριτος*, see

¹ The same signification is also adopted by Neander, when he says, having man in view: "James requires inner unity of soul, assured conviction, so that the soul be not driven to and fro by extraneous considerations, and by conflicting doubts. James' meaning is hardly to be described in one word. The notion of impartiality or simplicity is most in accordance with it."

chap. i. 6–8, ii. 4; on ἀνυπόκριτος, chap. i. 22, 26, ii. 1. — All the characteristics are attributed to true wisdom from the effects which it produces among those who are partakers of it; since it *makes* them pure, peaceable, etc.; the virtues of which it is the source belong to it.

Ver. 18. As in ver. 16 the fruit of ζῆλος, and thus of false wisdom on which it is founded, is named, so in this verse is the fruit of true wisdom, which is εἰρηνική. — καρπὸς δικαιοσύνης . . . σπείρεται is a pregnant expression for: *the seed, which yields the fruit of righteousness, is sown* (Weisinger, Bouman, Lange). δικαιοσύνη] is not justification (Gebser, Schneckenburger), but *righteousness* or *uprightness*. The genitive is that of apposition, and announces wherein the καρπὸς consists. This καρπὸς δικαιοσύνης forms the antithesis to ἀκαταστασία καὶ πᾶν φαῦλον πρᾶγμα, ver. 16. δικαιοσύνη is by various expositors incorrectly referred to the future life. — σπείρεται] is to be retained in its literal meaning, from which there is no reason to depart, when the pregnant form of the expression is kept in view. Brückner converts the idea without justification into that of dispersing, *i.e.* of profuse spending; Pott falsely explains σπείρεται by δεῖ σπείρεσθαι. The sower is not to be considered as God (Brückner), for from the whole context the discourse is not concerning the conduct of God, but of the Christian. The addition ἐν εἰρήνῃ is not to be combined with καρπὸς δικαιοσύνης (Rauch) or with δικαιοσύνης (Kern: righteousness before God, which manifests itself in peace with God) as one idea, but it belongs to the verb, and announces the condition by which only the seed sown yields the fruits of righteousness; it is in antithesis to ζῆλος καὶ ἐριθεία, ver. 16. — De Wette incorrectly takes ἐν εἰρήνῃ = εἰς εἰρήνην, in hope of peace. — τοῖς ποιοῦσιν εἰρήνην] (= εἰρηνοποιῶν, Matt. v. 9) is either the *Dativus actionis* (Weisinger, de Wette, formerly in this commentary; Lange uncertainly) announcing who are the sowers, or *Dativus commodi* (Brückner, Bouman) announcing for whose use the καρπὸς δικ. is sown; in the latter case the ποιοῦντες εἰρήνην are likewise to be considered as sowers (de Wette considers it possible that the *Dativus commodi* may by its importance have supplanted ὑπὸ τῶν κ.τ.λ.). The latter explanation is more corresponding to the context, as it is already indicated in ἐν εἰρήνῃ σπείρεται that

the sowing can only be by such as are in possession of *σοφία εἰρηνική*, and it was particularly brought forward that the righteousness springing from the seed is only imparted to those who make peace. Accordingly, the meaning of the sententious expression is: that the seed of righteousness sown in peace yields righteousness only to the peaceable. This explanation agrees in essentials with that of Wiesinger and Bouman, also of Lange, who, however, blends with it something foreign to it, and thinks on the future harvest of righteousness. Deviating from this, de Wette renders it: "The fruit (conduct, moral action) of righteousness is in hope of peace, as the seed of the heavenly harvest sown by them who practise peace." Brückner: "The fruit (the produce) of righteousness is in peace dispersed (namely, by God) for them who practise peace." Kern: "That which springs up for the peaceable as the fruit of their sowing, that is, of their peaceful conduct, is righteousness before God, which manifests itself in peace with God."

CHAPTER IV.

VER. 1. Before *μάχαι, πάλιν* is to be repeated, after A B C **8**, etc. (Lachm. Tisch.). — Ver. 2. After *καὶ πολεμεῖτε, ὡς ἔχετε* is to be read, according to almost all testimonies (A B G K, etc.); only a few min. insert *ὅς* (the reading of *Rec.*); several others (C **8**, etc.) read *καὶ ὡς ἔχετε*; recommended by Griesbach, guaranteed by Reiche; the insertion of the particle is explained from endeavouring more closely to connect the following with what goes before. — Ver. 4. Instead of the *Rec.* *μοῖχοὶ καὶ μοιχαλίδες*, after G K, etc., A B, several vss. Bede have only *μοιχαλίδες* (Lachm. Tisch.); **8**, pr. read only *μοιχαλίδες*, but corrected *μοῖχοι καὶ μοιχαλ.* Theile, Lange, Brückner (also Reiche) correctly consider the simple feminine as the original reading; otherwise de Wette, Bouman, and others. — Tisch. 7 remarks: loco identidem considerato non possum quin teneam etiamnum lectionem jam in ed. anni 1841 a me defensam; see on this the exposition. **8** has a *τοῦτο* after *κόσμου*, and instead of the genitive *τοῦ Θεοῦ* the dative *τῷ Θεῷ*. — Ver. 5. On the pointing of this verse, see exposition. — Instead of the *Rec.* *κατ' ὀφθαλμοῦ*, after G K, all min. vss. Theophylact, Occumenius, Bede (Tisch.), Lachm. has, after A B **8**, etc., adopted *κατ' ὀφθαλμοῦ*. — Ver. 7. A B **8**, very many min. etc., have, after *ἀντιστάτης*, the particle *ὅς* (Lachm.), which is wanting in G K, many min. etc. (*Rec.* Tisch.); probably the *ὅς* was omitted to give to the sentence an independent form; so also Lange; Bouman otherwise: *ὅς* fulciendae orationis causa inculcatum est. — Ver. 10. The article *τοῦ* is to be omitted before *καρπῶν*, according to the testimony of A B K **8**, etc. — Ver. 11. Instead of *καὶ καρπῶν*, *Rec.* after G K (Reiche, Bouman), etc., is, with Lachm. and Tisch., to be read *ἢ καρπῶν*, according to the testimony of A B, several min. vss. etc. — Ver. 12. After A B **8**, many min., almost all vss., the words *καὶ κρίτης* are, with Griesb. Lachm. Tisch. etc., to be added to *ὁ νομοθέτης*; they are wanting in the *Rec.* (after G K, etc.); so also, according to the testimony of almost all authorities, the particle *ὅς* is to be added after *αὐτοῦ*. — Instead of the *Rec.* *ὅς κρίνεις*, after G K, etc. (Bouman), *ὁ καρπῶν* is, with Lachm. and Tisch., to be read, after A B **8**, several min.; also recommended by Griesbach; and instead of the *Rec.* *τὸν ἔτερον*, likewise

with the same editors, τὸν πλῆσιον is to be read, after A B s, etc. — Ver. 13. The Elz. ed. reads σήμερον ἢ αὔριον (thus in B s, Lachm.); but A G K, very many min. etc., have the reading adopted by Tisch.: σήμε. καὶ αὔριον, which must be considered genuine, as ἢ appears to be a correction for the sake of simplification. — The *Rec.* (ed. Steph.) has the conjunctives πορευώμεθα, ποιήσωμεν, ἐμπορευώμεθα, κερδήσωμεν, after G K, several min. etc. In A the two first verbs are in the conjunctive; in s only the first verb, the others in the indicative; B, very many min. Vulg. and other vss. have only the indicative; so Lachm. and Tisch. The conjunctive appears to be a correction. — ἐνα, following ἐναντιόν, is omitted by Lachm.; the omission is, however, too slightly attested by B s, Vulg. etc., and, besides, is easily explained as the statement of time here expressed by ἐνα appeared unsuitable. — Ver. 14. Before τῆς αὔριον Tisch. reads, after G K s, the article τό (*Rec.*); Lachm., after A, τῶ; Buttmann, after B, has omitted the article; he has also omitted the words γάρ and ἡ after ποία, according to his statement after B (which Tisch. has not remarked), so that his reading is: οἱ τινες οὐκ ἐπίστασθε τῆς αὔριον ποία ζωὴ ὑμῶν; see exposition. — After ἀτμίς Lachm., according to A, Vulg., has omitted the particle γάρ; it is, however, probably genuine, and only removed from the text as interrupting the sense. — Instead of the *Rec.* ἐστίν (after G, etc.), which is defended by Reiche and Bouman, Lachm. and Tisch. have rightly adopted ἐστε; attested by A B K, very many min.; the change into ἐστίν is easily explained. In s the words ἀτμίς γάρ ἐστε are entirely wanting. — The *Rec.* ἔπειτα δὲ is a correction of the more difficult ἔπειτα καί, attested by A B K s, etc.; G has ἔπειτα δὲ καί. — Ver. 15. Buttmann reads θέλη instead of θελήσῃ, against the testimony of all authorities. — The indicative ζήσωμεν . . . ποιήσωμεν (Lachm. Tisch., after A B s, etc.) is to be preferred to the *Rec.* ζήσωμεν . . . ποιήσωμεν (after G K, etc.), not only according to authorities, but on account of the thought (Wiesinger, Lange). In some mss. and vss. ζήσωμεν . . . ποιήσωμεν is found; this reading is incorrectly defended by Fritzsche (*Leipz. Lit. Z.*, and Winer and Engelhardt's *neues krit. Journ.* V. 1826), Theile, Reiche, Bouman, and others; Winer, p. 256 [E. T. 357], prefers to read both times the conjunctive; see exposition. — Ver. 16. Instead of καυχᾶσθε, s alone has κατακαυχᾶσθε. — Instead of the form ἀλαζονείαις (B** K, Lachm. Tisch. 2, Buttm.), Tisch. 7 has adopted the form ἀλαζονίας (A B* G).

Ver. 1. The section beginning with this verse is in close connection with what goes before, pointing to the internal reason of the disorders in the congregations referred to. The

sudden transition is to be observed from the sentiment directly before expressed, that righteousness prospers only in *peace*, to the impressive question: *πόθεν πόλεμοι κ.τ.λ.*] an answer to which follows in a second question "appealing to the conscience of the readers" (Wiesinger). — *πόλεμοι . . . μάχαι*] synonymous terms, only to be distinguished by the first denoting the general condition, and by the second the single phenomena (Wiesinger, Lange, Bouman: *πόλεμος* = vehementior dimicatio, *μάχη* = minus aperta concertatio); correctly Laurentius: non loquitur apostolus de bellis et caedibus, sed de mutuis dissidiis, litibus, jurgiis et contentionibus. Several expositors, as Pott, Schulthess, Schneckenburger, arbitrarily limit these *πόλεμοι* to contentions between teachers; according to de Wette and Wiesinger, contentions concerning *meum* and *tuum* are to be understood; but in what follows the *object* is not stated, but the *cause* of the contentions and dissensions among the readers.¹ — The repetition of *πόθεν* is explained from the liveliness of the emotion with which James speaks. — *ἐν ὑμῖν*] *among you*. — The demonstrative *οὐκ ἐντεῦθεν* emphatically points to what follows; Bouman: *graphica rei significatae est informatio, qua primum intento tanquam digito monstrantur, deinde diserte nominantur αἱ ἡδοναί*; Michaelis incorrectly assumes this as a separate question = *οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου*, John xviii. 36. By *ἐκ τῶν ἡδονῶν ὑμῶν* the internal reason of these dissensions is disclosed. *ἡδοναί* is here by metonymy = *ἐπιθυμίαι*; they are lusts directed to earthly riches; not "a life of sensual indulgence as realized lusts" (Lange). — *τῶν στρατευομένων ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ὑμῶν*] The lusts have their seat—as it were their *encampment* (Wiesinger)—in the members (see on chap. iii. 2);² they, however, do not rest there, but according to their nature wage war (*στρατεύονται*). Estius (with whom Bouman agrees) incorrectly explains it: cupiditates, tanquam milites, membris vestris, ut armis utuntur ad opera peccati, by which *ἐν* is falsely understood. Calovius, Baumgarten, and

¹ According to Lange, James has in view all the hostile dissensions of the Jewish people (Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes, Alexandrians, Samaritans) and of the Jewish Christians (Nazarenes, Ebionites, etc.).

² Incorrectly Laurentius: Per membra hic intellige non tantum externa membra, sed et internos animi affectus. Still more strangely Lange explains *ἐν μέλεσιν* as "the members of individuals and the members of the people."

de Wette, after 1 Pet. ii. 11 and Rom. vii. 23, supply *κατὰ τῆς ψυχῆς* or *τοῦ νοός*; but if James had meant the fight of the lusts against the soul or the reason, he would have more plainly expressed it. Gebser, Schneckenburger, Lange, and others (Brückner comprehends both) understand it of the strife of the desires against each other; but this is evidently a foreign thought. According to Wiesinger, "the strife arises and is carried on because the *ἐπιθυμεῖν* has as its opponent an *οὐκ ἔχειν . . . οὐ δύνασθαι ἐπιτυχεῖν*, against which it contends." But it is better to refer the *στρατεύεσθαι* to everything which hinders the gratification of the desires. As in what follows *ἐπιθυμεῖτε* refers to *αἱ ἡδοναί*, and *φονεύετε καὶ ζηλοῦτε* to the idea *στρατεύεσθαι*, James appears chiefly to have intended the opposing strivings of others against which the *ἡδοναί* contend. From this internal war arose the *πόλεμοι καὶ μάχαι*.¹

Ver. 2 describes in a lively manner the origin of these external strifes. The stages are *ἐπιθυμεῖτε . . . φονεύετε καὶ ζηλοῦτε . . . μάχεσθε καὶ πολεμεῖτε*; the second succeeds the first because it is without result, and the third the second for the same reason. — *ἐπιθυμεῖτε*] here in a bad sense referring to *τῶν ἡδονῶν*, ver. 1. It is evident that the object to be thought on is worldly possessions; James does not mention the object, because he only required to express "the covetous impulse" (de Wette). It is unsatisfactory to think only on the desires of individuals. James rather describes the conduct of the churches to whom he writes; these, discontented with their low position in the world, longed after earthly power to which, as the church of God, they thought they had a claim. This striving made them consider persecution as a reproach; on the contrary, James exhorts them to count it as a joy (chap. i. 2). This also produced among them that respect of persons toward the rich of the world for which James blames them. This was also the source of internal division; the affluent in the church despising the poor instead of imparting to them of their wealth, and only striving after an increase of their riches; whilst the poor grudged the rich their possessions, and accused them of being the children of the world. Thus in these churches occurred the same strife which prevailed among the

¹ Comp. Plato, *Phaedr.* xv.: καὶ γὰρ πολέμους καὶ στάσεις καὶ μάχας οὐδὲν ἄλλο παρέχει ἢ τὸ σῶμα καὶ αἱ τοῦτου ἐπιθυμίαι; consult also Cicero, *de fin. bon.* i. 13.

Jews, and was the source of factions among them. — By *καὶ οὐκ ἔχετε*] the uselessness of *ἐπιθυμεῖν* is expressed, and also the motive to *φονεύειν καὶ ζηλοῦν* is assigned; it is unnecessary here, with Gebser, Hottinger, de Wette, to explain *ἔχειν* = to receive; it rather means: to *have*, to *possess*. The meaning is: from the desire follows not the possession, namely, of what is desired. — *φονεύετε καὶ ζηλοῦτε*] As here the external action is not yet described, but the internal disposition, *φονεύειν* cannot here be taken in its literal meaning, as Winer (p. 417 [E. T. 589]), Lange, Bouman think. Many expositors, as Carpzov, Pott, Morus, Augusti, Gebser, Schneckenburger, and others explain it adverbially: “even to murder and killing;” but the position of the words contradicts this explanation; if the idea *ζηλοῦτε* was to be strengthened by *φονεύετε*, it must be placed first. Other expositors, as Erasmus, Calvin, Beza, Piscator, Hornejus, Laurentius, Benson, Schulthess, Hottinger, and others, solve the difficulty by the conjectural reading *φθονεῖτε*; but this reading has not the slightest support in authorities. Nothing remains, as Wiesinger correctly remarks, than to explain *φονεύειν* here, with Estius, Calovius, also de Wette (who, however, wavers), according to 1 John iii. 15, of internal hatred,¹ and “to justify this word by the boldness of the expression prevailing in this passage; comp. *πόλεμοι καὶ μάχαι, στρατεύεσθαι, μοιχοί* (more correctly *μοιχαλίδες*),” Wiesinger. It is true that then an anti-climax would seem to occur; but this is only in appearance, as in point of fact *ζηλοῦν* (hostile zeal already ready to break out in word and action) presupposes internal *φονεύειν*.² — *καὶ οὐ δύνασθε ἐπιτυχεῖν*] namely, that for which you hate and envy. What follows on this are *πόλεμοι*, therefore James closes with *μάχεσθε καὶ πολεμεῖτε*, in which likewise the answer to the question *πόθεν πόλεμοι, πόθεν μάχαι* is contained (Wiesinger). With *οὐκ ἔχετε*, which does not stand in the same relation to *μάχεσθε* κ.τ.λ. as *καὶ οὐ δύν. ἐπιτυχεῖν* does to *φον. κ.*

¹ Stier in his exposition remarks: “James means hatred, but he speaks of killing and murdering, namely, in a spiritual sense, in order to designate hatred as an attack on one’s neighbour;” his translation: “ye *smite*” (instead of Luther’s: “ye hate”), is not, however, justified by this.

² The explanation of Occumenius is peculiar, but not to be justified: *φονεύειν* ἔχει τοὺς σὺν ταυτῶν ψυχὰν ἀποκτινύντας ταῖς πολεμικαῖς ταῦταις ἐπιχειρήσεσι, ὅτι ὡς καὶ ὁ πρὸς τὴν εἰσόδον αὐτῶν πόλεμοι.

ζηλ.,¹ James resumes the foregoing οὐκ ἔχετε and οὐ δύνασθε ἐπιτυχεῖν, in order to assign the reason of this "not having," etc.; the reason is διὰ τὸ μὴ αἰτεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς, thus the want of prayer.² That prayer for earthly things is heard, is not an opinion peculiar to James, but a divine promise; in which only this is to be observed, that the prayer must be no κακῶς αἰτεῖσθαι; see the following verse.

Ver. 3. James apparently again resumes the last expression, whilst he now grants αἰτεῖτε to his readers; but as he designates this their asking as κακῶς αἰτεῖσθαι, he does not consider it as an actual prayer, so that the foregoing declaration is nevertheless true. It is therefore inaccurate to resolve αἰτεῖτε into "or even if you ask."³—On the interchange of middle and active forms, see Winer, p. 229 [E. T. 321]. The middle form naturally suggested itself in ver. 2, prayer for others being not the point under consideration; but in the next clause, as James wished to lay stress on the active side—of prayer in antithesis to λαμβάνειν—he used the active form. "*Egotistical* praying for oneself" (Lange) is incorrectly understood by the middle.—καὶ οὐ λαμβάνετε] emphasizes the uselessness of their asking, the reason of which is assigned by the following: διότι κακῶς αἰτεῖσθε. κακῶς finds its explanation in the following ἵνα; your prayer is therefore evil, because it has no other object than δαπανᾶν ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς. Incorrectly Gebser: "for your prayer must implore only for true heavenly blessings." The discourse is here rather of the temporal condition; this, James observes, continues with you a poor and depressed one, because ye ask for a better one only in order to be able to indulge your lusts.—δαπανᾶν] to

¹ Accordingly, not a comma is to be put after πολυμίτς, but a full stop; thus Tischendorf and Lachmann. Stier incorrectly explains it: "it thus remains at the close as at the beginning, Ye have not."

² In this passage the exposition of Lange reaches almost the climax of arbitrariness. He here assumes a fourfold gradation—(1) desiring; (2) murdering and envying; (3) fighting and warring; (4) asking and not receiving; and corresponding to these—(1) not having; (2) not receiving; (3) an increased not having; (4) an increased not receiving. The first stage denotes Judaism full of chiliastic worldly-mindedness up to the time of the N. T.; the second, the attitude of the Jews toward the Christians; the third, the Jewish war; and the fourth, Judaism after the destruction of Jerusalem.

³ Semler very strangely paraphrases it: scio, quosdam vel publicis precibus (et execrationibus, iii. 9) eam in rem parcere, mala omnia precari imperatori et magistratui Romano.

expend, spend (Mark v. 26); here, in a bad sense, to *squander, to lavish*. Suidas: λαμπρῶς ζῆν καὶ σπαθᾶν; the object to the transitive verb is "that for which you pray." ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ὑμῶν] not *with*, but *in* your lusts. Wahl incorrectly explains δαπανᾶν ἐν = sumtum ponere in aliqua re, i.e. τιθέναι τὰ χρήματα ἐν τινι; this meaning combines δαπανᾶν with εἰς. The sense is not "for the gratification of your lusts" (Baumgarten), but *governed by your lusts*.

Ver. 4. μοιχαλίδες] The *Rec.* μοιχοὶ καὶ μοιχαλίδες has not only the most important authorities against it, but is also easily explained, because the term was taken in its literal sense, which is expressly done by Augusti, Jachmann, and Winer. The context, however, proves that the literal meaning is not here to be retained. If the idea is used in a *figurative* sense, according to the view which prevails in Ps. lxxiii. 27 (Isa. lvii. 3 ff.; Ezek. xxiii. 27), Hos. ii. 2, 4, and other passages of the O. T. (comp. also Matt. xii. 39, xvi. 4; as also 2 Cor. xi. 2; Rev. ii. 22), and as the context requires, then every reason for a distinction of sex ceases. Theile, Lange, Brückner have therefore correctly declared for the reading μοιχαλίδες. Theile's opinion: non minus recte singuli homines scorta dicuntur, quam totum genus atque universa aliqua gens scortum, is so far inappropriate, as the expression μοιχαλίδες used "of individuals in the church of God is certainly singular" (Wieseler); it is here to be referred not to individuals, but to the *churches* to whom James writes (not "the Jewish factions into which Judaism was sundered," Lange); so also Brückner. These, according to the conduct described by James, had 'fallen away from God, and therefore James, full of moral indignation, addresses them with these certainly severe words. — οὐκ οἶδατε, ὅτι] points the readers to their own conduct. — ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου] By κόσμος expositors understand either worldly goods (Pott, Gebser, Hottinger, Schneckenburger, Theile, Wiesinger) or worldly desires (Didymus, Laurentius), or both of these together (de Wette, Stier); and by ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου, the inclination of the heart diverted toward worldly things. But it is more correct to take κόσμος in the same sense as in chap. i. 27 (see explanation of that passage), and to understand ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου of reciprocal friendship; yet so that active conduct toward

the world here predominates. The Christian who aims at worldly glory conforms himself (contrary to the admonition in Rom. xii. 2) to the world, attaching himself to its pursuits, and is thus inclined to it with his heart, his endeavour at the same time being to be esteemed and not despised by the world. The explanation of Piscator: *amicitia cum impiis*, is in essentials correct. The term *φιλία* (ἀπ. λεγ. in N. T.) does not suit the usual explanation.¹ — *ἐχθρα τοῦ Θεοῦ*] expresses as *φιλία τοῦ κόσμου* a reciprocal relation; yet here also the active reference predominates, on account of which most expositors explain it directly by *ἐχθρα εἰς Θεόν* (Rom. viii. 7), although Pott gives also the explanation: *ad ejusmodi agendi rationem nos abripit, quae Deo displicet, nosque privat amore divino*. Lachmann, following the translation of the Vulgate: *inimica*, has adopted the reading *ἐχθρά*, by which, however, the peculiar force which consists in the opposition of the two substantives is removed.—From the judgment here expressed concerning the *φιλία τοῦ κόσμου*, James infers the sentiment that follows: *οὖν, therefore*. — *ὅς ἂν οὖν βουληθῇ κ.τ.λ.*] By the usual explanation of *φιλία τ. κόσμου*, and of the corresponding *φίλος τοῦ κόσμου, βουληθῇ* is at all events disconcerting. Whilst some expositors urge that by it *designed and conscious intention* is designated (Baumgarten), and others oppose it to the actual deed,² and find the idea expressed that even *the simple inclination* to the love of the world (de Wette: “whosoever has perchance willed to love the world”) effects *ἐχθρα τοῦ Θεοῦ*,³ Schneckenburger, on the contrary, says: *verbi βουληθῇ cave premas vim*. With each of these explanations the expression retains something strange, which also is not removed by distinguishing, with Lange, the “formal” and the “material intention,” and understanding *βουληθῇ* only of the latter. But it is different as soon as *κόσμος* is

¹ According to Lange, the friendship with the world consisted “in the chiliastic desire of the enjoyment of a worldly glory which was only coloured with hierarchical piety.”

² Laurentius states this opposition in the most definite terms: *non si tantum est inimicus Dei, qui est ipso opere amicus mundi, sed etiam ille, qui eum non possit, vult tamen . . . et sic voluntate implet, quod ipso opere non potest*.

³ Similarly also Wiesinger: “James brings under the same judgment not only the decided and expressed love to the world, but even the inclination to step into such a relation to the world.”

considered not as an aggregate of things but of persons, since then *φιλία*, as above remarked, consists in a reciprocity. The meaning is: Whosoever, although a Christian, giving himself up to the pursuits of the world, will live in friendship with it, and thus will be not despised but esteemed and loved by it, has directed to it his *wish* (*βουληθῆ*)¹—*he* (thereby) *is constituted an enemy of God*; *ἐχθρὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*] is likewise used in the sense of reciprocal relation, although here the passive meaning predominates.—*καθίσταται*] has here the same meaning as in chap. iii. 6 (so also Lange); it is generally rendered incorrectly = *ἔστι*; inaccurately by Theile = *fit, sistitur*; by Schneckenburger = *stands there as*; by Bouman = *constituitur divino in judicio*.

Vv. 5, 6. The views of expositors differ widely in the interpretation of these verses. At first sight the words following *λέγει* appear to be a quotation from the O. T. which James has in view. That of the older and some of the more recent expositors assume this to be the case, although they differ from each other, some combining *πρὸς φθόνον* directly with *λέγει*, but others including it in the quotation. Against this explanation, however, is the circumstance that the words supposed to be here quoted nowhere occur in the O. T. Such a passage has accordingly been sought for, where a similar thought is expressed, but almost every expositor has fixed upon a different passage. Many expositors seek to remove the difficulty by supposing that James does not here quote any single definite passage, but only a sentiment contained in the O. T. generally, or in several of its expressions. Opposed to this idea, however, is, first, the uncertainty whether James will confirm by it the statement contained in what precedes or in what follows; and secondly, the formula of quotation pointing to a definite passage, particularly as *λέγει* is not = *λαλεῖ*. But, moreover, the clause *μείζονα δὲ δίδωσιν χάριν* is against the view here indicated, since these words cannot be reckoned as part of the quotation, because James only afterwards quotes the O. T. passage from which they are derived; but, also, they cannot be considered

¹ In essentials Estius correctly says: *Terribilis vultu sententia adversus eos qui suas actiones et studia componunt ad gratiam humanam. Hoc enim vere est esse amicum hujus seculi.*

as a statement of James not belonging to the quotation, because *δέ* closely connects them to what directly precedes.

REMARK.—The various O. T. passages which have been conjectured are as follows:—Gen. iv. 7 (Rauch); Gen. vi. 3, 5 (Grotius); Gen. viii. 21 (Beza, Ernest Schmid); Num. xi. 29 (Witsius); Ps. xxxvii. 1 and lxxiii. 3 (Lange); Ps. cxix. 20 ff. (Clericus); Prov. xxi. 10 (Michaelis); Song of Solomon viii. 6 (Coccejus); from the Apocrypha Wisdom of Solomon vi. 12 (Wetstein), and others. Benson supposes that James has in view the N. T. passage, Matt. vi. 24; Stäudlin, that he has in view that passage and also Gal. v. 17; Storr, the latter passage only; and Bengel, 1 Pet. ii. 1 ff. Semler thinks that the passage is here cited from the “Testimony of the Twelve Patriarchs;” and Gabler, that the words are borrowed from a lost prophetic book. In recent times, Engelhardt (Remarks on Jas. iv. 5, 6, in the *Ztschr. f. d. Luth. Theol.*, by Delitzsch and Guericke, 1869, Part II.) has expressed the opinion that Isa. lxiii. 8–11, Ps. cxxxii. 12, 13, and Hos. i. 2, 15, form the groundwork of these words of James. Wolf, Heinsius, and Zachariae refer the words to the thoughts contained in what follows; Theile, de Wette, Brückner (also first edition of this commentary), to the thoughts contained in what precedes—that the friendship of the world is enmity with God.

If the words *πρὸς φθόνον ἐπιποθεῖ κ.τ.λ.* do not form the quotation belonging to *ἡ γραφή λέγει*, it is to be assumed that James here already had in view the scripture adduced after *διὸ λέγει* in ver. 6, but that he did not yet state it, because the sentiment expressed in those words obtruded itself upon him in confirmation of *οὐ κενῶς* (Wiesinger). *πρὸς φθόνον* cannot, as Gebser and others suppose, be united with *λέγει*; for if one takes it to be equivalent to *de invidia* or *contra invidia*, there is this against it, that in what goes before there is no mention of *envy*; or if it is taken adverbially, then it appears as an appendage dragging after *οὐ κενῶς*, which would be added the more unsuitably, because, as de Wette correctly remarks, it cannot be perceived what meaning can be attached to the assurance that the scripture does not speak *enviously*. Most expositors rightly refer it to *ἐπιποθεῖ*, which, without the addition, would be too bare; it is added to this idea as an adverbial and more exact statement = *in an envious, jealous manner*, for the sake of strengthening it. It is linguistically incorrect to explain *πρὸς φθόνον ἐπιποθεῖν* =

ἐπιθυμῆν κατὰ φθόνον, Gal. v. 17 (thus Luther: "the spirit lusteth against envy;" Bengel, Stier; also Lange: "the spirit longeth over against and in opposition to envy"), since πρὸς, although it may be used in a hostile relation (Luke xxiii. 12; Acts vi. 1), yet does not *in itself* express a hostile reference. The explanation of many ancient and some recent expositors (Bede, Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Hottinger, Gabler, Bouman, and others), taking πρὸς φθόνον = *ad invidiam*, is also unsuitable; for, on the one hand, ἐπιποθεῖν is not = proclivem esse, and, on the other hand, it is contradicted by the connection in which there is not the slightest allusion to *envy*. With the correct explanation of πρὸς φθόνον, τὸ πνεῦμα ὃ κατῴκησεν (κατῴκισεν) ἐν ὑμῖν is either subjective, "the Spirit of God," or objective, "the spirit of man." In the first case ἐπιποθεῖ has no object. De Wette, Brückner (so also Schneckenburger and some of the other expositors) supply ἡμῶς as the object. Engelhardt, on the contrary, will supply no object, thinking "the supposed translation of the verb נָפַח is conclusive against an object;" but נָפַח requires an object no less than ἐπιποθεῖν, as it is, as well as the other, a relative (not an absolute) verb. By this interpretation ἐν ὑμῖν is to be understood of Christians, in whom the Holy Spirit (according to Engelhardt: "by the covenant of baptism") has taken up His abode. In the second case, the subject is not expressed. Wiesinger supplies ὁ Θεός. There is no difficulty in this completion, the less so as the preceding ἡ γραφή, which, in connection with λέγει, is personified (comp. Gal. iii. 8, προιδούσα ἡ γραφή), points to God, with whom it is, as it were, identified. This second explanation would deserve the preference before the first, as it is not apparent why James here, instead of simply *God*, should name *the Holy Spirit*, whom he has not elsewhere mentioned in his whole Epistle, and because the specification of an object belonging to ἐπιποθεῖ, which is essentially required for the thought, can scarcely be wanting. Certainly, in this second interpretation, ὃ κατῴκησεν ἐν ἡμῖν added to πνεῦμα is difficult, not so much on account of the formation of the expression, as because this addition appears to be a very unimportant remark. But it is otherwise with the reading κατῴκισεν, as then the relative clause marks "the right of propriety as the ground of explanation of envious

love" (Wiesinger). According to this view, the passage is to be explained: *Or think you that the scripture says in vain*—(rather God) *enviously desires the spirit which He has made to dwell in us, but He gives the greater grace—wherefore it says, etc.*—It is yet to be remarked that *δοκεῖν* has the same meaning as in chap. i. 26; *κενῶς*, that is, without contents, corresponding to the truth; comp. *κενοὶ λόγοι*, Eph. v. 6 (Plato, *Lach.* 196*b*). The adverbial import of *πρὸς φθόνον* is justified by the usage of the Greek language; see Pape's *Wörterb.*: the word *πρός*; Winer, p. 378 [E. T. 529]; Buttmann, p. 292 f. [E. T. 340]. The verb *ἐπιποθεῖν* is also elsewhere in the N. T. construed with the accusative. The idea that God cherishes an "envious and loving longing" (Wiesinger) after the spirit of man, corresponds to the circle of ideas in the O. T., from which also the preceding *μοιχαλίδες* is to be explained.

REMARK.—The principal objections of Engelhardt—that the two members of the 5th and 6th verses are not in congruity, and that the scripture adduced in ver. 6 does not prove the thought expressed in ver. 4—are solved by the observation that the friendship of the world, in which man opposes himself to the will of God, is pride, and that those to whom God gives grace are none other than the humble, who disdain to be the arrogant friends of the world. It is erroneous when Engelhardt denies that an emphasis rests on *οὐ κενῶς*, so that the grammatical construction forbids to make the idea *πρὸς φθόνον κ.τ.λ.* intervene as a contrast to *κενῶς*; the asyndeton form is, besides, wholly suitable to James' mode of expression; moreover, Engelhardt on his part finds himself constrained to supply a transitionary thought before *μείζονα δὲ ὀδώσιν*. That James does not quote the scripture intended by him directly after the first *λέγει*, but defers it because he wished to emphasize that it was not vain and empty, may well surprise us, but it is to be explained from the liveliness peculiar to James. Moreover, in Rom. xi. 2–4, although not in the same, yet in a similar manner, the passage quoted is separated from the form of quotation: *τί λέγει ἡ γραφή*, and in such a manner that the formula itself is taken up again by an *ἀλλά*, referring to the intervening remark, before the intended passage. When Engelhardt thinks that the words in consideration are to be recognised as the quotation, because they are words which do not elsewhere occur in James, apart from this being anything but conclusive, it is, on the contrary, to be observed that *πνεῦμα* understood of the human spirit

already occurs in chap. ii. 26, and that the words *πρὸς φθόον ἐπιποθεῖν* do not occur in the passages of the O. T. which James, according to Engelhardt's opinion, had in view.

Ver. 6. The words *μείζονα δὲ δίδωσιν χάριν* are explained from the fact that James already had in his view the passage of the O. T., afterwards quoted, from which these words are taken. The subject is the same as in the former sentence. The comparative does not express the comparison with the blessings which the world gives (Bede: *majo rem gratiam dat quam amicitia mundi*; thus also Tirinus, Gebser, Pott, Winer, Schneckenburger, Kern), or after which those: *invidi atque arrogantes, quos reprehendit*, Jas. v. 2-4 (Bouman), longed for; also it does not indicate "the greater measure of the comforting and satisfying Spirit as related to the longing Spirit" (Lange: "but he gives grace greater than the longing"), but "*μείζονα* suggests a comparison with a case in which there is no *πρὸς φθόον ἐπιποθ.*" (Wiesinger, so also de Wette); incorrectly Bengel: *eo majorem, quo longius recesseris ab invidia*. — *διό* = *therefore, because it is so* (de Wette). *ἡ γραφή* is to be supplied to *λέγει*. Kern incorrectly takes *λέγει* impersonally: *it is said*. The passage is Prov. iii. 34, and is verbally quoted according to the LXX., except that here, as also in 1 Pet. v. 5, *ὁ Θεός* is put instead of *κύριος*. The *ὑπερήφανοι* are those who, whilst they in striving after high things (*τὰ ὑψηλὰ φρονοῦντες*, Rom. xii. 16) will be the friends of the world, are not ready to bear the reproach of Christ. That these are *ἐχθροὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, the scripture confirms by *ἀντιτίσσεται*. — Opposed to these are the *ταπεινοί*, that is, *the lowly*, those who *τοῖς ταπεινοῖς συναπαγόμενοι*, Rom. xii. 16, seek not the friendship of the world, but humbly bear the cross of Christ. That these are *φίλοι τοῦ Θεοῦ* the Scripture confirms by *δίδωσιν χάριν*.¹ Comp Ecclus. iii. 19, 20.

¹ The difficulty of the passage has induced some expositors to have recourse to arbitrary emendations; thus Erasmus and Grotius explain the words from *δαί λίζω* to *χάρις* as a gloss from 1 Pet. v. 5. Hottinger (with whom Reiche agrees), on the contrary, is inclined to erase the words from *μείζονα* to *λίζω*, and to insert a *δαί* between *ὁ* and *Θεός*. Also Lücke, according to Gebser, considered those words a kind of gloss and error librarii to *ἡ γραφή λίζω* and *ταῖς ταπειν.* δίδω. ver. 6, and that the context is to be thus construed: *πρὸς φθόον . . . ἐν ὧν οὐ δεκνῶσι ὅτι κινῶσι ἡ γὰρ λίζω: ὁ Θεός ὑπερήφανους κ. τ. λ.*

Ver. 7. From the sentiment expressed in the preceding, James infers (οὖν) several exhortations expressive of the duty of humility. — ὑποτάγητε οὖν τῷ Θεῷ] The exhortation is addressed to the ὑπερήφανοι: because God ἀντιτάσσεται them, they are to ὑποτάσσειν to God. In Schneckenburger's explanation: plena obedientia vos Deo committite, ut sitis δοῦλοι Θεοῦ, obedientia is incorrectly emphasized. Calvin's is better: subjectio ista, quam commendat, *humilitatis* est; neque enim generaliter hortatur, ut pareamus Deo, sed requirit *submissionem*.¹ — ἀντίστητε δὲ τῷ διαβόλῳ] This exhortation is closely joined to the preceding; submission to God means resistance to the devil. This requirement was so much the more appropriate, as the readers wished to be the friends of the κόσμος, whose ἄρχων is the devil. — καὶ φεύξεται ἀφ' ὑμῶν] comp. Hermas, I. 2, *mand.* 12 (ed. Hefele, p. 380): δύναται ὁ διάβολος παλαῖσαι, καταπαλαῖσαι δὲ οὐ δύναται. εἰάν οὖν ἀντίστης αὐτῷ, νικηθεὶς φεύξεται ἀπὸ σοῦ κατησχυμμένος. Calvin: Quamvis continuos insultus repetat, semper tamen exclusus discedit. — καί after the imperative commencing the apodosis; so also in Matt. vii. 7 and frequently. 1 Pet. v. 5–9 is to be compared with this passage, where upon the quotation of the same O. T. passage follow exhortations to humility before God, and to resistance to the devil.

Ver. 8. In contrast to the last exhortation and promise is the exhortation ἐγγίσατε τῷ Θεῷ, united in a similar manner with a promise. Whilst the devil is to be kept at a distance by resistance, we are to draw nigh to God. “ἐγγίζειν is not to be limited to prayer, but is to be understood generally of man's turning to God” (Wiesinger). Comp. on ἐγγίζειν, Isa. xxix. 13; Heb. vii. 19. — καὶ ἐγγιεῖ ὑμῖν] corresponding to the preceding φεύξεται ἀφ' ὑμῶν. Similar expressions in 2 Chron. xv. 2; Isa. lvii. 15; Zech. i. 3. — But in order to draw nigh to God, conversion from the former nature is necessary; therefore καθαρίσατε χεῖρας . . . ἁγνίσατε καρδίας.

¹ On account of its strangeness, we give here Semler's remarks on this passage: Jacobus, Paulus, Petrus, Judas, uno quasi ore id confirmant, opus esse, ut Romanis et sic Deo se subjiciant (in which Lange finds no fault were it only said: ut Deo et sic Romanis); and afterwards: τῷ διαβόλῳ, qui per πνῆμα φθόνου vos suscitavit adversus magistratum Romanum; similar also, of course, Lange.

The cleansing of the hands consists in withdrawing them from evil and in employing them in good works; the sanctification of the heart, in contending with impure desires, and in the cultivation of a holy disposition. The external and the internal must correspond; comp. Ps. xxiv. 4: ἁθῶς χερσὶ καὶ καθαρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ. Pott erroneously supposes the first expression to be a symbolical designation of μετάνοια, and denies its reference to the externa vitæ integritas (Carpzov). The reason why James names the *hands* is not only because they are the principal organa operandi, but also because that he, with ἐγγίξεν τῷ Θεῷ, does not think exclusively on prayer; see 1 Tim. ii. 8. On ἀγνίστατε καρδίας, comp. 1 Pet. i. 22; 1 John iii. 3. — ἁμαρτωλοὶ . . . δίψυχοι] This address, designating the present condition of the addressed, shows the necessity of μετάνοια; ἁμαρτωλοί, because instead of God, who chose them for His possession, they serve the lusts (ἡδοναῖς, ver. 1) of the κόσμος, corresponding to μοιχαλίδες, ver. 4; δίψυχοι, because they would at the same time be Christians. De Wette's explanation is too weak: *ye undecided* (between God and the world); Schneckenburger's remark: hic sensu latiore sumendum quam, i. 8, is incorrect, for διακρίνεσθαι there has its reason in the Christian giving his heart to the world instead of to God; see *Test. Aser.* III. p. 691: οἱ διπρόσωποι οὐ Θεῷ ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτῶν δουλεύουσι. — Calvin correctly remarks: non duo hominum genera designat, sed eosdem vocat peccatores et duplices animo.¹

Ver. 9. The μετάνοια required in ver. 8 does not take place without grief and mourning for guilt. The consciousness of the latter is the road to the former; therefore the summons now to this mourning: ταλαιπωρήσατε καὶ πενθήσατε καὶ κλαύσατε. The repetition of καί is an expression of emotion; ταλαιπωρεῖν] in the N. T. ἅπ. λεγ. (the adjective in Rom. vii. 24; Rev. iii. 17; the substantive in chap. v. 1; Rom. iii. 16), literally, *to suffer external hardships*, as in Micah ii. 4, is here used of the internal condition: *to feel unhappy, wretched*, as the adjective in Rom. vii. 27. Estius,

¹ Kern: As James considers man in reference to the divine grace as the receiver, so, on the other hand, he takes into account the free self-activity of man as the condition by which a relation of unity of man with God takes place.

Gagnejus, Grotius erroneously refer it to bodily castigations: affligite vosmet ipsos jejuniis et aliis corporis *σκληραγωγίαις* (Grotius); similarly Hottinger: sensum miseriae *claris indicibus prodite*; falsely also Beza: reprehendit *ἀναληγσίαν* in adversis. — *πενθήσατε καὶ κλαύσατε*] the same combination in Neh. viii. 9; 2 Sam. xix. 1; and in the N. T. Mark xvi. 10; Luke vi. 25; Rev. xviii. 15, 19: *wail and weep*. Grotius incorrectly explains *πενθήσατε*=lugubrem habitum induite, saccum et cilicia; there is not the slightest indication that James had in view the external signs of mourning in dress and the like. If the foregoing exhortations point to a change of the lusts and joy of worldly life into godly mourning (*τὴν κατὰ Θεὸν λύπην*, 2 Cor. vii. 10), this is still more definitely expressed in what follows, by which James passes from the outward manifestation (*γέλως . . . πένθος*) to the internal state (*χαρὰ . . . κατήφεια*). — *κατήφεια*] ἄπ. λεγ. (the adj., Wisd. of Sol. xvii. 4), literally, *the casting down of the eyes*, here indicates internal shame; in Plutarch, *Them.* 9, it is used synonymously with *δυσθυμία*. Compare with this the picture of the publican in Luke xviii. 13.

Ver. 10. Conclusion—carrying with it an O. T. colouring—of the exhortation, in which what has hitherto been said is summed up. — *ταπεινώθητε ἐνώπιον κυρίου*] *ταπεινώθητε* in reference to *ταπεινοῖς κ.τ.λ.*, ver. 6. — *κυρίου*] *i.e.* Θεοῦ (comp. ver. 7), not Χριστοῦ (Grotius). — *ἐνώπιον*] not = ὑπό, 1 Pet. v. 6: *ταπεινώθητε ὑπὸ τὴν . . . χεῖρα τοῦ Θεοῦ*, but expresses that the self-abasement is to take place in consciousness of the presence of God, who gives grace only to the humble; comp. Eccus. ii. 17: *οἱ φοβούμενοι κύριον . . . ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ ταπεινώσουσι τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν*. — *καὶ ὑψώσει ὑμᾶς*] is to be referred both to the present concealed and to the future manifested glory of the humble Christian (comp. chap. i. 9). The contrasted ideas *ταπεινοῦν* and *ὑψοῦν* often occur; see in the O. T. Job v. 11; Ezek. xxi. 26; in the N. T. Matt. xxiii. 12; Luke xiv. 11; 1 Pet. v. 6, and other places.

Ver. 11. Without any indication of a connection with the preceding, James passes to a new exhortation, which, however, is so far closely attached to the preceding, inasmuch as humiliation before God carries with itself humility toward our

brethren. From the fact that this exhortation, although decidedly earnest, has yet undeniably a milder character than the former, and that James uses here the address *ἀδελφοί*, whereas before it was *μοιχαλίδες, ἁμαρτωλοί, δίψυχοι*,¹ it is to be inferred that James now addresses, at least primarily, those who by the worldly ways of others felt induced to do those things against which he here exhorts them. — *μὴ καταλαλεῖτε ἀλλήλων*] *καταλαλεῖν* only here and in 1 Pet. ii. 12, iii. 16 (the substantive in 2 Cor. xii. 30; the adjective in Rom. i. 30; 1 Pet. ii. 1), *to speak in a hostile manner against one*; Luther, “to slander:” *ἀλλήλων*] *against each other*. Estius, Semler, Pott, Gebser, Hottinger incorrectly restrict the exhortation to teachers.² — *ὁ καταλαλῶν κ.τ.λ.* assigns the reason of the exhortation. The two ideas *καταλαλῶν* and *κρίνων* are indeed closely connected, but are not equivalent, since *καταλαλεῖν* presupposes *κρίνειν*; they are here indicated as distinct ideas by *ἥ*. — By the addition *ἀδελφοῦ* not only is the reprehensibleness of *καταλαλεῖν* emphasized (Schneckenburger: *jam hoc vocabulo, quantum peccatur καταλαλιάς, submonet*), but also the reason is given for the sentiment here expressed *καταλαλεῖ νόμον*. By *αὐτοῦ* added to *τὸν ἀδελφόν* this is brought out more strongly, whilst also the brotherly union is more distinctly marked than by the simple *ἀδελφοῦ*; incorrectly Bengel: *fraterna aequalitas laeditur obtrectando; sed magis judicando*. — *καταλαλεῖ νόμου καὶ κρίνει νόμον*] By *νόμος* the same law is here meant as in chap. i. 25, ii. 9, etc.: the law of Christian life, which according to its contents is none other than the law of love, to which *ἀδελφοῦ* and *τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ* already point. By reviling and condemning one's *brother*, the law of *love* itself is reviled and condemned, whilst it is thereby disclaimed as not lawfully existing, and, as may be added, its tendency to save and not to destroy is condemned (Lange). The explanation of de Wette, that there is here a kind of play of words, in which is contained *only* the idea of contempt and disregard of the

¹ Lange incorrectly observes that there is no reason to see here a transition from one class to another. But it is not here maintained that James has in view a sharply exclusive distinction of different classes of his readers.

² Wiesinger correctly says that we are not here to think of a contest between Jewish and Gentile Christians; Lange incorrectly asserts that the primary reference here is to the internal divisions of Judaism.

law, is unsatisfactory.¹ Grotius, Baumgarten, Hottinger quite erroneously understand by νόμος the Christian doctrine, and find therein expressed the sentiment, that whosoever imposes upon his neighbour arbitrary commandments designates the Christian doctrine as defective, and in so far sets himself up as its judge.² — With the following words: εἰ δὲ νόμον κρίνεις κ.τ.λ., the further consequence is added: *but if thou judgest the law, thou art not a doer of the law, but a judge.* — The particle δέ serves to carry on the thought: οὐκ εἰ ποιητὴς νόμου, i.e. thou thereby departest from the attitude which becomes thee; for the law is given to man that he might *do* it, but whosoever thinks he has right against the law, cannot be a doer of it, and consequently assumes a position which does not belong to him (Wiesinger), which position is, as the sequel says, ἀλλὰ κριτής. Baumgarten, Gebser, Neander, Wiesinger, Lange, and others supply the genitive νόμου to κριτής; incorrectly, for (1) this would make this sentence and the one preceding it tautological; (2) it dilutes the idea κριτής in its contrast to ποιητὴς νόμου; and (3) the sequel which is added to this idea κρίτης, adverts not to the judging of the law, but to the judging of the man. The meaning is: Whosoever judges the law constitutes himself a judge, giving a law according to which he judges or pronounces sentence upon his neighbour. But this is not the province of man. The following verse tells the reason why it is not so.

Ver. 12. *One is the lawgiver and judge, (namely) He who can rescue (save) and destroy.* The chief accent lies on εἰς, in opposition to men who presume to be judges. — ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ κριτής] The idea νομοθέτης is here introduced, because the

¹ The opinion of Stier is mistaken: "Whoever improperly and officiously notes and deals with the sins of other men, throws blame thereby upon the law of God, as if it were not sufficient; for he acts as if he supposed it necessary to come to the help of the law."

² Lange, in accordance with his view, supposes the reference to be to the Jewish ceremonial law, although he does not explain νόμος as equivalent to doctrine. Also Bouman thinks that James has here in view the judicia de aliena conscientia; but James does not indicate that among his readers disputes took place de sabbati veneratione, de licito vel illicito ciborum usu, etc. Augustine here arbitrarily assumes an attack upon the *Gentile Christians*. Correctly Laurentius: Is qui detrahit proximo, detrahit legi, quia lex prohibet omnem detractionem, sed et judicat idem legem, quia hoc ipso quod contra prohibitionem legis detrahit, judicat quasi, legem non recte prohibuisse.

judging belongs only to Him who has *given* the law, and is adduced against those who by judging their neighbour act as lawgivers, whereas their duty is to obey the given law. The explanation of Morus is false: legislator et judex est una eademque persona; and Theile infers from this something entirely foreign: unus est legislator . . . idem *utriusque* legis auctor: et severioris mosaicae et liberalioris christianae . . . isque etiam judex . . . et legitimus et idoneus, idque et utriusque legis et eorum qui alterutram sequuntur; of all which there is here no mention.—ὁ δυνάμενος σῶσαι καὶ ἀπολέσαι] serves for a more precise statement of the subject εἰς (so also Brückner, Lange, Bouman); it mentions who this One is, and in such a manner that it is also announced why He and He only can be νομοθέτης καὶ κριτής. Schneckenburger correctly observes: ὁ δυνάμενος . . . articulus appositionis signum, ad subjectum εἰς pertinentis grammaticæ; but incorrectly adds: ita autem ut, quoad sensum, melius in propriam resolvatur sententiam. Not only grammatically, but also according to the sense, ὁ δυνάμενος, etc., is to be most closely united to εἰς; therefore also Luther's translation: "there is one Lawgiver who is able to save and to condemn," is incorrect.¹—ὁ δυνάμενος] is not, with Schneckenburger, to be resolved into ὃ ἔξεστι, but is to be retained in its literal meaning. Bengel correctly remarks: nostrum non est judicare; praesertim cum exequi non possimus.—On σῶσαι, see chap. ii. 14; on ἀπολέσαι, particularly Matt. x. 28.—σὺ δὲ τίς εἶ] expresses the insignificance of man, in contrast to ὁ δυνάμενος κ.τ.λ. (Schneckenburger), thus: "Thou who hast no power to save and to destroy;" comp. Matt. x. 28.—The same question in Rom. xiv. 4, ix. 20.²—ὁ κρίνων] Schneckenburger: "thou appos. ad pron. σὺ; qui articuli hanc vim

¹ Most expositors in the interpretation of this passage have failed in precision, being satisfied with giving only its general meaning. They appear for the most part to regard ὁ δυνάμενος κ.τ.λ. as an attribute of ὁ νομοθετής (the Rec. omits καὶ κριτής); thus de Wette translates it: "One is the lawgiver and judge, who is able to save and to destroy." Wiesinger gives here only a paraphrase which is wanting in definiteness: "Judging us and our brethren belongs to Him alone (namely, to Him who as lawgiver is not under, but above the law), and He proves His exclusive right by His power to save and to destroy, with which He confirms His judicial sentence."

² Yet is the σὺ here to be understood in definite antithesis to another, namely to God, on which account also αὐτὸς is added. It has therefore a more independent

nescierunt, loco participii posuerunt ὅς κρινεῖς.” — τὸν πλησίον] without the personal pronoun, as in Mark xii. 33 ; Rom. xiii. 10, xv. 2. The *Rec.* τὸν ἕτερον perhaps arose from Rom. ii. 1.

Ver. 13. The apostrophe commencing with this verse, and continued until chap. v. 6, has a character plainly distinguished from other portions of the Epistle—(1) by ἄγε νῦν repeated ; (2) those addressed are neither directly designated as ἀδελφοί, as is elsewhere the case with James (with the single exception of chap. iv. 1 ff.), nor are yet characterized as members of the Christian church ; (3) only their forgetfulness of God is described, and their judgment is announced without any call being added to desist from their practice and be converted ; so that this apostrophe contains not the slightest exhortation to repentance, as is the case with those addressed in ver. 8 as ἁμαρτωλοί and δίψυχοι. All this is a sufficient proof that James has in view, as Oecumenius, Bede, Semler, Pott, Hottinger, and others have correctly remarked (differently Gebser, Schneckenburger, de Wette, Wiesinger ; Theile considers that Jewish Christians and Jews are here addressed), not so much the members of the church, as rather *the rich* (οἱ πλούσιοι, v. 1), of whom it is already said in chap. ii. 6, 7, that they oppress the Christians and blaspheme the name of Christ, and who are already, in chap. i. 10, opposed to “the brother of low degree.” The severe language against them in an Epistle directed to Christians is sufficiently explained from the fact that, with many among them, as follows from ver. 1 ff., the same forgetfulness of God had gained ground. Also the first section (vv. 13–17) is of such a nature that the fault therein expressed affected many of the readers not less than the arrogant Jews.¹ In this section, those addressed are at first characterized only according to their presumptuous security in their striving after earthly gain. — ἄγε νῦν] ἄγε, occurring in the N. T. only here and in chap. v. 1, is a *summons*, which also, with classical writers, is joined with the plural

meaning than in the passages adduced from the Epistle to the Romans. In this there is reason for the editors Lachmann, Tischendorf, and Buttmann here placing a comma after αἱ, but not in those other passages.

¹ Lange agrees with this in essentials, affirming that this section was principally addressed to the Jews ; whereby he certainly proceeds from the erroneous supposition that the Epistle was directed to the Jews generally by the hands of the Jewish Christians.

(Winer, p. 458 [E. T. 649]). — *νῦν*] serves not only for strengthening (de Wette, Wiesinger), but likewise for connection with what goes before. As in what follows there is no summons to *do* anything, some expositors suppose that *ἄγε νῦν* is designed only to excite attention; Grotius: jam ego ad vos; so also Pott, Theile: age, audite vos. Others supply a thought; thus Schulthess: *πῶς ποιεῖτε*, or *μὴ καλῶς ποιεῖτε*, and the like. De Wette thinks that the summons to lay aside the fault is indirectly contained in the reproof. Wiesinger suggests ver. 16 as the material for the designed imperative clause. It is more correct to assume that James has already here in view the imperative clause in chap. v. 1, — *κλαύσατε* . . *ἐπὶ ταῖς ταλαιπωρίαις ὑμῶν κ.τ.λ.*, — placed after *ἄγε νῦν* again resumed; thus Gebser, Hottinger, Schneckenburger; similarly Lange, according to whom *ἄγε νῦν* “refers to the announcement of the judgment, which comes out quite clear in chap. v. 1, but is here darkly and menacingly alluded to.” — *οἱ λέγοντες*] *ye who say*. *λέγειν* is to be retained in its usual signification; comp. chap. ii. 14. Theile, without reason, explains it: qui non solum cogitare soletis sed etiam dicere audetis. — *σήμερον καὶ αὔριον*] announces the precise duration of the intended journey — not *when* it should commence, but *how long* it should endure. With this explanation there is no difficulty in *καί*; otherwise *ἢ* (as the *Rec.* reads) must stand. In *καί* there lies a greater confidence (Theile), as according to it a definite plan is fixed upon also for the morrow. According to Wiesinger, different instances are here taken together, as in 2 Cor. xiii. 1 (so already Bengel: unus dicit hodie, idem aliusve cras, ut commodum est); according to this, *καί* would have to be explained: “and relatively” (see Meyer on that passage); but the indefiniteness contained therein does not suit the certainty with which these people speak. Lange’s meaning is unjustified: “that *αὔριον* is used for the undefined future subsequent to to-day.” — *πορευσόμεθα*] The indicative *we shall journey* expresses the certain confidence more strongly than the conjunctive *let us journey*; see critical remarks. — *εἰς τήνδε τὴν πόλιν*] Luther: *into this and that city*. This explanation is also in Winer, p. 146 [E. T. 201], who adduces for it *τήνδε τὴν ἡμέραν* in Plutarch, *Symp.* i. 6. 1; but Al. Buttmann (p. 90 [E. T. 103]), on the other hand, correctly

asserts that the pronoun in that passage, as everywhere among Greek authors, has its full demonstrative meaning, and that therefore it must be understood in James in the same sense; thus Schirlitz (p. 222) observes that the pronoun is here used *δεικτικῶς*; see also Lünemann's remark in Winer, ed. 7, p. 153; still it is not to be explained, with Schneckenburger: in hanc urbem, quae in conspectu quasi sita est; but, with Theile: certa fingitur, quae vero verie eligi potest. Those introduced as speaking mean each time a definite city; but as this differs with different persons, James could only indicate it in an indefinite manner, and he does so by *the* pronoun by which each time a definite city is pointed to; thus into *the* city which the traveller had chosen as his aim. By *πορεύεσθαι εἰς τ. πολ.* is indicated not merely the going into the city, but also the journey to the city in which they would remain. — *καὶ ποιήσομεν κ.τ.λ.*] *we will spend there a year*; *ποιεῖν* with a designation of time, as in Acts xv. 33, xx. 3, and other places; in the O. T. Prov. xiii. 23; see also Nicarch. *epigr.* 35 (Jacobs' ed.): *ἐν ταύτῃ πεποίηκα πολὺν χρόνον*. Luther incorrectly translates it: "and will continue there a year;"¹ for *ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα* is not the accusative of duration, but the proper objective accusative. The reading *ἕνα* fittingly expresses the confidence with which those introduced as speaking measure out their time beforehand, but not "their restless and unsteady conduct" (Lange). — *καὶ ἐμπορευσόμεθα καὶ κερδήσομεν*] Bengel: *καί* frequens; polysyndeton exprimit libidinem animi securi. — *ἐμπορεύεσθαι*] = *to traffic*; the final aim is designated by *κερδήσομεν*. That aim is worldly gain, which, in carnal security, is recognised as certain to be realized, so that it cannot fail. Kern correctly remarks: "Traffic is introduced only *by way of example*, as characterizing man's doings with reference to the *earthly* life as contrasted with the life in God."²

Ver. 14. James opposes to carnal security the uncertainty

¹ Stier correctly: "will spend there a year." The opinion of Lange, that "*ποιεῖν* along with a definition of time may likewise have indicated that the time in question is busily employed," is contradicted by 2 Cor. xi. 25.

² Lange indeed assents to this; but he thinks that the apostle, with a prophet's glance, evidently describes beforehand the fundamental trait of the diabolically excited worldliness of his people, as it afterwards became more and more developed.

of the future and the transitoriness of life. — οἵτινες] = ut qui; correctly Wiesinger: "Ye who are of such a character that," etc. — οὐκ ἐπίστασθε τὸ (τὰ) τῆς αὔριον] indicates the ignorance of what the next day will bring forth; comp. Prov. iii. 28, xxvii. 1: μὴ καυχῶ τὰ εἰς αὔριον, οὐ γὰρ γινώσκεις τί τέξεται ἡ ἐπιούσα: thus whether life will still last. What follows shows that James had this chiefly in view. — ποία γὰρ ἡ ζωὴ ὑμῶν;] γάρ gives an explanation of οὐκ ἐπίστασθε. — ποία] as in 1 Pet. ii. 20, *how constituted?* with the subsidiary meaning of nothingness. By the reading adopted by Buttinnann: οἵτινες οὐκ ἐπίστασθε τῆς αὔριον ποία ζωὴ ὑμῶν, the genitive τῆς αὔριον is dependent on ποία ζωή; thus, "Ye know not how your life of to-morrow is circumstanced." This idea is evidently feebler than the usual reading, for it is supposed that they yet live on the following day, which according to the other reading is denoted as doubtful. — ἀτμὶς γάρ ἐστε κ.τ.λ.] γάρ refers to the idea lying at the foundation of the preceding question, that life is entirely nothing. — ἀτμὶς (in the N. T. only here and in Acts ii. 19, in an O. T. quotation), literally *breath*; thus in Wisd. of Sol. vii. 25, synonymous with ἀπόρροια, has in the O. T. and the Apocrypha chiefly the meaning of *smoke*; thus Gen. xix. 28: ἀτμὶς καμίνου; so also Ecclus. xxii. 24; Ezek. viii. 11: ἀτμὶς τοῦ θυμιάματος; Ecclus. xxiv. 15: λιβάνου ἀτμὶς; see also Joel iii. 3; Ecclus. xliii. 4; in the classics it also occurs in the meaning of *vapour*. According to Biblical usage, it is here to be taken in the first meaning (smoke); thus Lange; Luther translates it by *vapour*; de Wette and Wiesinger, by *steam*. — ἐστε is stronger than the *Rec.* ἐστι; not only their life, but also *they themselves* are designated as a smoke; as in chap. i. 10 it is also said of the πλούσιος, that he shall fade away as the flower of the grass. — By ἡ πρὸς ὀλίγον . . . ἀφανιζομένη] the nature of the smoke is stated. — πρὸς ὀλίγον] = *for a little time*; ὀλίγον is neuter. — καί is to be explained: as it appears, so it *also* afterwards vanishes. In the corresponding passages, Job viii. 9, Ps. cii. 12, cxliv. 4, the transitoriness of life is represented not under the image of ἀτμὶς (Wiesinger), but of a shadow; differently in Ps. cii. 4.

Ver. 15. After the reason has been given in ver. 14 why it was wrong to speak as in ver. 13, this verse tells us how we

ought to speak. — ἀντὶ τοῦ λέγειν ὑμᾶς] is closely connected with οἱ λέγοντες, ver. 13, so that ver. 14 forms a parenthesis: *You who say, To-day, etc., instead of saying, ἐὰν ὁ κύριος κ.τ.λ.* — According to the reading ζήσομεν καὶ ποιήσομεν (instead of the *Rec.* ζήσωμεν καὶ ποιήσωμεν), it is most natural to refer καὶ ζήσομεν not to the protasis (as Tischendorf punctuates it), but to the apodosis (Lachmann and Buttmann; so also Wiesinger and Lange); for, first, it is grammatically more correct¹ to make only the conjunctive θελήσῃ dependent on εἰ, and to take the two indicatives together; and, secondly, from this construction the striking thought results, that not only the doing, but also the life, as the condition of the doing, is dependent on the will of God: it is accordingly to be translated: *If the Lord will, we shall both live and do this or that.* Correctly Wiesinger: "It appears to be more suitable to the sense to take ἐὰν ὁ κ. θελ. as a single condition, and not to complete it by a second." On the other hand, most expositors retain the reading of the *Rec.*, but they construe it differently. De Wette refers καὶ ζήσωμεν to the protasis, and takes the second καί as belonging to the apodosis: "If the Lord will and we live, we shall," etc.; so also Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Hornejus, Pott, and in general most expositors (also Winer, see critical remarks; on the contrary, Al. Buttmann, p. 311 [E. T. 362], prefers the indicative). Schneckenburger, indeed, refers καὶ ζήσωμεν to the protasis, but he connects it more closely with ἐὰν θελήσῃ: si Deo placet ut vivamus tum faciemus (similarly Grotius and Hottinger), which, however, cannot be linguistically justified. Bornemann (in Winer and Engelhardt's *N. krit. Journ.* VI. 1827) commences the apodosis with καὶ ζήσωμεν, and explains it: "Let us seek our sustenance." — Winer correctly observes that this explanation (which Brückner erroneously ascribes to this commentary) lacks simplicity, and is not supported by Biblical usage.² Bouman and others (see critical notes) refer ζήσωμεν naturally to the protasis, and ποιήσομεν to the apodosis. The

¹ The indicative future after εἰ is only found with absolute certainty in Luke xix. 40. See Al. Buttmann, p. 192 [E. T. 222].

² The opinion which Winer, in ed. 5, p. 331 f. [see E. T. 357], has expressed, that perhaps no apodosis is to be assumed, James only intending to say that we should always resolve never to speak decidedly, he has in later editions correctly relinquished.

meaning which this reading, unsupported by authorities, gives appears to be suitable, but yet is not correct, for it would be more correct to have said: *ἐὰν ζήσωμεν καὶ ὁ κύριος θελήσῃ*. — The indicative is to be preferred to the conjunctive in the apodosis, as a reciprocal call to definite action corresponds less with the context than the resolution to do something.

Ver. 16 expresses the conduct of those addressed in contrast to ver. 15; and in such a manner that the judgment upon that conduct is also expressed. — *νῦν δέ*] here, as frequently, where the reality in opposition to what is set before a person is emphasized; see 1 Cor. v. 11, xiv. 6. — *καυχᾶσθε ἐν ταῖς ἀλαζονείαις ὑμῶν*] By *ἀλαζονεία* is to be understood the arrogant self-reliance on the duration of earthly prosperity; see explanation of 1 John ii. 16. De Wette inaccurately explains it by *bragging*; Theile, by *arroganter facta, dicta*; Schneckenburger, by *pertness*; Wiesinger, by "those arrogant expressions affecting complete independence;" Lange, "by vain and arrogant self-exaltation;" and others differently. The plural is used, because such haughtiness manifests itself differently under different circumstances. — *ἐν*] here used differently than in chap. i. 9: the *ἀλαζονεῖαι* are not the object, but the reason of the boasting, that from which it proceeds (against Wiesinger), and *καυχᾶσθαι* is designated from the standpoint of James: that haughty and presumptuous language in ver. 13; comp. Prov. xxvii. 1. — With the following words: *πάντα καύχησις κ.τ.λ.*] James definitely expresses his reprobation. — *τοιαύτη*] not every boasting in itself (chap. i. 9), but *every* boasting which proceeds from *ἀλαζονεία*, which is founded in it and connected with it, is *wicked*.

Ver. 17. With the general sentence: *Whosoever knoweth to do good and doeth it not, to him it is sin*, James concludes what he has hitherto said. — *οὖν*] is used in the sense of conclusion, but indicates that the concluding thought is the result of what has gone before. — *καλὸν ποιεῖν*] belong together, dependent on *εἰδότε*; not "whosoever knows the good that is to be done," which would be to take *ποιεῖν* as an epexegetical infinitive. Wiesinger correctly remarks: "*καλόν* is not the idea of good, in which case the article would be put, but that which is fair, in contrast to an action which in its moral

nature is *πονηρόν*." That the discourse is concerning a sin of omission as such, to which this sentence is commonly referred (Bengel, Jachmann, and others), is rightly contested by de Wette and Wiesinger.¹—*ἁμαρτία αὐτῷ ἐστίν*] De Wette: "In the sense of reckoning; John xv. 22; Luke xii. 47 f." (so already Estius, also Schneckenburger, Wiesinger, and others). — *αὐτῷ* is here put, as frequently in the N. T., especially after the participle; comp. Matt. v. 40; see Al. Buttmann, p. 125 [E. T. 143]. With regard to the connection in which this sentence stands with the preceding, most expositors understand it as enforcing that to which James has formerly exhorted his readers, and refer *εἰδότε* to the knowledge which they have now received by the word of James. But against this is the objection, that if this expression be referred to all the previous exhortations (Estius: jam de omnibus satis vos admonui, vobis bene nota sunt), this would not be its proper place, because later on more exhortations follow; but if it is only referred to the last remark (Grotius: moniti estis a me, ignorantiam non potestis obtinere, si quid posthac tale dixeritis, gravior erit culpa; so also Pott, Theile, de Wette, Wiesinger), we cannot see why James should have added such a remark to this exhortation, as it would be equally suitable to any other. It is accordingly better to refer *εἰδότε* to the already existing knowledge of the subject just treated of; namely, the uncertainty of human life is something so manifest, that those who notwithstanding talk in their presumption as if it did not exist, as if their life were not dependent on God, contrary to their own knowledge, do not that which is seemly, but that which is unseemly, and therefore this is so much the more sin unto them.²

¹ "Since *καλόν* is the antithesis of *πονηρόν*, and not some positive good as beneficence, the defect of which is not *πονηρόν*, as de Wette correctly remarks, *μὴ ποιῶντι* does not merely signify a sin of omission, but the omission of *καλόν* is necessarily a doing of *πονηρόν*."

² When Lange, in arguing against this explanation, maintains that the word refers to the better knowledge of the readers, of evangelical behaviour in general, the definite connection of thought, in which here the general sentence is placed, is not properly considered by him.

CHAPTER V.

VER. 4. Instead of εἰσελθὲν the form εἰσελθῆναι is, with Tisch. and Lachm., to be preferred (on this form see Ph. Buttm. *Ausführl. Gr. Gr.* § 87, 8, Note 5, and Winer, p. 70 f. [E. T. 93]). — Ver. 5. The ὡς of the *Rec.* (after G K, etc.) before ἐν ἡμέρᾳ is, according to the testimonies of A B S, to be regarded as an explanatory addition, and, with Lachm. and Tisch., to be left out; so also Wiesinger, Lange, Brückner; Reiche and Bouman, however, judge otherwise. — Ver. 7. The *Rec.* after the second ὡς has the particle ὅν (so in S and many min.). Tisch. has omitted it, as, according to his statement, it is not found in A B G K, etc.; Lachm. has retained it (according to Tischendorf's note: ex errore); so also Buttmann, who adduces no authority for its omission. Already Griesbach regarded ὅν as suspicious. Lachm. and Tisch. have omitted ἐπεὶ; it is in A G K, etc., but is wanting in B S, etc.; its addition is easily explained, particularly as in the LXX. it is never wanting with πρῶτος καὶ ὕψιστος. — Ver. 9. The address ἀδελφοί, in A B, etc. (Lachm. Tisch.), stands before, in G S, etc. (*Rec.*), after κατ' ἀλλήλων; in K, etc., it is entirely wanting. Instead of κατακρίνει the simple verb κρινεῖ is, with Griesbach, Scholz, Lachm. Tisch., to be read, according to almost all authorities; so also the article ὁ before κρινεῖ (which in the *Rec.* is wanting, against almost all authorities) is to be adopted. — Ver. 10. The address according to the *Rec.* is ἀδελφοί μου (G K, S, etc.); in A B, etc., μου is wanting (Lachm. Tisch.); its correct position is after λαβετε, not after κακοπαθείας. — Instead of κακοπαθείας, S alone reads καλοκαγαθίας. — Before τῷ νόμῳ, B S, etc., have the preposition ἐν (Lachm.): a correction apparently for the sake of simplification. — S alone omits τῷ. — Ver. 11. It is difficult to decide whether we are to read, with the *Rec.* and Tisch., ἐπαμείνεταις (G K, etc.), or, with Lachm. and Wiesinger, ἐπαμείναιτας (A B S, etc.); yet the reading of the *Rec.* appears to have arisen from an endeavour to generalize the reference of the idea: Bouman certainly judges otherwise. — The *Rec.* ἔδοξε, after B* (teste Majors) K S, etc., Occumenius (Lachm.), is as a correction to be changed for the more difficult reading ἔδοξε, attested by A B G, etc. (Tisch.). — After ἔσται the *Rec.* has ὁ νόμος, according to A B

(in B, however, the article is wanting) **ς**, several min. vss. etc. (Lachm.); Griesbach regarded it as suspicious, and Tisch. has omitted it, after C K, many min. etc.; the omission can easily be explained from the fact that κυρίου directly precedes (so also Lange; Bouman wavers). — Ver. 12. The reading εἰς ὑπόκρισιν (Ed. Steph., after G K, etc.) has probably arisen from the original ὑπὸ κρίσιν, these two words being taken as one, and then a preposition placed before them. — Ver. 14. The αὐτόν after ἀλείψαντες is wanting in B; it was omitted as being self-evident. — Lachm. and Tisch. have, after A and some min., left out the article τοῦ before κυρίου; yet G K **ς**, many min. etc., attest its genuineness; in B also κυρίου is wanting; nevertheless Buttmann has received it, but without the article. — Ver. 16. The reading of the *Rec.* is ἐξομολογεῖσθε ἀλλήλοις τὰ παραπτώματα, καὶ εὐχεσθε κ.τ.λ. (Tisch.); instead of which A B read ἐξομολογεῖσθε ὁὖν ἀλλήλοις τὰς ἁμαρτίας καὶ προσεύχεσθε κ.τ.λ. (Lachm.); for ὁὖν also K **ς**, several min. Vulg. etc. testify: accordingly ὁὖν is to be considered as genuine; yet precisely this ὁὖν might mislead one to find in this verse an extension of the thought going before, and on this account to change the new expressions with the preceding, and thus, instead of παραπτώματα, to put again ἁμαρτίας, and instead of εὐχεσθε, for which also **ς** testifies, and to put again προσεύχεσθε, whereas the opposite change cannot be well explained. — Ver. 18. The *Rec.* ὑετὸν ἔδωκεν is found in B G K, almost all min. etc. (Tisch.); A, on the contrary, has ἔδωκεν ὑετὸν (Lachm.); so also **ς**, but with τὸν before ὑετὸν. It is possible that this change was occasioned by the following ἐβλάστησεν τὸν καρπὸν. — Ver. 19. Tisch. has omitted the pronoun μου after ἀδελφοί, yet the most important authorities, A B K **ς**, etc., attest its genuineness. — **ς** alone has, instead of the simple τῆς ἀληθείας, the combination τῆς ὁδοῦ τῆς ἀληθείας. — Ver. 20. The reading γινώσκετε in B is occasioned by the address ἀδελφοί. Instead of the *Rec.* ψυχὴν, after G K, many min. (Tisch.) Lachm. and Buttm. have adopted ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ. This αὐτοῦ is found in A **ς**, some min. vss. etc. B has it, probably by an error of the scribe, not after ψυχὴν, but after θανάτου. — B has as subscription Ἰακώβου; A: Ἰακώβου ἐπιστολή; others differently.

Ver. 1. That here the same persons are meant as in chap. iv. 13, and not others, has already been observed on that passage: by ἄγε νῦν, the ἄγε νῦν of that passage is again resumed.¹ — οἱ πλούσιοι] see chap. i. 10, ii. 6, 7; the

¹ Whilst de Wette, Wiesinger, and others understand by the rich here addressed Christians, Stier has correctly recognised that such are here addressed "who are outside of the Christian church," namely, those already mentioned

expression is not to be taken in a symbolical, but in its literal meaning (against Lange). — *κλαύσατε ὀλολύζοντες κ.τ.λ.*] *κλαύσατε* is not here to be understood, as in chap. iv. 9, of the tears of repentance (Estius, Hornejus, Laurentius, de Wette, and others), for there is no intimation of a call to repentance. Correctly Calvin: falluntur qui Jacobum hic exhortari ad poenitentiam divites putant; mihi simplex magis denuntiatio judicii Dei videtur, qua eos terrere voluit absque spe veniæ.¹ James already sees the judgment coming upon the rich, therefore the call *κλαύσατε*; that for which they should weep are the *ταλαιπωρίαι* which threatened them.² — The *imperative* is not here used instead of the future (Semler: stilo prophetico imperat, ut rem certissimam demonstret, *flebitis*; Schneckenburger: aoristus imperativi rem mox certoque eventuram designat), but is to be retained in its full force. The imperative expresses not what they will do, but what they shall even now do, because their *ταλαιπωρίαι* are nigh. The union of the imperative *κλαύσατε* with the participle *ὀλολύζοντες* is not an imitation of the frequent combination of the finite verb with the infinite absolute of the same verb in the Hebrew (Schneckenburger), since here *two different* verbs are united together (de Wette, Wiesinger); also *ὀλολύζειν* has not the same meaning as *κλαίειν*, but, as expressive of a more vehement affection, is added for the sake of strength. *ὀλολύζειν* frequently in the O. T., Isa. xiii. 6, xiv. 31, xv. 3 (*ὀλολύζετε μετὰ κλαυθμοῦ*), and in other places, and indeed chiefly used in reference to the impending divine judgment (Isa. xiii. 6: *ὀλολύζετε, ἐγγὺς γὰρ ἡμέρα κυρίου*). Calvin: est quidem et suus poenitentiae luctus, sed qui mixtus consolatione, non ad ululatum usque procedit. — *ἐπὶ ταῖς ταλαιπωρίαις ὑμῶν*] *for your miseries*, i.e. *the*

in chap. ii. 6, 7, who practise violence on *you*, the confessors of the Lord of glory. His remark is also striking: "To them James predicts as a prophet, and entirely in the style of the old prophets, the impending judgment."

¹ Wiesinger indeed concedes the point to Calvin, but only in words; for "the design of James, as in the case of the prophets of the O. T., is certainly nothing else than that of moving them by such a threat if possible yet to turn." If James has this design in these words, he has certainly not indicated it.

² That James by this intends the end of the Roman Empire (Hengstenberg), is proved neither from the Epistle of Peter, nor from Rev. xviii., nor from any other indications in this Epistle.

miseries destined for you, namely, the miseries of the judgment; see ver. 3: ἐν ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις; ver. 7: ἡ παρουσία τοῦ κυρίου. Thomas Aquinas, Grotius, Mill, Benson, Michaelis, Stier, Lange, Bouman refer this to the then impending destruction of Jerusalem; they are so far right, as the destruction of Jerusalem and the last judgment had not as yet been distinguished in representation;¹ but it is incorrect to refer it to the *judgment* itself, rather than to the *miseries which will precede the advent of Christ*; or with Hottinger, to find here only a description of the inconstancy of prosperity. — ταῖς ἐπερχομέναις] not sc. ὑμῶν (Luther: your misery which will come upon you; so also de Wette, Lange, and others), but *the impending, already threatening miseries*; comp. Eph. ii. 7.

Ver. 2. Description of the judgment destroying all riches: ὁ πλοῦτος ὑμῶν σέσηπεν] In a prophetic manner the future is described as having already taken place (Hottinger, Schneckenburger, de Wette, Wiesinger, Bouman, and others). By πλοῦτος is not here—as Estius, Raphelius, Wolf, Semler, Gebser, Bouman on account of σέσηπεν think—to be understood such things (fruit, etc.) as undergo literal rotteness, but is to be understood generally; and σέσηπε as a *figurative* expression denotes generally the destruction to which riches is abandoned. The explanation of Calvin is incorrect: hic immensa divitum rapacitas perstringitur, dum supprimunt, quicquid undecunque possunt ad se trahere, ut inutiliter in arca computrescat (similarly Hornejus, Laurentius, Grotius, Bengel, Theile²); James “does not here intend to give the natural result of covetousness, and thus the reason of the judgment, but the effect of the judgment breaking forth” (Wiesinger).³ James describes the reason from ver. 4 and onwards. — The verb σήπω, to *cause to rot*, in the passive

¹ Wiesinger: “The question whether James thought on the destruction of Jerusalem or on the advent of Messiah is an anachronism; for to him both of these events occur together.”

² Theile, who takes the preterite in its literal sense, thus explains the passage: divitiæ a vobis coacervatæ perierunt nulla vestra aliorumque utilitate . . . atque ideo vos coram iudice perdent. Ita causa additur istarum calamitatum perferendi, gravi oppositione eorum quæ per absurda et impia ipsorum avaritia jani facta sunt eorumque, quæ pro justâ Dei retributione adhuc fient.

³ In agreement with his explanation of πλούσιαι, Lange understands also πλοῦτος in a symbolical sense, namely, the externalized Judaistic righteousness—“connected, of course, with worldly prosperity.” His assertion is also incorrect,

and second perfect to *corrupt*, is in the N. T. ἄπ. λεγ., but often occurs in the LXX.; comp. Job xxxiii. 21, xl. 7; as here in a general sense (= φθείρεσθαι) it is found in Eccus. xiv. 19.—καὶ τὰ ἰμάτια ὑμῶν κτ.λ.] The general idea πλοῦτος is here and in what follows specialized.—σητό-βρωτος] *moth-eaten*, in the N. T. ἄπ. λεγ., does not occur in the classics, but in Job xiii. 20, LXX.: ὥσπερ ἰμάτιον σητόβρωτον; comp. Isa. li. 8. σκωληκόβρωτος in Acts xii. 23 is similarly formed.

Ver. 3. Continuation of the description of the judgment: ὁ χρυσοῦς ὑμῶν καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος] a further specification of riches. κατίωται] in the N. T. ἄπ. λεγ. (Eccus. xii. 10), equivalent to the simple verb, only in a stronger signification. Correctly Hornejus: loquitur populariter, nam aurum proprie aeruginem non contrahit; so in the Epistle of Jeremiah 11, where it is said of gold and silver images: οὐ διασώζονται ἀπὸ τοῦ; see also in the same, ver. 23. With too minute accuracy, Bretschneider justifies the use of the verb here, that we are to think on gold and silver vessels which are alloyed with *corrupt* (similarly Bouman). It is no less incorrect, with Pott, to weaken the idea κατίωται, that it is to be understood only of amisso auri et argenti splendore, de mutato auri colore ex flavo in viridem; against this is ὁ ἰός directly following. Wiesinger thinks that because κατίωται is here used figuratively, it is a matter of indifference that rust does not affect gold; but the ideas must suit each other in the figurative expression. The verb is rather here to be justified by the fact that since rust settles on metals generally, James in his vivid concrete description did not scrupulously take into consideration the difference of metals, which, however, is not to be reckoned, with de Wette, as a “poetical exaggeration.”¹ —καὶ ὁ ἰός αὐτῶν (namely, τοῦ χρυσοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀργύρου), εἰς μαρτύριον ὑμῶν ἔσται] Most expositors agree with the explanation of Occumenius: καταμαρτυρήσει ὑμῶν, ἐλέγχων τὸ that here not the last judgment, but “the natural immanent judgments of sinners” are meant.

¹ Lange strangely thinks that it is here intended to bring out the unnatural fact that the princes of Israel are become rebellious and companions of thieves: “It is as unnatural for gold and silver to be eaten up with rust, as for the glory of Israel to be as corrupted as the glory of other nations corrupts, which may be compared to base metals.”

ἀμετάδοτον ὑμῶν; accordingly, "The rust which has collected on your unused gold and silver will testify to your hardness, and that to your injury = κατ' ὑμῶν." But since the preceding κατίωται describes the judgment overtaking earthly glory, ἰός can only be understood with reference to it; correctly Wiesinger: "the rust is a witness of their own destruction; in the destruction of their treasures they see depicted their own."¹ Augusti superficially explains it: "will convince you that all riches are transitory." After their riches are destroyed, the judgment seizes upon themselves; therefore καὶ φάγεται τὰς σάρκας ὑμῶν. The subject is ὁ ἰός, "the corroding rust seizes also them, and will eat their flesh" (Wiesinger). The figurative expression, although bold and peculiar, is not unsuitable, since ἰός is considered as an effect of judgment. φάγεται] is not the present (Schneckenburger), but in the LXX. and N. T. the ordinary future for ἔδεται; see Buttmann, *Ausf. gr. Sprach.* § 114 [E. T. 58], under ἐσθίω; Winer, p. 82 [E. T. 110]. The object τὰς σάρκας ὑμῶν belonging to φάγεται is neither = ὑμᾶς (Baumgarten), nor yet in itself indicates "bloated bodies" (Augusti, Pott: corpora lautis cibis bene pasta); also Schneckenburger lays too much stress on the expression, explaining it: emphatice, quum ejusmodi homines nihil sint nisi σάρξ. According to usage, αἱ σάρκες denotes the fleshy parts of the body, therefore the plural is also used with reference to one individual; comp. 2 Kings ix. 36: καταφάγονται οἱ κύνες τὰς σάρκας Ἰεζάβελ; further, Lev. xxvi. 29; Judith xvi. 17; Rev. xix. 18, 21; in definite distinction from bones, Micah iii. 2, 3. It is to be remarked that in almost all these passages the same verb is united with the noun.² The context shows that what is spoken of is not "the consuming of the body by care and want" (Erasmus, Semler, Jaspas, Morus, Hottinger, Bouman), but the punishment of

¹ Stier incorrectly understands by rust "the guilt of sin which cleaves to mammon."

² Although σάρξ in itself indicates only flesh according to its separate parts, yet the expression is here chosen in order to name in a concrete manner that which is carefully nourished by the rich. According to Lange, αἱ σάρκες are "the externals of religious, civil, and individual life;" and the thought of James is that "the rotten fixity described as rust in its last stage transforms itself in the fire of a revolutionary movement!"

the divine judgment (Calvin, Grotius, Pott, Schneckenburger, de Wette, Wiesinger, and others). The words *ὡς πῦρ* may be united either with what goes before or with what follows. Most expositors prefer the first combination; yet already A, the Syriac version (where *ὡς* is wanting), and Oecumenius in his commentary put a stop after *ὑμῶν*. Grotius, Knapp, and Wiesinger, considering this construction as correct, accordingly explain it: *tanquam ignem opes istas congessetis*; Wiesinger states as a reason for this, that without the union with *ὡς πῦρ* the words *ἐθσαυρίσατε κ.τ.λ.* give too feeble a meaning. But this is not the case, since the chief stress rests on *ἐν ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις* (so also Lange); also James could not well reckon riches as a fire of judgment. Besides, in the O. T. the judgment is frequently represented as a devouring consuming fire, which was sufficient to suggest to James to add *ὡς πῦρ* to *φάγεται*; see Ps. xxi. 10, LXX.: *καταφάγεται αἰτῶνς πῦρ*; Isa. x. 16, 17, xxx. 27 (*ἡ ὀργὴ τοῦ θυμοῦ ὡς πῦρ ἔδεται*); Ezek. xv. 7; Amos v. 6.¹ The sentiment is: After the judgment has overtaken the wealth of the rich, it will attack themselves. Kern gives the sentiment in an unsatisfactory manner: "The destruction of that which was everything to the rich will punish him with torturing sorrow, as if fire devoured his flesh." That the *ταλαιπωρίαι* already draw near is said in ver. 1, and James by the words *ἐθσαυρίσατε ἐν ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις* indicates that the judgment is close at hand, so that *this time* is the *last days* directly preceding the judgment; accordingly, the heaping up of treasure appears as something so much the more wicked. Estius, Calvin, Laurentius, and others incorrectly supply to the verb the word *ἐργήν* in accordance with Rom. ii. 5 (comp. Prov. i. 18). The object to be supplied to *θησαυρίζειν*, which is often used absolutely (comp. Luke xii. 21; 2 Cor. xii. 14; Ps. xxxviii. 7), is contained in the verb itself, and also follows from what has preceded. The preposition *ἐν* is not used instead of *εἰς*, and *ἐσχαται ἡμέραι* are not the last days of life (Wolf: *accumulavistis divitias extremæ vitæ parti provisuri*; Morus: *cumulastis opes sub finem vitæ vestrac*), but

¹ Pott: *Aerugo describitur, quasi invadat membra divitum, eaque quasi, ut metallum, arrodât atque consumat et quidem . . . ὡς πῦρ, tanquam flamma membra quasi circumlabens carnemque lento dolore depascens.*

the last times which precede the advent of Christ (ver. 7), not merely the final national judgment (Lange). Jachmann most erroneously takes the sentence as interrogative: Have ye collected your (*spiritual*) treasures on the day (*i.e.* for the day) of judgment, in order to exhibit them?

Ver. 4. Description of the sins of the rich to the end of ver. 6, by reason of which they become liable to the judgment. The first sin mentioned is their *injustice toward those who work for them*. — ἰδοὺ] an interjection often occurring in the N. T. to draw attention to the object in question. — τῶν ἐργατῶν] emphatically put first; comp. the proverb: ἄξιός ἐστι ἐργάτης τοῦ μισθοῦ αὐτοῦ (1 Tim. v. 18). τῶν ἀμειψάντων (ἀμῆν = θερίζειν, in the N. T. ἄπ. λεγ.) τὰς χώρας ὑμῶν] χώρα = *fields*, as in Luke xii. 16; John iv. 35. — In the following words, expositors conjoin ἀφ' ὑμῶν with ἀπεστερημένος (ἀποστερέω, *to keep back*, Plato, *Gorg.* 519c, so also LXX. Mal. iii. 5; Ecclus. xxxiv. 27); whilst they either explain ἀπό = ὑπό, or, as Wiesinger, retaining the distinction of the prepositions, observes, that "not the direct origin, but the proceeding of the act of robbery from them is indicated" (comp. Winer, p. 332 [E. T. 464]; Al. Buttmann, p. 280 [E. T. 326]). But it would be more suitable to join ἀφ' ὑμῶν to κράζει (so also Lange); the kept back hire crieth from the place where it is; comp. Gen. iv. 10: φωνὴ αἵματος . . . βοᾷ . . . ἐκ τῆς γῆς; Ex. ii. 23: ἀνέβη ἡ βοή αὐτῶν πρὸς τὸν Θεὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ἔργων. The chief stress is put on ὁ ἀπεστερημένος; the same kind of conjunction as in chap. iv. 14. The injury of our neighbour, by diminished payment or withholding of the wages due to him, was expressly forbidden in the law; comp. Lev. xix. 13; Deut. xxiv. 14; Jer. xxii. 13; particularly also Mal. iii. 5: ἔσομαι μάρτυς ταχὺς ἐπὶ . . . τοὺς ἀποστεροῦντας μισθὸν μισθωτοῦ; comp. also Job xxxi. 38, 39; Tob. iv. 14; Ecclus. xxxiv. 27 (ἐκχέων αἷμα ὁ ἀποστερῶν μισθὸν μισθίου). — κράζει] Calvin: vindictam quasi alto clamore exposcit; comp. Gen. iv. 10. — In the following words it is stated that the cry has been heard by God; comp. on this expression, particularly Ps. xviii. 7; Isa. v. 9: ἠκούσθη εἰς τὰ ὦτα κυρίου σαβαὼθ ταῦτα; besides Gen. xviii. 21, xix. 13; Ex. ii. 23 f., iii. 9, xxii. 22 f.; 2 Sam. xxii. 7, and other passages. By the designation of God as κυρίου σαβαὼθ, His power as the Lord of the heavenly hosts

is emphasized; the reference occurring in the O. T. likewise to the earthly hosts is here evidently not admissible (against Lange); it is the transference of the Hebrew מִסְבָּךְ הָאֵלֹהִים, often occurring in the LXX., particularly in Isaiah; in other places the LXX. have κύριος παντοκράτωρ, 2 Sam. v. 10, vii. 27, or κύριος τῶν δυνάμεων, Ps. xxiv. 10. — James, in his graphic style, instead of the general word labourer, mentions specially the *reapers*, not on account of their multitude (de Wette), but because their laborious work in the sweat of their brow most strongly represents the work which is worthy of wages. Thus Calvin not incorrectly observes: quid est indignius quam eos, qui panem ex suo labore nobis suppeditant, inedia et fame conficere? It is more remote to explain it thus: "because selfish hard-heartedness is here most sharply stated, when even the joy of the harvest does not induce them to give to the poor their hardly-earned portion" (Brückner).¹

Ver. 5. A second sin of the rich, namely, their *luxurious and gluttonous life*, which forms a sharp contrast to the toilsome life of the labourers. — ἐτρυφήσατε . . . ἐσπαταλήσατε] synonymous terms: τρυφᾶν, in the N. T. ἄπ. λεγ., in the LXX. Neh. ix. 25; Isa. lxvi. 11 (Isa. lvii. 4). σπαταλᾶν, only here and in 1 Tim. v. 6; in the LXX. Ezek. xvi. 49; Amos vi. 4, and other places. Hottinger thus states the distinction between them: τρυφᾶν deliciarum est et exquisitæ voluptatis; σπαταλᾶν luxuriæ atque prodigalitatis; comp. the description of the rich man in Luke xvi. 19. These and the following verbs are in the aorist, not "because the conduct of the rich is described as viewed from the day of judgment" (1st ed. of this commentary; similarly also Wiesinger), for "this does not suit the present ἀντιτάσσεται" (Gunkel), but because James will mark the present conduct as a constant occurrence. The addition ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς] forms a sharp contrast to the preceding εἰς τὰ ὦτα κυρίου σαβαώθ. Whilst the Lord *in heaven* hears the complaints of the unjustly oppressed, the rich *on earth* enjoy their lusts, undisturbed by the wrath of God, which shall be revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men (Rom. i. 18). — ἐθρέψατε τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν] does

¹ Here also Lange comes in with his symbolical interpretation, understanding by the harvest "the time when the theocratic seed of God in Israel has ripened unto the harvest of God," and by the reapers "the apostles and first Christians."

not add a new idea to the preceding, but brings forward the fact that the rich in their luxurious living find the satisfaction of the desires of their heart. Luther's translation: "Ye have pastured your heart," does not sufficiently correspond to the idea *τρέφειν*; something bad is evidently denoted by it. Since *τρέφειν* is literally "to make firm, thicken," it is best here to render it by "to *saliare*." Other expositors translate it by "to *fatten*;" Lange, by "to *make fat*." τὰς καρδίας is equivalent neither to τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν nor to ὑμᾶς; comp. Acts xiv. 17, and Meyer on that passage;¹ Winer, p. 141 [E. T. 195].—ἐν ἡμέρᾳ σφαγῆς] corresponds to the preceding ἐν ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις. These last times are designated by James with reference to the rich as ἡμέρα σφαγῆς, *the day of slaughter*, because the sentence of death, which they have incurred, will be directly executed upon them at the approach of the παρουσία of Christ (comp. ver. 7) and the judgment; so also Wiesinger, Brückner, Lange, only the latter arbitrarily understands by the day of slaughter, the day of Israel's judgment, comprehending the time from the death of Christ to the destruction of Jerusalem. This designation of the day of judgment is also found in the O. T., particularly Jer. xii. 3, LXX.: ἄγνισον αὐτοὺς εἰς ἡμέραν σφαγῆς αὐτῶν; xxv. 34. By the reading ὥς before ἐν ἡμέρᾳ σφ. a comparison occurs, namely, with the beasts who are to be slaughtered, so that Pott after ὥς directly supplies θρέμματα. De Wette explains it: "Ye have pastured your hearts as in the day of slaughter; *i.e.* according to the comparison with beasts, who on the day on which they are to be slaughtered feed carelessly and devour greedily;" so also Bouman. But the idea "carelessly and greedily" is introduced; also the comparison is unsuitable, since beasts on the day of slaughter do not eat more greedily than on other days. Other expositors, as Wolf, Augusti, Hottinger, and others, take ἐν as equivalent to εἰς; Hottinger: corpora vestra aluistis, tanquam pecora, quae saginari solent ad mactationem; but this change of prepositions is arbitrary. Several expositors, as Calvin, Beza, Grotius, Laurentius, Bengel, and others, understand by ἡμέρα σφαγῆς *the day of sacrifice*; Calvin addit similitudinem, sicut etc., quia solebant in sacri-

¹ Meyer: "The heart is filled with food, inasmuch as the sensation of being filled, the pleasant feeling of satisfaction, is in the heart."

ficiis solemnibus liberalius vesci quam pro quotidiano more; the meaning then is: tota vita vestra est quasi perpetuum epulum ac festum continuum (Laurentius); but that expression never elsewhere occurs in *this* signification. Had James thought on the sacrificial feast or the like, he would have expressed it more definitely; besides, by this explanation the reference to the judgment is entirely wanting, and only the luxurious life is described; but this contradicts the character of the whole section, for if James, from ver. 4 onwards, assigns the reason of *ταλαιπωρίαί*, he does this not without an earnest pointing to the judgment and its nearness.

Ver. 6. The third sin, *the persecution of the just*, by which the ungodliness of their disposition is most strongly indicated. By *δίκαιος* is not meant Christ (Oecumenius,¹ Bede, Grotius, Lange), for, on the one hand, there is nothing in the context to indicate this, and, on the other hand, the present *ἀντιτάσσεται* is opposed to it; also, if this were the case, the perfect must be put instead of the aorist, as here only one deed is mentioned, not, as before, a repetition of deeds. Wiesinger, in an unsatisfactory manner, explains *τὸν δίκαιον* by *the innocent*. Not merely the unjust conduct of the *πλούσιοι* founded on covetousness is here intended to be described, but the reason of persecution is implied in the expression *τὸν δίκαιον* itself; comp. Wisd. of Sol. ii. 12–20; as also 1 John iii. 12. The singular is to be taken collectively, and the expression absolutely, as in ver. 16. Several expositors assume that the verbs *κατεδικάσατε*, *ἐφονεύσατε*, are not meant in their literal sense; but evidently without reason. *κατεδικάσατε* shows that here primarily judges are meant; yet the accusers, if these are to be distinguished from them, are not to be considered as excluded, since their accusation points to nothing else than to a sentence of condemnation.² The

¹ Oecumenius, indeed, says: ἀναντιρρήτως τό, ἴσον. τ. δικ., ἐπὶ τὸν Χριστὸν ἀναγίγνεται; but he thinks that James likewise understands by this: τοὺς ἀλλοῦς τοὺς τὰ ἔμοιζα παρὰ τῶν Ἰουδαίων παύοντας; and he closes with the remark: ἵσως δὲ καὶ πρεφητικῶς τὸ περὶ αὐτὸν ὑπεμφάνει πάθος.

² Wiesinger correctly observes that *φονεῖν* is here not to be explained according to Eccius. xxxi. 21: φονεύει τὸν πλησίον ὁ ἀφαιρούμενος τὴν ἐμβύωσιν; but he maintains without reason that the death of the just is not to be considered as the direct design of the *πλούσιοι*, but only as the result of their oppressions. Also de Wette thinks that the killing is not to be understood literally, but of

asyndeton sharpens the climax, which is contained in the addition of the second verb to the first. Bouman directs attention to the paronomasia between *κατεδικάσατε* and *δίκαιον*. — *οὐκ ἀντιτάσσεται*] opposes the calm patience of the just to the violence of the wicked: *he doth not resist* (comp. Acts xviii. 6; Rom. xiii. 4; Jas. iv. 6). Schneckenburger: *οὐκ ἀντιτ.* sine copula et pronomine ponderose additur. The present is explained from the fact that in what goes before not a single instance, but the continued conduct of the rich is described, and opposed to this is placed the similarly continued conduct of the *δίκαιοι*. Lange, by the reference of *τὸν δίκαιον* to Christ, misinterprets the force of the present, arbitrarily attributing to the verb the meaning: “He stands no longer in your way; He does not stop you (in the way of death); He suffers you to fill up your measure.” — It is unnecessary to supply in thought *ὅς* or *γάρ*; also *οὐκ ἀντιτάσσεται* is not to be converted into *οὐ δύναται ἀντιτάσσεσθαι* (Pott). For the correct construction there is no reason, with Bentley, for conjecturing *ὁ κύριος* instead of *οὐ*, or, with Benson, to take the sentence as interrogative, and to supply *ὁ κύριος*. The object of the addition of the clause is not so much the more strongly to mark the violent conduct of the rich, as rather by implication to point to the proximity of the vengeance of God, who interests Himself in the suffering just, as is definitely asserted in the previous verses. With this verse are to be compared, besides the already cited passage in Wisd. of Sol. ii. 12–20, particularly Amos ii. 6, 7, v. 12 (*καταπατοῦντες δίκαιον*), viii. 4, which testify for the correctness of the explanation here given.

Ver. 7. Exhortation to the brethren to patient waiting, on to ver. 11. — *μακροθυμήσατε οὖν*] *μακροθυμῆν*; literally, to be long-suffering to those who do an injury; opposed to *ὀξύθυμῆν*; see Meyer on Col. i. 11. On its distinction from *ὑπομένειν*, see on 2 Tim. iii. 11; here the meaning appears to run into that of *ὑπομένειν*; comp. the following *μακροθυμῶν* and ver. 8; but it is here well put, in order to exclude the feeling of disquieting doubt; comp. Heb. vi. 12, 15. — *οὖν*] refers to the preceding sentiment (also to that indicated in *οὐκ*

extreme violence, deprivation of liberty, and the like. This interpretation is, however, occasioned by the assumption that the rich are Christians.

ἀντιτάσσεται ὑμῖν), that the judgment is near (de Wette, Wiesinger¹). — ἀδελφοί] contrast to the πλούσιοι. — Patience is to endure ἕως τῆς παρουσίας τοῦ κυρίου. On ἕως as a preposition, see Winer, p. 418 [E. T. 590]. As regards the meaning which ἕως here has, Schneckenburger correctly observes: non tempus tantum sed rem quoque indicat, qua ἡ θλίψις μακροθύμως toleranda tollatur. By παρουσία τοῦ κυρίου, according to constant Christian usage, is to be understood the advent of *Christ* (Wiesinger, Brückner, Lange, Bouman), not the coming of *God* (Augusti, Theile, de Wette); although James by κύριος chiefly designates God, yet he also uses this name for Christ, chap. ii. 1. — The exhortation is strengthened by the reference to the patient waiting of the husbandman (the same figure in Eccles. vi. 19). As he waits (ἐκδέχεται) for the precious fruit of the earth, being patient with reference to it, until it has received the early and latter rain, so should the Christian *patiently* wait for the precious fruit of his labour, for which he hopes. The καρπός is designated as τίμιος, because it is its preciousness which occasions the μακροθυμία. By μακροθυμῶν ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ἐκδέχεται is more definitely stated, since that verb does not necessarily include in itself the idea here intended. On ἐπ' αὐτῷ = in reference to the καρπός, comp. Luke xviii. 7. — ὁ γεωργός is not the subject of λάβῃ (Luther), but ὁ καρπός (Stier). — The question whether we are here to read ἕως with or without ἄν (see critical remarks) cannot be answered from the usage of the N. T.; see Matt. x. 11, and, on the other hand, Luke xii. 59. According to Tischendorf, the authorities are decisive for the omission of ἄν. See Al. Buttmann, p. 198 f. [E. T. 230 f.].² — (ὑετὸν) πρώϊμον καὶ ὄψιμον] the autumnal and spring rains; see Deut. xi. 14; Jer. v. 26; Joel ii. 23; Zech. x. 1: not "the morning and the evening rain" (Luther); see Winer's *Realwörterb.* under "*Witterung*."³

¹ Schneckenburger correctly observes: ad iudicii divini propinquitatem respicit; but the remark is erroneous: neque eam initias, si quis pariter versui G hunc jungat, ita ut exemplo τῆς μακροθυμίας ad eandem animi lenitatem usque servandam excitentur.

² It is peculiar that in the parallel sentences, Ex. xv. 16, Jer. xxiii. 20, at first ἕως stands and then ἕως ἄν.

³ In a peculiar manner Occumenius allegorizing says: πρώϊμος ὑετός, ἡ ἐν νύκτι μετὰ δακρύων μετάνοια· ὄψιμος, ἡ ἐν τῇ γῆρα.

Ver. 8. Resumption and completion of the exhortation. The *καί* after *μακροθυμήσατε* is explained from the reference to *ὁ γεωργός*. — By the asyndeton addition *στηρίζετε τὰς καρδίας ὑμῶν*, the conduct which is the condition of *μακροθυμία* is emphasized. Not weak, but strong hearts are able to cherish *μακροθυμίαν*; on this expression, comp. 1 Thess. iii. 13; 1 Pet. v. 10. The strengthening is indeed, on the one hand, an affair of God; but, on the other hand, it depends on the man himself, just like everything else that is obtained by the man surrendering himself to the love of God working in him. — *ὅτι ἡ παρουσία κ.τ.λ.*] Calvin: Ne quis objiceret, nimium differri liberationis tempus, occurrit dicens, prope instare Dominum, vel (quod idem est) ejus adventum appropinquasse. — On the expression, comp. especially 1 Pet. iv. 7.

Ver. 9. To the preceding exhortation a new one is added: *μὴ στενάζετε, ἀδελφοί, κατ' ἀλλήλων*, since with impatience in affliction a sinful irritability of the sufferers toward each other is easily conjoined. *στενάζειν κατὰ* is to be understood neither of invidia alienis bonis ingemiscence (Grotius), nor of impatientia mutuis lamentationibus augenda; it rather denotes the gemitus accusatorius (Estius, Calvin, and others), without, however, necessarily supposing a provocatio ultionis divinae malorumque imprecatio (Theile, and similarly Calvin, Morus, Gebser, Hottinger, Lange, and others) united with it. Augusti incorrectly renders it: "Give no occasion to one another for sighing." — From *κατ' ἀλλήλων* it does not follow that the *πλούσιοι* (ver. 1 ff.) belong to the Christian church (against de Wette and Wiesinger); the reference here is rather to the conduct of Christians toward each other under the oppressions to which they were exposed by the *πλούσιοι*.¹ — Since *στενάζειν κατὰ* involves the judging of our brother, and is opposed to that love of which Paul says: *μακροθυμεῖ, χρηστεύεται, . . . οὐ παροξύνεται, οὐ λογίζεται τὸ κακόν . . . πάντα ὑπομένει*, James adds the admonition *ἵνα μὴ κριθῇτε* (comp. Matt. vii. 1), and then, for the purpose of strengthening

¹ Hornejus: Quos ad manifestas et gravissimas improborum injurias fortiter ferendas incitarat, eos nunc hortatur, ut etiam in minoribus illis offensis, quae inter pios ipsos saepe subnascuntur, vel condonandis vel dissimulandis prompti sint. Contingit enim, ut qui hostium et improborum maximas saepe contumelias et injurias aequo animo tolerant, fratrum tamen offensas multo leviores non facile ferant.

the warning, points to the nearness of the Judge. The *κριτής* is none other than the Lord, whose *παρουσία* is at hand. As His nearness should comfort Christians in their distress, so it should likewise restrain them from the renunciation of love to one another (comp. chap. ii. 13). Incorrectly Theile: non tam, qui impatientius ferentes certo puniat (quamquam nec hoc abesse potest), quam: qui vos ulciscatur, ut igitur ne opus quidem sit ista tam periculosa impatientia (so also de Wette); for *ὁ κριτής* evidently points back to *ἵνα μὴ κριθῇτε*.¹ — On *πρὸ τῶν θυρῶν ἔστηκεν*] i.e. *he stands already before the door*, on the point of entering, see Matt. xxiv. 33; Mark xiii. 29 (Acts v. 23).

Vv. 10, 11. Old Testament examples adduced for the sake of strengthening the exhortation to patience. — *ὑπόδειγμα λάβετε*] *ὑπόδειγμα* (instead of the classical *παράδειγμα*) here, as frequently in the N. T. and LXX., *an example, a pattern*; in sense equivalent to *ὑπόγραμμα*, 1 Pet. ii. 21; *τύπος*, 2 Thess. iii. 9 (*εἰς τὸ μιμεῖσθαι*). — *τῆς κακοπαθείας καὶ τῆς μακροθυμίας*] *κακοπάθεια*, in the N. T. *ἄπ. λεγ.*, is not synonymous with *μακροθυμία* = vexationum patientia (Hottinger), but denotes *suffering, affliction*, synonymous with *ξυμφοραί*, Thuc. vii. 77; in 2 Mace. ii. 26, 27, it is used in a somewhat attenuated sense. Schneckenburger arbitrarily combines it with the following words into *one* idea: *τῆς ἐν κακοπαθείᾳ μακροθυμίας*; by this combination the point of *κακοπάθεια* is weakened. On the sentiment, see Matt. v. 12. — By the relative clause *οἱ ἐλάλησαν (ἐν) τῷ ὀνόματι κυρίου*, belonging to *τοὺς προφήτας*, is indicated that the prophets, as servants of God, stand opposed to the world, even as believing Christians do. The dative *τῷ ὀνόματι* (see critical remark) is not to be explained, with Meyer (see on Matt. vii. 22), “by means of the name, i.e. that the name of the Lord satisfied their religious consciousness and was the object of their confession;” but, as is commonly understood: *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι κυρίου* (Wiesinger: *jussu et auctoritate*; de Wette: “by virtue of the name”); this is evident from the fact that the Hebrew יְהוָה בְּיָמֵינוּ is translated in the LXX. not only

¹ Wiesinger, indeed, recognises that the statement is added as a warning; but yet he thinks that the chief idea is: “Ye may with perfect calmness leave the judgment to Him” (so also Lange).

by ἐν (τῇ) ὄν. κυρίου (Dan. ix. 6) or by ἐπὶ τῷ ὄν. (Jer. xx. 9), but also by λαλεῖν τῷ ὀνόματι κυρίου (Jer. xlv. 16).¹

Ver. 11 assigns a new reason for the exhortation: *Behold, we count happy them who endure*; the μακαρίζειν of them is founded on the consciousness that God does not leave them unrewarded (Matt. v. 12), which is clearly manifested in the life of Job, on which account James, in conclusion, refers to him. By the reading τοὺς ὑπομένοντας the idea is to be taken quite generally; whereas by the better attested reading τοὺς ὑπομείναντας it is to be limited to sufferers of the past time; the latter is more in conformity with the context (Wiesinger). The "restricted reference" to τοὺς προφῆτας (Grotius, Baumgarten, Pott, Hottinger, Theile) is not to be justified. — τὴν ὑπομόνην Ἰωβ ἡκούσατε] ὑπομόνη is not = perpessio (Storr), but the patience which Job displayed both in his afflictions and in his replies to the contradictions of his friends; Tob. ii. 12–15 (Vulg.; the text in the Greek ed. Tisch. reads differently) refers to the same example; also in Ezek. xiv. 14, 20, Job is mentioned as a righteous man along with Noah and Daniel. — ἡκούσατε] may refer specially to the reading in the synagogue, but may be understood generally. — καὶ τὸ τέλος κυρίου] is, according to the connection given above, to be referred to and explained of the issue in which the sufferings of Job terminated: finem, quem a Domino habuit; so that κυρίου is the genit. subj. or causae (2 Cor. xi. 26); thus most expositors explain it. Others, as Augustin, Bede, Lyra, Estius, Thomas, Pareus, Wetstein, Lange, assume that by τέλος κυρίου the death of Christ is to be understood. Against this is not only the concluding clause, but also the context, which points to the end to which the pious sufferer is brought by the mercy of God, and on account of which he is accounted happy; apart altogether from the improbability that James should connect the example of Christ immediately with that of Job.² — With the reading εἶδετε this can only be

¹ Also in union with other verbs the LXX. translate עָלָם sometimes by the simple dative; thus Ex. xxxiii. 19, xxxiv. 5: καλῶν τῷ ὀνόματι; Jer. xii. 16: ἐμνύειν τῷ ὄν. μου; see also Isa. xli. 25, xliii. 7, xlv. 4. — Though this usage were not decisive, yet it would be most natural to explain the dative τῷ ὀνόματι = *through the name*, by which the name of the Lord would be conceived as the objective power by which the prophets were induced to speak.

² In a most unsatisfactory manner Lange seeks to justify this, by observing

understood of "indirect seeing, namely, of clear perception by hearing" (de Wette). The better attested reading, however, is ἴδετε, and it can only be regarded as an oversight that Wiesinger translates this ἴδετε by "audiendo cognovistis," as it is not the indicative, but the imperative. The imperative is here certainly surprising, and was on that account changed into the indicative. Tischendorf has connected ἴδετε with what goes before, and then it is to be explained: *Ye have heard of the patience of Job, look also at the end which the Lord gave.* The connection with what follows would, however, be more suitable: *Ye have heard of the patience of Job and the end which the Lord gave; see (i.e. recognise from this) that the Lord is πολὺσπλαγχνος and οἰκτίρων.* Such an imperative, introduced ἀσυνδέτως, is not foreign to the style of James; comp. chap. i. 16, 19. With the *Receptus*, and also with the union of ἴδετε with τὸ τέλος κυρίου, ὅτι is not a particle of proof = *for* (de Wette, Wiesinger, Lange), since in the preceding words no thought is expressed which would be confirmed by this clause;¹ but an objective particle *that*; a twofold object is joined to the verb, the second definitely bringing forward the point indicated in the first; arbitrarily Theile translates it *and certainly*.—The subject to ἔστιν is at all events ὁ κύριος, which, according to the most important authorities, is to be retained as genuine.—πολύσπλαγχνος] is a complete ἀπ. λεγ. "coined after the Hebrew מְרַחֵם" (Wiesinger), which the LXX. translate πολυέλεος, see Ex. xxxiv. 6, etc.; in Eph. iv. 32, 1 Pet. iii. 8, is the related expression εὐσπλαγχνος.—οἰκτίρων] in the N. T. only here and in Luke vi. 36 (comp. Col. iii. 12: σπλάγχνα οἰκτιροῦ), frequently in O. T.; comp. with this passage, particularly Ex. xxxiv. 6; Ps. ciii. 8; and Eccus. ii. 7 ff.—The reference to the mercy of God was to impress the readers, in their sufferings, with the hope that the reward of their patience would not fail them, and to encourage them to steadfast endurance.

that James "did thus connect the example of Abraham with that of Rahab." It is evidently inappropriate to place together Job as "the great sufferer of the Old Testament," with Christ as "the great sufferer of the New Testament."

¹ In a peculiar but highly arbitrary manner, Lange refers ἐν to what directly precedes, uniting it with τὸ τέλος κυρίου in the sense that it is thereby specified what Christ was able to effect in entering upon His sufferings.

Ver. 12. The warning contained in this verse against swearing is in no other connection with the preceding than what lay in the conduct of the readers. The Epistle of James was occasioned by manifold faults in the churches, and therefore he could not conclude without referring to the inconsiderate swearing prevalent among them. It is as little indicated that he refers to the warning against abuse of the tongue (chap. iii.; Hornejus) as that this swearing arose from impatience, against which the preceding verses are directed (against Gataker, Wiesinger). How important this warning was to the author the words *πρὸ πάντων* δέ show, by which it is indicated that it of all other exhortations is to be specially taken to heart. James assigns the reason of this in the words *ἵνα μὴ ὑπὸ κρίσιν πέσῃτε*. — The warning *μὴ ὀμνύετε* is more exactly stated in the words *μήτε τὸν οὐρανόν, μήτε τὴν γῆν, μήτε ἄλλον τινὰ ὄρκον*. It is to be noticed that swearing *by the name of God* is not mentioned. This is not, as Rauch along with others maintains, to be considered as included in the last member of the clause, but James with *μήτε ἄλλον τινὰ ὄρκον* has in view only similar formulæ as the above, of which several are mentioned in Matt. v. 35, 36. Had James intended to forbid swearing by the name of God, he would most certainly have expressly mentioned it; for not only is it commanded in the O. T. law, in contradistinction to other oaths (Deut. vi. 13, x. 20; Ps. lxxiii. 12), but also in the prophets it is announced as a token of the future turning of men to God (Isa. lxxv. 16; Jer. xii. 16, xxiii. 7, 8). The omission of *this oath* shows that James in this warning has in view only the abuse, common among the Jews generally and also among his readers, of introducing in the common every-day affairs of life, instead of the simple yea or nay, such asseverations as those here mentioned; so that we are not justified in deducing from his words an absolute prohibition of swearing in general,¹ as has been done by many expositors of our Epistle,

¹ Rauch says: "One should give honour to the truth, and freely and without prejudice recognise that according to the clear words of the text here, as in Matt. v. 34 ff., a general and unconditional prohibition of all oaths is expressed." To this it is replied that honour is given to the truth when one is not taken by appearance, but seeks without prejudice to comprehend the *actual meaning*. In opposition to the view that Christ by the prohibition of oaths, in Matt. v. 33 ff., has in view the *ideal* condition of the church, Wiesinger with justice

and especially by Occumenius, Bede, Erasmus, Gebser, Hottinger, Theile, de Wette, Neander (comp. also Meyer on Matt. v. 33 ff.); whereas Calvin, Estius, Hornejus, Laurentius, Grotius, Pott, Baumgarten, Michaelis, Storr, Morus, Schneckenburger, Kern, Wiesinger, Bouman, Lange,¹ and others, refer James' prohibition to light and trifling oaths. The use of oaths by heaven etc., arises, on the one hand, from forgetting that *every* oath, in its deeper significance, is a swearing by God; and, on the other hand, from a depreciation of the *simple* word, thus from a frivolity which is in direct contrast to the earnestness of the Christian disposition. The construction of ὁμνύειν with the accusative τὸν οὐρανόν, etc., is in accordance with classical usage, whereas the construction with ἐν and εἰς (in Matt.) is according to Hebraistic usage. — To the prohibition James opposes the command with the words ἦτω δὲ ὑμῶν τὸ ναὶ καὶ καὶ τὸ οὐ οὐ, which do not express a new exhortation (Schneckenburger), but the contrast to ὁμνύειν τὸν οὐρανόν, etc. Most expositors (Theophylact, Occumenius, Zwingli, Calvin, Hornejus, Grotius, Bengel, Gebser, Schneckenburger, Kern, Stier, and others) find here a command to *truthfulness* expressed; but incorrectly, as in the foregoing μὴ ὁμνύετε a reference to the contrast between truth and falsehood is not in question at all. De Wette correctly explains it: "let your yea be (a simple) yea, and your nay (a simple) nay" (so also Estius, Piscator, Hottinger, Neander, Wiesinger, and others; comp. Al. Buttmann, p. 142 [E. T. 163]).² Not the sentiment itself, but its form only is different from Matt. v. 37 (see Tholuck and Meyer *in loco*). — The form ἦτω (1 Cor. xvi. 22; Ps. civ. 31, LXX.) instead of ἔστω is found in classical Greek only once in Plato, *Rep.* ii. p. 361 (see Buttmann, *Ausführl. Gr.* § 108, Remark 15 [E. T. 49]; Winer, p. 73 [E. T. 95]). —

observes: "It can no longer be said, in reference to our passage, that only an ideal requirement is expressed calculated for entirely different circumstances than those which were in reality, for there can be no doubt that James demands for his requirement complete practice under the actual and not the ideal circumstances of his readers."

¹ Lange by this understands more exactly: "conspiracy, which is a swearing accompanied by hypothetical imprecations or the giving of a pledge." Moreover, his view of the design of the Epistle misled him to find the reason of this prohibition in Jewish zeal to enter into conspiracies.

² Lange would unite the two points together; and he is so far not in the wrong, as James presupposes truthfulness.

ἵνα μὴ ὑπὸ κρίσιν πέσῃτε] assigns the reason why one should not swear, but should be satisfied with the simple yea or nay. According to its meaning, the expression is equivalent to ἵνα μὴ κριθῇτε, ver. 9. There is nothing strange in πίπτειν ὑπό]; comp. 2 Sam. xxii. 39; Ps. xviii. 39. By κρίσις is to be understood judicium condemnatorium. The swearing forbidden by James subjects to the judgment, because it is founded on and in every instance promotes frivolity.

Ver. 13. *If one among you suffers, let him pray; if one is of good courage, let him sing psalms.* This exhortation stands in no assignable connection with what goes before. The sufferings to which ver. 7 ff. refer are those of persecution; but *κακοπαθεῖν* has here an entirely general meaning. On account of the following *εὐθυμεῖ*, many expositors (Beza, Semler, Rosenmüller, Hottinger) incorrectly explain *κακοπαθεῖν* = “*to be dejected*” (Vulgate: *tristatur quis*). It rather means *to be unfortunate, to suffer*, in which *aegritudo animo* is certainly to be considered as included. Pott incorrectly takes it as equivalent to the following *ἀσθενεῖν*, which is only a particular kind of *κακοπαθεῖν*. — *προσεύχεσθαι*] denotes prayer generally; there is no reason to limit it here to petition. — *ψάλλειν*] literally, to touch, used particularly of stringed instruments; in the LXX. the translation of פָּנָה and שָׁמַח = *to sing psalms*; comp. particularly 1 Cor. xiv. 15. Both joy and sorrow should be the occasion of prayer to the Christian. The form of the sentence is the same as in 1 Cor. vii. 18, 27. Meyer: “The protases do not convey a question, being in the rhetorically emphatic form of the hypothetical indicative;” see Winer, p. 152 [E. T. 213], p. 255 [E. T. 355], p. 478 [E. T. 678].¹

Ver. 14. From the general *κακοπαθεῖν* a particular instance, that of sickness, is selected. *ἀσθενεῖν*] = *aegrotare*, as in Matt. x. 8, Luke iv. 40, and many other passages; the opposite: *ὑγιαίνειν*. — By *ἀσθενεῖ τις* James hardly means *any* sick person, but only such a person who under the burden of bodily suffering also suffers spiritually, being thereby tempted in his faith. — The sick man is to call to himself the pres-

¹ Lachmann has after the sentence containing the hypothesis put a mark of interrogation. Al. Buttmann, p. 195 [E. T. 226], rightly declares this to be unnecessary, but has in his edition of the N. T. adopted the same punctuation.

byters of the congregation. *προσκαλεσάσθω*] in the middle expresses only the reference to *himself*; not that the call is by others, which is here taken for granted. — *τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους τῆς ἐκκλησίας*] the *presbyters of the congregation*, namely, to which the sick man belongs. It is arbitrary to explain *τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους* as *unum ex presbyteris* (Estius, Hammond, Laurentius, Wolf); the *whole* body is meant (Wiesinger), as the article shows; not some of its members, as Theile considers possible. The following words: *καὶ προσευξάσθωσαν κ.τ.λ.*, express the object for which the presbyters are to come; they are to pray over him, anointing him in the name of the Lord. The prayer is the chief point, “as also ver. 15 teaches: *ἡ εὐχὴ τ. πίστεως κ.τ.λ.*” (Wiesinger); the anointing is the act accompanying the prayer. *ἐπ’ αὐτόν*] is generally inaccurately explained as equivalent to *pro eo, pro salute ejus*; *ἐπί* with the accusative expresses figuratively the reference to something, similarly as the German *über* with the accusative; thus *κλαίειν ἐπὶ τινα*, Luke xxiii. 28. How far the author thought on a local reference, he who prayeth bending over the sick, or stretching forth his hands over him, cannot be determined; see Acts xix. 13. — With the prayer is to be conjoined the anointing of the sick, for what purpose James does not state. According to Mark vi. 13, the disciples in their miracles of healing applied it, when at the command of Jesus they traversed the Jewish land; but the reason of their doing so is not given, nor at a later period is there any mention of it in the miracles of the apostles.¹ Probably James mentions the anointing with oil only in conformity with the general custom of employing oil for the refreshing, strengthening, and healing of the body,² since he refers the miracle not to the anointing, but to the prayer, and, presupposing its use, directs that the presbyters should unite prayer with it, and that they should perform it *ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι (τοῦ) κυρίου*, that is, in a believing and trustful mention of the name of Christ (less probably of God). That *ἐν τῷ ὀν. κυρ.*

¹ Meyer *in loco* considers this anointing, as also the application of spittle on the part of Jesus Himself, as a conductor of the supernatural healing power, analogous to the laying on of hands. But in this the distinction is too little observed, that according to general custom oil, but not spittle, and the laying on of hands, was applied to the sick.

² See Herzog's *Real-Encycl.* on Oel, Oelung, Salbe.

cannot mean *jussu et auctoritate Christi* is evident, because there is no express command of Christ to employ it. Gebser incorrectly unites this particular with *προσευξάσθωσαν*; Schneckenburger with both verbs; it belongs only to *ἀλείψαντες* (de Wette, Wiesinger). The question why the presbyters should do this is not to be answered, with Schneckenburger: *quia τὸ χάρισμα ἰαμάτων* (1 Cor. xii. 9) *cum iis communicatum erat*; for, on the one hand, it is an arbitrary supposition that the presbyters possessed that *χάρισμα*, and, on the other hand, there is here no mention of it; incorrectly also Pott: *quia uti omnino prudentissimi eligebantur, sic forte etiam artis medicae peritissimi erant*. Bengel has given the true explanation: *qui dum orant, non multo minus est, quam si tota oraret ecclesia*; and Neander: "the presbyters as organs acting in the name of the church."¹

Ver. 15 mentions the result of the prayer conjoined with the anointing. — *καὶ ἡ εὐχὴ τῆς πίστεως*] That the prayer of the presbyters must proceed from faith was not asserted in the preceding, but was evidently presupposed; it is now directly characterized as such. *τῆς πίστεως* is gen. subj.: *the prayer which faith offers*; inaccurately Schneckenburger: *preces fide plenae*. *πίστις* is used here in the same signification as in chap. i. 16; it is sure confidence in the Lord, in reference to the case in question. Grotius, Gomarus, Schneckenburger, Theile, and others define the prayer more closely, as that of the presbyters *and of the sick man*. On the other hand, Wiesinger refers *ἡ εὐχὴ τ. π.* to *προσευξάσθωσαν*, accordingly the intercession of the presbyters; so also de Wette. This is correct; it is, however, to be observed that James has certainly supposed as self-evident the prayer of the sick man who called the elders. The following words: *σώσει τὸν κάμνοντα*, state the effect of the prayer of the presbyters. — *τὸν κάμνοντα*] takes up again *ἀσθενεῖ τις*. *κάμνειν*, in the N. T. except here only in Heb. xii. 3 in a figurative sense, has even with classical writers very commonly

¹ It is well known that the Catholic Church, besides Mark vi. 13, specially appeals to this passage in support of the sacrament of extreme unction. Chemnitz, in his *Examen Conc. Trid.*, has already thoroughly shown with what incorrectness they have done so. Even Cajetan and Baronius doubt whether James here treats of that sacrament, as he does not speak of the sick unto death, but of the sick generally. See Herzog's *Real-Encycl.* on the word *Oelung*.

the meaning *to be sick*. — *σώσει*] equivalent to *will recover*. This meaning is required by reference to *τὸν κάμνοντα*, and to the context generally; the word occurs in the same signification in Matt. ix. 22; Mark v. 23; John xi. 12, and elsewhere. — By the following clause: *καὶ ἐγερῇ αὐτὸν ὁ κύριος*, what is said is more exactly specified; the prayer of faith effects *σώζειν*, by which the Lord (apparently Christ) on its account helps; *ἐγείρειν*, *to raise up from the sick-bed*, see Mark i. 31, etc.; not “to raise up from sickness” (Lange; “to cause him to recover,” de Wette); the word never occurs in this meaning in the N. T. — A particular case is added to the general. *κὰν ἁμαρτίας ἢ πεποιηκώς*] *κὰν* is not, as is done by most expositors, but against linguistic usage,¹ to be resolved by *and if*, but by *even if* (so also Lange). By the sins here meant are such as formed the special reason of the sickness. Accordingly, the meaning is: even if he has drawn his sickness upon himself by special sins (unsatisfactorily Lange: “if his sickness has become by them very severe”). By *ἢ πεποιηκώς* the effect of the sins is represented as existing. — The apodosis *ἀφεθήσεται αὐτῷ* expresses that even in this case the healing will not fail. The forgiveness of sins is here meant, which is confirmed by the removal of the special punishment produced by the particular sins. The explanation of Hammond is evidently entirely erroneous: non tam a Deo, quam a Presbyteris, qui aegroto peccata ipsis confitenti . . . absolutionem dare tenentur. As regards the construction of the sentence, *κὰν πεποιηκώς* may be joined to what goes before, and *ἀφεθήσεται* considered as an asyndeton addition: *and the Lord will raise him up, even if he has committed sins . . . (for) it will be forgiven him*. But the usual construction, according to which *ἀφεθήσεται* is simply the apodosis to *κὰν κ.τ.λ.*, is to be preferred on account of the close connection of ideas; thus: *even if he hath committed sins, it will be forgiven him*; by which the idea is included in *ἀφεθήσεται αὐτῷ*, that he will be healed of his sickness. — *τὸ πεποιηκέναι* is to be supplied from the preceding to

¹ In no passage of the N. T., except perhaps Luke xiii. 9, is the *καὶ* in *κὰν* the simple copula uniting two sentences, but it has everywhere the meaning *though, even*. The N. T. usage is here in conformity with the classical; see Pape on the word *καὶ*.

ἀφελήσεται (Bengel, Theile, Wiesinger). -- The promise (σώσει . . . ἐγερῇ) so positively expressed by James is founded on his confidence in the Lord, who hears believing intercession, so that it is not in vain. It is certainly surprising that James gives this assurance without any restriction. Although we cannot say, with Hottinger: *si certus et constans talium precum fuisset eventus, nemo unquam mortuus esset*, since the nature of the condition, on which James makes the event dependent, is not considered; on the one hand, it is self-evident that true πίστις includes the humble πλὴν οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ θέλω ἀλλ' ὡς σύ (Matt. xxvi. 39); and, on the other hand, it is to be observed that although James here evidently speaks of bodily sickness and its cure, yet he uses such expressions as point beyond the sphere of the corporeal to the spiritual, so that even when the result corresponds not to the expectation in reference to the bodily sickness, yet the prayer of faith does not remain unanswered in the higher sense.¹

Ver. 16 annexes a new thought to what has been said, which is, however, as the strongly attested οὖν shows, in close connection. From the special order James infers a general injunction, in which the intervening thought is to be conceived that the sick man confessed his sins to the presbyters for the purpose of their intercession; Christians generally are to practise the same duty of confession toward each other. It is incorrect, with Chrysostom (*de sacerdot.* i. iii.) and several ancient and other expositors, to refer the injunction contained in this verse to the above-mentioned relation of the presbyters and the sick to each other, and accordingly to paraphrase it, with Pott: ὑμεῖς ἀσθενούντες ἐξομολογεῖσθε τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις τὰ παραπτώματα ὑμῶν καὶ ὑμεῖς πρεσβύτεροι εὐχέσθε ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀσθενούντων; for by this not only is violence done to the language, but also an intolerable tautology arises. ἀλλήλοις can only be referred to the relation of individual believers to each other, so that Cajetan correctly says: *nec hic est sermo de confessione sacramentali*. Some expositors

¹ It must be designated as arbitrary when Lange understands this passage also as symbolical, and thus interprets it: "If any man as a Christian has been hurt, or become sick in his Christianity, let him seek healing from the presbyters, the kernel of the congregation. Let these pray with and for him, and anoint him with the oil of the Spirit; such a course, wherever taken, will surely restore him, and his transgressions will be forgiven him."

incorrectly restrict the general expression *παραπτώματα* to such sins which one commits against another; Wolf: de illis tantum peccatis sermo est, quae alter in alterum commisit, quorumque veniam ab altero poscit; Bengel: aegrotus et quisquis offendit, jubetur confiteri; offensus orare. The passage treats not of human, but of the *divine* forgiveness; and thus of sins not as offences against our neighbour, but as violations of the law of God.¹ — καὶ εὐχεσθε ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων] Το ἐξομολόγησις intercession for one another is to be conjoined; indeed, the former takes place in order that the latter may follow. The contents of the prayer is naturally the divine forgiveness, but the aim to be attained thereby is ὅπως ἰαθῇτε. The word ἰασθαι is in the N. T. used both literally and figuratively (Heb. xii. 13; 1 Pet. ii. 24). After the example of several expositors (Hottinger, de Wette, Wiesinger), the first meaning has hitherto in this commentary been ascribed to ἰαθῇτε, on account of the connection of this verse with what goes before; but since among ἀλλήλοις are certainly to be understood not only the sick, and James indicates by nothing that his injunction refers only to them, it is more correct to take ἰαθῇτε here, in its proper reference to παραπτώματα, in a figurative sense (Estius, Carpzov, Grotius, Gebser, and others); whether James likewise thought on a bodily healing taking place in the cases occurring (Schneckenburger, Kern) must remain undetermined. — It is to be remarked that the prayer of the presbyters does not exclude the common intercession of the members of the church, and that the efficacy attributed to the latter is not less than that attributed to the former. — πολὺν ἰσχύει δέησις δικαίου ἐνεργουμένη] is added by James for the purpose of strengthening the above exhortation; the asyndeton connection is with him not remarkable. The stress is on πολὺν ἰσχύει, consequently it stands first. δίκαιος, equivalent to the Hebrew צַדִּיק, is, according to the Christian view of James, he who in faith performs the works of νόμος ἐλευθερίας. — With regard to ἐνεργουμένη, expositors have introduced much that is arbitrary. Most take the participle as an adjective belonging to δέησις, and then attempt to explain the expression δέησις ἐνεργουμένη. Occumenius leaves the word itself unexplained, but he lays stress on the point that the prayer of the

¹ Lange primarily understands by this "the sins of the Judaizing disposition."

righteous is only then effectual when he, for whom it is offered, *συμπράττη διὰ κακώσεως πνευματικῆς* with the suppliant. Michaelis explains it: *preces agitante Spiritu sancto effusae*; Carpzov: *δέσεις διὰ πίστεως ἐνεργουμένη*; Gebser understands prayer in which the suppliant himself works for the accomplishment of his wish; similarly Calvin: *tunc vere in actu est oratio, quum succurrere contendimus iis, qui laborant*. According to the usual explanation, *ἐνεργουμένη* is assumed to be synonymous with *ἐνεργής* or *ἐνεργός* (*ἐκτενής*, Luke xxii. 44; Acts xii. 5), "strenuous," "intentus," "earnest," etc., and this qualification of the prayer of the righteous man is attached to *πολὺν ἰσχύει* as its condition; Luther: "if it is earnest" (so Wiesinger, and similarly Erasmus, Beza, Gataker, Hornejus, Grotius, Wolf, Baumgarten, Hottinger, Schneckenburger, Theile, Bouman, and others). This explanation, however, has not only, as Wiesinger confesses, N. T. usage against it, but this qualification cannot be taken as the condition of *πολὺν ἰσχύει*, but is rather the statement of the characteristic nature of the prayer of the righteous man. It would be more correct to adhere to the *verbal* meaning of the participle (so Pott, whose paraphrases, however: *πολὺν ἰσχύει [δύναται] ἐνεργεῖν*, or: *πολὺν ἰσχύει καὶ ἐνεργεῖ δέσεις*, are arbitrary), and to explain it: the prayer of the righteous man availeth much, *whilst it works* (not: "if it applies itself to working," de Wette), *i.e. in its working*. That it does work is assumed; that, besides working, it *πολὺν ἰσχύει*, which James brings forward and confirms by the following example of Elias.¹

Vv. 17, 18. James, wishing to show in the example of Elias the power of prayer, observes beforehand on the objection that, owing to his peculiar greatness (see Ecclus. xlviii. 1-15), the example of Elias was inapplicable to ordinary men, that *Ἐλίας ἄνθρωπος ἦν ὁμοιοπαθὴς ἡμῖν. — ἄνθρωπος*] is not here pleonastic (Schneckenburger), but denotes the point on which James insists, which is still more strengthened by *ὁμοιοπαθὴς ἡμῖν*. This idea contains no reference to the sufferings which Elias had to endure (Laurentius, Schneckenburger, Bouman), but signifies only *of like disposition and nature*; see Meyer on Acts xiv. 15;

¹ Lange translates: "which is inwardly effectual (working)," and thinks that *ἐνεργεῖσθαι* expresses a *passive-active* working.

comp. also Wisd. of Sol. viii. 3, and Grimm on 4 Macc. xii. 13. Lange inappropriately explains it "similarly conditioned." Gebser assumes a contrast to *δίκαιος*, strangely explaining it: "having the same sentiments and passions as we; James inferred *how much more* will the prayer of a *δικαίου* avail." — The history, to which James refers, is contained in 1 Kings xvii. 1, xviii. 1, 41 ff. The account of James differs in two points from the O. T. narrative; first, the point on account of which James appeals to Elias, namely his twofold prayer, is not mentioned; and, secondly, it is stated that it began to rain in the third year. Both in 1 Kings xvii. 1 and in xviii. 41, Elias only announces what will take place; in the first passage, that it will not rain these years, and in the second passage, that it will soon rain. Neither in what Elias says of himself in 1 Kings xvii. 1: *אֲשֶׁר עָמַדְתִּי לִפְנֵי*, nor in what is related in 1 Kings xviii. 41, is it stated that Elias offered up such a prayer as James mentions; for although in ver. 42 Elias is represented as praying, yet it is not hinted that the rain took place in consequence of his prayer, since rather the promise of rain (ver. 1) preceded the prayer. Yet those statements, and particularly the word of Elias in 1 Kings xvii. 2: *כִּי אֶסְכְּלִי דְבָרִי*, are to be considered as the foundation of the statement of James, whether he followed a tradition (see Ecclus. xlviii. 2, 3) or a view peculiar to himself. — With regard to the second deviation, the same statement concerning the duration of the drought is found in Luke iv. 25 (see Meyer *in loco*), and in the Jalkut Schimoni on 1 Kings xvi., where it is said: Anno xiii. Achabi fames regnabit in Samaria per tres annos et dimidium anni. It is certainly correct, as Benson remarks, that if the rain, according to the word of Elias, was stayed at the beginning of the rainy season, and it again began to rain in the third year at the end of the summer season, the drought would continue in all three and a half years; but according to the statement of James, the drought began with the prayer of Elias, and continued from that three and a half years. Accordingly, Wiesinger is wrong in finding in the remark of Benson a sufficient reconciliation of the difference.¹ — *προσευχῇ προσηύξατο*] the same construction as

¹ It is otherwise with regard to Luke iv. 25, where the simple duration of time during which it would not rain is stated. James has erred in making the

θανάτῳ ἀποθανείσθε, Gen. ii. 17, LXX., as the Greek rendering of the Hebrew union of the infinite absolute with the finite tense, which the LXX. usually express by the union of the participle with the finite tense (see Winer, p. 317 f. [E. T. 427]). This addition of the substantive serves to bring out the verbal idea (de Wette), not to denote that the prayer of Elias was earnest (Schneckenburger, Wiesinger, Lange), but that nothing else than *his prayer* produced the long drought. — τοῦ μὴ βρέξαι] the genitive of design after προσήυξατο, because the contents of the prayer agreed with its object. This construction corresponds to the frequent use of ἵνα with verbs of asking in the N. T.; see Winer, p. 292 [E. T. 410]. — βρέχειν] is here used, as in the later classics, impersonally; otherwise in Matt. v. 45; Gen. ii. 5, xix. 24. Baumgarten incorrectly supplies ὁ Θεός as the subject. — καὶ οὐκ κ.τ.λ.] the result of the prayer. Schneckenburger: quis non sentit pondus dictionis τοῦ μὴ βρέξαι, καὶ οὐκ ἔβρεξεν; comp. Gen. i. 3, fiat lux, et facta est lux. — ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς] not *on the land*, i.e. Palestine (Grotius, Wolf, Baumgarten, Stolz, Lange, and others), but *on the earth* (Luther); comp. Luke iv. 25 (Gen. vii. 12).

Ver. 18. The second prayer of Elias, and its result. — ὁ οὐρανὸς ὑετὸν ἔδωκεν] a popular form of expression; comp. Acts xiv. 17. — καὶ ἡ γῆ κ.τ.λ.] contains not a further description, but added to mark more strongly the effect of the prayer: heaven and earth acted according to the prayer of Elias. — ἐβλάστησεν] properly an intransitive verb; so in Matt. xiii. 26; Mark iv. 27; Heb. ix. 4. The first aorist here, as frequently in the later classics, in a transitive signification; comp. Gen. i. 11, LXX. With respect to the form, see Winer, p. 77 [E. T. 92]. — τὸν καρπὸν αὐτῆς] Schneckenburger: fruges suas i. e. quas ferre solet.

Vv. 19, 20. To the exhortation to mutual confession and intercession is annexed “the reference to an important matter—the reclaiming of an erring soul” (Wiesinger). Ver. 19 forms the supposition; this is expressed in two co-ordinate prayer of Elias mentioned by him precede this whole period; whereas what is mentioned in 1 Kings xvii. 1, is that it commenced after the summer during which it had not rained. According to Lange, the reconciliation consists in this, that in 1 Kings xviii. only the duration of the real *famine* is stated, which did not begin until one year after the announcement of the drought; but there is no indication of this statement.

sentences, of which the first is subordinate in thought to the second: "if any convert one who has erred from the truth." — *πλανηθῇ*] the passive aorist here, as frequently in the signification of the middle. — *ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας*] With this is meant not a single practical aberration, but an alienation from the Christian principle of life, an inward apostasy from the *λόγος ἀληθείας* by which the Christian is begotten (Jas. i. 18), disclosing itself in a sinful course of life (so also Wiesinger, Brückner, Lange¹). — *καὶ ἐπιστρέψῃ*] *sc. ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν*; comp. Luke i. 16, 17.

Ver. 20 forms the apodosis. — *γινωσκέτω*] The *τις* mentioned in the second half of the preceding verse is the subject — the converter and not the converted. The remarkableness of the repetition of the subject after *ὅτι* disappears, when it is considered that the idea to be taken to heart is expressed as a sentence which is universally valid.² Calvin rightly draws attention to the fact that the tendency of the verse is to excite zeal for the conversion of the erring. — The word *ἁμαρτωλόν* is to be retained in its general signification, and not to be referred simply to *τὸν πλανηθέντα ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας*; it denotes the genus to which he that errs from the truth belongs as species. — *ἐκ πλάνης ὁδοῦ αὐτοῦ*] not = *ex erroris vita* (Schulthess); correctly Luther: "from the error of his way." *πλάνη* states the nature of the way on which the *ἁμαρτωλός* walks, and forms the contrast to *ἀλήθεια*. — *σώσει ψυχὴν [αὐτοῦ] ἐκ θανάτου*] *i.e. he will save a (his) soul from the death to which otherwise it would have fallen a prey*. The future is here used because James "has in view the final result of such a saving deed" (Wiesinger). On *ψυχὴν*, comp. chap. i. 21; on the reading of the *Receptus* Estius remarks: *absolute posita emphasin habet*. But probably *ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ* is the correct reading. *θάνατος*, eternal destruction, as in chap. i. 15. Lange strangely explains it as "the moral dissolution of the ontological life eternally self-generating itself." — *καὶ καλύψει πλῆθος ἁμαρτιῶν*] is to be understood not of the

¹ Arbitrarily, Lange defines the aberration more precisely "as an aberration into Judaistic and chiliastic doings and fanatical and seditious lusts."

² Wiesinger: "*ὁ ἐπιστρέψας* is not to be taken as equivalent to *he who*, in strict reference to the subject of *γινωσκέτω*, but expresses the general idea that every one who converts a sinner performs a great work; it is the general statement, under which he who is designated by *γινωσκέτω* subordinates his doing."

sins of the converter, who by his good work obtains forgiveness, whether on the part of God (Zacharias, *cp.* I. *ad Bonifac.*; Bede, Erasmus, Bouman, and others) or on the part of man (Augusti: "his own offences will not be remembered"), but of the sins of the converted (so most expositors). The words are an echo of Prov. x. 12 (comp. 1 Pet. iv. 8), although it is doubtful if James had this passage actually in view; especially *καλύπτειν* here does not, as a strict translation of the Hebrew *קָפַץ*,—see Neh. iii. 36 (LXX. ed. Tisch. iv. 6); Ps. xxxii. 1, lxxxv. 3,—signify *to forgive*, but the figurative expression is used by James in *the* sense that the sins of the converted are by the converter covered or concealed from the eyes of God, *i.e.* their forgiveness is effected. By *πλήθος ἁμαρτιῶν* are meant not the sins which the *ἁμαρτωλός* would otherwise commit (Jaspar: *peccata adhuc patrandi*), and which were now prevented by his conversion (Pott: *multa futura impediēt*), but the multitude of sins which he committed before his conversion.¹ Lange thinks: "this restriction misapprehends the progressive nature of guilt;" but how could sins which have *not* been committed be forgiven?² That the mention here is not of human, but of divine forgiveness, the close connection of the idea with the preceding *σώσει ψυχὴν ἐκ θανάτου* shows. Correctly Wiesinger: "*καλύψει* carries on further the *σώσει ψυχὴν*, and states the ground of this salvation."


¹ De Wette takes objection to the strong expression *πλήθος*, as he thinks that the reference here is only to *aberration*, and not to a vicious life; and on this account he will consider, along with this, the sins of those who stand in reciprocal action with him who has erred, and were or might have been injured and led astray by him; but without reason; especially *πλήθος ἁμαρτιῶν* corresponds entirely to the idea *πλανηθῆναι ἀπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας*, provided it be not arbitrarily weakened (so also Brückner).

² "In order to give prominence to the noble historical import of the Epistle, which has been only too much missed and neglected," Lange maintains that James here, at the conclusion, invites the believing part of his people to engage in intercession and in "the work of salvation, that many individuals may be saved from death, and a multitude of sins might be atoned for."

THE FIRST EPISTLE OF THE APOSTLE JOHN.

INTRODUCTION.

SEC. 1.—CONTENTS AND DESIGN OF THE EPISTLE.

1.  EADING IDEAS.—The entire development of the argument of the Epistle is based upon the single fundamental conviction of the antagonism subsisting between the “*world*” and “*believers*.” Whilst the former are under the power and dominion of the devil, the latter are in *fellowship with God*. Those who belong to the world are *the children of the devil*, the others are the *children of God*. The objective basis of believers’ life-fellowship with God is the mission of the Son of God, originating in His love, for the reconciliation of the world, or the incarnation of the Son of God (the Eternal Life which was with God from eternity), and His self-sacrifice unto death; its subjective basis is *faith* in this fact of the divine love. Whosoever believes in Jesus Christ, the Son of God, belongs no more to the world, but has been born of divine seed, a child of God. The Christian must therefore, above all things, be on his guard against the false doctrine which, making a distinction between Jesus and the Son of God (or Christ), denies the manifestation of the Son of God in the flesh,—and, consequently, the fact of the revelation of divine love,—and thereby abolishes the ground of the life-fellowship with God.—In the communion which the believer, anointed with the Holy Ghost, enjoys with God in Christ, he possesses not only *true knowledge*, but also *righteousness*. Whilst the world is dominated by darkness, and those who belong to it know not whither they go, believers walk in *the light*. Enlightened by

the Holy Ghost, they know God in the truth of His being, and are able to distinguish between truth and falsehood. At the same time their life is in sharpest contrast to sin. The latter is so opposed to their nature, that, as those who are born of God, they do not, nay, cannot sin, but, on the contrary, in harmony with the pattern of Christ, *do righteousness*; whereas those who belong to the world, as children of the devil, commit sin, which is the principle of their life. It is true the Christian is conscious that he also still has sin; but inasmuch as he does not deny, but, on the contrary, confesses it openly, *the blood of Christ cleanses him*; and, further, in the consciousness that Christ, the Righteous One, is his Paraclete with the Father, *he also purifies himself*, as Christ is pure. — The essence of the believer's righteousness is *love to God*, which manifests itself *in obedience to His commandments*, the sum of which is *love to the brethren*. — Whilst the world, following the example of Cain, who hated and slew his brother on account of his righteous life, hates the children of God, and in the spirit of hatred incurs the guilt of murder, the believer, imitating the pattern of Christ, feels himself bound, not in word only, but in deed as well, to love his brother, and to give his life for him if necessary. In love like this he possesses evidence of his divine adoption, and therein *eternal life*. Whilst the world continues in death, he has passed out of death into life; and in this new life he is free from fear and full of joyful confidence. He knows that his prayers are heard of God, and looks forward with confidence to the day of judgment, when he shall not be put to shame, but shall be like God, inasmuch as he shall see Him as He is. — The period still continues during which the world manifests its antagonism to the believer, who is also tempted by the devil; but in his faith, which is the victory over the world, he has vanquished these enemies, and the devil can accomplish nothing against him. Moreover, the world has already begun to vanish; it is the last time, as the appearance of Antichrist clearly proves—soon Christ shall appear, and with Him the perfecting of His own.

2. *Line of Argument.*—At the outset we have an introduction, in which the apostle announces the appearing of that Eternal Life which was with the Father to be the theme of

his apostolic message, and indicates the perfecting of his readers' joy, in their communion with the Father and with His Son Jesus Christ, as the end aimed at in his Epistle, chap. i. 1-4. The letter itself he begins with the thought that God is Light (i. 5), from which he infers that if a man asserts that he has fellowship with God, whilst walking in darkness, it is a lie (i. 6); and, on the other hand, that the fellowship of Christians with each other, and purification through the blood of Christ, are conditioned by a walk in the light (i. 7). In connection with the purification mentioned, he urges that whosoever claims to be without sin deceives himself, and makes God a liar, whereas in case of an honest confession of sin God manifests His faithfulness and justice by forgiving the sin and cleansing from it (i. 8-10); and with this consciousness, in case he sin, the Christian may comfort himself, since he has Jesus Christ the Righteous, who is the propitiation for the sins of the whole world, as his Paraclete with the Father (ii. 1, 2). In ver. 3 the apostle returns again to the starting-point in his argument, by showing that (just as fellowship with God can only be enjoyed whilst walking in the light) the knowledge of God can only exist in obedience to His commandments, and the being in Him in following after Christ (ii. 3-6). The command involved in this for the readers, says the apostle, is the old one which they had heard from the beginning, and which he now once more impresses on them because the darkness is already beginning to vanish. He then describes (ii. 7, 8) walking in the light as walking in brotherly love, whereas the man who hates his brother is in darkness (ii. 9-11); and turns directly to his readers, whom he addresses as true Christians who have obtained forgiveness, known the Father, and conquered the evil one (ii. 12-14), in order to warn them against love of the world and seduction by false teachers. The exhortation: "love not the world," he bases on a reference to the incompatibility of love of the world with love of God, and on the passing away of the world and its lust (ii. 15-17). The necessity for this exhortation the apostle discovers in the fact that it is the last time, as the appearance of the antichrists shows (ii. 18). The line of thought thus passes on to the consideration of these antichrists. The apostle mentions,

first of all, their relation to the Christian church. "They have," he says, "gone out from us, but they were not of us;" and he then describes them, after the interjectory remark that his readers, as the anointed of the Holy One, know the truth, as those who deny that Jesus is the Christ (*i.e.* as deniers of the identity of Jesus and Christ), whereby they deny the Father as well as the Son (ii. 19-23). After an exhortation to his readers to abide by what they had heard from the beginning, whereby they should continue in the Son and in the Father, and enjoy everlasting life, he expresses his confidence towards them that the unction they had received remains in them, that therefore they require no human teacher; and exhorts them to abide in Christ in order that they may not be put to shame at His coming (ii. 24-28).

In like manner as the apostle, in chap. i. 5, inferred from the light-nature of God that only the person who walks in light can have fellowship with Him, so now he argues from the righteousness of God, that only the person who practises righteousness is born of Him (ii. 29). But since Christians are the children of God, and as such entertain the hope of one day being like Him, therefore this hope is, as it were, an incentive to them to purify themselves even as Christ is pure, and consequently to avoid sin, which is disobedience to the law; and this is all the more since Christ has appeared for the very purpose of taking away sin, and is Himself free from it. From the sinlessness of Christ it follows that whosoever is in Him does not sin; but, on the contrary, whosoever sinneth hath not truly known Him (iii. 1-6). The apostle, having pointed out that he alone is righteous according to the pattern of Christ who *doeth* righteousness (iii. 7), sharply contrasts those who commit sin, as children of the devil, with those who are born of God, and therefore cannot sin, because the divine seed remaineth in them (iii. 8-10), and then indicates, as the righteousness which the children of God practise, that brotherly love which he describes as the theme of the message which Christians had heard from the beginning (iii. 10, 11). Warningly does the apostle point to the world, which, following the type of Cain, hates the children of God, and is in death; whereas the believer shows by love that he has passed from death unto life (iii. 12-15). The pattern of

Christian love is Christ; as *He* gave His life for us, so also must the Christian give his life for the brethren; nor may he content himself with a mere apparent love, but must love in deed and in truth (iii. 16-18). Love like this bears its own blessing with it; he who practises it knows that he is of the truth, and, whilst he overcomes thereby the accusation of his own heart, he has confidence towards God in the consciousness that God hears his prayers because he keeps the commandments of God (iii. 19-22). With the foregoing the apostle then immediately connects the idea that God's commandment embraces a twofold element, viz.—(1) that we believe on the name of His Son Jesus Christ; and (2) that we love one another (iii. 23); and then proceeds, after remarking that whosoever obeys the commandments of God stands in communion with Him (he in God, and God in him), and is conscious of this fellowship through the Spirit given him of God (iii. 24), to a further reference to the false teachers, which he commences with the warning: "Believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God." He gives the characteristic mark of the Spirit that is of God, and also of the spirit of Antichrist, assures the believers of victory over false teachers, and presents the difference between them and the true apostolic teachers: "They are of the world, wherefore they speak of the world, and the world hears them; we are of God, whosoever knoweth God heareth us" (iv. 1-6). — Without introducing any ideas to mark the transition thereto, the apostle now utters the exhortation: "Let us love one another," which he establishes by saying that love is of God, or—as he also says—that God is love. God has proved His love by sending His Son to be a propitiation for our sins; but if God has loved us so much, we ought also to love one another. When we do this, then God is in us, and lets us know that He is by His Spirit (iv. 7-13). Having pointed out that the manifestation of the love of God is the substance of apostolic testimony, and faith therein the condition of fellowship with God, the apostle once more utters the thought that God is love, in order to urge that communion with Him can consist only in love, and that this love manifests itself as perfect by our having confidence on the day of judgment, since love drives

out all fear (iv. 16–18). But if the love of God compels us to love Him in return, we must remember that we really love God only in case we love the brethren; for the man who does not love the person whom he sees, cannot possibly love God whom he does not see (iv. 19–21). That the *believer* loves the brethren, the apostle then infers from the fact that he is born of God; for if, as such, he loves God who has begotten Himself, he must also necessarily love those who are begotten of God, *i.e.* his own brethren (v. 1); and he is conscious of this love in that he loves God and keeps His commandments. After remarking that love to God consists in keeping His commandments, and that God's commandments are not hard to the believer, because being born of God he conquers the world by faith (v. 3–5), the apostle proceeds to refer to the divine evidence of the belief that Jesus is the Son of God. He describes the latter as having come by water and blood, and in proof of this appeals to the testimony of the Spirit. This testimony is all the stronger inasmuch as it is a three-fold one, *viz.*—that of the Spirit, the water, and the blood. If human evidence is accepted, much more ought the witness of God to be received. To the believer, however, this witness is not merely an external, but also, at the same time, an inward thing, *viz.*—the eternal life which has been given him in the Son of God (v. 6–12). As already previously, so also here again, the apostle sets forth, as a main element in the believer's eternal life, his confidence that God hears his prayers, and couples with this the exhortation to make intercession for the brother who may chance to sin. At the same time, however, he distinguishes between the case of the man who sins unto death and the man who does not, and explains that his precept anent intercession only refers to those who do not sin unto death (v. 13–17). — In bringing his Epistle to a close, the apostle once more announces, in three propositions, its leading thoughts, *viz.*—that he who is born of God does not commit sin; that they, the Christians, are born of God, whilst the world, on the other hand, belongs to the evil one; and that they have received, through the Son of God, the faculty to recognise Him that is true as the substance of their Christian consciousness. After the remark, that being in Christ we are in Him that is true, and that

He is the Son of God and eternal life, the Epistle closes with the exhortation: "Little children, keep yourselves from idols."

Concerning the various theories as to the construction of the Epistle, compare especially Erdmann, *Primac Joannis ep. argumentum*, etc., I. 1855; Lücke's *Kommentar*, § 4, 3d ed. 1856; and Luthardt's *Programm: de primac Jo. ep. compositione*, 1860. Pre-Reformation commentators hardly troubled themselves about the construction of the Epistle at all. After the Reformation, the theory which first prevailed was that a systematic, logically arranged sequence of ideas of any kind is entirely absent from the work (Calvin: *sparsim docendo et exhortando varius est*). After the time of Matth. Flaccius, some expositors assumed that it was made up of a number of isolated aphorisms, only loosely jointed together, and in which various subjects were discussed; though others (Calvin, Hunnius), notwithstanding, laboured to show a close sequence of ideas in accordance with a dogmatic plan. The most ingenious attempt of this kind was that made by Bengel, who, basing his argument upon the passage in v. 7 (*Receptus*), traced the construction of the Epistle to the dogma of the Trinity; a view adopted also by Sander. The right point of view from which to gain an insight into the structure of the Epistle was first discovered by Joach. Operinus in his work, *Johannis ap. paraenesis ad primos christianos de constanter tenenda communione cum patre ac filio ejus Jesu Christi*, etc., Götting. 1741, in which he shows that the purpose which John himself has announced in the preface is the same by which he was led in the composition of the Epistle throughout. Nearly all modern expositors, with the exception of a few of the earlier ones, have followed in the path opened up for them by Operinus. But with regard to the coupling of the ideas, unanimity has not been attained.

Whilst Lücke, in dividing the argument into eight groups of ideas, approaches at least the aphoristic method, the other modern commentators have laboured to prove a more stringent arrangement of the thoughts conveyed in the book. It is plain, however, on closer study of the work, that none of these attempts has really succeeded. The Epistle has indeed been divided into different sections, and to each section

a separate superscription been given, expressive of the main idea which informs the entire argument of that particular portion; but, on the one hand, the same ideas are found repeating themselves in the various sections, and, on the other, the leading thought suggested for a particular section does not invariably so inform that portion, that it might serve as the point of departure for studying its details. In the first edition of this commentary it is asserted—following the view of de Wette—that the Epistle from chap. i. ver. 5 till chap. v. ver. 17, may be divided into three groups of ideas, distinguishable from each other by the fact that at the outset of each, as it were, a chord is struck which, more or less, gives tone to the melody throughout the entire part which it marks. As keynotes for the three sections suggested, the three truths are indicated—1st, God is light, i. 5; 2d, Christ (or God) is righteous, ii. 28; and 3d, God is love. But that these keynotes actually sound throughout the whole of the parts they are respectively supposed to lead, is not, and cannot be proved.

REMARK.—That the theories respecting the argument suggested by other commentators, ancient as well as modern, are insufficient, has been shown by Luthardt in the work already quoted; the same remark, however, applies also to the construction which he himself—following in the lead of Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* 2d ed. II. 2, p. 353 ff.)—has proposed, and which divides the Epistle into the following five parts:—i. 5–ii. 11; ii. 12–27; ii. 28–iii. 24a; iii. 24b–iv. 21; v. 1–21. For, when he thus defines the contents of the third part: *salutis futurae spes christiana quantum afferat ad vitam sancte agendam*, exponitur, it is manifestly inappropriate, since the apostle throughout the entire section only refers to the Christian hope in ii. 2, from which it is plain that this is not the informing main idea of it. Again, when he represents the fourth part as treating of the Holy Ghost, his view is indeed so far correct, that, especially in the beginning, the discourse does turn upon the Spirit of God; but from iv. 7 onwards the development of the argument proceeds independently, without any reference to the Spirit, and only in ver. 13—and even then merely in passing—is there any mention of Him made whatever. Much more decidedly does the apostle refer to Him in v. 6 ff., which passage, however, according to Luthardt, belongs not to the fourth, but to the fifth part, in which the subject treated of is faith. But even this definition is doubtful, since faith is discussed not only in v. 1 ff., but also, and very distinctly, long previously, in

iii. 23 and iv. 13-16. Braune hardly attempts a disposition of the Epistle at all. It is true he divides it into four parts, namely—Introduction, i. 1-4; first main division, i. 5-ii. 28; second main division, ii. 29-v. 11; conclusion, v. 12-21. He also suggests leading chief topics for the two main divisions (viz. for the first, God is light; for the second, Whosoever is born of the righteous God doeth righteousness). But he only indicates as leading main topics the ideas which the apostle expresses in i. 5 and ii. 29, that is, at the beginning of the passages which Braune has marked as the chief sections, without showing how these thoughts inform the various groups of ideas which follow them. He contents himself with pointing out the simple sequence of the ideas as they follow each other in the development of the argument.

In order to understand the construction of the Epistle, the following three points are especially to be observed:—1st, The apostle's object is to preserve the readers in the fellowship of God, that their joy may be perfect. 2d, That the apostle, in order to achieve his end, unfolds especially the ideas that fellowship with God is only possible in the case of one whose life, rooted in faith in Jesus Christ, and harmonizing in holiness with the nature of God, is in love, and that the Christian is not only bound to such a life, but also in virtue of his divine birth (which has placed him in a relation of absolute antagonism to the world, which is *ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ*) is impelled by an inward necessity to lead it. 3d, That the apostle develops these ideas under the conviction that the antichristian lie is present in the world, and also that the second advent of Christ is rapidly approaching. Keeping these elements in view, it depends upon the identification of the various points in the unfolding of the argument in the Epistle when the latter takes such a turn that a new feature may be said to enter and to inform the discourse which follows. Nearly all commentators are agreed, and rightly, that the verses from chap. i. ver. 5 to chap. ii. ver. 11 form one self-contained group of ideas. The informing and ruling idea of this passage, however, is not a distinct and specific doctrinal proposition, intended to be explained in its several parts, but rather the antithesis to that indifferentism which ignores the antagonism between fellowship with God and a life in sin, in opposition to which the apostle urges that only the man who

walks in light—or who keeps the divine commandments and loves his brother—is in communion with God, and knows Him. The close relation in which these propositions stand to each other is shown also outwardly by the phrases: *ἐὰν εἴπωμεν κ.τ.λ.*, chap. i. 6, 8, 10, and *ὁ λέγων κ.τ.λ.*, ii. 4, 6, 8, which are only found here, and is proved by the fact that ii. 10, 11 manifestly refers backwards to i. 5, 6. — The argument takes a new turn, as most commentators also have noticed, with ii. 12, in which the apostle, after reminding his readers of their happy experiences in salvation, and indicating these as the ground of his writing to them, in direct exhortation warns them against the love of the world. With this warning is coupled the reference to the antichrists which has impelled the apostle to exhort his readers to abide by what they had heard from the beginning, because thus alone can they abide in the Son and in the Father, and enjoy everlasting life, so that they may not be put to shame on the day of judgment. The last turn in the argument shows how closely the apostle has kept in view, throughout this exhortation, the intention of the entire Epistle (i. 4). Moreover, the fact that the *ἀντίχριστοι*—as the apostle himself asserts subsequently—are *ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου*, justifies our joining together in one whole the warning reference to the antichrists, and that against the love of the world. — In the foregoing the apostle has indeed shown that if Christians are to glory in their communion with God they must walk in the light (that is, in obedience towards God, and in love towards the brethren), abstain from fellowship with the world, and faithfully abide by the Word of God; but he has not yet shown how they stand, *in accordance with their nature*, in antagonism to sin, and therefore also to the world. To this proof he proceeds in ii. 29, from which onwards he explains in detail how Christians as such are born of God, and therefore the children of God, who necessarily sanctify themselves in the hope of the future glory, do righteousness and abstain from sin, nay, cannot sin, because the divine seed remains in them; whilst, on the other hand, those who commit sin, and therefore belong to the world, are the children of the devil. This explanation the apostle gives from ii. 29—iii. 10, where, with the words *καὶ ὅς μὴ ἀγαπῶν κ.τ.λ.*, he begins to discourse about brotherly love. But that

a new section, properly speaking, does not open herewith, notwithstanding that the conception of the divine birth recedes into the background, appears not only from the nature of the connection with the foregoing, but also from the fact that the apostle at the outset holds fast to the contrast which he had so sharply defined at the close of the preceding—directing the attention of his readers to Cain, who was ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ, as the representative of the world. The immediate transition from the conception of the δικαιοσύνη to that of the ἀγάπη cannot excite surprise if we consider that to the mind of the apostle the latter was not something added to the former, but is the δικαιοσύνη itself in its practical manifestation. The propositions which treat of love, and in which the line of argument is so plainly defined by the intention of the work, hang so closely together down to ver. 22, that although one new element after another is introduced, still it is impossible to make a new section until, in ver. 23, to the conception of brotherly love there is added that of faith in the name of Jesus Christ the Son of God. This, however, dare all the less be overlooked, since in the whole discussion hitherto the element of faith, so weighty for the purpose of the work, has nowhere been exhaustively considered, nor even the word πιστεύειν been once introduced. It is true the apostle seems immediately afterwards to pass on to something else, since in iv. 1–6 he discourses of the difference between the anti-christian spirit and the Spirit of God, and in iv. 7–21 of the love of the brethren; nevertheless, on closer examination it is manifest that in these sections the reference to faith is maintained throughout. In the section iv. 1–6, namely, the ὁμολογεῖν Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν κ.τ.λ. is given as the characteristic of the Spirit of God. This ὁμολογεῖν, however, is nothing else than the belief εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τ. υἱοῦ Θεοῦ Ἰ. Χριστοῦ, expressing itself in words. That the apostle, while he would exhort his readers to hold fast their faith, first of all calls on them to try the spirits, need not surprise us when we think of the danger threatened to believers by the false teachers that had arisen. It may appear more strange that in ver. 7, with the exhortation ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους, there is a transition to a train of thought that treats of love; but it is to be observed, not only that in iii. 23 ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους is closely con-

nected with πιστεύσωμεν κ.τ.λ., but also that the further statements about love serve exactly to explain its connection with faith. The thought of the apostle is this: He only lives in God who loves God: God can only be loved because He is love; God has revealed Himself as love by the sending of His Son to be a propitiation for sin, therefore love to God is conditioned by faith in this act of the divine love. But while the believing Christian, who as such is born of God, now loves God, his love extends also to his brethren who, as he is, are born of God. In the development of these ideas, not only do the preceding statements of the apostle about brotherly love obtain their special confirmation, but the necessity of faith for fellowship with God is also set forth, so that the apostle in what follows, after referring to the world-overcoming power of faith, can proceed to treat of the divine evidences for faith, and emphasize the fact that the believer has eternal life, and therein possesses παρρησία πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. The ideas from iii. 23 to v. 17 are so grouped into a whole, as indeed may be perceived in them, that v. 13 (οἱ πιστεύοντες εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ) plainly refers backwards to iii. 23, in addition to which it is to be observed that the concluding thought here bears the same reference to the purpose stated in i. 4 as the concluding thought of the preceding group.

From this explanation it is clear that, if we lay aside the preface, i. 1-4, and the conclusion, v. 18-21, three points are to be noticed in the Epistle, at which the development of ideas takes such a direction that a newly-introduced point of view dominates what follows, and that the Epistle therefore divides itself into four leading sections, namely—i. 5-ii. 11; ii. 12-28; ii. 29-iii. 22, and iii. 23-v. 17. In order to fulfil in his readers the purpose of his writing, the apostle in the *first* section attacks the moral indifference which endangers them; in the *second* he warns them of love of the world and of Antichrist; in the *third* he shows that only a righteous life of brotherly love corresponds to the nature of the Christian; and in the *fourth* he points them to faith in Jesus Christ, the Son of God, as that which is testified by God to be the basis of Christian life.¹

¹ We may also unite the first and second sections more closely in *one* whole; for the former contains the premises for the warning uttered in the latter. In

3. *Motice*.—From chap. ii. 18 ff. and iv. 1 ff. it is to be understood that the appearance of the false teachers, spoken of by him as ἀντίχριστοι, furnished the special motive for the production of this Epistle. These are neither *different* false teachers (according to Storr, Sabians and Docetans; according to Sander, Ebionites and Docetans), nor even “*true Jews* as deniers of the Messiahship of Jesus” (Löffler, *Dissert. hist. cæg. Joannis Ep. I. gnosticos impugnari negans*, 1784, and *Comm. theol.*, ed. Velthusen, vol. I.), nor “practical false teachers, proceeding from heathenism” (Baumgarten-Crusius), nor “such men as partly had suffered shipwreck of their faith, and partly did not practise worthily the Christian belief in their lives” (Bleek); but *Docetans*, and indeed such *Docetans* as denied the identity of Jesus and Christ, and so adhered to *that* false doctrine which Irenæus ascribes to Cerinthus in the words: Cerinthus . . . subjecit, Jesum . . . fuisse . . . Joseph et Mariæ filium . . . post baptismum descendisse in eum . . . Christum, . . . in fine autem revolasse iterum Christum de Jesu. Not only the passages named, but also v. 5, 6, i. 3, iii. 23, iv. 15, point to *this* form of Docetism only (so also Braune). Without foundation is the view of several commentators (Sander, Lücke, Ewald, also Thiersch, Hilgenfeld, who, however, is not definitely decided, and others), that the polemical purpose of the apostle was equally, or even alone, directed against the stricter *Docetism* which ascribed to Christ only an apparent body, on behalf of which appeal is erroneously made to 1 John i. 1, iv. 2; 2 John 7.—That the former Docetans had a distinct antinomian direction, or in their darkness of knowledge in regard to duty felt themselves elevated to a moral course of life (Hilgenfeld, Thiersch, Guericke, Ewald, etc.), cannot be inferred from the moral exhortations of the apostle (comp. Brückner); it is much rather to be observed, that nowhere in these exhortations does the apostle refer to the antichristians, and that where he does mention them he nowhere characterizes them as Antinomians.¹

the threefold division which then arises, the conclusion of each part points to the joy of which the Christian partakes in fellowship with God.

¹ In opposition to the view that the passage, iii. 4, bears evidence for the Antinomianism of the false doctrine, Neander (*Gesch. d. Pflanzung der Kirche*

According to Lücke and Erdmann, the Epistle was occasioned not only by the appearance of the antichristians, but also by the *critical state* of the churches to which it is addressed (which Erdmann describes as a state of moral depravity). But although some of it, especially the antithetical import of the section, i. 5-ii. 11, indicates that in the case of many indifference to holiness of life was not wanting, yet nowhere do we find any blame expressed in regard to the moral condition of the churches on the whole. The apostle does not exhort his readers to return to the moral earnestness originally displayed by the Christians, but to perseverance in that which they are and have.

SEC. 2.—FORM AND CHARACTER OF THE EPISTLE.

1. *The Form.*—While the mass of ancient writers regarded this composition as a *letter*, Heidegger first speaks of it in his *Enchiridion bibl.* 1681, p. 986, as: *brevis quaedam christianae doctrinae epitome et evangelii a Joanne scripti succinctum quoddam enchiridion.* Similarly Michaelis judges, who understands it as a “treatise,” and indeed as the second part of the Gospel; so also Berger (*Versuch einer moralischen Einl. ins N. T.*) and Storr (*Ueber den Zweck der evangel. Gesch. u. Briefe Johannis*), only that the former speaks of it as the *practical*, the latter as the *polemical* part of the Gospel. Even Bengel (*Gnomon*, 2d ed.) thinks it is to be called rather a libellus than a letter; his reason is, that a letter *ad absentes* mittitur, Joannes autem apud eos, quibus scribebat, eodem tempore fuisse videtur. Reuss (*die Gesch. der heil. Schriften N. T.* p. 217) expresses himself similarly, when he would prefer to call it “a homiletical essay, at the most a pastoral, the readers of which are present,” rather than an epistle. But, in opposition to these views, the work proves itself by the form of its contents to be a real epistle. The author shows himself throughout in the most lively interchange of thought with his readers; and even though not infrequently the objective development of thought predominates, as is

durch d. Ap. p. 377) rightly remarks that the apostle against Antinomians would have had to say: Whosoever transgresseth the law committeth sin, for transgression of the law is sin.

peculiar to a treatise,—which, however, is found no less in other Epistles of the N. T.,—yet the language always returns involuntarily to the form of an address, in which is specially to be observed “the oft-recurring distinctive epistolary formula: *ταῦτα γράφομεν*, or *γράφω*, or even *ἔγραψα ὑμῖν*—in contrast particularly with the formula in the more general historical writing, the Fourth Gospel: *ταῦτα γέγραπται* without *ὑμῖν*, xx. 31; comp. xix. 35 and xxi. 24” (Lücke). Düsterdieck rightly remarks that “the epistolary nature expresses itself in the whole import and progress of the work,” inasmuch as in it “there dominates that easy naturalness and freedom in the composition and presentation, which corresponds with the immediate practical interest, and with the practical purpose of an epistle” (comp. Bleek, *Einl. in d. N. T.* p. 589, and Braune, *Einl.* § 5). — The absence of a blessing or a doxology at the close occurs also in the Epistle of James, and there is nothing strange in it; but it is rather striking that the epistolary introduction is also wanting to the work, as the author neither mentions himself nor the readers to whom he is writing; in the Epistle to the Hebrews, however, such an introduction is also omitted. We must explain this want in this way, that, on the one hand, the apostle presupposed that the readers would recognise him as the author of the Epistle without his naming himself in it, and, on the other, that he did not intend it for a single church or for a limited circle of churches.¹ The description of this work as a second part of the Gospel is so much the more arbitrary, as each of those works forms in itself a completed whole. — The view of some critics and commentators (Augusti, who calls the Epistle a summary of the Gospel; Hug, Frommann in the *Studien und Kritiken*, 1840, Heft 4; Thiersch in *Versuch zur Herstellung des hist. Stdpktes.* p. 78, and *die Kirche im apostol. Zeitalter*, p. 266; Ebrard in *Kritik der evangel. Geschichte*, p. 148, and in his *Commentary*), that the

¹ In opposition to Ebrard, who, admitting the epistolary character of the work, thinks that this want may be easily explained if the epistle “had no individual aim in itself, but depended on something else,” inasmuch as “by its form it bears the nature of a sort of preface or of an *epistola dedicatoria*,” it is to be remarked that the Epistle, from its whole character, cannot be at all compared to a *preface*, and that in an *epistola dedicatoria* this want would be just as striking as in any other epistle.

Epistle is a *companion-work* of the Gospel, is opposed by the contents of the Epistle, which follow an individual aim, as well as by the complete absence of a distinctly indicated reference to the written Gospel.¹ In opposition to Reuss, according to whose view the Epistle "was destined to bring home to the readers of the Gospel the practical side of the Gnosis there laid down," it is to be observed that neither is the practical side wanting in the Gospel, nor the Gnosis in the Epistle.

2. *The Character.*—The same peculiarity of conception, development of thought, and form of expression, which characterizes the Gospel of John, penetrates the Epistle also, and distinguishes it from all other Epistles of the N. T. There dominates in it the same spiritual tendency, and the same preference for the concrete and abstract ideas: ὁ ἦν κ.τ.λ., φῶς, ζωή, ζωὴ αἰώνιος, ἰλασμός; ποιεῖν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, π. τὴν ἀνομίαν, π. τὴν δικαιοσύνην; εἶναι ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας, etc.; the same combination of antitheses: φῶς . . . σκοτία; ἀλήθεια . . . ψεῦδος; ἀγαπᾶν . . . μισεῖν; ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ πατρὸς . . . ἡ ἀγ. τοῦ κόσμου; ποιεῖν τὴν δικαιοσύνην . . . π. τὴν ἁμαρτίαν; τὰ τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ . . . τὰ τ. τοῦ διαβόλου; τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας . . . τ. πν. τῆς πλάνης; ἁμαρτία οὐ πρὸς θάνατον . . . ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον; ζωή . . . θάνατος, etc.; the same continuation of the thought by the resumption of an idea that has preceded, and the accompanying and correspondingly unusual application of the relative pronoun; the same juxtaposition of the positive and negative expression of a thought. Both works, as Ebrard brings out, bear the same impress, not only in style and construction, but also in the sphere of ideas and in the dogmatic views; comp. also Ewald, *Die Joh. Schriften*, I. p. 429 ff.—With regard to the Epistle

¹ Ebrard derives the proof for his opinion from i. 1-4 and from ii. 12-14, referring ἀπαγγέλλομεν in the former passage, and the thrice-repeated ἐγγεγραμμένα in the latter, to the writing of the Gospel. That this is without adequate ground, comp. the commentary on these; but even if this reference were correct, yet the description of the Epistle as a "sort of dedicatory epistle" would still remain unjustified, for its purpose is clearly quite other than to dedicate the Gospel to its readers. We would then have to call every epistle, in which reference is made to another work, a dedicatory epistle. Even the designation "companion-work" is unsatisfactory, because it does not at all appropriately state the true character of the Epistle in accordance with its actual contents.

specially, here, in contrast to the dialectical development of thought, which is characteristic of the Pauline Epistles particularly, the individual propositions follow one another in gnomon fashion,¹ and unitedly form groups of ideas, which are sometimes strung together without any mark of the transition.² Even the proof of an idea takes place in the simplest manner by reference to a truth self-evident to the Christian consciousness. By the peculiar manner of connection of the ideas arises the appearance of rather frequent repetition of the same thoughts; but on closer observation it is evident that even where the negative expression follows the positive, or *vice versâ*, generally both expressions do not say *the same thing*, but that in the second a new element is taken up, a new direction is prepared for. Characteristic is the simplicity and plainness of statement. Whether the apostle states divine truths by themselves, whether he discourses in exhortation or in warning to his readers, his language always retains the same calmness and precision. He nowhere shows a disposition excited by passion. Everywhere the stillness of a heart reposing in happy peace is mirrored, and having this he is sure that the simple utterance of the truth is enough to procure for his discourse an entrance into the minds of his readers. At the same time, a firm, manly tone pervades the Epistle, in contrast with every weak fanaticism of sentiment, which is so little characteristic of the apostle, that he, along with the internal character of life, constantly urges that the reality of it is proved by *action*. It is also worthy of notice that, on the one hand, he speaks to his readers as a father to his children, but, on the other hand, does not ignore the fact that they are no longer minors, to whom he has some new information to give, but are quite like himself, and are, like himself, in possession of all the truth which he utters, of all the life which he is anxious,

¹ Comp. on this, Ewald, *D. Joh. Schriften*, I. p. 441.

² Düsterdieck finds the peculiarity of the manner of development and statement of thought in the Epistle in this, "that the ideas move, combine, and circle round certain leading propositions as points of support and connection." But it might be more appropriate to perceive it in this, that the apostle by single leading thoughts strikes as it were chords, which he allows to sound for a while in the thoughts deduced for them, until a new chord results, which leads to a new strain.

not to produce in them for the first time, but only to maintain in them. Against the reproach that the Epistle bears "the clearest traces of the feebleness of old age" (S. G. Lange), or that—as Baur says—"it is wanting in the fresh colour of direct life," that "the tenderness and fervour of John's manner of conception and representation have relaxed far too much into a tone of childlike feebleness, which loses itself in indefiniteness, falls into continual repetitions, and is lacking in logical force," it must be maintained that the Epistle bears the impress of directness, freshness, definiteness, and vigorous clearness in no degree less than the Gospel of John.¹

SEC. 3.—GENUINENESS.

According to the testimony of antiquity, the Epistle was written by the Apostle John, which is confirmed by the Epistle itself, in so far as that the author, in the whole tone in which he speaks to his readers, and in particular expressions (i. 1, iii. 5, iv. 14), may be recognised as an apostle, and that the agreement with the Gospel of John favours the conclusion that both works proceed from the same author. Eusebius (*H. E.* iii. 24, 25) rightly reckons it among the Homologoumena; and Hieronymus (*de viris illustr.* c. 9) says: ab universis ecclesiasticis eruditis viris probatur.—In the writings of the Apostolic Fathers, it is true, the Epistle is not considered in a definite way, but the passage found in Polycarp, cap. vii.: *πᾶς γὰρ ὃς ἂν μὴ ὁμολογῇ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθέναι, ἀντίχριστός ἐστιν*, etc., may be recognised as a "natural use of 1 John iv. 2, 3" (Düsterdieck), by deduction from particular resemblances to some expression or other of the Epistle;² and Eusebius (*H. E.* iii. 39) states of Papias: *κέχρηται*

¹ Hilgenfeld rightly states, in opposition to Baur, that the Epistle belongs to the *most beautiful* writings of the N. T., that it is specially rich and original "exactly in what relates to the subjective, inner life of Christianity;" "that the fresh, vivid, attractive character of the Epistle consists exactly in this, that it conducts us with such a predilection into the inner experience of genuine Christian life."

² In the *Ep. ad Diognet.* several expressions appear, which point back to John's mode of thought; so cap. vi.: *Χριστιανοὶ ἐν κόσμῳ οἰκοῦσιν, οὐκ εἰς διὰ ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου*; cap. vii.: *ὁ . . . Θεὸς . . . τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν ἅγιον καὶ ἀπριμνήστον ἀνθρώποις ἐπέμψεν*; cap. xi.: *οὕτως ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγάπη*; as also in the *Shepherd of Hermas*,

δ' ὁ αὐτὸς μαρτυρίαις ἀπὸ τῆς Ἰωάννου προτέρας ἐπιστολῆς καὶ τῆς Πέτρου ὁμοίως. — By the Fathers of the church: Tertullian (*adv. Prax.* c. 15; *Scorp.* c. 12; *adv. Marc.* iii. 8; *de Praescript.* c. 33; *de carne Christi*, c. 24), Irenaeus (*adv. Haeret.* iii. 16), Clemens Alex. (*Strom.* i. ii. c. 15, i. iii. c. 4, 5, 6; *Paedag.* iii. 11, 12, etc.), Origen (in Euseb. *H. E.* vi. 25), Cyprian (*de orat. Dom.* and *Ep.* 25), passages are frequently quoted from it, often with explicit mention of the apostle. Dionysius Alex. uses it, along with the Gospel, to prove the spuriousness of the Apocalypse; the *Peshito* and the *Muratorian Fragment*¹ also testify to its genuineness. That the Alogi rejected it, as Epiphanius conjectures, and that Marcion did not admit it into his canon, is of no importance; just as little is the highly obscure account of Cosmas in his *Topogr. Christ.* i. vii., according to which some maintain that all the catholic Epistles were composed, not by apostles, but by presbyters; and the remark of Leontius Byz. (*contra Nestor. et Eutychian.* iii. 14) in regard to Theodore of Mopsv.: *epistolam*

lib. ii. mand. 9 : πιστεύει τῷ Θεῷ. ὅτι πάντα τὰ αἰτήματά σου, ἃ αἰτῶ, λήψῃ (comp. 1 John iii. 23, iv. 15); *lib. ii. mand. 12* : εὐκόλως αὐτῷς (i. e. τὰς ἐπιστολὰς τοῦ Θεοῦ) φυλάξεις, καὶ οὐκ ἔσονται σκληραί (comp. 1 John v. 3).

¹ By the words: *epistola sane Jude et superscriptio* [superscripti; or, according to Laurent, *Neutest. Studien*, pp. 201, 205: *superscriptae* = "provided with superscriptions"] *Joannis duas* [duae] *in catholica habentur*, are not meant, as Braune supposes, the first and second, but the second and third Epistles. When, however, it is previously written: *Quid ergo mirum, si Johannes tam constanter singula etiam in epistolis suis proferat dicens in semet ipso*; *quae vidimus oculis nostris et auribus audivimus et manus nostrae palpaverunt, haec scripsimus*, this is a clear evidence for the composition of the First Epistle by the Apostle John. The reviewer of the first edition of this commentary, in the *theol. Literaturblatt zur allg. Kirchenztg.* 1855, No. 92, thinks, indeed, that in the words: *quartum evangeliorum Joannis ex discipulis*, the Presbyter John is indicated as the author of the Gospel, because it is not said *ex apostolis*; but that the author of the *Fragment* indicates by the expression *discipuli* such disciples of Jesus as were not apostles, can neither be proved by the fact that Papias (in Euseb. *H. E.* iii. 39) calls the Presbyter John a disciple (*μαθητής*) of Jesus, nor by the fact that afterwards "*ex apostolis*" is added to characterize Andrew. If the author of the *Fragment* had regarded as the author of the Gospel, not the apostle, but the Presbyter John, he would certainly have expressed this definitely. The expression *ex discipulis* presented itself to him here so much the more naturally, as he had immediately before spoken of Luke, and said of him: *Dominum nec ipse vidit in carne*. — Rightly, therefore, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, and others (comp. also Meyer in his *Comment. on Gospel of John*, and Laurent as above) have regarded the *Murat. Fragm.* as evidence for the apostolic origin of the Epistle.

Jacobi et alias deinceps aliorum catholicas abrogat et antiquat ; comp. on this Lücke's *Comment. Introd.* § 8, 4, p. 135 ff., 3d ed. — The genuineness continued unchallenged until first Jos. Scaliger came forward with the assertion: tres epistolae Joannis non sunt apostoli Joannis ; since then it has been variously disputed. Sam. J. Lange, indeed, recognised the unanimous testimony of antiquity as too significant to permit of denial of the apostolic authorship of the Epistle, but he nevertheless regarded it as a writing not worthy of the apostle ; Claudius (*Ursichten des Christenth.* p. 52 ff.) went further, explaining it as the performance of a Jewish Christian, which was revised by a Gnostic. Bretschneider (in his *Probabilien*) and Paulus ascribe it to the Presbyter John, while they, however, at the same time maintained the identity of the author of the Epistle and the author of the Gospel ; Horst (*Museum für Religionswissenschaft. Henke*, 1803, vol. I.) declared himself against this. — The later Tübingen school cannot, in consequence of their conception of the development of Christianity, regard either the Gospel or the Epistle as the work of the apostle ; the admission of the genuineness of one of these writings would overthrow their whole historical construction. Since, therefore, the adherents of this school are agreed in denying the genuineness of both writings, they nevertheless explain in different ways the relation of them to one another. K. R. Köstlin (*Lehrbegr. des Ev.* etc.) and W. Georgii (*Ueber die eschatolog. Vorstellungen der N. T. Schriftsteller ; Theol. Jahrb.*, Tübingen 1845) ascribe both writings (even the second and third Epistles) to the same author. After Zeller, who in his "Beiträgen zur Einl. in die Apokalypse" (in the *Theol. Jahrb.*, Tübing. 1842) presupposed the identity of the author in his review of Köstlin's writings (*Theol. Jahrb.* 1845), and K. Planck ("Judenthum und Urchristenth." in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1847) had intimated the opposite view, the former position was strongly defended by Baur ("Die Joh. Briefe," in the *Theol. Jahrb.* 1848, 3) and by Hilgenfeld (*Das Evang. u. die Briefe Joh.* 1849, and "d. joh. Briefe" in the *Tüb. theol. Jahrb.* 1855, Part iv.) ; but with this difference, that the former explains the Epistle as the *copy*, the latter as the *pattern* of the Gospel.

For the *non-identity of the authors*, it is specially advanced that in the Gospel a "more ideal and internal," in the Epistle,

on the other hand, "a more material and external" mode of thought dominates. This difference is to be chiefly recognised in the eschatological ideas. While the author of the Epistle expects a visible "*material*" (!) Parousia of Christ, the evangelist is held to know only of a "reappearance of Christ in the spirit of His disciples," and of a merely "present" judgment, because for him "the future has already become the present." How incorrect, however, this assertion is, is proved by passages such as Gospel of John v. 28, 29, vi. 39, 40, 44, 54, in which distinctly enough a *future* day of resurrection of the dead and of judgment by Christ is spoken of (comp. Weiss, p. 179 ff.); and as in this the Gospel is quite in agreement with the Epistle, so, on the other hand, the Epistle expresses, no less distinctly than the Gospel, the idea of a resurrection, already accomplished in belief, of Christians from the dead.¹ The fundamental conceptions, therefore, are the same in both writings; the only difference is, that in the Epistle the thought is expressed that the *ἐσχάτη ὥρα* is already,—but in the Gospel there was plainly no room for the expression of this thought.—For that difference between the material and the ideal conception, Baur appeals, moreover, to 1 John v. 6 comp. with Gospel xix. 34, and Hilgenfeld (1849) to 1 John i. 5, 7. Baur asserts that in place of the ideal import which the two symbols, blood and water, have in the Gospel, the sacramental appears in the Epistle. This assertion, however, is based on a false interpretation of *both* of those passages, since neither has the circumstance recorded in the Gospel xix. 34 the meaning: "that death (of which the blood is the symbol) is the necessary preliminary condition under which alone the Spirit (of which the water is the symbol (!)) can be communicated to the believer;" nor is 1 John v. 6 to be directly interpreted of the coming of Christ in or through the two sacraments,

¹ In the article of Hilgenfeld, quoted above, he thinks that "there is undeniably a different representation of the last day, when the author of the Epistle exhorts his readers so to deport themselves that they may meet the judgment day without shame, and when, on the other hand, the evangelist excludes believers from the judgment;" but neither of these views is at all exclusive of the other; it is only to be remembered that the future judgment for those who here already have passed from death into life, who here already possess the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* (1 John v. 13), is such that for them it is not a judgment in *that* sense in which it is a judgment for the wicked.

baptism and the Lord's Supper. Besides, it is rather strange to call the conception of water and blood as the two sacraments, a *material* one. — Hilgenfeld thinks that when in 1 John i. 5, 7 it is said of *God* that He is *φῶς*, nay, that He is *ἐν τῷ φωτί*, a representation is expressed which "has too much the ideas of matter and of space in it for the evangelist to have any connection with it," since he uses *φῶς* only as predicate of the Logos. But from the application which is made in the Epistle of the thought there expressed, it is clear that the writer of the Epistle, in the idea *φῶς*, did not think less of anything than of something "pertaining to matter and space." That alleged difference, therefore, does not exist; the groundless pretence of it proves neither the hypothesis of Baur, that the Epistle is the performance of an imitator of the Gospel, nor that of Hilgenfeld, that it belongs to an earlier stage of development than the latter. Nevertheless, according to Baur, we may recognise the imitative hand, not only in the character of the whole Epistle (see on this Sec. 2), but in the passages i. 1-4 and v. 6-9; according to Hilgenfeld (1849), the earlier stage of development may be perceived in the O. T. conception expressed in the Epistle, and in its view of the Logos and of the Holy Spirit. In regard to the passage i. 1-4, Baur says: "in all the features, in which the author himself would give us a picture of his personality, the premeditated most anxious concern cannot be mistaken, to be regarded as one person with the evangelist;" but that those verses are only to serve "to give a picture of the personality of the author," is a *groundless* supposition of Baur. In the other passage (v. 6-9 comp. with John viii. 16 ff.) Baur sees nothing but a mere playing on words, "for the *μαρτυρία τοῦ Θεοῦ* has the same subject as the *μαρτυρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, and the latter differs from the former only in this, that the three: spirit, water, and blood, are counted as three, and it therefore consists of nothing else than the numerical relation of those three to one another, which again is immediately annulled when it is said that it is God that bears witness in those three." But this entire conclusion is purely fanciful; for, on the one hand, the *μαρτυρία τῶν ἀνθρώπων* is not at all spoken of, in regard to its subject, as identical with the *μαρτυρία τοῦ Θεοῦ*; and, on the other hand, in the mention of

the former *μαρτυρία* the numerical relation is not alluded to by a single syllable. — Hilgenfeld asserts that the Epistle stands in a more intimate relationship to the O. T. law than the Gospel does. The proof of this is supposed to lie in the passages 1 John iii. 4 and ii. 7, 8; but with regard to the first passage, the idea *ἀνομία* in no way hints at the Mosaic law; and besides, if the author attached a higher importance to the Mosaic *νόμος* than the evangelist, he would somewhere state its signification; this, however, he is so far from doing, that the idea *νόμος* never appears in his work at all. With regard to the second passage, Hilgenfeld, indeed, admits that *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* refers to the transition to Christianity, but thinks that "this old commandment of love is not set forth as it is in the Gospel, as an absolutely new one which first receives its rule through the love of the Saviour to His people;" but, apart from the explanation of that passage itself, the immediately preceding verse, and, moreover, what is written in iii. 16 and iv. 7 ff. about love, shows how unfounded is the assertion of Hilgenfeld. It is not anything better with the remark of Hilgenfeld (1849), that "the greatest probability is in favour of the statement that the idea of the personal Logos is still foreign to the Epistle, whilst it is distinctly expressed in the Gospel;" this Hilgenfeld infers from this, that for description of what is loftier in Christ the expression *ὁ λόγος* is not used in the Epistle.¹ But even if in the expression *ὁ λόγος τῆς ζωῆς* the idea *λόγος* had the meaning of "doctrine," yet the supposition of Hilgenfeld would still be unjustified, since it cannot be denied that *ἡ ζωὴ* (*ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος*), whereby the superhuman that appeared in Christ is indicated, is considered by the writer of the Epistle as hypostatic nature, nor that the *υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ* is identical with Him who in the Gospel is called *ὁ λόγος*. Nay, the whole Epistle in the most unmistakeable manner presupposes the hypostatic nature of the Son of God. — That, finally, the writer of the Epistle ascribed no personality to the Holy Spirit, can neither be proved by this, that he does not call Him *ὁ παράκλητος*, nor by this, that He indicates Him by the expression *χρῖσμα*; the words *τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστι τὸ μαρτυροῦν* especially, 1 John v. 6 comp. with John

¹ In the article of 1855 this is merely noticed, without the former inference being drawn from it.

xv. 26, presuppose His personality.¹—For proof of the non-identity Baur finally appeals to this, that the “representation of Christ as the *παράκλητος*, i.e. the interceding High Priest, accords more with the sphere of ideas of the Epistle to the Hebrews than with that of the Gospel, that thereby intervening thoughts are inserted into John’s view of the relation of Jesus to those who believe on Him, which lay far from the horizon of the evangelist.” But if Baur were right in this assertion, then there would exist not only a difference between the Epistle and the Gospel, but a difference between the Epistle and itself, since, apart from those representations, quite the same view of the relation of Jesus to believers dominates in the Epistle as in the Gospel; with regard, however, to those representations, they are not peculiar to the Epistle to the Hebrews only, but are a common property of the apostles, as they are expressed in the Epistle to the Romans (comp. chap. iii. 25 and viii. 34) with no less distinctness than in the former.

The reasons adduced by Baur and Hilgenfeld are therefore unable to shake the conviction of combined antiquity, that both writings come from one and the same author. That each of the works—along with all unity of conception and of expression—has its own peculiarities, is naturally caused both by the difference of their object, and by the living activity of the Spirit from whom they both proceeded. It is also to be observed, that in the Gospel it is chiefly the Master, in the Epistle the disciple, that speaks,—a fact to which the Tübingen critics can certainly attach no importance. There is, however, the further question as to the character of the reasons which are said to be opposed to the genuineness of the Epistle, and to prove that the author of it could not be the Apostle John. When S. G. Lange says that on account of “its lack of all individual references, its slavish imitation of the Gospel, the too great generality of the thoughts, the traces of the feebleness of old age, the non-reference to the destruction of

¹ In the article of 1855, Hilgenfeld finds the difference only in this, that in the Epistle the Holy Spirit is not called *παράκλητος*, but *χρίσμα* and *σπῖσμα*. Along with this he admits, however, that the Gospel, in the expression *ἄλλος παράκλητος* shows an agreement with the Epistle, in which Christ is spoken of as *παράκλητος*.

Jerusalem," he *only reluctantly* regards the Epistle as the work of an apostle; these reasons are of such arbitrarily subjective character as to require no refutation. Of greater importance, indeed, is the frequently-expressed assertion, that the Epistle refers to circumstances which first belong to a time later than that of the apostles. As such Bretschneider regarded the doctrine of the Logos and the Docetism contended against in the Epistle; but "without the previous existence and assurance of a canonical doctrine of the Logos, the patristic doctrine from Justin on would be almost inexplicable" (Lücke), and that *Docetism*—to which the Jewish as well as the heathen speculation must be added, when, without giving itself up, it amalgamated with Christianity—first belonged to the post-apostolic age, is historically an unjustifiable assertion.—After Planck (in the article already quoted) advanced the view, that the author of the Epistle moves in the *Montanist* sphere of thought, as he "seeks to transform the external Jewish-Christian mode of conception into the deeper, more internal mode of John," Baur developed it further. He explains the Epistle directly as a writing belonging to *Montanism*. His proofs of this are—(1) the thought that the fellowship of Christians is sinless, holy; (2) the mention of the *χρῖσμα*, and (3) the distinction between venial and mortal sins. But how weak are these reasons! If the Montanists considered themselves as the *Spirituales*, in contrast to the *rest of the Christians*, who in their eyes were *Psychici*, this is plainly something very different from the representation of the Epistle that believing Christians—in contrast to the unholy world—form a holy fellowship. If the Epistle says that Christians possess the holy *χρῖσμα*, there lies therein nothing but an allusion to the custom, first mentioned by Tertullian, of anointing candidates for baptism with holy oil. And if in 1 John v. 16 the *ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον* is distinguished from the *ἁμαρτία οὐ πρὸς θάνατον*, this distinction is of a very different character from the Montanist distinction between venial and mortal sins. Baur, indeed, maintains that in the Epistle the same sins are called mortal sins as in Tertullian; but while Tertullian represents as mortal sins: homicidium, idololatria, fraus, negatio, blasphemia, moechia et fornicatio, et si qua alia violatio templi

Dei, Baur arbitrarily selects only *three* of these, namely idolatry, murder, adultery or fornication, which are alleged to be spoken of in the Epistle as mortal sins. To idolatry, namely, not only chap. v. 21, but also chap. iii. 4, is alleged to refer; to murder, chap. iii. 15;¹ and to *πορνεία*, which is nowhere mentioned in the Epistle itself, the superscription that appears in Augustin (corrupted from *πρὸς παρθένους*): ad Parthos. — The hypothesis so feebly established (comp. Lücke's incisive refutation in the 3d ed. of his comment.) of the Montanism of the writer of the Epistle, found in Hilgenfeld an opponent in the Tübingen school itself. In opposition to it,² Hilgenfeld has attempted to show that not only the false doctrine of the antichristians who are contended against in the Epistle, but also many of the views of the author himself, would go to prove that the appearance of the Epistle is to be fixed at the time immediately preceding that in which Gnosticism was at its prime. As Gnostic elements in the system of the Epistle, Hilgenfeld specifies the idea of the *σπέρμα* (iii. 9); the thought that we should not fear, but only love God (iv. 18, 19), and the idea of the *χρῖσμα* (ii. 20); but these ideas are so *essential* to the Christian consciousness, that it cannot at all be thought of without them. At the most, the expressions *σπέρμα* and *χρῖσμα* might seem strange, but the former so naturally suggested itself in connection with the idea of being born of God, and of God's being in him who is born of Him,³ and the latter

¹ Baur himself admits that with regard to these two points the author does not mean "the outward action," but "altogether the inner character of the moral sentiment;" but if that be the case, then it is clear that his position is not *in* Montanism, but *outside* it, since in Montanism it is precisely *actions*, and indeed particular, definite actions, that are referred to in that distinction of sins. Tertullian (*de pudicit.* c. 19): Cui non accidit, aut in se inique et ultra solis occasum, aut et manum immittere, aut facile male fieri, aut temere jurare, aut fidem pacti destrucere, aut verecundia aut necessitate mentiri. In negotiis, in officiis, in quaestu, in victu, in visu, in auditu quanta tentamus, ut si nulla sit venia istorum, nemini salus competat, etc.

² Hilgenfeld urges especially that it is impossible to conceive that a Montanist author would not have known to begin with the idea of the Paraclete; and also that the idea of special mortal sins already occurs in the *Παλιὰ Πίστις* (Rec. iv. 36), which belong to the pre-Montanist pseudo-Clementine literature.

³ In his article of 1855, Hilgenfeld attaches the chief importance to the idea of the *σπέρμα*, and tries to deduce from 1 John v. 1, that according to the representation of the author of the Epistle, "being born of God is to be regarded as

from the antithesis of the *Christian* to the ἀντίχριστος,—especially with the O. T. type of anointing,—that a derivation of them from Gnostic fancies is entirely unjustified; quite apart from the fact that these ideas play quite another part in the Gnostic systems from that which they fulfil in this Epistle. Even if it be conceded to Hilgenfeld further, that the false doctrine contended against is Gnostic, yet it cannot be admitted that *Gnosticism* also, as regards its beginnings, belongs first to the post-apostolic time. Hilgenfeld rightly says that the features alluded to by the author of the Epistle do not mark a completely definite Gnostic system, but wrongly, that therefore the doctrine of Cerinthus must not be thought of, because this represents a form of Gnosis as yet quite incomplete. The whole character of the polemic of the writer of the Epistle shows, however, that he has to do with a system of Gnosticism which, in comparison with the systems of the second century, had a form still incomplete. For there is only *one* point which he brings forward, namely *Docetism*, and indeed that form of it which consists of the distinction of the Son of God from the man Jesus, and therefore the same as was propounded by Cerinthus; comp. Dorner, *Lehre von der Person Christi*, I. p. 314 ff.—That this Docetism was associated with an antinomian sentiment “which set itself far above all the moral laws of life,” by no means follows, as has already been remarked in Sec. 2, from the polemic of the Epistle.—Against the assertion of Baur, that even the *form of the polemic* is decisive against the genuineness of the Epistle, since “nothing further is said than just that the false teachers of Docetism are antichristians,” it is to be observed that the main force of the apostle’s polemic throughout does not con-

the presupposition of Christian faith,” and therefore that the σπῆρμα is, according to him, “the metaphysical ground of existence” from which faith proceeds. But if the distinction between the τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ and the τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου has, according to the author, a metaphysical ground lying beyond faith, and if the former, by virtue of the σπῆρμα which is peculiar to them by nature, cannot sin—how does this accord with the Soteriology which is so clearly expressed in the Epistle, and according to which Christ is the ἰλασμός περὶ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν, and the blood of Christ cleanses us ἀπὸ πάσης ἁμαρτίας?—In this article also Hilgenfeld derives the “repeated assurance that God is love,” from the influence of Gnosticism on the author, without any regard to the close connection with the fundamental essential truth of Christianity in which this is brought forward by the author.

sist in negation, but in the positive presentment of the truth, in the light of which the antagonistic doctrine is manifested as a lie (see on this the excellent exposition of Thiersch, *Versuch*, etc., p. 255).

The spuriousness of the Epistle (as also of the Gospel, and of John's two other Epistles) also follows, according to Hilgenfeld (article of 1855), from *the relation of these writings to the Apocalypse*. While, namely, he presupposes the genuineness of the latter, he maintains that "the contrast between it and the Epistles must not be ignored," and that "the latter occupy a middle place between the two most extreme contrasts of the Apocalypse and the Gospel." The contrast is seen, according to him, 1st, in the language (in the Epistles not indeed an Attic, but an easy and versatile Greek style; in the Apocalypse, on the other hand, a strongly Hebraizing impress), and 2dly, in the sphere of thought, although he recognises "between the spheres of thought on both sides very essential points of contact." But against these instances it is to be observed—1. That the composition of the Apocalypse by the Apostle John is by no means so surely established as Hilgenfeld assumes, and is certainly not to be proved by stating that it is the product of a still judaistically-narrowed mode of conception; 2. That in the explanation of the Hebrew-coloured style of the Apocalypse, attention is to be paid to the fact that it stands in close connection with O. T. prophecy; 3. That the appearance of the contrast, alleged by Hilgenfeld, between the spheres of thought on both sides, disappears when with the necessary critical impartiality they are taken hold of with consideration of the entire individual elements which constitute them.¹

¹ Hilgenfeld proceeds uncritically in his demonstration of the contrast between the spheres of thought, inasmuch as he not only adduces, as antithetical, ideas which are not so, but also ascribes to one or the other writing views which are not contained in it. The former is, for example, the case when he thinks that the idea of an *angry* God, as is peculiar to the Apocalypse, and the idea of a God who is *love*, as we find it expressed in the Epistle, contradict one another; or when he asserts that the conception of the divine justice, according to which it is shown as the punishment of the wicked, is in contradiction to that, according to which it appears as the forgiveness of sins: when he supposes a contrast between the representation of the apocalyptic judgment and the idea of the spiritual victory of the Christian over the devil and the world, accomplished by means of morality and faith. He does the latter when, for example, he says

As the internal tests, which have been asserted to be opposed to the genuineness of the Epistle, do not prove the alleged spuriousness, as the Epistle much rather bears on the face of it quite the impress of an apostolic writing, as it also—as even Hilgenfeld admits—“belongs to the writings of the N. T., the genuineness of which was never disputed in the ancient church, and the chain of witnesses who have made use of it begins as far back as Papias,” the composition of it by the Apostle John is as surely established as it can ever be.

SEC. 4.—THE READERS; TIME AND PLACE OF COMPOSITION.

1. *The Readers.*—Augustin says in his *Quaest. Evang.* ii. 39, when he is quoting the passage 1 John iii. 2: scriptum est a Joanne in *Epistola ad Parthos*; this more particular determination of the Epistle is also found (only, however, in the Benedictine edition of Augustin's works) in the superscription of his treatises on the Epistle; and similarly in Possidius, in his *Indiculus operum S. Augustini*, as he introduces those treatises with the words: de ep. Joannis ad Parthos sermones decem. The same statement, it is true, frequently appears later; thus in the work of Vigilius Tapsensis (end of the fifth century), published under the name of Idacius Clarus, *contra Varimadum Arianum*; in Cassiodorus, *de institut. divin. script.* c. 14, who, however, refers the words ad Parthos to all the three Epistles; in Col. 62 of Griesb. and in several lat. codd. (see Guericke,

that the Apocalypse considers “the political world-power of the Roman Empire” as Antichrist, whereas the name ἀντίχριστος is never once mentioned in the Apocalypse; or when he ascribes to the Epistle the idea of a metaphysical antagonism between the children of God and the children of the devil, which is found in the Gnostics. — For the rest, it must not be denied that the difference in character between the Apocalypse and the other writings of John is considerable enough to allow the view, that it does not proceed from the same author, to appear not unjustified. While that difference, on the one side, is often not sufficiently estimated, on the other side, with the object of bringing it more clearly out, the mistake is not infrequently made, of not keeping strictly enough within the truth. But, as may hold good of the origin of the Apocalypse also, the Gospel and the First Epistle of John are too strongly attested, both by their whole character and by the external evidences, as writings of the Apostle John, to allow their genuineness to be denied on account of the Apocalypse.

Gesammtgesch. des N. T. 1854, p. 486, note 2); but the whole Greek Church, and similarly the Latin Church before Augustin, knows nothing of it.¹ It is therefore of no importance even for the determination of the original readers of the Epistle (against Grotius), nay, it cannot even be said that in it was retained an old tradition in regard to the determination of the Epistle or the activity of John (Baumgarten-Crusius), and still less that it "refers to its designation for Further and Central Asia, as formerly Persian lands" (Guericke as above, p. 487). It might no doubt be possible that Augustin thereby expressed *his own* conjecture (Michaelis), but then he would hardly have proceeded with the Epistle under this designation *without further remark*. Perhaps a mistake is at the bottom of it. Some critics assume a corruption of the reading in Augustin; Serrarius conjectures as the original reading: ad Pathmios; Wetstein: ad sparsos; Semler: adpertius. Most explain the words as originating in a Greek expression; quite arbitrarily, Paulus (*Heidelb. Jahrb.* 1832, p. 1071) thinks they might have arisen through misunderstanding of a probable inscription *πρὸς πάντας*; it is more natural to have recourse, with most critics, to the Greek word *παρθένος*, and to regard ad Parthos as originating in *πρὸς παρθένους*. Whiston considers *πρὸς παρθένους* as the description of the yet uncorrupted, virgin condition of the churches of John; according to Hug's view, the inscription of some manuscripts of the Second Epistle: *πρὸς πάρθους* (i.e. *πρὸς παρθένους*), was transferred to the First Epistle, because that designation was regarded as unsuitable to the Second Epistle; Gieseler (*Lehrbuch der Kirchengesch.* 4th ed. vol. I. Pt. 1, p. 139, note 1), with whom Lücke (3d ed. p. 52 f.) agrees, supposes that the inscription of the First and of the Second Epistle was: *ἐπιστολὴ Ἰωάννου τοῦ παρθένου*; this is certainly not found in any codex of the Epistle, but the inscription of the Apocalypse in *Cod. Guelfherit.* (30 of Griesb.) runs thus: *τοῦ ἁγίου . . . ἀποστόλου καὶ εὐαγγελιστοῦ*

¹ Against this fact the strange remark of Bede in the *Prologus super septem epistolas canonicas* (printed in *Care's Script. eccl. hist. B. C. C.*): *Multi scriptorum ecclesiasticorum, in quibus est S. Athanasius, primam ejus (i.e. Joannis) epistolam scriptam ad Parthos esse testantur*, cannot of course be regarded as of any weight.

παρθένου ἡγαπημένου ἐπιστηθίου Ἰωάννου θεολόγου. The simplest supposition might be that Augustin misunderstood the remark of Clemens Alex. (*Opp.* ed. Potter. *Fragm.* 1011) that the Second Epistle was written πρὸς παρθένας (*ad virgines*)—(see *Intro.* to Second and Third Epistle, Sec. 1)—and then by mistake referred it to the First Epistle.—But whatever be the origin of this *ad Parthos*, it can be of no value as an historical evidence for the original place of destination of the Epistle. As John, according to the unquestionable accounts of antiquity, after the death of the Apostle Paul, took up his place in Asia Minor; and as in Asia Minor, as the Epistle to the Colossians testifies, heretical tendencies of Gnostic character already appeared at an early date,—it is to be assumed, with most critics, that the Epistle was originally directed to the churches of Asia Minor; not to *one* of them (according to Hug, to that of Ephesus), but as ἐπιστολὴ ἐγκυκλική (*Occ.*) to several (perhaps to “John’s Ephesian circle of churches,” Lücke), perhaps to all of those to which the personal activity of the apostle extended, for the Epistle would otherwise certainly touch at individual circumstances of the single church.¹ It is clearly quite arbitrary to regard as its place of destination, with Benson, Palestine, or, with Lightfoot, Corinth.

2. *The Place of Composition.*—This is just as little stated in the Epistle as the place of destination; the prevailing opinion, that John wrote it in Ephesus, has at least nothing against it. Hug and Ebrard, who regard it—though without tenable reason—as a companion work of the Gospel, suppose that it was written with the latter in Patmos; but even though the statement is found in some of the later Fathers, that the Gospel was written in Patmos, the *more ancient* tradition names Ephesus as its place of composition; comp. Meyer’s *Comment. on the Gospel*, 3d ed. p. 39.—Hug appeals also to 2 John 12 and 13, 3 John 13; unwarrantably, however, for a want of writing materials is here in no way hinted at.

¹ Hilgenfeld thinks that the Epistle was addressed to the whole of orthodox Christendom, in so far as it did not belong to the immediate sphere of the apostle’s labours; but even if the apostle mentions no specific limit of his sphere of readers, such a limit is nevertheless indicated in the warning reference to the Docetan heresy.

3. *The Time of Composition.*—That the Epistle belongs, not to the earlier, but to the later apostolic time, *i.e.* the time after the departure of the Apostle Paul, is not to be disputed. The whole tone in which it is written leaves us in no mistake as to the advanced age of the writer; moreover, the somewhat prolonged existence of the Christian churches to which it is addressed is brought out pretty clearly; and there is the additional fact that the antagonism between Jewish and Gentile Christianity is no longer the subject, and that the Docetism therein opposed points also to the later time. With this corresponds the tradition, according to which it was written by John during his sojourn in Ephesus. As, however, the tradition states indeed the end (Iren. *Hær.* iii. 3, 4, in Euseb. iv. 14: *Ἰωάννου δὲ παραμείναντος αὐτοῖς μέχρι τοῦ Τραϊανοῦ χρόνων*), but not the beginning of this sojourn, the time of composition of the Epistle is only indefinitely fixed by it. This much only seems to be indisputable, that John first settled in Ephesus after the death of the Apostle Paul, in order from there to direct the churches of Asia Minor, especially those in the proconsulate; against which, the view that he remained in that city until the destruction of Jerusalem (Ewald, *Gesch. d. Volkes Israel*, VII. p. 202 ff.) lacks any certain ground. The composition of the Epistle *before* the destruction of Jerusalem, Grotius, Hammond, and Düsterdieck infer from chap. ii. 18; Ziegler, Fritzsche, and others, from the circumstance that that event, so important for Christianity, is not mentioned in the Epistle. But ii. 18 refers, indeed, to the nearness of the Parousia of Christ, not, however, to the fall of Jerusalem; that even later the time reaching to the Parousia of Christ was considered as the “last time,” is shown by the passage in *Ignat. ep. ad Ephes.* c. xi.: *ἔσχατοι καιροὶ λοιπὸν αἰσχυρθῶμεν, φοβηθῶμεν τὴν μακροθυμίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα μὴ ἡμῖν εἰς κρίμα γένηται*. And that the destruction of Jerusalem is not mentioned might be explained in this way, that when the Epistle was written a considerable time might have already elapsed since that event. Most commentators place the composition in the time *after* the destruction of Jerusalem, especially because, as they think, the state of the churches brought out in the Epistle was such as was appropriate only to the end of the apostolic age.

But even this conclusion is at least not *quite* sure, since even already Paul in his later Epistles had to take notice of moral indifferentism, nay, Antinomianism and Gnostic error;¹ and the disturbing influence of the judaistically-inclined Christians on the Gentile-Christian churches must be regarded as already overcome by the labours of the Apostle Paul, inasmuch as even Paul himself does not combat it in his later Epistles in the way in which he had done in the earlier ones. Thiersch appeals, in favour of a comparatively late appearance of the Epistle, to this, that according to chap. ii. 19, "the separation of the heretics from the Christian community was already accomplished," though they still, according to the Epistle of Jude, revelled at the Agapæ; but, on the one hand, it is to be observed that from the former passage it is not clear how far a *formal* separation was at that time already carried out (the church-forming activity of the heretics belongs first to the second century); and, on the other hand, it is at least uncertain whether John and Jude had to do with heretics of the same kind, for the one class are depicted as Antinomians, the other as Docetans.—Ebrard fixes as the time of composition the year 95 aer. Dion.; his reasons for this are: the Epistle was written at the same time as the Gospel, as its dedicatory Epistle; the Gospel was composed at Patmos; John was at Patmos in the 15th year of Domitian; but these premisses lack any certain foundation.—By most critics it is considered that the Epistle was written later than the Gospel, and that the latter was written after the destruction of Jerusalem. As regards the first part, appeal is made in its favour especially to this, that in the Epistle reference is sometimes made to the Gospel. This, however, is not the case; there is (as Bleek, as above, also remarks) in the whole Epistle not *a single* passage which assumes the *written* Gospel as *known*² (Guericke). It would seem on the face of it more probable that John, induced by the false teachers, first wrote

¹ Still it cannot remain unobserved, that the heretics, against whom Paul directs his polemic, are never accused of Docetism; that Cerinthus probably appeared only towards the end of the apostolic age; and that the heretical error which the Ignatian Epistles contend against was of specially Docetan character.

² Reuss (as above, p. 218) rightly says: "For us the Epistle requires the Gospel as a commentary; but as it once had this in the oral instruction of its author it is not thereby proved that it is the later."

the Epistle to warn and exhort the churches entrusted to him, and then wrote the Gospel for entire Christendom, as "a consecrated record of the historical foundation of salvation" (Thiersch), than that he first wrote the latter and then the former.¹ Some of the very passages by which it is thought the dependence of the Epistle upon the Gospel can be proved seem to tell in favour of this. The passage, 1 John i. 1-4, appears, when compared with Gospel i. 1 ff., to be not the later, but the earlier one, since the apostle in the former is still striving to give to the idea the suitable expression, whereas in the latter he has already found it. None the less, compared with the expression "*ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*," is the expression "*Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθώς*" the more indefinite, and therefore no doubt the earlier. Besides, the affinity of the two works permits the conjecture that the dates of their composition do not lie far from one another (comp. Bleek, p. 590; differently Brückner), especially as this appears not only in their peculiar character, but also in the form, to such an extent that not only do they both begin with a Prooemium containing the same ideas, but even the thoughts expressed at the close completely correspond with each other: Gospel of John xx. 31: *ταῦτα δὲ γέγραπται, ἵνα πιστεύσητε, ὅτι ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστὸς, ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ ἵνα πιστεύοντες ζωὴν ἔχητε ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ*, and 1 John v. 13: *ταῦτα ἔγραψα ὑμῖν, ἵνα εἰδῆτε, ὅτι ζωὴν αἰώνιον ἔχετε οἱ πιστεύοντες εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ*.—As regards the second point, no exact proof can indeed be drawn from the Gospel itself in favour of its composition *after* the destruction of Jerusalem;² but, on the other hand, there lies in this no ground to contradict the old tradition, that John wrote it in his more advanced age. It is also not improbable that

¹ What Thiersch (*Versuch f. d. Kritik*, p. 79) says generally: "As a general rule, the proposition may be proved to be historically true, that the writings of momentary design, to which most of the Epistles belong, appeared earlier, and the writings of permanent design, especially the Gospels, later,"—may also be applied to the relation of the Gospel and the Epistle of John.

² From the use of *ἔτι* in the passages of the Gospel of John xi. 18, xviii. 1, xix. 41, nothing can be inferred, as it is entirely explained "by the context of historical narrative;" on the other hand, however, the *ἔτι* John v. 2, does not prove that Jerusalem was not yet destroyed at the time when John wrote this, for John in his account of the past event might represent to himself that which no longer existed as still existing (comp. Ebrard, *Comment.* p. 40 ff.).

it was not already circulated in the lifetime of the apostle ; at least it is more natural to suppose that the 21st chapter was added to it immediately on its appearance than later, when it had already become a possession of the Christian churches.¹ In *that* case, John composed the Gospel as a legacy for the age after his death ; hence, however, it would result as to the Epistle, that it also was written only in the advanced age of the apostle, although before the Gospel. True, the apostle nowhere says that his readers **have** heard the Gospel *from him*, often though he speaks of their acquaintance with it, nor is there any passage from which it could be proved that he himself already laboured among them in person ; but from this the conclusion cannot be drawn, that " John composed the Epistle when he took up his place in Asia Minor after the death of the Apostle Paul, and indeed in order, by means of it as a pastoral Epistle, to introduce his labours there " (1st ed. of this comment.) ; for, on the one hand, such a purpose of the Epistle is nowhere hinted at ; and, on the other hand, that circumstance might arise from this, that the Epistle was not exclusively destined for *those* churches in which the apostle had already laboured by oral preaching, but was equally for others which he had not yet visited. On impartial consideration of all points, it appears probable that the Epistle of John was written in the last quarter of the apostolic age.

¹ Ewald (*Gesch. Israels*, VII. p. 217 ff.) thinks that the Gospel was written about the year 80, but was first circulated later, shortly before the death of John, with the supplementary chap. xxi. added by him ; and that the First Epistle was written later than the Gospel, though independently of it, but was circulated earlier than it, immediately after its composition. For this, however, there is quite as little certain proof as there is for the opinion that both the Gospel and the Epistle of John were composed only at the special urgency of his friends.

Ἰωάννου ἐπιστολὴ α'.

IN A B the superscription runs: Ἰωάννου (B.: -ανου) ᾧ; in other codl.: ἐπιστολὴ Ἰωάννου πρῶτη. The *Rec.* is: Ἰωάννου τοῦ ἀποστόλου ἐπιστολὴ καθολικὴ πρῶτη.

CHAPTER I.

Ver. 1. Instead of ἐωράκαμεν, Tisch. 7 has, both here and hereafter, and iii. 6, iv. 20, accepted the form ἴορ.; on this form, see Ph. Buttmann, *Ausf. griech. Gramm.* 1819, § 84, Anm. 11, note; Al. Buttmann (p. 56) says: "The form ἐώρακα, it is true, is often presented by the mss., but has not, up to the present, been received by the editors." — Ver. 2. Cod. B has before ἐωράκαμεν the relative ὁ, perhaps through mistake from vv. 1 and 3; even Buttm. has not accepted it. — Ver. 3. ἀπαγγέλλομεν ὑμῖν] *Rec.*, according to G K and several others, Copt. and others, Oec. Aug. Beda (Tisch.); according to A B C, however, with Lachm., a καὶ is to be inserted after ἀπαγγέλλομεν,—it seems to have been omitted as superfluous on account of the following ἵνα καὶ ὑμεῖς; in Thph. it reads: καὶ ἀπαγγέλλομεν ὑμῖν; so also s, in which it reads: ἀκηκ. καὶ ἐωράκ. καὶ ἀπαγγέλλομεν. — Ver. 4. Instead of γράφομεν ὑμῖν (*Rec.* Tisch. Lachm. ed. maj.), A* B s read γράφομεν ἡμεῖς (Lachm. ed. min. Buttm.); Lücke, de Wette, Ewald, and Reiche consider this reading as unsuitable; differently Brückner; the change of ἡμεῖς to ὑμῖν can at any rate be more easily explained than that of ὑμῖν to ἡμεῖς. — ἡ χάρις ὑμῶν] *Rec.*, according to A C K, several others, Copt. etc. etc. (Tisch.); Lachm., following B G s and others, reads ἡμῶν; hardly correct. — Ver. 5. καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη] according to B C G K s and others, Syr. Thph. Oec. (Tisch.), instead of the *Rec.* καὶ αὕτη ἐστίν, according to A, Vulg. (Lachm.). The *Rec.* is an alteration of the original reading; comp. ii. 25, iii. 11. — ἀγγελία] so Lachm. and Tisch. (approved of by Reiche and most modern commentators), following almost the entire number of authorities: A B G K, by far the most of the others (Thph. in Comm. Oec.), instead of the *Rec.* ἐπαγγελία, which only a few codices support; perhaps C; according to Lachm. C has ἀγγελία; according to Tisch.:

ἐπαγγελία. Paulus considers *ἀγγελία* as an explanatory gloss from iii. 11; so de Wette; but, on the contrary, *ἐπαγγελία* is a correction of *ἀγγελία*, which otherwise does not appear in the N. T. except in iii. 11, where, however, the same correction is found. The original reading of Σ is *ἀπαγγελίας*; later it corrects this to *ἀγγελία*; others have corrected it to *ἀγάπη τῆς ἐπαγγελίας*. Socin thinks that *ἐπαγγελία* should be read. — Ver. 7. Instead of *ἀλλήλων*, A* (?) Tol. some lat. codices, Aeth. Clem. Didym. Tert. read *αὐτοῦ*, which is plainly a correction, as *ἀλλήλων* does not seem conformable to the train of thought; see the comment. on this passage. After *Ἰησοῦ* the *Rec.*, following A G K and others, Vulg. etc., has *Χριστοῦ*, which is wanting in B C Σ ; Lachm. and Tisch. have omitted it; Reiche would have it retained; the addition is easily explained, comp. v. 3. — Ver. 8. Instead of *οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν* (*Rec.* after B G Σ , Vulg. etc.), Lachm. and Tisch., following A C K and others, read *ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἔστιν*; perhaps the former is a correction, after ver. 10. — Ver. 9. Instead of *καθαρίσει* is found, in A, h. some min. (perhaps also in C**): *καθαρίσει*, which, however, has too little evidence to be regarded as genuine.

Vv. 1-4. Introduction of the Epistle: statement of the subject of the apostolic proclamation and of the aim of this writing. The construction of the periods is not carried out conformably to rule. The relative clauses beginning with *ὅ* form the object of a verbal idea, which is just as little directly expressed as the subject which belongs to it; nay, more, with *περί* the period that was begun breaks off, and with *καὶ ἡ ζωὴ* (which refers back to the preceding *τῆς ζωῆς*) begins a new period consisting of two principal members. In the new sentence, ver. 3, the object, expressed in relative form, is placed before the finite verb, which contains in itself the subject. The parts of the sentence in ver. 1, beginning with *ὅ*, are co-ordinate with each other; it is grammatically impossible to take the first part as subject and the following parts as the predicate of it (Cappellus: quod erat ab initio hoc ipsum est, quod audivimus, etc.); as far as regards the sense, it is unsuitable to find in *ἐψηλάφησαν* the verb which governs the preceding objective clauses (Paulus: "that which was, etc., which we have seen, our hands also have touched"). The governing verb cannot be contained in ver. 2 either, for the verbs of this verse have their object near them in *τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον*. As *ὁ ἐώρακαμεν κ. ἀκηκόαμεν*, ver. 3, shows

itself to be the resumption of the objective clauses of ver. 1, —only in more abridged form,—it is to be assumed that ἀπαγγέλλομεν, ver. 3, is the verb which was before the apostle's mind from the very beginning, from the immediate addition of which he was, however, prevented by feeling himself constrained to define the object more precisely by the appositional addition περὶ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ζωῆς. As he was then induced by τῆς ζωῆς to the parenthetical continuation in ver. 2, he made the finite verb follow after he had first resumed the object.

Ver. 1. ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς] This thought, indefinite in itself, is more fully explained by the following relative clauses to this extent, that "that which was from the beginning" is identical with that which was the subject of perception by the apostle's senses. But from the appositional adjunct περὶ κ.τ.λ. and the parenthetical sentence, ver. 2, it follows that John understands by it the λόγος τῆς ζωῆς or the ζωή, and more exactly the ζωὴ ἡ αἰώνιος, which was with the Father and was manifested. That the apostle, however, does not thereby mean a mere abstraction, but a real personality, is clear, first from ὁ ἀκηκόσαμεν κ.τ.λ. and ἐφανερώθη, and then especially from the comparison with the prooemium of the Gospel of John, with which what is said here is in such conformity that it cannot be doubted that by ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς the same subject is meant as is there spoken of as ὁ λόγος. The neuter form does not entitle us to understand by ὁ ἦν κ.τ.λ., with the Greek commentators Theophylact, Oecumenius, and the Scholiasts, the "μυστήριον of God," namely, ὅτι Θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί, or even, with Grotius, the "res a Deo destinatae." Nor does de Wette's interpretation: "that which appeared in Christ, which was from eternity, the eternal divine life," correspond with the representation of the apostle, according to which the ζωὴ not only was manifested in Christ, but is Christ Himself. By far the greatest number of commentators interpret ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς correctly of the personal Christ. The reason why John did not write ὅς (comp. chap. ii. 13: τὸν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς), but ὁ, cannot, with several commentators (Erdmann, Lücke, Ebrard¹),

¹ Lücke gives this explanation of the neuter: that John, "seeking to express briefly the idea of the Gospel, combines in this idea the person of Christ, as the incarnate Logos, with His whole history and work." — Erdmann first remarks:

be found in this, that John means not only the person in itself, but at the same time its whole history, all that it did and experienced, for $\eta\upsilon \acute{\alpha}\pi' \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta\varsigma$ (synonymous with $\acute{\epsilon}\nu \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta\iota$ $\eta\upsilon$, Gospel of John i. 1) is decisive as to the historical manifestation of Christ. Nor is it, with Düsterdieck, to be found in this, "because only this form (the neuter) is wide and flexible enough to bear at the same time the two conceptions of the one . . . object, the conception of the premundane existence and that of the historical manifestation," for then each of the four δ 's would have to embrace in itself both these ideas, which, however, is not the case. But neither is it, with Hofmann (*Schriftbeweis*, ed. 2, I. p. 112), this: "because John just wants to describe only the subject of the apostolic proclamation as such;" for this is not the order, that John first describes the subject of the apostolic proclamation only generally, and "then" defines it more particularly, but $\delta \eta\upsilon \acute{\alpha}\pi' \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta\varsigma$ is itself the more particular definition of the subject of the proclamation. Nor, finally, is it, with Weiss, this, that the apostle does not here mean the Son of God Himself, but "that which constituted the eternal being of the Son," namely life; for, on the one hand, nothing here points to a distinction of the Son and His being, and, on the other hand, it is not the being of the Son which the apostle heard, saw, handled, but the Son Himself. The neuter is rather to be explained in this way, that to the apostle Christ is "the life" itself; but this idea *in itself* is an abstract (or general) idea.¹ True, the apostle could

Forma neutrius generis generalis notio e contextis atque Joannis dicendi ratione facile definienda, ad personam Christi aperte referenda significatur, nec solum vis et amplitudo sententiae apte notatur, sed etiam illo δ quater repetito orationis sublimitati concinnitas additur; and then continues: Praeterea meminerimus, non solum Christi personam per se spectatam hic designari, verum etiam omnia, quae per vitam humanam ab eo perfecta et profecta, acta, dicta, etc. λόγον in eo apparuisse comprobant. — With this the opinion of Ebrard agrees, that δ shows that the person was not to be proclaimed qua person, not as an abstraction, but in its historical manifestation. Against this, however, it is a valid objection, that John in $\delta \eta\upsilon \acute{\alpha}\pi' \acute{\alpha}\rho\chi\eta\varsigma$ has plainly in his view the Logos not *in*, but *before* its historical manifestation. — When Erdmann appeals, in favour of John's reference of the neuter to persons, to the passages, Gospel of John iii. 6, vi. 39, xvii. 2, 1 John iv. 4, it is, on the other hand, to be observed that in all these passages the neuter serves to combine the single individuals into a whole that embraces the entirety of them, which permits of no application to the use of δ here.

¹ Ebrard rejects this explanation as quite erroneous, and as being in contradiction with the acceptance of the verse otherwise. The rashness of this

have written even *ὅς* instead of the neuter; but as Christ has His peculiar importance just in this, that He is the Life itself (not merely a living individual),—comp. Gospel of John xiv. 6, —and as John begins his Epistle filled with this conception, it was more natural for him to write here *ὅ* than *ὅς*.¹ By *ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* John describes Christ as Him who, although at a particular time He was the object of perception by sense, has been from all eternity; the imperfect *ἦν*, however, does not express the premundane, eternal existence, but is explained in this way, that John speaks historically, looking backwards from the point of time at which Christ had become the object of sensuous perception. — *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*] has frequently in the N. T. its more particular determination along with it, as in Mark xiii. 19, 2 Pet. iii. 4: *τῆς κτίσεως*, or it is easily discovered from the context, as in Acts xxvi. 4. In the passage 2 Thess. ii. 13, *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* corresponds to the expression used in Eph. i. 4: *πρὸ καταβολῆς κόσμου*, and is identical with the German “von Ewigkeit her” (from all eternity), for which elsewhere is said: *ἀπὸ τῶν αἰώνων* (Eph. iii. 9), or similar words. Here it is explained by the following *ἦτις ἦν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα*. This existence of Christ with the Father precedes not merely His appearance in the flesh, but also the creation of the world, for according to John i. 2 the world was made by Him; *ἀρχή* is therefore not the moment of the beginning of the world, as it is frequently interpreted, but what preceded it (comp. Meyer on Gospel of John i. 1); Christ was *before* the world was, and is therefore not first from the beginning of the world, as Christ Himself in John xvii. 5 speaks of a *δόξα* which He had with the Father *πρὸ τοῦ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι*.²

judgment is clearly evident from the question which he adds: “Where would there be even the shadow of a grammatical reference of *ὅ* to *ζωῆς*?” for a grammatical reference is not and could not be asserted. — Bertheau’s objection (Lücke, *Comment.* ed. 3, p. 206 f.), that “we would still have to regard the neuter form as a general comprehensive expression which refers both to that to which the apostle ascribes a primeval existence and to that which he has heard with his ears,” etc., is not tenable, for it rests on the unproved assumption that *ὁ λόγος* π. ζ. is not identical with that which the apostle regarded as the object of the *ἀκούειν* π. δ.

¹ It is unsuitable to explain the ζ, with Braune, in this way, that the apostle, “in view of the mysterious sublimity . . . wrote in a flight and feeling of indefiniteness.”

² That the *λόγος* before the creation of the world was immanent in God, but

The apostle says here ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, because he is looking back from the time when Christ by His incarnation became the object of sensuous perception (similarly Ebrard). It is incorrect either to change the idea of εἶναι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς into that of existence in the predetermined plan,¹ by which the words are strained, or to interpret ἀρχή here of the beginning of the public activity of Christ in the flesh (Seinler, Paulus, and others), by which the connection with ver. 2 is ignored. — δ ἀκηκόαμεν κ.τ.λ.] By the four sentences the apostle expresses the thought that that which was from the beginning was the subject of his own perception; the main purpose of them is not "to put forward that which is to be proclaimed about Christ as absolutely certain and self-experienced" (Ebrard), but to bring out and to establish the identity of that which was from the beginning with that which was manifested in the flesh, while he has at the same time in his view the Docetan heresy afterwards mentioned by him.² By the ὃ with which these sentences begin, nothing else, therefore, is meant than by the ὃ of the first sentence, namely Christ Himself (Brückner, Braune); and here the peculiar paradox is to be noticed, which lies in this, that the general (ἡ ζωή) is represented by the apostle as something perceived by his senses. It is erroneous to understand by each of these ὃ's something different; thus by the first (with ἀκηκόαμεν), perhaps the testimony which was expressed by God Himself (Grotius), or by the law and the prophets (Oecumenius), or by John the Baptist (Nicolas de Lyra), or even the words which Christ uttered (Ebrard); by the second ὃ (with ἐωράκαμεν), the miracles of Christ (Ebrard); by the third ὃ (with ἐθεασάμεθα), tot et tauta miracula (Grotius), or even "the divine glory of Christ" (Ebrard); and by the ὃ which is to be supplied with ἐψηλάφησαν, the

by the accomplishment of the act of creation hypostatically proceeded from God (see Meyer on Gospel of John i. 1), is an idea nowhere hinted at in scripture.

¹ Grotius: eae res, quas apostoli sensibus suis percipere, fuerunt a Deo destinae jam ab ipso mundi primordio.

² Erdmann: Jam etiam clarum fit, cur tam diserte . . . testem oculatum et auritum se significare studeat, scilicet primum ut veritatem et certitudinem verbi aeterni in Christo manifestati sensibusque humanis percepti adversus contrariam pseudodoctorum doctrinam . . . confirmet, deinde ut sui praeconii apostolici fidem et auctoritatem in ipsa sensuum experientia fundatam ab insolentia illorum vindicet.

resurrection-body of Christ (Ebrard), or, still more arbitrarily, the panes multiplicatos, Lazarum, etc. (Grotius); all these supplementary ideas, which have originated in the incorrect assumption that John refers here to "the various sides of Christ's appearance in the flesh," and which can easily be confounded with others, are utterly unjustified, since they are in no way hinted at in the context. John does not mean here to say that he has experienced this or that in Christ, but that he has heard, seen, looked upon, and handled Christ Himself. In the succession of the four verbs there lies an unmistakable gradation (a Lapide: *gradatim crescit oratio*); from ἀκηκόαμεν to ἐώρακάμεν a climax occurs, in so far as we are more certainly and immediately convinced of the reality of an appearance of sense by sight than by hearing; the addition of the words τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ἡμῶν is not, as Lorinus already remarks, a περισσολογία or βαττολογία, but there is in them "plainly an aiming at emphasis, as: to see with one's own eyes" (Winer, p. 535, VII. p. 564). The third verb ἐθεασάμεθα must not here be taken—with Bede and Ebrard—in the sense of *spiritual* beholding, by which it is removed from the sphere to which the other verbs belong; it is rather of similar signification with ἐώρακάμεν—in this respect, that, equally with the latter, it indicates the seeing with the bodily eyes. The difference does not, however, lie in this, that θεᾶσθαι = μετὰ θαύματος καὶ θάμβους ὁρᾶν (Occumenius, a Lapide, Hornejus, etc.), or = attente cum gaudio et admiratione conspiciere (Blackwell), by which significations are put into the word which are foreign to it in itself, but in this, that it has in it the suggestion of *intention*.¹ It is to be remarked that ἐθεασάμεθα is closely connected with the following καὶ αἱ χεῖρες ἡμῶν ἐψηλάφησαν; for ὅ is not repeated here, and both verbs are in the aorist, so that they thus go to form a sort of contrast to the two preceding clauses; whilst ἀκούειν and ὁρᾶν express rather the involuntary perception, θεᾶσθαι and ψηλάφειν express acts of voluntary design,—the former the purposed beholding, the latter the purposed touching of the object in order to convince oneself of its reality and of its nature. As

¹ This force Lücke brings out correctly: "Where the expressions are used as contrasted, ὁρᾶν signifies altogether the objective seeing, but θεᾶσθαι the *designed*, continued beholding."

both these parts of the clause remind us of the words of the risen Christ: *ψηλαφήσατέ με καὶ ἴδετε* (Luke xxiv. 39), it is not improbable that John had in his mind the beholding and touching of the Risen One, only it must be maintained at the same time that Christ was one and the same to him before and after His resurrection. In this view, the transition from the perfect to the aorist is naturally explained in this way, that the apostle in the last verbs refers to single definite acts.¹ The plural *ἀκηκόαμεν κ.τ.λ.* is not plur. majestaticus, but is used because John, although he speaks of himself as subject, still at the same time embraces in his consciousness the other apostles as having had the same experience as himself. — *περὶ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ζωῆς*] is not dependent on any of the preceding verbs;² it is also inadmissible to explain *περί* here, with Brückner, in the sense in which it is used in 1 Cor. xvi. 1, 12, namely, in order to mark the transition to something new; not only the sense, but also the position of *περί* prohibits this signification; it is an additional clause in apposition to the preceding descriptions of the object, by which it is stated to what *ὃ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, ὃ ἀκηκόαμεν* refers. The expression *ὁ λόγος τῆς ζωῆς* may be in itself a description of the Gospel (so it is taken by Grotius, Semler, Frommann, Ewald, de Wette, Brückner, Düsterdieck, etc.), and *τῆς ζωῆς* either gen. obj. (1 Cor. i. 18; 2 Cor. v. 19), or *gen. qualitatis* (Phil. ii. 16; Gospel of John vi. 68); but this acceptation is refuted, first,

¹ Düsterdieck rightly remarks that the change of the tenses does not here originate in an indefiniteness. His view, however, "that the transition from the perfect to the aorist is to be explained in this way, that the nearer the apostle's discourse comes to the definite historical force of *ἐξημερώθη*, the more it takes the historical form," is untenable, for *ἀκούειν* and *ὄρν* stand to *ἐξημερώθη* in no other relation than *θεῖσθαι* and *ψηλαφῆν*. Brückner opposes the view indicated above, being of opinion that the perfect emphasizes "the certain effect," the aorist, on the other hand, "the historical event;" but why would John there emphasize the former and here the latter, if this were not to be explained by the distinction which we have stated?

² S. G. Lange construes *περί* with the first sentence: *ὃ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, so that the sense that results to him, explaining *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* = "from the beginning of His ministry," and *εἶναι* = "fieri, to happen," is: "that which happened from the beginning in connection with our Lord, the Word of life!" — Not less extraordinary is the explanation of Paulus: "what in general was thus in regard to the Logos; what we, in regard to Him, heard, saw, etc., that also, in regard to Him, these hands of ours have touched," namely, "the human body which here contained Him as the Logos come down from above."

by the preposition *περί*, instead of which the simple accusative would have had to be put, for John proclaimed not *about* the gospel, but the gospel itself (*ἀπαγγέλλομεν*, ver. 3); then by the close connection of this additional clause with the preceding objective clauses; and, finally, by the analogy with the prooemium of the Gospel of John (ver. 1: *ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος*; ver. 4: *ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν*). These reasons, which are opposed to that explanation, are in favour of the explanation of Hornejus: hic non denotatur sermo s. verbum evangelii, sed Christus, which is also that of most commentators. The opinion of Düsterdieck, that "as John (according to ver. 2) considered the Logos itself as *ἡ ζωή, ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, the λόγος in the composition *ὁ λόγος τῆς ζωῆς* cannot again be the personal Logos," is overthrown by this, that *τῆς ζωῆς* in itself is not the name of a person, but of a thing, just as in Gospel of John i. 4, *ζωή* in the clause *ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν*, and *τὸ φῶς τ. ἀνθρ.* in the clause *καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τ. ἀνθρ.* Even *ὁ λόγος* is the name of a thing; not, indeed, that we should understand by it, first, "the word, which was preached by the apostles," and then, because this has Christ as its subject, "Christ Himself," as Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* ed. 2, I. p. 109 ff.) thinks, for the subject of a word cannot be called the *Word* (comp. Meyer on Gospel of John i. 1¹), but *ὁ λόγος* signifies, in the province of religious thought, *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, the Word by which God expressed Himself *ἐν ἀρχῇ*. Though John of course knows that this *Word* is the personal Christ, yet in this expression *in itself* the idea of personality is not yet brought out. This being the case, we will have to understand the compound phrase: *ὁ λόγος τῆς ζωῆς*, first of all as *the name of a thing*;² so that John in this description, which in itself

¹ The identification of the ideas: *κείμενα* (= *λόγος*) and *ὁ κηρυσσόμενος*, by which, without enlargement, the former could be put where the latter is meant, is rightly opposed by Luthardt (*Das Ev. Joh.* p. 284 ff.); and what Hofmann, in the 2d ed. of his *Schriftbeweis*, brings forward for his defence, does not refute the statements of Luthardt. But even the explanation of Luthardt, that Christ is called the Word because He "is the Word which God has spoken to the world, because He is the final and last word of all earlier words of God to the world," cannot be justified, because, on the one hand, in the simple expression *λόγος* nothing is less indicated than that He is the *final* word, and, on the other hand, it must be acknowledged that Christ, not merely from His incarnation, but from the very beginning, is the Word in which life is, or the Word of Life.

² Even Hofmann has rightly recognised this, although only from his inad-

does not express the idea of personality, does not mean to say that that which was from the beginning, and which he has heard, etc., is the *person* that bears the name \acute{o} λόγος τῆς ζωῆς, but only defines more particularly the object, previously stated indefinitely, in so far that it is the Word of life, *i.e.* the Word which has life in it (whose nature consists in this, that it is life), and is the source of all life (Braune); comp. John vi. 35, viii. 12. In agreement with this, Weiss says (p. 35) that \acute{o} λόγος is here, as in the prologue of the Gospel, a description of the nature of the Son of God; but the assertion is incorrect, that the genitive τῆς ζωῆς describes the Word as "the Word belonging to life, necessary for life," in favour of which he appeals incorrectly to the expressions ἄρτος τῆς ζωῆς (John vi. 35, 48) and ῥήματα ζωῆς αἰωνίου (John vi. 68). This explanation is refuted by this, that with it ἡ ζωή, ver. 2, must be taken in a different reference from that which τῆς ζωῆς has here.¹ — The personality of this Word, which has already been indicated by δ ἀκηκόαμεν κ.τ.λ., is still more definitely expressed in ver. 2 by the twofold ἐφανερώθη, in which δ ἐωράκαμεν καὶ ἀκηκόαμεν of ver. 3 finds its explanation. That in the expression \acute{o} λόγος τῆς ζωῆς the emphasis lies on τῆς ζωῆς, is clear from this, that in ver. 2 it is not \acute{o} λόγος, but ἡ ζωή, that is the subject. The construction with περί is thus explained, that the apostle does not thereby mean to speak of the object of his proclamation, which he has already stated in δ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς κ.τ.λ., but only desires to add a more particular description of it, for which reason also it is not to be regarded as dependent on ἀπαγγέλλομεν. Braune incorrectly takes it as "a new dependent clause parallel in its matter to the succession of relative clauses, which along with the latter comes to an end in ἀπαγγέλλομεν." Ebrard ground-

missible interpretation of the idea δ λόγος: "As δ λόγος is the word of the apostolic proclamation, δ λόγος τῆς ζωῆς is also not meant to be the proper name of a personal being, but the description of a thing, which requires the genitival attributive τῆς ζωῆς in order to be described according to its peculiar essence."

¹ This incongruity is concealed by Weiss in this way, that he takes ζωή = "knowledge of God;" but it is not thereby removed, for Weiss understands by ζωῆς here "our knowledge of God," but by ἡ ζωή in ver. 2, on the other hand, the knowledge of God *which the Logos has*. — It is arbitrary for Ewald to explain λόγος by "subject," and, accordingly, περί τοῦ λόγ. τῆς ζωῆς by "in regard to the subject of life."

lessly finds in this construction the suggestion, that John considers as the object of his proclamation, not Christ "as an abstract single conception" (!), but "his concrete historical experiences of Christ."

Ver. 2. Without bringing to an end the thought begun in ver. 1, from the exact continuation of which he has already digressed in *περὶ τοῦ λόγου τ. ζ.*, the apostle in this verse expresses the double thought, that the life was manifested, and that this eternal life which was with the Father and was manifested, has been seen and is declared by him; so that in this both *ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* and *ὁ ἀκηκόαμεν*, how the former, namely, could have been the subject of sensuous perception, find their more particular determination. This *whole* verse is of course parenthetical; but that it is not regarded by John as mere parenthesis (contrary to Düsterdieck) is clear, partly from the connecting *καί*, and partly from this, that in ver. 3 it is not *ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, but only *ὁ ἀκηκόαμεν κ.τ.λ.*, that is resumed, while the former is fully dealt with in this verse. — *καί*] is not put for *γάρ*, but is copulative, "not *disjunctive*, but *conjunctive*" (Lücke); the thought with which it is connected is that which lies in *ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, that the life, before it became subject of perception, was, as it is afterwards put, *πρὸς τὸν πατέρα*.¹ — *ἡ ζωὴ ἐφανερώθη*] Instead of a relative, the noun is repeated, as is peculiar to the diction of John; *ἡ ζωὴ* instead of *ὁ λόγος τῆς ζωῆς*, because the emphasis, as has been already remarked, is on *ζωή*, is analogous to Gospel of John i. 4, where also, after it is said of the *λόγος*: *ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν*, it is not *ὁ λόγος*, but *ἡ ζωὴ*, that is the subject of the following sentence.² It is plainly incorrect to understand by *ζωή* the *doctrina de felicitate nova* = *evangelium* (Semler), or, with others: the *felicitas* of believers; but neither is S. G. Lange's explanation, according to which *ζωή* = "auctor vitae, the Life-giver," sufficient, for Christ is so designated not merely according to the operation that proceeds from Him, but at the same time according to the peculiarity of His

¹ Ebrard wrongly conceives the logical relation thus, that by *καί* the thought that is latent in the preceding verse: "that Christ was of eternal being, but became incarnate and was manifested," is *confirmed*.

² Groundlessly Baumgarten-Crusius asserts that *ζωή* "has here more inner, spiritual meaning than in Gospel i. 14;" this is to mistake the meaning which the word has in that passage.

nature.¹ — ἐφανερώθη] In what way the φανέρωσις took place is taught in chap. iv. 2 and John i. 14. In this way, that the life which was in itself hidden appeared in the flesh or became flesh, did it become perceptible by sense, subject of the ἀκούειν, ὁρᾶν κ.τ.λ. Ebrard rightly remarks: “the σὰρξ γίγνεσθαι indicates the objective event of the incarnation as such; the φανερωθῆναι, the result of it for our faculty of perception.” — καὶ ἑώρακαμεν καὶ κ.τ.λ.] The object that belongs to the verbs is τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον; according to de Wette, Brückner, and Düsterdieck, this object is only attracted to ἀπαγγέλλομεν, and the object is to be supplied to both of the first verbs from what precedes (ζωή); but the two ideas μαρτυροῦμεν and ἀπαγγ. are thereby unduly separated from each other; there is more in favour of supplying only an αὐτήν with ἑώρακαμεν (1st ed. of this comm., Myrberg), by which the idea of this verb is significantly brought out: “the life was manifested, and we have seen it;” but as in the context even this construction is not indicated, it is better, with most commentators, to connect τὴν ζωὴν τ. αἰών. also with ἑώρακαμεν. — By ἑώρακαμεν the apostle brings out that the eternal Life which was made manifest and perceptible was seen by himself; the verb μαρτυροῦμεν, which signifies the utterance of that which one has personally seen or experienced (comp. Gospel of John xix. 35; also 1 John i. 34, iii. 32),² is directly connected with this, and thereupon first follows the more general idea ἀπαγγέλλομεν; Baumgarten-

¹ The chief elements which are contained in the idea ζωή are differently stated by the commentators; Frommann mentions as such: “the truth, perfection, or the living and happy character of being;” Köstlin: “the mightiness, blessedness, and endlessness of being.” If we keep to the scriptural mode of conception, the chief elements appear to be “consciousness, activity, and happiness;” true activity is only where consciousness is, and happiness is activity which is not disturbed or hindered by any opposition. — Weiss wrongly infers from John xvii. 3, that by ζωή is to be understood only the knowledge of God, and it is erroneous for him to maintain that ἡ ζωή does not here signify Christ Himself, but “His peculiar knowledge of God,” which He possessed even before His φανέρωσις. The relative clause ἥτις ἦν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, which is connected with τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον, is opposed to this interpretation; inasmuch as it shows that here ἡ ζωὴ ἡ αἰώνιος, and just as much ἡ ζωή, is to be considered as the same subject which John in the proemium of the Gospel calls ὁ λόγος, and of which he says there that it ἦν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν.

² Incorrectly a Lapide: quasi martyres i.e. testes Dei tum voce, tum vita, tum passione, morte et martyrio.

Crusius incorrectly refers *μαρτυροῦμεν* specially to *ἐφανερώθη* and *ἀπαγγέλλομεν* to *ἐώρακαμεν*, with the assertion that "the former two have more objective, the latter more subjective meaning." Myrberg's explanation also: *μαρτυρία* est expertae veritatis simplex confessio, qua homo sibi ipsi potius, quam aliis consulat: *ἀπαγγελία* annuntiatio veritatis cognitae, qua aliis potius, quam sibi ipsi providere studeat, is without grammatical justification. — By *ὑμῖν, ἀπαγγέλλομεν* is put in reference to the readers of the Epistle; hence it does not follow, however, that it is to be understood only of the writing of this Epistle, and is therefore simply resumed by *ταῦτα γράφομεν* in ver. 4; but the former is the more general idea, in which the more special one of the writing of the Epistle is embraced; the *γράφειν* is a particular kind of the *ἀπαγγέλλειν*.¹ Ebrard incorrectly separates the two, by referring *ἀπαγγέλλομεν* to the written Gospel of John, and *γράφομεν* to this Epistle. — *τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον*] The noun is here put for the pronoun *αὐτήν*, not only in accordance with John's usual mode of expression, but because the idea of *ζωή* was to be more particularly defined by *αἰώνιος*. Baungarten-Crusius erroneously explains *ἡ ζωὴ ἡ αἰώνιος* by "bestowing higher, unending life;" rather the *ζωή*, which Christ is, is marked by *αἰώνιος* as such as *ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, or—still more comprehensively—as such as, though by the incarnation it entered into time, is in itself nevertheless without measure of time, eternal (Brückner; similarly Braune). It is true, the idea *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* has elsewhere in the N. T. admittedly another signification, but this does not justify the explanation of Calvin: ubi secundo repetit: annuntiamus vitam aeternam, non dubito quin de effectu loquatur, nempe quod annuntiet: beneficio Christi partam nobis esse vitam. De Wette's explanation also, that *ἡ ζωὴ ἡ αἰώνιος* is an idea "which hovers in the middle between the eternal true life which is to be appropriated by believers (John xvii. 3), and life in Christ, so that the first is to be considered in closest connection with *ἀπαγγέλλομεν*, but the second in reference to the reflexive *ἥτις ἡν*," can so much the less be held correct as the simple and clear thought of the apostle is thereby

¹ Bengel's interpretation: "*Testimonium, genus; species duae: annuntiatio et scriptio; annuntiatio ponit fundamentum, scriptio superaedificat,*" is inadmissible.

rendered complicated and obscure. Of that which the believer possesses in Christ there is here no mention at all, but only of Christ Himself; and, besides, that ἡ ζωὴ ἡ αἰών. is to the Apostle John not merely a subjective, but also an objective conception, is proved by chap. v. 11. — ἥτις ἦν] ἥτις is more significant than the simple ἦ, inasmuch as it makes the twofold relative clause as containing a confirmation of the preceding statement: ἐώρακαμεν κ.τ.λ., τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον.¹ — The imperfect ἦν also does not here indicate the intemporal existence, but is used in reference to ἐφανερώθη: ere the ζωὴ appeared, it was with the Father. — πρὸς τὸν πατέρα] comp. Gospel of John i. 1: πρὸς τὸν Θεόν. The preposition πρὸς is often combined with the accusative in the N. T. in the sense of "with:" comp. Matt. xiii. 56, xxvi. 55; but πρὸς with the accusative differs from πρὸς with the dative in this, that it describes being with one another not as a mere being beside one another, but as a living connection, a being in intercourse with one another (so also Braune); but we put too much into it, if we find the relationship of love directly expressed by πρὸς.² John does not mean to bring out that the ζωὴ (Christ) was connected with the Father in love, but that Christ already was, before He appeared (ἐφανερώθη); before He was ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ with men, He was therefore in heaven with God, and indeed in lively union with God as He afterwards entered into a lively communion with men. Quite

¹ The statement of Ebrard is inapposite, that by ἥτις the subject-matter of the relative clause is stated as an already (from ver. 1) *known and at the same time acknowledged* element of the substantive idea on which the relative clause depends. The right view seems to lie at the base of the explanation of Sander: "I declare unto you eternal life, *even as such as*," etc., at least it is not touched at by the remark of Ebrard in opposition: "The meaning of John is plainly this, that the ζ. αἰών. is really and in itself one which was with the Father and was manifested to us, and is by no means represented as such merely in the proclamation of it." Düsterdieck rightly says: "By ἥτις the twofold extension of the predicate is connected with the subject ἡ ζ. ἡ αἰών., not merely in simply relative manner, but in such a way that the extension of the predicate contains at the same time an explanatory and confirmatory reference;" but it is difficult to admit that by virtue of ἥτις the καὶ ἐφανερώθη ἡμῖν in its close connection with ἐν κρ. τ. πατ. is marked as the connecting link which unites to ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχ. the accessory elements ὁ ἀκηκόωμεν κ.τ.λ.

² Besser: "The Word was with God, related to the Father in *filial love*." Still less justifiable is Ebrard's explanation: "The ζωὴ was a life flowing forth indeed from the bosom of the Father, but immediately returning into it, floating in the inner circulation of the life of God." (!)

erroneously, Socin, Grotius, and others understand the expression of the concealment of the ζωὴ αἰών. in the decree of God. From the fact that John here calls God in His relation to Christ πατήρ, it follows that the sonship of Christ to God is to be regarded not as first begun with His incarnation, but as premundane. — καὶ ἐφανερώθη ἡμῖν] is not a mere repetition of what has been already said, but in ἡμῖν a new element is added, by which ἐώρακαμεν and ὁ ἀκηκόαμεν κ.τ.λ., ver. 1, find their explanation.

Ver. 3. In the opening words of this verse: ὁ . . . ἀκηκόαμεν, the object expressed in ver. 1 is resumed, and the governing verb, which was there already in the apostle's view, is added. The drift of this verse does not, however, lie in this, but rather in the final clause: ἵνα κ.τ.λ. While John first meant to state what was the subject of his proclamation, namely, that it was that which was from the beginning and was perceived by his senses,—which he then more particularly defined in ver. 2,—he now wants to state the purpose of this proclamation of that subject. In this lies the reason why the object is resumed in abridged form, namely, in the form which the immediately preceding words (καὶ ἐφανερώθη ἡμῖν) suggested. The ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, and similarly the ὁ ἐθεασάμεθα, was not to be resumed; the former, because it has been fully dealt with in what follows it; the latter, because it was not here in the purpose of the apostle once more to bring out the reality of the sensuous appearance of Him who was from the beginning. That ἐώρακαμεν is placed before ἀκηκόαμεν—in which no artificial parallelism is to be sought for (against Ebrard)—resulted naturally from the interweaving of ἐώρακαμεν into ver. 2 (de Wette). — ἀπαγγέλλομεν καὶ ὑμῖν] with ἀπαγγέλλομεν, comp. ver. 2. — καί (see the critical remarks) distinguishes the readers either from others to whom the apostle had declared the same thing (Spencer, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Myrberg, Braune, etc.), or from John (along with the other apostles). Lorinus: vos qui nimirum non audistis, nec vidistis, nec manibus vestris contractastis verbum vitæ; so also Zwingli, Bullinger, Ebrard. The latter interpretation would be preferable, if the following καί before ὑμεῖς, to which the same reference is to be attri-

buted, did not thereby become pleonastic. — *ἵνα καὶ ὑμεῖς κοινωνίαν ἔχητε μεθ' ἡμῶν*] Many commentators, as Socin, Bengel, Russmeyer, Spener, and others, supply with *κοινωνίαν* as enlargement: "with God and Christ;" without adequate ground; the enlargement of the idea *κοινωνία* is *μεθ' ἡμῶν* (Baumgarten-Crusius, Düsterdieck, Braune), whereby, however, John does not mean "the apostles and other Christians" (de Wette), but himself, although including the other apostles, who have also seen and heard the Word of Life. This *κοινωνία* is self-evidently the fellowship of spirit in faith and love, which was brought about by the apostolic preaching. — *ἔχειν* is neither to be explained, with a Lapidé, by: *pergere et in ea (κοινωνία) proficere et confirmari*, nor, with Fritzsche, by: "to acquire;" the word is rather to be retained in the signification peculiar to it; the apostle simply indicates the *having* fellowship as the aim of the apostolic proclamation, quite apart from the question as to how the hearers of this are related to that. — *καὶ ἡ κοινωνία δὲ ἡ ἡμετέρα κ.τ.λ.*] By *ἡ κοινωνία ἡ ἡμετέρα* most commentators understand "the fellowship which the apostles and the believing hearers of their proclamation have *with one another*," and, according as *ἦ* or *ἐστὶ* is supplied, have thus defined the thought of the verse, that the apostle states of this mutual fellowship that it either should be or is a fellowship with the Father and the Son. But as this view necessitates a scarcely justifiable enlargement of the idea *κοινωνία* (*ἡ κοινωνία ἡ ἡμετέρα ἦ* [or *ἐστὶ*] *κοινωνία μετὰ τ. πατρ. κ.τ.λ.*),¹ the explanation of Baumgarten-Crusius, who resolves *ἡ κοιν. ἡ ἡμετέρα* into *ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν κοινωνίαν μετὰ τ. πατρ.*, deserves the preference (so also Ewald, Braune); taking this explanation, the *κοινωνία* meant here is not identical with that mentioned before, inasmuch as the distinction is marked both by the difference of the subject: *ὑμεῖς* and *ἡμεῖς* (which is contained in *ἡμετέρα*),

¹ This enlargement is involuntarily made by the commentators—although they do not mention it; thus by Lücke, when he explains: "that ye may have fellowship with us: but (not with us only, but—ye know) our fellowship with one another is also *that* with the Father and with the Son;" similarly by Düsterdieck; Ebrard also says: "It is the purpose of John in his *ἀπαγγελία*, that his readers may enter into fellowship with the disciples, and that this fellowship may have its life-principle in the *fellowship* with the Father and with the Son."

and that of the object: *μεθ' ἡμῶν* and *μετὰ τοῦ πατρὸς*. According to this acceptation, the apostle here brings out that he (along with the rest of the apostles) has fellowship with the Father and with the Son, and, no doubt, in order to intimate by this that his readers, if they have fellowship with him, are thereby received with him into that fellowship. It is at all events incorrect, with Augustin, Luther, Calvin, Grotius, Ebrard, etc., to supply ᾗ with this sentence. In opposition to it are—(1) the structure of the sentence, for if it were dependent on ἵνα the verb could not be omitted;¹ and (2) the thought, for as the apostles are already in fellowship with the Father and with the Son, it cannot be the aim of their ἀπαγγελία to elevate the fellowship which exists between them and those who accept their word into fellowship with the Father and with the Son. Therefore it is ἐστὶ that must be supplied, as Erasmus, a Lapide, Vatablus, Hornejus, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Düsterdieck, Myrberg, Ewald Braune, etc., have rightly recognised. The conjunction καὶ . . . δέ, which is pretty often found in the N. T., is used when the idea which is *connected* with a preceding one is at the same time to be *contrasted* with it; “the introduction of *something new* is thereby intimated” (Pape, see on καὶ . . . δέ). Whether it be the connection or the contrast which is to be the more emphasized, this particle is never used to resume an idea with the view to a further expression of it. This usage therefore also proves that by ἡ κοιν. ἡ ἡμετέρα it is not the previously mentioned κοινωνία μεθ' ἡμῶν, but another fellowship, namely, the fellowship of the ἡμεῖς, i.e. of John and the other apostles (not with one another, but) with the Father and with the Son, that is meant.² God is here called πατήρ in relation to τοῦ

¹ The omission of *ἐστὶ* very often occurs; on the other hand, ᾗ is *very seldom* omitted in the N. T., only in 1 Cor. viii. 11 and 13 (still stronger is the ellipsis in Rom. iv. 16); thus even with Paul, who so frequently expresses only the outlines of the thought, the subjunctive of the substantive verb is almost never omitted; how much less can it be held as omitted in a construction of periods otherwise quite conformable to rule, in the second part of the dependent clause!

² For the usage of καὶ . . . δέ, comp. Matt. xvi. 18; Mark iv. 36; Luke ii. 35; Acts iii. 24, xxii. 29; Heb. ix. 21; and in Gospel of John vi. 51, viii. 16, 17, xv. 27. Lücke wrongly says that the particle is used for the more exact definition, expansion, and strengthening of a preceding thought, and that there is contained in it an “*at the same time*” or “*not only . . . but also*.” It must also be held as erroneous when Düsterdieck says: “John has just spoken of a

υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ. — The full description of Christ as τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ serves to bring out the identity of that which was from the beginning with Him who became man.

Ver. 4. After stating the subject and aim of his apostolic proclamation, the apostle intimates specially the aim of this Epistle. καὶ ταῦτα γράφομεν ὑμῖν] By καί, γράφομεν is made co-ordinate with ἀπαγγέλλομεν, the particular with the general, not the composition of the Epistle with that of the Gospel (Ebrard). ταῦτα refers neither merely to what precedes (Russmeyer, Sander), nor merely to what immediately follows (Socin), but to the whole Epistle (Lücke, de Wette, Düsterdieck). With γράφομεν ὑμῖν, comp. ii. 1, 12, v. 13. The plural is used because John as an apostle writes in the consciousness that *his* written word is in full agreement with the preaching of all the apostles; all the apostles, as it were, speak through him to the readers of the Epistle. — ἵνα ἡ χαρὰ ὑμῶν ᾗ πεπληρωμένη] comp. with this John xv. 11, xvii. 13. The aim of the Epistle is the πλήρωσις of joy which it, as apostolic testimony to the salvation founded on the φανέρωσις of the ζωὴ αἰώνιος (ver. 2), was to produce in its readers. De Wette groundlessly thinks that the effect, namely, the perfected Christian frame of mind, is here put for the cause, namely, Christian perfection. It is rather very especially the perfect χαρά (not merely "the joy of conflict and victory," Ebrard) that is the goal to which the apostle would lead his readers by this Epistle. With the reading ἡμῶν it is the χαρά of the apostles—first of all of John—that is the goal, and no doubt the joy which for them consists in this, that their word produces fruit in their hearers.¹ Incorrectly Ebrard: "If ἡμῶν is right, then the apostle resumes the mutual ἡμετέρα: that our (common) joy may be full;" for, on the one hand,

'fellowship with us;' now he wants to expand *this* idea further; therefore he continues: 'and *our* fellowship'—the new explanatory thought, however, forms a certain antithesis to what was previously said: but *our* fellowship is not so much the fellowship with *us* as rather that with the Father and with the Son." — Apart from the fact that καὶ . . . δι has not the force of such a restriction (not so much . . . as rather), who does not feel that, if John wanted to express this thought, he would have had to write not ἡμετέρα, but ὑμετέρα, or rather: αὕτη δὲ κοινωνία?

¹ Theophyl. : ἡμῶν γὰρ ὑμῖν κοινωνούντων πλείστην ἔχομεν τὴν χαρὰν ἡμῶν, ἣν τοῖς ἐκρίσταῖς ὁ χαίρων σπορεύς ἐν τῇ τοῦ μισθοῦ ἀπολήψει βραβεύσει, χαίριントν καὶ τούτων ὅτι τῶν πόνων αὐτῶν ἀπολαύουσι.

ἡμετέρα is not mutual (embracing the apostles and the readers), and, on the other, ἡμῶν would have to be referred to the ἡμεῖς that is contained in γράφομεν, but not to the more remote ἡμετέρα.

Ver. 5—chap. ii. 11.

After the apostle has indicated the fulness of joy, which is in the fellowship with the Father and with the Son, as the aim of his Epistle, he brings out in what follows, from the point of view that God is φῶς (ver. 5), in opposition to moral indifferentism, the condition under which alone that fellowship can exist.

Ver. 5. This verse contains no inference from what precedes (καί is not = igitur, Beza), but the thought that lays the foundation for what follows. — ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ ἀγγελία] “and this is the message;” ἔστιν is here put—contrary to its usual position, comp. ii. 25, iii. 11, 23, iv. 3, etc.—before αὕτη “in order to mark the reality of the message” (Braune); αὕτη here—as elsewhere also—refers to what follows: ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς κ.τ.λ., by which the subject-matter of the message is stated. Calvin incorrectly, following the reading ἐπαγγελία: promissio, quam vobis afferimus, hoc secum trahit, vel hanc conditionem habet annexam.—The word ἀγγελία only here and iii. 11 (where, however, it is also not unopposed); frequently in the LXX. 2 Sam. iv. 4; Prov. xii. 26, xxv. 26, xxvi. 16; Isa. xxviii. 9; Jer. xlviii. 34. The reading ἐπαγγελία is more difficult with the meaning “promise;” yet this may be justified in so far as every N. T. proclamation carries with it a promise.¹ De Wette prefers this reading, but takes ἐπαγγελία, following the example of Oecumenius, a Lapide, Beza, Hornejus, etc.,—contrary to the constant *usus loquendi* of the N. T.,—in the signification: “announcement” (Lange: “teaching”). — ἡν ἀκηκόαμεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ] “from Him, that is, Christ.” Instead of ἀπό, it is more usual to have παρά, comp. John viii. 26, 40, xv. 15; Acts x. 22, xxviii. 22; 2 Tim. ii. 2.—αὐτός in the Epistle, not always (Paulus, Baumgarten-Crusius) indeed, but mostly, refers to God, while ἐκεῖνος refers always to Christ; here it refers backwards to τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἰ. Χρ. in ver. 3; Düsterdieck: “From Him, Christ, the Son of God manifested

¹ Spener: “Promise; inasmuch as, in what follows, a promise is really involved. God is not only a light in Himself, but to believers He is also their light. And that is the promise.”

in the flesh (ver. 3), whom the apostle himself has heard (ver. 1 ff.), has he received the message about the Father." In favour of the correctness of this explanation is also the following: *ὅτι ὁ Θεός.*¹ — *καὶ ἀναγγέλλομεν ὑμῖν] ἀναγγέλλειν* is synonymous with *ἀπαγγέλλειν*, vv. 2 and 3, only that in *ἀνα* the idea "again" is contained; Erasmus: quod filius annuntiavit a patre, hoc apostolus acceptum a filio *renunciat*.² This *ἀναγγέλλομεν* refers back with peculiar subtleness to the preceding *ἀγγελία*, and thus testifies to the correctness of that reading (Düsterdieck). The subject is, as in vv. 2 and 3, John and the rest of the apostles. To reduce their proclamation to the word which they heard from Christ Himself serves to confirm its truth; comp. the combination of *ἀκούειν* and *ἀπαγγέλλειν* in ver. 3. Ebrard wrongly interprets this *ἀναγγέλλομεν* also of the proclamation of John which occurred in his Gospel, to which this Epistle is related as the concentrating development.³ — *ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς φῶς ἐστί] φῶς* is inappropriately translated by Luther: "a light;" the article weakens the thought; God is light, *i.e.* God's nature is light = absolute holiness and truth (comp. chap. iv. 8; Gospel of John iv. 24);⁴ for the signification of the symbolical expression "light," compare especially Jas. i. 13, 17. — As God is *φῶς* in absolute sense, so also all light outside of Him is the radiation of His nature, as all love flows forth from Him whose

¹ The use of this pronoun even where the reference is obscure is caused by this, that John does not think of the Father without the Son, or the Son without the Father; the thought therefore remains *essentially* the same, whether we refer it in the first instance to the Father or to the Son; notwithstanding, however, the view of Socinus is unjustifiable, according to which, on account of the conjunctio inter Deum et Christum (which Socinus, moreover, holds not as a conjunctio essentialis, but only as a conjunctio voluntatis et rerum aliarum omnium), by *αὐτῷ* is here to be understood equally *God and Christ*.

² Bengel: Quae in ore Christi fuit *ἀγγελία*, eam apostoli *ἀναγγέλλουσι*; nam *ἀγγελίαν* ab ipso acceptam reddunt et propagant.

³ According to Ewald, John is here quoting a definite utterance of Christ; possibly, but not necessarily.

⁴ The fulness of the references contained in these words, Lorinus states in the following manner: Deus lux est, quia clarissime se ipsum percipit, omniaque in se ipso, utpote prima et ipsissima veritas; quia summe bonus, ac summa et ipsissima bonitas; fidelis absque ulla iniquitate, justus et rectus, quia fons omnis lucis in aliis *i. e.* veritatis atque virtutis, non solum illustrans mentem, docensque quid agendum sit, verum etiam operans in nobis, ut agamus et sic radiis suis liberans mentem ab ignorantiae tenebris, purgans a pravitate voluntatem.

nature is ἀγάπη; comp. chap. iv. 7 ff. — καὶ σκοτία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία] The thought contained in the foregoing is emphasized by the negation of its opposite, which is here expressed in the strongest manner by οὐκ . . . οὐδεμία, in accordance with John's diction (comp. chap. ii. 4, 18, etc.). — σκοτία: antithesis of φῶς: sin and falsehood; the same antithesis is frequently in the N. T.; comp. Rom. xiii. 12; Eph. v. 8 ff.; 1 Thess. v. 4, 5. In opposition to the general prevalent explanation given here, Weiss thus explains the sense of this verse: "God is light, *i.e.* He has become visible, capable of being known, namely in Christ, who certainly proclaims this truth; there is no more any darkness in God at all, *i.e.* no part of His nature remains any longer dark and unknown, He has (in Christ) become completely revealed." This interpretation, to which Weiss is led by the erroneous supposition that the idea φῶς has in the N. T. no ethical reference,¹ is refuted both by the form of expression, which exhibits φῶς (just as ἀγάπη, chap. iv. 8) as a description of the nature of God, and also by the train of thought, in so far as the truth expressed here forms the starting-point for all the following amplifications — which bear on the *ethical* relationship of Christians. Besides, the apostle would have insufficiently expressed the thought, as he would have left out the essential ἐν Χριστῷ, which Weiss unjustifiably inserts. John rightly puts the truth that God is light, as the chief subject-matter of the ἀγγελία of Christ, at the top of his development; for it forms the essential basis of Christianity both in its objective and in its subjective subsistence; in it there lies as well as judgment in regard to sin, so also salvation from sin by the incarnation and death of Christ, as well as necessity of repentance and faith, so also the moral exercise of the Christian life.

Ver. 6. Inference from ver. 5. He alone has fellowship

¹ The assertion that φῶς refers only to knowledge and not to the ethical state, is so much the more untenable, as Weiss himself describes this knowledge as "the *true* knowledge of God, *i.e.* such that the entire spiritual life of man is absorbed in it, so that he is henceforth completely in God," or "in which the object of cognition is received into the whole spiritual life of man in such a way that it becomes a force, inspiring and determining, or ruling, the latter in its totality." But even *such* a cognition must certainly be regarded as an *ethical* act.

with God, who does not walk in darkness. — *ἐὰν εἴπωμεν*] The same form of speech (*ἐάν*) is repeated from verse to verse (only with the exception of ii. 2) until chap. ii. 3; then appears the participle with the definite article: *ὁ λέγων*, ii. 4, vi. 9; *ὁ ἀγαπῶν*, ii. 10; *ὁ μισῶν*, ii. 11. — The use of the hypothetical particles, especially of *ἐάν*, is also found very often in the Gospel.¹ On the 1st person plural, Lorinus says: suam quoque in hac hypothesis personam conjugit, ut lenius ac facilius agat; better Lücke: "By the communicative and hypothetical form the language gains, on the one hand, in refining delicacy, and, on the other, in more general reference and force;" unsatisfactorily Ebrard: "The 1st person plural serves only to express the general 'we.'" — *ὅτι κοινωνίαν ἔχομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ*] see ver. 3. Fellowship with God forms the innermost essence of all true Christian life. — *καὶ ἐν τῷ σκότει περιπατῶμεν*] comp. Gospel of John viii. 12. *ἐν τῷ σκότει περιπατεῖν* is not merely "not to know whither we are going" (Luther), but to live in darkness, *i.e.* in sin, as our element. According to Weiss, who denies to the *σκότος*, as well as to the contrasted *φῶς*, an ethical reference, it is = "to walk in the unenlightened state;" but is not this just the very state in which the life is ruled by sin? — Bengel, for more particular definition, rightly adds: *actione interna et externa, quoque nos vertimus*; such a walking in darkness is *all* life whose principle is not the love of God.² — *ψευδόμεθα καὶ οὐ ποιούμεν τὴν ἀλήθειαν*] for, *τίς κοινωνία φωτὶ πρὸς σκότος*; (2 Cor. vi. 14). *ψευδόμεθα* expresses the moral objectionableness of such a contradiction between the deed and the word. — The negative clause is not a mere repetition of the same thought, but introduces along with it a new idea:

¹ *ἐάν* is used—as Winer says, p. 260, VII. p. 273—with the idea of an objective possibility, *i.e.* when the particular event is to be represented simply as objectively possible, and the speaker does not want to express his subjective view of it (whether he considers it probable, desirable, etc.). A *Tertium non datur* (Ebrard) is not contained in it.

² That in *περιπατεῖν* there is a reference to the outward manner of life is self-evident, but that it only signifies this, as *visible by the eyes of men*, to the exclusion of the inner activity of life, is an unfounded assertion of Ebrard. The commentators rightly point out that this *περιπατεῖν ἐν σκότει* is different from "the failing and falling, through over-haste and weakness, in temptation and in conflict" (Gerlach); "it does not mean: still to have darkness in us" (Spener).

ψευδόμεθα refers to εἰπόμεν; οὐ ποιοῦμεν τ. ἀλ. refers back to ἐν τ. σκ. περιπατῶμεν; for ποιεῖν τὴν ἀλ. is not merely = ἀληθεύειν (Eph. iv. 15), but signifies the practice of ἀλήθεια in word and deed; comp. John iii. 21, where it is contrasted with φαῦλα πράσσειν, and is used expressly of ἔργα. In the common interpretation, according to which it is = agere candidē, sincere (Cyprian, Theodorus, Socinus, Grotius, etc.), τὴν ἀλήθειαν does not receive its due force; by the article the idea is specified in its complete generality and objectivity: "the true," i.e. that which corresponds to the nature and will of God (Brückner, Braune), although it must be admitted that the general idea is here used with special reference to the desirable conformity between word and deed; emphasis is thereby given to the fact that in the case mentioned in ἐὰν κ.τ.λ. the alleged κοινωνία with God is practically denied. In de Wette's explanation: "to do that which corresponds to the nature of Christian fellowship," a meaning is given to the expression which is neither indicated in the word nor in the train of thought.

Ver. 7. This verse does not merely repeat in its antithetical form the preceding thought, but contains also—as is peculiar to John's lively fertility of ideas—an expansion of it.—ἐὰν δὲ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ περιπατῶμεν] is contrasted not only with the preceding (ἐὰν) ἐν τῷ σκότει περιπατῶμεν, but also with ἐὰν εἰπόμεν, ὅτι κοιν. ἔχ. μετ' αὐτοῦ (so also Ebrard), thus: "if we do not merely say that we have fellowship with God, and yet at the same time walk in darkness, but if we really walk ἐν τῷ φωτί." — ἐν τῷ φωτὶ περιπατεῖν is not "to strive after likeness to God" (Lücke), but so to walk that the light (by which, however, we are not, with Weiss, to understand only knowledge) is the element in which our light moves; this, however, is a life which does not consist in striving after likeness to God, but which has this already as its own, or which is an ἔχειν κοινωνίαν μετ' αὐτοῦ with Him who is light. This unity between walking in the light and fellowship with God is even more clearly brought out by the following words: ὡς αὐτός ἐστιν ἐν τῷ φωτί] ὡς, because it is the same element in which the true Christian walks and in which God "lives and works" (Düsterdieck, Brückner), inasmuch as the Christian has become θείας κοινωνὸς φύσεως (2 Pet. i. 4). — αὐτός

refers back to αὐτοῦ, ver. 6, and is put for Θεός. The idea "that God is in the light" is the same as this "that God is light;" that which is the nature of God is also the element of His life; the expression used here is occasioned by the preceding ἐν τῷ φωτὶ περιπατεῖν; Ebrard incorrectly explains: "God has chosen for His habitation the spheres of the sinless, holy, and pure life of the angels and those made perfect;" there is not the slightest hint at such a conception in the context. As Weiss denies to the expression φῶς an ethical reference, and explains ἐν τῷ φωτὶ περιπατεῖν = "to walk in a state of right knowledge," the clause ὡς αὐτός ἐστιν ἐν τῷ φωτὶ necessarily causes him a difficulty, which he can only solve by the supposition "that an idea similar to that in 1 Tim. vi. 16 was before the apostle's mind, and that he institutes a parallel between the walk of the Christian in the light of true knowledge, and the dwelling of God in the brightness of His glory," in which it is plainly ignored that the second ἐν τῷ φωτὶ must necessarily have the same meaning as the first ἐν τῷ φωτὶ. — ἐστὶ is contrasted with περιπατῶμεν; the former is peculiar to God, the latter to men; the former (being) to Him who is *eternal*, the latter (walking) to him who is *temporal*. — κοινωνίαν ἔχομεν μετ' ἀλλήλων] Several commentators wrongly deviate from the statement of the apostle, by interpreting as if "μετ' αὐτοῦ" were used instead of μετ' ἀλλήλων, as indeed the reading of some is (see the critical notes); or by understanding—quite unsuitably—ἀλλήλων of God and men; so Calvin: quod dicit, societatem esse nobis mutuam, non simpliciter ad homines refertur, sed Deum in una parte, nos autem in altera; the same interpretation in Augustin, Beza, Socinus, Hornejus, Lange, Spener, Russmeyer, Ewald, etc. De Wette, it is true, interprets ἀλλήλων correctly, but supplies "μετὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ," thus: "we have fellowship one with another, namely with God;" against this explanation are: first, that then John would not have mentioned the very leading thought; and, secondly, that a tautological idea results from it (Lücke), for a περιπατεῖν ἐν τῷ φωτὶ is only possible through the κοινωνία μετὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ, nay, even is the necessary proof of it. The subject here is much rather the fellowship of Christians with one another (Bede, Lyranus, Grotius, Wolf, Bengel, Semler, Lücke, Baum-

garten-Crusius, Neander, Sander, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune, Brückner, etc.), and indeed quite generally, not, as Bengel considers, so that the apostle and his readers (*nos et vos*) would be regarded as the *two* parts bound together. The brotherly fellowship of Christians with one another *ἐν ἀγάπῃ* presupposes therefore the walking in light, or in fellowship with God, of which it is the necessary consequence. — With such a walk a second element is, however, united, namely : *καὶ τὸ αἷμα Ἰησοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ καθαρίζει ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ πάσης ἁμαρτίας*. — *τὸ αἷμα Ἰησοῦ*] is not a metonymical expression for “the *consideration* of His death” (Socinus, Episcopius, Grotius, etc.),¹ but: the blood which Jesus (thus spoken of here as incarnate) shed *as an offering* at His death; or: the bloody sacrificial death of the Lord (Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune).² — *τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*] is “not merely added as a name of honour,” but also not “to indicate the close connection between the cause of God and Christ,” as Baumgarten-Crusius says, but in order to bring out the identity of the crucified One with the Son of God (so also the incarnation of the Son of God); compare chap. v. 6; at the same time, however, there lies in it an indication how the blood of Jesus can have the effect which the apostle attributes to it (so also Ebrard). — *καθαρίζει ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ πάσης ἁμαρτίας*] may mean either the cleansing from guilt, *i.e.* the forgiveness of sins (Bede, Socinus, a Lapede, Calov, Lange, Baumgarten-Crusius, Erdmann, Weiss, etc.), or cleansing from sin itself, its eradication (Lücke, Frommann, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Myrberg, Braune, Ewald, etc.), or, finally, both together (Spener, Hornejus, Bengel, de Wette, Brückner). According to ver. 9, where *ἀφιέναι τὰς ἁμαρτίας* and *καθαρίζειν ἀπὸ πάσης ἀδικίας* are placed together and thus distinguished from one another, the second view must be regarded as the correct one,³ as indeed the context also demands; for,

¹ That the operation of the blood of Jesus on us is to be regarded as conditioned by faith is evident; but there is no justification in this for paraphrasing *τὸ αἷμα* by “faith in the blood.”

² It is unjustifiable for Myrberg to say: *quum hic sanguis nominatur, de toto opere Christi Mediatoris, immo de toto Christo Deum nobis et nos Deo reconciliante ac opus divinum in nobis operante cogitare debemus.*

³ Against Erdmann's assertion: “*Quum notio αἵματος J. Christi in s. scriptis æque ac mors ejus semper vim expiandi habeat atque idem quod ἱλασμός signifi- cæet (ii. 2), etiam h. l. expiatio ab apostolo designatur, qua sola fieri potest, ut*

as the fact that even the believer has still continually sin is in opposition to the exhortation to *περιπατεῖν ἐν τῷ φωτί*, the apostle had to point out that sin is ever disappearing more and more, and how, so that the walk which is troubled by it may still be considered as a walk in light, and that in spite of sin there may exist a fellowship with God, who is light. As *περιπατεῖν ἐν τῷ φωτί* is given as the condition (not as the means, which the blood of Christ is) of *καθαρίζεσθαι*, and as the subject here therefore is not the *change*, wrought by the blood of Christ, of man from a child of darkness into a child of light, but the growing transformation of him who has already become a child of light, the present *καθαρίζει* is not to be turned into the preterite, but is to be retained as the present; Spener: "He purifies us ever more and more until the final perfect purity." Comp. Gospel of John xv. 2.¹ — *ἀπὸ πάσης ἁμαρτίας*, "from every sin;" sins are regarded as the single dark spots which still continually trouble the Christian's walk in light. The *καί* which connects the two parts of the subordinate clause is explained by Oecumenius, Theophylact, Beza, Lange, Semler, etc. = *nam*. Sander recognises the grammatical incorrectness of this interpretation, but is of opinion that the second clause is to be taken as *causal*, as the basis and condition of the first; but even this is arbi-

peccata nobis condonentur," it is to be observed that in scripture the *vis expiandi* only is by no means ascribed to the blood of Christ; comp. 1 Pet. i. 18. In opposition to the assertion of Weiss, that "we cannot imagine how the blood of Christ should effect a deliverance from sin," it may be stated that a forgiveness of sin which produces no deliverance from sin, is no true forgiveness; comp. Tit. ii. 14. Forgiveness is here to be associated with the thought only in so far as it is the necessary presupposition of that deliverance.

¹ In what this purifying efficacy of the *αἷμα Ἰησοῦ* is founded, John does not here say; but from the fact that in ver. 9 the *ἀφίνοι τὰς ἁμαρτίας* is put before the *καθαρίζειν*, and Christ in chap. ii. 2 is described as *ἰλαστής*, it follows, that according to John the purifying power is associated with the blood of Christ in so far as it is the blood of atonement. Ebrard improperly separates the two elements from one another, ascribing to the death of Christ "the power of purifying our hearts from sin, because in Christ's death sin is condemned;" and, on the other hand, "the power of making atonement and obtaining forgiveness, because in Christ's death the debt was paid and mercy procured." — When Frommann says: "The power that purifies from sin does *not exactly* lie in the blood of Christ itself, but in the love of God, of which Christ in His bloody death is the most speaking token, and of the existence of which He supplies the most unquestionable evidence," this is clearly an inadmissible twisting of the apostle's words.

trary. According to de Wette, "*καί* connects directly with the idea of fellowship the progressive and highest perfection of it;" but this view is founded on the incorrect assumption that the subject of the first clause is fellowship with God. Ebrard thinks that John in these two clauses together expresses the idea of *κοινωνία* with God, while he "analyzes it forthwith into its two elements: the fellowship of believers with one another, and the fellowship and participation in the divine vital power;" but it is in the first place incorrect to describe the *κοινωνία μετ' ἀλλήλων* as an *element* of the *κοινωνία μετὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, and in the second place the purifying efficacy of the blood of Jesus can much less be regarded as an element of it; besides, Ebrard has clearly been induced to add the word "participation," through the perception that the idea of fellowship is quite unsuitable to the second clause. While the *κοινωνία μετὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ* is manifestly presupposed before the *περιπατεῖν ἐν τῷ φωτί*, these two clauses express rather the "double fruit of our walk in light, of our living fellowship with God, who is light" (Düsterdieck); but when John puts *κοινωνία μετ' ἀλλήλων* first, he thereby indicates that it is the sphere within which the purifying power of the blood of Christ operates on each individual (Brückner, Braune). Besides, it may be observed that the second clause is intended to point out the progressive growth of Christian life, and cannot therefore suitably precede the first clause.

Ver. 8. Purification from sin presupposes the existence of sin even in believers; the denial of this is self-deception. — *ἐὰν εἴπωμεν*] as in ver. 6; thereby is meant not merely "the speech of the heart" (Spener), but the actual expression and assertion. — *ὅτι ἁμαρτίαν οὐκ ἔχομεν*] The view of Grotius,¹ that this refers to sinning *before* conversion, and that *ἁμαρτία* therefore means the guilt of sin, is rightly rejected by Lücke, Sander, etc. — The question, especially of earlier commentators, whether *ἁμαρτία* is here original sin (or sinfulness, as Weiss still thinks) or actual sin (pecc. actuale), desire (concupiscentia) or deed, is solved by the fact that the idea is considered quite generally by the apostle (so also Braune)—only,

¹ Habere peccatum, non est: nunc in peccato esse, sed ob peccatum reum posse fieri.

of course, with the exception of the sin spoken of in chap. v. 16. The 1st person plural ἔχομεν is to be noticed in so far as the having sin is thereby represented as something that is true of *all* Christians. The expression ἁμαρτίαν ἔχειν describes in a quite general way the taint of sin; only of the absolutely pure, in whom no trace of sin exists, is it true that he ἁμαρτίαν οὐκ ἔχει; the relation of this ἁμαρτίαν ἔχειν to περιπατεῖν ἐν τῷ σκότει (ver. 6), in which the will of man serves sin (or in which sin is the dominating principle of life), is therefore not that of contrast (say in this way, that ἁμαρτίαν ἔχειν is a being tainted with sin, where no act of will takes place),¹ but is to be defined thus, that the latter (περιπατεῖν ἐν τῷ σκότει) is a particular species of ἁμαρτίαν ἔχειν. Even though as Christians, who are born of God, we have no longer sin in the sense that περιπ. ἐν τῷ σκότει is true of us, nevertheless we do not yet cease to have sin; if we deny this, if we maintain that we have no sin at all, then what John says in the following words is the case with us. ἐαυτοὺς πλανῶμεν] not = “we are mistaken,” which πλανώμεθα would mean;² but, as Sander explains: “we mislead ourselves, take ourselves astray from salvation (or better: from truth);” by that assertion, which is a lie (not an *unconscious* mistake), the Christian (for the apostle is not here speaking of non-Christians) deceives himself about the truth, for which he leaves no room in himself. Braune rightly observes that ἐαυτὸν πλανᾶν emphasizes the self-activity, which the middle with its passive form leaves in the background. — καὶ ἡ ἀλήθεια ἐν ἡμῖν οὐκ ἔστιν] is not a mere repetition of ἐαυτοὺς πλανῶμεν, but adds to this another new element. — ἡ ἀλήθεια, as in ver. 6, is neither = studium veri (Grotius), nor = castior cognitio (Semler), nor

¹ Even Ebrard does not correctly state the relation of the two expressions to one another, when he says that “in ἔχειν ἁμαρτίαν man is not in ἁμαρτία, but ἁμαρτία is in man,” for plainly he also who is in ἁμαρτία has this in himself.

² When Ebrard, in opposition to this, remarks that it cannot be asserted “that the middle πλανᾶσθαι means ‘to be mistaken,’ and πλανᾶν ἑαυτόν, on the other hand, ‘to mislead oneself,’” this is not at all to the point, since it is not said that πλανᾶσθαι has always the meaning “to be mistaken,” but that the German “sich irren” [Engl. “to be mistaken”] is expressed in Greek not by πλανᾶν ἑαυτόν, but by πλανᾶσθαι.

even = uprightness, or truthfulness (Lücke in his 2d ed.), or, as de Wette explains: "the veracity of self-knowledge and self-examination;"¹ but truth in its objective character (Lücke in his 1st ed., Baumgarten-Crusius, Düsterdieck, Brückner, Braune). Baumgarten-Crusius rightly says: "*ἀλήθεια* does not need to be taken in subjective sense, the subjective lies in *οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν*." The expressions used here: *ἐαυτ. πλανῶμεν* and *ἡ ἀλ. οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν*, are not milder (Sander) than the corresponding expressions in ver. 6: *ψευδόμεθα* and *οὐ ποιούμεν τὴν ἀλήθειαν*, but stronger (Ebrard), since in *ἐαυτ. πλ.* the self-injury, and in *ἡ ἀλήθ. οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν* the negation of possession of the truth, are more sharply marked.

Ver. 9. Not a mere antithesis of the previous verse, but an expansion of the thought; "there follows as conclusion not merely this, that *we* are then true, but the incomparably greater and surprisingly glorious thought that *God* then proves Himself actually towards us as the True, as the *πιστὸς καὶ δίκαιος*" (Ebrard). — *ἐὰν ὁμολογῶμεν τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν ὁμολογεῖν* does not mean *to recognise* (Socinus: *confiteri significat interiorem ac profundam suorum peccatorum agnitionem*),² but *to confess*; of course it is manifest that the confession is not here spoken of as a purely outward act; still, at the same time, it is not sufficient to regard it merely as "an *inward* fact, which is founded on the whole internal tendency of the mind" (Neander); it is rather the real (even if not *always* vocal) expression of sins recognised within and confessed to oneself; here also it is the word in which the inner life has to operate.³ — What are to be confessed are *αἱ ἁμαρτίαι ἡμῶν*,

¹ Ewald's explanation is also unsatisfactory: "truth about this relation of things, and therefore easily about every other also."

² Similarly Baumgarten-Crusius says: "*ὁμολογεῖν* is not exactly *to confess*, but *to recognise*, perceive, become conscious of, as opposed to the *εἰπεῖν μὴ ἔχειν ἁμαρτίαν*;" but it is just to *εἰπεῖν* that *ὁμολογεῖν* is exactly opposed only when it is taken in its natural signification.

³ It is quite clear that confession to God is meant; when, however, Braune adds: "and indeed a confession so fervent and deep that it becomes public and regulated by the church," he introduces an element which nothing here suggests. In genuine Catholic fashion a Lapidé says: *Quam confessionem exigit Johannes? Haeretici solam generalem quae sit Deo admittunt; Catholici etiam specialem requirunt. Respondeo: Johannem utramque exigere, generalem pro peccatis levibus, specialem pro gravibus.*

i.e. the sins of Christians, which are the particular manifestations of *ἀμαρτίαν ἔχειν* (so also Braune); therefore the plural.¹ — Ebrard rightly calls attention to the fact that John here mentions, as the subject of the confession, not the abstract *ἀμαρτίαν ἔχειν*, but *τὰς ἀμαρτίας*, *i.e.* the definite, concrete, single sins committed; “the mere confession in the abstract that we have sin would not have truth without the acknowledgment of the concrete particular sins, but would shrivel up into a mere phrase.” — *πιστός ἐστι καὶ δίκαιος*] It is true God *is* both in Himself, He does not become so only when we confess our sins; but this confession is the condition on which He actually proves Himself to us as *πίστος καὶ δίκαιος*.² These two epithets are indeed not of the same signification, but still, as their combination proves, of cognate meaning. God is called *πιστός*, inasmuch as He, as the promise-maker, also fulfils what He has promised, Heb. x. 23: *πιστὸς ὁ ἐπαγγελούμενος*; Heb. xi. 11; especially as He accomplishes in believers the promise of blessing, which lies for them in the fact of their call, by conducting them through manifestation of His grace to the goal of their calling (according to Ewald, “inasmuch as He keeps His promise already repeatedly given in the O. T.”), 1 Cor. i. 9: *πιστὸς ὁ Θεός, δι’ οὗ ἐκλήθητε εἰς κοινωνίαν τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*; x. 13; 2 Cor. i. 18–21; 1 Thess. v. 24: *πιστὸς ὁ καλῶν ὑμᾶς, ὃς καὶ ποιήσει*; 2 Thess. iii. 3. *πιστός* has this meaning here also, as results from the following *ἵνα κ.τ.λ.* Ebrard incorrectly calls the reference of the faithfulness of God here to His promises and prophecies an introduction of foreign ideas, and says “the subject here is faithfulness to the nature of truth and light, akin to His own nature, and which prevails in us, inasmuch as we confess our sins.” — God is described as *δίκαιος* in the N. T., inasmuch as He, for the realization of His kingdom of grace, gives to every one—without *προσωποληψία*—what is due to him, according to

¹ Even here Socinus, Grotius (*Si fatemur nos in gravibus peccatis vixisse ante notitiam evangelii*), and others understand *ἀμαρτίαι* of sins *before* conversion.

² Semler's interpretation is not satisfactory: “logice intelligendum est; nec enim in Deo jam demum oritur nova ratio tanti praedicati, sed in his christianis succrescit nova cognitio tantae rei.” The subject is not our perception, but the actual manifestation of God.

the righteous judgment of God, in proportion to the position which he occupies toward God (or toward the kingdom of God), God being in this regarded as the *Judge*; the idea of the righteousness of God and that of His judicial activity are very closely connected; God is ὁ δίκαιος κριτής, 2 Tim. iv. 8; He judges ἐν δικαιοσύνῃ, Acts xvii. 31 (Rev. xix. 11), or δικαίως, 1 Pet. ii. 23; His κρίσις is a κρίσις δικαία, 2 Thess. i. 5. The relation of the δικαιοσύνη of God to His judicial activity is found throughout in the N. T., even where the former is the subject without the latter being expressly mentioned with it. As the manifestation of the δικαία κρίσις of God consists in the righteous distribution of punishment and of blessing, it follows that δικαιοσύνη is referred to not only where both of these are mentioned together (as in 2 Thess. i. 5 seq.), but also where only one of the two is spoken of. God *punishes* as the δίκαιος, but He *blesses* also as the δίκαιος, no doubt in view of the realization of His kingdom, which depends upon the good obtaining the complete victory over the evil. Towards him who walks ἐν τῷ σκότει, God shows Himself δίκαιος in that He κατακρίνει him; towards him who walks ἐν τῷ φωτί, by ever more and more removing from him everything that hinders his perfect κοινωνία μετὰ τοῦ Θεοῦ (namely, both his consciousness of guilt, and the ἀδικία which still clings to him), and by finally permitting him to inherit the perfect happiness which is prepared for those who love God (comp. 2 Tim. iv. 8). Here God is called δίκαιος, inasmuch as His purpose is directed to allotting to those who, walking in light, confess their sins, that which is suitable for them, namely, the blessing mentioned in the following ἵνα κ.τ.λ. The meaning of δίκαιος is rightly stated by Baumgarten-Crusius, Düsterdieck, Brückner, and Braune;¹ on the other hand, it is incorrect to refer δίκαιος here to the *punitiv* activity (Drusus: justus, quia vere punivit peccata nostra in filio suo), but also to explain it as bonis, lenis, æquus (Grotius, Lange, Carpzov, etc.), for δίκαιος never has this meaning in

¹ Ewald's explanation is unsatisfactory, according to which God is here called just because He "knows well and considers that He alone is the Creator, whilst we are His creation exposed to error and sin, and acts according to this just consideration."

the N. T.; it is here of cognate meaning with πιστός,¹ because the allotment of blessing bestowed in accordance with the δικαιοσύνη of God has been promised by Him, and is accomplished according to His promise; yet it must not therefore be regarded as synonymous with it (Hornejus: = in promissis servandis integer). Following Rom. iii. 26, some commentators have here interpreted it = δικαιῶν; but this is so much the more unjustifiable, as that very passage by the juxtaposition of the two ideas proves their different meaning.² According to the Roman Catholic view, πιστός refers to the peccata mortalia, δίκαιος to the peccata venialia.³ — ἵνα ἀφῇ ἡμῖν τὰς ἁμαρτίας] ἵνα, not = "so that" (Castellio: ita justus, ut condonet), has here (as in other passages of the N. T.) not retained strictly its idea of *purpose* (hence not: "in order that"), but it states what is the aim of the divine faithfulness and justice to attain which these qualities operate on men; Luther therefore translates correctly: "*that*." De Wette's explanation, with which Braune agrees: "in the divine faithfulness lies the law or the will of forgiving sins," is unsatisfactory, inasmuch as ἀφιέναι κ.τ.λ. is not merely the *will*, but the operation of the divine faithfulness and justice. — τὰς ἁμαρτίας refers back to ὁμολογῶμεν τὰς ἁμαρτίας,

¹ In the passage Rom. iii. 3-5, πίστις and δικαιοσύνη are also used as cognate ideas, but even here in such a way that δικαιοσύνη has not lost its reference to the judicial activity of God; Meyer on this passage explains δικαιοσύνη, on account of the contrast with ἀδικία, generally by "justice;" but the former reference appears both in μὴ ἄδικος ὁ Θεὸς ὁ ἐπιφέρων τὴν ἐργάνην, and also in ver. 6 πῶς κρινεῖ ὁ Θεὸς τὸν κόσμον.

² Not less inexact is it for Ebrard to say: "God manifests Himself towards us as the δίκαιος, inasmuch as He is not only just, but also *makes just*," since δικαιοῦν does not mean "*to make just*." His assertion is also inappropriate, that here and in Rom. i. 17-iii. 26, "the justice of God appears as the source in Him from which His saving, sin-forgiving, and sin-overcoming action flows." This source is rather God's ἀγάπη manifesting itself as χάρις towards the guilt of men; there is a reference to that in chap. iii. 24 of the passage in Romans, but here the *source* of the salvation is not mentioned. — The interpretation of Calov: "justa est haec peccatorum remissio et ex justitia debita, sed Christo non nobis," and that of Sander: "the Lord is just, inasmuch as He remits the sin of the sinner who appeals to the ransom paid in the blood of Christ, because it would be unjust to demand the payment twice," introduce references into this passage which are foreign to it.

³ Suarez: *Fidelis est Deus, cum condonat poenitentibus peccata mortalia; justus, cum justis condonat venialia, quia, sc. justi per opera (!) poenitentiae, charitatis, etc., merentur de condigno hanc condonationem.*

thus: "the sins confessed by us." The *remission*, *i.e.* the forgiveness, of sins is therefore, by virtue of the faithfulness of God, the first result of the confession; the second John describes by the words: *καὶ καθάριση¹ ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ πᾶσης ἁδικίας*. Here the first thought is not repeated epexegetically (Semler), or only in figurative manner (Lange); but the words express the same thing as the corresponding words of the 7th verse, with which the 8th and 9th verses are in closest connection (Düsterdieck, Braune; Brückner does not explain himself definitely); *καθαρίζειν* has here the same meaning as there, and *ἁδικία* (not = *poena peccati*, Socinus) is synonymous with *ἁμαρτία*; they are two different names for the same thing; comp. chap. v. 17.² The order in which the two clauses that express the redemptive operations of God are connected together (Myrberg: *ordo verborum ponit remissionem ante abrogationem*), points to the fact that purification takes place by means of forgiveness. — The context is quite decisive in favour of regarding as the subject of *πιστός ἐστι κ.τ.λ.* not *Χριστός*, but (with Lücke, de Wette, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc.) *ὁ Θεός*; for even though in ver. 7 the *καθαρίζειν* is described as the operation of the *αἷμα Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ*, and in chap. ii. 2, *Ἰ. Χρ.* is the subject, yet in this section *ὁ Θεός* is the principal subject; ver. 5, *ὁ Θεός*; ver. 6, *αὐτός*, even in ver. 7, *τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ*; the blood of Christ, therefore, is regarded as the means by which God produces purification from sins. To hold, with Sander, that *God and Christ together form the subject*,³ is quite as

¹ The Rec. *καθαρίσει* corresponds to the passage Luke xxii. 39, where, according to the best attested Rec., *ἵνα* is followed both by the subjunctive first, and then by the indicative; but not to the passage John vi. 40, cited by Elbrand, where the indicative is not regarded as dependent on *ἵνα*. On *ἵνα* with the indicative, comp. A. Buttinnann's *Gramm.* p. 202. Winer, p. 258 ff., VII. p. 271 ff.

² While Weiss also interprets both expressions of the forgiveness of sins, he tries to repel the reproach of tautology by saying: "If sin committed is regarded as a stain, it is quite correct that God forgives us the sin, and thus purifies us from all unrighteousness, since by the very fact that God forgives it, sin has ceased to exist before Him, and at the same time also to stain us;" true though this may be, however, it cannot serve to refute that objection, for as *καθαρίζειν* in this sense is not the result of *ἀφίεναι*, but the former consists in the latter, both clauses express only one and the same thought.

³ In favour of conjoining Christ as the subject, Sander adduces the fact that just in the following chapter *Christ* is called *δικαίος*; but in this he overlooks

inappropriate here as in ver. 5 to understand by αὐτοῦ both together. Though, with John, God and Jesus Christ approach very close to a unity, yet they are always distinguished by him, and never represented as one subject.

Ver. 10. Not a repetition, but “a strengthening of ver. 8” (Baumgarten-Crusius). As ver. 8 is connected with the end of ver. 7, so is this verse with ver. 9. — ἐὰν εἴπωμεν] as in ver. 8. — ὅτι οὐχ ἡμαρτήκαμεν] is substantially synonymous with ὅτι ἁμαρτ. οὐκ ἔχομεν, only distinguished from it in this way that the former describes an activity, the latter a state (so also Braune); the expression used here is called forth by the plural τὰς ἁμαρτίας and the idea ἡ ἀδικία (ver. 9), by which the sinful character is more definitely specified as an activity than by ἁμαρτία in ver. 7. The perfect does not prove that ἡμαρτήκαμεν is meant of sins before conversion (Socinus, Russmeyer, Paulus, etc.); the subject here, as in all the verses before, is the sinning of Christians; for to deny former sin could not occur to a Christian.¹ The perfect is explained both by John’s usus loquendi, according to which an action lasting up to the present is often represented in this tense, and also by the fact that the confession every time refers to sins previously committed. — ψεύστην ποιούμεν αὐτόν] corresponds to ἐαυτοὺς πλανῶμεν; it brings out that the Christian by the denial of his sin accuses God (αὐτόν, i.e. τὸν Θεόν) of lying. In ποιεῖν there lies, as Düsterdieck remarks, a certain reproachful bitterness; comp. John v. 18, viii. 53, x. 33, xix. 7, 12. This thought presupposes the declaration of God that even the Christian sins, which ver. 9 πιστός ἐστι κ.τ.λ. also suggests; for if God has promised

altogether the different meanings which the word has in the two passages; for in the verse before us δίκαιος is used of a relation to men, but in chap. ii. 1 of the relation of Christ to the divine will; and when Sander further says that in Heb. ix. 14 it is precisely stated of Christ that He purges the consciences, this is incorrect, since τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ is the subject there just as here in ver. 7; and there even more expressly than here God is specified as the author of the purification, for the αἷμα τ. Χρ. purges, because it is offered as a sacrifice τῷ Θεῷ. Moreover, it is not meant by this that forgiveness and cleansing could not be ascribed to Christ quite as much as to God, only it does not follow from this that ὁ Χριστός is the subject here.

¹ Therefore it is also not correct to refer ἡμαρτίκ. to present and past, as Hornejus explains: si dixerimus nos non tantum peccatum nunc non habere, sed nec peccatores unquam fuisse.

Christians forgiveness of their sins on condition of their confessing them, the above declaration is thereby made on God's side. — καὶ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ (i.e. τοῦ Θεοῦ) οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν] ὁ λόγος, corresponding to the thought ἡ ἀλήθεια in ver. 8, refers directly to the preceding ψεύστην κ.τ.λ. Lücke explains it correctly: "the revelation of God, especially the gospel of Jesus Christ" (so also Brückner, Düsterdieck, Braune); to understand by it (with Occumenius, Grotius, de Wette, etc.) especially the O. T., is forbidden by the train of thought, for the subject here is not the sinfulness of *man in general*, but the ἁμαρτάνειν of *Christians*.¹ Ebrard interprets ὁ λόγος τ. Θ. as the "self-proclamation of the nature of God, which has taken place both in the verbal revelations of the O. and N. T. and in the revelations of deeds," so that even the λόγος of Gospel of John i. 1 is to be regarded as included; but from the fact that the elements mentioned here are very closely connected, it does not follow that that idea has here, or anywhere else, this extensive signification. The words οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἡμῖν are erroneously explained by Baumgarten-Crusius: "we have given it up, or also: we are not qualified or fit for it;" it means rather: "it is not vividly imprinted in our hearts" (Spener); it has remained external to us, inwardly unknown.

¹ This has been more or less overlooked by the commentators (even by Düsterdieck and Ebrard), although it is also important for the understanding of chap. ii. 1, 2. But John may with justice assume that the word of God denies the absolute sinlessness of Christians, since—apart from the fact that even the O. T. does not depict the δίκαιον as perfectly holy—in every evangelical announcement the παράκλησις is an essential element for believers, which presupposes their having and doing sin.

CHAPTER II.

VER. 2. Lachm., according to A B, Vulg., has put *ἔστι* before *ἰλασμός*. Instead of *μόνον*, B has *μόνων*, which, no doubt, is only to be regarded as a mistake. — Ver. 3. The original reading of *κ* is *φυλάξωμεν*, instead of *τηρώμεν*; but it was afterwards corrected. — Ver. 4. A B *κ*, *al.*, Clem. Thph. etc. (Lachm. min. Tisch. 7) read *ὅτι* after *λέγων*; it is wanting in C G K, *al.* (Tisch. 2); Lachm. maj. has *ὅτι* in brackets. It is possible that *ὅτι* was in later times omitted as an interruption. *κ*¹ has with *ἡ ἀλήθεια* the addition: *τοῦ Θεοῦ*. — Ver. 6. *οὕτως* before *περιπατεῖν* (*Rec.* following C K *κ*, *al. pl.*, Copt. etc., Thph. etc., Tisch.) is uncertain; A B, *al.*, Vulg. (Lachm.) omit it; perhaps it was inserted to emphasize more strongly *καθώς*, etc. — Ver. 7. *ἀγαπητοί*] accepted by Griesb. on overwhelming authority instead of the *Rec.* *ἀδελφοί* (G K, etc.). — The addition *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* after *ἠκούσατε* (*Rec.* after G K, etc.), already regarded as doubtful by Griesb., is with justice deleted by Lachm. and Tisch. (after A B C *κ*, *al.*); it was added from the preceding; Reiche, it is true, thinks otherwise. — Ver. 8. *ἐν ἡμῖν*] *Rec.* The reading *ἐν ἡμῖν*, recommended by Griesb., has in A too feeble evidence. — Ver. 10. Instead of *ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν* (*Rec.* after B G K, *al.*, Tisch.), A C *κ*, *al.*, have *οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῷ* (Lachm.). — Ver. 13. Instead of the *Rec.* *γράφω ὑμῖν παιδία* (K, *al.*), we must read, in accordance with A B C G *κ*, many min. vss. and Fathers: *ἔγραψα ὑμῖν παιδία* (Lachm. Tisch.; also recommended by Griesb.); see, further, on this passage. Instead of *τὸν πονηρὸν*, *κ* erroneously reads *τὸ πονηρὸν*. — Ver. 14. Instead of *τὸν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, B reads *τὸ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, plainly following chap. i. 1; this, however, is not accepted by Buttm.; in B the addition *τοῦ Θεοῦ* is wanting after *ὁ λόγος*. — Ver. 15. Instead of *τοῦ πατρὸς* (*Rec.* after B G K *κ*, *al.*, Vulg. Syr. utr. etc., Oec. Thph. etc.), A C, *al.* read *Θεοῦ*; which reading is the correct one cannot be decided, as an intentional change of the one to the other cannot be proved. Ebrard considers *Θεοῦ* as original, but without adequate grounds. Lachm. and Tisch. have retained the *Rec.* — Ver. 17. Although Griesb. approves of the omission of *αὐτοῦ* after *ἐπιθυμία* (following A), it must nevertheless be considered genuine. The difficulty of it easily explains why it would be left out. In

some of the Latin Fathers there is found at the close of the verse the addition: *quo modo et Deus manet in aeternum*, which Bengel, without reason, is disposed to regard as genuine. — Ver. 18. The article before ἀντίχριστος is at least doubtful; Lachm. and Tisch. have omitted it; it is wanting in B C S*. — Ver. 19. Instead of ἐξῆλθεν the more unusual form ἐξῆλθαν is probably, with Lachm. and Tisch. (after A B C), to be regarded as genuine. S, however, has ἐξῆλθεν. — The generally prevailing reading: ἀλλ' οὐκ ᾔσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν, has been changed by Buttm. into ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐξ ἡμῶν ᾔσαν, according to his own statement, following B; Tisch. has not noticed this reading. In the following clause Tisch. reads: εἰ γὰρ ἐξ ἡμῶν ᾔσαν, after B C, *al.*; Lachm., on the other hand, has retained the *Rec.*: εἰ γὰρ ᾔσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν, after A G K S, *al. pl.*, Vulg. etc. It is remarkable that even Buttm. — against the evidence of B — has the *Rec.* It cannot be decided which reading is the correct one. — Ver. 20. Buttm. omits καὶ before οἴδατε, according to B; the πάντες, instead of πάντα presented (according to the statement of Tisch. maj.) by B, has not, however, been accepted by Buttm. — Ver. 23. The words ὁ ὁμολογῶν . . . ἔχει are wanting (after G K, etc., Occ.) in the *Rec.* Calvin, Milius, Wolf, etc., do not consider them genuine; but they are sufficiently attested by A B C S, etc. etc., and with justice admitted into the text by Griesb. Scholz, Lachm. and Tisch. — Ver. 24. The *Rec.* οὖν after ὑμεῖς is with justice deleted by Lachm. and Tisch., following A B C S, *al.*, Vulg. etc. — ἐν τῷ πατρὶ] *Rec.* after A C G K, *al.*, Syr. utr. Sahid. *al.*, Thph. Occ. (Tisch.). Lachm. has omitted ἐν (after B, Vulg. etc.). The omission of the preposition is perhaps explained by the fact that it appeared superfluous. S reads ἐν τῷ πατρὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ. — Instead of ἡκούσατε, S has both times the unusual reading ἀκηκούσατε. — Ver. 25. Instead of ἡμῶν, Lachm. in his small ed., following B, has accepted ὑμῶν (Buttm.); in the larger ed., however, ἡμῶν is rightly found, which is defended by almost all the authorities. — Ver. 27. On the form ἐλάθατε, received by Tisch. 7, following B*, comp. Ph. Buttmann's *compl. Gram.* § 96, note 9, and Winer, p. 68, VII. p. 71. — Instead of ἐν ὑμῶν μένει is to be read, with Lachm. and Tisch., which Griesb. previously recommended: μένει ἐν ὑμῶν (after A B C S, several vss. etc.). Buttm., following B, has accepted, instead of ἀλλ' ὅς, the reading ἀλλὰ, which probably arose through a correction. Instead of the *Rec.* τὸ αὐτὸ χρίσμα (A B G K, etc., Thph. Occ. Hier.), retained by Lachm., with the approval of Bengel, Lücke, Brückner, τὸ αὐτοῦ χρίσμα has been accepted by Tisch., following C, 4, 5, 7, *al.*, which is approved of by Reiche and Braune; S has also αὐτοῦ, but instead of χρίσμα, “πνεῦμα;” see the comm. — Instead of διδάσκει ὑμᾶς, Lachm. in his large ed.

reads διδ. ἡμᾶς; probably a misprint, as it is not noticed either by him or Tisch. as a special reading. — *μνετε*] *Rec.* after G K, *al.* (Tisch.); Lachm. has received instead of it the reading *μνετε*, recommended by Griesb., following A B C *ς*, *al.* The overwhelming evidence of the authorities is in favour of this reading, which probably was changed at a later date in accordance with ver. 24; Reiche, however, has decided in favour of the *Rec.*; Düsterd. Ewald, Braune, and now Brückner also, justly prefer *μνετε*. — Ver. 28. The words at the beginning: καὶ νῦν . . . ἐν αὐτῷ, are wanting in *ς*. — Instead of ἵνα ἔταιν (*Rec.* after G K, *al.*, Thph. Oec. Tisch.) we must read, with Lachm., following A B C *ς*, *al.*, Copt. Sahid.: ἵνα ἔάν. Instead of ἔχωμεν (*Rec.* after A G K, etc., Oec.), Lachm. and Tisch., following B C, *al.*, Thph., read σχωμεν. *ς** has σχωμεν; *ς*¹ has ἔχωμεν. The words ἀπ' αὐτοῦ are read by *ς* not before, but after παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ. — Ver. 29. The *Rec.* ὅτι πᾶς (Lachm. Tisch. 2) is found in B G K, several min. vss. and Fathers; A C *ς*, *al.*, Vulg. read ὅτι καὶ πᾶς (Tisch. 7); if καὶ, on which Tisch. (ed. maj.) observes: *cujus addendi nulla causa erat; ex Johannis vero usu est, be genuine, it serves "to bring out the agreement of the conclusion with the premiss"* (Ebrard).

Vv. 1 and 2 are most closely connected with what immediately precedes, and further determine and conclude it.

Ver. 1. The apostle had considered, in chap. i. 7, the blood of Christ, in i. 9 the faithfulness and justice of God—and both in reference to the forgiveness and purification of believers; now he comfortingly points to Christ as the Paraclete, whereby the previous thought now obtains its necessary complement. First, however, he mentions the object of his previous statement. — *Τεκνία μου*] Similarly chap. iii. 18; without *μου*, ii. 12, 28, iii. 7. John chooses this form of address: *tum propter aetatem suam, tum propter paternam curam et affectum* (Hornejus). In regard to the verbal form, Lorinus rightly says: *diminutiva nomina teneri ac blandientis sunt amoris signa*. The Apostle Paul, in Gal. iv. 19, uses the same form of address, with special reference to the spiritual fatherhood in which he stood toward his readers. — *ταῦτα γράφω ὑμῖν*] *ταῦτα* is referred by Bengel to what follows, by Grotius to what follows and what precedes, by most commentators (Lücke, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Sander, Düsterdieck, Braune), correctly, to the latter only; it refers, however, not merely to the truth expressed in ver. 6, nor

merely to the "exhortation to self-knowledge and penitence" (de Wette) which is contained in the preceding, nor merely to the statement about forgiveness and cleansing; but to the "whole in its vivid harmony" (Düsterdieck, so also Braune).¹ — ἵνα μὴ ἁμάρτητε] Statement of the object for which the apostle wrote what precedes; the direction which Calvin gives it: ne quis putet eum peccandi licentiam dare, quum de misericordia Dei concionatur, which is also found in Augustin, Bede, Calov, Bengel, Hornejus, Düsterdieck, Ewald, etc., is incorrect, since the sternness of the apostle against sin has already been sharply and definitely expressed, and the context, in which the subject previously was the forgiveness of sin, would not permit such a supposition to arise at all.² — καὶ ἐάν τις ἁμάρτη] καὶ is neither = "however" (Baumgarten-Crusius), nor = *sed* (Vulg.); it connects as simple copula a new thought with the preceding one. By ἐάν the possibility of sinning is admitted; Calvin incorrectly explains it: Conditionalis particula "si quis" debet in causalem resolvi; nam fieri non potest quin peccemus. Whether it is possible for the Christian *not* to sin, John does not say. Under the influence of the new spirit of life which is communicated to the believer he cannot sin; but, at the same time, in his internal and external mechanism there lies for him the possibility of sinning—and it is this which the apostle has in view. Socinus perverts the idea of the apostle when he interprets: si quis peccat i. e. post Christum agnitus et

¹ Ebrard refers ταῦτα to the two sentences, i. 6, 7, and 8-10, in which these thoughts, involving an apparent contradiction, are contained—(1) "That we must by no means walk in darkness," and (2) "that we must confess that we have and that we commit sin," and thinks that this apparent contradiction is solved by ii. 1, in this way, that in contrast to those theoretical statements these two practical conclusions from them are here given, namely, (1) "that we *are not* to sin;" (2) "that when we have sinned we *are* to reflect that in Christ we have an Advocate." But against this it is to be observed—(1) that by such a changing of theoretical statements into practical precepts the problem mentioned above is really not solved; (2) that the ideas expressed in i. 6, 7, and in i. 8-10, do not stand to one another in the relation of co-ordination, but the idea of i. 8-10 is subordinated to that of i. 6, 7; (3) that it is herewith presupposed that the apostle should have written: καὶ ἵνα εἰδῇτε, ὅτι, ἐάν τις ἁμάρτη, παρὰ κλητόν ἔχομεν, which, however, is incorrect, as the advocate-office of Christ is not mentioned in the preceding.

² Socinus incorrectly renders ἁμαρτάνειν = manere in peccatis; Lössler even more so = "to remain unbaptized."

professionem nominis ipsius adhuc in peccatis manet, necdum resipuit, etc.; for, on the one hand, the true Christian may indeed sin, but cannot remain in his sins; and, on the other hand, Christ is not the *παράκλητος* for him who remains in his sins. Besser correctly: "If any man sin—not with wilful doing of sin, but in spite of the will in his mind, which says *no* to sin."—*παράκλητον ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα*] From the 1st pers. plur. it follows that the preceding *τις* is used quite generally; the apostle is speaking communicatively, and does not wish himself to be considered excluded.¹ It is unnecessary for the connection of this sentence to supply: "let him know that," or: "let him comfort himself with the thought that," or any similar expression; for it is precisely through the *ἁμαρτάνειν* of believers that Christ is induced to be their Paraclete. The verb *ἔχειν* indicates that Christ belongs to believers.²—The word *παράκλητος* has both a general and a special forensic meaning; in the former, in which it is = "assister," or "helper," it is used in Gospel of John xiv. 16, 26, xv. 26, xvi. 7, where the Holy Ghost is so called because by His witness He leads the disciples into all truth; see Meyer on John xiv. 16;³ here, on the other hand, it is used in its forensic meaning = "advocatus, patronus causae," or even more special = "intercessor," and is in close connection with the following *ἰλασμός*, and refers back to the *ἀφιέναι* and *καθαρίζειν* of chap. i. 9; so that in Christ the typical action of the high priest interceding for the people has reached its complete fulfilment. The idea of the apostle therefore is—as almost all commentators recognise⁴—the same

¹ Augustin: *habemus dixit, non habetis*; maluit se ponere in numero peccatorum, ut habeat advocatum Christum, quam ponere se pro Christo advocato et inveniri inter damnandos superbos. — Socinus thinks that the apostle speaks in the first person, non quod revera ipse esset unus ex illis, qui adhuc peccarent, sed ut melius indieet, id quod affirmat pertinere ad omnes, quibus evangelium annuntiatur; clearly erroneous. Grotius arbitrarily: *habet ille advocatum*, sed ecclesia habet, quae pro lapso precatur. Preces autem ecclesiae Christus more advocati Deo patri commendat.

² Besser: "He has made Himself ours, has given our faith an eternally valid claim on Him."

³ In the fact that in the Gospel of John the Holy Ghost, but here Christ, is called *παράκλητος*, there is so much the less a contradiction, as in John xiv. 16 it is expressly put: *ἄλλον παράκλητον*, by which Christ signifies that He Himself is the proper *παράκλητος*, and the Holy Ghost His substitute.

⁴ Ebrard, who here gives the same explanation, explains the expression in the

as is expressed in Rom. viii. 34 (ὃς καὶ ἐντυγχάνει ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν), in Heb. ix. 24 (εἰσῆλθεν ὁ Χριστὸς . . . εἰς . . . τὸν οὐρανόν, νῦν ἐμφανισθῆναι τῷ προσώπῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν), and in Heb. vii. 25.¹—πρὸς τὸν πατέρα] πρὸς in the same sense as chap. i. 2.—God is called πατήρ, because the παράκλητος is the Son of God, and we also (believing Christians) have become through Him τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ, chap. iii. 1, 2.—'Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν δίκαιον] Christ is the Paraclete, not as the Logos, but as the *incarnate* Logos, who has shed His αἷμα (chap. i. 7) for the atonement,—and indeed inasmuch as He is δίκαιος; δίκαιος is here also neither = *lenis et bonus* (Grotius), nor = *δικαιῶν* (see Wolf on this passage); but neither is it = *fidelis atque verax*, quatenus id praestat quod promisit, se scilicet suis adfuturum (Socinus); according to the *usus loquendi*, δίκαιος could be understood of (judicial) justice (Bede: *justus advocatus, injustas causas non suscipit*), but then the adjective would have had to be put with παράκλητον; Ebrard incorrectly explains it = δίκαιος καὶ δικαιῶν; but this explanation is so much the more unwarrantable, as δικαιοῦν is the very business of the παράκλητος; by the epithet δίκαιος, Christ is held up before the ἁμαρτάνουσι as one who by His nature is fitted to be the Paraclete of sinners, *i.e.* as one who perfectly satisfies the will of God; who is “just and stainless, and without sin” (Luther). “Only as the Holy One, in whom the holy ideal of manhood is seen realized, can He intercede for sinners with the heavenly Father” (Neander).

REMARK.—How Christ executes His office of Advocate with the Father, John does not say; a dogmatic exposition of it is not in place here, still it is important to mark the chief elements which are the result of the apostle's statement. These are the following:—1. The Paraclete is *Jesus*, the glorified Redeemer

Gospel of John = “Comforter,” ὁ παρακλητὴ (more correctly παρακλητῆται, *mid.*), according to the Hebrew עֲנִיִּי, LXX. Job xvi. 2; but in this passage it is not *παράκλητος*, but *παρακλήτης*, that is used; Hofmann's explanation is also incorrect (*Schrijtbe.* II. 2, p. 15 ff.) = “Teacher” (comp. Meyer and Hengstenberg on John xiv. 16).

¹ This idea is not, as it might appear, in contradiction with John xvi. 26; for even in this statement a lasting intercession by Christ is indicated, since Christ ascribes the hearing of prayer in His name to Himself (xiv. 13) as well as to the Father.

who is with the Father; therefore neither His divine nature alone, nor His human nature alone, but the Lord in His divine-human personality. 2. The presupposition is the reconciliation of men with God by His blood. 3. His advocacy has reference to believers, who still sin amid their walking in light; and 4. It is a real activity in which He intercedes for His people (that God may manifest in their forgiveness and sanctification His faithfulness and justice) with God, as His (and their) Father. If these points are observed, on the one hand, there is found in the apostolic statement no ground for a materialistic conception, which Calvin opposes in the following words: *obiter notandum est, nimis crasse errare eos, qui patris genibus Christum advolvunt, ut pro nobis oret. Tollendae sunt eiusmodi cogitationes, quae coelesti Christi gloriae derogant;*—but neither, on the other hand, is there any justification for doing away with the idea, as not a few commentators have been guilty of. Even Bede has not kept himself free from it, when he says that the advocacy consists in this, that Christ presents Himself as man to God, and prays for us *non voce, sed miseratione*, and therefore considers the *intercessio*, not as an *actio realis*, but only as an *actio interpretativa*. But the idea is even more done away with, when the intercession is viewed only as the permanent effect of the redemptive work accomplished by Christ in the giving up of His life to the death, which is no doubt the opinion of Baumgarten-Crusius when he says: “The apostles certainly did not think of a special oral intercession, but of an intercession by deed, in His work.”¹ Lücke rightly says: “The meaning of this form of representation is no other than this, that Jesus Christ also in His *δύξα* with the Father continues His work of reconciliation. If Christ were not the eternal Paraclete for us with God, His saving and reconciling work would be limited to His earthly life merely, and in so far could not be regarded as eternal and complete;” but it is not to the point when he further puts it: “Without the eternally active saving and reconciling spirit of Christ, without the *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*, Christ would not be a perfect, a living Christ;” for John is not here speaking of the *πνεῦμα* of Christ, but of the personal Christ Himself. The explanation of de Wette, that the advocacy of Christ is the combination of the idea of the glorified and of the suffering Messiah, is also unsatisfactory, because it changes the

¹ Similarly Köstlin (p. 61): “Christ is the eternal *παράκλητος*; He does not however, pray the Father, but the sense of His office of Advocate is simply this, that for His sake the Father also loves those who believe on Him.” Frommann also (p. 472 ff.) finds in the statement of the apostle only a symbolical form of expression, by which the continuation of the atoning work of Christ in His state of exaltation is indicated.

objective reality into a subjective representation. Neander rightly says: "When Christ is described as the Advocate, this is not to be understood as if only the effects of the work once accomplished by Him were transferred to Himself.—John considers the living Christ as personally operating in His work, as operating in His glorified position with His Father, with the same holy love with which He accomplished His work on earth as a mediation for sinful man. It is by Him in His divine-human personality that the connection between man, saved and reconciled to God by Him, and God as the Father, is always brought about." Comp. also Meyer on Rom. viii. 34, and Braune in the fundamental dogmatic ideas of the passage.

Ver. 2. *καὶ αὐτός* = et ipse, idemque ille; *καί* is here also the simple copula, and is not to be resolved either into *quia* (a Lapidé) or *nam*.—*αὐτός* refers back to *Ἰησ. Χριστὸν δίκαιον*, and the epithet *δίκαιον* is not to be lost sight of here; Paulus, contrary to the context, refers *αὐτός* to God.—*ἱλασμός ἐστι*] The word *ἱλασμός*, which is used besides in the N. T. only in chap. iv. 10, and here also indeed in combination with *περὶ τῶν ἁμ. ἡμῶν*, *may*, according to Ezek. xlv. 27 (= *חַטֹּאת*), mean the *sin-offering* (Lücke, 3d ed.), but is here to be taken in the sense of *חַטָּאת*, Lev. xxv. 9, Num. v. 8, and no doubt in this way, that Christ is called the *ἱλασμός*, inasmuch as He has expiated by His *αἷμα* the guilt of sin. This reference to the sacrificial blood of Christ, it is true, is not demanded by the idea *ἱλασμός in itself*,¹ but certainly is demanded by the context, as the apostle can only ascribe to the blood of Christ, in chap. i. 7, the cleansing power of which he is there speaking, because he knows that reconciliation is based in it.

REMARK.—In classical Greek *ἱλάσσειν* (as middle) is = *ἱλεῖν ποιεῖν*; but in scripture it never appears in this active signification, in which God would not be the object; but in all the passages where the Septuagint makes use of this word, whether it is as the translation of *כִּפָּר* (Ps. lxxv. 4, lxxviii. 38, lxxix. 9), or of *לָם* (Ps. xxiv. 11; 2 Kings v. 18), or of *חָנָה* (Ex. xxxii.

¹ In the Septuagint not only does *ἱλασμός* appear as the translation of the Hebrew *חַטָּאת* (Ps. cxxix. 4; Dan. ix. 9), but *ἱλάσκειν* is also used = *to be merciful, to forgive* (Ps. lxxv. 4, lxxviii. 38, lxxix. 9),—quite without reference to an offering.—The explanation of Paulus, however: "He (i.e. God) is the pure exercise of compassion on account of sinful faults," is not justifiable, because, in the first place, God is not the subject, and secondly, the *ἱλασμός* of Christ is not the forgiveness itself, but is that which procures forgiveness.

14), God is the subject, and sin, or sinful man, is the object; in Heb. ii. 17, Christ is the subject, and the object also is τὰς ἁμαρτίας. The case is almost exactly similar with ἐξιλιάσκεισθαι, which does not appear in the N. T. at all, but in the O. T., on the other hand, is used as the translation of רָפָא much more frequently than the simple form; it is only where this verb is used of the relation between men, namely Gen. xxxii. 21 and Prov. xvi. 14, that the classical usus loquendi is preserved; but elsewhere with ἐξιλιάσκεισθαι, whether the subject be God (as in Ezek. xvi. 63) or man, especially the priest, the object is either man (Lev. iv. 20, v. 26, vi. 7, xvi. 6, 11, 16, 17, 24, 30, 33; Ezek. xlv. 17) or sin (Ex. xxxii. 30; both together, Lev. v. 18, Num. vi. 11), or even of holiness defiled by sin (the most holy place, Lev. xvi. 16; the altar, Lev. xvi. 18, xxvii. 33, Ezek. xliii. 22); only in Zech. vii. 2 is found ἐξιλιάσκεισθαι τὸν κύριον, where, however, the Hebrew text has יִרְפָּא יְהוָה יִרְפָּא. Ἰλασμός, therefore, in scripture does not denote the reconciliation of God, either with Himself or with men, and hence not *placatio* (or as Myrberg interprets: propitiatio) Dei, but the justification or reconciliation of the sinner with God, because it is never stated in the N. T. that God is reconciled, but rather that we are reconciled to God.¹

Grotius, S. G. Lange, and others take ἰλασμός = ἰλαστήρ; of course that abstract form denotes the personal Christ, but by this change into the concrete the expression of the apostle loses its peculiar character; "the abstract is more comprehensive, more intensive; comp. 1 Cor. i. 30" (Brückner); it gives it to be understood "that Christ is not the propitiator through anything outside Himself, but through Himself" (Lücke, 2d ed.), and that there is no propitiation except

¹ Comp. Delitzsch in his *Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews*, on chap. ii. 17, p. 94 ff. But it is to be noticed that Delitzsch, while he states correctly the Biblical mode of representation, bases his opening discussion on the idea of the "self-reconciliation of the Godhead with itself," an idea which is not contained in scripture.—It is observed by several commentators that ἰλασμός, as distinguished from καταλλαγή = "Versöhnung" (reconciliation), is to be translated by "Sühnung" or "Versöhnung" (both = Engl. *expiation*, *atonement*). It is true, *Versöhnung* and *expiation* are properly one and the same word, but in the usage of the language the distinction has certainly been fixed that the latter word denotes the restoration of the disturbed relationship by an expiation to be performed; only it is inexact to assert that the idea ἰλασμός in itself contains the idea of punishment, since ἰλάσκεισθαι does not include this idea either in classical or in Biblical usage, and ἐξιλιάσκεισθαι, though mostly indeed used in the O. T. in reference to a sacrifice by which sin is covered, is also used without this reference (comp. Eccclus. iii. 28).

through Him.¹ — The relation of *ἱλασμός* to the preceding *παράκλητον* may be variously regarded; either *παράκλητος* is the higher idea, in which *ἱλασμός* is contained, Bede: *advocatum habemus apud Patrem qui interpellat pro nobis et propitium eum ac placatum peccatis nostris reddit*; or conversely: *ἱλασμός* is the higher idea, to which the advocacy is subordinated, as de Wette thus says: “*ἱλασμός* does not merely refer to the sacrificial death of Jesus, but, as the more general idea, includes the intercession as the progressive reconciliation” (so also Rickli, Frommann); or lastly, both ideas are co-ordinate with one another, Christ being the *ἱλασμός* in regard to His blood which was shed, and the *παράκλητος*, on the other hand, in regard to His present activity with the Father for those who are reconciled to God through His blood. Against the first view is the sentence beginning with *καὶ αὐτός*, by which *ἱλασμός* is marked as an idea which is not already contained in the idea *παράκλητος*, but is distinct from it; against the second view it is decisive that the propitiation, which Christ is described as, has reference to *all* sins, but His intercession, on the other hand, has reference only to the sins of the believers who belong to Him. There remains, accordingly, only the *third* view as the only correct one (so also Braune). The relationship is this, that the intercession of the glorified Christ has as its presupposition the *ἱλασμός* wrought out in His death,² yet the sentence *καὶ αὐτός* is not merely added, *ut causa reddatur*, *cur Christus sit advocatus noster* (Hornejus, and similarly Beza, Lorinus, Sander, etc.), for its independence is thereby taken away; the thought contained in it not merely serves for the explanation or confirmation of the preceding, but it is also full of meaning in itself, as it brings out the relation of Christ to the whole world of sinners. — *περὶ πᾶν ἡμαρτιῶν ἡμῶν*]

¹ The case is the same with the expression *ἱλασμός*; as with other abstractions by which Christ is described, as *ζωή*, *ὁδός*, *ἀγιος*, κ. τ. λ. Who does not feel that by these words something much more comprehensive is expressed than in the concrete forms: *ὁ ζωοποιῶν*, *ὁ ὁδηγῶν*, *ὁ ἀγιάζων*, κ. τ. λ.?

² Köstlin incorrectly says (p. 180): “Christ is *παράκλητος*, while He is *ἱλασμός*, i. e. high priest, and at the same time sacrifice, a high priest who offers himself; and *ἱλασμός*, while He is *παράκλητος*, i. e. a sacrifice which offers itself:” for neither does *παράκλητ.* describe the high-priesthood of Christ, according to its full comprehension, nor does *ἱλασμός* mean “sacrifice.”

περί expresses the reference quite generally: "in regard to;" it may here be observed that ἐξιλάσκεσθαι in the LXX. is usually construed with περί, after the Hebrew לַעֲשׂוֹת חַסְדִּים. The idea of substitution is not suggested in περί. — With τῶν ἁμαρτ. ἡμῶν, comp. chap. i. 9; it is not merely the sins of Christians (ἡμῶν, i.e. fidelium; Bengel) before their conversion that are meant, but also those which are committed by them in their Christian life; comp. chap. i. 7. Ebrard's opinion, that these words are added to ἱλασμός merely as a preparation for the following additional thought, is inadmissible; they rather suggest themselves to the apostle—and without regard to what follows—inasmuch as it is only by virtue of them that the idea obtains complete expression. — οὐ περὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων δὲ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου] Expansion of the thought, in reference to the preceding περὶ τ. ἁμ. ἡμῶν, in order to mark the universality of the propitiation. It is incorrect to understand by ἡμεῖς the Jews, and by κόσμος the Gentiles (Oecum., Cyril, Hornejus, Semler, Rickli, etc.); ἡμεῖς are rather believers, and κόσμος is the whole of unbelieving mankind; so Spener, Paulus, de Wette, Lücke, Sander, Neander, Düsterd., Braune, etc. — Baumgarten-Crusius agrees with this interpretation, only he understands by κόσμος not mankind together (extensive), but successively (protensive); but this distinction is unsuitable. It would be preferable to say that John was thinking directly of the κόσμος as it existed in his time, without, however, limiting the idea to it. The interpretation of Augustin and of Bede, by which κόσμος is = "ecclesia electorum per totum mundum dispersa," is clearly quite arbitrary. The propitiatory sacrifice was offered for the whole world, for the whole of fallen mankind; if all do not obtain the blessing of it, the cause of that does not lie in a want of efficacia in it; Düsterdieck therefore rightly says: "The propitiation is of judicial nature; according to this, the propitiation for the whole world has its real efficacia for the whole world; to the believing it brings life; to the unbelieving, death." Calvin quite improperly asserts: sub omnibus reprobos non comprehendit, sed eos designat, qui simul credituri erant et qui per varias mundi plagas dispersi erant (similarly Beza); against this the statement of Bengel is sufficient: quam late peccatum, tam late propitiatio. The expressly

added ὅλου places the matter beyond all doubt. — With regard to the genitive περὶ ὅλ. τοῦ κόσμου, Winer says (p. 509, VII. p. 536): “instead of this, either περὶ τῶν ὅλου τ. κ., or, instead of the first words, περὶ ἡμῶν might have been written; similarly Heb. ix. 7;” many commentators, on the other hand, supply τῶν directly, as Grotius, Semler, Wilke (*Hermeneutik*, II. p. 145), de Wette, Düsterdieck; as the Vulg. renders: “*pro totius mundi*,” and Luther: “für der ganzen Welt.” On behalf of this, appeal is made to passages such as John v. 36,¹ Matt. v. 20; but the construction which appears in these passages is the well-known comparatio compendiaria, which does not occur here, as there is no comparison here at all; an oratio variata is therefore to be accepted, which was the more natural to the apostle, as the idea κόσμος includes in itself that of sin.²

Vv. 3–11. Further antithetical statement of the believers' walk in light; it is described as τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολὰς Θεοῦ (vv. 3–6); this then is further defined as a περιπατεῖν καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησε (ver. 6), and ἀγαπᾶν τὸν ἀδελφόν is emphasized as being the essence of this walk (vv. 7–11).

Ver. 3. Semler would make a new section begin here: “after the foundation of salvation has been spoken of, there follows the exhortation to preserving the salvation;” incorrectly; ver. 3 is closely connected with chap. i. 5, 6, and states in what the Christian's walk in light consists; therefore also it begins simply with καί. — ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν] ἐν τούτῳ refers to the following εἰς; the object is stated by ὅτι; the same combination is found in the Gospel of John xiii. 35; similarly in chap. iv. 13, where, however, the particle ὅτι is used instead of εἰς, and chap. v. 2, where ὅταν is used. A Lapidé wrongly weakens the force of γινώσκομεν: non certo et demonstrative, sed probabiliter et conjecturaliter; it is rather the anxiety of the apostle to bring out that the Christian has a sure and certain consciousness of the nature

¹ This passage is cited by Elbrard further, in order to prove his assertion: “This abbreviation for περὶ τῶν ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου needs no explanation” (!).

² When Braune, who has accepted the explanation which is here given of the verse as a whole and in detail, says in reference to the oratio variata which occurs here: “it has not happened for the sake of the evil which attaches to the κρίσις, for this is true of Christians also (contrary to Luther),” he thereby shows that he has not correctly understood the above remark.

of the Christian life. This certainty is confirmed to him by unmistakeable facts, in which the truth of his knowledge attests itself. — ὅτι ἐγνώκαμεν αὐτόν] αὐτόν seems to refer to the last-mentioned subject in ver. 2, therefore to *Christ*; so it is explained by Oecumenius, Erasmus, Grotius, Calov, Spener, Bengel, Semler, Johannsen, Sander, Myrberg, Erdmann, etc.; but the deeper train of thought is opposed to this; John is not continuing the idea of ver. 2, but is going back to the fundamental thought of the whole section: "He who has fellowship with God walks in the light;" the principal subject is *God*, and to it, therefore, αὐτόν is to be referred; so Calvin, Beza, Lücke, Baumgarten-Crusius, Ewald, de Wette, Brückner, Ebrard, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc.¹ — On ἐγνώκαμεν, which is not, with Lange and Carpzov, to be interpreted = "love," the commentators rightly remark that it is not a mere external, purely theoretical knowledge that is to be understood by it;² it is the *living* knowledge that is meant, *i.e.* a knowledge in which the subject (God) is really received into the inner life, and thought and action are determined by it,³ so

¹ The reason brought forward by Ebrard: "it lies also in the idea of the *commandments*, that they are mentioned as commandments of the Father and not of the Son," is not valid; comp. Gospel of John xiv. 15, 21, 23, xv. 10. Ebrard, on the other hand, rightly points to ver. 6, where ἱεσὺς (Christ) is distinguished from αὐτός. From this verse it also follows that John, in this section, is considering Christ not as having given commandments, but as having walked according to the commandments of God.

² Lorinus: cognoscere cum quadam voluntatis propendentis approbatione. — A Lapide: cognitione non tantum speculativa, sed et practica, quae cum amore et affectu conjuncta est, ac in opus derivatur. — Spener: "This is not a mere knowing (1 Cor. viii. 1), such as may exist without love, but a knowledge which comes into the heart and fulfils His will with trust." — De Wette: "Knowledge of the heart, not of the mind, wherewith activity is also assumed." — Lücke: "the knowledge of God in the highest sense; not, however, in so far as it is identical with the love of God, but only in so far as it really impels men practically to fulfilment of the divine commands, and thus reveals itself in growing love to the God who is known as the Light."

³ Weiss not unjustly contends against the current view of γινώσκειν in John, in so far as the idea of knowledge is not kept pure in it from confusion with other ideas; but when Weiss says that in John only "the knowledge that rests on immediate contemplation is to be thought of," and observes that "it lies in the nature of the case, that in this intuition and contemplation the object is received into the entire spiritual being of man as a—nay, as *the* determining power," he not only agrees with the explanation given above, but defines the idea in such a way as not to deviate so *very* far from the commentators whom he opposes as his polemic would lead one to suppose.

that *ἐγνωκέναι* is necessarily connected with the *κοινωνίαν* ἔχειν μετ' αὐτοῦ (chap. i. 6); still it is inexact to render ὅτι ἐγνώκαμεν αὐτόν, with Occumenius, directly by ὅτι συνεκράθημεν αὐτῷ, or, with Clarius, by societatem habemus cum eo. By ἐγνώκαμεν the element of consciousness in the fellowship, and with this its internal and spiritual side, is brought out. — ἐὰν τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν] The expression τ. ἐντολ. τηρεῖν¹ describes the obedience resulting from the internal faithful keeping of the commandments;² it is incorrect, with Braune, so to press the idea τηρεῖν here, in its distinction from ποιεῖν, that merely “attention to the commandments” is to be understood by it; it rather includes in itself the actual obedience. This obedience is not here regarded as the means of the knowledge of God, but as the proof of it; rightly Occumenius: διὰ τῶν ἔργων ἡ τελεία δεδείκνυται ἀγάπη; only he should have said “γνώσις” instead of ἀγάπη. Between both of those there is the same relationship as between fellowship with God and walking in light; for as the former is related to the knowledge of God, so is the latter related to the observance of the divine commandments, which is the concrete embodiment of ἐν τῷ φωτὶ περιπατεῖν.

Ver. 4. Inference from ver. 3, expressing the antithetical side. — ὁ λέγων κ.τ.λ.] is used in the same sense as ἐὰν εἴπωμεν, chap. i. 6. Without reason, Braune considers that “in the singular there lies a progress in the development of the thought.” The statement that ἐγνώκα is used “with manifest regard to the *Gnostics*” (Ebrard), is not to be accepted; ὁ λέγων is rather to be taken in a quite general sense, comp. ver. 6, at the same time referring to the appearance of such a moral indifferentism among the churches. αὐτόν, as in ver. 3 = Θεόν. — ψεύστης ἐστὶ] = ψεύδεται, chap. i. 6; but in such a way that the idea is more sharply brought out by it (Braune).

¹ It is to be noticed, that to describe the Christian commandments John never uses νόμος (which by him is *only* used in reference to the Mosaic Law), but generally ἐντολαί (only now and then λόγος Θεοῦ or Χριστοῦ); and as verb, τηρεῖν, never ποιεῖν (except in Rev. xxii. 14). — In the writings of Paul, τηρεῖν ἐντολῆν appears only in 1 Tim. vi. 14, and besides in the N. T. in Matt. xix. 17 (chap. xviii. 20: τηρεῖν πάντα ὅσα ἐντιλάμπει ὑμῖν).

² The paraphrase of Semler may be given here merely for its curiosity: Si (nos Apostoli) retinemus et magnificamus hanc ejus doctrinam: Deum esse pariter omnium gentium.

— καὶ ἐν τούτῳ κ.τ.λ.] as in chap. i. 8. — From the connection between the knowledge of God and the observance of His commandments, it follows that he who boasts of the former, but is wanting in the latter, has not the truth in him, but is a liar.

Ver. 5. In this verse the apostle confirms the idea of ver. 3, in the form of an antithesis to ver. 4, and with the introduction of a new element. — ὃς δ' ἂν τηρῇ αὐτοῦ (i.e. Θεοῦ) τὸν λόγον] The particle δέ, which refers not to ver. 3 (Lücke), but to the words καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ μὴ τηρῶν, ver. 4, shows that this verse stands in the same relationship to ver. 4 as chap. i. 7 to ver. 6; “τηρῇ is with emphasis put first, and similarly αὐτοῦ before τὸν λόγον” (Braune). — αὐτοῦ ὁ λόγος is synonymous with αἱ ἐντολαὶ αὐτοῦ, vv. 3 and 4: “the essence of the divine commandments;” a Lapide: Dicit *verbum ejus* in singulari, quia praecipue respicit legem caritatis; haec enim caeteras omnes in se comprehendit. — The predicate does not run: οὗτος ἔγνωκεν αὐτόν, but: ἀληθῶς ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ τετελείωται, whereby “a new side of the thought comes into view” (Ebrard). — ἀληθῶς] “in truth,” opposed to appearance and mere pretence; it is emphatically put first, as in John viii. 31; with reference to the preceding ἡ ἀλήθεια (de Wette); and serves to bring out not a quality of the τετελείωται (Ebrard), but the actuality of the ἐν τούτῳ . . . τετελείωται (so also Brückner). — ἐν τούτῳ ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ τετελείωται] ἡ ἀγάπη τ. Θεοῦ is not here, as in chap. iv. 9: “the love of God to us” (Flacius, Calovius, Bengel, Spener, Russmeyer, Sander, Lange, etc.), nor: “the love commanded by God” (Episcopus), nor: “the *relationship* of mutual love between God and man” (Ebrard: “the *mutua amicitia et conjunctio* between God and the Christian”);¹ but: “love to God,” as in chap. ii. 15, iii. 17, iv. 12, v. 3 (Bede, Oecumenius, Luther, Calvin, Beza, Lorinus, Hornejus, Paulus, de Wette-Brückner, Baumgarten-Crusius, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, Braune, etc.). This interpretation is required by the context; for “the love of God” appears here in place of the

¹ Similarly Besser: “‘The love of God in us’ usually embraces both *God’s love to us, by which, and our love to God, in which we live.* This is the case in this passage also.” This interpretation can be just as little grammatically justified as that of Ebrard; neither a *duplicity* nor a *mutual relationship* is expressed in the phrase ἡ ἀγ. τοῦ Θεοῦ.

“knowledge of God,” vv. 3 and 4. As in the latter, so in the former also, consists fellowship with God. Both, love and knowledge, are so inseparably connected, and are so essentially one in their principle and nature, that the one is the condition of the other.¹ — The idea *τετελείωται* is not to be weakened, as in Beza: *τελειούν* hoc in loco non declarat perfecte aliquid consummare, sed mendacio et simulationi opponitur, ut hoc plane sit, quod dicimus: mettre en exécution; but it is to be taken in its constant meaning: “has been perfected,” as in chap. iv. 12, 17, 18.² The objection, that nevertheless no Christian can boast of perfect love to God, does not justify an arbitrary change of meaning. The absolute idea *τηρεῖν αὐτοῦ τὸν λόγον* demands for its counterpart an idea quite as absolute (so also Brückner).³ Where the word of God is perfectly fulfilled, there love to God is perfect; in perfect obedience perfect love is shown. That the Christian has not attained this perfection at any moment of his life, but is ever only in a state of progress towards it, is no doubt true; but John is not here considering that aspect (so also Braune).⁴ — *ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν*] *ἐν τούτῳ* refers neither to the thought contained in ver. 6 (Socinus, Ewald), nor to *ἡ ἀγάπη . . . τετελ.*, but to the keeping of the commandments (so also Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Brückner, Braune). Obedience is the evidence for the knowledge that we are *ἐν αὐτῷ*. — *ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἐσμεν*] The expression signifies the inward fellowship of life (differently Acts xvii. 28); it combines the preceding *ἐν τούτῳ . . . τετελ.* and the former

¹ Grotius, it is true, is not wrong when he says: Amor prae-supponit cognitionem; but it is just as correct to say: Cognitionis prae-supponit amorem.

² Even Bengel's interpretation: perfectum regimen nactus et perfecte cognitus est (viz. amor Dei erga hominem), does not correspond to the idea of the word.

³ Ebrard, it is true, wants the idea *τετελείωται* to be retained unweakened, but finds himself compelled by his interpretation of *ἡ ἀγ. τ. θ.* to agree with Beza's explanation, because “in the case of a *relationship* its *perfection* is nothing else than its *conclusion*.” Ebrard's opinion, that if *ἡ ἀγ. τ. θ.* = “love to God,” John must have written *τελεία ἰστίη* instead of *τετελείωται*, is—besides being contrary to John's *usus loquendi*—without foundation.

⁴ In Calvin's explanation: Si quis objiciat, neminem unquam fuisse repertum, qui Deum ita perfecte diligeret, respondeo: sufficere, modo quisque pro gratiae sibi datae mensura ad hanc perfectionem aspiret, and in that of Socinus: “Est autem perfectio ista caritatis in Deum et obedientia praeceptorum ejus ita intelligenda, ut non omnino requiratur, ne ei quicquam deesse possit, sed tantum ut ejusmodi sit, qua Deus pro sua ingenti erga nos bonitate contentus esse voluit,” limitations are introduced which are foreign to the apostle's train of thought.

ἐγνώκαμεν αὐτόν, and is identical with κοινωνίαν ἔχομεν μετ' αὐτοῦ (chap. i. 6), which it defines in its internal character. The knowledge and love of God is being in God (so also Brückner).¹ — Grotius, who understands αὐτῷ of Christ, enfeeblingly explains: Christi ingenii discipuli sumus.

Ver. 6 gives the more particular definition of what the τηρεῖν of God's commandments, and therefore the Christian's walk in light, consists in. — ὁ λέγων] as in ver. 4; here, however, with the infinitive construction. — ἐν αὐτῷ μένειν] ἐν αὐτῷ does not refer to Christ (Augustin, Hornejus, Wolf, Lange, Neander, etc.), but to God. — μένειν] instead of εἶναι, ver. 5. Both expressions are synonymous, it is true, but not identical (Beza); in μένειν the unchangeableness of the being is brought out. Bengel: Synonyma cum gradatione: illum nosse, in illo esse, in illo manere. Frommann (p. 187): "The *being* and *abiding* in God signifies one and the same fellowship with God. The latter describes it merely as something constant, lasting, which accessory notion is not contained in the former expression." — ὁφείλει] comp. chap. iii. 16, iv. 11, "is in duty bound," refers back to ὁ λέγων; it is not meant to be indicated here what is demanded in regard to the μένειν ἐν Θεῷ, but what is the duty of him who *says* that he abides in God—if he does not want to be a liar, in whom the truth is not, ver. 4. — καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιπατήσε, καὶ αὐτὸς [οὕτως] περιπατεῖν] By these words Christ is placed as a pattern before Christians, *i.e.* in regard to His whole walk (which is elsewhere done in the N. T. only in regard to His self-abasement and to His conduct in suffering; see this commentary on 1 Pet. ii. 21); *of what sort* this was, John does not here say; from the connection with what precedes, however, it is clear that the apostle points to Him in so far as He kept the commandments of God, and therefore walked in the light.² This reference to Christ as an example is frequently found in the same form

¹ In substantial agreement with this Weiss says: "In vv. 3 and 4 it was stated that in the keeping of God's commandments we recognise that we have known God. If, therefore, there is a continuous train of thought here, the being in God must only be a new expression for the knowing of God, or must be directly given along with it."

² Semler paraphrases: Si quis gloriatur, se suamque doctrinam semper convenisse cum doctrina illa Christi, is sane debet etiam in humanæ vitæ modo non Judaismum præferre (!).

(καθὼς ἐκεῖνος) in our Epistle; so iii. 3, 7, iv. 17; comp. also John xiii. 15, xv. 10, and *passim*. — περιπατεῖν describes not merely the disposition, but the action resulting from it. In the fact that John brings just this out (comp. especially chap. iii. 17, 18), it is evident how far his mysticism is removed from mere fanaticism. — On οὕτως, see the critical notes.

Vv. 7-11. A more particular statement of the nature and import of τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ or of περιπατεῖν καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησε.

Ver. 7. ἀγαπητοί] Such a form of address does not necessarily indicate the commencement of a new section, but is also used when the subject of the discourse is intended to be brought home to the hearers or readers; this is the case here. — οὐκ ἐντολὴν καινὴν γράφω ὑμῖν] certainly does not mean: "I do not write to you *of* a new commandment;" neither, however: "I write (set) *before* you" (Baumgarten-Crusius); for γράφειν has not this signification; it simply means: *to write*; when connected with an object, as here, it is = to communicate or announce anything by writing; comp. chap. i. 4. The subject of his writing the apostle calls an ἐντολή; it is arbitrary to take the word here in a different meaning from that which it always has; thus Rickli: "the whole revelation of divine truth as it has been brought to us in Jesus Christ"¹ (similarly Flacius, Calovius, etc.); and Ebrard: "the announcement, that God is light, chap. i. 5;" ἐντολή means "commandment;" this idea must not be confounded with any other. Most of the commentators (Augustin, Bede, Oecamenius, Theophylact, Luther, Calvin, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette-Brückner, Neander, Sander, Erdmann, Myrberg, Ewald, etc.) understand by it, according to vv. 9-11, the commandment of brotherly love; others, on the other hand (Socinus, Episcopius, Calovius, Schott, Lücke, Fritzsche, Frommann, etc.), according to ver. 6, the commandment of following Christ. These two

¹ Ebrard wrongly maintains that ἐντολή is "a truth including directly in itself practical requirements." Only the practical requirements contained in a truth can be—when regarded as a unity—called ἐντολή, but not the truth which contains them in itself. It is true the demand of faith in the message of salvation may be described as ἐντολή, but not the message of salvation itself; here, however, the context forbids us to take the expression in that sense (as Weiss), since neither in what precedes nor in what immediately follows is there a demand for faith expressed.

views seem to be opposed to one another, but they really are so only if we assume that John here wants to emphasize a single special commandment—in distinction from other commandments. This supposition, however, is erroneous; the command to keep the commandments (or the word) of God after the example of Christ, or to walk in the light, is no other than the command to love one's brother. From chap. i. 5 on, John is speaking not of different commandments, but of the one general commandment of the Christian life which results from the truth that God is light. It is to this commandment that reference is made when John, in order to bring it home to his readers, says: *οὐκ ἐντολήν καινήν γράφω ὑμῖν*, so that by *ἐντολή* he does not indicate a commandment which he then for the first time is about to mention, but the commandment which he has already spoken of in what precedes (only not merely in ver. 6), but defines more particularly in what follows, namely, in regard to its concrete import.¹ Of this commandment John says, that it is not an *ἐντολή καινή*;² in what sense he means this, the following words state: *ἀλλ' ἐντολήν παλαιάν, ἣν εἶχετε ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*; it is not new, but old, inasmuch as his readers did not first receive it through this writing, but already had it, and indeed *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, *i.e.* from the very beginning of their Christian life; comp. chap. iii. 11; 2 John 5, 6; and, for the expression *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, ver. 24 (Calvin, Beza, Socinus, Episcopius, Piscator, Hornejus, Lange, Rickli, Lücke, de Wette-Brückner, Sander, Neander, Besser, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, Ewald, Braune, etc.). The imperfect *εἶχετε*, instead of which we

¹ This view is in accordance with that of Düsterdieck, who rightly remarks: "The solution of the problem lies in this, that the holy command to walk as Christ walked, fully and essentially resolves itself into the command of brotherly love;" it is also accepted by Braune. The objection of Brückner, that brotherly love is only a *principal element*, and not the complete fulfilment of following Christ, can only be regarded as valid if brotherly love is not viewed in its full, complete character; comp. John xiii. 34, and also the statement of the Apostle Paul: *πλήρωμα νόμου ἡ ἀγάπη*, Rom. xiii. 10. — The instances adduced by Ebrard against the reference to brotherly love can only have any force if the commandment which prescribes this is distinguished, as a special one, from the command to walk in light.

² Certainly what John here says reminds us of the statement of Christ in John xiii. 34; nor can it be denied that John was here thinking of that, as well as in the passage 2 John 5; but from this it does not follow that *οὐκ ἐντολ. καιν. γράφω ὑμῖν* does not refer to what precedes, but only to what comes after (ver. 9).

should expect the present, either refers back to the time before John had come to his readers, or is to be explained: "which ye hitherto already had." The latter is the more probable. Some commentators weaken this interpretation, which is demanded by the context, and hold that John calls the commandment (namely, "the commandment of love") an old one, because it was already given by Moses; thus Flacius, Clarius, etc.; the Greek commentators even go beyond that, and refer it at once to this, that it was written from the very beginning in the heart of man;¹ the latter Baumgarten-Crusius maintains, and says: "here, therefore, the ethics of Christianity are represented as the eternal law of reason," in which he explains ἀπ' ἀρχῆς "from the beginning of the history of man," and regards "ye as men" as the subject of εἴχετε. — ἡ ἐντολὴ ἡ παλαιὰ ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὃν ἠκούσατε] This addition serves for a more particular definition of the preceding; ἡ παλαιὰ is repeated in order to accentuate this idea more strongly. By εἴχετε it was only stated that the readers were in possession of the commandment; now the apostle defines it more particularly in this respect, that it is the word (not: "the chief substance of the word," de Wette) which they had heard (comp. ver. 24, iii. 11, iv. 3), which, therefore, was proclaimed unto them (comp. chap. i. 2, 3), namely, by the apostolic preaching. The clause is therefore not to be taken, as Baumgarten-Crusius holds, as a correction of γράφω: "not by him was it first given; it is from the beginning of Christianity, the λόγος, ὃν ἠκούσατε, namely, from Christ:" for ἠκούσατε does not refer directly to γράφω (Bengel), but to εἴχετε.² On

¹ In the scholia of Matthæi it is thus put: εἰ μὴ Ἰουδαίους ταῦτα γράζει, εἰκίττοι, τὴν περὶ ἀγάπης ἐντολὴν οὐ καινὴν εἶναι φησί. πάσαι γὰρ αὐτὴν διὰ τῶν προφητῶν ἐπηγγέλονται. Εἰ δὲ οὐκ Ἰουδαῖοι ἦσαν, μή ποτ' οὖν ἐντολὴ παλαιὰ . . . ἐστὶν ἡ κατὰ τὰς φυσικὰς ἐννοίας φιλικὴ διάβησις, πάντες γὰρ φύσει ἡμεῖρα καὶ κοινωνικὰ ζῶα ὄντες ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς πλῆσιν. — Oecumenius and Theophylact combine the two together, holding that the Epistle was addressed to Jewish and Gentile Christians.

² Wolf assumes a peculiar antithesis between the two sentences: Ratio fortassis aliqua reddi possit, cur εἴχιν et ἀκούειν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς; sibi invicem subjungantur. Prius enim ad illos spectaverit, qui ex Judæis ad Christum conversi erant; illi enim jam ante præceptum hoc de amore mutuo ex lege Moysis et prophetis cognitum habebant; posterius respiciet ex-Gentiles, qui idem inter prima evangelicæ doctrinæ præcepta acceperant: this amounts, partly, if not altogether, to what the Greek commentators adduce for explanation of the expression παλαιὰ. The arbitrariness of such an antithesis is self-evident.

the addition ἀπ' ἀρχῆς (*Rec.*) after ἡκούσατε, which Ewald regards as genuine, see the critical notes.

Ver. 8. πάλιν ἐντολὴν καινὴν κ.τ.λ.] Almost all commentators hold that the ἐντολὴ καινὴ is the same ἐντολή as was the subject of ver. 7; differently Ebrard, who explains as follows: "With ver. 7 begins a new section which continues to ver. 29, in which the leading thought is the position of the readers to the light as one which was already shining; by ἐντ. παλαιά is meant the clause, chap. i. 5: ὁ Θεὸς φῶς ἐστι; by ἐντ. καινὴ, on the other hand, the following clause: ἡ σκοτία παράγεται καὶ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινὸν ἤδη φαίνει;¹ the relative clause ὃ ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς κ.τ.λ. belongs, by apposition, to the following sentence: ὅτι ἡ σκοτία κ.τ.λ., and states to what extent the essential true light has already begun to shine, namely, the fact that the light already shines has a double sphere in which it is ἀληθές, i.e. actually realized, first in Christ, but then also ἐν ὑμῖν, i.e. in the Ephesian readers themselves, and equally in all true Christians." This explanation is, however, incorrect; for—(1) the truth ἡ σκοτία παράγεται κ.τ.λ. can just as little be called an ἐντολή as the sentence ὁ Θεὸς φῶς ἐστι (see on ver. 7); (2) the relative clause, if it was to be a preceding apposition to ἡ σκοτία κ.τ.λ., would have had to come after ὅτι; according to the structure of the verse, ὃ must necessarily be connected with what precedes; (3) it is a false idea, that that which the clause ὅτι ἡ σκοτία expresses was actually realized in Christ; the incorrectness of this idea is concealed in Ebrard's interpretation in this way, no doubt, that he gives to ἐν αὐτῷ a different relation from that which he gives ἐν ὑμῖν, and changes the present παράγεται into the perfect.² Nor is the opinion that we are to

¹ The same view is found in Castellio, Socinus, and Bengel. The latter remarks on ἐντολὴν καινὴν: praeceptum novum, quod nobis nunc primum in hac epistola scribitur; and on ὅτι: quod hoc est illud praeceptum, to which he then very strangely adds: amor fratris, ex luce.

² Ebrard says: "The eternally existing light is one which has already appeared ἐν αὐτῷ, in so far as in Christ the light objectivized has arisen for the world and has overcome the darkness, and ἐν ὑμῖν in so far as also subjectively to the readers the light of the gospel has arisen, and they also subjectively have been drawn from darkness unto light." By ἐν ὑμῖν he means, therefore, the readers, in whom, i.e. in whose souls, the transition from darkness to light has taken place; by ἐν αὐτῷ, however, not Christ, in whom, but the world, for which that has happened objectively, inasmuch as Christ entered as the light into the

understand by *ἐν τ. παλ.* the commandment of walking in light, and by *ἐν τ. καινῇ*, on the other hand, that of brotherly love (ver. 9), tenable, because these commandments, according to their import, are not two distinct commandments, but one and the same commandment. Still more unjustifiable is the assumption of S. Schmid, that in ver. 7 the fundamental law of Christianity, namely, justification by faith, but here the commandment of Christian sanctification, is meant; and that of Weiss, that by *ἐντολή*, ver. 7, is to be understood the evangelical message of salvation, but here the commandment of love. The apostle, having in view here the same commandment as in ver. 7, says: "*Again a new commandment I write unto you, which thing is true in Him and in you: because the darkness is past, and the true light now shineth.*" The relative clause *ὃ ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.* serves not merely to establish the statement that the commandment is a *new* one (Socinus, Flacius, Morus, Hornejus, de Wette-Brückner, Lücke, ed. 2 and 3, ed. 1 of this commentary, Erdmann, etc.);¹ but the apostle thereby describes the commandment, yet not in a *material* way, so that *ὃ* would be referred to the substance of it (Oecumenius, Luther, Baumgarten-Crusius, Semler, From-

darkness of the world. Quite a different meaning, therefore, is here assigned to *ἐν αὐτῷ* from that which is given to *ἐν ὑμῖν*, as the difference in the relation from the antithesis of "objective" and "subjective" clearly shows.—It is not merely the change of the present *παράγεται* into the perfect that is the cause of this treatment, for it appears elsewhere in the commentary,—thus on p. 148: "that which is true in Christ and in you, that the darkness *is past*," etc.; p. 150: "similar to the new announcement, that the darkness *is past*," etc.; p. 155: "It is the truth, that the darkness *is past*;" against which, on the other hand, *παράγεται* is correctly explained on p. 150: "the darkness is passing by, is in a state of passing away, of disappearing."

¹ For if *ὃ ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.* is, according to the intention of the apostle, to be referred to the idea of the newness of the commandment, he would—first, have given this idea a more independent form than he has given it as a simple attribute of the object *ἐντολὴν* depending on *γράφω*; and, secondly, not have given the confirmation of the statement (that the commandment is a *new* one) in a sentence which does not so much show the truth of this idea as merely state the sphere in which that statement is true; to which may be added, that the idea so resulting is itself so indistinct, that it requires, in order to be understood, an explanatory circumlocution, such as: "that the commandment is a new one has its truth in Christ, inasmuch as it did not exist before Him," etc. (ed. 1 of this comm.). Besides, an emphasis unwarranted by the context is placed on the idea of the newness of the commandment, especially if it is thought that the following *ἔτι* again serves to establish the thought expressed in the confirmatory clause (Lücke, de Wette, Brückner).

mann, Düsterdieck, etc.),¹ but only in a *formal* way, as that which is actually fulfilled in Christ and in his readers; as the commandment in ver. 7 was also only defined in a formal way by ἡν εἶχετε ἀπ' ἀρχῆς. — ὁ ἐστίν . . . ἐν ὑμῖν is the object belonging to γράφω, and ἐντολήν καινὴν is to be taken as the accusative of more particular definition; this construction of it is found in Ewald, only he explains ἐν αὐτῷ incorrectly by: "in the last-mentioned (in ver. 7) word of God;" most recently it has been accepted by Braune with the interpretation here given. The sense accordingly is: that which is already true, *i.e.* fulfilled, in Christ and in you, namely, the τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολὰς τοῦ Θεοῦ (comp. John xv. 10, where Christ says of Himself: ἐγὼ τὰς ἐντολὰς τοῦ πατρὸς μου τητήρηκα), I write unto you as a new commandment.² With this view it is self-evident that the apostle calls the old commandment a *new* one only in so far as he writes it anew to them. It is true a different reference has usually been given to καινὴ, by understanding it either of the constant endurance of the commandment of love (Calvin: novum dicit, quod Deus quotidie suggerendo veluti renovat; Joannes negat ejusmodi esse doctrinam de fratribus diligendis, quae tempore obsolescat: sed perpetuo vigere), or to indicate that this commandment first entered into the world along with Christianity — whether emphasis was put more upon the substance of it (Lücke, de Wette, ed. 1 of this comm.), or upon the mere time of it

¹ Düsterdieck, it is true, approves of Knapp's paraphrase, which agrees with the above explanation: πάλιν (ὡς) ἐντολὴν καιν. γρ. ὑμῖν τοῦτο ὁ ἐστίν ἀληθὲς κ.τ.λ.; but, with the idea of a constructio ad sensum, refers ὁ to the preceding ἐντολὴν, so that this forms the object of γράφω, which by the relative clause obtains its more particular definition. In opposition to this construction, de Wette has rightly observed that it has grammatical difficulty. When Düsterdieck, in reply to Lücke's objection, that with that interpretation it would need to run ἡ ἐστίν ἀληθὲς, says that it is not the ἐντολή itself as such, but its substance in Christ, etc., that has been fulfilled, Ebrard's observation is a sufficient answer: "That which is required in the ἐντολή is nothing else than just the ἐντολή itself; the requirement itself is fulfilled in Christ when its substance is fulfilled in Him."

² That John places before his readers anew as a commandment that which already has been fulfilled in them, is clearly not more strange than that he declares to them truths of which he himself says that they know them already (comp. ver. 21). Brückner admits that the construction here advocated is simple and clear, but groundlessly thinks that "the strangeness of this form of speech" is not mitigated by the reference to ver. 21.

(Düsterdieck);¹ but these constructions, not being indicated in the context, are purely forced. — On *πάλιν*, Erasmus says: *et contrarietatem declarat et iterationem*; hic autem non repetitionis sed contrarietatis est declaratio; with this interpretation almost all commentators agree, referring *πάλιν* to the idea *ἐν τ. καινῇ*; but an antithetical construction is foreign to the word; it is = “again, once more,” is to be connected with *γράφω*, and is explained by the fact that the readers have already heard the commandment, nay, even are already fulfilling it. Lücke and de Wette connect it directly with the verb, but in such a way that even they give to it an antithetical reference.² — *ἐστὶν ἀληθές*] *ἀληθής* signifies here the actual reality, as in Acts xii. 9 (see Meyer on this passage). — *ἐν αὐτῷ*] *ἐν* is to be retained in its special meaning, not = “respectu, in reference to,” nor is it used “of the subject *in* *which* something true is to be recognized as true (ver. 3)” (de Wette), for there is no mention here of any knowledge. That by *αὐτός* here not God (Jachmann), but Christ is to be understood, is shown by the context. Socinus incorrectly explains *ἐν αὐτῷ* = *per se ac simpliciter*. On the point that *ἡμῖν* is not to be read, see the critical notes. Grotius unjustifiably understands by *ἡμῖν* the apostles. — Neander has a wrong conception of the relation of *ἐν αὐτῷ* and *ἐν ὑμῖν* when he explains: “it takes place in reference to Christ and in reference to the church, therefore in reference to their *mutual* relationship to one another.” — *ὅτι ἡ σκοτία κ.τ.λ.*] *ὅτι* is not

¹ On the basis of the right view of *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, ver. 7, we find the nature of the newness of the commandment indicated just in this; this, however, is only the case if the temporal reference is retained in its purity. This Düsterdieck indeed insists on; but this relation has only force if we regard at the same time the substance of the commandment, as Düsterdieck does. But nothing in the context indicates this *new* substance, and it is therefore very differently defined by the commentators.

² Lücke does so when he says: “In ver. 8, John continues *correctly* thus: Again a new commandment I write unto you.” (In the edition of 1851, Lücke agrees with the usual acceptance: “Again—in contrast—a new commandment I write unto you;” see ed. 3, p. 249, note 1.) — De Wette does not expressly give his opinion about *πάλιν*; but when he thinks that John should properly have written: “again a new commandment I call it,” and when he then paraphrases it: “The commandment of love is an old and long-known one to you; *but* (as it is altogether revealed as a new one by Christ) for you who partake in the newness of life it is in an especial manner a new one,” the antithetical reference is clearly brought out by him also.

used *declaratively*, nor in such a way as to be dependent on ἀληθές ("it is true that the darkness," etc.), or on ἐντολήν (Castellio, Socinus, Bengel, Ebrard),—to both these views the structure of the verse is opposed,—but *causally*; this is rightly perceived by most of the commentators; but it is incorrect when they connect it with the immediately preceding ὁ ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς κ.τ.λ., for the double-membered clause: ὅτι ἡ σκοτία . . . φαίνει, being a confirmatory clause, does not stand in a corresponding relationship to the thought: ὁ ἐστὶν ἀλ. . . ὑμῖν, which it is intended to confirm.¹ By ὅτι κ.τ.λ. the apostle rather states the reason why he writes to them as a new commandment that which is true in Christ and in them (Düsterdieck, Braune); this reason is the already commenced disappearance of darkness and shining of the true light. The contrasted words ἡ σκοτία and τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν are to be taken in ethical sense (Braune);² the former idea signifies the darkness which consists in error and sin, as it exists outside the fellowship with God; the latter, the light which consists in truth and holiness, as it

¹ With this connection of the thoughts, the double-membered clause: ὅτι ἡ σκοτία . . . φαίνει, must confirm both *ἐστὶν ἀλ. ἐν αὐτῷ* and also *ἐστὶν ἀλ. ἐν ὑμῖν*. Now, when Lücke makes the apostle to say, as a proof that the commandment to walk in light shows itself in Christ and in his readers as a *new* one: "Not only in Christ Himself (*ἐν αὐτῷ*) has the true light appeared, but it has also shed itself abroad, dispelling the darkness in the minds of his readers (*ἐν ὑμῖν*), and is shining in them," he attributes the thought really expressed by the apostle (*ἡ σκοτία . . . φαίνει*) *only* to *ἐν ὑμῖν*; while to *ἐν αὐτῷ*, on the other hand, he attributes an idea which the apostle has *not* expressed. — Brückner says: "The *ἐν αὐτῷ* refers to *καὶ τὸ φῶς κ.τ.λ.*, the *ἐν ὑμῖν* rather to *ἡ σκοτία κ.τ.λ.*;" but this reference of the one member of the confirmatory clause to the one element of the thought to be confirmed must be regarded as unjustified, although Brückner thinks "it can easily be imagined that the apostle in the one part of the confirmation had in view rather the latter, and in the other rather the former part of the clause to be confirmed," for such a different reference is in no way hinted at; besides, ἥδη is here altogether left out of view. Düsterdieck rightly establishes the proposition that the *whole* sentence: ἀληθ. . . ὑμῖν, is to be regarded as confirmed by the *whole* sentence: ὅτι ἡ σκ. . . φαίνει; but when he then, in interpretation, says: "Already the darkness is dispelled by the true light, which shines in truth *in Christ* and *in His believers* (in so far, namely, as brotherly love attained its most perfect manifestation in the walk of Christ, and is exercised by believers also)," it is only the *second* part of the confirmatory clause that is referred by him to *ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐν ὑμῖν*, but not the first part; and this indeed is quite natural, since *in Christ* a disappearance of darkness is not imaginable.

² It was to be expected that Weiss here also denies to the ideas σκοτία and φῶς the ethical meaning, and wants to be understood by the former only error,

proceeds from Christ, who Himself is the true light. It is incorrect to understand here by τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀλ., Christ Himself (Bengel, Erdmann), as the contrast with ἡ σκοτία shows. ἀληθινός is an expression which is almost confined to the writings of John; outside them it is only found in Luke xvi. 11, 1 Thess. i. 9, and three times in the Epistle to the Hebrews; it describes the light of which the apostle is speaking as the eternal, essential light, of which the earthly light is merely the transitory reflection; see especially Neander on this passage. — παράγεται is translated by the Vulgate as perfect: quoniam tenebrae transierunt; similarly by Luther: "the darkness is past;" and Calvin directly says: Praesens tempus loco Praeteriti. This, however, is arbitrary; the present is to be retained as such; it is used in the same sense as in 1 Cor. vii. 31: παράγει (see Meyer on this passage), so that we must interpret: "the σκοτία is in the state of passing away." It is unnecessary to take παράγεται, with Bengel, with whom Sander and Besser agree, as passive (Bengel: non dicit παράγει transit, sed παράγεται traducitur, commutatur, ita ut tandem absorbeatur); it is more natural to regard it as the middle form with intransitive meaning. With the meaning: "is in the state of passing," corresponds the particle ἤδη with φαίνει, which is not="now" (Luther), but by which the moment is described in which the darkness is retreating before the light, at which therefore neither has the darkness already completely disappeared, nor is the light completely dominant. Most of the commentators, both the older and more recent (Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette-Brückner, Lücke, Sander, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Ebrard), take this as referring to Christianity in general, in so far as by it, as the true light, the old darkness is being ever more and more overcome; but by the word ἤδη the apostle shows that in these words he is looking forward to a future time at which that victory will have been completely won, and which he regards as close at hand (so also Braune). The moment by the latter only the knowledge of God. Weiss himself, however, views them both so that they are of ethical—and not merely theoretical—character; and, moreover, as he admits that with the former error sin, and with the latter knowledge holiness, is necessarily connected, it is so much the more arbitrary to allege that John, in the use of these ideas, utterly ignored this necessary connection.

in which he writes this is in his eyes, therefore, no other than that which immediately precedes the second coming of Christ, and which He Himself in ver. 18 calls the *ἐσχάτη ὥρα*,¹ in which it is of the greater importance for Christians, by keeping the commandment, to show themselves as children of the light. The same train of thought essentially occurs here as afterwards in vv. 15-18; compare also the Pauline *ἡ νύξ προέκοψεν, ἡ δὲ ἡμέρα ἤγγικε*, Rom. xiii. 12.

Vv. 9-11. Further definition of the life of light as life in love. — Ver. 9. *ὁ λέγων*] the same form as in ver. 4, to which the structure of the whole verse is very similar. *ἐν τῷ φωτὶ εἶναι*] stands in close relation to what immediately precedes; although he alone is in the light who lives in fellowship with Christ, and belongs to the church of Christ, yet *τὸ φῶς* describes neither Christ Himself (Spener, etc.) nor “the church, as the sphere within which the light has operated as illuminating power” (Ebrard). Chap. i. 6, 7 may be compared. — In contrast with *καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ μισῶν* is ver. 10, *ὁ ἀγαπῶν ἀδ. αὐτοῦ*, in which the apostle states the substance of the *τηρεῖν τὸν λόγον τοῦ Θεοῦ* after the example of Christ. As *φῶς* and *σκοτία*, so *μισεῖν τ. ἀδ.* and *ἀγαπᾶν τ. ἀδ.* exclude each other; they are tendencies diametrically opposed to one another; human action belongs *either* to the one *or* to the other; that which does not belong to the sphere of the one falls into that of the other; Bengel: *ubi non est amor, odium est: cor non est vacuum*. Here also John speaks absolutely, without taking into consideration the imperfect state of the Christian, as is seen in the hesitations between love and hatred. — *τὸν ἀδελφόν* Grotius interprets: *sive Judaeum, sive alienigenam; fratres omnes in Adamo sumus*; similarly Calov, J. Lange, etc.; by far the greatest number of commentators understand thereby fellow-Christians. Apart from its exact meaning and the wider meaning = brethren of the same nation (Acts xxiii. 1; Heb. vii. 5), *ἀδελφός* is used in the N. T. generally, in Acts and in the Pauline Epistles

¹ Rickli: “John says this of the *time* in which they are living, and in which the great work of the Lord had had a wonderful, rapid progress of development. The true Light, the Lord in His perfect manifestation of divine truth, is already *shining*; . . . already the great morning is dawning for mankind. When the Lord shall return, then shall be the perfect day of God. Towards this manifestation all believers walk.”

always, to denote Christians; but in many passages it is also = *ὁ πλησίον* or *ὁ ἕτερος*; thus in Matt. v. 22 ff., vii. 3 ff., xviii. 35; Luke vi. 41 ff.; Jas. iv. 11, 12 (in Matt. v. 47 it describes our friendly neighbour). In the Gospel of John it is only used in the sense of relationship, except in chap. xx. 17, where Christ calls His μαθηταί "οἱ ἀδελφοί μου," and in chap. xxi. 23, where οἱ ἀδ. is a name of Christians. If, therefore, according to the *usus loquendi* of the N. T., *ὁ ἀδελφός* may certainly be = *ὁ πλησίον*, yet in the Epistles of John, according to chap. iii. 11 (comp. Gospel of John xiii. 34, xv. 12; besides, especially with chap. iii. 16, comp. Gospel of John xv. 13; there: *ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀδελφῶν τὰς ψυχὰς τιθέναι*; here: *ὑπὲρ τῶν φίλων αὐτοῦ*), and according to chap. v. 1 (where the ἀδ. is specifically called a *γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ*), we must understand by it *the Christian brother*; so that John, therefore, is speaking, not of the general love towards men, but of the special relationship of Christians to one another; comp. the distinction in 2 Pet. i. 7; Gal. vi. 10. — *ἕως ἄρτι*] "until now," refers back to *ἤδη*, ver. 9; the meaning is: although the darkness is already shining, such an one is nevertheless *still* (*adhuc*) in darkness; on this peculiarly N. T. expression, see Winer, p. 418, VII. p. 439; A. Buttmann, p. 275; there is no reason for supplying "even if he were a long time a Christian" (Ewald). With the *ἐν τ. σκ. ἐστίν* is contrasted, ver. 10: *ἐν τῷ φωτὶ μένει*; see on this ver. 6.¹ That the "exercise of brotherly love is itself a means of strengthening the new life" (Ebrard), is not contained in the idea *μένει*. Even if the idea of ver. 10—in relation to that of the 9th verse—is brought out more distinctly by *μένει*, this is much more done by the words: *καὶ σκάνδαλον ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν*. *σκάνδαλον* appears in the N. T. only in the ethical signification = "offence," *i.e.* that which entices and tempts to sin; in the case of *ἐν αὐτῷ*, the preposition *ἐν* is generally either left unnoticed by the commentators (Grotius says, appealing to Ps. cxix.: *est*

¹ Köstlin incorrectly finds the reason why he who loves his brother remains in the light, in this, "that the Christian life of the individual requires for its own existence the support of all others." Of such a support the apostle is not speaking here at all, but the truth of his statement lies rather in this, that *love* and *light* are essentially connected with one another.

metonymia et ἐν abundat. Sensus: ille non impingit) or changed in meaning; de Wette: "*in his case* (for him) there is no stumbling; comp. John xi. 9 ff.;" similarly Baumgarten-Crusius, Neander, etc.; Lücke even says: "ἐν αὐτῷ can here only signify the outer circle of life," because "the σκάνδαλα for the Christian lie in the world, and not in him;" with him Sander agrees. For such changes there is no ground, since in the usage of the word the figure (the snare, or rather the wood that falls in the snare) has quite given place to the thing, and it is therefore unnecessary to say, with Düsterdieck, that "in the expression ἐν αὐτῷ the thing itself penetrates into the otherwise figurative form of speech;" the offence may be outside a man, but it may be *in* him also; comp. Matt. v. 29, 30. The preposition ἐν is here to be retained in its proper meaning (Düsterdieck, Ewald, Braune). The sense is: In him who loves his brother and thus remains in the light, there is nothing which entices him to sin. Some commentators refer σκάνδαλον to the temptation of *others* to sinning; so Vatablus: nemini offendiculo est; Johannsen: "he gives no offence;" Ebrard: "there is nothing in them by which they would give offence to the brethren," etc.; but in the context there is no reference to the influence which the Christian exercises upon others, and if John had had this relationship in his mind, he would certainly have expressed it;¹ this is decisive also against Braune, who would retain both references. Paulus quite unwarrantably refers ἐν αὐτῷ to τὸ φῶς: "in that light nothing is a stumbling-block."—The beginning of the 11th verse repeats—in a form antithetical to ver. 10—that which was said in ver. 9; but with further continuation of the ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ ἐστίν. —The first subordinate clause runs: καὶ ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ περιπατεῖ. The difference of the two clauses does not consist in this, that the representation passes over from the less figurative (ἐστίν) to the more figurative (περιπατεῖ) (Lücke); for, on the one hand, περιπατεῖν is so often used of the ethical relationship of man, that it is scarcely any longer found as a figurative expression; and, on the other

¹ When Ebrard finds no obstacle in the thought that he who loves his brother does not by any act give offence to others, he should find no obstacle in the thought that there is nothing in him which becomes an offence to himself.

hand, the connection by *καί* shows that there is a difference of idea between the two expressions; this has been correctly thus described by Grotius: *priori membro affectus* (or better: *habitus*, Sander), *altero actus denotatur* (similarly de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Braune). Both: the being (the condition) and the doing (the result) of the unloving one belong to darkness; comp. Gal. v. 25. The second subordinate clause: *καὶ οὐκ οἶδε ποῦ ὑπάγει*, is closely connected with *περιπατεῖ*; *ποῦ*, properly a particle of rest, is in the N. T. frequently connected with verbs of motion; comp. John vii. 35, xx. 2, 13; Heb. xi. 8; in the Gospel of John especially, as here, with *ὑπάγειν*; see John iii. 8, viii. 14, etc.; in John xii. 35 it runs exactly as here: *ὁ περιπατῶν ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ οὐκ οἶδε ποῦ ὑπάγει*. The translation: "where he is going," is false, for *ὑπάγειν* is not: "to go," but: "*to go to*." To the unloving one, the goal whither he is going on his dark way, and therefore the direction of his way, is unknown. By this goal it is not exactly the final goal, *i.e.* condemnation (Cyprian: *it nescius in gehennam, ignarus et caecus precipitatur in poenam*), that is to be thought of, for the subject according to the context is not punishment; but by the figurative expression the apostle wants to bring out that the unloving one, not knowing whither, follows the impulse of his own selfish desire: he does not know what he is doing, and whither it tends. As a confirmation of this *last* idea, the apostle further adds: *ὅτι ἡ σκοτία ἐτύφλωσε τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς αὐτοῦ*; *τυφλοῦν* does not mean "to darken," but "*to make blind, to blind*;" this idea is to be retained, and is not, with Lücke and others, to be enfeebled by an interpolated "*tamquam, as*" ("in the darkness they are as if blind"), by which the clause loses its meaning; the apostle wants to bring out that, inasmuch as the unloving one walks in the darkness, the sight of his eyes is taken from him by this darkness, so that he does not know, etc. He who lives in sin is blinded by sin, and therefore does not know whither his sin is leading him; comp. John xii. 40 and 2 Cor. iv. 4.

Vv. 12-14. After the apostle has depicted the Christian life in its essential features, he passes on to exhortation. To this these verses form the introduction, in which the apostle assures his readers that their Christianity is the ground of his

writing. The motive of this, which explains also the form of expression, is the earnest longing which inspires the apostle, that his readers may take home to themselves the following exhortation. — The apostle addresses them under four different names: *τεκνία* and *παιδιά, πατέρες, νεανίσκοι*. By the two latter names they are distinguished according to the two corresponding degrees of age; ¹ in the case of *πατέρες* the proper meaning is not to be strictly retained, but in contrast to *νεανίσκοι* it is = *γέροντες* or *πρεσβύτεροι*, the members of the church who are already in advanced age; thus Erasmus, Calvin, Socinus, Morus, Carpzov, Lange, Paulus, de Wette-Brückner, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc. — The *νεανίσκοι* are the younger members of the church; Calvin: *tametsi diminutivo utitur, non tamen dubium est, quin sermonem ad omnes dirigat, qui sunt in aetatis flore et statu*. The view of Augustine is to be rejected, that under the three names *the same* persons are addressed, whom the apostle only designates differently in different aspects: *filioli*, quia baptismo neonati sunt; *patres*, quia Christum patrem et antiquum dierum agnoscunt; *adolescentes*, quia fortes sunt et validi. So also is the opinion that the apostle has in view, not the difference in age, but the difference in the degree, or even in the length of existence of Christian life; a Lapidé: *triplici hoc aetatis gradu triplicem Christianorum in virtute gradum et quasi aetatum repraesentat; pueri enim repraesentant incipientes et neophytos; juvenes repraesentant proficientes; senes perfectos*; similarly Clemens, Oecumenius, further Gagneius, Cajetanus, Russmeyer, Grotius,² etc. Some commentators (as Erasmus, Socinus, J. Lange, Myrberg) also refer the two expressions: *τεκνία* (ver. 12) and *παιδιά* (ver. 13), to the difference of age, and understand by them *children*, in the proper sense of the word; but more prevalent is the view that this is true of *παιδιά* only, and that *τεκνία*, on the other hand, is to be regarded as a form of address to *all* Christians; Calvin: *haec (namely, ver. 12) adhuc generalis est sententia, mox speciales*

¹ That "the distinction between church leaders and church members appears in the distinction between old and young" (Hilgenfeld), is in no way suggested.

² Grotius: *Partitur Christianos in tres classes, quae discrimina non secundum aetatem, sed secundum gradus diversos ejus profectus, qui in Christo est, intelligi debent, cf. 1 Cor. xiii. 11, 12; Heb. v. 13; Eph. iv. 13, 14.*

sententias accommodabit singulis aetatibus; similarly Luther, Beza, Calov, Wolf, Baumgarten-Crusius, Sander, Neander, Besser, Elbrard, etc. With the first view there arises a wrong succession, namely: children, fathers, young men, instead of: children, young men, fathers, or: fathers, young men, children; and, moreover, since *τεκνία* is in the Epistle frequently the form of address to all readers, and not only with, but also without *μου* (see on ver. 1), so it is to be taken here also. Equally, however, by *παιδιά* the apostle addresses *all* readers, as Lücke, de Wette-Brückner, Düsterdieck, Gerlach, Erdmann, Ewald, Braune rightly interpret. If we read before *παιδιά*, with the *Receptus*: *γράφω ὑμῖν*, there certainly results, if *παιδιά* is taken as alluding to children, a more accurate succession: fathers, young men, children; but (1) according to almost all authorities we must read, not *γράφω*, but *ἔγραψα*, and the former reading can only be explained in this way, that *παιδιά* was understood in its proper sense, and it was thought that this clause must be brought into the closest connection with the preceding; (2) then in the repetition of the same succession in ver. 14 one member of it is wanting, as the children are not mentioned again; and (3) in ver. 18 *παιδιά* is used as a form of address in reference to all readers; comp. John xxi. 5. Against the two last reasons it might indeed be alleged, with Bengel, Sander, and Besser, that from ver. 14 to ver. 17 is still intended for the *νεανίσκοις*, and that then in ver. 18 the address to the children comes in, and that the sequel as far as ver. 27 refers to them. But against this construction is—(1) the dissimilarity in the form of the sentences that thereby results; (2) the absence of an exhortation addressed to the fathers; (3) the unsuitable reference of the warning against false teachers specially to the *children*, with the additional remark: *οἴδατε πάντα*, ver. 20, and *οὐ χρεῖαν ἔχετε, ἵνα τις διδάσκη ὑμᾶς*, even though the warning against false teachers in chap. iv. 1 ff. is referred without distinction to all readers; and finally, (4) the close connection of ver. 17 and ver. 18: *ὁ κόσμος παράγεται* (comp. ver. 8: *ἡ σκοτία παράγεται*), and *ἔσχάτη ὥρα ἐστὶ*. — According to the true construction of the sentences, they fall into two groups; in each group first all Christians, and then specially the older and the younger members of the church, are

addressed ;¹ the correctness of this construction is shown also by this, that in reference to *πατέρες*, and equally to *νεανίσκοι*, in both groups the same thing is expressed, but in reference to all there are different statements. The arbitrary conjecture of Calvin (with whom Wall agrees), that both the clauses of ver. 14 are spurious, and interpolated *temere* by ignorant readers, requires no refutation. — The interchange of *γράφω* with the aorist *ἔγραψα* is peculiar, and is not to be explained by saying that *ἔγραψα* points to another writing of the apostle, whether it be the Gospel (Storr, Lange, Baungarten-Crusius, Schott, Ebrard, Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* II. 2, § 336 ; Braune²), or even an earlier Epistle (Michaelis) ; both expressions rather refer, as most of the commentators have recognised, to this Epistle ; not, however, to *the same thing*, as some commentators suppose ; thus Bengel, who regards the two expressions as synonymous, explains : *verbo scribendi ex praesenti in praeterito transposito innuit commotionem firmissimam*, which cannot be grammatically justified ;³ and Düsterdieck, who thinks that the “different import of the present and of the aorist can only be sought for in the representation of the writing itself ; that both times the apostle means the whole Epistle lying before him ; that by *γράφω* he represents himself in the immediately present act of writing, and by *ἔγραψα*, on the other hand, his readers, who have received the completed Epistle ;” opposed to this, however, is the fact that such a change of the mere form of representation would certainly be rather trifling. The

¹ Even Ebrard regards the second triad as beginning with *παιδιά*, although he understands by it children in age ; there is a glaring inconsistency in this construction.

² To this view the following reasons are opposed :—1. That if the apostle in *ἔγραψα* had another writing in view than in *γράφω*, he would have expressed this distinctly ; 2. That thereby the train of thought of the Epistle is unduly interrupted, since the assertion of the reason why he had written the Gospel is here introduced without any connecting link ; 3. That then the emphasis contained in the threefold repetition of *ἔγραψα* remains inexplicable, whereas it is perfectly justifiable if the reference to something written in this Epistle is intended to stimulate the readers more earnestly to attend to the following exhortation. The view of Ebrard, that “while the Epistle plainly could only be understood by grown people,” the Gospel “is even for children (*παιδιά*) enjoyable and pleasing food,” scarcely any one will endorse ; although even Braune passes this over in silence.

³ When Buttmann (p. 172) thinks that the change of tense is entirely occasioned by the need for variation in a sixfold repetition of the verb, it may be observed against this, that then ver. 14a would be nothing but a repetition of ver. 13a.

ἔγραψα must be referred to something else than the preceding γράφω; yet it is not, with Neander and Erdmann,¹ to be referred to that which is expressed in the clauses beginning with γράφω; for, on the one hand, the clauses beginning with ἔγραψα have not the form of confirmation, and, on the other hand, there is no real cause apparent for the addition of such a confirmation; it seems more appropriate when Rickli thinks that γράφω refers to what follows, and ἔγραψα to what precedes;² but opposed to this is the fact that ἔγραψα would then stand more naturally before γράφω. The correct view has been taken by de Wette, Brückner, and Ewald, who refer ἔγραψα to what was already written, and γράφω to the immediate act of writing, and hence to the Epistle in general; taking this view, it is quite in order for John to write γράφω first, and that he then refers specially by ἔγραψα to what has been already written is explained in this way, that this contains the principal grounds for the following exhortations and amplifications.³ — In each part a clause beginning with ὅτι follows the address; this ὅτι is not objective or declarative = “that” (Socinus, Lange, Russmeyer, Bengel, Paulus, Johannsen, Neander, Hilgenfeld, etc.), but causal: “because” (Calvin, Beza, Baumgarten-Crusius, Lücke, de Wette-Brückner, Gerlach, Münsterdieck, Myrberg, Ebrard,⁴ etc.). The apostle does not

¹ Neander explains: “As John had said: ‘I write unto you,’ so now he resumes confirmingly what has just been written, and says: ‘I have written unto you,’ as if he would say: It is agreed. This that I am now writing to you, I have now written, it is settled, I have nothing else to say to you, this you must always allow to be said to you.” Erdmann: Pertinet hoc (ἔγραψα) neque ad superiorem epistolam, neque ad quidquam in hac ep. supra dictum, sed ad ea, quae modo verbo γράφω notata sunt. Similarly Paulus, who compares with this the expression: “His majesty decrees and has decreed.”

² Lücke, following Rickli, thought that with the first part (ὅτι ἀφίωστα κ.τ.λ.) corresponded the section ii. 15-17 in what follows, and i. 5-7 in what precedes; with the second part (ὅτι ἰγνώκασι κ.τ.λ.), in the former ii. 18-27, and in the latter i. 8-ii. 2; and with the third part (ὅτι νουκλήκασι κ.τ.λ.), in the former ii. 28-iii. 22, and in the latter ii. 3-11; but he afterwards gave up this artificial, cruciform construction of the clauses, and explained the γράφω with ἔγραψα as belonging to the rhetoric of the author. See 3d ed. p. 265, note.

³ It is only if the signification of the section chap. i. 5-ii. 11 for the essentially hortatory Epistle is ignored that it can be said, with Ebrard and Braune, that with this view the antithesis of γράφω and ἔγραψα becomes a mere repetition or play upon words.

⁴ Luther varies curiously in his translation; in ver. 12 he translates ὅτι: “that,” in ver. 13 “for,” and in ver. 14 again “that.” Sauder thinks that in

want to say *what* he is writing, but *why* he is writing to them; comp. especially ver. 20, also vv. 21, 27, iii. 5, 14, 15, v. 18-20. The particular Christian experiences of his readers form the fundamental presuppositions of the Epistle; it is not anything *new* that the apostle declares unto them, but he reminds them of what they know, so that they may take it more seriously to heart.—The first thing that the apostle, addressing all, reminds them of is: ὅτι ἀφέωνται ὑμῖν αἱ ἁμαρτίαι διὰ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ. The forgiveness of sins is the basis of all Christian life; therefore this is put first.—On the form used here, the perfect passive ἀφέωνται, see Buttmann, *Ausf. gr. Gr.* § 97, Anmerk. 3, and § 108, note 1; and Winer, p. 74, VII. p. 77. The Vulgate and Luther incorrectly translated it as if it were the present: “are forgiven” (similarly Rickli and others; Paulus strangely interprets, deriving it from ἀφ’ ἐάω = ἀφ’ ἐώνται, dimittuntur).—διὰ with the accusative is not = “through” (this meaning, as is well known, it has only with the genitive, comp. Acts x. 43: ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν λαβεῖν διὰ τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ), but = “for the sake of;” αὐτοῦ = Χριστοῦ, not = Θεοῦ (Socinus, Paulus). According to most of the commentators, διὰ τ. ὄν. αὐτοῦ refers to the objective ground of the forgiveness of sins, and τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ signifies Christ Himself; thus Düsterdieck: “Christ who is what His name signifies;”¹ but this is contrary to the Biblical *usus loquendi*; if by διὰ Christ is referred to as the author of salvation, the preposition is always construed with the genitive; by διὰ τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, therefore, it is the *subjective* ground of forgiveness that is stated (de Wette-Brückner, Braune), in this sense: because His name is in you, *i.e.* because ye believe on His name (comp. ver. 23: πιστεύειν τῷ ὀνόματι Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ). The name is therefore not regarded as empty, but as the form

vv. 14 and 18 ὅτι is used causatively, but that in ver. 12 both “because” and “that” are contained in ὅτι. Erdmann takes ὅτι in the first three sentences *objectively*, but he leaves it undecided whether in the last three sentences it is to be taken *objectively* or *causally*.

¹ Similarly Sander: “God forgives our sins for the sake of the offering which Christ made; both of these—the person and work of Christ—are His name, for the sake of which we receive forgiveness.” Besser: “for the sake of all that Christ is, from the manger to the throne.” Ewald: “because Christ is and is called Christ.”

which includes the contents and reveals them; so that the subjective ground embraces in itself the objective. — In the second group it is said, in regard to the readers of the Epistle there called *παιδιά*: γρ. ὑμῖν . . . ὅτι ἐγνώκατε τὸν πατέρα. By ὁ πατήρ we are not to understand, with Hornejus, Christ, inasmuch as believers per fidem in nomen ejus renati sunt, for such a designation of Christ has the constant *usus loquendi* of Scripture against it, but God; for the name ὁ πατήρ is used here without any more particular definition, with clear reference to *παιδιά*, and so God is here so called, not merely on account of His relationship to Christ, but equally on account of His relationship to those who, by faith in Christ, have obtained the forgiveness of their sins, and are thereby placed in the relationship of children to God. From this it is clear also how exactly ὅτι ἀφέωνται ὑμῖν αἱ ἁμαρτίαι and ὅτι ἐγνώκατε τὸν πατέρα correspond with one another. But in the fact that John ascribes to the believers both of these, he testifies to them that they are in possession of the fulness of divine peace and of divine truth. — In regard to the *πατέρες*, the apostle brings out the same thing in both groups, vv. 13 and 14: ὅτι ἐγνώκατε τὸν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς. If the forgiveness of sins and the knowledge of God are common to all, the knowledge of Him who is ἀπ' ἀρχῆς is specially appropriate to the older members of the church. When some commentators, as a Lapide, Grotius, (novistis Deum, qui Senex dierum; Dan. vii. 9, xiii. 22), and others, understand by ὁ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς God, they ignore the deeper connection which exists between the particular ideas; ὁ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς is Christ, but not so called because He is the author of Christianity (Socinus: novi foederis et evangelii patefacti primum initium; Semler: qui inde ab initio auctor fuit hujus melioris religionis), but because He is from all eternity; ἀπ' ἀρχῆς is used in the same sense as in chap. i. 1. John brings out by this designation of Christ the truth that Christ is subject of their knowledge in the quality of His being herein mentioned; it is therefore incorrect to understand ἐγνώκατε of the personal knowledge of Him who was manifest in the flesh (Bengel, Schoettgen, etc.); the word has rather the same meaning as in ver. 3.¹ John ascribes this knowledge to the *fathers*,

¹ Neander: "A knowledge of Christ as the One who is from the beginning,

because he might with justice assume that they had not contented themselves with a superficial knowledge of Christ in His appearance according to the sense, but had looked more deeply into the eternal nature of the Lord.—In regard to the *young men*, it is said in both groups: *ὅτι νενικήκατε τὸν πονηρόν*; not as if the same were not true also of the older members of the church, but John attributes this eminently to the young men, because *they*—in accordance with their age—had just recently obtained this victory, and their care therefore must be specially this, not to lose again what had been lately won. That *ὁ πονηρός* is the devil (comp. Matt. xiii. 19, 38, 39; Eph. vi. 16; 1 John iii. 12, v. 18, 19) the commentators have rightly recognised.¹ Carpzov suitably says: *Viris fortibus et robustis tribuiter supra fortissimum et robustissimum victoria.* In the second group some further subordinate clauses precede that word, which state the conditions under which the young men have attained their victory: *ὅτι ἰσχυροὶ ἐστέ; ἰσχυροί*, “*strong in spirit*,” with special reference to the fight, comp. Heb. xi. 34; Luke xi. 21; Matt. xii. 29 (Düsterdieck); here also *ὅτι* is “*because*,” not: “*that*,” thus: “*because ye are strong*,” not: “*that ye are to be strong*” (Paulus).—This conquering power of the young men is not their “*own moral strength*” (Baumgarten-Crusius), but the effect of the Word of God; therefore John adds: *καὶ ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν μένει*, and only then brings in *καὶ νενικήκατε κ.τ.λ.*—The individual sentences are simply placed side by side in order to let each of them appear the more strongly in its own meaning. The train of thought, however, is this, that their strength has its ground in the Word of God, which is permanent in them (*μένει*), and that it is in this power that they have attained the victory.² This

which results from the deeper communion with the personality of Christ. This is something else than the statement of a certain formula about the person of Christ.”

¹ Even Semler admits this, but then observes: *Est usitata Judaeorum descriptio, quae gravium peccatorum et flagitiorum magistrum diabolum designat, quam descriptionem non opus est ut Christiani retineant, quum non sint ex Judaeis.*

² Weiss groundlessly finds in what is said above an incorrect expression, and thinks that not the *abiding*, but the *being*, of the Word of God in them is the ground of their strength; for to the Apostle John the *being* is really this only when it is a firm and abiding existence.

relation is correctly stated by Grotius, who explains the first *καί* by *quia*, the second by *ob id*. — *ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ* is not = Christ, but the word proceeding from God, *i.e.* the Gospel, of which the personal Christ is no doubt the substance.

Vv. 15–17. A warning against love of the world, which is directed neither specially to the children (Oecumenius: *ἐπτόηται γὰρ αἰεὶ τὰ παῖδιά περὶ τὸ φαινόμενον ἡδύ*), nor specially to the young men (Bengel, Semler, Besser), but to all (Bede: *omnibus haec generaliter ecclesiae filiis scribit*).

Ver. 15. *μὴ ἀγαπᾶτε τὸν κόσμον*] The meaning of *ἀγαπᾶν* depends on that of the idea *κόσμος*. — *κόσμος* is with John eminently an ethical conception = mankind, fallen away from God, and of hostile disposition towards Him, together with all that it lives for and has made its own; comp. on Jas. i. 27, iv. 4 (similarly Gerlach, Besser, Düsterdieck, Myrberg, Ebrard, Braune¹). The explanations that deviate from this are divided into three leading classes—(1) Those in which *κόσμος* is regarded as a total number of men indeed, but in a limited way; either = “the heathen world” (Lange), or more indefinitely: “the mass of common men” (Oecumenius: *ὁ συρφετὸς ὄχλος, ὃς οὐ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἔχει ἀγάπην ἐν ἑαυτῷ*; Calovius: *homines dediti rebus hujus mundi*), or “the greater part of men” (Grotius: *humanum genus, secundum partem majorem, quae in malis actionibus versatur*); Storr limits the idea here “to that part of the world which the antichristians constituted.” (2) Those which understand *κόσμος* not of the human world itself, but of the evil dwelling in it; so says the Scholiast: *κόσμον τὴν κοσμικὴν φιληδονίαν καὶ διάχυσιν λέγει, ἧς ἐστὶν ἄρχων ὁ διάβολος*; Luther: “the world, *i.e.* godlessness itself, through which a man has not the right use of the creatures;” to this class belong also the explanations of Calvin, Morus, S. Schmid, Semler;² but in this abstract sense

¹ It might not be incorrect to suppose that John, when he here and afterwards in his Epistle places the *καίτοι* in sharp contrast with believers, specially understands the sum-total of those who, as the light has come into the world, love the darkness rather than light (Gospel of John iii. 13), and therefore not unsaved humanity as such, but those of mankind who resist salvation, while by *ὅλος ὁ κόσμος* (ii. 2) the whole human race, as needing salvation, is to be understood.

² Calvin: *Mundi nomine intellige, quicquid ad praesentem vitam spectat, nisi separatur a regno Dei et spe vitae aeternae. Ita in se comprehendit omne genus*

the word never appears elsewhere; and besides, taking this view, difficulties appear in the sequel which can only be overcome by arbitrary interpretations. (3) Those explanations in which κόσμος is regarded as the total of perishable (actual) things; these things being regarded as purely physical, there lies in the idea κόσμος, in and by itself, no ethical meaning, but this appears only through the ἀγαπᾶν which is connected with it; the κόσμος as a creature of God is in itself good and irreproachable, but the love to the κόσμος, through which man centres his affections on it, and makes it the single aim of his activity, is to be blamed, because amid all association with earthly things it is not they, but God, that must be loved; thus there results for the command: μὴ ἀγαπάτε τὸν κόσμον, certainly an appropriate idea; but what follows in vv. 16 and 17 has induced almost all commentators who accept this view to give, nevertheless, to the idea κόσμος itself, more or less distinctly, an ethical reference; thus Lücke indeed says: “ὁ κόσμος is, as the sum total of the temporal and sensuous, in *contrast* (!) to the πνεῦμα, always only the objective sphere of evil, *i.e.* to which it tends as ethical direction and disposition,” but immediately afterwards he explains the same idea “as the sum total of all sensuous appearances, which excite *the desire of the senses* ;” still more definitely de Wette says: “the sum total of that *which attracts desire*, the temporal, sensuous, earthly—*regarded in contrast with God* ;” but this connection of the ethical reference with the idea of actual things is itself rather unsuitable; not in the things, but in man himself, lies the cause of the seductive charm which things exercise upon him; besides, it is not possible to retain this conception of the word without modification to the end of the 17th verse.¹ It is true some

corruptelae et malorum omnium abyssum. Morus explains κόσμος by: malum morale; S. Schmid by: corruptio peccaminosa; Semler by: vulgata consuetudo hominum, res corporeas unice appetentium. Here may be enumerated also the interpretation of Erdmann: totus complexus et ambitus mali, quatenus hoc non solum toti generi humano, verum etiam propter hominum a Deo defectionem omnibus rebus humanis totique rerum naturae inhaeret.

¹ Thus Lücke finds himself compelled in the case of πᾶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ to make an abstraction of the things themselves, and to understand thereby *their ethical reference*; and here results the certainly unjustifiable thought that this ethical reference of things has its origin in the things themselves (ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου). Still more decidedly, de Wette says that in the words ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου ἰστί, ver. 16,

commentators¹ distinctly say that John here makes a sort of play upon the word, but such an assumption does too much violence to the clearness and certainty of the thought for us to approve of it. The right view, therefore, is to take ὁ κόσμος here in the same sense that the word prevailingly has throughout John's works, so that it signifies the world lying ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ. This κόσμος, this is the meaning of the apostle's warning, is not to be the object of the ἀγάπη of believers. From this it follows that ἀγαπᾶν here means neither "to love too much," nor "to love with unhallowed sense," but love in the strictest sense of the word, consisting in a life of inner fellowship.²—μηδὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ] As κόσμος is an ethical idea, natural objects as such cannot be meant by τὰ ἐν τ. κ., but only these in so far as they are taken by the ungodly world into its service; or better, the apparently good things which the world pursues, or with which it delights itself, and which therefore belong to it, as riches, honour, power, human wisdom, and such like. Ebrard erroneously understands thereby "the different kinds of sinful impulse, thought, and action, *c.g.* avarice, ambition, sensuality, and such like," for either of these is plainly a love (although a false, unholy love) which cannot itself again be regarded as the object of love.—ἐάν τις ἀγαπᾷ τὸν κόσμον, οὐκ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ.] By this sentence the apostle confirms the previous exhortation, expressing the incongruity of love to the κόσμος with the ἀγάπη τοῦ πατρὸς; Bede: Unum cor duos tam sibi

"ὁ κόσμος is not regarded as the sum total of earthly things, but as the sensuous life alienated from God, or as the sum total of worldly men who enjoy this;" somewhat differently Brückner: "that the sum total of earthly evil, of the κόσμος, is here regarded rather of *real* things, is clear from the subordinate clause μηδὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κ.; in ver. 16 the *personal* aspect prevails." Neander, on ver. 16, equally deviates from the explanation which he had given of ver. 15; in the latter he regards ὁ κόσμος as "the world and earthly things," but in the former as "the predominating tendency of the soul to the world, the growing worldliness of the soul, which blends itself with the world."

¹ Thus a Lapidé says (after he has assigned to the word three meanings, namely (1) homines mundani, in his proprie est concupiscentia; (2) orbis sub-lunaris, in hoc mundo proprie et formaliter non est concupiscentia; sed in eo est concupiscentia materialis i. e. objectum concupiscibile; (3) ipsa mundana vita vel concupiscentia in genere): omnibus hisce modis mundus hic accipi potest et Johannes nunc ad unum, nunc ad alterum respicit; *ludit* enim in voce mundus.

² Lücke groundlessly thinks the idea of love must necessarily be weakened to that of "mere longing for," if by κόσμος the human world is understood.

adversarios amores non capit. By ἀγάπη τοῦ πατρὸς is to be understood neither the love of God to us (Luther II., Calovius), nor the charitas quam Pater praescribit (Socinus); but, as by far the most of commentators (Bede, Beza, Grotius, Vatablus, Spener, etc., and all the modern commentators, even Ebrard, despite his erroneous interpretation of ver. 5), interpret, *love to God*.¹ — If πατρὸς is the correct reading, then the name Father is here to be explained from the filial relationship of Christians to God, and points to their duty not to love the world, but God. — Between the two sorts of ἀγάπη there is the same exclusive contrast as between the Θεῷ δουλέειν and μαμωνᾷ δουλέειν, Matt. vi. 24. Compare also Jas. iv. 4: ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου, ἔχθρα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστίν.

Ver. 16. Confirmation of the preceding thought that love to the world is inconsistent with love to God. — ὅτι πᾶν τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ] Bede incorrectly explains the neuter here (as it certainly does appear elsewhere in John) as masculine: omnes mundi dilectores non habent nisi concupiscentiam; most commentators regard the expression as identical with the foregoing τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ; even Düsterdieck, who, in reference to the following ἡ ἐπιθυμία κ.τ.λ., thinks that a “change occurs from the representation of the objects of the love of the world to the subjective desire itself and its actual manifestations.” But even apart from the fact that the assumption of such a change in the form is only a makeshift, the expression of the apostle himself is opposed to this; for had he not meant by πᾶν τὸ ἐν τ. κ. something else than by τὰ ἐν τῷ κ., he would have put the neuter plural here also. Besides, it must not be overlooked why the following: ἡ ἐπιθυμία κ.τ.λ. could not be the apposition stating the sense of πᾶν τ. ἐν τ. κ. (Frommann, p. 269).² Accordingly, the apostle means by this expression: all that forms the contents, *i.e.* the substance of the κόσμος; its inner life, which animates it (Braune); in what this consists, the following words state. ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκὸς κ.τ.λ.] Although the ideas ἐπιθυμία and ἀλαζονεία in them-

¹ A combination of both interpretations: amor patris erga suos et filialis erga patrem (Bengel), is clearly unjustifiable.

² According to Ebrard, πᾶν τὸ ἐν τ. κ. is a resumption of τὰ ἐν τ. κ.; as, however, he understands by it various kinds of conduct, etc., that idea is rightly interpreted by him. Myrberg agrees with the interpretation given above.

selves denote a subjective disposition of man, yet several commentators think that here not this, but the objective things are meant, to which that subjective disposition is directed (Bengel, Russmeyer, Lange, Ewald), or that the otherwise subjective idea disappears into the objective (de Wette), or at least that both the subjective and the objective are to be thought of together (Lorinus, Brückner). But with the correct conception of the ideas *κόσμος* and *πάν τὸ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ* there is no apparent reason for such an arbitrary explanation, by which violence is done to the words of the apostle. — *ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκός*] The genitive is here not the genitive of the object, but, as is the case with *ἐπιθυμία*¹ always in the N. T. (except 2 Pet. ii. 10; on Eph. iv. 22 comp. Meyer on this passage), the genitive of the subject, hence not: "the desire directed towards the flesh," but: "the desire which the flesh, *i.e.* the corrupted sensual nature of man, cherishes, or which is peculiar to the flesh;" comp. Gal. v. 17: *ἡ σὰρξ ἐπιθυμεῖ*. — Ebrard interprets, describing the genitive as that "of quality and reference," for which he wrongly appeals to Eph. iv. 22, 2 Pet. ii. 10: "the desire which occurs in the sphere of the flesh;" the apostle scarcely conceived the idea so indefinitely. The idea may be taken in a broader or in a narrower sense; the first view in Lücke ("fleshly, sensuous desire in general, in contrast to *πνεύματι περιπατεῖν* and *ἄγεσθαι*; comp. Eph. ii. 3; 1 Pet. ii. 11"), de Wette, Neander, Düsterdieck; in the second, the desire of sensuality and drunkenness is specially understood; Augustine: *desiderium earum rerum, quae pertinent ad carnem, sicut cibus et concubitus et caetera hujusmodi*; similarly Grotius, Baumgarten-Crusius, Sander, Besser, etc.; Brückner limits the idea to "the lust of the flesh in the narrower sense;" Gerlach specially to every sort of pursuit of *enjoyment*,² and Ebrard to "*sexual enjoyments*."³ The right explanation can be found

¹ It is arbitrary for Ebrard to say: *ἐπιθυμία* is here—as in John viii. 44; Rom. vii. 8; Gal. v. 16, etc.—"*that which one lusts after*," which indeed he again cancels by translating the word by "*lust*."

² Even Bengel takes the expression (while, however, he understands it of the objective things) in a narrower sense: *ea quibus pascuntur sensus, qui appellantur primitivi: gustus et tactus*.

³ This explanation results for Ebrard from the fact that he takes *σάξ* here = *σῶμα*, and then describes the idea "*sensual*" as identical with "*sexual*" (!).

only on the consideration of the following expression. — *καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν*] *i.e.* “the desire that is inherent in the eyes, that is peculiar to them;” the expression is explained in this way, that the desire of seeing something is attributed to the sense of sight itself.¹ This idea also is understood in a broader and in a narrower sense. As Lücke calls the eyes “as it were the principal gates of sensual desire for the external world,” he identifies this idea with the preceding one; de Wette does the same, interpreting it (in objective aspect): “what the eyes see, and by what *sensual desire* is excited.” The connection by *καί*, however, which is further followed by a second *καί*, shows that the two ideas are to be definitely distinguished. Accordingly, most commentators justly regard *ἐπιθ. τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν* as the description of a special sort of *ἐπιθυμία*; thus (against de Wette) Brückner in subjective and objective view: “the lust of the eyes, and, at the same time, that in which, as sensuous and earthly, the eyes delight.” Two different interpretations are found with a more exact definition. Very many commentators, as Luther, Socinus, Grotius, Hornejus, Estius, Lorinus, Wolf, Clarius, Paulus, Semler, Baumgarten-Crusius, Gerlach, etc.,² hold, though with some modifications, the expression to be substantially synonymous with *πλεονεξία*, avaritia. On behalf of this interpretation, appeal is made principally to several passages of the O. T., and especially to Eccles. iv. 8, v. 10, Prov. xxiii. 5, xxvii. 20; but erroneously, for even though the eye of the covetous or avaricious man looks with pleasure on his treasures, and eagerly looks out for new ones, still the possession or acquirement of wealth is to him the chief thing; the striving for it, however, is not expressed by the phrase: *ἐπιθυμία τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν*. Still less justifiable is the explanation of Ebrard, who partly agrees with those commentators, but regards the idea of “avarice” as too narrow; and, with an appeal to passages such as Ps. xvii. 11, liv. 9, xci. 8, xcii. 12, Prov. vi. 17, etc., maintains that by *ἡ ἐπιθ. τ. ὀφθ.* is meant “the whole sphere of the desires of selfishness, envy, and

¹ Ebrard strangely thinks that in this view the genitive *ὀφθαλμῶν* is regarded as objective genitive = “the desire for eyes, *i.e.* for enjoyment of the eyes.”

² Sander also explains it of avarice, but would not exclude the *curiositas* in *spectaculis*, etc., regarding this, however, as merely collateral.

avarice, of hatred and revenge (!)." Other commentators, on the contrary, retain the reference to the pleasure of mere sight, but limit this too much to dramatic performances, etc.; thus Augustine: *omnis curiositas in spectaculis, in theatris*; similarly Neander and others. Such a limitation, however, is arbitrary; accordingly, others refer the expression to other objects of sight, thus Calvin: *tam libidinosos conspectus comprehendit, quam vanitatem, quæ in pompis et inani splendore vagatur*; but it is more correct to take the reference to these things in a quite general way, and, with Spener, to interpret: "all sinful desire by which we seek delight in the seeing itself" (so also Braune); besides, it is to be observed that ἡ ἐπιθυμία τ. ὀφθ. is not the desire for wealth, etc., which is excited by the sight (Rickli and others¹), but the desire of seeing unseemly things, and the sinful pleasure which the sight of them affords.² Thus, this idea is quite exclusive of the ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκός; if the latter is taken quite generally, then the lust of the eyes is a particular species of it, which the apostle specially mentions in order to meet the idea that the desire of seeing anything can have nothing sinful in it. But, having regard to the simple juxtaposition of the ideas by καί, it is more correct to suppose that John conceived the ἐπιθ. τῆς σαρκός not in that general sense, but in the particular sense of the "lust for wealth and immoderate enjoyment," so that the two ideas stand to one another in the relation not of subordination, but of co-ordination, both being subordinate to the general idea of ἐπιθυμία. — καὶ ἡ ἀλαζονεία τοῦ βίου] ἀλαζονεία is usually translated by superbia, ambitio (Socinus: *ambitio in honoribus quaerendis ac sectandis*), and by similar words, and thereby is understood *ambition*, together with the pride and haughty contempt for others which are frequently associated with it;³ thus Cyril

¹ Rickli interprets: "the low, sensual style of thought, in so far as this is excited and fostered by the sight." Dusterdieck understands by it specially covetousness and avarice; but at the same time observes that every sort of desire may be excited by the eye.

² Bengel extends the idea beyond the limit which lies in the expression itself, when he explains: *ea, quibus tenentur sensus investigativi: oculus, sive visus, auditus et olfactus.*

³ Calvin: *fastus aut superbia, cui conjuncta est ambitio, jactantia, aliorum contemptus, cœcus amor sui, præceps confidentia.*

interprets (*Homil. Pasch.* xxvii.): ἀλαζονείαν τ. β. φησὶ τῶν ἀξιωμάτων ὑπεροχὴν καὶ τὸ ἡρμένον ὕψος κατὰ γε τιμὴν καὶ δόξαν. Thereby, however, its peculiar meaning is not assigned to the word. In the N. T. ἀλαζονεία only appears in Jas. iv. 16 (in the plural); the adjective ἀλάζων in Rom. i. 30 and 2 Tim. iii. 2, in close connection with ὑπερήφανος, from which, however, it does not follow that the idea of ambition, thirst for glory, etc., is contained in it, but only that the ἀλαζ. is related to ὑπερηφανία; in James is meant thereby—according to the context—the *haughtiness which overlooks the uncertainty of earthly happiness, and ostentatiously relies on its permanency*. In the same sense = *ostentatious pride in the possession, whether real or pretended, of earthly good things*, such as happiness, power, knowledge, etc., the word appears also in the Apocrypha of the O. T.; comp. Wisd. v. 8, xvii. 7; 2 Macc. ix. 8, xv. 6. In classical Greek ἀλαζονεία has almost always the collateral meaning of the unreality of proud ostentation (Theophr. *Charact.* 23: προσποιήσις τις ἀγαθῶν οὐκ ὄντων πρὸς δόξαν; Plato, *Phaedr.*: ἕξις προσποιητικὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἀγαθῶν τῶν μὴ ὑπαρχόντων; antithesis of εἰρωνεία), which has obtained in Hellenistic usage only in so far that the idea here also always refers to something by its very nature worthless and trifling, and in this way certainly includes a delusion or unreality. This meaning is to be retained here also, as is rightly done by Lücke, Sander, Besser, Braune;¹ for examples in the Scriptures, comp. 1 Chron. xxii. 1 ff.; Eccles. ii. 1 ff.; Ezek. xxviii. 16, 17; Dan. iv. 27; Rev. xvii. 4, xviii. 7, etc. The genitive τοῦ βίου serves for the more particular definition of the idea; βίος signifies in the N. T. either “*temporal life*” (1 Tim. ii. 2; 1 Pet. iv. 3, *Rcc.*), or more commonly “*the support of life, the means*” (chap. iii. 17; Mark xii. 44;

¹ With this view Neander, Gerlach, and Düsterdieck substantially agree also; yet their paraphrases do not keep precisely enough within the definite limits of the extent of the idea, as they include ostentation, ambition, etc.; a definite distinction between this idea and ἐπιθυμία is requisite.—Augustine not inaccurately describes the ἀλάζων thus: jactare se vult in honoribus, magnus sibi videtur, sive de divitiis, sive de aliqua potentia. Ebrard wrongly denies that according to Hellenistic usage the element of pride is contained in the idea ἀλαζονεία; neither in classical nor in Hellenistic usage has the word the meaning “*luxury*,” which he maintains for it.

Luke viii. 43, xv. 12, 30, xxi. 4); it never has the meaning "conduct of life" (Ebrard). Following Polyb. *Hist.* vi. 576: ἡ περὶ τοὺς βίους ἀλαζονεία καὶ πολυτέλεια, it is appropriate to take βίος here in the second meaning, and the genitive as objective genitive (so Lücke); as, however, σαρκός and ὀφθαλμῶν are subjective genitives, it is much more correct to take βίου also as subjective genitive, and accordingly to interpret: "the ἀλαζονεία peculiar to the βίος;" in the expression ἡδοναὶ τοῦ βίου, Luke viii. 14, τοῦ βίου may also be the objective genitive, thus: "the pleasures which refer to the βίος, the temporal good;" but more probably it is the subjective genitive here also, especially if it be connected with the preceding ideas (see Meyer on this passage), thus: "the pleasures peculiar to the present life."¹

REMARK.—It has almost become traditional to find the modes of appearance of the evil fully stated in this threefold form, corresponding to the triplicity which appears in the Greek writers, as in Pythag. *Clitias*: φιληδονία μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἀπολαύσεσσι ταῖς διὰ σώματος, πλεονεξία δὲ ἐν τῇ κερδαίνειν, φιλοδοξία δὲ ἐν τῇ καθυπερβίνειν τῶν ἴσων τε καὶ ἡμίων; for other expressions, see Wetstein.² This threefold form, it has been thought, is found both in the fall and again in the temptation of Christ; thus Bede, following Augustine, says: Per haec tria tantum cupiditas humana tentatur; per haec tria Adam tentatus est et victus; per haec tentatus est Christus et vicit; while a Lapidé finds expressed in it even the contrast with the three Persons in the divine Trinity.³ —Bengel opposes this view, and makes such a distinction between the ἐπιθ. τῆς σαρκός and the ἐπιθ. τ. ὀφθ., that he refers

¹ The commentators for the most part express themselves somewhat vaguely; de Wette explains: "the enjoyment, combined with pride of (earthly) life (not: of the good things of life);" Braune says that the genitive is to be taken as subjective genitive, and then interprets: "the genitive τ. βίου signifies the side on which ostentatious pride usually appears;" Ewald translates: "swindling in money," which is not only indefinite, but even unjustifiable.

² Ebrard justly denies that a division of sin as such is to be sought for here; but his own view, that in that threefold form there is given a distribution of worldly conduct in its entire extent, and in this way, that first the relation of man to his own bodily and sensual nature is expressed, then the egotistical opposition to his fellow-men, and finally, his relation to them and complication with them, is, as resting on a false interpretation of the particular ideas, just as little to be justified.

³ The counterpart of these three forms of the sinful life is, according to a Lapidé, the three primariae virtutes: continentia, caritas, humilitas, which coincide very exactly with the three monastic vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience.

the former to the *sensus fruitivi*, the latter to the *sensus investigativi*, but says of the ἀλαζονεία τ. β.: *arrogantia vitae est, quae cupiditatem foras educit et longius in mundum diffundit, ut homo velit quam plurimus esse in victu, cultu, etc.; and then observes: non coincidunt cum his tribus tria vitia cardinalia: voluptas, avaritia, superbia; sed tamen in his continentur.* By the last clause Bengel shows, however, “that there is a trace of that scheme to be found even in him” (Düsterdieck). — Lücke has more decidedly expressed himself against it, inasmuch as he finds in that threefold form only “the three chief points of worldly lust” (according to the first edition, only “as examples”); and, moreover, the points “in which it proceeds from the sensual desire to the climax of the ἀλαζονεία.” But Lücke’s own interpretation of the particular ideas is opposed to such a progress, as he makes the first two ideas to coincide in regard to *their substance*, and thus no progress takes place from the one ἐπιθυμία to the other, nor is it, besides, in any way hinted at by the apostle. — Lücke rightly contends that particular leading vices are the subject here; not individual vices, but the leading forms (Lücke¹); or, as Brückner says, the leading tendencies of worldly sense are stated by the apostle in that threefold form. But in what relation do these stand to one another? According to Düsterdieck, the ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκός forms the superior idea, to which the two other ideas, as mutually co-ordinate, are in subordination: “The first-mentioned lust of the flesh, the most comprehensive and thorough description of the love of the world (ver. 15), embraces both the lust of the eyes and the pride of life.” This is incorrect. For, on the one hand, the ἀγάπη to the κόσμος is not to be identified with the ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκός, as the latter rather describes the inner nature of the κόσμος; the apostle warns against that love, because in the κόσμος the ἐπιθυμία which is not of God dominates; the thought that is to be supplied is this, that love to the κόσμος necessarily implies an entrance into its nature; and, on the other hand, the apostle’s form of expression is utterly opposed to such a subordination; the two first-mentioned forms of worldly sense are by the same appellation: ἐπιθυμία, closely connected with each other, and distinguished from the third, which is not called ἐπιθυμία, but ἀλαζονεία;² it is unsuitable, however, to regard the latter as ἐπιθυμία; ἐπιθυμία is the *desire* directed to the attainment of any good—the lust *for* something (not exactly:

¹ When Lücke calls those three not merely the leading forms, but also the principles and sources of the worldly sense, this is not correct, for the worldly sense does not *spring* from the ἐπιθυμία κ. τ. λ., but the latter is the living motion of the former.

² Frommann (p. 270 ff.) justly remarks that the two leading forms are the

the lust or delight *in* anything), but the ἀλαζονεία is a definite behaviour in regard to the good which one possesses. The worldly man stands in a double relationship to the perishable good things; on the one hand, he *aspires* after them, whether he wants to possess and enjoy them or to delight himself with looking at them; on the other hand, he fancies himself great in them when he has them as his own. — That the whole sphere of sinful life is not here surveyed, Luther has noticed when he says: "The following three things are not of the Father, viz.: (1) hatred of the brethren; (2) the three idols of the world; (3) false and seductive teaching." — Sander also brings out the same trichotomy of sinful corruption, appealing for it to chap. ii. 2–12, where the subject is the first, to vv. 15–17, where it is the second, and to ver. 19 ff., where it is the third. The apostle certainly mentions these different modes of the appearance of sin; but that the organism of the Epistle rests on this, is an assertion that goes too far.

The following words: οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς κ.τ.λ.] express the anti-divine character of the worldly nature of the ἐπιθυμία κ.τ.λ. — πατήρ, as in ver. 15; κόσμος here quite in the same sense as before. — εἶναι ἐκ is, according to Paulus, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, not the description of the origin, but only of the connection and similarity; by this view, however, the depth of John's conception is ignored; the expression rather embraces both, but the second only as the result of the first (so also Ebrard); comp. John viii. 44. — By the addition of ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου ἐστὶ the antagonism between God and the world, as the source of the ungodly disposition, is brought out with peculiar distinctness.

Ver. 17 adds a new element to the preceding, whereby the exhortation of ver. 15 is strengthened and confirmed. — καὶ ὁ κόσμος παρίγεται] is frequently taken by commentators, with an appeal to 1 Cor. vii. 31, as an expression of the transitoriness of the world; either the present being changed into the future (Bede: mundus transibit, quum in die iudicii per ignem in meliorem mutabitur figuram, ut sit coelum novum et terra nova), or the peculiar nature of the world being regarded as described in it (Oecumenius: τὰ κοσμικὰ ἐπιθυμήματα οὐκ ἔχει τὸ μένον τε καὶ ἐστώς, ἀλλὰ παρίγεται); Düsterdieck

ἐπιθυμία and the ἀλαζονεία; that the ἐπιθυμία signifies the *desire*, and the ἀλαζονεία the *action*, which in the attainment of the object desired has already found its satisfaction.

combines both; the apostle, according to him, expresses a truth "which holds good with ever present meaning, and which will thereby show itself some time in fact" (so also Ebrard and Braune). But ver. 8 and the following *ἐσχάτη ὥρα ἐστίν* make it more than probable that the apostle here also uses *παράγεται* in the consciousness of the approaching second advent of Christ and the judgment on the *κόσμος* which is connected with it, thus: "*the world is in the state of disappearing*;" in 1 Cor. vii. 31: *παράγει τὸ σχῆμα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου* is said with the same feeling. — *καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία αὐτοῦ*] With the world passes away also the *ἐπιθυμία* which dwells in it; whereby the apostle briefly refers to the three-fold form previously named: *αὐτοῦ* is not genitive of the object (Lücke, Neander, Sander, Besser), but of the subject (Düsterdieck, Braune); though there is mention previously of an *ἀγαπᾶν τὸν κόσμον*, yet there is none of an *ἐπιθυμία* directed towards the *κόσμος*; the contrary view rests on an erroneous interpretation of *κόσμος*. — *ὁ δὲ ποιῶν τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ*] antithesis to *ὁ κόσμος*, which in its *ἐπιθυμία* does not do the will of God. It is true, "*ὁ πατήρ*" is previously put as antithesis to the *κόσμος*, but it does not follow from this that the antithesis here is not to be taken as fully corresponding, and "*ἐπιθυμῶν*" to be taken out of *ἐπιθυμία* (Lücke); the appearance of this arises only from the fact that *κόσμος* is taken as something concrete. The expression used by the apostle is synonymous with *ὁ ἀγαπῶν τὸν Θεόν*; for the doing of the divine will is the effect of love to Him. — *μένει εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*] antithesis of *παράγεται*; the expression signifies, as frequently, eternal, infinite endurance, comp. John vi. 51, 58, viii. 35, etc. That John regarded this abiding for ever as the eternally happy life in the fellowship of God is certain, but is not contained in the expression.¹ To the *κόσμος* is assigned *θάνατος*, to the children of God *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*.

Vv. 18—27. Warning against the antichrists, whose pre-

¹ Ebrard arbitrarily explains that by *αἰών* is to be understood "the Aeon which will begin with the visible establishment in glory of Christ's kingdom on earth," and that *ὁ ποιῶν . . . εἰς τ. αἰῶνα* therefore means: "he who does the will of God shall remain till the establishment of the kingdom of Christ—he will be permitted to see the victory of Christ's kingdom."

sence shows that the last hour has come. Description of them, and exhortation to believers to continue in that which they have heard from the beginning, combined with the testimony that they have known the truth.—This section stands in closest connection with the preceding one; for, in the first place, the preceding exhortation is occasioned by the thought that it is ἐσχάτη ὥρα, as is evidenced by the appearance of the ἀντίχριστοι; and, in the second place, the ἀντίχριστοι, of whom the apostle treats here, are, as it is put in chap. iv. 5: ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου.

Ver. 18. The appearance of the ἀντίχριστοι shows that the last hour has come. — παιδία] not an address to the children (see on vv. 12–14), but to all readers.¹ — ἐσχάτη ὥρα ἐστί] ἐσχάτη ὥρα may be the whole Christian era from the incarnation of Christ to His second advent. In the O. T. prophecy the appearance of the Messiah was promised מָלְאִךְ מִדָּוִד (Isa. ii. 2; Hos. iii. 5; Mic. iv. 1, LXX.: ἐν ταῖς ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις; comp. also Acts ii. 16). Hence arose among the Jews the distinction of the two eras: הָיָה דָּוִד (αἰὼν οὗτος) and נֶאֱמַר דָּוִד (αἰὼν μέλλον), the former the time up to the appearance of the Messiah, the latter embracing the Messianic time itself. — In the N. T. are found, partly the former idea that Christ has appeared in the *last time* (Heb. i. 1; 1 Pet. i. 20), partly also the distinction of these two periods, but in this way, that the αἰὼν οὗτος does not close with the *first* appearance of Christ, but only with his Parousia, which coincides with the συντέλεια τοῦ αἰῶνος; comp. Mark x. 30; Luke xx. 34, 35; Eph. i. 21. — Inasmuch as the period which begins with the birth of Christ is now the last preceding the συντέλεια, it may be described by the expression ἐσχάτη ὥρα, as Calvin says: ultimum tempus, in quo sic complentur omnia, ut nihil supersit praeter ultimam Christi revelationem. This view is the customary one with the older commentators; Semler agrees with it, but the context is opposed to it; on the one hand, it results from vv. 8 and 17 that the apostle is writing with a presentiment of the Parousia of Christ; and, on the other hand, the conclusion of

¹ For the contrary, Ebrard appeals to the peculiarly childlike character of this section; but plainly this bears no other character than the *whole* Epistle, of which Ebrard himself says that it could only be understood by adults.

this verse: *ὁθεν κ.τ.λ.*, shows that the apostle cannot here mean the whole period extending from the first appearance of Christ to His second coming, but only a distinct time in it, namely, the time immediately preceding its termination; in favour of this also is the *usus loquendi* of the N. T.; comp. 2 Tim. iii. 1; Jas. v. 3; 1 Pet. i. 5; 2 Pet. iii. 3; along with which it is to be observed that, especially in the Gospel of John, the day of judgment is called *ἡ ἡμέρα ἐσχάτη*. Lücke, Neander, Baumgarten-Crusius, Gerlach, Erdmann, Myrberg, Ebrard, etc., have therefore rightly interpreted the expression as a description of this time. The hesitation to admit that the apostle was mistaken in his expectation of the nearness of the advent, has given rise to many a false interpretation. Socinus and Grotius think that *ἐσχάτη ὥρα* is the time immediately preceding the destruction of Jerusalem; this view approximates to that of Düsterdieck, according to which the last time before the commencement of the *κρίσις* is meant, which had its beginning at the destruction of Jerusalem. But the scruple is not overcome by this, for chap. ii. 28 shows that John regarded the *παρουσία* of the Lord as near, and not as distant, just as the other apostles, and especially also Paul, according to 1 Thess. iv. 15, in view of which even Düsterdieck finds himself compelled to admit this; Besser urges the want of the article, and translates: "a last time," *i.e.* the time before a special revelation of the judicial glory of Christ, in which the last hour before the universal final judgment is prefigured; but it is well known that the article is often wanting just with ideas which are definite in themselves; to which it may be added that the idea of such a succession of different epochs, which are to be regarded as special revelations of the judicial power of Christ, is nowhere found expressed in the N. T.¹ Oecumenius regarded it as likely that *ἐσχάτη* here is used = *χειρίστη*; this explanation is found in Schoettgen (*tempora periculosa*,

¹ Braune, who speaks of Calvin's view and that of Besser as "worthy of notice," expresses himself somewhat vaguely when he says: "The expression *ἐσχάτη ὥρα* is to be taken prophetically, eschatologically, and has a value connected with the history of the kingdom, even a historical reference to the *Parousia* of Christ, as the beginning of the second era of the world, but no chronological reference to the date of the commencement of this *Parousia*." Clearly a quite arbitrary assertion.

pessima et abjectissima), Carpzov, and others (similarly Paulus: it is a late, *i.e.* dark, and ever growing worse, time); whereas the distinction between these ideas is perfectly clear from 2 Tim. iii. 1: ἐν ἐσχάταις ἡμέραις ἐνστήσονται καιροὶ χαλεποί.¹ The result of an impartial exegesis therefore remains, that—as the other apostles—John also expected that the advent of the Lord would *soon* take place.² It was only when the first generation of believers was already dead, without that expectation having been fulfilled, that in the consciousness of Christians the period till the coming of the Lord extended to an indefinitely *distant* limit, without, however, extinguishing the hope of His *speedy* advent; comp. 2 Pet. iii. 4 ff.; but that later still the time which began with the appearance of false teachers was regarded as the *last*, is proved by Ignatius, *ep. ad Eph.* c. xi. — καὶ καθὼς ἠκούσατε κ.τ.λ.] With the observation that it is the last time the apostle connects the other, that in accordance with what his readers have heard, that the ἀντίχριστος would come, many ἀντίχριστοι have already come. Bengel supplies before καθὼς: “et ita est,” and after καί: “adeo” (et ita est, sicut audistis, nempe antichristum venire: atque adeo jam multi, etc.); these

¹ Peculiar, but artificial, is Bengel's interpretation, which, moreover, rests on the false opinion that the children are here specially addressed: *ultima*, non respectu omnium mundi temporum sed in antitheto puerulorum ad patres et ad juvenes. Tres omnino horae erant, quarum una post aliam et inchoavit, et conjunctim continuato cursu ad finem se inclinavit. Patrum itemque juvenum hora statim absoluta fuit. Hinc puerulis Johannes dicit: ultima hora est. Hac ultima hora nos etiamnum vivimus omnes.

² In opposition to the “prejudice” that the apostles regarded the advent as so near, Sander thinks that they could not possibly have imagined that “all the great changes, transformations, and developments,” to which 2 Thess. iii. 3, Rom. xi. 25, 26, Luke xxi. 24–26 allude, could be accomplished within a generation. But could not important events take place within a comparatively short period? As it was not the business of the apostles to foresee the course of history, it cannot be any reproach on them if they cherished the hope that the longed-for coming of the Lord would soon occur, especially as they formed out of this hope no peculiar doctrine, and did not venture to determine the time and the hour. The certainly extravagant assertion of Ebrard, that it would have been contrary to the order of God's economy of revelation if John, at the time when he wrote his Epistle, had not expected the second advent of Christ in the *near* future, rests entirely on Ebrard's views of the Apocalypse, from the visions of which, according to him, it could only be clear to the apostle for the first time that the ἔρχομαι of the Gospel of John xxi. 22 is to be understood of the coming of the Lord in a vision.

supplements are, however, unnecessary, for the *καί* before *νῦν* is not the simple copula, but serves to mark the appearance of the *ἀντίχριστοι* as a fact corresponding to the *καθὼς ἠκούσατέ κ.τ.λ.*: “as ye have heard, etc., so, accordingly, *μανην ἀντίχριστοι* are even now actually appearing.”¹ *καθὼς ἠκούσατε*, namely, by the apostolic declaration, which had been communicated to his readers (comp. vv. 7, 24) either by John, or even earlier, by Paul especially, according to Semler by Jewish teachers, who were spreading false rumours of the end of the world (!). *ὅτι (ὁ) ἀντίχριστος ἔρχεται καὶ κ.τ.λ.*] The present *ἔρχεται* is put for the future; it marks what is still future as a certainly occurring event; Ebrard incorrectly translates *ἔρχεται* by “is to come;” even in the passages cited by him: chap. iv. 3; Matt. xi. 3; Gospel of John xvi. 13; Rev. i. 8 (why not i. 4?), *ἔρχεσθαι* does not express simply the idea of the future; besides, Ebrard *interprets* correctly: “will one day appear.” — The prophecy that before Christ comes (hence before His Parousia) Antichrist will come, accordingly formed a part of the apostolic preaching, although it is not contained in the last discourses of Christ that have been handed down to us, for the *ψευδοπροφήται* and the *ψευδόχριστοι*, whose appearance Christ foretells, are not to be identified with the *ἀντίχριστος*. — According to the view which has prevailed from antiquity, the *ἀντίχριστος* and the *πολλοὶ ἀντίχριστοι* are to be distinguished in this way, that *the latter* are only the *πρόδρομοι* of the former, in which for the first time the antichristian spirit which already animates them will be revealed in his full perfection and energy; Bengel, deviating from this, takes the expression *ἀντίχριστος* as a collective idea: *ubi Joh. antichristum, vel spiritum antichristi, vel deceptorem et antichristum dicit, sub singulari numero, omnes mendaces et veritatis inimicos innuit. Antichristus pro antichristianismo, sive doctrina, et multitudine hominum Christo contraria dicitur*; with this interpretation Lange, Baumgarten-Crusius, Besser, and Myrberg agree. But neither here nor in iv. 1 ff. does John say that Antichrist has already come; here he merely indicates the fact that *πολλοὶ ἀντίχριστοι γεγόνασιν* as corresponding to the announcement

¹ Düsterdieck: “With the expectation *ὅτι ὁ ἀντιχρ. ἔρχ.*, founded on the apostolic teaching, corresponds the fact already begun: *ἀντιχρ. πολλοὶ γεγόνασιν.*”

of the coming of Antichrist, and in the other passage it is merely stated that many *ψευδοπροφῆται* are gone out into the world, and that the *πνεῦμα* of Antichrist is already in the world. In the passage 2 John 7, "it is true that the explanatory clause *οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ πλάνος καὶ ὁ ἀντίχριστος* refers so directly to the preceding *πολλοὶ πλάνοι*," that it appears that "the identity is thereby indicated" (1st ed.); but this direct connection may, no doubt, be explained in this way, that he who speaks through the many is, according to John, no other than the one Antichrist; and even though John "neither describes the *ἀντίχριστοι* as the *πρόδρομοι*, nor the *ἀντίχριστος* as the one in whom the principle that animates them is concentrated in highest potency," it is to be remembered that John is speaking of the Antichrist here, not in doctrinal aspect, but only in order to show by the heretics, whom he calls *ἀντίχριστοι*, that the *πνεῦμα* of Antichrist is already *ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ*.¹ The name *ἀντίχριστος* is not found in the Scriptures outside of the First and Second Epistles of John; only in the later ecclesiastical literature does it appear frequently. — That the prefixed *ἀντι* does not express the substitutionary reference (as in *ἀντιβασιλεύς*), but the reference of antagonism, is with justice now commonly recognised; but the prevailing translation: "enemy of Christ," is grammatically inaccurate, as in *substantive* compounds formed with *ἀντι* (in the antagonistic sense) the substantive is an object which by *ἀντι* is described as standing in opposition to an object of the same kind. Thus, an *ἀντιφιλόσοφος* is not an "opponent of philosophy" (Ebrard), or of philosophers, but a philosopher who is opposed to other philosophers, a hostile philosopher; comp. *ἀντιμαχητής*, *ἀντιπαλαιστής*, *ἀντίπολις*, *ἀντίρρῃσις*, *ἀντίρροια* κ.τ.λ.² Accordingly, *ὁ ἀντίχριστος* does not mean generally: the enemy of

¹ Weiss justly maintains, against Frommann and Reuss, according to whom John has spiritualized or confused the dogma of Antichrist, that he in no way denies the reality of the Antichrist, although Weiss thinks that John regards the prophecy of the Antichrist as fulfilled in this, that the spirit of Antichrist has come into the world, and in the false teachers is denying the fundamentals of Christian truth.

² From this it is clear that the rule laid down by Lücke, that "the word compounded with *ἀντι* is the object of the opposition," can by no means hold good for all compounds with *ἀντι*, inasmuch as the examples adduced by Lücke: *ἀντίζημιον ἄκρον*, *ἀντιδόριστος*, *ἀντίηλιος*, *ἀντίθετος*, are not substantives; and, in the second place, *ἀντι* does not express in them the idea of hostile antagonism.

Christ, but the "*opposition Christ*," i.e. *that* enemy of Christ who, under the false pretence of being the real Christ, seeks to destroy the work of Christ.¹ Almost all commentators have correctly supposed that John understands by this enemy the same as Paul speaks of in 2 Thess. ii. 3; the features which appear in the description of the Apostle Paul and in the statements of John correspond too closely to permit of this being doubted; according to both, his appearance in the Church is preceded by a falling away (John says in ver. 19 of the antichrists: ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐξηλθον; Paul in ver. 3 speaks of an ἀποστασία connected with his ἀποκάλυψις); both ascribe to him a God-opposing, wicked nature (Paul calls him ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἁμαρτίας, ὁ ἄνομος; John puts the πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀντιχρίστου in antithesis to the πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ, and says of the antichrists who are animated by the former, that they are ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου); both characterize him as a liar, who seeks to establish the lie against the truth; according to both, he appears in the last time before the Parousia of Christ; even the names correspond with each other, for even though the name ἀντίχριστος contains an important feature which is not expressed in the name ὁ ἀντικείμενος, yet this very feature comes out so distinctly in the Pauline description, that it is clear how suitable John's appellation of that enemy is; when, namely, Paul describes him as the ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἁμαρτίας, and afterwards says of him that he ἀποδείκνυσιν ἑαυτόν, ὅτι ἐστὶ Θεός, this points to the fact that he will represent himself as the *incarnate God*,—and this is just what is indicated in the name ἀντίχριστος.

REMARK.—On the various views of the Antichrist, see Lünemann on 2 Thess. ii. 1–12, p. 204 ff., and Düsterdieck on this passage. — The Greek Fathers regard the Antichrist usually as a man who, as an instrument of the devil, imitates the true Christ, comp. Hippolyt. *de consummat. mundi*, c. vi. 14, c. xlviii.; Cyril, *Catech.* xv.; yet there is also found the incorrect view that he is the incarnate devil himself (comp. Theodoret, *Epit. div.*

¹ While Brückner agrees with the explanation given here, it is opposed by Braune; but he does not pay attention to the grammatical vindication. Besides, it is to be observed that the more particular definition of "false pretence" does not lie in the word itself, but certainly in the fact, since there is only *one* Christ; it is different in the case of the word ἀντιφίλοσοφος.

decret. c. xxiii., and *Comment. in Dan. ii.* ; Hippolyt. c. xxii.). — Like the Parousia of Christ, so the appearance of Antichrist also belongs still to the future ; of antichrists, as they had appeared in the time of John, there has never since been any lack ; but the Antichrist has not yet come, and it was equally arbitrary for Grotius to regard Barkochba, or others Mohammed, or Luther the Pope, or Catholics Luther, and so on, as Antichrist. — Not merely rationalistic writers, but also Lücke, de Wette, Neander, and others, distinguish *form* and *idea* in John's representation of the future appearance of the Antichrist. As the fundamental *idea*, they regard the thought that, equally with the development of Christianity, the evil will gradually increase more and more in its contest against Christ, until at last, when it has attained its highest summit, it will be completely conquered by the power of Christ. As the *Form* they regard the representation that this highest energy of the evil will finally appear in one *single* person. For such a distinction it is difficult, however, to show any justification, as Scripture itself gives no suggestion of it ; it is therefore rightly rejected by Düsterdieck, Braune, Brückner.

In the words : καὶ νῦν ἀντίχριστοι πολλοὶ γεγόνασιν, the apostle mentions the fact in which the expectation : ὅτι ὁ ἀντίχριστος ἔρχεται, is beginning to be realized. The ἀντίχριστοι are the heretics who accept the lie described in ver. 22 ; but they bear that name because the πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀντιχρίστου animates them, and thus the Antichrist himself is already revealing himself in them. γεγόνασιν is not = coeperunt esse (Erasmus), but : “they have become,” i.e. they are already in existence. By means of the subordinate clause ὅθεν γινώσκουμεν κ.τ.λ., the connection between the two first parts of the verse is to be recognised.

Ver. 19. Relation of the ἀντίχριστοι to the Christian Church. — ἐξ ἡμῶν ἐξῆλθαν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἦσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν] On the form of the second aorist with *a*, see Winer, p. 68 (VII. p. 71). — By ἡμῶν we are not to understand the Jews (Grotius, Eichhorn, Rieckli), nor the apostles (S. Schmid, Spener, Besser, and others), but Christians in general, as the Church of Christ.¹ ἐξῆλθαν is taken by several commentators = prodierunt (Vulgate, Baumgarten-Crusius, Erdmann, and others), finding the

¹ Elbrard finds himself compelled by his interpretation of παιδία not to include in ἡμεῖς those addressed, but to say : “the apostle puts himself and the Church in contrast to the little ones whom he addresses.”

idea of origin expressed in it; this is incorrect; the following *μεμενήκεισαν* shows that it is rather to be taken in the sense of secessio (so Augustin, Bede, Erasmus; and among the moderns, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune, and others). By the emphatic position of *ἐξ ἡμῶν* it is brought out that the antichrists were previously *μεθ' ἡμῶν*, and belonged therefore to the Christian Church. How far this separation had been formally accomplished, John does not say; but it is contained in *ἐξῆλθαν* that they had taken up an antagonistic position, not merely to the apostolic doctrine (Beza: *ad mutationem non loci sed doctrinae pertinet*), but to those who by their faithful observance of the unadulterated gospel proved themselves to be the children of God (as also Braune).—*ἀλλ' οὐκ ἦσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν*] *ἀλλ'* expresses the contrast to the preceding thought: although they went out from us (and therefore were connected with us), yet they were not of us. *εἶναι ἐκ* expresses connection in the most complete reality, thus: they were not of us, viz. in such a way that they would have really belonged to us, as common members of *one* body, in which *one* soul lives; in contrast to which the *εἶναι μετά* contained in the following *μεμενήκεισαν ἂν μεθ' ἡμῶν* expresses the *outward* fellowship as distinguished from the former idea. Even here *ἐκ* does not depart from its original meaning (see on ver. 16), for he only truly belongs to the Church of the Lord who in regard to his inner life has proceeded from it, *i.e.* from the Spirit ruling in it.¹ The imperfect *ἦσαν* embraces the whole previous period during which the antichristians were connected with the believers, and does not merely refer to the time immediately preceding their separation (Episcopus, Socinus).—That they were not *ἐξ ἡμῶν*, John proves by the words: *εἰ γὰρ ἦσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν, μεμενήκεισαν ἂν μεθ' ἡμῶν*. The *ἀντίχριστοι* belonged therefore to the Christians for a while; they were *μετ' αὐτῶν*, although not *ἐξ αὐτῶν*, for in this case they would also have remained

¹ Düsterdieck: "That those antichrists left the fellowship of the believers, follows from *μεμενήκ. ἂν μεθ' ἡμῶν*; but the original, inner, ethical relationship of those men who *went out* from the bosom of Christian fellowship and fell away from it, is indicated by the different meaning in which the same phrase *ἐξ ἡμῶν* appears, on the one hand, with *ἐξῆλθαν*, with which *μεμενήκ. κ.τ.λ.* is to be combined; and, on the other hand, in the expressions *οὐκ ἦσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν* and *εἰ γὰρ ἦσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν*."

μετ' αὐτῶν. Here, too, John proceeds on the idea that the μένειν is the evidence of the εἶναι. On the pluperfect without the augment, see Winer, p. 67 (VII. p. 70). — ἀλλ' ἵνα φανερωθῶσιν κ.τ.λ.] ἀλλά refers back to ἐξῆλθαν, or to the thought: οὐ μεμενῆκασι μεθ' ἡμῶν: "but they have not remained with us." Less simply Düsterdieck interprets: "they have not remained with us, but (ἀλλά) they have been separated from us, in order that." Such a double supplement is not necessary, for ἀλλά is not necessarily the antithesis of a negation. — By ἵνα κ.τ.λ. it is not the result (Paulus), but the purpose that is stated,—the purpose, namely, of their separation or not remaining, which was willed by God; the purpose is that it might be manifest that they are not ἐξ ἡμῶν. The connection of φανερωθῶσιν with the following ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶ πάντες ἐξ ἡμῶν is not quite regular; Socinus construes οὐ and πάντες together: non omnes = nulli i. e. nemo ex illis est ex nostro numero; this is incorrect, οὐ πάντες is not = nulli, but = nonnulli; de Wette rightly supposes the conjunction of two thoughts, viz. (1) ἵνα φανερωθῇ, ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶ πάντες ἐξ ἡμῶν; and (2) ἵνα φανερωθῶσιν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐξ ἡμῶν, only de Wette should have put the second thought first, for John's immediate intention was, as the plural φανερωθῶσιν shows, to speak only of the ἀντίχριστοι, but then he extends his idea so as to introduce the new subject πάντες; the sense is: it was to be made manifest in the ἀντίχριστοι that they were not—and therefore that all who were μεθ' ἡμῶν were not—ἐξ ἡμῶν (so also Braune¹). — For the work of the Christian Church it is necessary that it shall be manifest who really belongs to it and who does not; this κρίσις is the purpose for the sake of which God has so arranged it that those ἀντίχριστοι should go out; comp. with the idea in 1 Cor. xi. 19.

REMARK.—In the words: εἰ ἦσαν ἐξ ἡμῶν, μεμενῆκασιν ἂν μετ' ἡμῶν, this thought is contained: He who really belongs to the Church never leaves it; he who leaves it shows thereby that

¹ Myrberg interprets: sed (egressi sunt) ut manifesti redderentur; nam non omnes sunt de nobis; but incorrectly, for (1) φανερωθῶσιν requires a more particular definition; and (2) the idea: non omnes sunt de nobis, cannot serve to establish the idea φανερωθῶσιν. According to Hilgenfeld, πάντες is to be referred only to the antichrists: "that they all were not of us;" but this is refuted by the position of πάντες.

he did not really belong to it. This confidence of the apostle in the preserving love of the Lord, and in the faithfulness of those whom He has saved, seems to be opposed to the idea brought out in Heb. vi. 4 ff., that even those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Ghost, etc., may fall away. But, as constantly in his Epistle, so here also John speaks absolutely, without taking into view the state of gradual development, from which, however, it does not follow that he does not recognise it. The *one* circumstance that he *exhorts* believers as such to abide in Christ, shows that he would not deny the *possibility* of their falling away; only it is—justly—certain to him that he who does *not* abide had not yet with his *whole* heart entered into the fellowship of the Lord, but, even though touched by His love, and exhibiting the trace of love towards Him, had nevertheless not broken completely with the world. Ebrard thinks that the apostle means only, that temptation by this particular lie (namely, by Gnosticism) is only possible with those who in their inner being were previously strangers to Christianity; but even though John here speaks of particular Antichrists, yet the *general* thought is at the basis of the words *οἱ ἥσαν* uttered in reference to them; otherwise the apostle would have definitely pointed out the difference of *these* apostates from *others* to whom the word has no reference. — Augustin, Calvin, Beza, etc., find in the words a confirmation of *their* doctrine of predestination, but only by inserting in them ideas which are foreign to them, since the subject here is neither a *donum perseverantiae* nor a distinction of the *vocati* and *electi*.

Vv. 20, 21. Testimony that the believers, to whom the apostle writes, know the truth. — *καὶ ὑμεῖς χρίσμα ἔχετε*] The apostle writes this neither as a *captatio benevolentiae* (Lange), nor as a justification of the brevity of his writing on the foregoing subject (a Lapidé), nor for the purpose of quieting his readers, “who at the appearance of so many Antichrists might possibly be alarmed for the safety of their own faith” (Lücke), but in order to make the warning contained in his words in reference to the antichristian lie the more forcible; see on ver. 12. — Most commentators take *καί* here as *particula adversativa* (so even de Wette; more cautiously Lücke: “the logical relationship of this verse to ver. 19 is that of an antithesis, therefore *καί* becomes logically adversative”); the incorrectness of this view is recognised indeed by Düsterdieck and Ebrard, yet they maintain the antithetical reference of

this verse to the preceding one; and of course in itself there is nothing against the supposition of a connection of adversative ideas by the simple copula; but that an adversative relationship occurs here is very much to be doubted, for the apostle did not now need to say to his readers that they, as such as have the *χρῖσμα*, were in opposition to the antichrists, and, besides, in the sequel that idea is not further followed up.¹ It is more suitable to the context to connect the first part of this verse closely with the second, and in this two-claused sentence to find the presupposition stated for what is said in the following verse (so also Brückner). — *χρῖσμα* appears in the N. T. only here and in ver. 27; according to Greek *usus loquendi*, it is the *anointing oil*; as in the O. T., for example Ex. xxix. 7, xxx. 31. “In the O. T. the holy anointing oil is constantly the type of the Holy Spirit, both where anointing appears as a figurative action (besides the passages quoted, in 1 Sam. x. 1 ff., xvi. 13, 14) as well as where it appears in figurative language (Ps. xlv. 8; Isa. lxi. 1). But that which in the O. T. is presented in type and shadow, in the N. T. has appeared in truth and substance” (Besser); *χρῖσμα* is therefore a symbolical expression for the *Holy Spirit*, as *χρίεν*, moreover, is frequently used of the gift of the Holy Spirit; comp. Acts iv. 27, x. 38; 2 Cor. i. 21. With this most of the commentators agree, only that *χρῖσμα* is usually incorrectly explained as the act: “unctio, anointing,” and this is then taken as a description of the Holy Spirit; so by Augustin, and even by de Wette, Ewald, Sander, and Erdmann. It is erroneous to understand *χρῖσμα* of the “true tradition about Christ, vividly transmitted, proceeding from the apostles” (Köstlin, p. 243), or of the working of the Holy Spirit (Didymus: *charitas, quae diffunditur in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum*; Socinus: *divinum beneficium cognoscendi ipsas res divinas, quatenus homini est opus*; Emanuel

¹ By this, however, it is not meant that the apostle, when he turns to his readers with *ἐμῶν*, does not contrast them at all with the antichrists, but only that he does not do it in *this* sense, that he wishes thereby to emphasize a contrast between them. Had the apostle intended this, he would certainly not have used *καί*, for in *such* antitheses *καί* is only suitable when the predicates exactly correspond with one another (e.g. *they* have τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀντιχρίστου, and *ye* have τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ); but even then usually *οἱ* is used (comp. Matt. v. 21, 22, and many other passages), or no particle at all (comp. John iii. 31, etc.).

Sa: christianismus), or of the act in which the Spirit is given to Christians, thus of baptism (Ewald) or of confirmation. Oecumenius wrongly finds here (ἐλάβετε διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος τὸ χρίσμα τὸ ἱερόν, καὶ διὰ τούτου τὸ εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ὁδηγοῦν ὑμᾶς θεῖον πνεῦμα) an allusion to the old custom of anointing the candidate for baptism; this custom does not belong to the apostolic age, but was probably first introduced by this passage, as Bengel has observed.¹ It is, on the whole, less likely that John was here thinking of the communication of the Spirit by means of baptism, as is usually supposed, than that he was thinking of that by means of the preaching of the gospel (Düsterdieck), as in the whole context there is nothing to suggest the former.² That John uses just the word *χρίσμα* is not without meaning; as in the O. T. not only kings, but also priests and (sometimes) prophets were anointed, he reminds believers thereby "of their high honour, calling, office, and glory" (Sander).³ If it be the case that there is also an allusion in it to the name of the Antichrist (Bengel, Düsterdieck), then the apostle wanted to bring out that believers in possession of the *χρίσμα* are enabled fully to know the *antichristian* ψεύδος in its contradiction to the ἀλήθεια; see ver. 21. — ἔχετε ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου] For ἔχετε, in

¹ As Bengel thinks that this whole section is addressed to the children, he says: Eam unctionem spirituales habent τὰ παῖδια pueruli; namque cum baptismo, quem susceperunt, conjunctum erat donum Spiritus s., cujus significandi causa ex hoc ipso loco deinceps usu receptum esse videtur, ut oleo corpora baptizatorum ungerentur. — How in modern times this passage is misused as a proof of the post-apostolic origin of the Epistle, see the Introduction, sec. 3.

² As quite arbitrary interpretations, we may further mention here that of Semler and that of J. J. Hess (*Flatt's and Susskind's Magaz.* vol. xiv.); the former, on the false assumption that the Epistle is addressed especially to the presbyters also, explains *χρίσμα* by: legitima auctoritas docendi, and adds: *χρίσμα* est idem ac *χάρισμα* illud, cujus auctor spiritus s., qui per apostolos impertitur doctoribus; and the latter understands by it the instruction which the Churches of Asia Minor received about Antichrist through the Apocalypse.

³ Neander: "That which in the Old Covenant was connected only with individuals to whom in some way the guidance of God's people was entrusted, with individuals who thereby were singled out from the mass of the rest of the people, this under the New Covenant is connected with the people of God in general. . . . There are therefore no longer among the people of God any such distinctions as there were in the Old Covenant between kings, prophets, priests, and people. . . . They are one kingly priestly race, whose nobility and high destination all share; all are prophets by virtue of that common enlightenment by the Holy Spirit."

ver. 27, ἐλάβετε is put; the possession rests upon a reception, and this, indeed, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἁγίου; ὁ ἅγιος is—following the correct interpretation of χρίσμα—not the Holy Spirit (Didymus, Lorinus, Semler), but either *God* (Rickli, Besser, Neander: “ἀπό indicates the source;” which, however, is not always the case),—comp. John xiv. 16; 1 Cor. vi. 19: τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος, οὗ ἔχετε ἀπὸ Θεοῦ,—or more probably, as most commentators think, *Christ*; comp. John xv. 26: ὁ παράκλητος, ὃν ἐγὼ πέμψω ὑμῖν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς; and John vi. 69, where Christ (according to the overwhelming authorities) is called ὁ ἅγιος τοῦ Θεοῦ; in favour of which is the fact that John, in ver. 29, calls Christ δίκαιος, and in chap. iii. 3, ἄγνος (comp. also Acts iii. 14; Rev. iii. 7). — That the bestower of the χρίσμα is called by John ὁ ἅγιος (whether it be God or Christ) arises from this, that the anointing with the Spirit is an act of *making holy*, i.e. of separation from the world; but he only can *make holy* who himself is holy. — καὶ οἶδατε πάντα] Bengel, according to the sense, explains καί correctly by: et inde; the possession of the χρίσμα is the reason of the εἰδέναι πάντα. — πάντα is not masculine (Syrus: omnes; Bede: discernitis inter probos et improbos), but neuter. Calvin rightly says: omnia, non universaliter capi, sed ad praesentis loci circumstantiam restringi debet; still it must not be restricted merely to those things (quae sunt) necessaria agnoscendis antichristis et cavendis illorum insidiis (Bengel), but it embraces along with these τὴν ἀλήθειαν in general (ver. 21); comp. John xiv. 26, xvi. 13: πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. In the possession of the whole truth Christians are also enabled to distinguish lies and truth.¹

Ver. 21. οὐκ ἔγραψα ὑμῖν] does not refer to the whole Epistle (Beza), but to that which is said of the antichrists; comp. ver. 26.² — ὅτι οὐκ οἶδατε τὴν ἀλήθειαν κ.τ.λ.] ὅτι = because (comp. vv. 12–14); the apostle does not want to teach the *anointed* Christians for the first time the truth which was revealed in Christ, but he is writing to them because they know it; a Lapide: non ut haec vos doceam, sed ut doctos

¹ The genuinely Catholic interpretation of Estius is worthy of notice: habetis episcopos et presbyteros, quorum cura ac studio vestrae ecclesiae satis instructae sunt in iis, quae pertinent ad doctrinae christianae veritatem.

² Ebrard refers this ἔγραψα also arbitrarily to the Gospel of John.

confirmem. — καὶ ὅτι πᾶν ψεῦδος κ.τ.λ.] This ὅτι is not co-ordinate with the preceding one, but is dependent on οἴδατε. Luther, correctly according to the sense: “but ye know it, and know that,” etc. — πᾶν ψεῦδος, quite generally, though with special reference to the antichristian doctrine; ψεῦδος: “not merely error, but lie” (de Wette)—the absolute antithesis of ἀλήθεια; Lange quite arbitrarily thinks that the abstract is here put for the concrete: “that no false teacher can be a genuine Christian.” It is incorrect to take πᾶν . . . οὐ as a Hebraism = οὐδέν; οὐ belongs rather to the predicate. — ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας οὐκ ἔστι] ἐκ here also indicates the source, and does not express merely the connection (de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius). Because the lie is not of the truth, so also it has no connection with it; Lorinus: ex vero non nisi verum sequitur, et verum vero consonat. Whence the lie, which is not ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας, originates, Christ says in John viii. 44: The truth is from God, who is Himself the truth; the lie from the devil, who is not in the truth.

Vv. 22, 23. The existence of the antichrists and their relationship to the Christian Church having been previously stated, there follows now the more particular definition of the antichristian lie. — τίς ἐστιν ὁ ψεύστης;] The interrogative form, with which John addresses his readers who know the truth, is explained by the vividness of the feeling with which the apostle is writing; similarly in chap. v. 5. He passes from the abstract (πᾶν ψεῦδος) directly to the concrete (ψεύστης). The definite article: ὁ ψεύστης (Luther incorrectly: a liar), brings out the idea in clearer distinctness: the liar κατ’ ἐξοχήν, i.e. he in whom the lie appears in concrete personality (so also Braune), identical with ὁ ἀντίχριστος, which is denied by Jachmann through mistake of John’s idea. The thought is weakened by the supposition that the apostle is speaking here comparatively (Grotius: quis potest major esse impostor?). Nor is Bengel’s interpretation satisfactory: quis est illius mendacii imposturaeque reus? with which Düsterdieck agrees, when he paraphrases: “What sort of a lie I mean, ye know very well. Who are the liars? Are they not those who deny, etc.?” The apostle certainly has the particular lie of the antichrists of his time in view, but this he regards as the one chief and fundamental lie “in

which all *ψεύδος* is comprised" (Lücke). The explanation of Baumgarten-Crusius is plainly quite erroneous: "what else is a false doctrine than, etc.?" nor is that of Ebrard less so, as he finds in this *catechetical* (!) question intended for *children* this meaning: "on whose side is the lie?" with which he then supplies the corresponding question: "and on whose side is the truth?" — *εἰ μὴ ὁ ἀρνούμενος*] *εἰ μὴ*, often after a negation, may also stand after a question, as in this a negation is contained; comp. Luke xvii. 18; Rom. xi. 15; 1 Cor. ii. 11; 2 Cor. ii. 2; 1 John v. 5; it corresponds to the German: "*als nur*" (English: "but only," "except"), and limits the general thought to a particular one; the sense accordingly is: No other is the liar but he who, etc. According to Ebrard, *εἰ μὴ* must here only have the meaning of "than," because the question here is, which *of the two dogmatical tendencies* (!) belongs to the lie; that the apostle here has in view *two* parties, namely, the antichrists and the believing Christians, and asks which of them is in possession of the truth, is a pure fiction, for which there is not the slightest evidence in the text. *ὅτι Ἰησοῦς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ Χριστός*] On the construction of the negative idea *ἀρνεῖσθαι* with the following *οὐκ*, by which the negation is more strongly emphasized, see Kühner, II. p. 410.—The lie of the Antichrist consists in the denial that Jesus is *ὁ Χριστός*, i.e. in the denial of the identity of Jesus and Christ, whereby is meant, according to ver. 19 and chap. iv. 3, not the Jewish unbelief, that Jesus is not the promised Messiah, but the Gnostic heresy of the *distinction between Jesus and Christ*, which forms the sharpest contradiction to the apostle's doctrine that Jesus is the *λόγος σὰρξ γινόμενος*. It is erroneous to find here a reference to two different kinds of heresy; on the one hand the denial of the *divine*, on the other the denial of the *human*, nature of Jesus;¹ for John speaks only of *one* lie. — *οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀντίχριστος*] *οὗτος* refers back to *ὁ ἀρνούμενος*: the liar who denies the identity

¹ So Tertullian (*de Praescript.* c. 33): Joh. in ep. eos maxime antichristos vocat, qui Christum negarent in carne venisse et qui non putarent Jesum esse Filium Dei; illud Marcion, hoc Ebion vindicavit. Similarly Besser: "That Jesus was not the Christ, the Christ not Jesus. Either the *Word* that was from the beginning was separated from this Jesus, or the *flesh* was denied to the eternal Word." Comp. *Introd.* sec. 3.

of Jesus and Christ, he is the Antichrist. It is natural to take ὁ ψεύστης and ὁ ἀντιχρ. here in general signification, and to find therein a justification for Bengel's conception of John's idea of Antichrist; but as the lie of the antichrists proceeds from the πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀντιχρίστου, it may be ascribed to the Antichrist himself; the individual antichrists are the mouth by which he speaks.—ὁ ἀρνούμενος τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱόν] is not to be connected with οὗτος, so that the sense would be: this one, who denies the Father and the Son, is the Antichrist; but as a clause of more particular definition subordinate to ὁ ἀντίχριστος. "John hereby adds a new element which states the full unhappy *consequence* of that Antichristian lie" (Düsterdieck; similarly Braune). The apostle wants to bring out here that the denial that Jesus is ὁ Χριστός is in its very essence a denial of the *Father* and of the *Son*. He who denies the identity of Jesus and Christ, directly denies the Son, for the Son is no other than Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστός (neither an Aeon named Christ that did not become man, nor Jesus who is not Christ, or, according to John i. 14, the Logos);¹ but he who denies the Son denies also the Father, and not merely inasmuch as Son and Father are logically interchangeable ideas, but because the nature of the Father is only manifested in the Son, and all true knowledge of the Father is conditioned by the knowledge of the Son, so that the God of those who deny the Son is not the true God, but a false image of their own thoughts—an εἰδωλον.²

Ver. 23. Confirmation of the last stated thought in two

¹ Weiss correctly brings out the distinction between the ideas Χριστός and υἱός, when he observes that ὁ Χριστός is a historical conception to the apostle, and that it is enough for him that that proposition of the false teachers denies the Messiahship of Christ, from which all belief in Him must take its starting-point, in order to arrive at the recognition that Jesus is the Son of God, and thus in the Son to recognise the Father.

² That such commentators as proceed on rationalistic assumptions have not been able to interpret the thought of the apostle is quite natural. But even others have got a more or less indistinct view of it by putting, as Düsterdieck rightly says, "the ideas of John too directly into dogmatic forms (and, indeed, into those defined by the Church);" or by ignoring the realism of the apostle, and regarding what he considered in an objectively real way as a mere element of the subjective consideration; or, finally, by bringing out one-sided references instead of giving the ideas the due force of their entire comprehension.

clauses, which express the same idea, only in different form.¹ — *πᾶς ὁ ἀρνούμενος τὸν υἱόν, οὐδὲ τὸν πατέρα ἔχει*] *ἀρνεῖσθαι τὸν υἱόν* is in meaning synonymous with *ἀρνεῖσθαι, ὅτι Ἰησοῦς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ Χριστός*. The assertion that John here confounds with the idea of Christ that of the Son, *i.e.* of the eternal Logos (de Wette and others), is erroneous; it is not Christ apart from Jesus that he regards as the Son, but Christ in his identity with Jesus (Düsterdieck, Brückner). — Instead of saying in the second part of the first clause: *καὶ ἀρνεῖται*, corresponding to the first part, John says: *οὐδὲ . . . ἔχει*, which has a wider import, for *ἔχειν* is to be taken emphatically = “to possess in living fellowship” (Düsterdieck); the explanation of Beza is insufficient: *nec patrem esse credit* (better, a Lapidé: *habere in mente et fide, in ore et confessione*); the thought of the apostle is utterly eliminated when, with Socinus, Episcopius, Grotius, *ἔχειν τ. πατέρα* is explained by: “to know the will of God;” erroneously Storr also: “to him is the Father not gracious.” — In the following words: *ὁ ὁμολογῶν κ.τ.λ.*, which are wanting in the *Recepta* (see the critical notes), *ὁμολογεῖν* forms the antithesis of *ἀρνεῖσθαι*; it means a confession which is the expression of faith (Matt. x. 32; Rom. x. 10). In regard to the construction, Ebrard rightly remarks: “That *τὸν υἱόν* is dependent on *ὁμολογῶν*, and not along with *καὶ τὸν πατέρα* (as in 2 John 9) on *ἔχει* (in which case *ὁμολογῶν* would be used absolutely), clearly results from the preceding words, to which these form the antithesis.”

Vv. 24, 25. Exhortation to the faithful keeping of the gospel. Ver. 24. *ὑμεῖς*] By the *Recepta* *ὑμεῖς οὖν* the correct relationship of this verse is taken away; it is not a conclusion from what immediately precedes (Düsterdieck, Braune), but with the emphasized *ὑμεῖς* it is put in contrast with what is said of the false teachers; Theophylact: *ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ὑμεῖς δὲ ἄπερ ἠκούσατε ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς φυλάττετε παρ’ ἑαυτοῖς*. — In regard to the construction: *ὑμεῖς ὁ ἠκούσατε ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, ἐν ὑμῖν μενέτω*, Beza and Socinus, it is either an attraction (*ὑμεῖς ὁ ἦκ.* for *ὁ ὑμεῖς ἠκούσ.*, so also Bengel: *antitheton est in pronomine; ideo adhibetur trajectio; de Wette: “ὑμεῖς is properly no doubt the subject of the relative clause*

¹ Braune, rightly: “Here is the progress from the denying to the having, and from the particular (*ὁ ψεύστης*) to the general (*πάντες*).”

placed first;" Jachmann)¹ or an ellipsis (*ὑμεῖς* = quod ad vos attinet); Paulus and Ebrard regard *ὑμεῖς* as the pure vocative; but it is more correct to admit an anacolouthon which has its natural origin in this, that the apostle's thought in opposition to the false teachers was first directed to his readers, but equally also to the word which they had heard from the beginning; accordingly the apostle begins with *ὑμεῖς*, but does not follow it up by *μένετε ἐν* or a similar expression, but by *ὁ ἡκούσατε κ.τ.λ.*, as a new subject; comp. Winer, p. 506; VII. p. 534; Buttmann, p. 325. The same anacolouthon in ver. 27.² With *ὁ ἡκούσατε ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, comp. ver. 7; thereby, of course, the whole gospel is meant, but here specially the fundamental doctrine of it: that Jesus is the Christ. — *ἐν ὑμῖν*] Theophylact interprets *ἐν* by *παρά*; Luther: "among;" but the preposition must be retained in its proper meaning; for upon that it depends that what was heard "abides in the soul as something that determines the life" (Neander; comp. John xv. 7), because only then does that take place which the apostle expresses in the sequel. — *καὶ ὑμεῖς . . . μενεῖτε*] The *καὶ* before the concluding clause brings out more clearly its corresponding relationship to the preceding clause; here it is so much the more significant, as in both clauses the same verbal idea *μένειν* is used: If the Word remain in you, ye *also* will remain in the Son, etc.³ That our remaining in the Son is the immediate result of the *Word* remaining in us, is explained by the fact that "the words of Christ substantially contain nothing else than a self-revelation or explanation of His person and His appearing, and similarly the evangelical proclamation of the apostles is only the copy of this preaching of Christ Himself" (Weiss). *ἐν τῷ νύμφῃ* is put first, because fellowship with the Father is conditioned by fellowship with the Son.

¹ The idea of an attraction is erroneous, because "*ὑμεῖς*, if attracted to the relative clause, would be too strongly emphasized in this position" (Winer).

² Myrberg's reply, that *ὑμεῖς* is rather to be regarded as nominative absolute, is met by the fact that the use of the nominative absolute is precisely an anacolouthon.

³ Diisterdieck: "By *καὶ* before *ὑμεῖς* John specifies the promised consequence which will correspond to the condition which is stated, while at the same time he brings out the nice point which is contained in the significant interchange of *ἐν ὑμῖν μένειν* and *ὑμεῖς ἐν τῷ νύμφῃ . . . μινεῖτε*."

Ver. 25. *Καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπαγγελία κ.τ.λ.*] *αὕτη* may be referred either to what precedes, or to the concluding words of this verse: *τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον*. In the first case the meaning is: and this remaining is what He has promised, namely, eternal life. Gagnejus: "Manere in filio et patre promissio est, quam nobis pollicitus est orans pro nobis patrem Dominus Joh. xvii. 20. Bene ergo ait de hoc Johannes: haec est promissio, quam pollicitus est nobis, quae quidem est vita aeterna; vita enim aeterna est manere in Deo eoque frui hic per gratiam, in futuro per gloriam;" *τὴν ζωὴν τὴν αἰώνιον* then forms an apposition, by which that very remaining is described as happiness; this view in Oecumenius, and among modern commentators in Sander, Besser, Weiss. In the second case the thought is: "and eternal life is the promise which He has given us;" taking this view, a new thought, it is true, enters with ver. 25, and it requires something to be supplied to connect it with the preceding, perhaps what a Lapidé gives: si in ipso maneamus (Spener: that is the promise if we remain in the Word, and consequently in the Father and the Son); but nevertheless it is, in accordance with the analogy of John's mode of expression, to be preferred; comp. chap. i. 5, v. 14; similarly also chap. iii. 23, v. 11; in the last two passages the connection with what precedes appears clearly enough by both being connected with the same idea, whereas here there is no previous mention of the *ἐπαγγελία*; but even here the connection is not to be mistaken, because the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* is directly connected with the *μένειν ἐν τῷ υἱῷ κ.τ.λ.* This second interpretation in a Lapidé, Grotius, Lorinus, Russmeyer, Spener, Lücke, de Wette, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, Ebrard, Braune, and others. — *καί* is not used here *αἰτιολογικῶς* (Oecumenius), but is the simple copula. — *ἡ ἐπαγγελία*: "the promise." Lücke unnecessarily conjectures that instead of this perhaps *ἀπαγγελία* is probably to be read, or that *ἐπαγγελία* has here the meaning: "proclamation," for neither is it the case that the idea of the promise refers only to the distant future life, nor, according to John, that Christ does not bestow any promise.¹ — *αὐτός* is Christ,

¹ From this passage it is clear that with John *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* and the *knowledge of God* are not by any means, as Weiss thinks, identical ideas, for if John here, according to the view of Weiss, describes the abiding in the Son and in the

who in this whole passage forms the centre round which all the statements of the apostle move. — On the accusative τὴν ζωὴν, which has occurred through the attraction of the verb in the relative clause, comp. Wiener, p. 552; VII. p. 583; Buttmann, p. 68.

Vv. 26, 27. Conclusion of the section on the antichrists.

Ver. 26. ταῦτα refers to all that the apostle has written about the antichrists from ver. 18 down. In calling them here οἱ πλανῶντες ὑμᾶς, he gives it to be understood that their efforts were directed to seduce the Church from the truth of the gospel to their lie; that their purpose had actual effect (Braune) is not indicated by the verb. — Ver. 27. In the first part of this verse the apostle testifies to his readers that they do not need any teacher, in which he goes back to what he had already expressed in vv. 20, 21. — καὶ ὑμεῖς] καί is here used just as in ver. 20. — On the anacolouthon, see on ver. 24. — τὸ χρίσμα ὃ ἐλάβετε ἀπ' αὐτοῦ] τὸ χρίσμα is, with Braune, to be regarded as the accusative, for the juxtaposition of two nominatives could not be explained; the apostle probably had an ἔχετε in his mind, instead of which, however, he then wrote μένει ἐν ὑμῖν; αὐτοῦ, i.e. Χριστοῦ; so the context demands; αὐτός, ver. 25. Herein lies a proof that τοῦ ἀγίου in ver. 20 is to be understood of Christ. — ἐν ὑμῖν μένει] The indicative, instead of which the imperative is used in ver. 24, expresses the certain confidence of the apostle. — καὶ οὐ χρεῖαν ἔχετε] This sentence, which by καί is made co-ordinate with the preceding, stands to it in the relation of conclusion; meaning: since, as is not to be doubted, the Spirit is in you —and abiding—you do not need; Bengel describes this relation correctly by: et ideo. — ἵνα τις διδάσκη ὑμᾶς] ἵνα is used here, as not unfrequently in the N. T., in an enfeebled signification; only in an artificial way could the original force of purpose of this particle be here retained; while this force sometimes passes over into that of object, this is still further weakened, so that the clause beginning with ἵνα is the object

Father as the ζωὴ αἰώνιος, he then mentions what this consists in, as something plainly transcending the idea of knowledge; but if αὐτῇ is directly connected with τὴν ζ. τ. αἰών., then the abiding in the Son and the Father is considered as the condition of the ζωὴ; it is impossible, however, for it to be the condition of knowledge, for it rather presupposes the latter.

which completes the idea of the verb; so it is here; comp. especially Heb. v. 12: *χρείαν ἔχετε τοῦ διδάσκειν ὑμᾶς*; in other passages *χρ. ἔχειν* is used even with the simple infinitive, Matt. iii. 14, xiv. 16; 1 Thess. i. 8, iv. 9; with *ἵνα* as here, John xvi. 30.¹—Several commentators suppose here a reference to the false teachers, so that in the words of the apostle there lies a warning against those who wish to impose themselves on the Church as teachers; so a Lapide, Spener, (τίς=“who may make pretence of a new revelation”), Sander, Gerlach, Besser, and others. But it is more appropriate (according to ver. 21) to refer the apostle’s word to a teaching proceeding from himself or other apostolic teachers; so Hornejus, de Wette-Brückner, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc.—only we must not restrict the generally expressed thought merely to instruction about the false teachers, even though it is intended with special reference to that.² Believers need no human teacher in order that the divine truth may be made known to them. They have received, with the word which was declared unto them (ὃ ἤκουσαν), the *χρῖσμα*, which leads them *εἰς πᾶσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν*; therefore the apostle frequently in this Epistle emphasizes the fact that he does not want to *instruct* them, but is writing to them what they already know (*οἴδατε πάντα*, ver. 20). John thereby assumes *believing* readers, in whose hearts that which they have heard from the beginning is preserved true and uncorrupted. Nothing *new* therefore can be proclaimed to *the believers*, but only that which they already possess in faith may be brought to a clearer consciousness.³—*ἀλλ’ ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ χρῖσμα κ.τ.λ.*] In this second part of the verse the first question is about the construction. Lücke, Ewald, de Wette, Neander, Düsterdieck, Braune (and pre-

¹ At the most it may be said that *ἵνα* is used with the verb *χρείαν ἔχειν*, because that of which one is in need may be regarded as the object of his need; on the other hand, it is unsuitable when Braune says: “the teaching is here regarded as the object and purpose for the sake of the position of him who is to be taught.”

² Lücke paraphrases the passage: “The reason why I do not write any more about the false teachers, is that I assume that that holy unction of the Spirit remains in you; and if that is so, you do not need that any one shall instruct you further on the subject.”

³ Several commentators rightly remark here, that in the statement of the apostle there is no foundation for the error of the “enthusiasts,” inasmuch as John does not separate the teaching of the *χρῖσμα* and the apostolic word from one another, but places them in the closest connection.

viously Oecumenius and Theophylact) think that the whole to the end of the verse forms *one* period, in which the premise ἄλλ' ὥς . . . διδάσκει is resumed by the words καὶ καθὼς ἐδίδαξεν ὑμῖν, and has its conclusion in μενεῖτε (or μένετε) ἐν αὐτῷ, and in which the words καὶ ἀληθὲς . . . ψεῦδος contain a parenthetical adjunct. The difficulty that in the resumed premise καί is put instead of ἀλλά, καθὼς instead of ὥς, and the aorist ἐδίδαξεν instead of the present διδάσκει, can certainly be easily got over by the fact that the apostle wanted not simply to repeat the thought, but at the same time to bring out a new phase of the subject; but the additional περὶ πάντων, which does not stand in any relationship whatever to the conclusion μενεῖτε (μένετε), is decidedly opposed to this construction; to this is added that ἀλλά indicates that the apostle wants to express a *contrast* to the οὐ χρεῖαν ἔχετε κ.τ.λ., that is, a clause in which the teaching of the χρίσμα is described as such as removes the need of any other (human) teacher; finally, that the subordinate clause καὶ οὐκ ἔστι ψεῦδος conjoined with ἀληθὲς ἔστι raises this thought above the level of a mere parenthetical adjunct, and stamps it as a leading thought. For these reasons it is preferable, with Luther, Calvin, Baumgarten-Crusius, Sander, Brückner, Besser, and in general most of the commentators, to divide the whole into two parts, and to regard καὶ ἀληθ. ἔστι . . . ψεῦδος as the conclusion of the first part; Luther: "but as the anointing teaches you all things, it is true, and is no lie; and," etc.¹ — ὥς refers not so much to the form and fashion, as to the substance of the teaching. — τὸ αὐτὸ χρίσμα] τὸ αὐτό is not *idem* semper, non aliud atque aliud, sed sibi constans et idem apud sanctos omnes (Bengel; so also Erdmann), but: *just the same* χρίσμα, namely ὁ ἐλάβετε. Still the reading αὐτοῦ might be preferable, for it seems unnecessary to emphasize the fact that the χρίσμα is the same that they have received, and no other. — περὶ πάντων is used in the same sense as πάντα, ver. 20. — καὶ ἀληθὲς ἔστι κ.τ.λ.] καί before the conclusion, as in

¹ Ebrard makes ὥς dependent upon ἔγραψα, ver. 26; it is true he himself admits that this gives a "*laxe and legere* form of speech," but he thinks that there is "nothing strange" in this, because the apostle is speaking to *children* in quite *childlike* language. But what child's understanding would be capable of supplying with the words: "but as the same anointing teacheth you of all things," the thought: "sc. I have said to you"?

ver. 24: "*then it is also true*," etc.; it brings out prominently the idea ἀληθές; ἀληθές is referred to τὸ χρίσμα by Lücke, de Wette, Brückner, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Ewald, Braune, and others; but the substantive ψεύδος is opposed to this connection, for it cannot be referred to τὸ χρίσμα, inasmuch as it is considered by John as a person (διδίσκει), and must neither be arbitrarily explained, with Beza, by ψευδές, nor, with Braune, be separated from ἀληθές ("and there is no lie in it"); Oecumenius, Theophylact, Luther, Neander, Besser, Erdmann, and others, have therefore rightly referred ἀληθές κ.τ.λ. to that which the χρίσμα teaches. Because this is true, and is no ψεύδος, therefore believers do not need any teacher besides, but they may rely entirely upon the teaching of the χρίσμα. To this thought the apostle further adds a new one, in which he goes back to the end of ver. 24. — καὶ καθώς] καθώς, as distinct from ὡς, means: "*in proportion as*." — ἐδίδαξεν ὑμᾶς] namely, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς. — μένετε (μενεῖτε) ἐν αὐτῷ] The *Recepta* μενεῖτε is taken by Socinus, a Lapide, Lorinus, Semler, and others, in the sense of the imperative; others retain the future meaning, as in ver. 24; thus Beza says: *mihī videtur omnino servanda Futuri propria significatio ut est optime sperantis*; as the apostle thereby expresses his good confidence, the future accordingly has the vim consolandi (Bengel). The correct reading, however, is μένετε, which, corresponding to the preceding μένει and ἔχετε, is not imperative (Ewald, Braune), but indicative (Brückner), and as such it expresses the firm conviction of the apostle that they, according to the constant instruction of the χρίσμα, abide ἐν αὐτῷ, i.e. in *Christ* (Erasmus erroneously: = ἐν τῷ χρίσματι, and Baumgarten-Crusius: "*in the teaching which the χρίσμα communicates to them*"). In favour of this view is also the exhortation of ver. 28 herewith connected.¹

Ver. 28 concludes the section beginning at ver. 18, but serves at the same time as an introduction to the following section. — καὶ νῦν] cannot, it is true, be explained, with I'aulus, by "*even now already*," but neither can it be explained, with most of the commentators, exactly by igitur, or a similar word; here it rather introduces, as it frequently

¹ Myrberg on ver. 28: *Sperantis verba illa sunt, quae paullo ante leguntur; haec adhortantis, quod novum quoddam initium dicendi indicat.*

does, the following exhortation as a deduction from the present circumstances. Incorrectly Ebrard: "And now (namely, after I have spoken to the *παιδίοις*) I turn to *you*" (namely, to the whole Church): a supplement of that kind cannot be justified from the passages quoted by Ebrard; John xvii. 3; Acts x. 5, xxii. 16. — *τεκνία*] as in ver. 1. — *μένετε ἐν αὐτῷ*] quite the same thought as in ver. 27. Rickli's view is incorrect, that in ver. 27 it is "the abiding in the confession that Jesus is the Christ, but here another abiding, namely, the abiding in righteousness," that is meant. — *ἵνα ἐὰν φανερωθῇ*] *ἐὰν* is distinguished from *ὅταν* (*Recepta*) in this way, that it describes not the time, but only the actuality of the manifestation of Christ. The *φανέρωσις* of Christ is His Parousia occurring at the end of the *ἐσχάτη ὥρα*; comp. Col. iii. 4. By the same word the first appearance of Christ on earth is also elsewhere described; see chap. iii. 5, 8. *ἔχουμεν (σχῶμεν) παρῥησίαν*] The communicative form of expression indicates that John tacitly includes himself also under the exhortation: *μένετε ἐν αὐτῷ*.¹ — *παρῥησία*: the confidence of the believer at the day of judgment; chap. iv. 17. — *καὶ μὴ αἰσχυνθῶμεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ*] Elsewhere also *παρῥησία* and *αἰσχύνεσθαι* are contrasted with one another; so Prov. xiii. 5: *ἀσεβῆς αἰσχύνεται καὶ οὐχ ἔξει παρῥησίαν*; comp. also Phil. i. 20. *αἰσχυνθῶμεν* is either used in the passive sense, in which case the original meaning "to be shamed" passes over into this, "to be put to shame" (see Meyer on Phil. i. 20); then *ἀπό* (which is not = *ὑπό*) describes Christ as the one from whom this *αἰσχύνεσθαι* comes, namely, by means of His judgment of condemnation; or it is used in the middle sense: "*to be ashamed*," in which case *ἀπό* is not = *coram* (Luther, Ewald), but = "*away from*," thus: "*to draw back from Him with shame*;" so Calvin, Beza, Episcopius, de Wette, Lücke (who adduces Sir. xxi. 22: *ἄνθρωπος δὲ πολύπειρος αἰσχυνθήσεται ἀπὸ προσώπου*), Düsterdieck, Ebrard.² The second view de-

¹ Sander introduces here a foreign reference, when he thinks that John includes himself as if he would also have to be ashamed if on that day his children, whom he begot through the gospel, should come short. Similarly a Lapidé: *ne pudeamus utrique, sc. tam vos, si a doctrina Christi aberretis, quam nos Apostoli et Pastores, quod vos in ea non conservaverimus. Lorinus: conjungit seipsum discipulis, spe de illorum gloria adgaudens.*

² Braune thinks that the passive meaning is to be retained: "For we shall

serves the preference, on account of the corresponding contrast with ἔχειν παρρησίαν. — ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ] expresses definitely the reference already implied in φανερωθῇ: "at His (Christ's) coming;" παρουσία, in John only here, frequently appears in this sense in the N. T.; comp. Matt. xxiv. 3, xxvii. 37, 39; 1 Cor. xv. 23; 1 Thess. ii. 19, and elsewhere.

Ver. 29. With this verse the third section begins, which continues to chap. iii. 22, and consists of two groups: (1) ver. 29—iii. 10a, and (2) iii. 10b—22. — After the apostle has warned them against the love of the κόσμος, and against the false teachers (who are ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου), he shows the obligation of Christians to δικαιοσύνη, in which they reveal themselves as τέκνα Θεοῦ, in contrast to the τέκνα διαβόλου.

Ver. 29. The apostle now goes on to indicate how it is consistent with the nature of Christians, as those that are born of God, to do righteousness. — εἰδῆτε] Here also the apostle directs himself to his readers' own consciousness, as he does not want to teach them anything new, but only to state what they already know for their more earnest consideration. — ὅτι δίκαιός ἐστι. The present ἐστι is not used, either here or in iii. 5, iv. 17, for ἦν (Storr). It is doubtful whether the subject is *Christ* (a Lapede, Lorinus, Bengel, Rickli, Frommann, Myrberg, 1st ed. of this Comm., etc.) or *God* (Baumgarten - Crusius, Neander, Gerlach, Köstlin, de Wette, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Elbrard, Braune, Weiss, and others). In favour of the *former* is the fact that previously, not only in ver. 25 by αὐτός, and ver. 27 by ἐν αὐτῷ, but also in ver. 28 by φανερωθῇ, ἀπ' αὐτοῦ, and ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτοῦ, *Christ* is clearly meant; for the *latter*, that in the following ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγέννηται the pronoun refers back to the subject of δίκαιός ἐστι, and the idea γεννᾶσθαι ἐκ Χριστοῦ never appears in the writing, and, moreover, John, in what follows, calls Christians τέκνα Θεοῦ, and in ver. 9 makes use of the expression γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ (comp. iv. 7, v. 1, 4, 18). From the predicate δίκαιος nothing can be inferred, as this attribute is

not draw back and tremble, but we shall be rejected and cast out;" but the meaning above stated, and accepted also by Braune, does not suit the passive idea; besides, the correspondence with the idea ἔχειν παρρησίαν demands the middle signification of the word.

assigned by John both to God (i. 9) and Christ (ii. 1). As, with John's peculiar blending of the Father and the Son (or of God and Christ), it would not be easy to explain how he can pass from the one to the other without specially indicating it, it appears more safe, in accordance with the constant mode of conception and expression in the Epistle, to supply as the subject of *δίκαιός ἐστι* *God*, than *Christ*. It is inappropriate, with Storr, Lücke, and others, to refer *δίκαιος* to Christ, and *ἐξ αὐτοῦ*, on the other hand, to God, because the thought of the apostle would thereby lose its peculiar force (Bengel: *justus justum gignit*).¹ — The statement that God is *δίκαιος* corresponds with the statement that He is *φῶς* (chap. i. 5); it does not follow from ver. 28 that by *δίκαιος* here the *justitia judicialis* is to be understood; Erdmann: *quum ποιῶν τὴν δικαιοσύνην ad δίκαιός ἐστι referendum sit, hoc justitiam Dei sensu judiciali significare nequit, sed absolutam ejus sanctitatem*. — *γινώσκετε*] is here not to be regarded as the indicative (Beza, Bengel, Semler, Düsterdieck, Myrberg, Ewald, and others), but, as its position between *μένετε* (ver. 27) and *ἴδετε* (chap. iii. 1) shows, as the imperative: "*then know*, i.e. *observe and reflect*," with Vulgate, Grotius, Russmeyer, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Lücke, Erdmeyer, Ebrard, Braune, and others. — *ὅτι πᾶς . . . γεγέννηται*] The same relationship in which, according to chap. i. 6, *κοινωνίαν ἔχειν μετὰ Θεοῦ* and *περιπατεῖν ἐκ τῷ φωτί* stand to one another, exists between *γεγεννησθαι ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ* and *ποιεῖν τὴν δικαιοσύνην* (so also Braune), inasmuch as the latter is the practical proof of the former, so that every one who practises righteousness—but no one else (Bengel: *omnis et solus*)—is born of God. That when Episcopiuses describes the *nasci ex Deo*, not as the condition, but as the result of the *exercitii justitiae*, he perverts the thought of the apostle, needs no proof. The right interpretation in Bengel, Neander, Besser, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, Ebrard, Brückner, Braune, Weiss.² By *τὴν*

¹ Sander would leave the question undecided; still he correctly states the alternative: "If *δίκαιος* must be referred to Christ, so also must *ἐξ αὐτοῦ*. But if the latter cannot be, if *ἐξ αὐτοῦ* can only be referred to God, then *δίκαιος* must also be referred to God."

² The thought that only he who is born of God can practise righteousness, is not exactly expressed here by John, but it is suggested in the preceding *πᾶς*. When Lücke in his 2d ed. says: "We might have properly expected *ὅτι πᾶς ὁ*

δικαιοσύνην it is plainly righteousness, in the full extent of the idea, that is described; with the expression *ποιεῖν τὴν δικαιοσύνην*, compare the synonymous idea *ποιεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν* (chap. i. 6); similarly in Hebrew *הקדשׁ הטהור*; Gen. xviii. 19; Isa. lvi. 1; Ps. xiv. 15; in the N. T. comp. Matt. vi. 1. On *ποιεῖν* an emphasis is placed which must not be overlooked; comp. chap. iii. 18; for now is the truth of the experience and of the word first proved in *deed*.—In *ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγ.* we must retain *ἐξ* in its proper meaning; explanations which weaken it, such as that of Socinus: *dei similem esse*, or of Rosemüller: *amari a deo*, are of course to be rejected (Braune); the relation of the perfect *γεγέννηται* to the present *ποιῶν* is to be observed.¹

γεγεννημένος ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ποιῶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην; but John would appear to have the purpose of exciting in his readers the consciousness of sonship to God in Christ, therefore he states the reversed relation,"—this is erroneous, since it is rather *ποιῶ τὴν δικαιοσύνην* that has the chief emphasis; in his 1st ed. Lücke correctly stated the thought of the apostle.

¹ The definition of Weiss: "The being born of God is the act by which the known nature of God, and therewith God Himself, who indeed is received into our entire spiritual life as the object of that intuitive knowledge, operates determiningly, mouldingly, regeneratingly, upon our spiritual and moral being," is in various aspects unsuitable; for (1) it is not so much the act of God as rather the activity of man, his knowledge, which is represented as causing the being born of God; (2) it is erroneous to describe the *birth* as *producing*, since the birth is the result of the generating activity; (3) it is no doubt true that the birth is brought about by knowledge, for it is only by producing in man the knowledge of His nature that God produces in him the new birth; but, on the other hand, it is just as true that the knowledge of God is conditioned by the being born of God: only he who is born of God knows God; there are two grades of the knowledge to be distinguished, namely, the knowledge as condition, and the knowledge as result, of being born of God.

CHAPTER III.

VER. 1. Instead of *δέδωκεν*, A G read the aorist: *ἔδωκεν*; the *Rec.* is, however, sufficiently attested by the majority of authorities. — The reading *ὑμῶν* in B is not even accepted by Buttm., rightly; for it no doubt owes its existence merely to the connection with the 2d pers.: *ἴδετε*. — After *κληθῶμεν* is found in A B C *ς*, many min. and vss., in Thph. Aug. Bede, the addition: *καὶ ἐσμέν*; the Vulg. and other Latin vss. have: *et simus*; Oecum. in his comm.: *ἔδωκεν ἡμῶν τέκνα αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι τε καὶ κληθῆναι*, and Thph. in his comm.: *γενέσθαι τε καὶ λογισθῆναι*. According to these authorities, the addition must be regarded as genuine (Lachm. Düsterd. Ewald, Brückner); Tisch. (following G K, many min. Copt. etc.) has not accepted it; many critics (thus even Reiche) explain it as a gloss; this it certainly may be—taken from ver. 2; but the overwhelming weight of authorities is in favour of its genuineness. Düsterdieck thinks that the omission originated in a false explanation of *κληθῶμεν*. — Instead of *ἡμᾶς*, *ς* has *ὑμᾶς*. — Ver. 2. After *οἶδαμεν* the *Rec.* has *δέ* (G K, etc., Syr. Copt. etc., Thph. Oec. etc.), which, with Lachm. and Tisch., following A B C *ς*, several min. etc., is to be deleted; its insertion is easily explained by the apparent antithesis to the preceding. — Ver. 4. The *Rec.* *ἡ ἁμαρτία* is certified by all the authorities; Lachm. omits *ἡ*, but, as Tisch. observes, *sine teste*, for even B, to which Lachm. appeals, reads *ἡ ἁμαρτία*. After *ἔστιν*, *ς* (sol.) reads *καί*, which, scarcely genuine, serves to connect more closely the two ideas *ἁμαρτία* and *ἀνομία*. — Ver. 5. Instead of *οἶδατε*, *ς* (sol.) reads *οἶδαμεν*, which makes no essential difference in the thought. — *τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν*] *Rec.* following C G K *ς*, etc., Syr. etc., Thph. Oec. Bede (de Wette); Lachm. and Tisch. omit *ἡμῶν*, following A B, etc., Copt. Theb. etc., Tert. Aug. etc. The genuineness of *ἡμῶν* is certainly doubtful; perhaps it was omitted at a later date, to generalize the idea *τὰς ἁμαρτίας*; Reiche regards it as genuine. — Ver. 6. With the reading *ἰόρακεν* in Tisch. 7, comp. chap. i. 1. — Ver. 7. Instead of the *Rec.* *τεκνία* (in B G K *ς*, etc., vss. min. Thph. Oec. Tert. etc., Lachm.), Tisch. has accepted *παιδία*, after A C, etc., Copt. etc.; it is difficult to decide; it is possible that *τεκνία* is a correction for *παιδία*, a form of address unusual in the Epistle. That *παιδία*, as Ebrard thinks, is a correction,

because in the section beginning with the address *παιδία* (chap. ii. 18) the conclusion is *περὶ τῶν πλανώντων* (ver. 25), and here the same verb (*μηδεὶς πλανήτω ὑμᾶς*) follows the address, has little probability in its favour. — Ver. 10. Lachm. in his larger ed. has instead of the *Rec.* *ποιῶν δικαιοσύνην*, which he had retained in his smaller ed., the reading *ὦν δικαίος*, attested by no cod., but only by the Vulg., some other vss. and several Fathers (Or. Tert. Cyp. etc.); clearly without adequate reason. — The Codd. A C K, etc., have before *δικαιοσύνην* the article *τῇ*, probably inserted in correspondence with ver. 7 and chap. ii. 29. — Ver. 11. Instead of the *Rec.* *ἀγγελία*, C K, etc., some vss. read *ἐπαγγελία*; probably in accordance with chap. ii. 25; de Wette considers it the original reading, just as chap. i. 5; scarcely correct. — Ver. 13. K has before *μὴ θανάξεται*: “καί,” clearly added for the purpose of closer connection. — *ἀδελφοί*] according to A B C K, 27, etc., Vulg. etc., Aug. Oros. etc.; recommended by Griesb., accepted by Lachm. Tisch.; the *Rec.* adds *μου*, after G K, etc. — Ver. 14. After *τοὺς ἀδελφούς* K reads *ἡμῶν*, probably a later addition to complete the thought. — *ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἀδελφόν*] *Rec.* following C G K, Thph. Oecum.; *τὸν ἀδελφόν* is, however, a later addition; it is not found in A B K, etc., Vulg. etc., Aug. etc.; justly omitted by Lachm. and Tisch.; its insertion is easily explained; Reiche, however, is of a different opinion. — Ver. 15. Instead of *αὐτοῦ*, as Lachm. and Tisch., or *αὐτοῦ*, as most of the editors read, B has *ἐαυτοῦ*. — *ἐν αὐτῷ* (or better: *ἐν αὐτῷ*, Tisch.), *Rec.* after B G K, etc., Thph. Oec. — Lachm. has accepted *ἐν ἐαυτῷ*, the reading of A C K, etc. — Ver. 16. Instead of *τιθεῖναι* (*Rec.* according to G K, etc., Oec.) we must read, with Lachm. and Tisch., following the overwhelming evidence of A B C K, etc., the aorist *θεῖναι*. — Ver. 18. After *τεκνία* the *Rec.* (following G K, etc.) has *μοῦ*, the genuineness of which, however, is justly doubted by Griesb. — The article *τῇ* before *γλώσση*, which is omitted by the *Rec.*, is with certainty attested by almost all authorities; it is wanting, however, in K. — Before *ἔργῳ* the *Rec.* has omitted *ἐν*, only on the evidence of K; almost all the authorities attest its genuineness; as the co-ordinate ideas are without *ἐν*, it was natural to omit the preposition with *ἔργῳ* also. — Ver. 19. Before *ἐν τούτῳ* the *Rec.*, following C G K K, most min. vss. etc., reads *καί*, which is also accepted by Tisch. Lachm. has omitted it; it is wanting in A B, etc., Vulg. Copt. etc.; it is, however, probably genuine; omitted because it seemed unsuitable for the connection. — Instead of *γινώσκουμεν*, *Rec.*, following G K, etc., Vulg. etc. (Tisch.), A B C K, etc.,¹ several vss. etc., read *γινώσμεθα*

¹ Lücke, whom Sander copies, says that C does not testify in favour of *γινώσμεθα*, but according to Tischendorf it certainly does.

(Lachm.); as the latter is the more difficult reading, and besides has the most important authorities in its favour, it is to be regarded as genuine, with Ewald, Brückner, Braune, contrary to the opinion of Lücke, de Wette, Reiche; Bengel and de Wette think that the following *πείσομεν* has led to the change of the present to the future; but it is just as likely that the indicative is a correction of the copyists, in accordance with the frequently-occurring formula: *ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν*, ii. 3, iii. 24, iv. 2, v. 2 (Erdmann). — *τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν*] *Rec.* following A** C G K **Σ**, almost all min., several vss. Thph. Oecum. Bede; retained by Tisch. and Lachm. (in his larger ed.); in the small ed. Lachm. has: *τὴν καρδίαν ἡμῶν*, after A* B, Syr. etc.; the plural was apparently altered to the singular in accordance with ver. 20. — Ver. 20. Instead of *ὅτι ἐάν*, Lachm. and Buttm. read: *ὅτι ἐάν*; see on this the explanation of the verse. — The *ὅτι* before *μερίζων*, which Lachm. had omitted in his small ed. (following A, etc., Vulg. etc., Oec. etc.), he has again rightly accepted in the larger ed. The change of it to *ἐτι*, which Henr. Stephanus would read, is arbitrary. — Ver. 21. The genuineness of *ἡμῶν* (*Rec.*) after *ἡ καρδιά* is uncertain; it is found in C G K **Σ**, etc. (Tisch.), but is wanting in A B, etc., Vulg. etc. (Lachm.). — The *ἡμῶν* after *καταγινώσκει* is wanting in B and C; it is, however, hardly spurious, as it is indispensable for the sense. Instead of *ἐχόμεν*, attested by almost all the authorities, B has *ἐχσι*, originating in a false reference to *καρδιά*. — Ver. 22. Instead of *ὅ ἐάν*, B reads *ὅ ἄν*. — Instead of the active form: *αἰτῶμεν*, there is found in **Σ** the middle form: *αἰτῶμεθα*. — In opposition to the *Rec.* *παρ' αὐτοῦ* (G K, etc.), *ἀπ' αὐτοῦ* deserves the preference, according to the authorities (A B C **Σ**, etc., Lachm. Tisch.). — The reading *τηρώμεν* in **Σ** instead of *τηροῦμεν* is no doubt only a clerical error. — Ver. 23. *πιστεύσωμεν*] *Rec.* following B G K, *al. pl.*, Oec. Tisch.; the reading of A C **Σ**, etc., Thph., on the other hand, is *πιστεύωμεν*; recommended by Griesb., accepted by Lachm., probably a change in accordance with the following present *ἀγαπῶμεν*; so Reiche thinks. — After *ἐντολήν*, *ἡμῶν* is wanting in G K, etc. (omitted by Tisch.). The most important authorities attest the genuineness of *ἡμῶν*; Reiche, however, regards it as a later addition. — Ver. 24. In **Σ** the *καί* is wanting before *ἐν τούτῳ*; in the same cod. *ὃ ἔδωκεν ἡμῶν* is found instead of the *Rec.* *ὃ ἡμῶν ἔδωκεν*.

Ver. 1. From the *ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγέννηται* (chap. ii. 29) the apostle goes on to the thought that he and his readers are children of God, whence he deduces the necessity that exists for them of *ποιεῖν τὴν δικαιοσύνην*. First, however, he points his readers to the *love* of God, through which they have

become children of God, inviting them to the consideration of it by ἴδετε. — ποταπὴν ἀγάπην δέδωκεν ἡμῖν ὁ πατήρ] *what manner of love the Father has bestowed on us.* ποταπός (later form for ποδαπός, properly = from whence?) in the N. T., never in the direct question, is strictly, it is true, not = quantus, but = qualis (comp. Luke i. 29; 2 Pet. iii. 11), but is frequently used as an expression of admiration at anything especially wonderful (comp. Matt. viii. 27; Mark xiii. 1; Luke vii. 39), so that the meaning of qualis passes over into that of quantus; and so it is to be taken here also. — ἀγάπην διδόναι only here; διδόναι is more significant than ἐνδεικνύναι or a similar expression; it means: “to give, to bestow.” God has made His love our property (so also Braune). It is quite incorrect to take διδόναι = destinare, and, weakening the thought, ἀγάπην as metonymous for “love-token” (Grotius), or for effectum charitatis (Socinus).¹ The reference which Calvin finds in the word, when he says: quod dicit *datum* esse caritatem, significat: hoc *merae* esse liberalitatis, quod nos Deus pro filiis habet, is not indicated by John. — On ἡμῖν a Lapidè remarks: indignis, inimicis, peccatoribus. — The name ὁ πατήρ points to the following τέκνα Θεοῦ. — ἵνα τέκνα Θεοῦ κληθῶμεν] Paulus, de Wette, Lücke, etc., retain ἵνα in its original meaning; “the greatness of the divine love,” says Lücke, “lies in the sending of the Son” (chap. iv. 10). This thought is correct in itself; but the apostle is not here thinking of the sending Christ; it is therefore arbitrary to supply it; here there is in his mind only the fact that we—as believers—are called the children of God: “This is the proof and the result of love” (Spencer); ἵνα is accordingly used here in modified signification, synonymous with ἐν τούτῳ, ὅτι, only that by ἵνα the τέκνα Θ. κληθ. is more definitely described as the purpose (not, however, as the object of an act distinguished from it) of the love of the Father;

¹ A Lapidè interprets ἀγάπην in the Catholic interest: i.e. charitatem tum activam (actum amoris Dei quo nos mire amat), tum passivam nobisque a Deo communicatam et infusam. Videte quantam charitatem . . . nobis . . . praestitit et exhibuit Deus, cum . . . charitatem creatam nobis dedit et infudit, qua filii Dei nominamur et sumus. — Very appropriately Luther, in his *Scholia*: usus est Joannes singulari verborum pondere: non dicit, dedisse nobis Deum donum aliquod, sed ipsam caritatem et fontem omnium bonorum, cor ipsum, etc.

Ebrard unsuitably gives the meaning by the explanation ποτ. ἀγ. δέδωκεν ἡμ. ὁ πατήρ ἐν τῷ βούλεσθαι ἵνα κ.τ.λ., inasmuch as the love of God is bestowed on us, not in His will, but in the act which is the outcome of it. — καλεῖσθαι is erroneously explained by Baumgarten-Crusius = ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν γενέσθαι, John i. 12, so that the sense would be: “that we have the *right* to *dare* to call ourselves God’s children” (Neander); it is very common to take καλεῖσθαι = εἶναι, Augustin: hic non est discrimen inter dici et esse; this is so far correct as the name, which is here spoken of, inanis esse titulus non potest (Calvin), for: “where God gives a name, He always gives the nature itself along with it” (Besser); the εἶναι is included in the καλεῖσθαι; yet the very fact of being *called* is significant, for it is only in the *name* that the *being* is revealed, and it is through that giving of a name that the separation of believers from the world is actually accomplished. ἵνα . . . κληθῶμεν is usually translated: “that we *should* be called.” Ewald adds: “at the day of judgment,” but it is not the future, but the present, that is here spoken of; κληθῶμεν is therefore not to be taken as the subj. fut., but as the subj. aor.: “that we were named, and therefore are called.” Braune would explain the apostle’s expression in this way, that being children of God is “a work only gradually accomplished, an operation;” incorrectly, for “being the children of God” is certainly “a simply stated fact;” comp. the καὶ ἐσμέν and ver. 2. Instead of τέκνα αὐτοῦ, John says τ. Θεοῦ, because he wants to state the *full* name itself. The view of Baumgarten-Crusius has less in its favour, that the apostle contrasted πατήρ and Θεοῦ in order to indicate: “He bestowed it on us *lovingly*, that we should be connected with the *Godhead*, inasmuch as the former describes the divine will, the latter the divine nature.” — καὶ ἐσμέν, which according to the majority of authorities is scarcely a mere gloss (see the critical notes), says John in an independent form, not depending on ἵνα (the Vulgate erroneously = sinus),¹

¹ Ebrard thinks that ἐσμέν may be dependent upon ἵνα, not certainly according to Buttmann’s, but according to John’s grammar; incorrectly, for the present indicative after ἵνα is not surely attested in John even by a single passage, whilst it is unmistakeably in Paul, 1 Cor. iv. 6 and Gal. iv. 17 (comp. in addition, Al. Buttmann, p. 202, note); it therefore appears most probable that

in order still more specially to bring out the element of being, which was certainly contained already in *κληθῶμεν*. — Not in order to comfort believers in regard to the persecutions which they have to suffer from the world (de Wette, Lücke, etc.), but to specify the contrast in which believers as τέκνα Θεοῦ stand to the world, and the greatness of the love of the Father who has given them that name, the apostle continues: διὰ τοῦτο ὁ κόσμος οὐ γινώσκει ἡμᾶς] διὰ τοῦτο refers back to the preceding thought (Bengel, de Wette, Brückner, Braune); thus: therefore, because we are children of God; the following ὅτι then serves to confirm the reason why the world does not know us as children of God. It is true, διὰ τοῦτο might be also directly referred to ὅτι (Baumgarten-Crusius, also perhaps Lücke, Ewald); but with this reference the sentence would come in too disconnectedly. — With ὁ κόσμος comp. chap. ii. 15. — οὐ γινώσκει means: “does not know us,” i.e. our inner nature, which we as τέκνα Θεοῦ possess, is to the world something incomprehensible; to it, alienated from God, what is godly is strange and inconceivable; comp. John xiv. 17. Many commentators unnecessarily deviate from this proper meaning of the word; thus Grotius, who interprets it = non agnoscit pro suis; Senler = nos rejicit, reprobatur; Baumgarten-Crusius = μισεῖ (“therefore the world cannot endure us, because it cannot endure Him—God”). — ὅτι οὐκ ἔγνω αὐτόν] “for it did not know Him” (namely, God or the Father); S. Schmid erroneously explains ἔγνω by: credere in Deum; Episcopius by: jussa Dei observare; John’s idea of knowledge is to be retained, as in the case of γινώσκει, so also in ἔγνω (Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune).

Ver. 2. After emphatic resumption of ἐσμέν, the apostle indicates the yet concealed glory of the τέκνα Θεοῦ. He begins with the address ἀγαπητοί, which occurs to him here the more readily as he feels himself most closely connected with his readers in the common fellowship with God (so also

καὶ ἰσμίν is added by John, not indeed as a triumphant exclamation, but as an utterance about the actual present state of his readers, confirming the preceding. If ἰσμίν is regarded as dependent on ἴνα, we are compelled to weaken the idea κληθῶμεν, for Ebrard’s supposition that in κληθῶμεν is contained the relationship of God to us, or the element of “being reconciled,” and in ἰσμίν, on the other hand, “our relationship to God, or the element of the conversion and renewal of our nature,” lacks any tenable ground.

Düsterdieck). — *νῦν τέκνα Θεοῦ ἐσμέν*] *νῦν* is used in reference to the future (*οὔπω*); it is here a particle of time, not = “now, in consequence of that decree” (de Wette); a contrast with what immediately precedes (Lücke: “amidst all mistake on the part of the world, we are *nevertheless* really now the children of God;” so also Düsterdieck and Braune) is not suggested by it. Hereby the present glory of the believing Christian is described;¹ before the apostle mentions the future glory, he observes that this is yet concealed: *καὶ οὔπω ἐφανερώθη τί ἐσόμεθα*] *φανεροῦσθαι* may, as Ebrard remarks, mean both: “to be actually revealed,” or: “for the knowledge to be revealed;” most commentators rightly take the word here in the first meaning; it is true, Ebrard maintains that this explanation is grammatically impossible, because *φανερώω*, as governing a question, can only have the meaning of theoretical revelation; but this assertion is unfounded, for in the N. T. *usus loquendi* (nay, even in the classics) the interrogative *τίς*, sometimes *τί*, confessedly appears where, according to the rule, the relative should properly be used; comp. Winer, p. 152; VII. p. 158 f.; Al. Buttmann, p. 216; and especially if the thought involves an assumed question, as is the case here.² That *φανεροῦσθαι* cannot here be understood of the theoretical revelation is clear—(1) from the fact that no *ἡμῖν* is put with it, which Ebrard arbitrarily inserts when he interprets: “it has not yet been revealed *to us*, no information about it has yet been communicated *to us*;” (2) from the fact that the apostle himself immediately afterwards says what Christians will be in the future; (3) from the fact that a confession of present ignorance is at variance with the natural connection; from the fact that with this view a very artificial thought results for the following words: *οἶδαμεν κ.τ.λ.*;

¹ De Wette incorrectly remarks on *ἐσμέν*: “by destiny, by faith and aspiration or idea;” John rather signifies by *ἐσμέν* the actual reality.

² Acts xiii. 25 is especially to be compared. According to Buttmann, the interrogative is used for the relative only after predicates which have a certain similarity with the verba sentiendi, etc., thus especially after *ἔχεν* (Mark viii. 1, 2); yet this similarity is sometimes at the least very remote, thus with *δοξάζονται*, Matt. x. 19, and with *ἰστούμασιν*, Luke xvii. 8, where Buttmann finds himself compelled to supply a connecting verb. Besides, a similarity with the verba sentiendi is not to be denied to the verb *φανεροῦσθαι*, even if it does not describe the theoretical revelation, for the coming out of concealment includes the becoming visible.

see below. — By οὕτω ἐφανερώθη κ.τ.λ. the apostle accordingly states that the future condition of those who at present are τέκνα Θεοῦ is still concealed, has not yet come to light (comp. Col. iii. 3; Rom. viii. 18).¹ This future state is, it is true, something different from the present, yet it is not *absolutely* new, but is that “which is latent and established in the present” (Düsterdieck, Braune). — οἶδαμεν ὅτι ἐὰν φανερωθῇ κ.τ.λ.] By οἶδαμεν the apostle expresses his own and his readers’ consciousness of that which, as τέκνα Θεοῦ, they will be in the future. — With φανερωθῇ we must supply τί ἐσόμεθα, the meaning is the same as it previously has; so it is correctly explained by Didymus, Augustin, Socinus, Grotius, Paulus, Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Semler, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Braune, etc. As Ebrard similarly supplies τί ἐσόμεθα, but understands φανερωθῇ here also of the knowledge, there results for him this thought: “we know *rather* that when it shall be made known to us, we shall *even already* be like Him,” in which “the emphasis is made to rest on the *contemporaneity* of the theoretical φανεροῦσθαι with the actual ὅμοιοι ἔσεσθαι;” but in this interpretation, which suffers from unjustifiable supplements, a reference is brought out as the chief element of the thought which is in no way indicated, and is foreign to the context. — Some critics supply with φανερωθῇ as subject Χριστός, as in chap. ii. 28, so Syrus, Calvin, Beza, Hornejus, Calov, Semler, etc. (Myrberg at least thinks that this is not omnino improbabile); this is, however, erroneous, as in this φανερωθῇ what immediately precedes is clearly resumed. It is self-evident that this revelation will take place ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ Χριστοῦ; comp. ii. 28. — [ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ ἐσόμεθα] αὐτῷ, i.e. Deo, cujus sumus filii (Bengel); the idea remains, indeed, essentially the same if αὐτῷ is taken = Χριστῷ (Storr), but the context decides in favour of the first explanation. The apostle says: we shall be to God ὅμοιοι, not ἴσοι, because likeness to God will not be unconditioned, but conditioned by the nature of the creature, as a creature; in so far ὅμοιος may be translated by “like,” only this idea

¹ Ebrard groundlessly asserts that this view amounts to a tautology: “our future state is still future,” for according to it the apostle rather expresses the thought that the future condition of the τέκνα Θεοῦ will be distinguished from the present; in which, plainly, there is not the slightest tautology contained.

has something indefinite in it, and therefore Sander not unjustly says "that thereby the point of the thought is lost." As John himself does not more particularly define this future *ὁμοιότης* of man with God, the commentator must not arbitrarily restrict the general idea on the one side or the other, as, for instance, by the reference to the "light-nature of God" (Ebrard), or the *δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ* (Düsterdieck), or the *δόξα Θεοῦ* (de Wette)¹. — *ὅτι ὁψόμεθα αὐτόν, καθὼς ἐστι*] This sentence states the *logical* ground of the foregoing; Calvin correctly: *ratio hæc ab effectu sumta est, non a causa*; so that the sense is: "because we shall see Him as He is, we therefore know that we shall be like Him" (Rickli; so also Socinus, S. Schmidt, Erdmann, Myrberg, etc.). It is a different thought in 2 Cor. iii. 18, according to which Bengel explains: *ex aspectu, similitudo* (similarly Irenaeus, *adv. hæc.* iv. 38, says: *ὄρασις Θεοῦ περιποιητικὴ ἀφθαρσίας*), according to which the sense is: "the beholding is the cause of the likeness" (Spener; similarly Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Neander, Köstlin, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune, Weiss, etc.). But John does not here want to explain whence the *ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ Θεῷ* comes to the believer, but on what the *οἶδαμεν* is based. The certain hope of the Christian is that he shall see God. In that hope there lies for him the certainty that he will one day be like God; for God can only be seen by him who is like Him.² When Rickli remarks on *ὁψόμεθα*: "not a bodily vision of Him who is Spirit; it is the spiritual beholding, the knowledge of God in His infinite divine nature" (similarly Frommann, p. 217), or when others interpret this *ὁρᾶν* simply by "to know aright," and similarly, this is contrary to the sense of the apostle; for as the word itself indeed *shows*, an *actual* seeing is meant. For man in his *earthly*

¹ Baumgarten-Crusius and others quote on this passage 2 Pet. i. 4: *κοινωνοὶ τῆς θείας φύσεως*; this is (as Brückner also remarks) unsuitable, for in this expression the author of that Epistle does not say what the Christian *will be* one day, but what he already *is*; it therefore corresponds rather to the *τίκνα Θεοῦ*.

² To Düsterdieck's question, Why then did not the apostle write: *ὁψόμεθα αὐτόν, ὅτι ὅμοιοι αὐτῷ ἰσόμεθα*? it is a valid reply: because he did not want to represent the beholding of God, but likeness to God, as the purpose of the divine love. The justification of the rejected explanation by 2 Cor. iii. 18 is inappropriate, because John describes the future condition of the children of God, not as a *becoming* like, but as a *being* like (*ισόμεθα*).

body, God is certainly invisible; but it is different with the glorified man in his *σῶμα πνευματικόν* (1 Cor. xv. 44); he will not merely *know* (the believer has *knowledge* already here), but *see* God; and, moreover, no longer δι' ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνύματι, but πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον, 1 Cor. xiii. 12. Compare on the seeing of God, Matt. v. 8; 2 Cor. v. 7; Rev. xxii. 4. — By καθὼς ἐστὶ the entire reality of the nature of God: “as He is, not merely in a copy, etc., but in Himself and in His nature, His perfect majesty and glory” (Spener), is described.¹ The relation of the single parts of this verse is usually regarded by the commentators as adversative; certainly νῦν and οὕτω form an antithesis, but the connecting καὶ shows that the apostle considered the first two thoughts less in their antithesis to one another than in their co-ordination, inasmuch as it occurred to him to emphasize them both equally: both that believers are now really τέκνα Θεοῦ, and also that a glory as yet concealed—namely, likeness to God—awaits them. Between the third and fourth parts also a sort of antithesis occurs (hence the *Recepta* δέ), but here also the apostle is not anxious to bring out this contrast, but rather to add to the negatively-expressed thought, for its confirmation, the positive substance of Christian consciousness; comp. de Wette-Brückner, Braune.

Ver. 3 shows the moral effect of the Christian hope; not the condition with which the fulfilment of it is connected, as Lücke thinks. The same combination of ideas, only in the form of exhortation, occurs in 2 Cor. vi. 18 and vii. 1; 2 Pet. iii. 13, 14. — πᾶς ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἐλπίδα ταύτην ἐπ' αὐτῷ] namely, the hope of one day being like God.² “In the case of πᾶς ὁ ἔχ. we can, as in ii. 29, bring out the converse in the meaning of the apostle: every one . . . and only such” (Düsterdieck).

¹ Calvin: Deus nunc se nobis conspiciendum offert, non qualis est, sed qualem modulus noster eum capit. Weiss rightly observes that the emphasis is laid on καλῶς ἵστιν; but it is incorrect for him to place this in contrast with His manifestation in the Son; for God has not revealed Himself in Christ otherwise than καλῶς ἵστι.—As a curiosity the explanation of Oertel may be given here: “One day after several centuries, mankind, which now belongs too much to the spirit of barbarism, will become more glorified, more ennobled, and more happy, and thus attain to the perfect knowledge of the plan of God and the purpose of Jesus.”

² Elbrand groundlessly would understand by ἡ τῆς the treasure which is the object of the hope.

The phrase ἔχειν ἐλπίδα ἐπὶ with dative only here; Acts xxiv. 15: ἔχ. ἐλπ. εἰς Θεόν; but ἐλπίζειν ἐπὶ with dative: Rom. xv. 12 and 1 Tim. vi. 17. — αὐτῷ, *i.e.* Θεῷ] God is regarded as the basis on which the hope is founded. The idea of maintaining (Spener) is not contained in ἔχειν. — ἀγνίζει αὐτὸν καθὼς κ.τ.λ.] ἀγνίζειν (comp. on 1 Pet. i. 22), not “to keep oneself pure” (à Mons, Bengel, Russmeyer, etc.), but “to purify oneself, *i.e.* to make oneself free of everything that is unholy;” in Jas. iv. 8 it is used synonymously with καθαρίζειν. This self-purification necessarily follows from the Christian’s hope, because the object of this is to be like God, and therefore also to be holy. — In reference to the opinion that this purification is described as an act of *man*, Augustine says: videte quemadmodum non abstulit liberum arbitrium, ut diceret: castificat semetipsum. Quis nos castificat nisi Deus? Sed Deus te nolentem non castificat. Castificas te, non de te; sed de illo, qui venit, ut habitet in te. The active impulse of this ἀγνίζειν αὐτόν does not lie in the natural liberum arbitrium of man, but in the *hope*, which the salvation work of God presupposes in man. — This purification takes place after the pattern (καθὼς) of Christ (ἐκεῖνος, ver. 4), who is ἀγνός, *i.e.* “pure from every sinful stain.” The want of harmony which exists in the juxtaposition of the ἀγνίζειν αὐτόν of the Christian and the ἀγνὸν εἶναι of Christ, must not induce us to take καθὼς here otherwise than in ver. 7, ii. 6, iv. 17, namely = quandoquidem, so that this clause would add a *second* motive for the ἀγνίζειν αὐτόν, as Ebrard thinks; the sense rather is, that the purity of Christ is the pattern for Christians, which the Christian by self-purification strives to copy in his life also. — ἐστὶ: “the ἀγνότης is a quality inherent in Christ” (Lücke); the present is not put for the preterite, but signifies the unbroken permanent state; chap. ii. 29.

Ver. 4. The believer is so much the more bound to holiness, as all sin is ἀνομία. — πᾶς ὁ ποιῶν κ.τ.λ.] corresponding to the beginning of ver. 3, πᾶς ὁ ἔχων κ.τ.λ. The apostle is anxious to emphasize the truth of the thought as being without exception. ποιεῖν τὴν ἀμαρτίαν, as the antithesis of ποιεῖν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, chap. ii. 29, is contrasted with ἀγνίζειν αὐτόν, ver. 3; as the apostle “wants to contrast with the positive sentence ver. 3 its negative counterpart,” “he begins

with the antithesis of that idea which formed the predicate in ver. 3, and makes it the subject" (Ebrard). The definite article shows that the idea, according to its complete extent, is intended as definite, as forming the concrete antithesis to ἡ δικαιοσύνη;¹ both the interpretation of Socinus: "to remain in sin," and that of Baumgarten-Crusius: "to receive sin into oneself, to let it exist in oneself," are alike arbitrary; even the very common definition: "to sin knowingly and wilfully," is out of place here, as the subject here is not the *way in which* sin is done, but the actual doing of sin itself. According to Brückner,² by ποιεῖν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν "an actual moral tendency of life" is indicated; this explanation is apparently justified by vv. 6, 8, 9, but even in these passages the apostle's meaning goes beyond the restricted idea of "tendency of life," inasmuch as he certainly has sinning in view. — καὶ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ποιεῖ] "καί accentuates the idea that the very doing of ἁμαρτία is as such equally the doing of ἀνομία" (Düsterdieck); by ἀνομία we are to understand, according to the constant *usus loquendi*, never the mere non-possession of the law (differently ἄνομος, 1 Cor. ix. 21), but always the violation of the law, namely, of the divine law, of the divine order according to which man should regulate his life,—*lawlessness* (Lücke).³ The sense therefore is: he who practises sin (in whatever way it may be) thereby makes himself guilty of the violation of divine order, he acts contrary to the θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ, chap. ii. 17. According to Ebrard, τὴν ἀνομίαν ποιεῖν expresses the antithesis of ἔχειν τὴν ἐλπίδα ταύτην, ver. 3; but it is more correct to perceive in that sentence—instead of a conclusion—the introduction of a new element, by which the sharp contrast with τὴν δικαιοσύνην (ii. 29) is indicated. — The following words: καὶ ἡ ἁμαρτία ἐστὶν ἡ ἀνομία, are added,

¹ Braune, however, rightly observes that too strong an emphasis is not to be laid here, either upon the article or on ποιεῖν, for in ver. 9 it is put ἁμαρτίαν ποιεῖν, and then, as synonymous with it, simply ἁμαρτάνειν; nevertheless, it is to be noticed that "the fuller idea ποιεῖν τὴν ἁμ. at the beginning includes and determines the others, ποιεῖν ἁμ. and ἁμαρτάνειν" (Ebrard).

² Brückner rightly rejects the interpretation of de Wette: ἁμαρτία appears to be the broader idea, ἀνομία the narrower, more definite and stronger, including particular offences, vices, etc.

³ ἀνομία is distinguished from ἀδικία (i. 9, v. 17) in this way, that the former idea is contrasted with abstract right (δικαίω), the latter with the concrete form of right (νόμος) (Brückner).

partly to confirm the previous thought, partly to mark emphatically the identity of ἁμαρτία and ἀνομία which is expressed in it. The apostle does not want to give an exact definition of the idea ἁμαρτία (contrary to Sander), but to indicate its nature from the side "on which its absolute antagonism to any fellowship with God appears most unrestrictedly" (Brückner). The apostle could not more sharply express the antithesis between the character of the believer, who *is* a τέκνον Θεοῦ, and *will be* ὅμοιος Θεῷ, and the ἁμαρτία, than by showing ἁμαρτία to be ἀνομία, whereby he most distinctly opposes the moral indifferentism, against which the first section of the Epistle is also directed. Violence is done to the thought, both by limiting the idea ἁμαρτία to a *particular* kind of sin (a Lapide: loquitur proprie de peccato perfecto, puta mortifero), and by making ἀνομία the subject and ἁμαρτία the predicate;¹ so also by mixing up references which are foreign to the context.² The καί by which the two sentences are connected with one another, Bengel translates and explains by: *inmo* (so also Brückner by "nay"), with the remark: *non solum conjuncta est notio peccati et iniquitatis, sed eadem*; this is incorrect, for even the first sentence expresses, not a mere connection, but identity. The apostle could have written instead of καί the confirmatory particle ὅτι, or the like, but by means of καί the thought of the second clause obtains a more independent position (so also Braune).

Ver. 5 contains a new proof of the incompatibility of the Christian life with sin; this exists in Christ, to whose example the apostle has already pointed in ver. 3. Of Christ John states two things, while he appeals to the consciousness of his readers (οἶδατε; the same is the case with the reading of κ: οἶδαμεν)—(1) that His manifestation (ἐφανερώθη, an expres-

¹ Köstlin (p. 246) appeals in behalf of this construction to John i. 1: καὶ Θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος, assuming that καὶ ἁμαρτία κ.τ.λ. is to be read; see, however, the critical notes. Against this construction there is, besides, the fact that ἁμαρτία would have to be taken in a different sense here from that in which it is previously used, namely, as Köstlin says: "The first time ἁμαρτία means sinful action, the second time guilt in the sight of God."

² This is the case, for example, in Hilgenfeld's explanation: "Not every one who deviates from the ceremonial laws, but only the sinner, falls under the category of ἀνομία;" not less in the remark of Calvin: "the sum of the thought is that the life of those who give themselves to sin is *hateful to God, and cannot be tolerated by God.*"

sion which refers to the previously unrevealed existence of Christ in heaven) had this purpose: *ἵνα τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἄρῃ*; and (2) that He is without sin. — *τὰς ἁμαρτίας αἶρειν* may, of course, mean in itself “to bear our sins,” i.e. as the atoning sacrifice, in order thereby to procure their forgiveness, but here it means “to take away, to remove our sins;” for even although the Hebrew expression *נָשָׂא וְנָשָׂא* signifies both, yet the LXX. translates this in the second sense only by *αἶρειν*, but in the first sense by *φέρειν* (comp. Meyer on John i. 29, and my comm. on 1 Pet. ii. 24); moreover, *αἶρειν* with John constantly means “to take away;” comp. xi. 48, xv. 2, xvii. 15, xix. 31, 38; and the context is also decisive in favour of this meaning, for even though in the thought that Christ bore our sins, inasmuch as He suffered for them, there lies a mighty impulse to avoid sins, yet the antagonism of the Christian life to sin appears more directly and more strongly if the *taking away of sins* is described as the purpose of the manifestation of Christ. Köstlin (p. 180) rightly says: “the expression signifies to take away the sins themselves, but not their guilt or their punishment, for it is added: *καὶ ἡμ. ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν*, and in ver. 8: *ἔργα τοῦ διαβόλου*.” This interpretation in Calvin, Luther, Russmeyer, Paulus, Baumgarten-Crusius, Neander, Frommann (p. 449), Düsterdieck, Myrberg, Ebrard, Braune, etc., contrary to which Lücke, de Wette, Erdmann, etc., explain *αἶρειν* = “to bear;” Lücke: “the object of the manifestation of Christ is the bearing of sins as a holy offering in His death;” while others, as Bede (“tollit et dimittendo quae facta sunt et adjuvando ne fiant et perducendo ad vitam, ubi fieri omnino non possint”), Socinus, a Lapide, Spener, Sander, Besser (also Lücke in his 1st ed.¹), combine both meanings. Weiss, it is true, interprets *αἶρειν* correctly, but thinks that the plural *ἁμαρτίας* “can only signify actually existing sins” which Christ takes away, “inasmuch as His blood cleanses us from their guilt;” but in the whole context the subject is not the *guilt* of sins, but the sins themselves. The plural, however, by no means renders that interpretation compulsory. —

¹ “*Ἀῖριν τ. ἡμ. ἡμῶν* corresponds to the *καθαρίζειν ἀπὸ πάσης ἡμ.*, i. 7, and signifies the whole extent of the redemptive activity of Christ, His office of taking away sin, both in the ideal sense by the act of forgiving sin, and also in the real sense by the act of sanctifying the saved.”

The pronoun *ἡμῶν* after *τὰς ἁμαρτίας* (see the critical notes) is regarded by Lücke and de Wette as genuine; Lücke: "because John would otherwise have written *τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*;" de Wette: "because its omission appears to be occasioned by the interpretation of *αἶρειν* = *to remove*;" Düsterdieck remarks against *ἡμῶν*, that in the whole section vv. 4–10 there is no direct application expressed; from internal grounds it cannot be decided, inasmuch as *τὰς ἁμαρτ. ἡμῶν* can be taken quite as generally as the simple *τὰς ἁμαρτίας*. In regard to the plural *τὰς ἁμαρτίας*, Düsterdieck rightly says that "thereby the form of representation is made so much the more vivid, as the whole mass of all individual sins is taken into view." It is to be observed that John does not regard Christ, according to the Pelagian mode of thought, only as the *motive* for the free self-determination of man, but as the active living cause of sanctification determining the will of man. It is His crucifixion especially from which proceeds, not only the forgiveness of sins, but also (in and with this) the new life, in which the believer purifies himself (*ἀγνίζει*), even as He is pure (*ἁγνός*). — The second thing which John states of Christ is: *καὶ ἁμαρτία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστι*. The meaning of these words is not that in those who are in Christ there is no sin (Calvin, Paulus), but that Christ Himself is without sin; comp. ver. 3, ii. 29. This clause is not meant to confirm the preceding one (a Lapidé: *ideo Christus potens fuit tollere peccatum, quia carebat omni peccato, imo potestate peccandi*; so also Oecumenius, Lorinus, Baugarten-Crusius, Sander, Neander); but it is co-ordinate with it (Lücke, de Wette-Brückner, Düsterdieck, Braune), in order to serve as a basis for the following statement. — The present *ἐστί* is not used instead of the preterite (Grotius), nor is it to be explained in this way, with Winer (p. 239, VII. 251), that "the sinlessness of Jesus is considered as still present *in faith*;" but it rather denotes, as in ver. 3, the character of Christ in its eternal existence.

Ver. 6. *πᾶς ὁ ἐν αὐτῷ (i.e. Χριστῷ) μένων*] refers back to the exhortation in ii. 27; *μένειν*, not merely = *in esse*, expresses close fellowship. — *οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει*] John hereby states the abiding in Christ and sinning as irreconcilable opposites; still it is not his meaning that the believing Christian does not sin any more at all, or that he who still sins is not in

Christ, for in i. 8–10, ii. 1, 2, iii. 3, he clearly enough expresses that sin still clings to the Christian, and that he therefore needs constantly both the forgiving and saving grace of God and the intercession of Christ, as well as self-purification. The solution of the apparent contradiction must not be sought by giving the word ἁμαρτάνειν here a meaning different from what it has elsewhere (*e.g.* = *persistere in peccato*; or with Capellus = *sceleratum esse*, or = *to commit peccata mortalia*); nor even by appealing to the apostle's *ideal* mode of conception (de Wette, Düsterdieck; substantially also Weiss and Brückner¹), for “John has here to do with *real* cases, and wants to indicate to us the marks by which it may be known whether a man loves the Lord or not, whether he is a child of God or of the wicked one” (Sander), as is clear from φανερά ἐστὶ, ver. 10; but only in the fact that the Christian, who is a τέκνον Θεοῦ, bears the contradiction in himself that he, on the one hand, it is true, still actually sins, but, on the other hand, is also actually free from sin—so free from it that he *cannot* sin (ver. 9); he has actually broken with sin, so that in his most inner nature he is in the most decided opposition to it; yet at the same time he finds it in himself, and indeed in such a way that he still actually sins (chap. i. 10), but inasmuch as he confesses it, and experiences the forgiving and saving love of the faithful God towards him (chap. i. 9), and with all earnestness practises the ἀγνίζειν ἑαυτὸν, it ever loses more and more its power over him, and thus it results that it is no longer sin, but opposition to it (as something foreign to his nature), that determines his conduct of life; and hence the apostle may with perfect justice say, that he who abides in Christ does not sin (so also Braune²), which is quite the same as when Paul says: εἴ τις ἐν Χριστῷ, καὶνὴ κτίσις· τὰ ἀρχαῖα

¹ When Weiss (and Brückner agreeing with him) says “that John here represents the Christian life as according to its nature it is and *ought to be*,” the expression of the apostle is explained by him also from its idealism.

² Besser appropriately says: “Every one who abides in Christ, to whom He once belongs, does not sin, but says ‘No’ to sin, which belongs to the old man, and resists its alien power. A Christian does not *do* sin, but he *suffers* it. His will, his Christian Ego, is not at one with sin. *Hatred of sin* is the common mark of the children of God; *love of sin* the common property of the children of the devil.” Augustine’s explanation: “in quantum in Christo manet, in tantum non peccat,” is unsatisfactory, because it would thereby appear as if the inner

παρήλθεν, ἰδού, γέγονε καινὰ τὰ πάντα (2 Cor. v. 17). — The antithesis expressed in the first clause is even more sharply brought out in the second, inasmuch as John does not say : πᾶς ὁ ἁμαρτάνων . . . οὐ μένει ἐν αὐτῷ, but : οὐχ ἑώρακεν αὐτόν, οὐδὲ ἔγνωκεν αὐτόν. — πᾶς ὁ ἁμαρτάνων is every one who leads a life in ἁμαρτία, and therefore has not come out of the κόσμος into the number of God's children ;¹ such an one, says John, hath not seen, neither known αὐτόν, i.e. Christ. Lücke takes the perfects ἑώρακεν and ἔγνωκεν in present signification, the former in the meaning of "the present possession of the experience," the latter in the meaning of "the present possession of previously obtained knowledge;" but this is not rendered necessary by the context, and hence the perfects are to be retained as such, although it must be admitted that John is considering the result as one that continues into the present. The meaning of the two verbs in their relation to one another is very differently explained; according to some commentators, ἑώρακεν signifies something inferior (Semler, Baumgarten-Crusius, Lücke in his 1st ed.), according to others, something superior (Socinus, Neander, Frommann, p. 223), to ἔγνωκεν; with the former view οὐδέ is taken as = "and still less," with the latter as = "and not as much as;" both are incorrect, for a difference of degree is in no way suggested; yet the two expressions are not to be regarded as synonymous, so that ἔγνωκε would only be added to bring out the *spiritual meaning* of ἑώρακεν (Düsterdieck), for although οὐδέ can neither be necessarily "disjunctive" (Lücke, 1st ed.) nor "conjunctive" (Lücke, 2d ed.), yet the form of the clauses shows, inasmuch as the object is put along with each verb, that οὐδέ here has a stronger emphasis, and that John wanted to express by the two verbs two distinct ideas. In order to determine these, the original signification

life of the Christian was something divided in itself; but it is more correct when he says: "Etsi infirmitate labitur, peccato tamen non consentit, quia potius gemendo luctatur."

¹ Ebrard says this explanation is opposed to the context, because "even from ver. 4 the subject is such as are Christians, but are lacking in holiness, and it is only in ver. 6 that it is stated how far such Christians cannot be regarded as truly regenerate;" but (1) do not the *unregenerate* Christians still belong to the κόσμος? and (2) does not that explanation refer precisely to the close of the 6th verse?

of the words must be retained ; *ὁρᾶν* signifies neither "the mere historical knowledge of Christ" (Lücke), nor the perseverantia communionis cum Christo (Erdmann), and *γινώσκειν* signifies neither "the experience of the heart," nor even "love," but even here *ὁρᾶν* means *to see*, and *γινώσκειν* *to know* ; but the seeing of Christ takes place when the immediate consciousness of the glory of Christ has dawned upon us, so that the eye of our soul beholds Him as He is in the totality of His nature ; the knowing of Him when by means of inquiring consideration the right understanding of Him has come to us, so that we are clearly conscious not only of His nature, but also of His relation to us.¹

Ver. 7. While the apostle would reduce the specified antithesis to the last cause, and thereby bring it out in all its sharpness, he begins the new train of thought, connected, however, with the preceding, after the impressive address *τεκνία* (or *παιδιά*), with the warning directed against moral indifferentism : *μηδεὶς πλανᾷτω ὑμᾶς*, which, as Düsterdieck rightly observes, is not necessarily founded on a polemic against false teachers (Antinomians, for instance) ; comp. chap. i. 8. — *ὁ ποιῶν τὴν δικαιοσύνην, δίκαιός ἐστι καθὼς κ.τ.λ.*] with *ποιεῖν τὴν δικ.*, comp. chap. ii. 29. From the connection with the foregoing we would expect as predicate either : *έώρακεν αὐτὸν κ.τ.λ.* (ver. 6), or *ἐν αὐτῷ μένει* (ver. 5) ; but it is peculiar to John to introduce new thoughts and references in

¹ With this interpretation that of Sander, who interprets *έώρακεν* of "spiritual intuition or beholding," and *έγνωκεν* of the "knowledge obtained more by reflection along the lines of dialectic and inquiry," as well as that of Myrberg, according to which the former signifies the "immediata perceptio Christi spirituali modo homini se manifestantis," the latter the "perdurans cognitio atque intelligentia," are in substantial agreement. Braune, it is true, assents to this view, but he erroneously thus defines the thought of the apostle : "Every one who sins, and inasmuch as he sins, is one in whom the seeing and knowing of Christ is a thing of the past, but does not continue and operate into the present," for John plainly says of him who sins that he *has* not seen or known Christ. When Erdmann defines *έγνωκεν* as the cognitio Christi, quae et intuitu et intellectu non solum personae Christi verum etiam totius ejus operis indolem complectitur, this is in so far unsuitable, as the intuitu belongs precisely to the *έώρακεν*. Very unsatisfactory is Elberd's explanation, that *ὁρᾶν* is "the seeing of Christ as the light, *γινώσκειν* the loving knowledge." The difference between *ὁρᾶν* and *γινώσκειν* appears also in this, that in the former the operating activity is represented rather on the side of the object, which presents itself to the eye of the soul ; in the latter, rather on the side of the subject, which this verb makes the subject of consideration.

antithetical sentences. By the subordinate clause *καθὼς ἐκεῖνος* (*i.e.* *Χριστός*) *δίκαιός ἐστι* he puts the idea *δίκαιος* in direct reference to Christ, so that the thought of this verse includes in it this, that only he who practises *δικαιοσύνη* has known Christ and abides in Him; for he only can be exactly *καθὼς Χριστός* (*i.e.* in a way corresponding to the pattern of Christ) who stands in a real fellowship of life with Him. It is incorrect, both to interpret, with Baumgarten-Crusius: "he who is righteous follows the example of Christ," and also to take *δίκαιος* = "justified," and to define the meaning of the verse thus: "only he who has been justified by Christ does righteousness."¹—There is this difference between the two ideas: *ποιεῖν τὴν δικ.* and *δίκαιον εἶναι*, that the first signifies the action, the second the state. The reality of the latter is proved in the former. He who does not *do* righteousness shows thereby that he *is* not righteous.²

Ver. 8. *ὁ ποιῶν τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*] forms the diametrical opposite of *ὁ ποιῶν τὴν δικαιοσύνην*, inasmuch as it signifies the man whose life is a service of sin, "who lives in sin as his element" (Sander). While the former belongs to Christ, and is a *τέκνον Θεοῦ*, the latter is *ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου*; *ἐκ* does not signify here either merely connection (de Wette), or similarity (Paulus), or imitation (Semler), but, as the expression *τέκνον τοῦ διαβόλου* (ver. 10) shows, origin (so also Ebrard): the life that animates the sinner emanates from the devil; "not as if the devil created him, but that he introduced the evil into him" (Russmeyer). The apostle confirms the truth of this statement by the following words: *ὅτι ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ὁ διάβολος ἁμαρτάνει*. The words *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* are put first, because the chief emphasis rests on them, inasmuch as those who commit sin are *ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου*, not because he sins, but because it is he who sinneth *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*. From this expression it must not, with Frommann and Hilgenfeld, be

¹ As there is no reference here at all to justification, there is no ground whatever for the assertion of a Lapidé, that the thought of this verse forms a contradiction to the Protestant doctrine of justification by faith. — The interpretation of Lorinus, that *ὁ ποιῶν τὴν δικ.* is = *qui habet in se justitiam i. e. opus gratiae, videlicet virtutem infusam*, is also plainly erroneous.

² Braune rightly proves, against Roman Catholics and Rationalists, that "the predicate is not first attained after what is expressed in the subjective clause has taken place," and that rather "the predicate is immanent in the subject."

inferred that John was considering the devil as an originally evil being,—in dualistic fashion (comp. Köstlin, p. 127, and Weiss, p. 132 ff.),—for John is not here speaking of the *being*, but of the *action* of the devil. In order not to accuse John of the Manichaean dualism, the attempt has been made to define ἀπ' ἀρχῆς more particularly, either by referring it to the creation of the world (Calvin, S. G. Lange; also Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* 2d ed. I. 429: “since the beginning of the world,” or: “from the beginning of history, in the course of which the sin of men has begun”), or to res humanae (Semler), or to the time of the devil's fall (Bengel: ex quo diabolus est diabolus); but all these supplements are purely arbitrary. Many modern commentators take the expression in reference to the sin of man, and find this idea expressed in it, that “the devil is related to all the sins of men as the first and seductive originator” (Nitzsch, *Syst. der christlichen Lehre*, 6th ed. p. 244 f.); thus Lücke, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Weiss, Braune, and previously in this commentary; but this thought, while it no doubt lies in the preceding ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου and in the following τέκνον τοῦ διαβόλου, and hence in the thesis to be established, does not lie in this confirmatory clause, apart from the fact that in ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἁμαρτάνει no reference is indicated to the sin of man. It is otherwise in John viii. 44, where the more particular definition of the relation of the devil to men is supplied with ἀπ' ἀρχῆς from the context (“since he has put himself in connection with men”); here, on the contrary, John does not say: “what the devil is to men, but what is his relationship to God” (Hofmann as above); but as he describes his relationship by ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἁμαρτάνει, as a sinning which has continued from the beginning, this can only mean that the devil's first action was sin, and that he has remained and remains in that action. Likewise in the interpretation which Brückner gives of ἀπ' ἀρχῆς: “i.e. so long as there is sin,” ἀπ' ἀρχῆς does not receive its full force.¹—The present ἁμαρτάνει describes the sinning of

¹ The idea that the devil, before he sinned, was for a time without sin, is nowhere expressed in Scripture; neither in John viii. 44 nor in the deutero-canonical passages Jude 6 and 2 Pet. ii. 4 (see my comm. on these passages).—The view of Frommann, that John's statements do not justify the representation of a personal existence of the devil, that “he is nothing further than the

the devil as uninterruptedly continuous. — εἰς τοῦτο ἐφανερώθη κ.τ.λ.] As vv. 6, 7 refer to the second part of ver. 5, these words refer to the first part of that verse; they not only express the antithesis between Christ and the devil, but they bring out the fact that the appearance of Christ has for its object the destruction of the ἔργα τοῦ διαβόλου, i.e. of the ἁμαρτίαι which are wrought by him (not "the reward of sin," Calov, Spener; nor "the agency that seduces to sin," de Wette). λύειν is used here as in John ii. 19 (similarly 2 Pet. iii. 10-12), in the meaning of "to destroy;" less naturally some commentators (a Lapide, Lorinus, Spener, Besser, etc.) maintain the meaning "to undo," sins being regarded as the snares of the devil.

Ver. 9. Antithesis of the preceding verse; yet what was there the subject is here—in its opposite—the predicate, and what was there the predicate is here the subject. — πᾶς ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ] Antithesis to him who is ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου (ver. 8); "by πᾶς the general signification of the clause is indicated" (Braune); ἁμαρτίαν οὐ ποιεῖ] is used in the same sense as οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει, ver. 6. To be born of God and to commit sin are mutually exclusive contraries; for ὁ Θεὸς φῶς ἐστι, καὶ σκοτία ἐν αὐτῷ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία, chap. i. 5; comp. also chap. ii. 29; the child is of the same nature with him of whom he is born. For confirmation of the thought, John adds: ὅτι σπέρμα αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ μένει. Both the deeper context and the expression itself are opposed to the interpretation of these words, according to which σπέρμα is explained = τέκνον, and ἐν αὐτῷ = ἐν Θεῷ (Bengel, Lange, Sander, Steinhofer); for if the apostle meant to say that "a child of God remains in God," he would certainly not have exchanged the word τέκνον, which so naturally would suggest itself just here, for another word, unusual in *this* sense. By σπέρμα Θεοῦ is rather to be understood the divine element of which the *new* man is produced¹ (comp. Gospel of John i. 13), and which, as the essence of his being, keeps him from

world-spirit that tempts man, considered in concrete personality," is to be rejected as arbitrary.

¹ Frommann (p. 170) incorrectly interprets σπέρμα of the divine light originally dwelling in man, by which he is distinguished from the rest of creation; for the subject here is not men as such, but the τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ.

sin. According to many commentators (Clemens Al., Augustin, Bede, Luther I.,¹ Spener, Grotius, Besser, Weiss, Ewald, etc.), this is *the word of God*, in favour of which appeal is made not only to the parable of the sower (Matt. xiii.), but also to 1 Pet. i. 23 and Jas. i. 18. But that parable can here so much the less be adduced, as in it the reference is to the seed of plants; but here, as the allusion to the idea *γεννημένος* shows, "the comparison is made to the seed of human birth, as in John i. 13" (Neander); and in the two other passages the word is not represented so much as the seed, but as the means of producing the new life.² It is scarcely to be doubted that the apostle was here thinking of the Holy Spirit; the only question is whether he means the Spirit Himself, the *πνεῦμα ἅγιον* in His divine personality (so Beza: sic vocatur Spiritus sanctus, quod ejus virtute tanquam ex semine quodam novi homines efficiamur; Düsterdieck, and Myrberg; also, perhaps, Lücke and de Wette), or the Spirit infused by Him into the heart of man, the germ of life communicated to his nature (Hornejus: nativitatis novae indoles; Semler: nova quaedam et sanctior natura; so also Ebrard, Braune, and others). The figurative expression is more in favour of the second view than of the first, only this germ of life must not, on the one hand, be regarded as something separate from the Holy Spirit Himself,³ nor, on the other hand, as *love* (a Lapidé, Lorinus), for this is the life which has proceeded from the *σπέρμα*, but not the *σπέρμα* itself. — The thought that he who is born of God does not commit sin is still further emphasized by the words *καὶ οὐ δύναται ἁμαρτάνειν*, whereby, of course, not the physical, but no doubt the moral impossibility of sinning is described; both ideas, *ἁμαρτάνειν* as well as *οὐ δύναται*, are to be retained in their proper meaning, and not to be arbi-

¹ In his 2d edition Luther says: "He calls the cause of our change a seed, not a full ear of corn, but what is cast into the ground, and must first die there; from thence there now results true repentance, so that it is accordingly said: he cannot sin."

² Weiss appeals to chap. ii. 14; but from the fact that John there says: *ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν ὑμῖν μένει*, it does not follow that *σπέρμα* is here = *ὁ λόγος τ. Θε.*; so much the less as there is no reference there to being born of God. It is more appropriate in connection with *σπέρμα* to refer to chap. ii. 27.

³ Brückner inversely first interprets *σπέρμα* as the *πνεῦμα τ. Θε.*, but then adds: "and, indeed, in this way, that the principle of life which operates on man is at the same time regarded as the germ of life planted in man."

trarily perverted; *ἀμαρτάνειν* must here, just as little as in ver. 6, be restricted to mortal sins (a Lapidé, Gagnejus), or to "sinning in the way in which they who are of the devil sin" (Besser), or "to sinning knowingly and wilfully" (Ebrard), or even merely to the violatio charitatis (Augustin, Bede); but just as little is the pointedness and definiteness of *οὐ δύναται* to be weakened and to be explained = aegre, difficulter potest, or similarly,¹ for the apostle here wants to bring out the *absolute* antagonism which exists in general between being born of God and committing sin (so also Braune); comp. on ver. 6. With regard to the question as to the relationship of the thought expressed here to Heb. vi. 4 ff., comp. the remark on chap. ii. 19. — As in the case of the first thought of this verse, so here to this second one a confirmatory clause is added, namely: *ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγέννηται*; it is true, the idea of the subject seems to be here repeated (similarly John iii. 31: *ὁ ὢν ἐκ τῆς γῆς, ἐκ τῆς γῆς ἐστι*), but here *ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ* is put first, whereas in the subject it follows *γεγεννημένος*, by which that idea is strongly accentuated; Bengel: *priora verba: ex Deo, majorem habent in pronunciando accentum, quod ubi observatur, patet, non idem per idem probari, collato initio verso.* The sense therefore is: Because he is born of *God* (comp. chap. i. 5), he who is born of God, *i.e.* the believer, cannot sin.

Ver. 10a concludes the development of the thought with the sharp antithesis of the children of God and the children of the devil. — *ἐν τούτῳ* is by most commentators justly referred to the preceding, inasmuch as in ver. 9 the characteristic sign of the *τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ*, and in ver. 8 that of the *τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου*, are stated. Some commentators, however (a Lapidé, Grotius, S. Schmidt, Spener, Episcopius, Ebrard, etc.), refer it to what follows; but as in this only the one part of the antithesis is resumed, this reference is found to necessitate an arbitrary supplement; the explanation of a Lapidé is clearly quite erroneous: *hae sunt duae tesserac et quasi duo symbola filiorum et militum Dei, sc. justitia et caritas.* — *φανερὰ ἐστι*] The *εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, and equally the *εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου*, are in their principle internal, and therefore concealed: it is by

¹ Grotius explains: *res de qua agitur aliena est ab ejusmodi ingenio*; Paulus: "not absolutely impossible, but: his whole spirituality and *habit* (!) are opposed to it."

the different *ποιεῖν* that the different nature is disclosed; comp. Matt. vii. 16. — The expression: *τὰ τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου*, nowhere else in the N. T. except in Acts xiii. 10: *υἱὸς διαβόλου*, is easily explained from ver. 8; comp. also John viii. 44. Sander supposes a distinction between these and the children of wrath, Eph. ii. 3; while the latter name signifies all who are not born again, the latter only signifies those among them “who despise the grace offered to them in Christ, and wantonly set themselves against it.” This is, however, incorrect; as the *whole* conduct of men falls under the contrast of *ἁμαρτάνειν* and *οὐχ ἁμαρτάνειν*, so the distinction of *τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ* and *τέκνα τοῦ διαβόλου*, that is based on it, equally embraces the whole of humanity (see also Braune). Socinus accordingly with justice says: Ex Apostoli verbis satis aperte colligi potest, quod inter filios Dei et filios Diaboli nulli sint homines medii.

Vv. 10b–22. This section treats of *brotherly love* as the substance of *δικαιοσύνη*, and is therefore most closely connected with the foregoing; it is the commandment of Christ (ver. 11), instead of which hatred reigns in the world (vv. 12, 13); with love, life is connected; with hatred, death (vv. 14, 15); in Christ we possess the ideal and example of love (ver. 16). True love consists not in word, but in deed (vv. 17, 18); it produces firm confidence towards God, and obtains an answer to prayer (vv. 19–22).

Ver. 10b. Transition to the section on brotherly love. — *πᾶς ὁ μὴ ποιῶν δικαιοσύνην*] refers to ver. 7, and further to chap. ii. 29; the meaning of *ποιεῖν δικαιοσύνην* is here the same as there; only that the idea *δικαιοσύνη* is indicated by the article as definite and restricted; comp. ver. 8: *τὴν ἁμαρτίαν*; ver. 9: *ἁμαρτίαν*. — *οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ*] = *οὐκ ἔστιν τέκνον τοῦ Θεοῦ*. — *καὶ ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ*] Calvin correctly says: hoc membrum vice expositionis additum est. The *ἀγάπη* is not a part of the *δικαιοσύνη* (Bengel, Spener, Lange, Neander, Gerlach), still less something different from the *δικαιοσύνη*, which must be connected with it (Rickli), or even forms an antithesis to it (Socinus¹);

¹ While Socinus understands by *δικαιοσύνην ποιεῖν* *juste vivere ex praeSCRIPTIONE Moisaicae legis et ipsius humanae rationis*, he explains *ἀγάπη* as the transcendent Christian virtue of sacrifice for the brethren.

but it is the *essence and nature of the δικαιοσύνη* (so also Braune¹), or rather the *δικαιοσύνη* itself in reference to the brethren; comp. Rom. xiii. 8-10; Gal. v. 14; Col. iii. 14; 1 Tim. i. 5; John xiv. 15. Besser: "brotherly love is the essence of all righteous life;" it is related to *δικαιοσύνη* just as to the *περιπατεῖν καθὼς ἐκεῖνος περιεπάτησε*, chap. ii. 6. Ebrard erroneously tries to prove from the *αὐτοῦ* which is added that *ἀδελφός* = *ὁ πλησίον*, Luke x. 36, and is therefore used differently from ii. 9, 10, 11, iv. 20, 21, for that John in this relative sentence passes on to the love of Christians towards one another is quite clear from ver. 11; the *αὐτοῦ* only shows that, though in the foregoing the antithesis between the regenerate and the unregenerate is quite generally stated, this is for the special consideration of *Christians*. It is incomprehensible that the view, according to which John in this section speaks of Christian brotherly love (*i.e.* the love of Christians towards one another), is in antagonism with Matt. v. 44; 1 Cor. iv. 12 (according to Ebrard). The co-ordinating *καί* is exegetical = "*namely*," it is unnecessary to supply *οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ τ. Θ.*

Ver. 11. *ὅτι* confirms the thought expressed in the foregoing, that he who does not love his brother is not of God. — *αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγγελία*] *αὕτη* refers to the following *ἵνα*, with a retrospective allusion to *ἀγαπῶν τ. ἀδ. αὐτοῦ*. The word *ἀγγελία* = "*message*," is here to be taken in the meaning of "*commission*," "*commandment*." With the reading *ἐπαγγελία*, comp. i. 5. By the words *ἦν . . . ἀπ' ἀρχῆς*, which do not refer to the Old Testament period (Grotius: *etiam sub lege*), or to "the beginning of history" (Ebrard), the commandment of brotherly love is characterized as the *ἀγγελία* which is necessarily connected with the preaching of the gospel; comp. chap. ii. 7. — *ἵνα κ.τ.λ.*] states, not the *purpose* for which the *ἀγγελία* is given, but the import of it, as frequently with words of wishing, commanding, etc.; comp. Buttm. p. 203 ff.² The *ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους* shows that the apostle is in this

¹ Ebrard and Myrberg object to this, that it may be true of love to God only, but not of love to the brethren; but Christian brotherly love is, according to John, certainly identical with love to God, for the Christian loves his brother as one who is born of God.

² Braune would have the idea of purpose retained; but in his interpretation: "it is not merely the substance of a commandment that is treated of, but a

section treating of the love of Christians towards one another; it is self-evident that the Christian has to fulfil the general commandment of love even to those who are not Christians. Yet John does not here enter on that, as it would be inappropriate, for he has here to do with the ethical antithesis between Christians as children of God and those who are opposed to them as children of the devil; it is only on the ground of this antithesis that it can be said: *μὴ ἀγαπᾶτε τὸν κόσμον*, ii. 15.

Ver. 12. The converse of Christian brotherly love is the hatred of the world, which has its example in Cain. — *οὕτως Κάϊν κ.τ.λ.*] Contrary to the opinion of Grotius, with which Lücke agrees, that before *καθώς* we must supply "*οὐκ ὄμνεν ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ*" dependent on *ἴνα*, de Wette has shown the clumsiness of speech that would result with this construction; it is unjustifiable, however, on the side of the thought also, for it is impossible that John would say that to Christians the commandment has been given from the beginning, not to be *ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ*. Most commentators supply after *οὕ* the thought "we should be disposed," and after *Κάϊν* the relative *ὅς*. Thus there certainly results a good sense; but if the apostle had thought *thus*, he would also have expressed himself *thus*; at least he would not have left out the *ὅς*. De Wette rightly finds here "an inexact comparison of contrast, as John vi. 58, only still more difficult to supply, and just on that account not to be supplied," *i.e.* by a definitely formulated sentence (so also Braune). Christians are (and therefore should also show themselves as) the opposite of Cain; they are *ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, Cain was *ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ*; *τοῦ πονηροῦ* is not neuter, but masculine; *ὁ πονηρός* = *ὁ διάβολος*; comp. especially Matt. xiii. 38.¹ — *καὶ ἔσφαξεν τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ*]

commandment which is contained as a *task* in the *gift* of the *message*," he quite overlooks the fact that if *ἴνα* = in order that (and only thus is the original idea of purpose retained), it cannot refer to *αὐτῇ*.

¹ The strange Rabbinical view of the devilish nature of Cain in Zohar on Gen. iv. 1: Rabbi Eleazar dixit: Cum projecisset serpens ille immunditiam suam in Evam eaque illam suscepisset, remque cum Adam habuisset, peperit duos filios, unum ex latere illo immundo et unum ex latere Adami; fuitque Cain similis imagine superiorum h. e. Angelorum et Abel imagine inferiorum h. e. hominum, ac propterea diverse fuerunt viae istius ab illius viis. Equidem Cain fuit filius spiritus immundi, qui est serpens malus; Abel vero fuit filius Adami; et propterea quod Cain venit de parte Angeli mortis, ideo interfecit fratrem suum.

This murder of his brother is the evidence that Cain was ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ. The verb σφάζειν (besides here, only in the Apocalypse), strictly used of slaughter, indicates the *violence* of the action;¹ the *diabolical* character of it is brought out by the following: καὶ χάριν τίνος κ.τ.λ.; the form of the sentence in question and answer serves to bring out emphatically the thought contained in it, that the hatred of Cain towards his brother was founded in his hatred towards the good, *i.e.* that which is of God, for it is just in this that the hatred of the world towards believing Christians is also founded.² The correspondence between ἐκ τοῦ πονηροῦ and τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ πονηρά, which J. Lange and Düsterdieck have already noticed, is to be observed.

Ver. 13. If Cain is the type of the world, it is not to be wondered at that the children of God are hated by it; accordingly the apostle says: μὴ θαυμάζετε κ.τ.λ.; comp. ver. 1; not exactly to *comfort* his readers about it, but rather to bring out the antithesis clearly; Neander: "it must not surprise Christians if they are hated by the world; this is to them the stamp of the divine life, in the possession of which they form the contrast to the world."—The particle εἰ expresses here neither a doubt nor even merely possibility; for that the world hates the children of God is not merely possible, but in the nature of the case *necessary*; it is only the form of the sentence, and not the thought of it, that is hypothetical;³ comp. John xv. 18, also Mark xv. 44.

¹ From the fact that σφάζειν is used in the Revelation of "slaying in a holy service, as the martyrs are slain, even though by the godless" (which is never quite appropriate, comp. Rev. vi. 4), it cannot be concluded that John here used the expression in order "to mark the death of Abel as a martyrdom by the hand of a godless man, or as a sacrifice which Cain offered to his god, the devil."

² That Cain slew his brother because his own works were evil and his brother's righteous, does not seem to correspond to the Mosaic narrative, for τὰ ἔργα are not the offering, but the works in general (Spencer: "the whole manner of life"); but there is no real contradiction, for the narrative in Genesis does not exclude the idea that the piety of Abel had already excited in Cain hatred towards his brother, and that, when God despised his offering, but had respect unto his brother's, this hatred went so far that he became guilty of murder. Cain with this hatred, and Abel in his suffering on account of his δικαιοσύνη, serve the apostle as prototypes of the world and of the children of God. On the similar view in Philo and in the *Clementine Homilies*, see Lücke on this passage.

³ Ebrard explains εἰ incorrectly: "whenever the case occurs," for the hatred

Ver. 14. The contrast of love and hatred is at the same time one of life and death. — *ἡμεῖς οἶδαμεν*] *ἡμεῖς* forms the antithesis of *ὁ κόσμος*. Though the world hate us and persecute us *to death*, as Cain killed his brother, *we* know, etc. — *ὅτι μεταβεβήκαμεν ἐκ τοῦ θανάτου εἰς τὴν ζωὴν*] comp. Gospel of John v. 24; the perfect shows that the subject is a present and not merely a future state; moreover, the apostle does not say that the Christian has received the *title* to eternal life (Grotius: *juri ad rem saepe datur nomen rei ipsius*), but that the believer has already passed from death into life, and therefore no longer is in a state of death, but in life. By *ζωή* is to be understood not merely the knowledge of God (Weiss), but holy life in truth and righteousness; by *θάνατος*, not merely the want of the knowledge of God (Weiss), but unholy life in lying and sin. The natural man is fallen in lies and unrighteousness, and hence wretched *ἐν θανάτῳ*: by the salvation of Christ he enters from this state into the other, the essence of which is happiness in truth and righteousness.¹ That the Christian, as such, is in a state of *ζωή*, he knows from the fact that he loves the brethren; brotherly love is the sign of the *ζωή*; therefore the apostle continues: *ὅτι ἀγαπῶμεν τοὺς ἀδελφούς*. — *ὅτι* refers, as most commentators rightly interpret, to *οἶδαμεν* and not to *μεταβεβήκαμεν* (Baumgarten-Crusius, Köstlin); the relation between *ζωή* and *ἀγάπη* is, namely, not this, that the latter is the originating cause of the former (Lyra: *opera ex caritate facta sunt meritoria*), but both are one in their cause, and are only distinguished in this way, that *ζωή* is the *state*, *ἀγάπη* the *action* of the believer: out of the happy life, love grows, and love again produces happiness; therefore John says: *ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν* (*sc. τὸν ἀδελφόν*, see the critical notes) *μένει ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ*, by which the identity of not loving and of abiding in death is directly brought out.² — It is not

which is here spoken of is not a frequently occurring case, but a necessary relationship. Braune unintelligibly says: "by *ἡμεῖς* John signifies that his readers as a whole or as individuals have after all at present no hatred to endure."

¹ By this expression: *μεταβεβήκαμεν* κ.τ.λ., the apostle describes Christians as having been, previously to their believing, *ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ*, hence also not yet *τίκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ*; contrary to the assertion of Hilgenfeld, that the author of the Epistle shared the Gnostic view of the original metaphysical difference in men.

² Besser: "Where hatred is, there is death; where love is, there is life; nay,

without a purpose that the apostle contents himself here, where he has only to do with the simple antithesis to the preceding, with the negative idea: *μὴ ἀγαπᾶν*, with which the *ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ μένει* also corresponds; it is only in the following verse that the negation reaches the form of a positive antithesis. — *μένει* expresses here also the firm, sure being (so also Myrberg); it is therefore used neither merely in reference to the past, nor merely in reference to the future.

Ver. 15. *πᾶς ὁ μισῶν*] instead of the preceding: *μὴ ἀγαπῶν*; *not* loving and hating are one and the same thing:¹ for pure indifference is not possible to the *living* human soul. — *ἀνθρωποκτόνος ἐστὶ*] This word (except only in John viii. 44, used of the devil) does not signify the murderer of the *soul*, whether one's own or one's brother's, but the murderer in the strict sense. Every one who hates his brother is a murderer, not merely inasmuch as hatred sometimes leads to murder, but because by his nature he is inclined to the destruction of his brother, and if he does not attain this object is only hindered from it by other opposing forces. As in the moral life it is not the outward act in itself, but the intention, that is of consequence, every one who lives in hatred towards his brother must by the moral consciousness (or by God, Drusius, Hornejus) be regarded as a murderer; comp. Matt. v. 21 ff., 27, 28. — Hence it is clear that the real thought of the apostle is missed when *μισεῖν* is here limited to the odium perfectum (Hornejus). Baumgarten-Crusius erroneously denies that *ἀνθρωποκτόνος* refers to Cain, ver. 12; this reference is clearly patent. — *καὶ οἶδατε*] de Wette: "whence? from the Christian consciousness in general." — *ὅτι πᾶς ἀνθρωποκτόνος κ.τ.λ.*] He who takes his brother's life cannot and must not retain life himself, his life decays in death; that is the order appointed by God; comp. Gen. ix. 6. Accordingly he who *in his heart* murders his brother, cannot be in possession of the life which dwells

love itself is life." Weiss erroneously maintains that here, "instead of the strict converse in the form of a progressive parallelism, just that is mentioned which is the result of the non-transition from death to life, namely, the abiding in death," for John did not need to say actually that he who has not passed from death to life is in death.

¹ Wrongly Nicol. de Lyra: *odisse pejus quam non diligere*.

in the heart, *i.e.* of "eternal life." By ζωὴ αἰώνιος we are to understand the same thing as in ver. 14 was described by the simple word ζωή; and ἔχει is to be retained as the actual present; erroneously a *Lapide*: non habebit gloriam vitae. — The adjective μένουσαν Lücke, with whom Sander agrees, appealing to the parable of the unmerciful servant, explains by the fact that John is speaking to Christians who already had some part in eternal life. But the expression πᾶς ὁ μισῶν shows that John is here speaking quite generally, and, indeed, in order to confirm the preceding thought: ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν μένει ἐν τῷ θανάτῳ; it must therefore be the condition of those who form the κόσμος (to whom also the mere nominal Christians belong), of those accordingly who have no part in the ζωὴ αἰώνιος, that is stated. By μένουσαν is therefore not suggested the loss of a previously possessed good; just as little as in the corresponding passage, Gospel of John v. 38: τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔχετε ἐν ὑμῖν μένοντα, where also the meaning is not that those addressed have previously had the word of God, for this is distinctly denied in ver. 37. The μένουσαν is rather explained by the fact that he alone really has the ζωὴ αἰώνιος in whom it abides (comp. chap. ii. 19); μένειν expresses here also, according to John's *usus loquendi*, the idea of *being* in a strengthened degree, and may accordingly be used quite apart from any reference to the previous state; μένουσαν is to be connected with ἐν αὐτῷ; he has not the life abiding, *i.e.* surely and firmly existing, in him.¹

Vv. 16–18. Description of true love.

¹ It is incorrect to say, with Braune: "by μένουσαν the existence of eternal life from baptism, etc., is indicated," since in the context there is no reference whatever to baptism, instruction, etc., and the advantage resulting therefrom. Weiss artificially explains: "John supposes the case of a person having eternal life, and now goes so far as to say that even such an one may not have it permanently at least, but may be in the condition of losing it if by hating his brother he becomes a murderer;" such a case John would not and could not at all assume. Very strange is Ebrard's interpretation: "*supposing* that the murderer *had* at the time the ζωὴ αἰώνιος in him (which, however, according to ver. 9, is not possible in the full (!) sense), yet this *would* not remain in him, he would again fall away from the ζωή (which just for this reason could not be *genuine*)," as well as his assertion that ζῶν αἰών. is here used without the article, because John could not ascribe to him who is not a true child of God "the eternal life," but "eternal life," *i.e.* powers of the future world. Comp. against this, v. 13.

Ver. 16. Whilst he who belongs to the world hates his brother and is therefore an *ἀνθρωποκτόνος*, Christians, on the contrary, are by the example of Christ to lay down their life for their brethren. — *ἐν τούτῳ* refers to the following *ὅτι*. — *ἐγνώκαμεν τὴν ἀγάπην*] “*we have known the love, i.e. the character or the nature of the love*” (Bengel, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Lücke, Sander); some commentators (Carpzov, Paulus, etc.) erroneously supply with *τὴν ἀγάπην* as a more particular definition: *τοῦ Χριστοῦ*; others (Grotius, Spener, etc.): *τοῦ Θεοῦ*. In Christ’s self-devotion to death, love itself became concrete. Without adequate reason Ebrard supplies with *ἐν τούτῳ* an *οὖσαν*, so that *ἐν τούτῳ* forms the predicate of *τὴν ἀγάπην*; thus: “*we have known love as consisting in this*,” and *ἐγνώκαμεν* is only used as an accessory. — *ὅτι ἐκεῖνος*] *i.e.* Christ; comp. ver. 7, chap. ii. 6. “*He*, says the apostle, without mentioning him by name, for He is to every believer the well-known,” Rickli. — The phrase: *τὴν ψυχὴν τιθέναι*, besides here and frequently in the Gospel of John, never appears elsewhere either in the N. T. or in the classics. Meyer on John x. 11 explains it by the “*representation of the sacrificial death as a ransom paid: to lay down, to pay*”; according to the classical usage of *τιθέναι*, according to which it is used of *payment*,” Hengstenberg (on the same passage) explains it by Isa. liii. 10; but it is unsuitable to supply the idea “*ransom*” or “*an offering for sin*,” for the *τιθέναι τὴν ψυχὴν* is not merely ascribed to Christ, but is also made the duty of Christians; besides, in that case *ὑπέρ* could not be wanting, as is the case in the Gospel of John x. 17, 18. The derivation of it from the Hebrew *נָתַן נַפְשׁוֹ בְּקָרְבָּן* (Ebrard) is equally unsuitable, because “*here the נָתַן is essential*” (Meyer). According to John xiii. 4, *τίθημι* may in this phrase also be interpreted = *deponere* (so most commentators), which is so much the more appropriate as in John x. *ἵνα πάλιν λάβω αὐτήν* is conjoined with *τίθημι τὴν ψυχὴν μου*, just as in chap. xiii. 12 it runs: *καὶ ἔλαβεν τὰ ἱμάτια αὐτοῦ*; “*comp. animam ponere in Propert. II. 10, 43, and animam deponere in Corn. Nep. vita Hannib. I. 3*” (Brückner). Perhaps *τίθημι* might also be taken in the meaning of “*to give up*” (Il. xxiii. 704: *θεῖναι εἰς μέσσον, τιθέναι εἰς τὸ κοινόν*, in Pape see *τίθημι*). — *ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν* is: “*for our good*,” *i.e.* to save us

from destruction; for the idea, comp. chap. ii. 2.—*καὶ ἡμεῖς κ.τ.λ.*] comp. chap. ii. 6. By this the climax is stated (John xv. 13); but even every self-denying sacrifice for our brethren belongs to the *τιθέναι τὴν ψυχὴν*, to which we are bound by the example of Christ by virtue of our fellowship with Him. — The reading *θεῖναι* is just as conformable to the N. T. *usus loquendi* as the *Rcc. τιθέναι*, for *ὀφείλειν* is sometimes connected with the pres. inf., and sometimes with the aor. inf. For the idea, comp. Rom. xvi. 4.¹

Ver. 17. As the apostle wants to bring out that love must show itself by action, he turns his attention to the most direct evidence of it, namely, compassion towards the needy brother. “By the adversative connection (*δέ*) with ver. 16, John marks the progress from the greater, which is justly demanded, to the less, the non-performance of which seems, therefore, a grosser transgression of the rule just stated” (Düsterdieck). According to Ebrard, the *δέ* is meant to express the opposition to the delusion “that love can only show itself in great actions and sacrifices;” but there is no suggestion in the context of anything like this. — *τὸν βίον τοῦ κόσμου*: “the life of the world,” *i.e.* that which serves to support the earthly, worldly life; comp. Luke viii. 43, xv. 12, xxi. 4.² The expression forms here a significant contrast to *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* (ver. 15). — *θεωρεῖν*, stronger than *ὄραν*, strictly “to be a spectator,” hence = *to look at*; “it expresses the active beholding” (Ebrard, similarly Myrberg: *oculis immotis*). — With *χρεῖαν ἔχειν*, comp. Mark ii. 25; Eph. iv. 28. — The expression: *κλείειν τὰ σπλάγχνα*, is only found here; *τὰ σπλάγχνα* as a translation of *רַחֲמֵי*

¹ The thought of this verse is, according to Ebrard, the surest proof that John in this section is not treating of the “general and vague (!) idea of brotherly love,” but of “the relation of the *τίκνα Θεοῦ* to those who are not *τίκνα Θεοῦ*,” because the apostle cannot possibly “limit the duty of loving sacrifice of life to the relationship of the regenerate to one another.” But (1) the idea of Christian brotherly love is very far from being a vague idea; (2) when Christians are exhorted so to love one another as to lay down their lives for one another, that is not a limitation of the commandment of love; (3) those who are not *τίκνα Θεοῦ*, and are therefore *τίκνα τοῦ διαβόλου*, John cannot possibly call *ἀδελφοί* without any further statement; (4) the whole section is an explication of *ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους*, ver. 11; but by *ἀλλήλους* cannot be understood the children of God and the children of the devil in their relation to one another; comp. besides, iv. 2–11.

² Comp. the Greek proverb: *βίος βίου δέσμιος οὐκ ἔστι βίος*.

appears both in the LXX. as well as often in the N. T. = *καρδία*; "to close the heart," is as much as: "to forbid to compassion towards the needy brother entrance into one's heart;" the additional ἀπ' αὐτοῦ is used in pregnant sense = "turning away from him" (Lücke, de Wette, Düsterdieck). The first two clauses *might* have had (not, as Baumgarten-Crusius says, "*must* have had") the form of subordinate clauses; but by the fact that the form of principal clauses is given to them, the statement gains in vividness. The conclusion, which according to the sense is negative, appears as a question with πῶς (comp. chap. iv. 20), whereby the negation is emphatically brought out. ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ is love to God, not the love of God to us (Calov).¹ Here also μένειν has the meaning noticed on ver. 15 (Myrberg); incorrectly Lücke: "as John is speaking of the probable absence of the previously-existing Christian life, it is put μένει and not ἐστί." The apostle does not want to say that the pitiless person loses again his love to God, but that it never is really in him at all. Pitilessness cannot be combined with love to God; the reason of this John states in chap. iv. 20.

Ver. 18. *True* love proves itself by deed. The exhortation contained in this verse is, on the one hand, a deduction from the foregoing (especially from vv. 16 and 17); but, on the other hand, it forms the basis of the further development. — *τεκνία*] Impressive address before the exhortation. — *μὴ ἀγαπῶμεν λόγῳ μηδὲ τῇ γλώσσῃ*] i.e. "let us not so love that the proof of our love is the outward word or the tongue;" *μηδὲ τῇ γλώσσῃ* is epexegetically added, in order to mark the externality of the love indicated by λόγῳ ἀγαπᾶν, inasmuch as it points out that by λόγος here only the outward word is meant; it is erroneous to regard γλώσσα as a climax in so far as "one may love with words (without deeds), but in such a way that the words are nevertheless really and sincerely meant" (Ebrard), for John would not in the very least consider as truly and sincerely meant words of love which remain without corresponding deed. The article serves "to vivify the expression" (Lücke): *the* tongue as the particular member for expression of the word. It is unnecessary, nay, "contrary to

¹ Ebrard explains ἡ ἀγάπη τ. Θεοῦ: "the love which in its essential being took substantial form after Christ and in Christ's loving deed" (!).

the text" (Düsterdieck), with Beza, Lange, Sander, etc., to supply "μόνον" with ἀγαπῶμεν κ.τ.λ.; for ἀγαπᾶν λόγῳ κ.τ.λ. in itself expresses the *mere apparent love*. — ἀλλ' ἐν ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ] Instead of the *Rec.* ἔργῳ, we must read ἐν ἔργῳ; according to de Wette, the two readings are synonymous; according to Lücke, ἐν ἔργῳ κ. ἀλ. has more of "adverbial nature" than ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ; "in τῷ λόγῳ the apostle is considering more the way in which love expresses itself, in ἐν ἔργῳ κ. ἀλ. he is considering more the form and fashion of it;" the preposition suggested itself to the apostle because the *work*, as being the realization of love, stands in an inner relationship to it, "is the element in which love moves" (Düsterdieck).¹ λόγος and ἔργον are frequently in the N. T. connected with one another, so Luke xxiv. 19; Acts vii. 22, and many other passages; in order to bring out the insufficiency of λόγος in 1 Cor. iv. 19, 20, 1 Thess. i. 5, δύναμις is contrasted with it. By καὶ ἀληθείᾳ the apostle does not mean to add a *second* element of love, but to characterize the ἀγαπᾶν ἐν ἔργῳ as the *true* love (so also Myrberg); a love which does not show itself ἐν ἔργῳ is only an apparent love.² The relationship of (ἐν) ἀληθείᾳ to ἐν ἔργῳ is just the same as that of τῇ γλώσσῃ to λόγῳ. The two words of each clause express together *one* idea, and these two ideas are contrasted with one another, so that it is not to be asked whether λόγῳ corresponds with ἔργῳ, and γλώσσῃ with ἀληθείᾳ, or γλώσσῃ with ἔργῳ, and λόγῳ with ἀληθείᾳ (against Düsterdieck and Braune). With the thought of this verse compare especially Jas. ii. 15, 16; only here the thought is more comprehensive than there.³

Vv. 19, 20. Blessed result of true love. — καὶ ἐν τούτῳ] καί: simple copula. — ἐν τούτῳ does not refer here, as in

¹ Braune: "It is to be observed that the first pair in the dative only states the means by which love operates; the preposition *in* states the element in which it moves."

² Comp. John iv. 24, where also "καὶ ἀληθείᾳ" is added to ἐν πνεύματι, not to bring out a *second* element of true worship (contrary to Meyer on this passage), but to describe the προσκυνεῖν ἐν πνεύματι as true worship in contrast to every apparent worship.

³ Wolf quotes the corresponding statement of Picke, *Aroth*, chap. v.: omnis dilectio, quae dependet a verbo, verbo cessante, ipsa quoque cessat: at quae non dependet a verbo, nunquam cessat. — In Theognis 979 it is put thus: καὶ μὴ ἀπορτῆν γλώσσῃ φίλοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔργῳ.

chap. ii. 3, iii. 16, 24, iv. 2, to the following thought, but to the foregoing ἀγαπᾶν ἐν ἔργῳ κ. ἀλ. The future γνωσόμεθα, which, according to the authorities, is to be read instead of γινώσκουμεν (see the critical notes), "is used as in John vii. 17, viii. 31, 32, xiii. 35, where the subject is the possibility of an event which may with justice be expected" (Braune): it is the more natural here, as the form of thought is the cohortative; the sense is: If we love ἐν ἔργῳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, we shall thereby know that, etc. — ὅτι ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐσμέν] weakening and partly erroneous explanations of the phrase: ἐκ τῆς ἀλ. εἶναι, are those of Socinus: vere talem esse ut quis se esse profitetur; of Grotius: congruere evangelio; of Semler: ἀληθεύειν ἐν ἀγάπῃ; of Baumgarten-Crusius: "to be as we ought to be;" of de Wette: "to belong to the truth; to live in it." Bengel, on the other hand, rightly interprets the preposition ἐκ of the principium or ortus; so also Lücke, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc.; comp. John xviii. 37, and Meyer on this passage. The truth is the source of life in love. It is indeed in its deepest nature God Himself; but ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ must not be put instead of ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας, for the apostle here, with reference to the preceding ἀληθείᾳ, arrives at the idea of *truth*. Love ἐν ἀληθείᾳ is the evidence of being born ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας. — καὶ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ πείσομεν τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν] This sentence is not governed by ὅτι, but it is independently connected with the preceding, either depending or not depending on ἐν τούτῳ; if the former is the case, "we must take ἐν τούτῳ combined with πείσομεν somewhat differently than when connected with γινώσκουμεν (γνωσόμεθα); with the latter it would be more *therein*, with the former more *thereby*" (Lücke; so also Braune); if the latter be the case, the thought: ἐν τούτῳ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι κ.τ.λ., serves as the presupposition of the following ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ. in this sense: *if we truly love our brethren, we shall therein know, etc., and thus* (in this consciousness of being of the truth) *we shall assure our hearts, etc.*¹ The

¹ Lücke: "Even if it be unadvisable to connect καὶ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ. directly with ἐν τούτῳ, so that it appears better, with Lachmann and the old commentators, to put a comma after ἐσμέν, every one must at least admit the connection in the direct succession of the sentences. But then it must also be permitted to take the logical connection thus: In this (vv. 16-18) do we know that we are of the truth. And thus (if we in living love have the assurance that we are of the truth) we shall, etc."

idea that with *καὶ ἔμπροσθεν* an *entirely new* thought appears, which stands in no intimate connection with the preceding (Ebrard), is contradicted by the *καί*, which closely connects the two thoughts with one another. What, then, is the meaning of *πείσομεν τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν*? Plainly *πείσομεν* expresses a truth which *we* (the subject contained in *πείσομεν*) impress upon our hearts, so that they are thereby determined to something, which presupposes at least a relative contrast between *us* and *our hearts*. The verb *πείθειν* means either to *persuade* a person to something, so that he thinks or acts as we wish, or to *convince* him of something so that he agrees with our opinion. *Some ancient commentators* have interpreted in accordance with the first signification: *suadebimus corda nostra, ut studeant proficere in melius*; the more particular definition which is added is here clearly quite arbitrary; it is not much better with the explanation of Fritzsche (*Comment. III. de nonnullis Pauli ad Gal. cp. locis*): *animos nostros flectemus, nempe ad amorem vita factisque ostendendum*, or even with the more recent one: *anim. n. flectemus sc. ut veram Christi doctrinam tueamur* (see Erdmann, p. 129 ff.). It is very common to explain *πείθειν* here by *placare*, to *calm*, to *compose*; this, it is true, is in so far inaccurate as *πείθειν* has not this meaning in itself, but certainly the verb is sometimes used in such a connection that the purpose of the persuasion is the calming of anger or of a similar passion;² hence the original meaning of the word passes into the above. This may be the case here also, for the following *καταγινώσκη* shows that the apostle regards our heart as affected with a passion directed against us; then the following *ὅτι*, ver. 20 (at least the second, for the first may also be the pronoun *ὅτι*), is the causal particle = "*because, since*." Taking this view, the sense is: *In the consciousness that we are of the*

¹ This interpretation is based on the erroneous view that *εἶναι ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας* is = *veram doctrinam tenere*; the former interpretation is contradicted by the fact that if we already know from our love to the brethren that we are of the truth, we do not need for the first time to move our hearts to love.

² In favour of this we may appeal to the passages cited by Lücke, Matt. xxviii. 14; Joseph. *Arch.* vi. 5, 6 (Samuel), *ὑποσχνύται καὶ παρακαλίσιν τὸν Θεὸν συγγινῶναι περὶ τούτων αὐτοῖς, καὶ πείσιν*, and the passage in Plutarch, where to *ἀπολοιμνῆν*, *εἰ μὴ σι τιμωρησαίμην* the reply runs: *ἀπολοιμνῆν, εἰ μὴ σι πείσαιμι*, although *πείθειν* has not in them exactly the meaning of "to calm."

truth, we shall silence the accusation which our heart makes against us, because God is greater than our heart.— If, on the other hand, we take *πείθειν* in the meaning of *to convince*, *ὅτι* (at least the second) is = “*that* ;” and the sentence *μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν* is the object belonging to *πείσομεν* ; so that the sense is : *If our heart accuses us, we shall bring it to the conviction that God is greater than it.* — The words *ἐμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ*, *i.e.* *τοῦ Θεοῦ*, do not point to the “future judgment” (Lücke, de Wette), but to the representation of God in the devotion of the soul, which is peculiar to the Christian. By putting them first, it is brought out that the *πείσομεν* only occurs in this representation of God (Düsterdieck, Ewald, Brückner, Braune). — Ver. 20. By far the most of the commentators take the *ὅτι* with which this verse begins as the particle, either = “*because*” or “*that*,” and explain the second *ὅτι* as epanalepsis of the first. The supposition of the epanalepsis of a particle has, considered in itself, nothing against it, although it very seldom appears in the N. T., but it is only suitable if *ὅτι* is the objective particle (comp. Eph. ii. 11, 12) ;¹ from this it follows that if *πείθομεν* has the meaning “*to calm*,” the first *ὅτι* is not to be regarded as the particle. Sander, it is true, translates : “we can calm our heart, *that*—God is greater,” etc., but this has only sense if before “*that*” is supplied “*with this*,” or “*inasmuch as we reflect* ;” such a supplement, however, is arbitrary. Several commentators (Hoogewen, Bengel, Morus, Baumgarten-Crusius, Ewald) regard the first *ὅτι* as the pronoun, as also Lachmann (in his large ed.) reads *ὅ τι ἐάν*. Düsterdieck erroneously asserts (as even Bertheau in the 3d ed. of Lücke’s *Comm.* p. 339, Ebrard, and now even Brückner and Braune, have acknowledged) that this form is never found in the N. T. ;

¹ Lücke himself admits that the passages adduced by him in favour of the epanalepsis “have only value for those who take *ὅτι* both times not as causal particle, but as conjunction, belonging to *πείσομεν* ;” but thinks that the context makes it necessary to assume the epanalepsis here even for the causal particle ; similarly Braune, although without even showing the grammatical justification in any way. Besides, in this construction it is quite overlooked that if the intermediate clause *ἐάν καταγινώσκῃ κ.τ.λ.* is connected with the preceding, the first *ὅτι* comes in disturbingly ; and if it is connected with the following, the second *ὅτι* does so. As in accordance with the thought only the former connection can be the correct one, it is incomprehensible how John should have here interrupted it by *ὅτι*.

it is true that in Col. iii. 23 it is probably not *ὁ, τι ἑάν*, but *ὁ ἑάν* that is to be read, although D^{***} E J K have the former, but in Acts iii. 23 Tisch. reads *ἥτις ἑάν* (so also *κ*), and in Col. iii. 17, according to the overwhelming authorities, it is not *ὁ τι ἄν*, but *ὁ τι ἑάν*, that must be read (which is admitted by Lachm. Tisch. and Buttm.), and similarly in Gal. v. 10, not *ὅστις ἄν*, but *ὅστις ἑάν* (also accepted by Lachm. Tisch. 7, and Buttm.); moreover, there is nothing syntactically against reading here *ὁ, τι ἑάν*, for *καταγινώσκειν* is frequently construed with the accusative of the thing. Ebrard, however, thinks that this view is “improbable,” nay, “absolutely impossible;” “improbable,” because in ver. 22 *ὁ ἑάν* is used, but in the 1st ed. of this comm. it was shown that *ὁ ἑάν* is by no means the constant form with John, but that in the Gospel, ii. 5, xiv. 13, xv. 16, *ὁ, τι ἄν* also appears,¹ and that the sudden change of forms is found elsewhere also in the N. T., as in Matt. v. 19, first *ὁς ἑάν*, and afterwards *ὅς δ' ἄν* is used, and in Matt. xvi. 19, in some codd. (Lachm.), first *ὁ ἄν*, and then *ὁ ἑάν* is read; “absolutely impossible,” “on account of the mutual relationship of the two conditional clauses, ver. 20 and ver. 21;” certainly the *ἑάν* in ver. 21 seems to form a sharp antithesis to the *ἑάν* in ver. 20, but it must not be unnoticed that, similar though the two clauses are to one another, they nevertheless have not the pure form of antithesis, inasmuch as in ver. 21 there is no antithetical particle, in the clauses the succession of the particular words is different, and the first conditional clause only forms an inserted intermediate clause.² In favour of the explanation: “before Him shall we calm our heart, whatever it may accuse us of, because,” etc. (or convince . . . that, etc.), is the fact that not only is the idea *καταγινώσκειν* thereby more closely connected with *πείσομεν*, but also the certainly strange epanalepsis of the *ἔτι* is avoided.³ — The verb *καταγινώσκειν*, according to

¹ *κ* has in chap. ii. 5: *ὁ ἄν*; xiv. 13: *ὁ τι ἄν*; xv. 16: *ὁ τι ἑάν*.

² If it was the apostle's intention to contrast sharply two different cases, he could do this more definitely if he constructed the first period thus: *ἵαν καταγ. ἡμῶν ἡ καρδία, ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ πείσομεν τ. κ., ὅτι μίζων κ.τ.λ.*, and the second: *ἵαν δὲ μὴ καταγ. ἡμῶν ἡ καρδία*. From the fact that he did not do so, it may be concluded that such a sharp contrast was not in his purpose.

³ That the supposition of an epanalepsis for the causal particle is improper, has been already noticed above; and for the passage before us it is further clear

Lücke, does not signify condemnation, but only accusation; in the inner life of the heart, however, the two are not distinctly separated from one another, but the accusation of conscience rather includes the condemnation; the special *κατάκρισις* is certainly the work of God.¹ The object of the *καταγινώσκειν* of the heart is variously defined by the commentators, some understanding by it, with reference to the preceding thought, the "want of love," others more generally the sinfulness which still adheres to believers even with all the consciousness of loving the brethren (chap. i. 8). The decision as to which is the correct interpretation depends on the explanation of the following sentence: *ὅτι μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ Θεὸς τῆς καρδίας ἡμῶν καὶ γινώσκει πάντα*. — The old controversy is, whether God is called greater than our heart as *forgiving* or as *judging*; the *former* is the view of Thomas Angl., Luther, Bengel, Morus, Russmeyer, Spener, Noesselt, Steinhöfer, Rickli, Baumgarten-Crusius, Sander, Besser, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, Ewald, Brückner, Braune, etc.; the *latter* is the view of Calvin, Beza, Socinus, Grotius, a Lapide, Castalio, Hornejus, Estius, Calovius, Semler, Lücke, Neander, Gerlach, de Wette, Ebrard, etc. — If *πείθειν* is = "to calm," then *μείζων* must refer to the forgiving love of God; Lücke, indeed, gives the following explanation: "after John has said that *only* if we are, in active brotherly love, conscious that we are of the truth, shall we calm our hearts in the judgment he adds: for if the contrary is the case, if our conscience accuses us of the want of genuine love, then God is greater than our

from the fact that if *ὅτι* is the causal particle, the clause *μείζων ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.* forms, according to the thought, the conclusion of *ἰὰν καταγινώσκη*, as plainly appears in Lücke when he explains: "Then, if . . . our conscience accuses us, God is greater than our heart," etc. — But even the epanalepsis of *ὅτι* as objective particle may be doubted; for as the thought *ἰὰν καταγινώσκη* does not form the presupposition for *μείζων ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ.*, but for *πίσσομεν*, it is unsuitable to place it in the objective clause dependent on *πίσσομεν*, instead of connecting it with *πίσσομεν*.

¹ Düsterdieck, with whom also Braune agrees, appropriately remarks that *καταγινώσκειν* occupies a middle place between *κατηγορεῖν*, along with which an *ἀπολογεῖν* further occurs, and *κατακρίνειν*, which includes the judicial decree of punishment; comp. Deut. xxv. 1, 2. — Düsterdieck suitably quotes on this passage, Sir. xiv. 2, comp. xix. 5, and *Test. Gad.* 5; J. A. Fabricius, *Cod. pseudep.* I. T. p. 681. — *καταγινώσκειν* means: to pronounce against a person that he is guilty; *κατακρίνειν*, on the other hand: to pronounce the merited punishment on a person.

heart, and before His holiness and omniscience there is no calm for the accusing conscience." But the assumption of such a declaratio e contrario, which is in no way hinted at, is only an artificial expedient for reconciling contraries. *μείζων* can only be referred to God as judging, if *πείθειν* has the meaning "*to persuade*." As Elbrard regards this as the right view, and would begin "*a perfectly independent new sentence*" with *καὶ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ*, he states the meaning as follows: "In the sight of God we shall convince our hearts of this, that if (even) our heart (so prone to self-deception and self-excuse, and therefore *small*) accuses us (namely, of not practising love), God, the all-knowing, is greater than our heart, and we shall therefore *so much the less* be able to stand before Him." This interpretation is contradicted, in the first place, by the fact that it separates the second part of the 19th verse from the first, nay, even places it in antithesis to it,¹ whereas such an independence is not only not suggested as belonging to it, but is refuted by the connecting *καί*, and in the second place, by the fact that the thought is in itself inadmissible. According to the representation of the apostle, *we* and *our heart* are regarded as contrasted with one another, inasmuch as our heart brings a condemning accusation *against us*, which plainly refers to the fact that we by our sins have made ourselves liable to the judgment of God; it is not *we* therefore that hold out *to our heart*, but *our heart* that holds out *to us*, the judgment of God; how, then, shall *we* after this bring *our heart* to the conviction that God will condemn us, nay, will condemn us even more than our heart does already? From this it follows that—whatever be the meaning of *πείθειν*—*μείζων* cannot refer to the judicial activity of God. As God is called *μείζων* in comparison with our heart that condemns us, the comparison expresses an opposition; Erdmann: *Notioni cordis condemnantis magnitudo Dei comparatur et opponitur*; the heart, inasmuch as it condemns us, is like the "*hostis, qui nos aggreditur, sed Deus μείζων h. e. fortior est, ut hostem illum devincere possit*" (comp. iv. 4). As this greatness of God, which surpasses the heart, proves itself in this, that in those who are *ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας* it overcomes the

¹ The conviction, namely, that we cannot stand before God, plainly forms an antithesis to the conviction that we are of the truth.

accusations of the heart, those commentators are right who assign to this verse a comforting tendency, and therefore refer *μείζων* to *the forgiving love*; no doubt, it is objected that the thought of God's omniscience (*γινώσκει πάντα*¹) is not able to comfort the man whom conscience accuses, but this can only hold good in reference to those who are not yet *ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας*, and not in reference to those of whom John is here speaking, namely, those who in their sincere love to the brethren have the evidence that they are *ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας*.² If this is the right interpretation, then it is clear that *καταγινώσκειν* does not refer to the want of love, but to sin in general, from which even the *τέκνον τοῦ Θεοῦ* is not yet free (i. 8 ff.); and this is also indicated by the apostle's very form of expression, if *πείσομεν* is directly connected with *καταγινώσκει*, and if, accordingly, *ὅ, τι ἐάν* is to be read (see above), in which case *ὅτι μείζων ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.* states the *objective* ground of the *πείθειν*: "*because God is greater than our heart, we therefore (in the consciousness that we are of the truth) shall calm our hearts before God, however much our heart may accuse us.*" This interpretation deserves the preference before that, according to which *πείσομεν* is = "*to convince,*" and *ὅτι μείζων κ.τ.λ.* the object governed by it, because not only does the purpose of the verse thereby appear more clearly, but it is not easy to perceive how the conviction of the greatness of God which overcomes the heart should result from the consciousness *ὅτι ἐκ τῆς ἀληθείας ἐσμέν*.³ — It is further to be observed that

¹ Several commentators find in the words *καὶ γινώσκει πάντα* the explanation of the idea *μείζων*, so Oecumenius, Augustine, Bede, Socinus, a Lapide, Lorinus, Hornejus, Paulus, de Wette, etc.; even Ebrard says that God is called *μείζων*, "because He cannot be deceived," but its position gives no justification for that; we can at the most say that the apostle by those words brings specially out one element which is included in *μείζων*.

² Luther rightly says: "Though our conscience makes us despondent, and represents God to us as angry, yet God is greater than our heart. Conscience is a single drop, but the reconciled God is a sea full of comfort. . . . When conscience punishes and condemns a man, he becomes alarmed; but against this darkness of the heart it is said: God knows all things. Conscience is always in fear and closes its eyes; but God is deeper and higher than thy heart, and more exactly searches the innermost parts of it."—Besser: "Our heart knows some things, and decides against us; God knows all things, and does not decide against us, but for us, because before His eyes the seed of truth, of which we have been born, is not concealed."

³ Ewald construes correctly, but in his explanation: "If we earnestly seek in

de Wette makes the *first* ἵτι as causal particle dependent on *πείσομεν* (= to calm), the *second*, on the other hand, on *καταγινώσκη*: "for, if our heart accuses us because God is greater than our heart, He also knows all things;" but this construction is opposed not only by the fact that the *καί* is more naturally taken as copula (Baumgarten-Crusius), but also by the fact that the thought, that our heart condemns us *because* God is greater than our heart, is incorrect.¹ — Without adequate ground, Erdmann thinks that *καρδία* in ver. 19 is used in a wider sense than in ver. 20 ("vertimus *πείσομεν τὰς καρδίας*: nobis ipsis persuadebimus"), because there the plural, and here the singular, is used; this change of the number has no influence on the meaning of the word, but the apostle speaks of the *καρδία* as the object of *πείθειν*, and as the subject of *καταγινώσκειν*, inasmuch as the heart is the seat or the union of the affections; the Greek commentators explain *καρδία* here as synonymous with *συνείδησις*.

Ver. 21. In this verse the apostle states the case of our heart not accusing (or condemning) us. We can understand it thus, that what he previously observed has happened, namely, that in the consciousness that we are of the truth, we have induced our heart to refrain from its accusation against us. Then this thought does not stand to the preceding one in the relation of antithesis (as if in this verse a different case was contrasted with the case stated in ver. 20), but in that of continuation;² but it is more correct to suppose that the apostle is here speaking of a relationship which is dif-

His sight whether we really love . . . we shall be able, even if we must sometimes accuse ourselves before God, nevertheless by the penitent (?) acknowledgment of the truth, to convince our conscience that we are men and God is God, that we may therefore sometimes fail and must be admonished by Him,"—he introduces references into the thought which are not contained in it.

¹ Brückner, it is true, defends de Wette's interpretation, but he substantially perverts it; for whilst de Wette refers the *whole* verse to the *accusation* of God (therein agreeing with Lücke), Brückner takes the ὅτι γινώσκει πάντα in *comforting* sense; but it then becomes still more untenable, for it is plainly unjustifiable to refer the omniscience of God in the subordinate clause to *condemnation* (for both explain μύζων by: "looking more deeply, examining all the recesses of the heart"), but in the principal clause to *forgiveness*.

² The objection of Ebrard to this interpretation, that *ἵαν* cannot serve the purpose of introducing a deduction from a premiss which is presupposed as already having actually occurred, is inappropriate, for *ἵαν* is not in this view at all taken as "if, then, therefore," but is retained in its own proper meaning.

ferent from that indicated in ver. 20, and that he is not regarding the question whether the non-condemnation has never taken place at all, or has been only brought about by persuasion. That two sentences may stand to one another in the relation of antithesis even without the antithetical particle, is proved by chap. i. 8 and 9. — *παρρησίαν ἔχομεν πρὸς τὸν Θεόν*] states what occurs when the case exists which is mentioned by *ἐάν*; it is erroneous to explain *παρρησίαν ἔχομεν* = *πείσομεν τὰς καρδίας ἡμῶν*; the same expression in chap. ii. 28 and iv. 17, and construed with *πρός*, chap. v. 14; the same construction in Rom. v. 1: *εἰρήνην ἔχ. πρὸς τὸν Θεόν*. As the calming of the heart, so also confidence toward God, which is the subject here, is based on the fact that God is greater than our heart, and knows all things.

Ver. 22. By *καί* the following is closely connected with the preceding, inasmuch as it states what further happens when, in consequence of non-condemnation on the part of the heart, the *παρρησία πρὸς τὸν Θεόν* exists; it is not merely the consciousness of the hearing of our prayers, but it is this hearing itself. — *ὁ ἐὰν αἰτῶμεν*] is to be taken quite generally, and must not be spoiled by arbitrary limitations; the necessary limitation lies, on the one hand, in the subject itself: *the child of God* asks for nothing which is contrary to his Father's will, comp. v. 14; and, on the other hand, in the *παρρησία* with which he prays; comp. Matt. xxi. 22; the contrary in Jas. i. 6, 7. — *λαμβάνομεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ*] *i.e.* *τοῦ Θεοῦ*. The present is not used instead of the future (Grotius); the subject is here not something future, but what constantly occurs in the life of believers. Augustine suitably says: *Charitas ipsa genit, charitas ipsa orat, contra hanc aures claudere non novit, qui illam dedit.* — *ὅτι τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ.*] *ὅτι* is connected with the immediately preceding *λαμβάνομεν*, and states the ground of God's manifestation of love in the hearing of prayer; this ground, which, however, is not to be regarded as the *causa meritoria*, is the childlike obedience of him who prays, wherein God recognises him as His child; the idea of obedience is expressed in two

Contrary to Braune's opinion, that with this interpretation not *μή*, but *μηκέτι* would have to be used, it is to be observed that it was not necessary to bring out the element which is contained in *μηκέτι*.

mutually co-ordinate sentences (similar to the Hebrew parallelism): *τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ* and *τὰ ἀρεστὰ ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ* are synonymous;¹ by *ποιεῖν* the obedience is specified as *active*; the second clause indicates that it consists, not in a slavish subjection to the *commandment*, but in a childlike fulfilment of that which is *pleasing* to God. In John viii. 29, *ἀρεστόν* is construed with the dative; only in Acts vi. 2, xii. 3 is the word besides found; similar is the expression: *ἀπόδεκτον ἐνώπιον τοῦ Θεοῦ* (1 Tim. v. 4).

Ver. 23. With this verse, which—as the statement of the substance of God’s commandments—is most closely connected with the preceding, begins a new leading section, indeed the last in the Epistle, inasmuch as in *ἵνα πιστεύσωμεν τῷ ὀνόματι κ.τ.λ.* a new element of the development of ideas appears, by which the sequel is not merely “prepared for” (Ebrard), but is dominated. — *καί* is not explicative, but simply copulative. — *αὕτη* refers to the following *ἵνα*, which here also does not merely state the *purpose* (Braune), but the *substance*. — *ἡ ἐντολὴ αὐτοῦ*] The singular is used, because the manifold commandments in their inner nature form one unity: this is especially true of the two commandments of faith and love, here mentioned. From the fact that *faith* is described as an *ἐντολή*, it must not be inferred that it is not a work of God in man, but it certainly follows that neither can it be accomplished without the self-activity of man. — The phrase *πιστεύειν τῷ ὀνόματι τοῦ υἱοῦ κ.τ.λ.* only appears here; in chap. v. 13 the preposition *εἰς* is used instead of the dative; so also in John i. 12, ii. 23, iii. 18, etc.; by the dative the *ὄνομα* of Christ is indicated as the object of devoted, believing trust;² “to believe on the name of Christ” is, however, identical with “to believe on Christ,” inasmuch as in the

¹ Meyer actually thinks that by *ἀρεστὰ* are meant the so-called *consilia evangelica*, by which ordinary Christians are not bound, but which are voluntarily undertaken by Christians who are specially holy!

² Weiss has been at pains to show that *πιστεύειν* in John does not include the element of trust; in this, however, he is wrong, because even where the element of *conviction* prevails in the use of the word, this must not be identified with the theoretical belief, which is a mere act of the understanding, but it includes as an essential element the immediate trust of the words or of the person to which the *πιστεύειν* refers; in the phrase: *πιστεύειν τῷ ὀνόματι* Ἰ. Χρ., the ethical meaning of the verb is so much the more to be recognised, as the denial of it necessitates also a weakening of the idea *ὄνομα*.

name the nature of Him who is spoken of is expressed; comp. Meyer on John i. 12. Grotius quite erroneously: propter Christum sive Christo auctore Deo credere. — While faith is the fundamental condition of the Christian life, brotherly love is the active proof of the living character of the faith; the two things cannot be separated from one another; hence it follows here: *καὶ ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους*,¹ which as the effect is distinguished from *πιστεύειν* as the cause; *καί* is therefore copulative and not expegetical (as Frommann thinks, p. 591). — The subordinate clause: *καθὼς ἔδωκεν ἐντολὴν ἡμῖν*, is best referred to *ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους*, inasmuch as it is not *God* (Estius, Bengel, Sander) but *Christ* that is to be regarded as the subject; by *καθὼς* ("in proportion as") the *quality* of love is indicated: it must correspond to the commandment of Christ; Myrberg: Non modo amandum est, sed etiam vere et recte amandum.

Ver. 24. After the apostle has mentioned the substance of the divine commandment, he describes the keeping of it as the condition of fellowship with God, and states the mark whereby the Christian knows that God is in him. — *καί* is the simple copula, not = itaque; *τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ* is a resumption of the *ἡ ἐντολὴ αὐτοῦ* of ver. 23; the plural is used because the commandment is described as containing two elements; *αὐτοῦ* = *τοῦ Θεοῦ*, not *Χριστοῦ* (Sander, Neander, Besser). — *ἐν αὐτῷ μένει κ.τ.λ.*] The mention of fellowship with God, which consists in this, that we abide in God and God abides in us,² is explained by the purpose of the Epistle. — *καὶ ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκουμεν*] *ἐν τούτῳ* is referred by Lücke and Ebrard to the preceding, namely to *τηρεῖν τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ*; but thus there results a superfluous thought, for with the connection which according to the apostle exists between

¹ Frommann (p. 200) wrongly concludes from this passage and iv. 7, 19, in which the obligation to love is expressed, that being born of God is conditioned by love, as the free act of man, "by which He keeps His independent personality and freedom towards God" (!), nay, even is *produced* by it (p. 205).

² When Weiss defines the abiding or being of God in him who keeps His commandments, in this way, that God who is known, or the knowledge of God, is the determining principle of his spiritual life, this seems "to weaken the powerful realism of John's conception;" yet Weiss guards himself against this when he says that he does not in any way diminish the divine causality in the act of regeneration, but only means thereby that God accomplishes this act by means of His revelation in Christ, which must be accepted into knowledge.

the keeping of God's commandments and God's abiding in us, and which he has expressed in the first half of the verse, it is plainly superfluous to say once more that we know the latter by the former; it is, besides, contradicted by the following *ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος*, which has induced Lücke to assume a combination of two trains of thought and an ambiguity of *ἐν τούτῳ*,¹ and Ebrard arbitrarily to supply with *ἐκ τ. πνεύματος* the words "we know;" Düsterdieck, de Wette, Erdmann, Braune, etc., refer *ἐν τούτῳ* to *ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος*, so that according to the apostle it is from the *πνεῦμα* which is given to us that we know that God is in us if we keep His commandments; comp. iv. 12, 13, where the same connection of ideas occurs. The change of the prepositions *ἐν* and *ἐκ* is certainly strange, but does not render this interpretation "*impossible*" (Ebrard); for, on the one hand, the form: "*ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν*," is too familiar to the apostle not to have suggested itself to him here; and, on the other hand, by *ἐκ* the *πνεῦμα* is indicated as *the source* from which that *γινώσκειν* flows; besides, the construction with *ἐκ* appears also in chap. iv. 6. — By *πνεῦμα* is here to be understood, just as by *χρῖσμα* in chap. ii. 20, "*the Holy Ghost*," who lives and works in the believer, but not, with Socinus, the disposition or the love produced by Him; or, with de Wette, "first of all the true knowledge and doctrine of the person of Jesus." With this verse the apostle makes the transition to the following section, in which, with reference to the false teachers, the distinction is made between the *πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ* and the *πνεῦμα* which is not *ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ*.

¹ The two thoughts which Lücke considers as combined here are—(1) that we in the keeping of God's commandments know that we are in fellowship with Him, and (2) that the *κατὰ τὰς ἐντολάς* is nothing else than the expression and operation of the Divine Spirit.—It is plainly quite mistaken for Paulus to regard *ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος* as the subject belonging to *μῖν*.

CHAPTER IV.

VER. 2. Instead of the *Rec.* γινώσκετε, found in K, several min. vss. and Fathers have γινώσκεται; in \aleph^* : γινώσκομεν (\aleph^1 : γινώσκετε); the *Rec.* is to be regarded as genuine. — The reading in B: ἐληλυθέναι, instead of the *Rec.* ἐληλυθότα, is a correction. — Ver. 3. Instead of the *Rec.* ὁμολογεῖ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα (K, etc., and G, though with the article τὸν prefixed), A B, etc., have the simple τὸν Ἰησοῦν (Lachm. Tisch.). This is probably the original reading (Brückner), and is confirmed by the preceding (contrary to Reiche, etc.). \aleph reads: Ἰησοῦν κύριον ἐν σ. ἐληλυθότα. — According to Socrates, vii. chap. 32, ὁ λύει is found in old manuscripts instead of ὁ μὴ ὁμολογεῖ; the same reading in Iren. iii. 18: qui solvit Jesum Christum; similarly the Vulg. (Lucif.: destruit) and in Fulg. — Tertullian also prefers this reading, though in connection with the common one; *Adv. Marc.* v. 16: negantes Christum in carne venisse . . . hic antichristus est; the same connection in Tychonius and Augustine: qui solvit Jesum et negat in carne venisse. Semler's view is a strange one, that ὁ λύει has arisen oculorum vitio; the reading is probably to be explained by the polemic against the Gnostics (Grotius, Lücke, de Wette), in favour of which is the Scholion in Matthæi, p. 225: προώδυσαν γὰρ αὐτοῦ (τοῦ ἀντιχριστοῦ) αἱ αἱρέσεις, ὧν χαρακτηριστικὸν τὸ διὰ ψευδοπροφητῶν καὶ πνευμάτων λύειν τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἐν τῷ μὴ ὁμολογεῖν αὐτὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθέναι. — The reading in \aleph : ὅτι (ὅ τ ι) ἀκηκόαμεν, instead of ὁ ἀκηκόατε, is singular. — Ver. 6. In his small edition Lachm., after A, Vulg. etc., reads ἐν τούτῳ instead of ἐκ τούτου; in his large edition he has accepted the latter reading. — Ver. 7. Το ἀγαπῶν is wrongly added in A: τὸν Θεόν. — Ver. 8. Instead of ἔγνω, \aleph^* has ἔγνωκεν; in the original text of \aleph the whole sentence: ὁ μὴ ἀγ. . . Θεόν, is wanting. — Ver. 9. \aleph has ζῶμεν for ζήσωμεν. — Ver. 10. Το ἡ ἀγάπη is added in \aleph : τοῦ Θεοῦ, plainly a correction. For ἡγαπήσαμεν, B has ἡγαπήκαμεν (Buttm.). — For ἀπέστειλεν, \aleph has ἀπέσταλκεν. — Ver. 12. The order of words varies: the *Rec.* is τετελειωμένη ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῶν, following G, K, etc. (Tisch.); A, etc., Vulg. etc., have ἐν ἡμῶν before τετελειωμένη (Lachm.); B and \aleph : ἐν ἡμῶν between τετελ. and ἐστίν (Buttm.). — Ver. 15. B reads ὅς ἐάν instead of ὅς ἂν, and Ἰησοῦς Χριστός instead of the simple Ἰησοῦς. — Ver. 16. At the end of the verse B G K \aleph , etc., several vss. etc., read μένει

(bracketed by Lachm.) ; in A, etc., Vulg., several Fathers, μέλει is wanting (Tisch.) ; according to the authorities it is to be regarded as genuine, being probably omitted to correspond with the end of the 15th verse (Reiche). — Ver. 17. **Σ** has after μεθ' ἡμῶν the further words : ἐν ἡμῶν, and instead of ἐσμέν the future ἐσόμεθα. — Ver. 19. The *Rec.* ἡμεῖς ἀγαπῶμεν αὐτόν, ὅτι αὐτός is found in G K, etc. ; in A is found : ἡμεῖς οὖν ἀγαπῶμεν, ὅτι ὁ Θεός (Lachm.) ; in B ἡμεῖς ἀγαπῶμεν, ὅτι αὐτός (Tisch.) ; **Σ** has ἡμ. ἀγ. τὸν Θεόν, ὅτι αὐτός. The αὐτός after ὅτι is sufficiently attested by the authorities ; the αὐτόν after ἀγαπῶμεν, on the other hand, appears to be a later addition, added for explanation of the thought. Reiche, however, regards it as genuine ; Lücke thinks that if ἀγαπῶμεν is without an object, ὁ Θεός is necessary ; this, however, according to John's *usus loquendi*, is not the case. — Ver. 20. **Σ** omits the ὅτι. In reference to the reading ἐώρακεν in Tisch. 7, see on chap. i. 1. — Instead of the *Rec.* (Tisch.) πῶς, **Σ**, B, etc., Theb. etc., read ὡς (Lachm.). The interrogative is, however, more expressive than the negative.

Vv. 1–6. Resumption of the warning against the false teachers ; comp. chap. ii. 18 ff. The connecting link is formed by ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος, chap. iii. 24 ; the object is to distinguish between the πνεῦμα which is of God and the πνεῦμα which is not of God (vv. 2, 3), between the πν. τῆς ἀληθείας and the πν. τῆς πλάνης : the distinguishing mark is the confession ; the former confesses, the latter denies Jesus ; the former is mightier than the latter ; therefore the believers have overcome the ψευδοπροφήτας ; the words of the former spring ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου, and are pleasing to the κόσμος ; the words of the latter are accepted by him who is ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ.

Ver. 1. The apostle first exhorts them not to believe παντὶ πνεύματι. The idea πνεῦμα is in closest connection with ψευδοπροφήται. The true prophets spoke, as we read in 2 Pet. i. 21 : ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι ; the source of the revelations which they proclaim (πρόφημι) is the πνεῦμα ἅγιον or πν. τοῦ Θεοῦ, by which is meant not an affection of their mind, but the power of God, distinct from their own personality, animating and determining them (δύναμις ὑψίστου, synonymous with πνεῦμα ἅγιον, Luke i. 35). This πνεῦμα speaks through the prophet, penetrating into his πνεῦμα and communicating to him the truth to be revealed ; thus the πνεῦμα of the prophet himself becomes a πνεῦμα ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ. As every prophet has his own πνεῦμα, there exists, though the

πνεῦμα ἅγιον is a single being, a plurality of prophetic spirits. The same relationship holds good, on the other hand, in the case of the false prophets. These also are under the influence of a spirit, namely, of the πνεῦμα which ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ οὐκ ἔστι, of the πνεῦμα τῆς πλάνης; this similarly is a single being, but inasmuch as with its lie it penetrates the πνεύματα of the false prophets and makes them like itself, it is true of the πνεῦμα of every individual prophet that it is not of God, not a πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας, but a πνεῦμα τῆς πλάνης. As John speaks here of a plurality of spirits (παντὶ πνεύματι, τὰ πνεύματα), we are to understand by πνεῦμα in this passage not the higher spirit different from the human spirit, but this spirit itself, penetrated, however, and filled with the former¹ (comp. 1 Cor. xiv. 32, and Meyer on this passage). This spirit, however, may be spoken of, not merely in plurality, but also in unity, that is, in collective sense, for on each of the two sides all πνεύματα, being animated by one and the same spirit, —whether the divine or that which is against God,—are of *one* nature, and so form together one unity. It is incorrect to understand by πνεῦμα here by metonymy, “the prophets” themselves (= λαλοῦντες ἐν πνεύματι, Lücke, de Wette, Calvin: pro eo, qui spiritus dono se praeditum esse jactat ad obeundum prophetae munus; so also Erdmann, Myrberg, etc.), or “their inspiration” (Socinus, Paulus), or even “the teaching of the prophet, his inspired word” (Lorinus, Cyril, Didymus, etc.). — ἀλλὰ δοκιμάζετε τὰ πνεύματα] The appearance of the ψευδοπροφήται, *i.e.* such teachers as, moved by the ungodly spirit, proclaimed instead of the truth the anti-christian lie, under the pretext of speaking by divine inspiration, necessitated in the Christian Church a trial of the spirits (a διακρίσις of them, 1 Cor. xii. 10, xiv. 29); comp. 1 Thess. v. 20, 21; in order to know εἰ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστίν, *i.e.* (if ἐκ is to be retained in its exact meaning), if they originate in and proceed from God. — This trial is to be exercised by all (comp.

¹ Düsterdieck considers the expression as describing “the superhuman principle animating the man who prophesies,” and explains the plural in this way, that “those different principles reveal themselves differently in their different instruments;” but with this interpretation the plural would be used in a very figurative signification. Braune correctly: “The question is not about a dual, but about a plural; we must therefore understand *the spirits of men*, to whom the Spirit bears witness.”

Rom. xii. 2; Eph. v. 10; 1 Cor. x. 15, xi. 13), for "alloquitur (apostolus) non modo totum ecclesiae corpus, sed etiam *singulos* fideles" (Calvin); against which Lorinus arbitrarily says: non omnium est probare; unum oportet in ecclesia summum judicem quaestionum de fide moribusque; is est sine dubio Pontifex Maximus. — The necessity of the trial John establishes by the words: *ὅτι πολλοὶ ψευδοπροφῆται κ.τ.λ.* These *ψευδοπροφῆται* are the same as in chap. ii. 18 are called *ἀντιχρίστοι*; comp. vv. 2, 3. The name *ψευδοπροφῆται* indicates that the teachers proclaimed their doctrine, not as the result of human speculation, but as a revelation communicated to them by the *πνεῦμα* of God. The expression: *ἐξεληλύθασιν εἰς τὸν κόσμον*, does not merely signify their *public* appearance (Socinus: *existere et publice munus aliquod aggredi*; Grotius: *apparere populo*), nor is "*ἐξ οἰκῶν αὐτῶν* to be mentally supplied" (Ebrard), but it is to be explained by the fact that the prophets, as such, were *sent* (comp. John xvii. 18), and therefore *go out* from Him who sends them. It is He, however, that sends them, who through His *πνεῦμα* makes them prophets. The idea of *ἐξέρχεσθαι* is accordingly different here from what it is in chap. ii. 19 (contrary to Lorinus, Spener, etc.); a going out of the false prophets from the Church of the Lord is not here alluded to. With *εἰς τὸν κόσμον*, compare John vi. 14, x. 36.

Ver. 2. Statement of the token by which the *πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ* is to be recognised. — *ἐν τούτῳ* refers to the following sentence: *πᾶν πνεῦμα κ.τ.λ.* — *γινώσκετε* is imperative, comp. *πιστεύετε, δοκιμάζετε*, ver. 1. — *πᾶν πνεῦμα ὃ ὁμολογεῖ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα*] It is arbitrary not only to change the participle *ἐληλυθότα* into the infinitive *ἐληλυθέναι*, but also to change *ἐν* into *εἰς* (so Luther, Calvin, Piscator, Sander); by *ἐν σαρκί* the flesh, *i.e.* the earthly human nature, is stated as the form of being in which Christ appeared. The form of the object is explained by the polemic against Docetism; it is to be translated *either*: "*Jesus Christ as come in the flesh*" (Lücke, de Wette, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, etc.); *or*: "*Jesus, as Christ come in the flesh*;" the last interpretation has *this* advantage, that it not only brings out more clearly the reference to the *Cerinthian Docetism*,¹ but it

¹ In the first interpretation the antithesis to the Cerinthian Docetism lies not merely in the combination of *Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν* as one name (Ebrard), but also in

makes it more easy to explain how the apostle in ver. 3 can designate the object simply by τὸν Ἰησοῦν. It might, however, be still more suitable to take Ἰησοῦν . . . ἐληλυθότα as one object = "*the Jesus Christ who came in the flesh*," so that in this expression the individual elements on which John here relied in opposition to Docetism have been gathered into one ; so perhaps Braune, when he says: "the form is that of a substantive objective sentence," and "in ἐν σ. ἐλ. it is not a predicate, but an attributive clause that is added." That the apostle has in view not only the Cerinthian, but also the later Docetism, which attributed to the Saviour only a *seeming* body, cannot be proved from the form of expression used here. The commentators who deny the reference of the apostle to Docetism find themselves driven to artificial explanations ; thus Socinus, who expands the participle by quamvis, and Grotius, according to whom ἐν σαρκί refers to the status humilis in which Christ appeared, in contrast to the regia pompa in which the Jews expected the Messiah.¹ To exact unbelievers there can here be no reference, as, according to chap. ii. 2, the false prophets had previously belonged to the Church itself.² That John brings out as the token of the Spirit, that is, of God, just the confession of this particular truth, has its ground in the circumstances that have been mentioned ; while it is also so very much the fundamental truth, that, as Lücke on ch. ii. 22 with justice says : "every ψεῦδος is contained in this and amounts to this, the denial of that truth in any sense."³

this, that this subject so described, which contains in it the idea Χριστός, is more particularly defined as having come in the flesh.

¹ Socinus : Qui confitetur Jesum Christum i. e. eum pro suo servatore ac domino et denique vero Christo habet, *quamvis* is in carne venerit h. e. homo fuerit, non modo mortalis, sed infinitis malis obnoxius. Without any ground, Baumgarten-Crusius asserts : "If any force were to be assigned to the predicate : come in the flesh, the infinitive would have been used."—Brückner thinks that if in ver. 3 the shorter reading (without the apposition) be the correct one, the reference to Docetism is here uncertain and unnecessary ; but the uncertain expression is plainly to be interpreted in accordance with the more certain, and not, contrariwise, the latter in accordance with the former.

² Comp. with this passage Polycarp, *ep. ad Philipp.* : πῶς γὰρ ἔς ἂν μὴ ὁμολογῇ Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα, ἀντίχριστός ἐστι καὶ ὅς μὴ ὁμολογῇ τὸ μαρτύριον τοῦ σταυροῦ ἐκ τοῦ διαβόλου ἐστί.

³ Augustine peculiarly turns this sentence against the Donatists, whom he reproaches with a denial of their love, on account of their separation from the Catholic Church, when he says that John speaks here of a denial of Christ not

Ver. 3. In the reading: *ὁ μὴ ὁμολογεῖ τὸν Ἰησοῦν*, the article (which is not, with Lücke, to be deleted) must not be overlooked, for it indicates Jesus as the historical person who is Christ. The false teachers did not confess Jesus when they ascribed the work of healing, not to Jesus, but to the Aeon Christ. The particle *μή* indicates the *contradiction* of the true confession, whilst *οὐ* would only express the simple negation. At the words: *καὶ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ τοῦ ἀντιχρίστου*, almost all commentators (even Brückner and Braune) supply with *τό* the word *πνεῦμα*; but Valla (with whom Zegerus agrees) interprets: *et hic est antichristi spiritus, vel potius: et hoc est antichristi i. e. proprium antichristi*; if this latter interpretation be correct, then *τοῦτο* refers to *μή ὁμολογεῖν*, and *τὸ τοῦ ἀντιχρίστου* is "the antichristian nature." As it is not easy to see why John should have left out *πνεῦμα*, this interpretation is to be preferred to the usual one (so also Myrberg; Ewald similarly interprets: "the work of Antichrist;" the same form of expression in Matt. xxi. 21; 1 Cor. x. 24; 2 Pet. ii. 22; Jas. iv. 14).¹ — *ὁ ἀκηκόατε ὅτι ἔρχεται*] compare chap. ii. 18. Stephanus, groundlessly, would read "*ὄν*" instead of *ὅ*; the relative does not refer to *ἀντιχρίστου*, but to *τὸ τ. ἀντιχρ.* — *καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἐστὶν ἤδη*] i. e. in the false prophets; comp. ver. 1. John does not say here that Antichrist, but only that the antichristian nature (or the spirit of Antichrist) is already in the world; *ἤδη* is doubtless added, not merely to intensify the *νῦν*, but to point to the future time of the appearing of Antichrist, which is already being prepared for. According to Ebrard, the last sentence depends on *ὅ*; this, however, is not likely, as *ὅ* is the accusative; it is rather connected, as an independent sentence, with the preceding one.

Ver. 4. After the apostle has characterized the twofold *πνεῦμα*, he directs the attention of his readers to the relationship in which they stand to the false prophets. — *ὁμοίως ἐκ τοῦ*

merely by word, but also by deed: *quisquis non habet charitatem negat Christum in carne venisse*; so Bede: *ipse est Spiritus Dei, qui dicit Jesum Christum in carne venisse, qui dicit non lingua, sed factis, non sonando, sed amando.*

¹ Braune thinks that in these passages it was of importance to form a substantive conception, but that here the simple genitive would have been sufficient; it is plain, however, that the substantive idea *τὸ τοῦ ἀντιχρ.* is here also more significant than a mere genitive connected with *ιστίς*.

Θεοῦ ἐστε] A contrast to those who are ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου; believers are of God, because the πνεῦμα which animates them is the πνεῦμα τοῦ Θεοῦ. — καὶ νενικήκατε αὐτούς] αὐτούς is not = antichristum et mundum (Erasmus), but τοὺς ψευδο-προφήτας, in whom the antichristian nature dwells. — νενικήκατε is to be retained as perfect, comp. chap. ii. 13; Calvin inaccurately interprets: in media pugna jam extra periculum sunt, quia futuri sunt superiores. John could say to his readers: νενικήκατε, not only inasmuch as in them was mighty the strength of Him who had said: θαρσείτε, ἐγὼ νενίκηκα τὸν κόσμον, and inasmuch as they in Him were sure of ultimate success (Neander, Düsterdieck), but also inasmuch as their opponents with their seductive arts must have been put to shame by their faithfulness, and must have been repulsed by them (Ebrard, Braune). The cause of this victory, however, did not and does not lie in the human power of believers, but in the fact ὅτι μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ ἐν ὑμῖν ἢ ὁ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ; — ὁ ἐν ὑμῖν, i.e. ὁ Θεός (according to Grotius, Erdmann, and others: ὁ Χριστός); as the believer is of God, God remains in him as the soul of his life; ὁ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, i.e. ὁ διάβολος, “whose children the antichrists are” (Lücke). Instead of the more particular ἐν αὐτοῖς, John uses the more general ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, in order thereby to signify that they, although they were for a while in the Church, belong nevertheless to the κόσμος, which the following words expressively bring out.

Ver. 5. In chap. ii. 19, John had said of the false teachers: οὐκ εἰσὶν ἐξ ἡμῶν; now he states from what source they spring; this is the κόσμος; the antichristian nature in them belonged to *the world*, quatenus Satanas est ejus princeps (Calvin). The manifestation of life corresponds with the source of it; because they are of the world, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦ κόσμου λαλοῦσι; ἐκ τ. κόσμου λαλεῖν means: to speak that which the κόσμος supplies, to take the burden of their speech from the κόσμος, ex mundi vita ac sensu sermones suos promere (Bengel). This is not identical with ἐκ τῆς γῆς λαλεῖν (John iii. 31), for ἡ γῆ is not an ethical idea like ὁ κόσμος. — καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτῶν ἀκούει] The false prophets had gone out from the Church into the world, to which they inwardly belonged, and proclaimed to it a wisdom which originated in it; therefore the world *heard* them, i.e. gave to

their words applause and assent: τῷ γὰρ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον προστρέχει (Oecumenius); in contrast to which believers were hated and persecuted by the world.

Ver. 6. ἡμεῖς] Antithesis of αὐτοί, ver. 5; either specially John and the other apostles (Storr, Düsterdieck, Brückner, Braune, etc.) as the true teachers, or believers generally (Calvin, Spener, Lücke, de Wette, etc.); in favour of the former interpretation is the fact that believers are addressed in this section in the second person, together with the following ἀκούει ἡμῶν, as also the antithesis to ψευδοπροφήται indicates *teachers*.—With ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἔσμεν we are to supply, according to ver. 5, the thought διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ λαλοῦμεν; the following words: ὁ γινώσκων τὸν Θεὸν ἀκούει ἡμῶν, contain the proof of the thought just expressed.—ὁ γιν. τὸν Θεόν forms the antithesis of ὁ κόσμος, and is synonymous with ὃς ἔστιν ἐκ τ. Θεοῦ, for it is only he who is a child of God that possesses the true knowledge of God. According to Lücke and others, the apostle means by this those to whom belongs the “*general ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι*, i.e. the divine impress and instinct, which is *the condition of childhood of God in Christ* ;” but the expression itself is opposed to this, for the knowledge of God is necessarily conditioned by faith in Christ.—In the second clause: ὃς οὐκ ἔστιν . . . οὐκ ἄκ. ἡμῶν, ὃς . . . Θεοῦ forms the antithesis to ὁ γινώσκων τ. Θεόν. This is the antithesis between “world” and “church of the children of God.”—In the concluding clause: ἐκ τούτου . . . τῆς πλάνης, it is to the immediately preceding thought that ἐκ τούτου refers. According to the usual view, with which Düsterdieck agrees, the sense of this passage is: He who hears the apostles shows thereby that the πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας is in him; he who, on the contrary, does not hear them, shows that the πν. τῆς πλάνης is in him; it is in his relation to the apostolic teaching that any one shows of what spirit he is the child.¹ But, according to the train of thought in this section, it is not the spirit of the *hearers*, but that of the *teachers* that is the subject (so also Myrberg and Braune); the sense therefore is: That the πνεῦμα τῆς πλάνης prevails in the false prophets, may be known by this, that *the world*

¹ Luther: “If we hear God’s true messengers, that is a plain token of true religion; if, however, we despise and mock them, that is a plain token of error.”

hears them; that in us, on the contrary, the πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας dwells, may be perceived by this, that those who know God, *i.e.* the children of God, hear us. The πν. τῆς ἀληθείας cannot be in him whom the world hears, nor can the πν. τῆς πλάνης be in him whom the children of God hear; Braune: "the πν. τῆς πλάνης is certainly in him whom the world hears, and the πν. τῆς ἀληθείας in him whom the children of God hear." — τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας; comp. John xiv. 17, xv. 26, xvi. 13; a description of the Holy Ghost, inasmuch as He not only produces a knowledge of the truth, but "makes the truth His very nature" (Weiss).¹ τὸ πν. τῆς πλάνης, the spirit that emanates from the devil, which seduces men to falsehood and error; comp. chap. i. 8; 1 Thess. ii. 3; 1 Tim. iv. 1.

Vv. 7–21. After the apostle, induced by the appearance of the antichristian nature, has characterized the spirit of truth and the spirit of error, he passes on directly to a detailed account of the elements of faith and love alluded to in chap. iii. 23.

Vv. 7, 8. Exhortation to mutual love, and the establishing of this. — The address ἀγαπητοί emphatically introduces the command: ἀγαπῶμεν. — The object ἀλλήλους shows that here also it is not human love in general, but Christian brotherly love that is the subject. Mutual love is the holiest calling of Christians who are τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ, for ἡ ἀγάπη ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστίν,² *i.e.* love proceeds from God; Calovius: originem habet a Deo. Unsatisfactory is the explanation of Grotius: Deo maxime placet bonitas. ἡ ἀγάπη is used without a determining object, because it is love in its *full* extent that is meant. — καὶ πᾶς ὁ ἀγαπῶν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγέννηται κ.τ.λ.] Inference from what immediately precedes. If love is of God, then he who lives in love must also be born of God

¹ The thought of this passage corresponds with that of John x. 3–5, where Christ appeals for a proof that He is the Good Shepherd to the fact that the sheep know and hear His voice, whilst they do not know the voice of the stranger, and flee from it.

² Neander: "The apostle does not here lay down a commandment of love; he does not want to impress on believers new motives for love, but to convince them that as sure as they are God's children, this fact must be manifested by mutual love. — As proof he adduces that love is of God, and therefore every one who loves is born of God."

and know Him. The relation of ἀγαπᾶν and ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγεννησθαι is not to be defined thus, that the former is the condition of the latter (de Wette), but thus, that the former is to be regarded as the criterion of the latter; to be born of God does not follow from love, but love follows from being born of God. The same relationship exists also between ἀγαπᾶν and γινώσκειν τὸν Θεόν;¹ what sort of a knowledge of God is meant, however, is seen from the close connection of γινώσκει with ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγέννηται. — Ver. 8. From the foregoing it follows further: ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν οὐκ ἔγνω τὸν Θεόν; οὐκ ἔγνω, i.e. “has not known.” The reason is: ὅτι ὁ Θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν. — By this thought the preceding ἡ ἀγάπη ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστὶ receives its full comprehension. — ἀγάπη is without the article, because it is considered as a general definition of the nature of God; so ver. 16, comp. i. 5: ὁ Θεὸς φῶς ἐστί. “Love is not so much a quality which God *has*, as rather the all-embracing total of what He *is*” (Besser). Luther: Deus nihil est quam mera caritas; Grotius tamely: plenus est dilectione.

Ver. 9. The manifestation of the love of God is the sending of His Son. — ἐν τούτῳ refers to the following ὅτι. — ἐφανερώθη ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν] ἐφανερώθη expresses the objective fact, not the subjective knowledge; the apostle does not mean that the love of God is *known* by us through the sending of His Son (comp. ver. 16), but that it has by that means come forth from its concealment, has manifested itself in act. ἐν ἡμῖν is therefore neither “*in*” nor “*among*” us; neither must it be explained = εἰς ἡμᾶς; ἐν is here, as in ver. 16 and John ix. 3 = “*to*,” either connected with ἐφανερώθη or with ἡ ἀγάπη τ. Θ.; hence either: “it has been manifested to us” (Düsterdieck, Brückner, Braune, etc.), or: “the love of God to us” (Ewald) has been manifested.

¹ It was previously stated in this commentary: “John does not here say that love flows from the knowledge of God, but that love, because it is of divine nature, necessarily brings with it the knowledge of God.” This is incorrect, since γινώσκει τὸν Θεόν stands in the same relationship to ἀγαπᾶν as ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γιγνέσθαι does, even though it is in itself true also that only he who himself loves can really know God, who is love. For the correct explanation, see Lücke, Braune, Weiss. It has already been observed, however, that the last-named does not correctly state the connection between being born of God and the knowledge of God, as he makes the latter the condition of the former.

With the first interpretation the sentence: *ὅτι . . . εἰς τὸν κόσμον*, makes a difficulty which has been overlooked by the commentators;¹ with regard to the second, the article *ἡ* is wanting before *ἐν ἡμῖν*; but a direct connection of an attributive clause with a substantive, without a connecting article, is very often found in the N. T., and is therefore not "ungrammatical" (as Düsterdieck thinks); the idea is here, then, the same as that which John in ver. 16 expresses by: *ἡ ἀγάπη ἣν ἔχει ὁ θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν*.² The difference between *εἰς ἡμᾶς* and *ἐν ἡμῖν* is this, that the former indicates only the tendency towards the goal, the latter the abiding at the goal. By *ἡμῖν* we are to understand not mankind in general, but believers in particular, so also ver. 10 in the case of *ἡμεῖς κ.τ.λ.* — In the following sentence: *ὅτι τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ . . . ἵνα ζήσωμεν δι' αὐτοῦ*, the special emphasis rests on the last words, for the love which God has towards us is manifested in the fact that He sent His Son into the world *for this purpose*, that we might live through Him, *i.e.* become partakers through Him of the life of blessedness. It is especially in its purpose that the sending of His Son is the manifestation of God's love to us. The more particular description of the Son of God as *ὁ μονογενής*, which is frequently found in the Gospel of John, appears only here in his Epistles. In Luke (vii. 12, viii. 42, ix. 38) and in the Epistle to the

¹ Even Ebrard has not perceived the difficulty. It lies in this, that by *ὅτι κ.τ.λ.* something is mentioned which happened for us, but not which happened to us; differently in John ix. 3. Brückner thinks that the difficulty is removed by the fact that "in the purpose of the sending of Christ there also lies something which happened to us;" incorrectly, since even if the purpose of that is *our* life (*ἵνα ζήσωμεν*), yet it cannot be said that the love shown in the sending of Christ has manifested itself to us; the result is then that *ἐφανερώθη* is taken = "has operated," and that an emphasis is laid on *ἐν ἡμῖν* which it does not receive from the context.

² Lücke incorrectly observes that with this connection there is in *ἐν ἡμῖν* "something superfluous and unsuitable." This is so far from being the case, that it is just in this that the apostle arrives at the consideration of the relationship between God and the believer. True, the love of God relates to the whole world, John iii. 16: *ἠγάπησεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν κόσμον*, and to all, without exception, He has given, by sending His Son, the possibility of not being lost, but obtaining eternal life, but the loving purpose of God is accomplished only in them that believe; the unbelieving remain *ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ θεοῦ*; hence the love of God to the world is more narrowly limited than His love to believers, who are His *τέκνα*.

Hebrews (xi. 17), *μονογενής* denotes the only child of his parents. So the expression is used by John also to denote Christ as the *only* Son of God, "besides whom His Father has none." This predicate is suitable to Him, inasmuch as He is the *λόγος* who is *ἐν ἀρχῇ, πρὸς τὸν Θεόν, Θεός*. Lorinus arbitrarily explains *μονογενής* = *ἀγαπητός*; comp. Meyer on John i. 14. Calvin rightly remarks: "quod unigenitum appellat, ad auxesin valet." How great the love of God, in that He sent His only-begotten Son in order that we might live! Baumgarten-Crusius: "*μονογενής* and *ζήσομεν* are the principal words: the most glorious . . . for our salvation!"

Ver. 10. *ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγάπη*] i.e. "*herein consists love*," love is in its nature of *this* kind. Occumenius inaccurately: *ἐν τούτῳ, δεικνύται, ὅτι ἀγάπη ἐστὶν ὁ Θεός*; for *ἐστὶ* is not = *δεικνύται*; nor is *τοῦ Θεοῦ* to be supplied with *ἡ ἀγάπη* (with Lücke, de Wette, Brückner, etc.), but the expression means love *in general*, as in ver. 7 in the words: *ἡ ἀγάπη ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστὶ* (Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune). — *οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς ἠγαπήσαμεν τὸν Θεόν, ἀλλ' ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*] Grotius and Lange arbitrarily render *οὐχ ὅτι* here = *ὅτι οὐχ*. Several commentators take the first part as, according to its sense, a subordinate clause = *ἡμῶν μὴ ἀγαπησάντων*; Meyer: "Herein consists love, in that, although we had not previously loved God, He nevertheless loved us;"¹ this, however, is incorrect; as John in ver. 7 has said that love is *ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, so here also he would emphasize the fact that love has its origin not in man, but in God; it is originally in God, and not first called forth in Him by the love of men; the latter is rather first the outcome of the divine love;² the words *οὐχ ὅτι* therefore serve to specify love as something divine, not, however, as Düsterdieck (who otherwise interprets correctly) thinks, to emphasize the fact that "the love of God to us is entirely undeserved;" this is a thought which is only to be derived

¹ Similarly a Lapidè: Ille caritatem Dei ponderat et exaggerat ex eo, quod Deus nulla dilectione, nullo obsequio nostro provocatus, imo multis injuriis et sceleribus nostris offensus, prior dilexit nos.

² With this interpretation it is not at all necessary, as Baumgarten-Crusius thinks, to give a different meaning to the *ὅτι* in each case: "not as if . . . but in the fact that;" but *ὅτι* has the same meaning both times, as the sense is: "this is not the nature of the love that *we* were the first to love, but that *God* was the first to love."

from the statement of the apostle (Braune). — *ἡμεῖς* and *αὐτός* are emphatically contrasted with one another. — *καὶ ἀπέστειλε τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ.*] states the actual proof of *αὐτὸς ἠγάπησεν ἡμᾶς*; here also the special emphasis rests, not on *ἀπέστειλε*, but on *ἰλασμόν κ.τ.λ.*, which corresponds to the *ἵνα ζήσωμεν* of ver. 9, inasmuch as it states the basis of the *ζωή*; with *ἰλασμόν*, comp. chap. ii. 2. The aorists *ἠγαπήσαμεν*, *ἠγάπεσε*, *ἀπέστειλεν*, are to be retained as historical tenses (de Wette); by the perfect *ἀπέσταλκεν*, ver. 9, the sending of Christ is merely stated, whereas the aorist employed here narratively depicts the loving act of God in the sending of His Son (Lücke).

Ver. 11. Conclusion from vv. 9 and 10, giving the motive for the exhortation in ver. 7. — The love of God (previously described: *οὕτως*) to us obliges us, believers, to love one another. The obligatory force lies not merely in the example given by God's act of love, but also in this, that we by means of it have become the children of God, and as such *love* as He loves (Lücke). At the same time, however, the correspondence between *ἡμᾶς* and *ἀλλήλους* is to be observed; the Christian, namely, as a child of God, feels himself bound to love his brother because he knows that God loves him, and him whom God loves God's child cannot hate.

Ver. 12. The blessing of brotherly love is perfect fellowship with God. — *Θεὸν οὐδεὶς πώποτε τεθέαται*] comp. ver. 20 and Gospel of John i. 18. In opposition to Rickli's view, that these words were spoken in polemic reference to the false teachers who pretended to see God, *i.e.* to know Him fully, Lücke rightly asserts that in that case the apostle would have more definitely expressed the polemic element; *τεθέαται* does not here at all denote spiritual seeing or knowledge (Hornejus, Neander, Sander, Erdmann), but seeing in the strict sense of the word (de Wette, Düsterdieck, Braune). John, however, does not here emphasize this invisibility of God (in which He is infinitely exalted above man; comp. 1 Tim. vi. 16) in order to suggest that we can reciprocate the love of God, not directly, but only through love to our *visible* brethren (Lücke, Ebrard; similarly Hornejus, Lange, etc.), but in order thereby to emphasize still more the following: *ὁ Θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν μένει κ.τ.λ.* as the Scholiast in Matthiae

indicates by paraphrasing: ὁ ἀόρατος Θεὸς καὶ ἀνέφικτος διὰ τῆς εἰς ἀλλήλους ἀγάπης ἐν ἡμῖν μένει; a Lapidé correctly interprets: licet cum non videamus, tamen, si proximum diligamus, ipse invisibilis erit nobis praesentissimus (so also de Wette, Diisterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, Braune). The πῶποτε which is added shows that τεθέαται is regarded as the simple perfect, and does not "include past and present" (Lücke); nevertheless with the thought: "no one has seen God at any time," the further thought: "no one can see Him," is tacitly combined. That the apostle had in view the passage Ex. xxxiii. 20 (Sander), is the more improbable, as both thought and expression are different. In reference to the appearances of God which the O. T. in Gen. xii. 7, xvii. 1, and elsewhere, relates, Spener rightly remarks: "All such was not the seeing of the Divine Being Himself, but of an assumed form in which His being manifested itself." — ἐὰν ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους, ὁ Θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν μένει] In these words the blessing of brotherly love is stated: With brotherly love fellowship with God is associated, because, indeed, love is of God. The explanation of several commentators: "if we love one another, *then it may thereby be known* that God is in us," weakens the thought of the apostle.¹ God's dwelling in us is certainly not meant to be represented here as a result or fruit of our love to one another (as Frommann, p. 109, interprets); and just as little is it the converse relation; but it is the inseparable co-dependence of the two elements, which mutually condition each other (so also Braune). — καὶ ἡ ἀγάπη αὐτοῦ τετελειωμένη ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν] ἡ ἀγάπη αὐτοῦ is not here "the love which God has to us" (Calovius, Spener, Russmeyer, Sander, Erdmann, etc.), for the idea τετελειωμένη ἐστὶν does not agree with this, comp. ver. 18, but the love which the believer has; αὐτοῦ may, however, be either the objective genitive (so most commentators) or the subjective genitive;

¹ Weiss insists on this interpretation, because "it is meant to be shown how we have in brotherly love the *visible* evidence of an existence of God who is in Himself *invisible*;" incorrectly, for (1) Christians need no visible proof of the existence of the invisible God, and, besides, it is not the *existence* of God, but God's dwelling in us, etc., that is the subject here; (2) the conjunction *ἐὰν* shows that the subordinate clause states the condition under which what is stated in the principal clause takes place; (3) the supplement of a γινώσκωμεν is purely arbitrary.

but in the latter case we must not interpret, with Socinus: "ea dilectio, quam ipse Deus nobis praescripsit," nor, as Calvin thinks probable: "caritas, quam Deus nobis inspirat," but "*the love which is inherent in God*" (which is His nature and ἐξ αὐτοῦ); this, however, considered as dwelling in believers (ἐν ἡμῖν) as the soul of their life (so also Brückner and Braune). This explanation, in which no object which would restrict the general idea of love has to be supplied (comp. vv. 7, 8, 16, 18), deserves the preference, because the specific love to God is first mentioned in ver. 19. Quite unjustifiably Ebrard asserts that ἡ ἀγ. αὐτοῦ denotes "the mutual loving relationship between God and us; comp. ii. 5."

Ver. 13. The token of our fellowship with God (ἐν αὐτῷ μένομεν) corresponds to the preceding: ἡ ἀγάπη αὐτοῦ . . . ἐν ἡμῖν) is: ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος αὐτοῦ δέδωκεν ἡμῖν; comp. iii. 24. The expression: ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος (instead of τὸ πνεῦμα), is explained by the fact that the πνεῦμα of God is the entire fulness of the life of God operating in believers, of which his share is given to each individual. The expression is not to be connected with the διαίρεσις τῶν χαρισμάτων, of which Paul speaks in 1 Cor. xii. 4, 11. Compare Acts ii. 17; in reference to Christ it is said: οὐκ ἐκ μέτρου δίδωσι τὸ πνεῦμα, Gospel of John iii. 34. Against the view that by πνεῦμα here "love" or a similar quality is to be understood, Spener says: "it is the Spirit Himself, and not His gifts only, that we receive."¹—ὅτι does not mean "if" (Baumgarten-Crusius), for John supposes that his readers *are* believers, and as such are certainly partakers of the Spirit.

Vv. 14, 15. That love brings with it fellowship with God, is caused by the fact that God is love and love springs from God. But God's love was made manifest by the sending of His Son, and this is testified by the apostles, who themselves have seen Him. The last thought which ver. 14 expresses serves as an introduction to the thought that follows in ver. 15, in which the believing confession (and therefore

¹ Weiss incorrectly uses this passage as a proof that, whilst *Jesus* considered the Holy Ghost as a personal being, *John* had *not yet* perfectly taken hold of this conception; for even if it be admitted that the expression used here does not specify the personality of the Spirit, yet it is in no way contradictory to it. Besides, Weiss himself admits that the passage: τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια (chap. v. 6), points to the personality of the Spirit.

faith) is described as the condition of fellowship with God, and hence also of true love. — καὶ ἡμεῖς] By ἡμεῖς John means here himself and his fellow-apostles; comp. ver. 6. — τεθεάμεθα καὶ μαρτυροῦμεν, comp. chap. i. 1, 2. τεθεάμεθα expresses the direct seeing (Gospel of John i. 14), not knowledge through the medium of others. The apostles saw that the Father sent the Son, inasmuch as they saw the Son Himself—and not after the flesh merely, but also as the μονογενὴς παρὰ πατρός. With τεθεάμεθα corresponds the closely-connected idea μαρτυροῦμεν, which presupposes one's own direct experience; comp. Gospel of John i. 34. — The subject of this testimony is: ὅτι ὁ πατήρ ἀπέσταλκε τὸν υἱὸν σωτήρα τοῦ κόσμου, comp. vv. 9, 10; σωτήρα τ. κ. states the purpose of the sending, which does not refer to particular elect ones, but to the whole number of sinners (comp. chap. ii. 2 and Gospel of John iii. 16). — Ver. 15. With ὁμολογήσῃ, comp. ver. 2. The subject of the confession is: ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ; this is precisely what the antichrists deny; comp. vv. 2 and 3. — Weiss erroneously interprets: "Whosoever abides in this confession, in him it is seen that God is in him;" the words "in him it is seen" are a mere interpolation.

Ver. 16. The beginning of this verse: καὶ ἡμεῖς, is indeed of the same import as the beginning of ver. 14; but ἡμεῖς here does not merely mean the apostles (Myrberg), for otherwise ἐν ἡμῖν also would have to be referred to them, and a contrast, here inappropriate, would be drawn between the apostles and the readers, but it is used in its more general sense (as most commentators take it), which is also indicated by the connection of this verse with the preceding one. — With ἐγνώκαμεν καὶ πεπιστεύκαμεν, comp. John vi. 69. As the object of faith must have been previously made known to us, and hence made the subject of knowledge before we can take hold of it in faith, and as, on the other hand, it is only through faith that knowledge becomes the determining principle of our life, and these two elements mutually condition each other continually in the Christian life, knowledge, therefore, can be put before faith, as here, and faith can also be put before knowledge, as in John vi. 69.¹ — τὴν ἀγάπην, ἣν ἔχει ὁ Θεὸς ἐν ἡμῖν] is not,

¹ Lucke: "True faith is, according to John, intelligent and experienced: true knowledge is a believing knowledge. Both together form the complete Christian

with Wilke (*Hermeneutik des N. T.* II. 64), to be interpreted: "the love which God has in us, *i.e.* as a love dwelling in us," or, with Ebrard: "God's love which He has kindled in us, by means of which, as by His own nature, He works in us," for the verbs ἐγνώκαμεν and πεπιστεύκαμεν show that the subject here is not something subjective, and therefore not our love (which only in so far as it is the outcome of the divine love is described as the love which God has in us), but something objective, and therefore the love of God, which has manifested itself in the sending of His Son for the propitiation for our sins. ἐν is used here just as in ver. 9. The following words: ὁ Θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ., which are closely connected with what immediately precedes, form the keystone of the foregoing, inasmuch as the particular ideas of the previous context are all embraced in them. — On ὁ Θεὸς ἀγ. ἐστὶ, see ver. 8. — καὶ ὁ μένων κ.τ.λ. is the inference from the thought that God is love, in this way, namely, that all true love springs from Him. The idea of love here is not to be restricted to *brotherly* love (ver. 12, ἐὰν ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους), but (as also Düsterdieck, Braune, and Weiss remark)¹ is to be understood quite generally.² The idea of fellowship with God is here expressed just as in ver. 15. If John makes it at one time dependent on knowledge, and at another dependent on love, this is explained by the fact that to him both knowledge and love are the radiations of that faith by means of which the new birth operates.

Ver. 17. After the apostle has said in ver. 16 that *he that dwelleth in love* (and therefore no one else) has fellowship with God, he now indicates wherein love shows itself as perfected; the thought of this verse is accordingly connected with the

conviction, so that John, when he wants to express this very strongly, puts them both together, in which case it is indifferent whether the one or the other comes first." Comp. also Neander on this passage, and Küstlin, *der Lehrbegr. des Ev.* etc., pp. 63, 215 ff.

¹ Weiss further erroneously observes that "here also being in God is not to be made dependent on love, but love on being in God."

² Ebrard introduces a reference foreign to the passage when he includes in μένειν ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ also the "dwelling in the love of God to us, in faith in God's love;" Erdmann also incorrectly interprets: "τῷ μένειν ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ eadem animi nostri ad caritatem Dei relatio denotatur, quae verbis ἐγνώκαμεν καὶ πεπιστεύκαμεν significatur." Had the apostle meant this, he would have added to ἀγάπῃ, as a more particular definition, τοῦ Θεοῦ. Comp. Gospel of John xv. 10.

preceding: ὁ μένων ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ. — ἐν τούτῳ τετελείωται ἡ ἀγάπη μεθ' ἡμῶν] Several commentators, Luther, Calvin, Spener, Grotius, Hornejus, Calovius, Semler, Sander, Besser, Ewald, etc., understand by ἡ ἀγάπη "the love of God to us," interpreting μεθ' ἡμῶν = εἰς ἡμᾶς, and τετελείωται as referring to the perfect manifestation of the love of God; Grotius: hic est summus gradus delectionis Dei erga nos.¹ This interpretation, however, has the context against it, for in ver. 16: ὁ μένων ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ, as well as in ver. 18: ὁ φόβος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ, by ἀγάπη is meant the love of man, the love that dwells in us; comp. also ver. 12. Here also, therefore, ἀγάπη must be understood of this love, with Estius, Socinus, Lange, Lücke, de Wette, Neander, Gerlach, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc.; τετελείωται is used in the same sense as τετελειωμένη ἐστιν, ver. 12; comp. also ver. 18: ἡ τελεία ἀγάπη. — It is not the object of the love that is described by μεθ' ἡμῶν, for μετά is not = εἰς, but it means "in;"² it either belongs to the verb: "therein is love made perfect in us" (Lücke, de Wette, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc.; Erdmann, who explains μετά = ἐν), or to ἀγάπη: "the love which exists (prevails) in us is," etc. With the first construction, the addition appears rather superfluous; besides, its position would then be more natural before ἡ ἀγάπη. The underlying idea is that the love which has come from God (for all love is ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ) has made its abode

¹ Sander: "That it is made perfect must only mean: this love of God which was manifested in the sending of His Son is manifested in its might and glory in this, that, as overcoming everything, it brings us so far that we," etc. — Calovius: Perficitur dilectio Dei in nobis, non ratione sui, sic enim absolute perfecta est, sed ratione nostri, non quoad existentiam, sed quoad experientiam.

² Hence ἡ ἀγ. μεθ' ἡμῶν is neither = ἡ ἀγ. (τοῦ Θεοῦ) εἰς ἡμᾶς, nor = ἡ ἀγάπη (ἡμῶν) εἰς ἀλλήλους, as Lücke in his 1st ed. interprets ("our love among ourselves, i.e. our mutual love"); still less justifiable is the interpretation of Rickli: "the mutual love between God and the believer;" for John never includes God and men in ἡμεῖς. When Ebrard, admitting this, nevertheless accepts the interpretation of Rickli as far as the sense is concerned, explaining "the love of God with us" by "the love which exists between God and us," this is purely arbitrary, for even though μετά is frequently used to denote a reciprocal action (see Winer, p. 336; VII. p. 352 ff.), yet this reference is here unsuitable, for it is not God and we, but love and we, that are placed together. Moreover, to supply τοῦ Θεοῦ with ἡ ἀγάπη is at the best only defensible if in μεθ' ἡμῶν the subject to which the love refers is stated; but this is grammatically impossible. If, as Ebrard thinks, ἡ ἀγάπη denotes not love, but the love-relationship, then ἡ ἀγάπη μεθ' ἡμῶν may only mean "the loving-relationship that exists among us;" this idea, however, as Ebrard with justice says, does not suit the context.

with believers. Here, also, ἡ ἀγάπη is used without more particular definition, as in ver. 16, and is therefore not to be limited to a specific object (so also de Wette, Düsterdieck, Braune); it is therefore neither merely "love to the brethren" (Socinus, Lücke,¹ etc.), nor merely "love to God" (Lange, Erdmann); Baumgarten-Crusius not incorrectly explains the idea by "the *sentiment of love*;" only it must not be forgotten that true love is not merely *sentiment*, but *action* also; comp. chap. iii. 18. — ἐν τούτῳ does not refer to the preceding, nor to dwelling in love, nor to fellowship with God, but to what follows; not, however, to ὅτι, as Beza,² Grotius, etc., assuming an attraction, think, but to ἵνα παρρησίαν ἔχωμεν ἐν τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῆς κρίσεως. From ver. 18 it is clear that the chief aim of the apostle is to emphasize the fact that perfect love (ἡ τελεία ἀγάπη, ver. 18) is free from fear, or that he who is perfect in love (τετελειωμένος ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ) experiences no fear, but has confident boldness (παρρησία). The thought of *this* verse is no other than this, that love has its perfection in the fact that it fills us with such παρρησία; the clause beginning with ἵνα therefore contains the leading thought, to which the following ὅτι is subordinated. It is true, the combination ἐν τούτῳ . . . ἵνα (instead of ὅτι, vv. 9, 10, and frequently) is strange, but it is quite John's custom to use the particle of purpose, ἵνα, not seldom as objective particle; the same combination is found in the Gospel of John xv. 8 (Meyer, indeed, differently on this passage); comp. chap. iii. 10, 23: αὕτη . . . ἵνα (Gospel of John xvii. 3); by ἵνα, παρρησίαν ἔχειν is indicated as the goal, not "which God has in view in the perfecting of love in us" (Braune), but which the ἀγάπη in its perfection attains (Düsterdieck). With παρρησίαν ἔχειν, comp. chap. ii. 28.³ — The ἡμέρα τῆς κρίσεως is the

¹ According to Bertheau's note in the 3d ed. of Lücke's *Commentary* (p. 364), Lücke has, however, in the edition of 1851 interpreted ἡ ἀγάπη: "brotherly love combined with love to God."

² Beza's interpretation runs: (Charitas adimpletur in nobis per hoc quod qualis ille est, tales et nos simus in hoc mundo, ut fiduciam habeamus in die judicii.

³ In Luther's version, παρρησία is here, as elsewhere frequently, translated by "Freudigkeit;" this is not a word derived from "Freude" (joy), but the old German word "Freidikeit" (from "freidic, fraidig")=haughtiness, boldness, confidence (comp. Vilmar's *pastoral-theol. Blätter*, 1861, vols. I. and II. p. 110 ff.); in the older editions it is written sometimes "freydickeyt"

day *ὅταν φανερωθῇ Ἰησοῦς Χριστός*, ii. 2. 8. The preposition is not to be interpreted = *εἰς*, and *ἔχωμεν* ¹ is not to be taken as a future (Ewald: "that we shall have") the difficulty that anything future (behaviour on the judgment-day) should be taken as the evidence of perfect love in the present (*τετελείωται* is not to be taken as future complete, but as perfect: "has been made perfect," or "has become perfect" = "is perfected"), is removed if we take it that in *ἐν* the *παρρησία*, which the believer will have at the judgment-day, and which he already has when he thinks of the judgment, is included, which could the more easily occur in John, as in his view the judgment-day did not lie in far-off distance, but was already conceived as begun (chap. ii. 18). The future *παρρησία* is to him in his love already present; similarly de Wette, Sander, Besser.¹ — The following words: *ὅτι καθὼς . . . τούτῳ*, serve to establish the foregoing thought. By *ἐκεῖνος* we are not to understand, with Augustine, Bede, Estius, Lyranus, Castalio, etc., *God*, but, with most commentators, *Christ*, who is also suggested by the idea: *ἡ ἡμέρα τῆς κρίσεως*. — The comparison (*καθὼς*) does not refer to *εἶναι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ*, so that the sense would be: "as Christ is in this world, so are we also in this world," for (1) Christ is no longer in this world (comp. Gospel of John xvii. 11), and (2) in the fact that we are in this world lies no reason for *παρρησία* at the day of judgment. By *καθὼς . . . καί* it is rather the *similarity of character* that is brought out, as in ii. 16, where *καθὼς* does not refer to the idea of *περιπατεῖν* in itself, but to the character of the walk, so that it is to be

(Wittenb. ed. 1525), sometimes *freudigkeit* (Nürnberg ed. 1524), but in 1537 (in a Strasburg ed.) "*freudigkeit*." In what sense Luther understood the word is clearly seen from a sermon on 1 John iv. 16-21 (see Plochmann's ed. XIX. 383), in which he says: "he means that faith should thus show itself, so that when the last day comes, you may have *boldness* and stand firm." It is to be observed also that such Hebrew and Greek words as contain the idea of joy Luther never translates by that word ("boldness"), but by "joyous," "joy."

¹ Braune, though he explains correctly the particular thought, denies that these two elements are here to be regarded as combined; but without entering into the difficulty which lies in the expression. Ebrard states the meaning of the words incorrectly thus: "In the fact that the *will* of God, that we should have boldness in the day of judgment, is internally revealed to us, and manifests itself as a power (of confidence) in us (even now), the loving relationship of God with us is shown to be perfect." How many elements foreign to the context are here introduced!

interpreted: "as the character of Christ is, so is our character also;" in the second clause οὕτως is to be supplied, as in 1 Cor. viii. 2; Eph. iv. 17, 21. What sort of character is meant must be inferred from the context; it is entirely arbitrary to find the similarity in the temptation (Rickli) or in the sufferings of Christ (Grotius), or in the fact that Christ was in the world but not of it (Sander), for there is no such reference in the context. But it is also inadmissible to regard as the more particular definition of καθώς the δικαιοσύνη (Düsterdieck), or the Sonship of God (Lücke: "as Christ is the Son of God, so are we also children of God"), for neither do these ideas appear in the context. We are rather to go back to ὁ μένων ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ, and accordingly to refer καθώς to love (so Lorinus: "reddit nos charitas Christo similes et conformes imagini filii Dei;" Bengel, de Wette, Ewald, Myrberg, Braune, etc.¹), so that the sense is: "if we live in love, then we do not fear the judgment of Christ, because then we are like Him, and He therefore cannot condemn us."² The present ἐστί is to be retained as a present, and not to be turned into the preterite (Oecumenius: ὡς ἐκεῖνος ἦν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἄμωμος καὶ καθαρός). Love is the eternal nature of Christ, comp. iii. 7: καθὼς ἐκεῖνος δίκαιός ἐστιν. In the concluding words: ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ, which belong, not to ἐστί, but only to ἐσμεν, it is brought out that we are still in the earthly world (κόσμος οὗτος is not

¹ The reference of καθώς to love is the only one demanded by the context, so that it is not suitable to regard love only as a single element in the likeness of believers to Christ which is here spoken of, as is the case with Lücke, for instance. Erdmann lays the chief emphasis not so much on love as on fellowship with God, which exists in love; but by καθὼς . . . ἐστί it is not a relationship, but a quality that is indicated.

² Ebrard in his interpretation arrives at no definite result; as, on his supposition that the centre of the tertii comparationis lies in the words ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ, the present ἐστί is objectionable to him, he would prefer to conjecture "οὕτως" instead of ἐστί; but "as a faithful attention to the requirements of Biblical exegesis would scarcely permit such a conjecture," he thinks that nothing else remains but either to suppose that ἐστί (in the sense of a historical present) "is added as an indifferent, colourless word," or to refer καθὼς ἐκ. ἐστί to the fact that Christ even now "still exists in the wicked world to a certain extent, namely, in the Church, which is His body." Ebrard regards the second conjecture as the more correct, and in accordance with it thus states the sense: "We look forward to the judgment with boldness, for, as He (in His Church) is still persecuted by the wicked world (even at the present day), so are we also in this world (as lambs among wolves)" (!). Ebrard groundlessly maintains,

an ethical idea), whereas Christ has already ascended from it into heaven.

Ver. 18 serves to establish the preceding thought, that love has its perfection in *παρρησία*. — *φόβος οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ*] The thought is quite general in its character: "where love is, there is no fear" (Ebrard); *φόβος* is therefore not specially the fear of God, and by *ἀγάπη* we are not to understand specially love to God, but at the same time this general thought is certainly expressed here in reference to the relationship to God. It is quite erroneous to explain *ἀγάπη* here, with Calvin, Calovius, Flacius, Spener, etc., as "the love of God to us;"¹ but it is also incorrect, with Lücke and others, to understand by it, specially, brotherly love.² — The preposition *ἐν* is not = with (à Mons: ne se trouve avec la charité); Luther correctly: "Fear is not in love;" i.e. it is not an element in love, it is something utterly foreign to it, which only exists outside it. By the following words: *ἀλλ' ἡ τελεία ἀγάπη ἔξω βάλλει τὸν φόβον*, the preceding thought is confirmed and expanded: love not only has no fear in it, but it does not even endure it; where it enters, there must fear completely vanish. Beza inadequately paraphrases the adjective *τελεία* by: sincera, opposita simulationi; it is not love in its first beginnings, love which is still feeble, but love in its perfection, that completely casts out fear. The reason why love does not suffer fear to be along with it is: *ὅτι ὁ*

against the explanation given in the text, "that with it an *εὐτως* could not be omitted, nay, that even this would not suffice, but that it would have to read: *ὅτι οὗτος ἐκείνους ἵσται, τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἡμεῖς ἵσμεν*, and that even then the passage remains obscure enough;" and "that with this acceptance *ὡς τ. κ. τ.* almost appears quite superfluous and foreign." Against the statement that "our confidence in view of the judgment could not possibly be founded on our likeness to Christ, but only on the love of God as manifested in Christ," it is a decisive answer that John in other passages as well makes the *παρρησία* dependent upon *our* character, comp. ii. 28, iii. 21.

¹ Calovius interprets: *charitas divina, quae apprehensa per fidem, omnem servilem timorem expellit*, whereby a reference foreign to the context is plainly introduced.

² For justification of this interpretation Lücke refers to the words: *ἔξω βάλλει τὸν φόβον*, and remarks: "it cannot be said of the love of God in its perfection, that it casts out fear of God, for it has not got any." But John does not say that love casts out fear out of itself; the idea rather is: it drives fear out of the heart in which it dwells before it (love) obtains its entrance. If *ἀγάπη* and *φίλος* were meant to have different references, the apostle would certainly have indicated this.

φόβος κόλασιν ἔχει. The word κόλασις (besides here, only in Matt. xxv. 46; comp. Wisd. xi. 14, xvi. 2, 24, xix. 4) has always the meaning of “*punishment*” (also LXX. Ezek. xiv. 3, 4, 7, xviii. 30, xliv. 32, as incorrect translation of חַיִּיבָה); if we adhere to this meaning, that expression can only mean: fear *has punishment*, in which case that which it has to expect is regarded as inherent in it, just as on the other hand it could be said: ἡ ἀγάπη ἔχει ζωὴν αἰώνιον (this being considered as future happiness, as in Matt. xxv. 46); this idea has nothing against it, for fear, as rooted in unbelief, is in itself deserving of punishment, and therein lies the reason (ὅτι) why perfect love casteth out fear.¹ Several commentators, however, explain κόλασις by “*pain*,” thinking that “*here causa is put pro effectu*” (Ebrard), or, in more correspondence with the thought, by “*pain of punishment*” (Besser, Braune, so also previously in this comm.); similarly Lücke explains κόλασις = “*consciousness of punishment*.” The thought that then results is indeed right in itself, for “*certainly this having of κόλασις does actually show itself in the consciousness or the pain of the expectation of punishment*” (Brückner); but such a change in the meaning of the idea κόλασις cannot be grammatically justified. The following sentence: ὁ δὲ φοβούμενος οὐ τετελείωται ἐν τῇ ἀγάπῃ, which is not connected with the subordinate clause ὅτι ὁ φόβος κ.τ.λ., but with the preceding principal clause, does not contain a conclusion from this (δέ is not = οὖν), but (as Braune also thinks) expresses the same thought in negative form (hence the connection by δέ); only with this difference, that what was there expressed in an objective way, here receives a subjective aspect. It needs no proof that the apostle has in view in this verse no other fear than that of which Paul says, Rom. viii. 15: οὐκ ἐλάβετε πνεῦμα δουλείας πάλιν εἰς φόβον, and therefore not the childlike awe of God arising from the consciousness of God’s glory, which forms an essential element of love to God.² The conjectures of Grotius,

¹ It is unnecessary to take the abstract (ὁ φόβος) for the concrete (ὁ φοβούμενος), as de Wette and Düsterdieck do; de Wette incorrectly interprets ἔχει by “*receives*,” and Baumgarten-Crusius by “*keeps, tenet, thinks of . . . punishment*” (so that the sense is: “*Fear knows nothing of mercy, of love*”).

² That the fear which the apostle means has its necessary place also in the development of the spiritual life, Augustine strikingly expresses thus: *Timor*

instead of *κόλασιν*: *κόλουσιν* (*i.e.* mutilationem; so that the sense is: "metus amorem mutilat atque infringit, aut prohibet, ne se exserat"), and instead of *φοβούμενος*: *κολούμενος* ("qui mutilatur aut impeditur in dilectione, is in ea perfectus non est"); and that of Lamb. Bos: instead of *κόλασιν*, *κώλυσιν*, are not merely useless, but even rob the thought of the apostle of its peculiar force.

Ver. 19. *ἡμεῖς ἀγαπῶμεν*] According to this reading (omit *αὐτόν*), *ἀγαπᾶν* is here to be taken in the same comprehensive way as *ἀγάπη* in ver. 16 (Düsterdieck, Myrberg,¹ Ebrard), and must not be restricted to "brotherly love" (Lücke). — *ἀγαπῶμεν*, in analogy with *ἀγαπῶμεν* in ver. 7, and with *ὀφείλομεν*, ver. 11, is taken by Hornejus, Grotius, Lorinus, Lange, Lücke, de Wette-Brückner, Baumgarten-Crusius, Sander, Besser, Düsterdieck, Myrberg, etc., as imperative subjunctive; but it might be more correct to regard this verse, just as ver. 17, as an expression of the actual character of true Christians, with whom, in ver. 20, by *ἐάν τις εἶπῃ* the false Christian is contrasted, and therefore to take *ἀγαπῶμεν*, with Beza, Socinus, Spener, Bengel, Rickli, Neander, Ebrard, Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 338), Braune, etc., as indicative, in favour of which is also the prefixed *ἡμεῖς*. — The reason of *ἡμεῖς ἀγαπῶμεν* is stated in *ὅτι αὐτὸς πρῶτος ἠγάπησεν ἡμᾶς*, in which the chief emphasis rests on *πρῶτος*; comp. vv. 9, 10.

Ver. 20—chap. v. 1. Proof of the necessary co-existence of love to God and love to the brethren. The absence of the latter is evidence of the absence of the former; where love to God is, brotherly love also cannot be wanting.

Ver. 20. This verse divides itself into two parts, the second part confirming the thought of the first. — *ἐάν τις εἶπῃ*] The same form of thought as in chap. i. 6 ff. — *ὅτι ἀγαπῶ τὸν Θεόν*] *ὅτι* is used, as frequently, at the commencement of the

quasi locum præparat charitati. Si autem nullus timor, non est qua intret charitas. Timor Dei sic vulnerat quomodo medici ferramentum. Timor medicamentum, charitas sanitas. Timor servus est charitatis. Timor est custos et paedagogus legis, donec veniat charitas.—The different steps are thus stated by Bengel: varius hominum status: sine timore et amore; cum timore sine amore; cum timore et amore; sine timore cum amore.

¹ Myrberg remarks: totum genus amoris hic proponitur; sed ubi totum genus amoris nuncupatur, ibi mens ante omnia fertur ad considerationem amoris erga Deum.

direct oration. — καὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ μισῇ] With μισῇ corresponds the subsequent ὁ μὴ ἀγαπῶν, comp. chap. iii. 14, 15. Spenser: "not only with actual hatred towards him, but even not loving him in perfect truth." To hate is the positive expression for "not to love" (so also Braune). — ψεύστης ἐστίν] see chap. i. 6. The truth that he who hates (or, does not love) his brother, also does not love God, the apostle confirms by the contrast between ὃν ἑώρακε and ὃν οὐχ ἑώρακεν, in which the *visibility* of the brother is contrasted with the *invisibility* of God. The perfect indicates the permanent state; comp. ver. 12, Gospel of John i. 18. Lücke: ἑωρακέναι = "to have before one's eyes;" a Lapide: "vidit et assidue videt." Socinus incorrectly lays a certain emphasis on the preterite when he says: quandoquidem satis est ad amorem per cognitionem alicujus erga illum excitandum, quod quis ipsum aliquando viderit; nec necesse est, ut etiam nunc illum videat. The premiss for the conclusion of the apostle is, that the visible—as the object directly presented to the sight—is more easily loved than the invisible. Even the natural man turns with love to the visible,¹ whereas love to God, as the Unseen, requires an elevation of the heart of which only the saved are capable. Hence brotherly love is the easier, love to God is the more difficult. In him who rejects the former, the latter has certainly no place. The truth that love to God is the condition of Christian brotherly love, is not in contradiction with this; for that love, as the glorification of natural love, has its necessary basis in the natural inclination which we have to our visible brother, who is like us. It is therefore unnecessary to attach any importance to elements which the apostle here leaves quite untouched, as is the case with Calvin (with whom Sander, Ebrard, etc., agree) when he says: Apostolus hic pro confesso sumit, Deum se nobis in hominibus offerre, qui insculptam gerunt ejus imaginem; Joannes nil aliud voluit, quam fallacem esse jactantiam, si quis Deum se amare dicat, et ejus imaginem, quae

¹ Oecumenius: ἐφικνωσκὸν γὰρ ὅρασις ἀγάπην. Hornejus: Sicut omnis cognitio nostra communiter a sensu incipit, ita amor quoque, unde facilius et prius amatur, quod facilius et promptius cognoscitur. Similarly Luther, Calovius, etc. Compare also the statement of Gregory (*Homil. XI. in Evang.*): Oculi sunt in amore duces; and Philo (*ad Dealog.*): ἀμήχανον εὐσεβεῖσθαι τὸν ἀόρατον ὑπὸ τῶν εἰς τοὺς ἐμφανεῖς καὶ ἰγγύς ἀσεβούντων.

ante oculos est, negligat;¹ and with de Wette in his interpretation: "the brother is the visible empiric object of love; whereas God, the ideal invisible object, can really be loved *only in him*." By the interrogative: *πῶς δύναται ἀγαπᾶν* (comp. chap. iii. 17), and by placing the object *τὸν Θεόν* first, the expression gains in vivacity and point. — *πῶς δύναται* must not be taken: "how can he attain to that?" but: "how can we suppose that he loves?" (Baumgarten-Crusius). Bengel: *sermo modalis: impossibile est, ut talis sit amans Dei, in praesenti*.

Ver. 21. Alterum argumentum cur amare proximum (or, more correctly: fratrem) debeamus: quia Deus id praecepit (Grotius). — *καί*] not = and yet (Paulus); for this verse does not contain an antithesis, but an expansion of the preceding thought. — *ταύτην τὴν ἐντολὴν κ.τ.λ.*] Lange interprets *ἐντολή* here by: "teaching;" and Grotius paraphrases *ὁ ἀγαπῶν τὸν Θεόν* by: qui a Deo pro amante ipsius haberi vult; both false and unnecessary; for although brotherly love is the natural fruit and activity of love to God, yet at the same time the practice of it is the habitual task which he who loves God has to perform, as one appointed him by God. It is doubtful whether we are to understand by *αὐτοῦ* God (Baumgarten-Crusius, de Wette, Düsterdieck, etc.) or Christ; that in the latter case *ἐκείνου* must be read is unfounded; because *τὸν Θεόν* follows, the second view seems to be the more correct; but as in the context there is no reference here at all to Christ, it might be safer to understand by *αὐτοῦ* God. — By *ἵνα* referring back to *ταύτην*, it is here, as frequently after verbs of wishing and commanding, not so much the purpose as the purport of the commandment (the realization of which is certainly the aim and object of the commandment) that is stated, which Braune here also incorrectly disputes.

¹ The objection of Ebrard, that "it is not easier to love a person who stands visibly before me, and has, for instance, *injured* me, than a person whom I have not seen at all," is overthrown by the fact that the apostle does not here make the slightest reference to the conduct of persons standing in visible opposition to us, by whom the natural feeling of love towards our equals is destroyed and turned into hate. As the apostle is contrasting the elements of visibility and invisibility, it is so much the more arbitrary to introduce here a reference to the *imago Dei*, as this is not something visible, but something invisible,—the object, not of sight, but of faith.

CHAPTER V.

VER. 1. Lachm. has bracketed the *καί* before τὸν γεγεννημένον, because it is wanting in B, some min. Vulg. Hil. etc. Instead of τὸν γεγεννημένον, *℣* reads τὸ γεγ. as it runs in ver. 4. — Ver. 2. Instead of τηρῶμεν, *Rec.* in A G K *℣*, etc., Lachm. and Tisch. read : ποιῶμεν, according to B, several min. Vulg. Syr. Thph. etc. The authorities, however, decide in favour of τηρῶμεν, even A; in which the following words : αὕτη γὰρ . . . τηρῶμεν, are wanting, perhaps through a mistake. Still it remains likely that τηρῶμεν has been inserted as John's usual expression (with ἐντολάς) instead of ποιῶμεν. — Ver. 5. Instead of the *Rec.* τίς ἐστιν (A G, *al. pl.*, Vulg. etc., Lachm. Tisch.), is found in B K, several min. etc. : τίς ἐστιν δέ; τίς δὲ ἐστιν; in *℣* the δέ is inserted, perhaps for closer connection of the clauses. — Ver. 6. Instead of αἵματος, πνεύματος is found in some min. etc.; in A *℣*, some min. etc., is found the addition : καὶ πνεύματος; others read : πνεύματος καὶ αἵματος, and αἵματος καὶ πνεύματος is also found; πνεύματος is evidently a later addition. — The *Rec.* has before Χριστός the article ὁ; it is wanting in A G *℣* (K : Χριστός Ἰησοῦς) and, according to the statement of Tisch. 7, in B; according to Tisch. 2, it is found in B (namely, e silentio collatorum); Buttmann has retained it, as well as Lachmann and Tisch. 2; Tisch. 7 has, however, rejected it. — Instead of μόνον, B reads μόνῳ; a correction right according to the sense. — καὶ τῷ αἵματι] According to A B G, and many others, Syr. Copt. (with Lachm. and Tisch.), καὶ ἐν τῷ αἵμ. is probably to be substituted. Other variations, as πνεύματι instead of αἵματι, etc., do not call for observation; the reading ὅτι Χριστός instead of ὅτι τὸ πνεῦμα need only be mentioned, which, because it is found in the Vulgate, is the basis of several old interpretations, although it is supported by scarcely any other authorities. — Ver. 7. Before τρεῖς, *℣* has the article οἱ; but in this it is alone. — The words that follow οἱ μαρτυροῦντες in the *Rec.* : ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ὁ πατήρ, ὁ λόγος καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα καὶ οὗτοι οἱ τρεῖς ἓν εἰσι. (Ver. 8) Καὶ τρεῖς εἰσιν οἱ μαρτυροῦντες ἐν τῇ γῇ, are rejected by Griesb. Lachm. Tisch. etc., and are considered spurious by almost all modern commentators (except Sander, Besser, Mayer). — They are wanting in *all the*

Greek Codices, except in 173** (of the 16th cent.), 34, and 162; in the two latter, however, which also belong only to the 16th cent., the words: *καὶ οἱ τρεῖς τὸ ἐν εἶναι*, and the articles: *ὁ, ὁ, τὸ*, are omitted. They are wanting, further, in *almost all the versions*. With regard to the Latin Codices, they are only found in these after the 8th cent.; the Codex Amiatinus (circa 541), Harleianus (of the 7th cent.), and others do not contain them; the Codex Demidovianus has transposed them, thus: *quia tres sunt qui testimonium dant in terra, spiritus, aqua et sanguis, et tres unum sunt. Et tres sunt, qui testimonium dant in coelo, pater, verbum, et spiritus.*—Of the *Greek Fathers* not a single one mentions them, although reference to them would have been very convenient in the Arian controversies; just as little is there any reference to them in most of the older Latin Fathers, as Hilary, Lucifer, Ambrose, Faustinus, Jerome, Augustine, etc. An allusion to them has incorrectly been believed to exist in Tertullian in the passages: *c. Præc.* 25, and *de Pudicit.* 21; on the other hand, Cyprian (*de unitate ecclesiæ*) seems to refer to them in the words: *Dicit Dominus: Ego et Pater unum sumus; et iterum de Patre et Filio et Spiritu Sancto scriptum est: Et tres unum sunt.* The passage in Phoebadius (4th cent.), *contra Arianos*, c. 45, refers rather to Tertullian than to John;¹ and in Eucherius (5th cent.), *lib. formularum*, c. 11, they are only found in interpolated handwriting. They are first certainly quoted by Vigilius (towards the end of the 5th cent.) in the books written under the name of Idacius, *contra Varinadum*, by Fulgentius, Cassiodorus (of the 6th cent.), and in many later ones since the 9th cent.—The peculiar quotation in Cyprian finds its explanation in the symbolical interpretation of the words: *τὸ πνεῦμα, τὸ ὕδωρ, and τὸ αἷμα* of the Trinity, which is also found in the Schol. in Matthæi: *οἱ τρεῖς οἱ εἶπεν Ἀρσενίου, ὅτι σύμβολα ταῦτα τῆς τριάδος*; and in the Schol.: *τρεῖς εἰσι τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον καὶ ὁ πατήρ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἱεροῦ* (and on *ἐν εἶναι*: *τρεῖς εἰσι μία θεότης, εἷς Θεός*), and which Facundus (6th cent.) has rightly recognised when he says, *pro defens. trium capit.* L. i. c. 3: *tres sunt qui testimonium dant (in terra?) Spiritus, aqua et sanguis, et hi tres unum sunt*

¹ The passages in Tertullian run thus: *the first*: *Ceterum de meo sumet, inquit, sicut ipse de Patris. Ita connexus Patris in Filio et Filii in Patre, tres efficiunt coherentes alterum ex altero: qui tres unum sunt, non unus, quomodo dictum est. Ego et Pater unum sumus, ad substantiæ unitatem, non ad numeri singularitatem; the second*: *Et ecclesia proprie et principaliter ipse est Spiritus, in quo est trinitas minus divinitatis, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus.* The passage in Phoebadius: *Sic alius a Filio Spiritus, sicut alius a Patre Filius. Sic tertia in Spiritu, ut in Filio secunda Persona: unus tamen Deus omnia, quia tres unum sunt.*

. . . quod Joannis apostoli testimonium Cyprianus . . . de Patre, Filio et Spiritu s. intelligit.¹ — As at first the three persons of the Trinity were substituted for the former words, as was the case with Cyprian, the idea arose afterwards that they were named by the apostle *in addition to them*, and some Fathers then quoted the passage as it had taken shape in accordance with this idea. — The weight of the evidence *against* the genuineness of the disputed words is so strong, that it is opposed to the fundamental principles of a sound and unprejudiced criticism to regard them as genuine. — In the 16th cent. the words are found in most of the Latin translations, as well as in some of the German translations which were made in accordance with the Vulgate. With regard to the editions of the Greek text, the Complutensian (1504–1514), following the Vulgate, accepted them; on the other hand, Erasmus in his earliest editions rejected them, as well as Aldus Manutius in the Venetian edition (1518); in his translation of 1521 and in the 3d edition of 1522, Erasmus, however, accepted them, adducing Cod. 34; Stephanus and Beza did the same; “the *Rec.* sanctioned the claim of this reading” (Braune). Luther *never* admitted them into his translation.² They are first found in the translations which appeared in *Switzerland* without Luther’s name; thus in the *Zürich* edition of Froschover 1529; the edition of 1531 also has them, but with the omission of “in earth,” and in small print; in that of 1533 they are printed in ordinary letters, whilst they are bracketed in later editions of 1540, 1545, 1549.³ The *Basel* edition of Bryllinger, 1552, has them without brackets; the *Zürich* edition of Gessner, 1555, on the other hand, has them bracketed. — With regard to the editions published in *Frankfurt on the Main*, these words, according to the usual statement, are first found in the edition of 1593; this, however, is incorrect, for they previously occur in the quarto edition of 1582, though they are wanting in the octavo of Feyerabendt, 1582.⁴ Among the editions printed in *Wittenberg*, the

¹ Ebrard, indeed, also holds these words to be spurious, but thinks it probable that they existed in the MSS. which were available to Cyprian; this, however, is the less to be inferred from the fact that Vigilius had the passage in his N.T., since he quotes it in a corrupt sense.

² It is strange that the words are found explained in Luther’s second Commentary on the Epistle (Walch) without the slightest reference to their spuriousness, whilst in Luther’s first Commentary they are distinctly specified as spurious. This is no doubt explained by the fact that he based his second edition on the later text of Erasmus.

³ According to Rickli, these brackets were first omitted in 1597; Ebrard, on the other hand, says that they were already omitted in the edition of 1561 which was in his possession.

⁴ For these and the following notices I have to thank my friend Dr. Klose of

quarto edition of Zach. Lehmann, 1596, is probably the first that admitted the words; but again they are wanting in many later editions; the last which does not contain them is the quarto of 1620, which was published by Zach. Schürer at Joh. Richteris. — In the 17th cent. their genuineness was defended — certainly on insufficient and false grounds. After Richard Simon had declared himself against them, they were opposed in the 18th cent., especially by Thomas Emlyn (1715), Clarke (1738), Wetstein, Michaelis, Semler, Hezel, Griesbach, Matthaei. Bengel, on the contrary, defended them, but with the arbitrary assumption that the text originally ran: “ὅτι πρὸς εἰσιν οἱ μαρτυροῦντες ἐν τῇ γῇ τὸ πνεῦμα κ.τ.λ. εἰς τὸ ἐν εἰσιν. Ver. 8. καὶ πρὸς εἰσιν οἱ μαρτυροῦντες ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, ὁ πατήρ, ὁ λόγος καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα καὶ οὗτοι οἱ πρὸς ἐν εἰσιν.” Compare especially: Bengel, *Apparat. criticus*; Griesbach, *diatribe in loc. 1 Johann. v. 7, 8*, as appendix of the 2d part of his edition; Semler in his *hist. u. krit. Sammlungen über die sog. Beweisstellen in d. Dogm. St. I.*; Rickli in his notes on this passage; Knittel, *Neue Kritiken über 1 Joh. v. 7, 8*. — Ver. 9. Instead of ἦν, according to G K, etc., Thph. Oecum., A B s, etc., Vulg. etc., Cyr. read ὅτι, which is recommended by Griesbach and accepted by Lachm. and Tisch.; ἦν seems to have arisen from ver. 10; Reiche, however, holds ἦν to be the original. — Ver. 10. ἐξ ἧς τὴν μαρτυρίαν] *Rec.* according to B G K s, very many min. and vss. Thph. etc. (Tisch.); Lachm. (following A, Vulg.) adds τοῦ Θεοῦ, which, however, seems to be an explanatory gloss. — Instead of ἰαυτῶ, Tisch. reads: αὐτῶ, following A G K; only a clerical variation. τῶ Θεῶ, *Rec.* after B G K s, Syr. etc., Thph. (Tisch.). Against this A and the Vulg. have τῶ υἱῶ (Lachm.). This reading has arisen from the idea that this negative sentence must exactly correspond to the preceding: ὁ πιστεύων εἰς τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ. — Ver. 13. The *Rec.* runs: ὑμῶν τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἵνα εἰδῇτε ὅτι ζῶντες ἐχέτε αἰώνιον καὶ ἵνα πιστεύητε εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ. In A B s, etc., Vulg. Copt. Theb. etc., Cassiod. Bede, the addition: τοῖς πιστεύουσιν . . . τοῦ Θεοῦ, is wanting after ὑμῶν; instead of the concluding καὶ ἵνα κ.τ.λ., the

Hamburg, who has personally examined these editions in the Hamburg Library. According to Panzer (*Hist. d. Bibellibers.* p. 492 ff.) and Mönckeberg (*Beitr. z. Feststellung*, etc., p. 152), the words are said to occur as early as in the Frankfurt edition of 1574, edited by Reffeler (published by John Feyerabendt); but this statement is incorrect. According to a written communication from Professor Dr. Keil, who has compared the edition in the Leipzig University Library, the passage referred to runs: “And it is the Spirit that bears witness that the Spirit is truth. For there are three that bear record on earth, the Spirit and the water and the blood, and these three are one. If we receive the witness of men,” etc. The folio edition of Weyg. Hanen, 1574, also does not contain the words.

reading in A, etc., almost all the vss. Cassiod. Bede is: *οἱ πιστεύοντες εἰς τὸ ὕν. κ.τ.λ.*; in B, however, *τοῖς πιστεύουσιν*; so also \aleph^* ; in \aleph^1 , however: *οἱ πιστεύοντες*. — Griesb. Scholz, Lachm. Tisch. have accepted the reading as it is in A, Buttmann as it is in B. Even if the common reading is to be justified according to the sense (de Wette, Sander, Reiche), yet its correctness does not therefore follow, as it has too little support from external authorities, and as *ἵνα πιστεύῃτε* seems to owe its origin to the passage, Gospel of John xx. 31. The reading of B might, however, be preferable to the reading of A, since the former is not only the more difficult, but by it the origin of the *Rec.* can be more easily explained; so also Brückner; Braune prefers the reading of A, "as *difficilior*," but the addition is more easily connected with *ἔχετε* than with the preceding *ἡμῶν*. — It is doubtful whether *αἰώνιον* had its original position before or after *ἔχετε*; the former is attested by G K \aleph , several min. Thph. Oec.; the latter by A B, etc., Vulg. etc. (Lachm. Tisch.). — Ver. 14. Instead of *ὅτι ἐάν τι*, Lachm., following A, reads: *ὅ, τι ἂν*, which, however, has too little support. — Ver. 15. Lachmann's reading: *καὶ ἂν*, instead of *καὶ ἐάν*, has too little evidence in B. A omits entirely the words: *καὶ . . . ἡμῶν*; so also \aleph^* ; \aleph^1 reads: *καὶ ἐάν ἴδωμεν κ.τ.λ.* — *ὅ ἂν*] *Rec.* according to A K, etc., Oec. (Lachm.); instead of which B G \aleph , and many others, Thph., have *ὅ ἐάν* (Tisch.). The reading in \aleph^* : *ὅτι ἐάν ἐχωμεν*, is merely a mistake. — Instead of *παρ' αὐτοῦ* (A G K and several others), B \aleph read *ἀπ' αὐτοῦ* (Lachm. Tisch.). — Ver. 16. Instead of *ἴδῃ*, *Rec.* according to A B G K \aleph , etc., Clem. Thph. Oec., Lachmann has accepted the reading *εἰδῇ*, presented only by the Vulg. and Latin Fathers. \aleph^* has *αἰτήσεις καὶ δώσεις* instead of the third person. — Ver. 18. Instead of *ἀλλ'*, Tisch. and Buttm., following B, read *ἀλλὰ*. The reading *αὐτόν* in A* B, instead of *ἑαυτόν*, is only a clerical variation of the word. — Ver. 20. *καὶ οἶδαμεν*] *Rec.* according to A, several min. etc. (Lachm. Buttm.); K \aleph , etc. (according to Tisch., also B; contrary to which Buttm. states that *καὶ οἶδ.* is found in B) have: *οἶδαμεν δέ* (Tisch.); G reads merely *οἶδαμεν*. — Tisch. 7, following A B* G \aleph , etc., reads *γινώσκουμεν*, whilst the *Rec.*, according to B** K, etc., is *γινώσκωμεν* (Tisch. 2, Lachm. Buttm.); the latter is probably a correction. — To *τὸν ἀληθινόν*, A, several min. vss. and Fathers add: *Θεόν*, which, though approved of by Lücke, de Wette, Reiche, is with justice not accepted by Lachm. and Tisch., since it may easily be recognised to be an interpolation. \aleph^* has *τὸ ἀληθ.*; \aleph^1 however, *τόν*. — *ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος*] According to A B \aleph , many min. etc., the article *ἡ*, which is only supported by a few min., is, with Lachm. and Tisch., to be deleted, inasmuch as it is either *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, or *ἡ ζωὴ ἡ αἰώνιος*, or *ἡ αἰώνιος ζωὴ* (John xvii. 3),

that always appears in John, but never ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος. The grounds which Frommann (p. 91 ff.) adduces for the retention of the article are not adequate. — Ver. 21. Instead of *ἐαυτοῦς* (*Rec.* according to A K, etc., Tisch.), B G S* (S¹: *ἐαυτούς*) read *ἐαυτά* (Lachm.); this is probably a correction with reference to *τεκνία*.

Ver. 1 shows that the believer, as born of God, necessarily loves his brother. The two elements of the Christian life, faith and love, are represented in their real unity. — *πᾶς ὁ πιστεύων ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ Χριστός*] refers back to chap. iv. 15; comp. ii. 22, iv. 2; instead of *ὁ Χριστός*, the apostle in ver. 5 puts: *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*; comp. iii. 23, from which, however, it does not follow that *ὁ Χριστός* and *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ* are to the apostle exactly identical ideas, but certainly that he only is Christ to him, who is also Son of God. That John says here *ὁ Χριστός*, is occasioned by the antithesis to the false teachers; comp. on this Weiss, p. 155 ff. (Grotius erroneously explains: *qui credere se ostendit*: it is not the manifestation of faith, but faith itself, that is the subject. — *ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γεγέννηται*] for faith is not a human, but a divine work in us.¹ This first sentence forms the premiss from which the apostle draws his conclusion. He does not specially emphasize the self-evident intermediate thought: *πᾶς ὁ γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀγαπᾷ τὸν Θεόν*, but presupposing it,² he says: *καὶ πᾶς ὁ ἀγαπῶν τὸν γεννησάντα, ἀγαπᾷ καὶ τὸν γεγεννημένον ἐξ αὐτοῦ*] *ὁ γεγενν. ἐξ αὐτοῦ* is not "Christ" (Augustine, Hilarius, a Lapide, etc.), but "the believer;" Calvin correctly: *Sub numero singulari omnes fideles Ap. designat. Est autem argumentum ex communi naturae ordine sumptum.* By the last thought Calvin rightly indicates why the apostle here says "*τὸν γεννησάντα*" instead of *τὸν Θεόν*, and "*τὸν γεγεννημένον ἐξ αὐτοῦ*" instead of *τὸν*

¹ The relationship between being born of God and faith is not to be expressed thus, that first the latter and then the former follows; but neither is it first the former and then the latter, but being born of God happens in this way, that God works faith in man; "the new birth is," as it runs in the Mecklenburg Catechism, "the working and gift of faith." The *πιστεύων*, which begins with the gift of *πίστις*, is therefore the result, and hence also the token, of being born of God, as the *ποιεῖν τὴν δικαιοσύνην* (chap. ii. 29) and the *ἀγαπᾶν* (chap. iii. 7).

² That this thought is presupposed by John, which Ebrard and Braune erroneously deny, is proved by the fact that John does not say here: *ὁ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ γινωσκόμενος*, but instead of it: *ὁ ἀγαπῶν τὸν γεννησάντα*.

ἀδελφόν.—ἀγαπᾷ is not subjunctive “let him love,” but indicative: “he loves;” John is here expressing not an exhortation, but a fact.

Ver. 2 states how love to the “*children of God*” is to be recognised. The sign of it is: ὅταν τὸν Θεὸν ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν (ποιῶμεν). The difficulty, that whereas elsewhere the keeping of the commandments or brotherly love is mentioned as the evidence of love to God (or of knowing God), comp. ii. 3, iv. 20, 21, here the converse relationship is represented, so that, as de Wette says, “the apostle here makes the cause (love to God) the token of the effect (love to the brethren),” cannot be solved by the arbitrary assumption of an attraction, which Oecumenius supposes when he interprets: δέγμα τῆς εἰς Θεὸν ἀγάπης τὴν εἰς τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀγάπην τίθεται, and which Grotius distinctly expresses when he paraphrases: ἐν τούτῳ γινώσκομεν ὅτι τὸν Θεὸν ἀγαπᾶμεν, ὅταν ἀγαπῶμεν τὰ τέκνα αὐτοῦ καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν; nor even with de Wette by the view “that τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν is the principal clause, and τὸν Θεὸν ἀγαπῶμεν only the anticipated confirmation of it, so that the one result of love to God is put for a token of the other;” but the explanation lies in this, that these two elements, “love to God” and “love to the brethren as children of God,” in reality mutually prove one another.¹ By the addition of the words: καὶ τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ τηρῶμεν, it is brought out that love to God necessarily shows itself in the obedient keeping of His commandments. This obedience, rooted in love to God, is equally with the former the token of true brotherly love, because the commandments of God include the duties which we owe to the brethren. He therefore who regards it as incumbent on him to fulfil God’s commandments, possesses therein the evidence that he loves his brethren, the τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ, that his love to them is not mere appearance, but reality; similarly Lücke, Sander, Baungarten-Crusius, Ewald, Düsterdieck, Braune, interpret; Calvin, on the other hand, gives the thought an erroneous direction when he says: “nunc docet, recte et

¹ He who loves God has therein an evidence that he loves the brethren also—as τέκνα τοῦ Θεοῦ, because brotherly love is the *necessary result* of love to God; but it is also quite as true that he who loves the brethren has therein an evidence of love to God, because the latter is the *necessary cause* of the former.

ordine amari homines, quum Deus priores obtinet; vult sic mutuam coli inter nos caritatem, ut Deus praeferatur." — It is further to be observed that the first ἀγαπῶμεν is neither subjunctive nor used instead of the future (Carpzov, Lange), but is simple indicative; and that ὅταν is not = quamdiu (Carpzov, Lange), but conditional particle, as εἰάν, chap. ii. 3.

Ver. 3 refers to the last two ideas, which were simply mentioned co-ordinatively, and expresses their unity: αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ἀγάπη τοῦ Θεοῦ] αὕτη is explained by the following ἵνα. — ἐστίν is to be kept in its proper meaning, though ἵνα follows; the paraphrase: "it brings this with it, it includes the endeavour" (de Wette), weakens the thought; ἵνα states the import of the ἀγάπη τ. Θεοῦ, to the realization of which it is directed. Quite incorrectly Grotius takes ἡ ἀγάπη metonymically for: ostensio dilectionis. — καὶ αἱ ἐντολαὶ αὐτοῦ βαρεῖαι οὐκ εἰσὶν is connected with the preceding as a new idea; βαρεῖαι = "heavy, as an oppressive burden;"¹ comp. Luke xi. 46: φορτία δυσβάστακτα, and Matt. xi. 30: φορτίον ἐλαφρόν. It is grammatically incorrect to explain βαρεῖαι: "difficult to fulfil" (Elbrard). The idea is, indeed, expressed absolutely, but from the confirmation that follows in ver. 4 it is evident that the apostle meant it in special reference to those who are born of God.

Ver. 4. Confirmation of the preceding thought. — πᾶν τὸ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ] The neuter is used here as in Gospel of John iii. 6, vi. 37, xvii. 2; it serves "to bring out the general category;" see Meyer on John iii. 6; comp. Winer, p. 160; according to the sense = πάντες οἱ κ.τ.λ.; it is not the disposition, but persons that are meant. Quite erroneous is the remark of Baumgarten-Crusius: "the γεγενν. ἐκ τ. Θ. has here only an external signification: whatever has the position of God's children." — νικᾷ τὸν κόσμον] for: μείζων ἐστὶν ὁ ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἢ ὁ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, chap. iv. 4. — νικᾷ is the simple pre-

¹ Spencer: "We are to understand the heaviness of a burden that is so oppressive that one cannot bear it, that is, painful." Calovius: "dicit ea non esse gravia, quia non aggravant, aut instar molis onerosae praemunt renatum." The commandments of God, as the demands of His love on man who is made after His own image, cannot be grievous to the latter; if, however, they are so, that is because man has departed from his original relationship to God: to the believer they are not grievous, because as the child of God he has gone back to the original relationship of love to God.

sent; in the conflict between the *κόσμος* and him who is born of God, the latter is constantly gaining the victory. Baumgarten-Crusius unsatisfactorily explains *νικᾶν* by "to keep oneself innocent;" this does not exhaust the idea of victory; that is not obtained when we take our stand against the enemy, but only when the enemy is overcome. The completion of the victory in its full sense certainly only takes place with the second coming of Christ. — Rickli and de Wette explain *κόσμος* by "love of the world and of self;" better Lücke, Calvin, Sander, Düsterdieck, Brückner, etc.: "all that strives against the will of God within and without man;" but even this is too abstract. It is the kingdom of the wicked one which, under its prince the devil, striving against the kingdom of God, seeks to tempt the believer to unbelief and disobedience to the divine commands. — As the apostle wants to show how he that is born of God overcomes the world, he continues: *καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ νίκη ἡ νικήσασα τὸν κόσμον ἡ πίστις ἡμῶν*. The pronoun *αὕτη* refers to *ἡ πίστις ἡμῶν*, which in its import is no other than the *πίστις, ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*, ver. 5. The expression is peculiar, inasmuch as faith is described as the *νίκη* itself, and the *νικᾶν* is ascribed to it. Lorinus rightly remarks: *victoria proprie non vincit, sed comparatur pugnando, sed energiam continet ea formula, denotans in quo sita sit vincendi ratio, unde victoria parta.*¹ The aorist *νικήσασα* is not to be turned into the present (a Lapidé, Lorinus, Grotius, etc.); even though the victory is a continuous one, in which every believer is constantly taking part, the aorist nevertheless indicates that faith from the beginning overcame the world. The explanation of Baumgarten-Crusius: "it is already victory won that ye have become believers" (similarly Neander), is incorrect; it is not here intended to commend faith as the result of a fight, but as that which fights, and which has won the victory; hence the active *ἡ νικήσασα* (so also Braune).

Ver. 5. Confirmation of the preceding thought by an appeal to the experience of the readers (Lücke). — *τίς ἐστὶν ὁ νικῶν κ.τ.λ.*] The same form of speech as in chap. ii. 22. The thought is: "Credens omnis et solus vincit" (Bengel).

¹ Ebrard opposes this explanation with the arbitrary statement that *ἡ νίκη* "is the action which conquers the world" (!).

With ὅτι Ἰησοῦς ἐστὶν κ.τ.λ. comp. ver. 1, chap. ii. 22, iii. 23.—The believer is victorious because he is born of God; vv. 1 and 4 (Düsterdieck).

Vv. 6–12. That Jesus is the Son of God, is confirmed by divine testimony.

Ver. 6. In order to arrive at an understanding of this verse we must first of all look at the expression: ἔρχεσθαι δι' ὕδατος καὶ αἵματος. The question, what is to be understood by ὕδωρ and αἷμα, has been answered in very different ways. The explanations worthy of notice are these:—1. That the apostle means thereby the blood and water which flowed from Christ's side on the cross, John xix. 34; this explanation is found in Augustine, Vatablus, and many of the old commentators; but some of them consider that the apostle here mentions this water and blood as the proof of the actual occurrence of the death of Christ, others that he uses them as symbols of baptism and the Lord's Supper. 2. That by ὕδωρ and αἷμα are to be understood the sacraments appointed by Christ; this is the explanation of Wolf (who, however, understands an allusion to the incident recorded in John xix. 34), S. Schmid, Carpzovius, Baur, Sander, Besser, and others.¹ 3. That by ὕδωρ John means the baptism of Christ by John the Baptist, and by αἷμα the atoning death which He suffered. This is the explanation of Tertullian, Theophylact, Cappellus, Heumann, Semler, Storr, Lange, Baumgarten-Crusius, Hilgenfeld, Neander, Ewald,² Brückner, Lücke (3d ed. Introd. p. 160;

¹ To this class belongs also Luther's interpretation (in the 1st ed. of Walch), which, however, differs in this, that according to it water and blood *together* constitute the sacrament of baptism; he says: "Most commentators consider both sacraments . . .; I do not object, indeed, to this explanation, but I understand the phrase of baptism merely. . . . Christ comes not by water only, but by water which is mixed with blood, that is, by baptism, which is coloured with blood." So also in the interpretation of the following verse: "If you are baptized with water, the blood of Christ is sprinkled by the Word. If you are baptized in blood, you are at the same time washed by the Holy Spirit through the Word." In his 2d ed., on the other hand, Luther understands water and blood, with reference to John xix. 34, of the two sacraments: "This brief summary has been kept in the Church, that out of the side of Jesus the two sacraments flowed."

² Ewald understands by them, however, not merely the baptism and the death, but by ὕδωρ the baptism "*with everything special which besides occurred in His case,*" and by αἷμα "*the bloody death on the cross with everything still more wonderful that was connected with it.*"

comp. Bertheau's note on this passage, p. 381), Erdmann, Myrberg, Weiss, Braune, etc. Not a few commentators, however, divide the explanation, understanding *ῥδωρ* of the baptism appointed by Christ, and *αἷμα* of His own death; so Hornejus, Knapp, Lücke (in the comm. on this passage; also in the 3d ed., Introd. p. 110; differently, Introd. p. 160), de Wette, Rickli, Gerlach, Frommann (p. 596), Düsterdieck, etc.¹ — By many commentators (as Bede, a Lapide, Russmeyer, Spener, Bengel, etc.) different interpretations are connected together in one or the other of these ways.²

To these interpretations may be added others, the arbitrariness of which is evident at the first glance. To this class the following belong:—1. That by *ῥδωρ* and *αἷμα* John denotes the two elements of the physical life of Jesus; this is the view of Schulthess. Wetstein adds even the following *πνεῦμα*, and says that the apostle wants to prove that Christ was a *verus homo*, who was formed *ex spiritu, sanguine et aqua sive humore*.³ 2. That by both words, or at least by *ῥδωρ*, the ethical nature of Christ is indicated; thus Grotius interprets *δι' ῥδωτος* = *per vitam purissimam, quae per aquam significari solet*. Socinus understands by *ῥδωρ*: *ipsa doctrina pura cum vitae puritate conjuncta*. 3. That in *ῥδωρ* and *αἷμα* it is not so much the baptism and death of Christ themselves that are to be thought

¹ To this class Ebrard also belongs, but he differs from the other commentators in this respect, that he understands by *ῥδωρ* Christian baptism indeed, but “not the *entire* sacrament of baptism (consisting of symbol and thing signified), but only the *symbol* in the sacrament;” hence only *that* side of Christian baptism in which it is identical with the baptism of John. Clearly an unjustifiable division of the sacrament! The same view is no doubt that of Hofmann, who says (*Schriftbew.* II. 1, p. 76): “*αἷμα* is, in contrast with *ῥδωρ*, the blood shed by Jesus for the remission of sins, differing from the water of baptism, which John also performed;” then on p. 470 he asserts that *ῥδωρ* is not the baptism which Jesus received, but that which He introduced—hence it denotes *that which Jesus had in common with the Baptist*; and in II. 2, p. 221, he describes *ῥδωρ* precisely as “the baptism with water originated by John.” But how strange it is to say, nevertheless, that the baptism which Jesus introduced is the baptism of water originated by John!

² Bengel: *Aqua dicit baptismum, quem primum administravit Johannes; ideo in aqua baptizare missus, ut Jesus manifestaretur tanquam Filius Dei. Porro baptismus etiam per discipulos Jesu administratus est. Sanguis est utique sanguis—Jesu Christi, qui effusus in passione, in coena dominica bibitur. Tertullian says: Venerat per aquam et sanguinem, sicut Joh. scripsit, ut aqua tingeretur, sanguine glorificaretur. Proinde ut nos aqua faceret vocatos, sanguine electos, hos duos baptismos de vulnere perfossi lateris emisit.*

³ Similarly Paulus in reference to *αἷμα*; *ῥδωρ* he understands of the baptism of John.

of, as rather the testimonies that were given in connection with them; in ὕδωρ the testimony of the divine voice in the baptism (Wahl); in αἷμα either the testimony of the good centurion (Stroth), or the events that followed the death of Jesus, namely His resurrection and ascension (Wahl, Ziegler, Lange), or even the testimony of God in John xii. 28 (Occumenius).¹ 4. That in these two expressions we are to consider the operations brought into exercise by Christ; in ὕδωρ, regeneratio et fides (Clemens Al.), or purgatio (Cameron); in αἷμα, cognitio (Clemens Al.), or expiatio (Cameron), or redemptio (Bullinger). To this class belongs also Calvin's explanation: ego existimo Joannem hic fructum et effectum exprimere ejus rei, quam in historia evangelica narrat. Christi latus sanguinis et aquae fons erat, ut scirent fideles, veram munditiem (cujus figuræ erant veteres baptismi) in eo sibi constare: ut scirent etiam completum, quod omnes sanguinis aspersiones olim promiserant. 5. That those expressions and πνεῦμα are descriptive of the threefold redemptive office of Christ: that ὕδωρ (= coelestis doctrini; Bullinger) represents Him as prophet, αἷμα as priest, and πνεῦμα as king. Here may be added the strange explanation of ὕδωρ as the tears which Jesus shed on various occasions, and of αἷμα as the blood which He shed at His circumcision. Again, some of the old commentators understood by αἷμα the blood of the martyrs.

It is at all events incorrect to permit ourselves, in the interpretation of ὕδωρ and αἷμα, to be led by the question as to the nature of their testimony (Sander: "It must be maintained as the chief difficulty in the passage before us, what are the *three witnesses* on earth"), for that is not the subject in this verse, in which the πνεῦμα only is mentioned as bearing witness.² By the words: οὗτός ἐστιν κ.τ.λ., the apostle simply states who Jesus the Son of God is.—With regard to the expression: ὁ ἐλθὼν δι' κ.τ.λ., most commentators

¹ Occumenius: διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος, τουτίσιν, ἐν τῷ δι' ὕδατος βαπτίσματι ἐξηφάνθη υἱὸς τοῦ θεοῦ ὁ Ἰησοῦς διὰ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς μαρτυρίας· διὰ δὲ τοῦ αἵματος· ὅτι μύλων σταυροῦσθαι ἔλεγε, δοξάσόν με σὺ πάτερ, καὶ ἠνέχθη ἡ φωνή, καὶ εἶδυστα, καὶ πάλιν δοξάσω· διὰ δὲ τοῦ πνεύματος, ὅτι ὡς θεὸς ἀνίστη ἐκ νεκρῶν.

² This is usually too little noticed by commentators. Even Lücke—who remarks on the following words: καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα κ.τ.λ., that "it was not said of the water and blood that they bear witness," and then "it is only through the πνεῦμα that both of them, which in themselves give no testimony, likewise become witnesses"—has in his discussion of the meaning of ὕδωρ and αἷμα all along regarded them as "witnesses" for the Messiahship of Jesus. Brückner also, in his interpretation of the ideas ὕδωρ and αἷμα, has all along included the element of testimony, whereby the clearness of his statement is only too much diminished.

interpret as if it were: "οὗτος ἔρχεται," or: "οὗτός ἐστιν ἐρχόμενος." Others, it is true, have not overlooked the aorist, but they interpret it as if it expressed something present; thus Sander = "has come and comes," against which Bengel rightly says: non dicit: ὁ ἐρχόμενος in Praesenti, sed ὁ ἐλθὼν Aoristo tempore, Praeteriti vim habenti. It is true, it is further correct when, in opposition to de Wette, who takes ἐλθὼν as synonymous with ἐληλυθώς, chap. iv. 2, Brückner objects that by the aorist as a purely historic tense nothing continuous or permanent is expressed; but even then the expression does not obtain complete justice. It is to be observed that John did not write "ἦλθε," or "ἐστὶν ἐλθὼν," but ἐστὶν ὁ ἐλθὼν. By the participle with the definite article, it is not a verbal, but a nominal, and, if it is not in apposition to a preceding substantive (as in John i. 18, 29, iii. 13, vi. 44, and passim), a substantive idea that is expressed; comp. John i. 15, 33, iii. 31, 36, and many other passages. It therefore does not mean "this came," or "this is one who came," but "this is he that came;" by this predicate it is not merely stated what the subject which is here spoken of (namely, οὗτος) *has done*, but the subject is thereby characterized as the particular person to whom this predicate is suitable as a specific characteristic; according to the analogy of John i. 33 (οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ βαπτίζων ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ), iii. 13 (ὁ ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καταβάς), and other passages, the expression therefore serves to state something characteristic of the Messianic office of Christ. If this is taken into consideration, the incorrectness of Augustine's interpretation (see above) follows; for even if the flowing of the blood and water from the side of Jesus was intended by John not so much as a proof of the actual occurrence of Christ's death (Lücke), but as a wonder proving the Messiahship of Jesus (Meyer on John xix. 34), yet this would be only a very subordinate proof, which by no means states a characteristic sign of the Messiah as such. — In the life of Jesus there are two points which correspond with the expressions ἵδωρ and αἷμα, namely, *His baptism* at the beginning of His Messianic work, and *His bloody death* at the end of it; by His *baptism* Jesus entered on His mediatorial work; it formed the *initiatio* (Erdmann, Myrberg) of it, but this did not take

place only by means of what happened at the baptism, but by the act of baptism itself; by His *death* he effected the atonement itself, inasmuch as by His blood he blotted out the guilt of the sinful world, for *χωρὶς αἱματεκχυσίας οὐ γίνεται ἄφεσις* (Heb. ix. 22). John may with justice therefore describe Christ as the Mediator by calling Him the one who came *δι' ὕδατος καὶ αἵματος*.¹ Against the view that *ὕδωρ* and *αἷμα* are to be understood of the sacraments instituted by Christ, is not only the circumstance that these are only *the means for the appropriation* of the atonement effected by Him, whereas the subject here is *the accomplishment of the atonement itself*, but also the use of the aorist *ἐλθών*, instead of which, in that case, the present would have to be used, and also the expression *αἷμα*, which by itself alone never in the N. T. signifies the Lord's Supper; even in 1 Cor. xii. 13 *ἐποτίσθησαν* is not an allusion to the Lord's Supper, but to the communication of the Spirit in baptism. In opposition to the idea that *αἷμα* indeed signifies the death which Christ suffered, but that *ὕδωρ* does not denote the baptism which He received, but the baptism which He instituted, are—(1) that the close connection of the two words (without repetition of *διὰ* before *αἵματος*) is only suitable if the ideas correspond with one another, which is not the case if by *δι' ὕδατος* we understand an institution of Christ, but by *αἵματος*, on the other hand, the blood shed by Christ;² (2) that the simple expression *ὕδωρ* is little suited for a description of *Christian* baptism;³ (3) that as the institution of baptism

¹ That "Jesus in both cases proved His obedience to His Father's will, and that His obedience proved Him to be the Son of God, the holy and innocent One" (Braune), are ideas which John here in no way suggests.

² This inconsistency is only apparently removed by Dusterdieck's observation that "John regards the blood of the Lord shed at His death as something which has a substantial existence;" for even if this be correct, yet there remains the difference that the water of Christian baptism *is* something at present existing, but the blood which Christ shed is only *regarded* as such by John. It is no better with the interpretation of Hofmann, who at one time describes *αἷμα* as "the blood of Christ shed for remission," and at another time as "the sprinkling of blood which Christ bestows."

³ It is indeed just this very fact that distinguishes Christian baptism from that of John, that the former in its *nature* is not *ὕδωρ* as the latter is, as John the Baptist himself, marking his difference from Christ, said: *ἐγὼ βαπτίζω ἐν ὕδατι* (John i. 26), whereas Jesus was described by him as *ὁ βαπτίζων ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ* (John i. 33).

took place *after* the death of Christ, and necessarily presupposes it, John, if he had understood by ὕδωρ Christian baptism, would certainly have put ὕδατος, not *before*, but after αἵματος. Hilgenfeld and Neander have rightly shown that if ἔρχεσθαι δι' αἵματος signifies something pertaining to the Messiah personally, the same must be the case with ἔρχεσθαι δι' ὕδατος. The connection must be the same in both expressions. If by αἷμα is meant the death which Christ underwent, then by ὕδωρ can therefore only be meant the baptism which He likewise underwent.

The objection of Knapp (with whom Lücke and Sander agree), that ἐλθὼν δι' ὕδατος in this sense is much more appropriately said of John the Baptist than of Christ, is untenable, for that expression may at least just as well be used of him who allowed himself to be baptized as of him who baptized; Erdmann: sane id non alius momenti, ac si quis objiceret, ἔρχεσθαι δι' αἵματος non posse dici de Christi sanguine et morte, sed potius de iis, qui cruentam mortem ei paraverint. There is just as little in the objection of Lücke, that Christ allowed Himself to be baptized, not in order to purify Himself, but to fulfil all righteousness; since two ideas are here placed in antagonism to one another, which are by no means mutually exclusive, as Jesus underwent the baptism of purification just for the very purpose of fulfilling all righteousness.

With regard to the expression ἐλθὼν διά, διά is not to be separated from ἐλθὼν, so that ὁ ἐλθὼν in itself would denote "the Saviour who came," and δι' κ.τ.λ. would state "in what way Jesus is the Saviour who came" (Hofmann in the *Schriftbew.* 2d ed. p. 469); for that Christ is called ὁ ἐρχόμενος (Matt. xi. 4; Luke vii. 19, 20) does not confirm, but contradicts this interpretation; besides, John does not here want to bring out how Jesus is the Messiah, but that He is so. The preposition διά has been differently explained; usually it is here taken simply in the sense of accompaniment, which, however, is unjustifiable; in this commentary, with reference to Heb. ix. 12 (where it is indicated by διά that the high priest entered into the holy place *by means of* the blood which he had *with* him), the idea of instrumentality is combined with that of accompaniment, inasmuch as Jesus *operated* as mediator by means of ὕδωρ καὶ αἷμα; similarly Brückner

explains *διά* as a preposition of instrumentality, namely, in the passive sense, as “by which he was *proved* ;” *διά*, however, is here connected neither with an idea of operation nor of verification, but with *ἐλθών*. Weiss takes the preposition in this way, that *ὔδωρ κ. αἷμα* are thereby “introduced as historical elements of the life of Christ through which His career *passed* ;” but it might be more suitable to interpret *δι’ ὕδ. κ.τ.λ.* in this way, that thereby the elements are brought out *by* which the *ἐλθών* was specially characterized ; just as in 2 Cor. v. 7 by *διὰ πίστεως* the feature is mentioned by which our present *περιπατεῖν* is characterized ; comp. also Rom. viii. 24 : *δι’ ὑπομονῆς ἀπεκδεχόμεθα*, and Heb. xii. 1 ; Braune simply abides by the idea of instrumentality, without further explaining himself on the subject. The question, whether *οὗτος* refers to *Ἰησοῦς* or to *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*, is to be answered in this way, that it refers to the *whole* idea : *Ἰησοῦς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ* ; Jesus, the Son of God, is the subject of Christian faith ; it is *He* who came by water and blood. In favour of this reference is the addition *Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστός*, which, as *Ἰησοῦς* shows, is not an explanatory apposition of the predicate (“He who came by water and blood,” *i.e.* Christ), but is in apposition to the subject *οὗτος*, which is more particularly defined by the predicate ; the preceding *Ἰησοῦς ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ* is thereby resumed, but in this way, that in consequence of *ὁ ἐλθών κ.τ.λ.* the idea *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ* is changed into *ὁ Χριστός*. — The import of the preceding lies, as cannot be doubted, simply in the statement which is therein contained ; Ebrard, indeed, thinks that the apostle wants thereby to express “that in the loving and merciful act of the devotion of Jesus to death lies the power by which He has overcome the world ;” but although in the preceding the victory over the world is ascribed to the belief that Jesus is the Son of God, yet it is not to be inferred from this that it is Christ’s victory over the world that is the subject here, as John does not make the most remote suggestion of that. — By the words : *οὐκ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι μόνον ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι καὶ τῷ αἵματι*, the apostle brings out with special emphasis the fact that Jesus did not come by water only, but by both water and blood ; as the latter *two*, in their combination, are contrasted with the former *one*, the

principal emphasis plainly falls on the *blood*, as that by which the Mediator as such has operated. This emphasis is not intended for the purpose of indicating the difference between Jesus and John the Baptist (Lücke, de Wette, Düsterdieck, Ebrard); for, on the one hand, it is self-evident to Christians that Jesus would not be the mediator if He had not acted differently from John; and, on the other hand, the feature which distinguishes Jesus from John in regard to baptism is this, that the latter baptized with water, but the former baptizes with the Holy Ghost.¹ The addition has a polemic import (not against "disciples of John," Ewald, but) against the Docetans, who in a certain sense indeed taught that Christ came δι' ὕδατος, but denied that He came δι' αἵματος, inasmuch as, according to their heresy, Christ united Himself with Jesus at His baptism, but separated from Him again before His death (Erdmann, Myrberg, Weiss, Braune); indeed, it is only by the reference to these heretics, against whom the apostle frequently directs a polemic in the Epistle, that the whole section from ver. 6 to ver. 12 can be explained. — With regard to grammar, it is to be observed that μόνον is not connected with οὐ, but with ὕδατι, and therefore there can be no καί after ἀλλά, which is not observed by A. Buttmann (p. 317). The preposition ἐν simply expresses the idea of accompaniment without bringing out the accessory notion which lies in διά; comp. Heb. ix. 12 and 25. — The definite article before ὕδατι and αἵματι is explained by the fact that both have been already mentioned. Bengel correctly: Articulus habet vim relativam. — καὶ τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν τὸ μαρτυροῦν] Just as in regard to ὕδωρ and αἷμα, so in regard to πνεῦμα the views of commentators vary very much. The following opinions are to be rejected as utterly arbitrary:—(1) that it denotes the psychical element, which, with αἷμα and ὕδωρ as the physical elements, consti-

¹ Erdmann has rightly pointed out that the view, according to which ὕδωρ is understood of the baptism instituted by Christ, is opposed to the idea that the addition refers to John the Baptist; this antagonism can only be removed if we explain the idea ὕδωρ in the principal clause differently from its meaning in this subordinate clause, in the former of a baptism which was not merely a baptism of water, but also of the Spirit, but in the latter of a baptism which is only a baptism of water; but that would be an interpretation which condemns itself.

tuted the human nature of Christ (Wetstein); (2) that it is the spirit which Christ at His death committed into His Father's hands (Augustine, etc.); (3) that it means "the teaching of Jesus" (Carpzovius); (4) that τὸ πνεῦμα is = ὁ πνευματικός, whereby John means himself (Ziegler, Stroth). Πῦ τὸ πνεῦμα can only be understood either *the Holy Ghost Himself* or the *spiritual life* produced by Him in believers.¹ Against the latter view there are, however, two reasons:— (1) that τὸ πνεῦμα never has this meaning without a more particular definition indicating it; and (2) that the τὸ μαρτυροῦν, which is added, here defines the πνεῦμα as something specifically different from the subjective life of man. We must therefore understand by it the objective Spirit of God, yet not, however, inasmuch as He descended on Christ at His baptism, and testified to Him as the Messiah, nor inasmuch as He was in Christ as the divine power which manifested itself in His miracles,² but (as most commentators correctly interpret) *the Holy Ghost*, whom Christ sent to His disciples at Pentecost, and who is the permanent possession of His Church. The predicate ἐστὶ τὸ μαρτυροῦν is not put for μαρτυρεῖ or for ἐστὶ μαρτυροῦν; here also the article must not be overlooked; τὸ μαρτυροῦν is a nominal idea, and, moreover, not adjectival, but substantive: "the Spirit is the witness" (Lücke). The office of witnessing belongs essentially to the Holy Ghost; comp. John xv. 26.³—As the apostle continues: ὅτι τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια, he seems thereby to state the object of μαρτυρεῖν;⁴ but this view is opposed to

¹ Sander is very uncertain in his explanation of τὸ πνεῦμα; first he explains it by: "the conversion of man accomplished by the communication of the Holy Ghost," but then he puts instead of this, without further explanation: "those who are born of the Spirit" (!).

² Grotius understands by τὸ πνεῦμα even the miracles themselves: admiranda ejus opera a virtute divina manifeste procedentia.

³ The assertion of Ebrard, that John in these words shows "how and how far our faith in Christ, in consequence of the fact that Christ bears in Himself the power that overcomes the world, is itself an overcoming power," and that μαρτυρεῖν therefore "must denote an act which is in substance identical with the act of overcoming the world," is simply to be rejected.

⁴ In connection with this view, Luther takes τὸ πνεῦμα in a different sense from that in the principal sentence, namely, as "the word which has saved us by baptism and by blood," and of which the Spirit bears witness that it proceeds from the Spirit of truth, and is the truth itself; Besser distinguishes τὸ πν. in the principal clause from the πν. in the subordinate clause, in that he under-

the whole context, according to which the apostle does not want to bring out that the Spirit is truth, but: "that Jesus the Son of God is the Christ." Therefore *ὅτι* here must, with Gerhard, Calovius, and most modern commentators (de Wette, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, Braune), be taken as *causal particle*, so that the subordinate clause serves to strengthen the preceding thought. It is *because* the Spirit is the truth that the Spirit is the witness in the fullest sense of the word. — To interpret *ἡ ἀλήθεια* = *ἀληθές* (Grotius) is to weaken the thought; by the definite article the idea *ἀλήθεια* is indicated in its full concrete vividness; comp. John xiv. 6, where Christ calls Himself *ἡ ἀλήθεια*. Weiss calls attention to the way in which this designation proves the personality of the Spirit, inasmuch as "the truth is the nature of God Himself made manifest." — The object which is to be supplied with *τὸ μαρτυροῦν* can be no other than the thought which John has previously expressed in the first half of the verse.

Ver. 7. By means of the witness of the Spirit, water and blood also attain to the position of witnesses. As such John now adduces them in connection with the Spirit, in order by the weight of this threefold witness to confirm the truth that the Son of God, who is identical with Jesus, is the Messiah. — The *ὅτι* which begins the verse means neither: "jam vero" (Grotius, Calov), nor: "hence" (Meyer), nor: "consequently" (Baumgarten-Crusius), but: "*for*." This connection with the foregoing is explained by the fact that the truth of the testimony of the Holy Ghost (who is the truth itself) is strengthened by the circumstance that it is not He alone that bears witness, but that with Him the water and the blood bear witness also, as the two elements by means of which the atonement took place (similarly Lücke);¹ de Wette unnecessarily supplies: "and, humanly considered, the witness is also

stands by the former "the Spirit bearing witness to the heart of believers," and by the latter "the Spirit dominating in the sacraments and in the word." Ebrard interprets: "the Spirit evidences itself . . . by its power;" clearly the words "by its power" are a pure importation.

¹ "In ver. 6 it was said that the witnessing Spirit is the truth, and hence it is implied that, to prove that Jesus is the Christ, the Spirit unites with the water and blood, as the testimony of the truth. As John now assumes this conclusion from ver. 6, he adds, passing on to another subordinate *confirmatory* proof: *for*," etc.

true, *for*." Paulus connects ver. 9, as consequent, with this verse as antecedent: "because there are three, etc., then, if, etc., the witness of God is much greater." This construction, which is contrary to the style of John, is the more to be rejected as an erroneous idea arises from it. — *τρῆς εἰσιν οἱ μαρτυροῦντες*] The masculine is used because the three that are mentioned are regarded as concrete witnesses (Lücke, etc.), but not because they are "types of men representing these three" (Bengel),¹ or symbols of the Trinity (as they are interpreted in the Scholion of Matthaei, p. 138, mentioned in the critical notes). It is uncertain whether John brings out this triplicity of witnesses with reference to the well-known legal rule, Deut. xvii. 6, xix. 15, Matt. xviii. 16, etc., as several commentators suppose. It is not to be deduced from the present that *ῥῶδωρ* and *αἷμα* are things still at present existing, and hence the sacraments, for by means of the witness of the Spirit the whole redemptive life of Christ is permanently present, so that the baptism and death of Jesus — although belonging to the past — prove Him constantly to be the Messiah who makes atonement for the world (so also Braune). The participle *οἱ μαρτυροῦντες*, instead of the substantive *οἱ μάρτυρες*, emphasizes more strongly the activity of the witnessing. — *τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ ῥῶδωρ καὶ τὸ αἷμα*] All these three expressions have here, of course, the same meaning as previously.² — *καὶ οἱ τρεῖς εἰς τὸ ἓν εἰσιν*] Luther inaccurately:

¹ Tropum . . . Ap. adhibet . . . ut hoc dicat: tria sunt genera hominum, qui ministerio testandi in terra funguntur: (1) illud . . . genus testium, quod praeconio evangelii vacat; (2) illud gen. test., quod baptismum administrat, ut Johannes baptista et ceteri; (3) illud gen. test., quod passionem et mortem Domini spectavit et celebrat.

² Weiss erroneously refers the witness of the baptism here to that which was given at the baptism of Christ, and the witness of the death to that which was given at the outflowing of His blood. — It is not by what happened in connection with them, but in themselves, that *ῥῶδωρ* and *αἷμα* are the *μαρτυροῦντες*. — According to Ebrard, *ῥῶδωρ* here "is the baptism of water instituted by Christ, as an external institution . . . as the representation of every means of grace to be administered by men, above all in its connection with the preaching of the word;" and *αἷμα* is "the blood of Christ, i.e. His atoning death, . . . not, however, the blood of Christ alone, but also the power of the blood of the testimony, which is shed from time to time by His disciples for the sake of confessing Jesus." To this Ebrard further adds: "we may say that in the *water of baptism* is embodied the confession which by its firmness overcomes the lie, and in the *blood of testimony* that love which by patience overcomes the power of the flesh." This interpretation needs no refutation.

"and these three are one;" τὸ ἓν is the one specific object of the witness; "*the three are directed to this one*," namely, in their thus unanimous witness. Storr inaccurately: "they serve one cause, they promote one and the same object, namely, the object previously mentioned (v. 1, 5)."

REMARK.—According to the *Rec.*, after οἱ μαρτυροῦντες appear the words: ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ . . . οἱ μαρτυροῦντες ἐν τῇ γῇ (see the critical notes). Luther says in reference to them: "It appears as if this verse was inserted by the orthodox against the Arians, *which, however, cannot suitably be done*, because both here and there he speaks not of witnesses in heaven, but of witnesses on earth." With this most modern commentators agree, with the exception of Besser and Sander. It is true that, if we consider the contents of the *whole* Epistle, the idea of the three witnesses in heaven may be brought into connection with something or other that appears in the Epistle; but it does not follow from this that that idea has here a suitable or even a necessary place. This plainly is not the case, so much the more, as neither in what follows nor in what immediately precedes, with which ver. 7 is closely connected by οὕτως, is there the slightest reference to such a witness of the Trinity. There are clear and intelligible grounds in the foregoing for adducing the three witnesses: πνεῦμα, ὕδωρ, αἷμα, but not for adducing the three witnesses: ὁ πατήρ, ὁ λόγος, τὸ πνεῦμα ἅγιον; this trinity appears quite unprepared for; but the sequel is also opposed to it, for it makes it unintelligible what witness is meant, by the μαρτυρία τοῦ Θεοῦ, ver. 9, whether that of the three in heaven, or that of the three on earth.—To this it may be added that these two different classes of witnesses appear together quite unconnected; it is said, indeed, that these three witnesses agree in one, but not in what relationship the two threes stand to one another.—Besides, however, the idea in itself is utterly obscure; for what are we to understand by a witness *in* heaven? Bengel, it is true (with whom Sander agrees), says: "non fertur testimonium in coelo, sed in terra: qui autem testantur, sunt in terra, sunt in coelo; i. e. illi sunt naturae terrestres et humanae, hi autem naturae divinae et gloriosae." How untenable, however, this is, is shown, on the one hand, in the fact that ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ does not belong to εἶσιν, but rather to μαρτυροῦντες, and the text therefore does not speak of being, but of *bearing witness, in heaven*; and, on the other hand, in the fact that according to it the πνεῦμα which is connected with ὕδωρ and αἷμα must be regarded as something earthly and human.—There is further the un-Johannean character of the diction, as by John ὁ Θεός and ὁ λόγος, and similarly ὁ πατήρ and ὁ υἱός, are certainly conjoined, but never

ὁ πατήρ and ὁ λόγος; Sander avails himself of the assumption, which is certainly very easy, of a ἀπαξ λεγόμενον; but this is here unwarrantable, for those ideas are so frequently occurring in John—and that mode of conjunction is not accidental, but is grounded on the nature of the case. We see that the interpolator wrote λόγος, because this suggested itself to him as a genuine Johannean expression, without reflecting that its connection with πατήρ is un-Johannean. Finally, the καὶ οὗτοι οἱ τρεῖς ἐν εἰσί is also strange. Bengel interprets: unum sunt essentia, notitia, voluntate, atque adeo consensu testimonii. Bengel with justice puts the *essentiality* first, for it is just this that is denoted by the expression—but just this is unsuitable here, where the subject rather is *the unity of the witness*.

Ver. 9 brings out the greatness of the witness of God, and our obligation to accept it. The two clauses which are here connected with one another do not perfectly correspond in form; for in the antecedent clause the idea that corresponds to the *μείζων* of the consequent clause is not expressed, nor in the consequent clause the idea that corresponds to the *λαμβάνομεν* of the antecedent. The sentence, if completed, would run: If we receive the witness of men because it is of some value, much more must we receive the witness of God, as it has a much greater value (comp. A. Buttm. p. 338). The sentence contains a conclusion ex minore ad majus. The conjunction εἰ, as frequently, is not dubitative. — Brückner justly says, in opposition to Baur: "The witness of men is only alluded to on the side of its judicial value; there is not assumed to be in it an import which would be equal to that of the witness of God by water and blood and spirit."¹ — ἡ μαρτυρία τοῦ Θεοῦ is here used quite generally; the more particular definition is only given by the sequel (so also Düsterdieck). — ὅτι αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ μαρτυρία τοῦ Θεοῦ] With ὅτι it seems necessary to supply a thought to which it refers; Lücke supplies the thought: "if we accept the witness of God, we must believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God;" Düsterdieck, with whom Braune agrees: "a witness of God now really exists, namely this . . .," but such a supplement is not necessary if we suppose that the clause beginning with ὅτι is intended to give the reason of the contrast of the human

¹ It is quite erroneous for Storr to understand by the witness of men specially the witness of John the Baptist.

and of the *divine* witness which here appears, in *this* sense: "I say, ἡ μαρτυρία τοῦ Θεοῦ, for . . ." — In the reading: ὅτι (instead of ἣν) μεμαρτύρηκε περὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ, which is attested by the best manuscripts, this second ὅτι may be taken as causal particle, in which case αὕτη would be referred to the witness spoken of in vv. 6 and 7, in this sense: "for this is the witness of God, since He has testified (it) of His Son;" but the want of an αὐτός before μεμαρτύρηκε is an obstacle to this view; it is therefore better to interpret ὅτι by "*that*," and to refer αὕτη to this sentence which begins with ὅτι (Lücke, Erdmann, Diisterdieck, Myrberg, Ebrard, Ewald, Brückner, Braune), so that the sense is: for this is (therein consists) the witness of God, that He has testified of His Son. By this witness we are to understand no other than that which was spoken of in the preceding, namely, the objective witness of the Spirit, not the internal witness, of which the apostle does not speak until afterwards (contrary to Diisterdieck), but still less, as Ebrard interprets, the witness in John i. 33. — With the reading ἣν, αὕτη must be referred back to the preceding; the sense then is: "for that (vv. 6 and 7) is the witness of God which He has testified of His Son."¹ — The perfect μεμαρτύρηκε is here to be taken in the same way as John frequently uses the perfect, namely, in this way, that the witness which God has given is to be regarded as permanently remaining.

Ver. 10. God's testimony of His Son has for its object faith in the Son of God. Hence: "*He that believeth on the Son hath the witness in himself.*" — τὴν μαρτυρίαν, *i.e.* the witness of God which was previously spoken of; ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ, *i.e.* the witness is no longer merely external to him, but by virtue of his faith he has it *in* (not as Luther translates: "with") himself; the external has become internal to him. This thought forms the transition to that contained in ver. 11. The believer, namely, has the objective witness *in* himself, inasmuch as he experiences in his soul the power of the truth attested by God; yet τὴν μαρτυρίαν must not here be understood—as in

¹ Lücke erroneously thinks that with the reading ἣν there results only an imperfect sense, when he says: "the witness of God, which He has testified, consists—in what?" This appearance of incompleteness disappears, however, as soon as αὕτη is referred to the preceding.

ver. 11—of this operation itself (contrary to Düsterdieck). In the interpretation: “he accepts the witness,”—for which, corresponding to the ἔχει, it should at least be put: “he *has accepted it*,”—the preposition ἐν does not receive due justice. — In the following negative sentence, by which the thought expressed is strengthened and extended, we must supply with τῷ Θεῷ (instead of which τῷ νύῳ is not to be read), “τῷ *μεμαρτυρηκότι*.” — ψευστὴν πεποίηκεν αὐτόν] see chap. i. 10. In his unbelief, the witness of God is regarded by him as a lie, and God, who has given it, therefore as a liar. — This thought is confirmed by the following words: “*for he believeth not (has not become a believer) in the record which God has given (as a permanent record) of His Son.*” — With the participle πιστεύων, which describes a general class (not a single particular individual), μή is used; but with the finite verb πεπίστευκεν it is οὐ, because thereby the πιστεύειν of those that belong to that class is exactly and directly denied (comp. chap. ii. 4, iii. 10, 14, iv. 8).¹

Ver. 11 states in what way that witness of God shows itself as internal to the believer; to him who, by believing, has the objective witness of God in himself, it is no longer purely objective, but he experiences it in himself as a divine power, or as the ζωὴ αἰώνιος which God has given him.² Hence the apostle says: “*And this is the record, ὅτι ζωὴν αἰώνιον ἔδωκεν ἡμῖν ὁ Θεός.*” With ἡμῖν, τοῖς πεπιστευκόσιν is to be mentally supplied. — ζωὴ αἰώνιος is not “the hope of eternal life” (Bede: dedit nobis vitam æternam, sed adhuc in terra peregrinantibus *in spe*, quam daturus est in coelis ad se pervenientibus *in re*), but it is this itself, the divine life, of which the believer is even here a partaker; what the believer hopes for, that he has already. — ζωὴν αἰώνιον, as the principal idea, is put first. — ἔδωκεν means:

¹ It is different in John iii. 18, where ὅτι μὴ πιστὸς ἐστίν follows ὁ μὴ πιστεύων, but as the reason for ἣδη κρίνεται, and where, therefore, it is considered as the reason of the condemnation operating in the mind of the judge; differently Winer, p. 420 ff.; VII. p. 411 ff. The distinction lies in this, that by ψευστὴν πεποίηκεν αὐτόν it is an act of the subject, but by κρίνεται the action of the judge (i.e. of God) that is indicated.

² According to Bramer, by ὅτι the import of the record is meant to be stated; but then John would be speaking of a different record from that which he mentioned before.

"*he gave*;" it is not = *promisit* (Socinus), nor does it express merely the *firmitatem et certitudinem promissionis divinae* (a Lapidé). — Myrberg incorrectly finds the import of the *μαρτυρία* of God stated in *ὅτι κ.τ.λ.*, which is in opposition to the context. The second part of the verse: *καὶ αὕτη ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῷ υἱῷ αὐτοῦ ἐστίν*, which is not dependent on *ὅτι* (Baumgarten-Crusius), but forms a co-ordinate principal clause, gives a further explanation in regard to *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*. Several commentators find this thought expressed in these words, that we possess the *ζωὴ αἰών.* in the Son, *i.e.* in fellowship with the Son; but this the words do not say; they rather state where the *ζωὴ αἰών.*, which God gave to believers, had its original place, namely, in the Son; comp. John i. 4. Frommann (p. 405): "the eternal life of which the Christian is by faith a partaker, is one with the life that dwells in Christ" (so also Düsterdieck, etc.). Braune incorrectly separates *αὕτη* from *ἡ ζωὴ*, as he puts *ἐστίν* between them in the thought, and refers *αὕτη* to the idea *αἰώνιος*: "and this . . . namely, *αἰώνιος* . . . is the life," etc.

Ver. 12 states the inference from the immediately preceding thought. If the *ζωὴ* is originally in the Son, then he who has the Son has with him also the *ζωὴ*. With *ὁ ἔχων τὸν υἱόν*, comp. chap. ii. 23. Changing and weakening the sense, Grotius puts for *τὸν υἱόν*: *verba illa quae Pater Filio mandavit*; even *ἔχει τὴν ζωὴν* he erroneously explains by: *jus certum ad vitam aeternam*. Whilst John in the first clause says simply *τὸν υἱόν*, in the second he adds *τοῦ Θεοῦ*; on this Bengel remarks: *habet versus duo cola*; in *priore non additur Dei*, nam *fideles norunt Filium*; in *altero additur, ut demum sciant fideles, quanti sit, non habere*.

Ver. 13. Many commentators (Lorinus, Spener, Bengel, Rickli, Baumgarten-Crusius, Lücke, Sander, Düsterdieck, Braune) make the conclusion of the Epistle begin with this verse ("a sort of concluding section," Ebrard), referring *ταῦτα* to the whole Epistle. This, however, is incorrect. That this verse also belongs to the last leading section beginning at iii. 23, is shown not only by the idea *ζωὴν αἰώνιον*, which refers to what immediately precedes, but also by the idea *πιστεύειν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, which refers back to iii. 23; besides, it is to be observed that the following sentences,

vv. 14 and 15, correspond to the thought with which the preceding leading section ended; comp. iii. 21, 22. Accordingly, *ταῦτα* is not to be referred to the whole Epistle, but to the last section, vv. 6–12 (Brückner), which reaches its climax in the thought: *ὁ ἔχων τὸν υἱὸν ἔχει τὴν ζωὴν*; comp. ii. 1, 21, 26. In the words: *ἵνα εἰδῆτε, ὅτι ζωὴν ἔχετε αἰώνιον*, John states the object for which he wrote that which is contained in the foregoing. The *certainly* of the life which is bestowed on him is so much the more necessary to the Christian's mind, as this is sometimes hidden from him in the struggles of life—the life is there, but at times like a hidden treasure. That the possession of this life, however, is conditioned by faith, the apostle brings out especially by an additional clause, which indeed runs differently in the different codices (see the critical remarks), but in its different forms expresses essentially the same thought; according to the probable reading, it is connected with *ὑμῖν*; according to A, however, with *ἔχετε*. The second clause in the *Rec.*: *καὶ ἵνα πιστεύητε εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ*, indicates as the second object the adherence to faith; with the phrase: *πιστεύειν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα*, comp. chap. iii. 23.

Ver. 14, as the preliminary *καί* shows, is not the beginning of a new section (contrary to de Wette); but the thought expressed here is in close connection with the foregoing, inasmuch as the *παρρησία* is an essential element of the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*. As in chap. iii. 21, 22, so here also, *παρρησία* is the confidence which the believer experiences in the certainty that his prayer is heard. — *αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ παρρησία* does not mean: "hence arises also a happy spirit" (Ziegler), but "*herein consists the confidence*" (de Wette). — *ἣν ἔχομεν πρὸς αὐτόν*] *αὐτόν* does not refer to the Son, but to God; though God is not previously mentioned as the subject, yet He is nevertheless considered as the principal subject, as the One who gives life through the Son. — *ὅτι*] Lücke (with whom Ebrard agrees, with the incorrect remark that *ὅτι* does not depend on *αὕτη*, but simply on *παρρησία*) supplies before *ὅτι*: "that we have the confidence;" but the concise thought of the apostle is thereby weakened, and besides the *παρρησία* is itself this confidence (Düsterdieck). — *εἰάν τι αἰτώμεθα κατὰ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ*] By means of *κατὰ τ. θέλ. αὐτοῦ*, i.e. τοῦ

Θεοῦ, prayer is more particularly defined as to its substance and character. — ἀκούει ἡμῶν] In chap. iii. 22 it is put instead of this: λαμβάνομεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. — ἀκούειν includes the idea of *granting*, which, however, is not brought definitely out until the following verse.

Ver. 15. καὶ ἐὰν οἶδαμεν. By the indicative after ἐὰν (see on this, Winer, p. 264; VII. p. 277; Al. Buttmann, p. 191 ff.) this knowledge is emphasized as something undoubtedly belonging to the believer; differently ver. 16: ἐάν τις ἴδῃ. — ὅτι ἀκούει ἡμῶν, ὃ ἐὰν (ἂν) αἰτώμεθα] Resumption of what was previously stated. — οἶδαμεν, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.] In the certainty that God hears us lies also the certainty: ὅτι ἔχομεν τὰ αἰτήματα ἃ ᾠτήκαμεν ἀπ' (παρ') αὐτοῦ. — ἔχομεν is neither = λαμβάνομεν, nor is the present put for the future (Grotius); the present is rather to be kept in its proper meaning; the believer always has that for which he has asked God (κατὰ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ); he has God, and in Him all things. — τὰ αἰτήματα are the *res petitae* (Lorinus). — ἀπ' αὐτοῦ from its position is not to be connected with ἔχομεν, but with ᾠτήκαμεν; comp. Matt. xx. 20; Acts iii. 2; differently chap. iii. 22: λαμβάνομεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ.

Ver. 16. The apostle applies the general thought expressed in ver. 15 to a particular case, namely, to a prayer for one's brother when one sees him committing sin. — ἐάν τις ἴδῃ τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ] By ἐὰν with the subjunctive the possibility is simply stated. By ἀδελφός we are to understand, according to the *usus loquendi* of the Epistle, not the neighbour in general (Calovius), but the Christian brother (αὐτοῦ), not exactly the "regenerate" (Düsterdieck); Ebrard erroneously: "first of all members of the Christian Church, yet without excluding those who are not Christians." — ἁμαρτάνοντα ἁμαρτίαν μὴ πρὸς θάνατον] The phrase ἁμαρτάνειν ἁμαρτίαν is stronger and more expressive than ποιεῖν ἁμαρτίαν. — The sort of ἁμαρτία is more particularly defined by the addition μὴ πρὸς θάνατον. The negative μὴ (instead of which οὐ is used in ver. 17) is explained by the fact that the idea is regarded as dependent on ἐάν τις ἴδῃ (comp. Winer, p. 421). The apostle distinguishes between the ἁμαρτία οὐ πρὸς θάνατον and the ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον. What sin is to be understood by the latter? The idea תשובה נשח, LXX.: ἁμαρτία

θανατηφόρος, is found already in the O. T. Num. xviii. 22, whence the Rabbis distinguish between *למיתה* and *למיתה* *המאח* (Schoettgen, *Hor. hebr.*); in accordance with this, as Schoettgen also interprets, the *ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον* would be that sin to which the Mosaic law assigned the punishment of death, as idolatry, adultery, etc.; but even if that Old Testament definition is the basis of John's expression, yet it does not follow that he used the idea in the same sense: *θάνατος* may here, as distinguished from *ζωή* (*καὶ δώσει αὐτῷ ζωὴν*), not mean *bodily* death. For this reason alone, therefore, the explanation of Morus and S. G. Lange is to be rejected, according to which *that* sort of sin is meant which is punished by the authorities with death or with other severe punishments (!), even apart from the fact that it makes the prayer of the Christian dependent on the penal decrees of civil law. But the opinion of Zachariae, Michaelis, and Linder (in the *Zeitschrift für d. luth. Theol.* of Rudelbach and Guericke, vol. IV. 1862), that here, as in Jas. v. 14 ff., it is those who are in *bodily* sickness that are spoken of, and that such sin is meant as God punishes with deadly sickness or sudden death, is for the same reason unfounded.¹—If *θάνατος* is not *bodily* death, then by *πρὸς θάνατον* the period to which the sin lasts cannot either be meant.—With reference to the ecclesiastical discipline exercised in the Church, the older Catholic theologians especially understood by the *ἁμ. πρ. θάν.*, without further comment, all those sins which were punished by the punishment of excommunication. But even if the Church had always punished in that way the sin which John here has in view, yet that expression could not be explained by that practice.—As *θάνατος* is not *bodily* death, it is only *spiritual* death or *damnation* that can be meant by it; *ἁμ. πρὸς θάνατον* is therefore the sin which leads to damnation.

¹ Linder, it is true, remarks against this that a new section begins with ver. 13, but even in that verse *ζωή* is used in the spiritual sense. The above view is also opposed by the fact that it assumes in John the opinion that deadly sickness or sudden death is always divine punishment for a special sin, which can neither be justified by Acts v. nor by 1 Cor. xi. 30. The appeal to Jas. v. 14 ff. is so much the more inappropriate, as John here in no way suggests that he is speaking of *those who are in bodily sickness*. It is therefore quite arbitrary for Linder to interpret *καὶ δώσει αὐτῷ ζωὴν*: "God will grant to him pardon and recovery."

But what sin is this? It is much too general to regard every grievous transgression as such. As Christ Himself refuses forgiveness absolutely only to *one* sin, the commentators who assent to the above view find themselves driven to an arbitrary weakening of *πρὸς θάνατον*; so Ambrosius (*lib. de poenit.*), when he says: quodvis peccatum gravissimum, quod *vix* remittitur; and still more strangely a Lapidé: peccatum quodvis gravissimum, quod . . . juxta legem communem per gratiam, quam Deus *ordinarie* dare solet, est quasi immedicabile, incorrigibile et insanabile. It is more correct, indeed, to regard it as sin which is not repented of, and to find the characteristic of the *ἀμ. πρ. θάν.* in the impenitence of the sinner who will give heed to no exhortation (Grotius, Socinus, etc.); but even this cannot be the feature which John here has specially in view, because at the time of the commitment of a sin it cannot be decided whether it will be repented of or not. John must mean a *ἀμαρτία*, which in itself is characterized as a *ἀμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον*. Many commentators accordingly fix the meaning of it on a single particular sin; thus Tertullian, who understands by it, moechia post baptismum commissa; Bede, who, following the precedent of Augustine,¹ understands by it the peccatum invidentiae, quo quis invidet fratri gratiam, virtutem et salutem; but then we do not see why John did not specifically and definitely mention this *particular* sin. We might therefore agree with those who take *ἀμαρτία* here as the description of a *state*, as Bengel, who thus interprets: talis *status*, in quo fides et amor et spes, in summa, vita nova exstincta est; but this is opposed by the apostle's mode of expression, which plainly refers to a *sinful deed*, and not to a state. Though, on the one hand, a *single* sin cannot be meant (Calvin: non est partialis lapsus, nec praecepti unius transgressio), yet we must only think of a whole species of sins, or better, of such sinning as is characterized not by the object with which it is

¹ Augustine (*de serm. Dei in monte Matt.* lib. i. c. 22, § 73) says: Peccatum fratris ad mortem puto esse, cum post agnitionem Dei per gratiam. . . . Jesu Christi quisque oppugnat fraternitatem et adversus ipsam gratiam. . . . invidentiae facibus agitur. Yet Augustine is not consistent in his interpretation; in the *Retractions* he adds further: si in hac perversitate finierit vitam; in his work, *de corrept. et gratia*, c. 12, § 35, he explains the idea by: fidem, quae per dilectionem operatur, descrere usque ad mortem.

connected, but by the disposition from which it proceeds. For the further definition it is to be observed, as Lücke with justice points out, that it can "only be a class of sins of *Christians*, and not of those who are not Christians," that is spoken of, and that "the distinction between the sin unto death and sin that is not unto death must be capable of being known." It is true, every sin can be called a *ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον*, inasmuch as it tends in the direction of *θάνατος*, but every sin does not *infallibly* lead to *θάνατος*; so long as along with the *ἁμαρτία* there still exists an *ἔχειν τὸν υἱόν* (vv. 11 and 12), the sinning Christian is still in fellowship with the *αἷμα Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ* which cleanses him *ἀπὸ πάσης ἁμαρτίας* (chap. i. 7), and so long as he has a *παράκλητος πρὸς τὸν πατέρα*, namely, Jesus Christ the righteous (chap. ii. 1), sin does not deprive him of the *ζωὴ αἰώνιος*, and is not therefore *ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον*; this it only is when it involves an *actual falling away* from Christ; de Wette and Lücke therefore rightly say that the sin unto death is the sin by which the Christian falls back again from the Christian's *ζωή* into the *θάνατος* (comp. also Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 340), only it is not exactly the *falling away itself* that is to be understood, for this is an *internal* act which, as such, is invisible,¹ but rather the sinful conduct by which the internal loss of life with Christ externally operates and reveals itself (so also Braune).² It is incorrect of Düsterdieck (and similarly Ebrard) to understand by the sin unto death the antichristian denial that Jesus is the Christ; for if John had meant this, he would have expressed it definitely, so much the more as in the Epistle he is carrying on a polemic against that antichristianity. Just as little has Myrberg arrived at the

¹ This also contradicts Ebrard's interpretation, according to which the *ἁμ. πρ. θάν.* is "the act of inward rejection;" although Ebrard is correct when he says: "*πρὸς θάν.* is that sort of sinning which has resulted in a corruption of the soul, from which the return to *πίστις* and *ζωή* is no longer possible to him."

² Several commentators, as Calvin, Beza, Calovius, Heumann, Sander, etc., identify this sin with the sin against the Holy Ghost in Matt. xii. 31 ff.; certainly the *ἁμαρτία* meant here is not imaginable without a *βλασφημία τοῦ πνεύματος*; and the *βλασφημία τ. πν.* has *θάνατος* as its reward; but the ideas do not quite coincide, for (1) the *βλασφημία τ. πν.* may occur even on the part of non-Christians, but it is the sin of the Christian that is spoken of here; and (2) the former is completed in *words* (*εἰπὼν κατὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τ. ἁγ.*), but the *ἁμ. πρ. θάν.* can only consist in further action.

correct explanation when on ἔστιν ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον he remarks: varia genera peccatorum, quae mortem in sensu loci nostri adferant, vide enumerata, Gal. v. 18–21; for although Paul says: ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα πράσσοντες βασιλείαν Θεοῦ οὐ κληρονομήσουσιν, yet it does not follow from this that no return is possible from such sins. — In the face of the apostle's words the possibility of knowing the ἁμαρτάνειν πρὸς θάν. cannot be denied, yet it is difficult to distinguish amongst the particular concrete manifestations; but, on the one hand, the Christian mind which is fitted for the κρίσις will not decide without scrupulous examination; and, on the other hand, John himself shows by the μή that the decision can at any time be only a subjective one. The meaning of the sentence accordingly is: If any man see his brother sin in such a way that the sin which he commits does not involve absolute renunciation of Christ, and therefore does not necessarily bring condemnation with it, he shall pray for him.¹ — αἰτήσει is not to be understood of the united prayer of the Church as such (so Neander; Ewald also says: "Christian prayer, especially in the consecrated bosom of the Church"), but of every prayer of one for another. The future is not exactly used instead of the imperative; it rather expresses the certainty that, in the case stated, the Christian will pray, but in this there is certainly involved the injunction actually to do it. The substance of the prayer is indicated by the following. — καὶ δώσει αὐτῷ ζωήν] denotes the result of the prayer; very many, perhaps most commentators (Socinus, a Lapide, Lorinus, Grotius, Spener, Lücke, Sander, Erdmann, etc.), supply with δώσει as subject ὁ Θεός or ὁ αἰτούμενος (so also Winer, p. 463; VII. p. 487; Al. Buttm. p. 116, Anm.); a similar change of subject occurs in Acts viii. 6; but considering the close connection of αἰτήσει and δώσει, along with which the similarity of the verbal form is also to be noticed, it is preferable, with Jerome, Sander, de Wette-

¹ When Linder (as above quoted) remarks against this explanation that "the decision whether a sin is a ἁμ. πρ. θ. or not is *objectively* made by God Himself, and must be cognizable in some outward manifestation," we may reply that even the occurrence of bodily death cannot be regarded as a certain proof; for even though God sometimes ordains it as a punishment of the sinner, yet it occurs also when it is not to be concluded that there is special guilt.

Brückner,¹ Baumgarten-Crusius, Frommann (p. 674), Düsterdieck, Myrberg, Braune, etc., to assume the same subject with δώσει as with αἰτήσει; then the sense is: he that prays gives the ζωή, inasmuch as God grants him his prayer. The idea finds its explanation in the fact that every sin brings with it a weakening of the ζωή; in order that he that sins may not remain in this want, he requires a new infusion of life, and this is procured for him by the prayer of his believing brother. In addition to this, of course, the confession of his sin, with trust in the cleansing power of the blood of Christ (comp. chap. i. 7), is necessary on his part; but it is just in this that the blessing of the prayer consists, that he receives as the result of it the needful inclination for this.² — τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσι μὴ πρὸς θάνατον] apposition to αὐτῷ; the plural serves only for generalization (de Wette, Winer, etc.); Bornemann (*Bibl. Studien der sächs. Geistlichen*, I. p. 71; and Alex. Buttm. p. 156) erroneously explains τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσι as the dative commodi, referring αὐτῷ to the person that prays himself. By the following words: ἔστιν ἁμαρτία πρὸς θάνατον, the apostle brings out that there is really a sin unto death, with which he connects the observation: οὐ περὶ ἐκείνης λέγω ἵνα ἐρωτήσῃ. Most commentators find in this a prohibition, even though mildly expressed, of prayer in reference to the sin unto death; but this is not contained here, as Grotius, Hornejus, Besser, Myrberg, Ebrard, Brückner, etc., rightly observe; for the negative οὐ does not belong to ἐρωτήσῃ, but to λέγω; if the negative was to be referred to the former, it would have had to be μὴ. The sense is: My injunction does not mean (οὐ λέγω) that a man is to offer prayer (ἵνα ἐρωτήσῃ) in reference to (περὶ) the sin πρὸς θάνατον. — The words do not express more than this, although it is admitted that in the emphasizing of οὐ λέγω a

¹ Brückner seems, however, to be doubtful, as he remarks: "if there were only an αὐτός, or a similar indication!"

² It is to weaken the thought of the apostle if, with Rickli, we find the blessing of the prayer only in this, that he who prays is himself led thereby to a right relation toward his brother. According to the apostle's view, the prayer rather brings blessing directly to the brother, for as James (v. 16) says: πολλοὶ ἰσχύου ἐν ἡμῖν δικαίως ἐπικυνομένην.

³ As Neander thinks that it is only Church prayer that is spoken of here, he interprets: "one who sins πρὸς θάνατον is not to be included in the united prayer

warning is indicated (similarly Braune); John does not want to make a duty of a prayer, to which the certain assurance of being granted is wanting; he therefore adds this limitation to his exhortation to prayer (so also Besser): a formal *prohibition* would only be appropriate if the *ἁμαρτάνειν* πρ. θάν. was always cognizable as such. It is observable that John does not say here *αἰτήσῃ*, but *ἐρωτήσῃ*; *ἐρωτᾶν* (lit. "to ask") is a milder idea than *αἰτεῖν* (lit. "to demand"); the apostle warns against the *ἐρωτᾶν*, and, of course, much more against the more urgent *αἰτεῖν*.¹

Ver. 17. To guard against indifference to transgressions occurring in the Christian's life, the apostle continues: *πᾶσα ἀδικία ἁμαρτία ἐστί*. — *ἀδικία* is not synonymous with *ἀνομία*, chap. iii. 4; for whilst *ἀνομία* there serves to strengthen the idea *ἁμαρτία*, the idea *ἀδικία* is here more particularly defined and strengthened by *ἁμαρτία*; *ἀδικία*, namely, is the character of every offence against that which is right, "every breach of duty" (Meyer). Though, on the one hand, every such transgression is *sin*; yet, on the other hand, it must be maintained that every sin does not lead to death; hence *καὶ ἔστιν ἁμαρτία οὐ πρὸς θάνατον*: *καί* is not adversative, but serves to emphasize the thought. — *οὐ πρὸς θάνατον* does not belong to *ἔστιν* (Luther: "some sin is not to death"), but to *ἁμαρτία*: "there is sin not unto death."

Ver. 18, it is true, is closely connected with the foregoing, but at the same time forms the commencement of the conclusion of the Epistle, which is indicated as such by the successive thrice-repeated *οἶδαμεν* (Ebrard), and in which the apostle describes the position of believers in brief vigorous strokes. — As in vv. 16 and 17 it was admitted that even in Christians *ἀδικία*, and hence *ἁμαρτία*, still exist, the apostle finds himself compelled to repeat, confirming, what was said in chap. iii. 6–10, as a truth known to Christians (*οἶδαμεν*, in which there does not lie "an appeal to the fact that he has already said it," Ebrard), in order that it may be thoroughly

of the Church for sinners in general, so that he may not be confirmed in his sin and be led to a false trust in the prayer of others;" but John in no way indicates that he is speaking only of Church prayer.

¹ Braune unsuitably says that "*αἰτεῖν* implies conversation; *ἐρωτᾶν*, on the other hand, equalization of him who prays with him whom he addresses."

impressed on them that all sin is in the sharpest antagonism to their essential principle of life. — οἶδαμεν, ὅτι πᾶς γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει] This appears to be in contradiction with what is previously admitted; John does not solve the contradiction; many commentators seek to do so by supplying πρὸς θάνατον as a more particular definition of οὐχ ἁμαρτάνει, or by interpreting it of *remaining in sin*; both are, however, arbitrary; the solution lies rather in the fact that the apostle wants simply to emphasize the antagonism between being born of God and sinning. Though sin is still found in the life of the believer, who as such is γεγεννημένος ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, yet it is nevertheless foreign to him, opposed to his nature, and in the strength of his faith he is ever becoming more and more free from it.¹ — ἀλλ' ὁ γεννηθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ τηρεῖ ἑαυτόν] This second clause is not dependent on ὅτι, but is to be regarded as an independent sentence (Düsterdieck, Braune). Bengel erroneously states the difference between the form ὁ γεννηθεὶς and the preceding ὁ γεγεννημένος thus: Praeteritum grandius quiddam sonat, quam aoristus: non modo qui magnum in regeneratione gradum assecutus, sed quilibet, qui regenitus est, servat se; it is rather the same distinction that occurs here as that by which these two verbal forms are generally distinguished; ὁ γεννηθεὶς is: "he who *was* born," regarded as a historical fact. — In 1 Tim. v. 22, ἄγνον, and in Jas. i. 27, ἄσπιλον, are put with τηρεῖ ἑαυτόν as more particular definition. It is, however, unnecessary to supply such a predicate (de Wette); τηρεῖ ἑαυτόν denotes the self-preservation of the believer in his proper character (so also Braune);² the more particular definition results from the following; καὶ ὁ πονηρὸς οὐχ ἅπτεται αὐτοῦ] is the result of the τηρεῖ ἑαυτόν; Ebrard incorrectly: "Satan *dare* not touch him; God does not permit it;" the present simply expresses the fact, but this, according

¹ It needs no proof that the thought of the apostle is perverted by the explanation of de Wette: "the apostle expresses his confidence that the occurrence of the sin unto death and of sin in general cannot often (!) take place in the Christian Church."

² It is less suitable to explain τηρεῖ ἑαυτόν here, with Ebrard = *τηρηῖσθαι*, "to be on guard, to take care;" for, in the first place, it is opposed to the *usus loquendi* of the N. T. to assign this meaning to the word; and secondly, it is not expressive enough for the context.

to the context, is the case, because the devil is prevented from ἄπτεσθαι by the τηρεῖν ἑαυτὸν of him who is born of God. With ὁ πονηρός, comp. chap. i. 13. By ἄπτεσθαι we are to understand touching in order to do harm; Ps. cv. 15, LXX. (see Raphelii *Annot. ex Polybio*). Compare Jas. iv. 7: φεύζεται ἀφ' ὑμῶν. It is true the believer is still tempted by the devil (comp. 1 Pet. v. 8, etc.), just as sinful desires still arise in him; but being in his most inner nature redeemed from the fellowship of sin, he suffers from these temptations no injury to the life that has come to him from God: in the πανοπλία τοῦ Θεοῦ he is protected against all the μεθοδεῖαι τοῦ διαβόλου (Eph. vi. 11 ff.).¹

Ver. 19 marks the antithesis between believers as being born of God, and the κόσμος, as belonging in its whole extent (ὅλος) to the πονηρός; and this is done by the apostle vindicating for himself and his readers—who are united with him in faith—the εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ. — ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐσμεν finds its explanation in the preceding: ὁ γεννηθεὶς ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ. Socinus incorrectly: a Deo pendemus. — καὶ ὁ κόσμος ὅλος κ.τ.λ.] probably as an independent sentence, not depending on ὅτι (Düsterdieck); καί is not = δέ; it is just the connecting καί that brings out the antithesis which exists between the two parts of the verse, still more clearly than if this had been done by an adversative particle. ὁ κόσμος is here used in the ethical meaning of the word, which is peculiar to John. — ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ κείται] τῷ πονηρῷ is not neuter (Socinus, Episcopius, Rickli, Erdmann), but masculine, as is clear both from ὁ πονηρός in ver. 18, as also from the antithesis to ὁ Θεός. — By the preceding ἐκ τ. Θεοῦ and Luther's translation of Isa. xlv. 3, some commentators have been led erroneously to refer the expression ἐν . . . κείται to the relation of the child to its mother (Spener: "as a child in its mother's womb"); by ἐν it is expressed that the κόσμος is as it were surrounded by the devil, i.e. is quite in his power; κείται, stronger than ἐστί, indicates, if not, as Lücke thinks, the permanent, yet certainly the passive state (so also Braune), and hence the complete domination of the devil, which is in the

¹ Calvin: Ut ut malignus renatum ad peccatum sollicitet, tela tamen illius irrita cadunt, quoniam renatus scuto fidei munitus ea repellit et diabolo per fidem resistit.

most pronounced contrast with the preceding: καὶ ὁ πονηρὸς οὐχ ἄπτεται αὐτοῦ.

Ver. 20. In conclusion, the apostle indicates whence the εἶναι ἐκ τῷ Θεῷ (the result of the εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ) has come to him and his readers; and he does this by expressing it through οἶδαμεν as the substance of their Christian consciousness. — οἶδαμεν δέ, ὅτι ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ ἦκει] The conditioning cause of the former is the coming of the Son of God. — The particle δέ is here used to indicate the antithesis to the immediately preceding thought; Brückner has with justice decided in favour of this reading (contrary to καὶ οἶδαμεν; see the critical notes). — ἦκει is not = adest (Bengel), but: “has come;” the reference is to the incarnation of the Son of God. — καὶ δέδωκεν ἡμῖν διάνοιαν, ἵνα γινώσκωμεν τὸν ἀληθινόν] Still dependent on ὅτι. — The subject of δέδωκεν is not: ὁ Θεός (Bengel), but: ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, as the close connection of this clause with that immediately preceding clearly shows; τὸν ἀληθινόν, on the other hand, is not a description of the Son (Bengel), but of God. — By διάνοια we are not to understand, with Lücke and de Wette, “knowledge,” or even “insight,” but the *capability* of knowledge (Düsterdieck, Ebrard), yet in its living activity, hence “*the faculty of knowing*.”¹ — By ἵνα γινώσκωμεν κ.τ.λ. it is neither the purpose: “*in order that*,” nor even the result: “*so that*,” that is stated, but the object to which the διάνοια is directed, and which it attains. We can only regard ἵνα as the particle of purpose, if we unjustifiably understand by διάνοια “the spiritual disposition” (contrary to Braune). — The idea γινώσκειν is here used with the same force as in chap. ii. 4, 5, where it is similarly connected with ἐν αὐτῷ εἶναι. By τὸν ἀληθινόν God is described, in distinction from all idols, especially from the idol which the false teachers made of God, as the *true* God; Calvin: *Verum Deum intelligit, non veracem, sed eum qui vere Deus est, ut eum ab idolis omnibus discernat*; comp. John xvii. 3² (similarly Lücke, de Wette,

¹ It is quite arbitrary, with Semler, to interpret the idea διάνοια = μετάνοια καὶ πίστις. Paulus lays a special emphasis on εὐσ: “*thinking through (ou)*” in contrast to a vague acceptance and thoughtless belief” (!).

² Baumgarten-Crusius thinks that ἀλλεῖ means more here than in John xvii. 3, namely: “*he who gives a satisfaction, in quo uno acquiescendum est*;”

Neander, Erdmann, Düsterdieck, Myrberg, Ebrard, Braune, etc.). He is the true God, who has sent His Son into the world; the coming of Christ has not been ineffectual, but has produced in believers the knowledge of God—a knowledge which is one with being in God. Therefore the apostle continues: καὶ ἐσμὲν ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ. These words are not dependent on ὅτι (Vulg. : et simus), but form an independent sentence. The ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ refers back to τὸν ἀληθινόν; considering the close connection of the two sentences, it must be *the same* subject, namely *God*, that is meant by *the same* word (Brückner, Braune); it is arbitrary to understand by τὸν ἀληθινόν God, and by τῷ ἀληθινῷ, on the other hand, Christ, and it is, moreover, forbidden by the context, in accordance with which the καὶ ἐσμὲν ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ states the consequence of the preceding, namely of the fact that the Son of God has come and has given to us the capability of knowing *the true God*.¹ Therefore also the following words: ἐν τῷ υἱῷ αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστῷ, are not to be taken as apposition to ἐν τῷ ἀλ. (Weiss), against which even the αὐτοῦ testifies, for then it would have to be referred, not to τῷ ἀληθινῷ, but beyond it to τὸν ἀληθινόν. The additional clause shows in what the εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ has its ground and stability (Brückner, Braune); ἐν is not = per, but indicates, as generally in the formula ἐν Ἰησ. Χριστῷ, the relationship of intimate fellowship: the believer is in God, inasmuch as he is *in* Christ.—Before the last warning, connected with this (ver. 21), the apostle expressively concludes with the statement: οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς καὶ ζωὴ αἰώνιος. As is well known, views have differed from old times about the meaning of οὗτος. While the Arians understand οὗτος of God, the orthodox refer it to the immediately preceding ἐν τῷ υἱῷ Ἰ. Χρ., and use this passage as a proof of the divinity of the Son. This interpretation remained the prevailing one in the Church, even after Erasmus had remarked: “hic est verus Deus” referri potest ad Deum verum Patrem qui praecessit; and against this the but if this were really contained in the idea here, that would be the case in John xvii. 3 also.

¹ This explanation is so much the more justifiable, as it is to be expected from John that at the close of his Epistle he would express in brief language the highest thing that can be said of the life of the believer, and this is the εἶναι ἐν τῷ Θεῷ (τῷ ἀληθινῷ).

Socinians, and then Grotius, Wetstein, the English Antitrinitarians, and the German Rationalists followed the opposite view. It is not to be denied that on both sides the different dogmatic interests did not remain without influence on the interpretation, until in more recent times a more unbiassed consideration has led the way. Among the latest commentators, Rickli, Lücke, de Wette, Neander, Gerlach, Frommann, Düsterdieck, Erdmann, Myrberg, even Brückner and Braune (who, however, leave room for doubt), similarly Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* 2d ed. I. p. 146), Winer (p. 142 ; VII. p. 148), and Al. Buttmann (p. 91), have decided in favour of the reference to God ; Sander, Besser, Ebrard, Weiss, etc., for the reference to the Son. The dispute cannot be settled on grammatical lines, for οὗτος can be referred both to τὸν ἀληθινόν¹ and also to τῷ νῑῷ ; the addition : καὶ ζωὴ αἰώνιος, seems to support the latter reference, for Christ, in the Gospel of John, calls Himself precisely ἡ ζωή, and also in the beginning of this Epistle it is the Son of God that is to be understood by ἡ ζωή and ἡ ζωὴ ἡ αἰώνιος. The former reference, on the other hand, is supported by the expression : ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεός ; for, in the first place, it is more natural to understand here the same subject as is previously designated by ὁ ἀληθινός, than any other ; and, in the second place, the Father and the Son, God and Jesus Christ, are always so definitely distinguished throughout the whole Epistle that it would be strange if, at the close of it, and, moreover, just after both subjects have been similarly distinguished immediately before, Christ—without further explanation, too—should be described as ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεός, especially as this designation is never ascribed to the Son in the writings of John, definitely though the divinity of the Son is taught in them.² To this it may be added that, after John has brought out as the peculiar characteristic of the Christian's life, of which he partakes in the Son of God,

¹ It lies in the very nature of the case that οὗτος may refer to the principal subject, nay, that this is the reference most suitable to the word ; comp. 1 John ii. 22 ; 2 John 7 ; Acts iv. 11, vii. 19. Calvin's rule, which Sander repeats, is erroneous ; Prom. demonstr. *ἄγεις ordinariē*, nisi evidentē textus aliud requirat, immediate antecedens nomen respicit ac demonstrat.

² It is only through a superficial consideration that, for the refutation of this assertion, appeal can be made to John i. 1, xx. 28, and the passages in the Apocalypse in which the predicate ἀληθινός is ascribed to Christ.—How little

the εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ, the clause in question has its right meaning only if it states who that ἀληθινός is, namely that he is the ἀληθινὸς Θεὸς καὶ ζωὴ αἰώνιος. Now, though elsewhere it is only Christ that is called exactly ἡ ζωή, yet He has the ζωή—according to His own words, John v. 26—only from the Father, who originally has the life in Himself (ὁ πατήρ ἔχει ζωὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ), and may therefore be called ζωὴ αἰώνιος no less than the Son. Besides, it is to be observed that ζωὴ αἰών. is here used without the article, so that the expression comes under the same category as the expressions: ὁ Θεὸς ἐστὶ φῶς (i. 5), ἀγάπη (iv. 16), πνεῦμα (Gospel of John iv. 24). — The objection that “it would be a feeble repetition, after the Father had twice been called ὁ ἀληθινός, again to say: this is the ἀληθινὸς Θεός” (Ebrard, similarly Weiss; also Schulze, *Menschensohn*, etc. p. 263¹), is the less valid, as the apostle has already in view the warning of ver. 21, and by ἐν τῷ υἱῷ αὐτοῦ Ἰ. Χρ. it is indicated that He alone is the true God, with whom we are in fellowship in Christ: it is only the Father of Jesus Christ that is the true God. — The connection of the words: καὶ ζωὴ αἰώνιος, as a second predicate, with οὗτος, has appeared a difficulty to many commentators. Socinus wanted to take οὗτος = τοῦτο, with reference to the whole preceding thought, and then he paraphrases τοῦτο by ἐν τούτῳ and interprets: in eo, quod diximus, est ille verus Deus et vita aeterna; nam quatenus quis habet et cognoscit Christi Patrem et ipsum Christum, habet et illum verum Deum et aeternam vitam; similarly Ewald, when he paraphrases: “this, both these things together, that we know and that we are all this, this is the true God and eternal life.” The arbitrariness of this explanation is self-evident. Others, as Clarke, Benson, Lücke (in his 1st ed.), supply before ζωὴ αἰών. an αὕτη ἐστίν out of οὗτός ἐστιν, referring αὕτη either to ὁ υἱός

care is sometimes exercised in the proof of the truth that what is stated by John of Jesus Christ really proclaims Him as the true God, is shown, amongst others, by Schulze, in the way in which he appeals on behalf of this to John xvii. 23 and xiv. 20, since it would follow from this that even the disciples of Jesus could be described as the true God.

¹ Brückner and Braune also consider the “tautology” at least as something not quite out of the question; but a real tautology is here so far from being the case, that “Θεός” is here added to ἀληθινός, and the idea ζωὴ αἰώνιος is directly connected with the idea ὁ ἀληθινὸς Θεός.

or to the idea εἶναι ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ. Lücke has rightly withdrawn this explanation in his 2d edition as unwarrantable, and correctly says: “καὶ ζωὴ αἰών. can certainly not be grammatically connected directly with οὗτος;” Lücke, however, thinks that there is an ellipsis in the expression, and that it is to be interpreted: “*this . . . the true God is eternal life*, which can either be understood of the fact that God is the cause and source of eternal life, or thus: *His fellowship is eternal life*.” But why could not John have described by ζωὴ αἰών. the substantial character of the divine nature? If God has ζωὴ in Himself (John v. 26), namely the ζωὴ which He has given to the Son, and which believers possess through the Son (John v. 24), then God in His very nature is ζωὴ, and ζωὴ αἰώνιος too. As John mentions this as the characteristic of God’s nature, there certainly lies in this the indication that God is the source of life for us.

Ver. 21. If believers have come to the true God through Christ, they have to take care that they do not lose this eternal and highest good by giving themselves up to any vain idol. In this train of thought John closes his Epistle with the short exhortation, so impressive, however, in its brevity: τεκνία φυλάξετε ἑαυτοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν εἰδώλων. In the address τεκνία we may see the depth of the feeling with which John utters these concluding words. — εἶδωλα are properly *images*; this signification is retained here by many commentators (Tertullian, Oecumenius, Lyranus, Lorinus, Salmeron, Lücke, Baumgarten-Crusius, Erdmann, Düsterdieck, etc.), whilst some of them, however, extend the idea to that of “false, heathen gods;” others, again, refer the expression to the arbitrary self-made representations of God which the false teachers had—thus Bede, Rieckli, Sander, Thiersch (*Versuch zur Herstellung*, p. 241), etc. — Others combine both views, and understand by εἶδωλα here all sorts of images which men arbitrarily make for themselves of God (Ebrard, Braune). If the warning is not to be regarded as a detached appendix, foreign to the contents of the Epistle, we cannot rest satisfied with the first interpretation. As the apostle, just in the antithesis to the false teachers, who belong to the κόσμος, has so decidedly referred to the ἀληθινὸς Θεός, he certainly has in view in this warning, if not altogether, yet principally, the untrue mental

images of those teachers.¹ It is only if so taken that the warning to keep themselves from idols forms the appropriate conclusion of the whole Epistle.

¹ That the apostle here also means the *res mundariae*, inasmuch as man is attached to them (Myrberg), is so much the more improbable as the foregoing contains no reference to them.

THE SECOND AND THIRD EPISTLES OF THE APOSTLE JOHN.

INTRODUCTION.

SEC. 1.—GENUINENESS.

THE testimony of the ancient Church is not very certain. The first mention of the Second Epistle is found in Clemens Alex. and Irenaeus. The former calls the First Epistle the *greater* (*Strom.* ii. 15, ed. Potter), and says in the *Adumbrat.*: *secunda Joannis epistola, quae ad virgines scripta est, simplicissima est; scripta vero est ad quandam Babyloniam Electam nomine.* Irenaeus (*adv. Haer.* i. 163) quotes the passage 2 John 11, with the words: *Ἰωάννης, ὁ τοῦ κυρίου μαθητής, ἐπέτεινε τὴν καταδίκην αὐτῶν, μηδὲ χαίρειν αὐτοῖς ὑφ' ἡμῶν λέγεσθαι βουληθείς· ὁ γὰρ λέγων αὐτοῖς, φησί, χαίρειν κ.τ.λ.*; he further adduces (iii. 16. 8) the passage 2 John 7, 8, but by mistake, as a passage of the First Epistle. From this it follows, that at the time of these Fathers the Second Epistle was not merely known in the Church, but was also received as an Epistle of the Apostle John. If the remark of Eusebius (*H. E.* vi. 14), that Clemens Alex. commented on *all* the Catholic Epistles, be correct, then the Third Epistle was known to him also; according to the statement of Cassiodorus, however (comp. my *Comm. on Second Peter*, Introd. § 2, p. 291 ff.), this is at least uncertain. — Origen likewise knew several Epistles of John; for in the 8th Homily on Joshua he says: *addit et Joannes tuba canere per epistolas suas*; yet he did not express himself quite certainly about the *apostolic origin* of the Second and Third Epistles, as is seen from his words in

Euseb. (*H. E.* vi. 25): 'Ιωάννης . . . καταλέλοιπε δὲ καὶ ἐπιστολὴν πάνυ ὀλίγων στίχων· ἔστω δὲ καὶ δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην. ἐπεὶ οὐ πάντες φασὶ γνησίους εἶναι ταύτας; that the *canonicity* of these Epistles was doubted, is not contained in these words. — His disciple Dionysius Alex., in his polemic against the genuineness of the Apocalypse, according to Eusebius (*H. E.* iii. 25), appealed not only to the First, but also to the Second and Third Epistles of John. His words are: ὁ δὲ εὐαγγελιστῆς οὐδὲ τῆς καθολικῆς προέγραψεν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ὄνομα . . ., ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἐν τῇ δευτέρᾳ φερομένη Ἰωάννου καὶ τρίτῃ . . ., ὁ Ἰωάννης ὀνομαστὶ πρόκειται. According to Ebrard, in the word *φερομένη* a doubt is meant to be expressed as to the apostolic authorship of the two Epistles; this, however, is erroneous; *φερομένη* is only added because the Epistles were accepted as apostolic, without bearing the name of the Apostle John, as even Eusebius (*H. E.* iii. 25) calls the First Epistle *τὴν φερομένην Ἰωάννου προτέραν*, although he was convinced of its composition by the apostle (Düsterdieck); and, besides, how could Dionysius have appealed to those two Epistles if he had doubted their apostolic origin? — The Epistles are nowhere mentioned by Tertullian and Cyprian; but that the Second Epistle at least was known in the North African Church at the time of the latter as a canonical writing, is clear from the fact that, at a Synod held at Carthage on the subject of the baptism of heretics, the bishop Aurelius appealed to the passage 2 John 10. — The Peshito originally contained of the Catholic Epistles only the Epistle of James, First Peter, and First John; the Syrian Ephraem, on the other hand, quotes the Second and Third of John as well as the rest of the Catholic Epistles. — The testimony of the Muratorian Fragment is not quite certain; after a passage is quoted in it from the First Epistle, it is stated, after the mention of some spurious writings: *epistola sane Jude et superscriptio Joannis duas in catholica habentur*, and then: *ut (or et) sapientia ab amicis Salomonis in honorem ipsius scripta*. It is possible that by *duas* (*duae*) the First and Second Epistles are meant; yet it is more probable that he understood by it the Second and Third Epistles (Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune; comp. also Laurentius, *Neutest. Studien*, p. 205). From the following words: *ut (or et) sapientia*, etc., it is not to be inferred, with

Düsterdieck, that the author regarded the two Epistles as spurious. — Eusebius (*H. E.* iii. 25) says: τῶν δ' ἀντιλεγομένων . . . ἡ ὀνομαζομένη δευτέρα καὶ τρίτη Ἰωάννου, εἴτε τοῦ εὐαγγελιστοῦ τυγχάνουσai, εἴτε τοῦ ἑτέρου ὁμωνύμου ἐκείνῳ; he therefore reckoned them among the first class of the Antilegomenoi (comp. Guericke, p. 606 ff.), and thereby proves that their canonical authority was not uncontested; but by the addition εἴτε κ.τ.λ., by which he does not want to confirm the doubt as to their *canonicity*, he expresses the uncertainty whether the Epistles were composed by John or by another of the same name, namely, the Presbyter John. In the Antioch school they were refused acceptance; Theodosius Mops. is said to have rejected them on the testimony of Leontius Byz.; Theodoret does not mention them; and in the Homily on Matt. xxi. 23, ascribed to Chrysostom, it is said: τὴν δευτέραν καὶ τρίτην οἱ πατέρες ἀποκατανύζουσι. For the rest, after the time of Eusebius their *canonicity* was undisputed; but that doubts still obtained in regard to their *apostolic origin* is proved by Jerome, who, in his *Catal. script. eccl.* chap. 9, s.v. Papias, says: scripsit Joannes et unam epistolam, quae ab universis ecclesiasticis et eruditis viris probatur; reliquae autem duae, quarum principium *Senior . . . Joannis Presbyteri* asseruntur; and in chap. 18 calls this view an opinio, quam a plerisque retulimus traditam. The, generally speaking, infrequent quotation of these Epistles, as well as the hesitation in the decision as to their canonicity and apostolicity, are easily explained, partly by their character, partly by the designation of the author (ὁ πρεσβύτερος) which is prefixed. From the fact, however, that the oldest authorities, Clemens Alex. and Irenaeus, quite unhesitatingly cite them, at least the Second Epistle, as writings of the Apostle John, it may be concluded that in the most ancient tradition they were regarded as apostolical Epistles, and that it was only at a later date that they were ascribed by many, perhaps only on account of the superscription, to the Presbyter John, whom Papias (Euseb. iii. 39) calls a μαθητὴς τοῦ κυρίου, but definitely distinguishes from the Apostle John. In the Middle Ages the authorship of the Apostle John was not disputed. Erasmus first again regarded the Presbyter John as the author of the Epistles; the same view was afterwards

expressed and defended by Grotius, J. D. Beck (*Observ. crit.-æcæget. Specim. I.*), Fritzsche ("Bemerkk. über die Br. Joh.," in Henke's *Museum für Religionswissenschaft*, III. part 1), Ammon (*Leben Jesu*, I. p. 45 ff.), and others. Almost all modern commentators and critics (Lücke, de Wette, Brückner, Baumgarten-Crusius, Düsterdieck, Ewald,¹ Bleek, Braune), on the other hand, have with more or less confidence decided in favour of their apostolic authorship, against which Elbrard again ascribes them to the Presbyter John. It is extraordinary that *the same* reasons are alleged for both views, namely, (1) the character of the style; (2) the self-designation of the author by ὁ πρεσβύτερος; and (3) the connection with Diotrophes. (1) As far as the style is concerned, the Second Epistle has unmistakably a pronounced Johannean impress. This is less the case with the Third Epistle; yet even this, which at any rate has the same author as the Second Epistle, bears in itself, in particular expressions and ideas, traces of the same peculiarity (comp. Lücke, Braune, Düsterdieck). According to Elbrard, the correspondences are to be explained by "*allusions and certain reminiscences*," while the peculiar style of the author of the two Epistles appears in the section vv. 5-10 of the Third Epistle, and this deviates altogether from that of the Apostle John. But that the elsewhere well-known diction of John is not reflected in this section, may be very well explained by the fact that he is treating of quite special circumstances, and that, too, only in hints, and with the greatest possible brevity; but that in 2 John 5, 12, and 3 John 11, there is "an intentional allusion to particular dicta of the First Epistle," and that in 2 John 6, 7, 9, such dicta "are almost exactly quoted," are assertions which cannot be proved, as the agreements may just as well, at least, have their origin in the identity of the author. (2) As, according to the distinct testimony of Papias (in Euseb. *II. E.* iii. 99), the existence of a presbyter named John, who was a μαθητής of the Lord, cannot be doubted, it is natural to regard him as the author of the Epistle, who calls himself ὁ πρεσβύτερος. But as Papias

¹ According to Ewald's idea (*Gesch. Isr.* VII. 219), John in Ephesus, in answer to urgent demands, wrote several letters to particular Churches and persons, of which, however, only these two have been accidentally preserved. Comp. also Ewald's *Joh. Schriften*, p. 505.

designates this John as *ὁ πρεσβύτερος* merely to distinguish him from the previously-mentioned (Apostle) John, it cannot be inferred from his words that "*ὁ πρεσβύτερος*" was *in itself* a name denoting the non-apostolic John. If this was not the case, how then could this John venture to call himself *κατ' ἐξοχήν* "*ὁ πρεσβύτερος*"? Ebrard thinks that, as the two Johns lived in Ephesus, the non-apostolic John was in his intimate circle called "*the Presbyter*" in distinction from the apostle, and that "it is easily intelligible from this how the Presbyter John would, in his confidential private circles, use this designation as a stamped coin;" but, besides, Ebrard appeals to the fact that the small filial Churches in the neighbourhood of the city, the single members of the presbytery established in the mother Church, and hence those small Churches which had gathered round the Kyria and Caius and Diotrephes, had been handed over to the care of the Presbyter John, "so that according to his official position he was '*the Presbyter*' to these Churches." Ebrard thus gives two explanations, of which, however, only *one* could be valid;¹ moreover, both explanations are based on uncertain assumptions. — Lücke and Düsterdieck (similarly Brückner and Braune) with justice show that the name: *ὁ πρεσβύτερος*, would not have been suitable for the Presbyter John without the addition of his proper name. But how does the case stand in this respect with the Apostle John? Oecumenius says: *ἦτοι ὅτι γεραίος ὢν ἤδη ἔγραψε ταύτας, ἣ καὶ ἐπίσκοπον καλῶν ἑαυτὸν διὰ τοῦ πρεσβυτέρου*; the former view, which is defended by Piscator, Lange, Carpzovius, Sander, Bleek, etc., has the form of the word against it; if John wanted to describe himself as "the old man," it is not conceivable why he did not write *ὁ γέρων*, *ὁ πρεσβύτης*, or similarly, especially as *ὁ πρεσβύτερος* was already in use as an official name; even apart from the fact that the designation would only vaguely state who the author was, the expression must certainly be taken, with Baumgarten-Crusius, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Braune, as an official name. For this purpose it was quite suitable to the Apostle

¹ For if John used the name because it was a coin once stamped for him, then he did not use it to describe his special position to those to whom he was writing; and if he did it for the latter cause, then plainly he did not do it for the former.

John, as he was connected with the Churches in question not merely as an apostle, but had entered into a special (episcopal) relationship towards them. He undertook the same position towards them as, immediately after the apostolic age, the bishop occupied towards the Churches subordinate to him. Hence John *might* have called himself *ὁ ἐπίσκοπος*, but he *could* not, as in his time both expressions denoted the same position; though in later times, when in the ecclesiastical organization bishops and presbyters were definitely distinguished from one another, the former were still frequently described by the name *οἱ πρεσβύτεροι*.¹ — (3) In the Third Epistle there is reference to a relationship of Diotrephes to the author of the Epistle, which, if this was the Apostle John, must certainly be regarded as strange. It seems more easy of explanation if, as Ebrard thinks, the author was an Ephesian presbyter to whose oversight the Churches, in which Caius and Diotrephes were prominent members, had been entrusted; but in the first place this supposition lacks historical foundation, and, secondly, a still greater degree of violence would belong to the case if Diotrephes “prated with malicious words” against a man who was not only a member of the Ephesian presbytery, but also had to exercise an oversight over those Churches, and who as an immediate *μαθητὴς τοῦ κυρίου* certainly enjoyed great respect. If Diotrephes was capable of *that*, then his ambition—which indeed may lead to the most extreme steps—might have induced him to despise even the dignity of an apostle. Besides, the particular circumstances are much too unknown by us for it to be justifiable for us on their account to deny the Apostle John the authorship of the Epistle. — The assertion that the prohibition contained in 2 John 10, 11, contradicts the loving disposition of the Apostle John, is with justice rejected by Ebrard, and that, too, with the suitable remark: “the love of the Apostle John was that sort of love which does not want to please, but to save souls; and hence he meets the lie not with careless connivance, but with firm confession of the truth and other discipline.”

¹ When Ebrard says that *πρεσβύτερος* cannot have been a title of the apostles, he is so far right, as an apostle, as such, was not designated by that name; but it does not therefore follow that an apostle might not assume to particular Churches such a position as would make this name suitable to him.

Baur (in the work quoted above) regards these two Epistles, as he does the First Epistle, as writings of *Montanist* origin. He proceeds from the fact that they both have one author, and that the Second was written to the Church to which Caius (to whom the Third Epistle is directed) belonged, and is no other than the Epistle mentioned in 3 John 9 ; in this Church, Baur further says, a schism had taken place ; the one part, with Diotrephes at their head, had refused ecclesiastical fellowship to the Church to which the author of the Epistle belonged ; the other part, on the contrary, were in agreement with this Church ; and that, although the cause of that schism is not evident from the Epistles themselves, it is nevertheless clear that it is conformable to a time at which there had already occurred between several Churches too lively differences about questions of the highest interest for the Christian mind. From these premises Baur concludes that the Second Epistle " was written to the *montanistically* disposed section of the *Roman* Church ; " and that Diotrephes is the symbolic description of the bishop of Rome, not indeed, as Schwegeler (*Montanismus*, p. 284) supposed, of Victor (for Irenaeus and Clemens Alex. already knew both Epistles), but of an earlier bishop, perhaps Soter, or Anicet, or Eleutheros. Baur in this proof lays a special weight upon the *partisanship* of the writer of the Epistle, which had gone so far that he describes the followers of Diotrephes just as *heathen* (3 John 7) (!). Baur finds the main support of his view in the passage of Clemens Al. cited above : *Secunda Joannis ep., quae ad virgines scripta est, simplicissima est. Scripta vero est ad quandam Babyloniam electam nomine, significat autem electionem ecclesiae sanctae* ; he holds that in these words Clemens refers the name *Ἐκλεκτή* to the idea of the Church, inasmuch as the predicate of holiness is appropriate to it ; that this quite corresponds to the idea of the Montanists, whose first demand of the Ecclesia was that she should be, as the " *sponsa Christi*," vera, pudica, sancta ; that the name *Babylonia* is to be allegorically understood of the city of Rome (as in 1 Pet. v. 13), where there were divided opinions in regard to Montanism. It does not require to be pointed out how very much arbitrary and extraordinary modes of interpretation are heaped up in this statement. Quite apart from this, Baur's assertion places

Clemens in the most wonderful contradiction with himself; on the one hand, Clemens exactly specifies the Second Epistle as written by the Apostle John; and, on the other hand,—though in an obscure way,—he is said to have stated that it was of Montanist origin. And then, what could have induced a Montanist to invent epistles under the pretended name of the apostle, which do not contain anything of Montanist character at all? Did he want to put the authority of John in the scale against the bishop of Rome? But the Epistle could not in any way have been used for that purpose, as it must have been clear to any one that *John* could not have written against Soter (or Anicet, or Eleutheros). The Montanists, however, have taken so little advantage of these Epistles for their interests, that the Montanist Tertullian never once mentions them!—Hilgenfeld assigns the appearance of the Second and Third Epistles, as that of the First Epistle, to the post-apostolic age, yet he does not seek their explanation in the interest of the author on behalf of Montanism, but he thinks that the Second Epistle is an “excommunicatory writing,” by which, in the form of the epistles which the Christian Churches interchanged, an “official apostolic condemnation” was meant to be uttered against the fellowship with the Gnostic false teachers; and that the Third Epistle is an ἐπιστολὴ συστατικὴ which originated in the Church of John, and had the object of vindicating for that Church the right to the circulation of such commendatory epistles, which the strict Jewish Christians would allow only to their patron James, as the author had known “the usefulness of such a regular passport” in the storms of Gnosticism. These hypotheses, according to which the circumstances hinted at in the Third Epistle are a pure invention, can, however, only be regarded as makeshifts to explain, as well as is possible, the origin of the two Epistles, which Hilgenfeld, for the same reasons as those for which he denies the genuineness of the First Epistle, thinks it is impossible to regard as memorials of the apostolic age.

SEC. 2.—CONTENTS AND DESIGN OF THE EPISTLES ; TIME AND
PLACE OF THEIR COMPOSITION.

The Second Epistle begins with the inscription, which, after mentioning the writer and the receiver of the Epistle, contains the greeting of benediction. It is addressed, according to the most probable explanation of the word *κυρία* (see the commentary on ver. 1), to a Christian Church, to which the author expresses his joy that its members are walking in truth, with which he connects an exhortation to mutual love, which he confirms by a reference to the appearance of false teachers who deny that Jesus is the Christ, come in the flesh. After he has mentioned the abiding in the doctrine of Christ as the condition of fellowship with God, he forbids the brotherly reception of the opponents of this doctrine, because thereby we would make ourselves guilty of fellowship with their evil deeds. The conclusion of the Epistle contains a justification of its shortness, and the delivery of the greeting from the Church in which the apostle is.—The design of the Epistle accordingly lies in the danger which threatened the Church through the false teachers, and of which the author wanted to warn the Church in few words before he could come to it himself.

The Third Epistle also begins with an inscription, in which Caius (see on ver. 1) is mentioned as the receiver of it. After the wish that Caius may have prosperity, the apostle expresses his joy that he—according to the testimony of some brethren—is walking in the truth, and praises him especially on account of his active display of love towards strange brethren, whom he then recommends to his further care, because they went forth for Christ's sake, and it is a duty to receive such.—Then he mentions the arbitrary procedure of Diotrephes, who withheld from the Church a letter written to it by him, made evil speeches against him, and opposed the reception of the brethren; in connection with which the author expresses his intention to come and bring him to account. After an exhortation not to follow that which is evil, but that which is good, the apostle gives Demetrius (the probable bearer of this Epistle) a good testimonial, justifies himself for the shortness of his writing, and, after a short benediction, concludes

by giving the greeting of friends and sending greeting to friends. — The design of the Epistle accordingly was furnished by an incident which had occurred in the Church of Caius. Some strange missionary brethren, who had found a friendly reception from Caius, had come to the apostle. The latter had written on their behalf to the Church to which Diotrophes also belonged; but Diotrophes, with insolent expressions against the apostle, had opposed the reception of those brethren, and had even cast out of the Church those who did not agree with him. This Epistle is now meant to serve the purpose of confirming Caius in the continuation of his manifestations of love, as well as of intimating to him the near arrival of the apostle. — Ewald's ideas, that both Epistles were addressed to one and the same Church, that Diotrophes had specially interested himself in the false teachers, and that the Third Epistle was written to Caius from fear lest the Second Epistle might have been withheld from the Church by Diotrophes, are to be regarded as mere conjectures, which cannot be proved from the contents of the two Epistles.

The *place and time of their composition* are unknown in the case of *both* Epistles; yet it is not unlikely that 2 John 12 and 3 John 14 refer to a tour (perhaps one and the same) of inspection (especially as Eusebius, *H. E.* iii. 24, describes such a tour of inspection made by John from Ephesus), and that the Epistles were written in Ephesus. — As in the Second Epistle the same false teachers are referred to that are spoken of in the First Epistle, it is probable that the places at which these two Epistles were composed are not far remote from one another.¹ — The remark of Eichhorn, that in the Second Epistle a more vigorous spirit is displayed than in the First, is no less incorrect than the idea that the "rigorous" (!) prohibition in 2 John 10, 11 indicates the still youthful old age of the apostle.

¹ According to Ebrard, the Second Epistle appeared at a later date than the First; the proof of this he finds in the fact that the former refers back to the latter. But that the similarities are the result of a backward reference, is only certain if the two Epistles proceed from *different* authors.

Ἰωάννου ἐπιστολὴ δευτέρα.

THE superscription is shortest in B and \aleph : *ἰωάννου β.*; in some codd. *καθολικὴ* is added to *ἐπιστολὴ*; in some *τοῦ ἐπὶ στηθοῦς* comes after *Ἰωάννου*; in G it runs: *τοῦ ἁγίου ἀποστόλου Ἰωάννου τοῦ θεολόγου*. In the Elz. ed. the superscription runs: *Ἰωάννου τοῦ ἀποστόλου ἐπιστολὴ καθολικὴ δευτέρα*; the *Rec.* is: *ἐπιστολὴ Ἰωάννου δευτέρα*.

Ver. 1. *καὶ οὐκ ἐγώ*] *Rec.* The reading *οὐκ ἐγὼ δέ* in A, 73, Syr. Thph. owes its origin to the desire to mark the antithesis more sharply (Düsterdieck); Ebrard regards the *Rec.* as a correction, made in order to make the Second and the First Epistles conformable in style. Scarcely credible. G reads: *καὶ οὐκ ἐγὼ δέ*. — Ver. 2. The reading in A: *ἐνοικοῦσαν*, instead of *μένονσαν*, is too feebly attested for us to regard it, with Ebrard, as the correct one; it has probably arisen in order to avoid the tautology which *μένονσαν* appears to form with the following. — Ver. 3. The Elz. ed. reads: *ἔσται μεθ' ὑμῶν*, which is attested by B G \aleph , etc., several versions, etc. It is possible that *ἡμῶν* arose from the immediately preceding (so Braune), but just as likely that *ἡμῶν* was changed to *ὑμῶν*, because the former did not seem appropriate for the greeting; the weight of authorities is in favour of *ἡμῶν*. — Instead of *παρά*, \aleph^* reads *ἀπὸ* (sol.). — Before *Ἰησοῦ Χρ.* the *Rec.* has *κυρίου*, which is found in G K \aleph . In A B, etc., *κυρίου* is wanting (Lachm. Tisch.); Bengel, Brückner, Sander are in favour of the genuineness of *κυρίου*; yet the later insertion of it seems more probable than the omission. — The *αὐτοῦ* of \aleph between *τοῦ υἱοῦ* and *τοῦ πατρός* must be regarded as a clerical error. — Ver. 4. \aleph (sol.) has instead of *ἐλάβομεν* the third person: *ἔλαβον*. — B omits *τοῦ* before *πατρός*. — Ver. 5. Instead of the *Rec.* *γράφω*, we must read *γράφων*, according to A B G K \aleph , etc. — Lachm. has *καινήν* before *γράφων*, which is not adequately attested by A \aleph Vulg. — Ver. 6. In the second part the succession of the words varies; in G \aleph , most of the min. etc., *αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐντολὴ* (*Rec.*) is found; in A B K, etc., on the other hand, *αὕτη ἡ ἐντολὴ ἐστὶν* (Lachm. Tisch.); it is possible that the *Rec.* has been formed in accordance with the preceding *αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγάπη*. It is to be noticed that \aleph has before *αὕτη* a *καί*, and after *ἐντολὴ* an *αὐτοῦ*, and also that in the same cod. “*ἵνα*” is

found before καθώς, so that an epanalepsis occurs here. — Instead of περιπατήτε, **N** reads περιπατήσῃτε. — Ver. 7. The most probable reading is ἐξῆλθον, according to A (ἐξῆλθαν; Tisch.) B **N** (Lachm.); the *Rec.* εἰσῆλθον, according to G K, etc., is a correction; comp. 1 John ii. 19, iv. 1, and 3 John 7. — Ver. 8. The *Rec.*, according to G K, has: ἀπολέσωμεν . . . εἰργασάμεθα . . . ἀπολάβομεν. Cod. A and **N** read: ἀπολέσῃτε (**N***: ἀπολήσθε) . . . εἰργάσασθε . . . ἀπολάβῃτε; this reading, accepted by Lachm. and Tisch., is regarded as the original reading by Lücke, de Wette, Reiche. Cod. B reads: ἀπολέσῃτε (according to Bentley's collation; Griesb. gives ἀπολέσῃται, which is also given by Tisch., bracketed, however) . . . εἰργασάμεθα . . . ἀπολάβῃτε; de Wette regards this reading as a combination of the reading of A with the *Rec.*; Düsterdieck, Brückner, Braune (also the 2d ed. of this comm.) regard the reading in B as the original. It is certainly the one by which the origin of the various readings can be easily explained; yet the circumstance that it is almost only found in B (Reiche: lectio codicis B in nullis aliis subsidiis inventa est, nisi quod Syr. p. in m. et Sahid. ejus sensum expressit) must render it doubtful. Of the two others, that of A and **N**, at any rate, deserve the preference. Bengel would arbitrarily read: ἀπολέσῃτε . . . εἰργάσασθε . . . ἀπολάβομεν, which is only found in Cod. 34. — Ver. 9. παραβαίνων] *Rec.*, according to G K, etc., Syr. Thph. Occ. (Reiche). Lachm. and Tisch. read instead of it: προάγων, which is attested by A B **N**, etc., and the readings: praecedit and procedit in several codd. of the Vulg. (against which, in the printed Vulg. and Lucif., is: recedit). The opinion of Matthaei and Lücke, that προάγων arose out of the paraphrase which appears in the scholia: ἀπάγων ἑαυτὸν, which also occurs in Occumenius, is unfounded; this explanation rather points to προάγων as the original reading. — The *Rec.* (according to G K, etc., several vss. Thph. Occ.) has, both after the first and after the second ἐν τῇ διδαχῇ, the addition: τοῦ Χριστοῦ; Lachm. and Tisch. have the addition only after the first; so in A B **N**, several min. Vulg. etc.; this is to be regarded as the correct reading. — It is doubtful whether υἱόν or πατέρα comes first in the following sentence; the *Rec.*, retained by Lachm., is: τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱόν; this is found in B G K **N**, etc., several vss. Thph. Occ.; Tisch., on the other hand, following A and several vss., has accepted: τὸν υἱόν καὶ τὸν πατέρα; but this appears to be a change effected on account of ἐν τῇ διδ. τοῦ Χριστοῦ. — Ver. 11. ὁ γὰρ λέγων] *Rec.*, according to G K, almost all min. Thph. Occ. (Tisch. 2); instead of it Tisch. 7 (similarly Lachm.), according to A B **N**, reads: ὁ λέγων γάρ, which, as unusual, might be preferable. Tisch. 7 remarks: γάρ tertio loco positum fere ubique a plerisque testibus in secundum

locum translatum. — Tisch. has omitted γάρ after αὐτῷ, although it is wanting only in K, several min. and Oec. — Ver. 12. **κ*** has ἔχω; **κ¹**, however, ἔχων. — Instead of ἐλπίζω γάρ, *Rec.* (Lachm.), according to A, some min. and vss., Tisch., following B G K **κ**, many min. etc., reads: ἀλλὰ ἐλπίζω; this reading is the original one; the context might easily lead to the change of ἀλλὰ into γάρ. — γενέσθαι] This reading, recommended by Griesbach, has been accepted also by Lachm. and Tisch. The *Rec.* ἐλθεῖν (according to G K, etc.) is a correction. Instead of στόμα πρ. σ., **κ*** reads: στόματι πρὸς στόμα. — ἡ χαρὰ ἡμῶν] *Rec.*, according to G K **κ**, etc., Tisch.; instead of it Lachm., following A B, etc., Vulg. etc., reads: ἡ χαρὰ ὑμῶν; ὑμῶν perhaps is preferable; the preceding ἡμᾶς might easily lead to the change into ἡμῶν. — Instead of ἡ πεπληρωμένη, *Rec.*, according to A G K, all min. etc. (Tisch.), the reading of B **κ**, Vulg. is: πεπληρ. ἡ (Lachm.). — The *Rec.*, following G K, etc., adds for conclusion: ἀμήν, a later addition. — In various codd. a subscription is found which runs most briefly in A B **κ** thus: Ἰωάννου β. The Cod. 62 adds the words: πρὸς Πάρθους (comp. on 1 John).

Vv. 1–3. Superscription of the Epistle.

Ver. 1. ὁ πρεσβύτερος] The definite article restricts the general idea πρεσβύτερος to a particular person, to whom this epithet is specially appropriate. That this is most probably the *Apostle* John, see Introduction, sec. 1. The reflection on his age may have led the apostle to write, not ὁ ἐπίσκοπος, but ὁ πρεσβύτερος. — ἐκλεκτῇ κυρία καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις αὐτῆς] The interpretation of these words has from the earliest times been very diverse, according as either ἐκλεκτῇ or κυρία has been regarded as a proper noun, or both words have been considered as appellatives. The first opinion (Lyranus, a Lapide, Lorinus, Cappellus, Grotius, Wetstein, etc.) has been with justice given up by modern commentators; it is clearly enough opposed not only by the mode of its conjunction with κυρία, but also by ver. 13. The second view, according to which κυρία is the proper noun, is found as early as in Athanasius, and afterwards in Bengel, Carpzovius, Heumann, Krigel (*Commentatio de κυρία Johannis*, Lips. 1758), Paulus, Lücke, de Wette, Brückner, Guericke, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune, etc. That Κυρία appeared as a feminine proper name is not to be doubted, see Grutteri, *Inscriptt.* p. 1127, num. xi.; comp. Heumann: *Poecile de Cyria Johannis*; but if this view be taken, not only is the

adjective *ἐκλεκτή* strange, as it never is assigned to any individual in the N. T. as a single predicate except in Rom. xvi. 13 (where, however, *ἐν κυρίῳ* is put along with it), but also its connection with the proper noun, instead of *Κυρία τῇ ἐκλεκτῇ*, comp. 3 John 1; Phil. i. 1, 2; Rom. xvi. Lücke, it is true, refers to 1 Pet. i. 1: *ἐκλεκτοῖς παρεπιδήμοις*; but here the case is different, as *παρεπιδήμοις* is not a proper noun, as even Brückner admits, though he nevertheless falls back on a "familiar carelessness" in this case.¹ The third interpretation is found in Luther ("the elect woman"), Hornejus, Wolf, Rittmeier (*Diatriba, de electa domina*, Helmst. 1706), Baumgarten-Crusius, Sander, etc. According to Epictetus, chap. 62: *αἱ γυναῖκες εὐθὺς ἀπὸ τεσσαρεσκαίδεκα ἐτῶν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν κυρίαι καλοῦνται*, women might certainly be called *κυρίαι*; but this was plainly only a *polite* address, corresponding not to the German "Frau" (woman), but to the German "Herrin" (lady). It hardly corresponds with the apostolic dignity of the author, however, to describe the receiver of the Epistle in the superscription by this name of a conventional politeness.² But the opinion of Knauer (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1833, Part 2, p. 452 ff.), that by *ἐκλεκτῇ κυρία* is to be understood Mary, the mother of Jesus, lacks any tenable foundation (see Lücke on this passage). — Already at an early date *κυρία* was taken as a symbolic description of the Christian Church; so Jerome (*cp. xi. ad Agruchiam*) and the Scholiast I. (*ἐκλεκτὴν κυρίαν λέγει τὴν ἐν τινὶ τόπῳ ἐκκλησίαν*), and later Calovius, Whiston, Michaelis, Augusti, Hofmann (in his *Weissagung u. Erfüllung*, II. p. 321, and in his *Schriftbew.* I. p. 226 ff.), Hilgenfeld (1855), Ewald, etc. It is true the word does not elsewhere appear in this signification, but according to its connection with Him who is

¹ According to Ewald, it is "foolish to think" that "the apostle is here writing to an individual woman."

² Against the distinction between the expressions "Frau" and "Herrin," Braune adduces the etymology of the former word (Frau, feminine of *fro* = Herr); this is quite irrelevant here, however, as it is not the German, but the Greek, expressions, that are in question; it is the distinction between *γυνή* and *κυρία*. That "Frau" originally corresponded to the expression *κυρία* is certain,—the word is even yet frequently used in this sense,—but it does not therefore follow that the Greek *κυρία* became so much weakened in usage as the German word "Frau."

ὁ κύριος, the Church *may* certainly be called κυρία in its relationship to the individual members.¹ Both the contents of the Epistle, which is lacking in the slightest individual reference to a single person, and the way in which John speaks to the receivers of the Epistle and passes judgment on them (comp. what follows in this verse; further, vv. 4, 5, 8, 10); and, finally, the way in which the sister and her children are mentioned,² — are no less *opposed* to the opinion that the Epistle was written to one particular woman, than they are *in favour* of the opinion that it was directed to a Christian Church; only κυρία must not be regarded as the name of honour of any one particular Church, according to Serrarius of the Corinthian Church, or according to Augusti of that of Jerusalem; it is rather a name suitable for every Church, by which, therefore, *that* Church could also be described to which the Epistle is directly addressed.³ — καὶ τοῖς τέκνοις αὐτῆς] If κυρία is a description of the Church, the τέκνα are her individual members. The representation of the Church as a mother, and of her members as her children, occurs elsewhere also; comp. Gal. iv. 26. — οὓς ἐγὼ ἀγαπῶ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ] If we take κυρία as a proper noun, then οὓς indicates that by τέκνοις only sons are to be understood; but why then does not the apostle write: καὶ τοῖς υἱοῖς αὐτῆς? If the τέκνα are the members of the Church, however, then οὓς is used here exactly as τεκνία μου, οὓς in Gal. iv. 9; comp. also Matt.

¹ Hofmann recalls the description of the Church in the Apocalypse as the νύμφη and the γυνή. When Ebrard objects to this, that the Church in contrast with the "Lord" is not "the lady," but the obedient handmaid, it must be remembered that she is here spoken of not in regard to her subordinate relationship to Christ, but in regard to her superior relationship to her individual members.

² De Wette also says: "The way in which her sister and her sister's children are mentioned is favourable to the idea that a single Christian Church is meant."

³ That the Epistle is directly addressed to a particular Church is evident from ver. 12; the want of references to individual circumstances may perhaps be explained by the fact that it also had an encyclical design; that the author, however, "had in view the whole of orthodox Christendom" (Hilgenfeld), is just as little appropriate to this Epistle as to the First. — Braune's considerations are of little importance; the name of the Church might be omitted, because the bearer of the Epistle knew to what Church he had to take it; ἐκκλησίη is by no means unsuitable with κυρία = ἐκκλησία, according to ἡ ἐν Βαβυλῶνι συνἐκκλησίη (by which the Church is certainly to be understood); it has not been asserted that the relationship of the mother in Gal. iv. 26 has been given to a single Church.

xxviii. 19: τὰ ἔθνη . . . αὐτούς. Suitable though the masculine is to denote *all* Church-members, it would be just as unsuitable to denote members of one *family*, if this consisted not merely of sons, but—as Braune here supposes—of daughters also. ἐγὼ is used emphatically, inasmuch as the apostle wants to bring out *his* intimate relationship to the members of the Church.—ἐν ἀληθείᾳ in its connection with ἀγαπῶ is not = ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, as if the (Christian) truth were thereby indicated as the element in which love has its existence (Bengel, Düsterdieck), but it is used adverbially, not, however, to emphasize the sincerity of the love, but, as the word itself states, the *truth* of the love (Ebrard: “I love thee with that love which is a *love* in truth;” similarly Lücke: “it is the real *Christian* love that is meant,” and Braune).—καὶ οὐκ ἐγὼ μόνος, ἀλλὰ πάντες] All who have known the truth share with the apostle love to the τέκνα of the κυρία. This addition also goes to show that κυρία is not a proper noun; for how could the children of an individual woman be regarded as an object of the love of all believers? Bengel, with whom Düsterdieck agrees, remarks indeed on this: *communio sanctorum*, but the apostle’s mode of expression presupposes an actual knowledge about one another. Several commentators accordingly have recourse to a weakening of the idea πάντες,¹ which, however, is arbitrary.—ἀλήθεια is the divine truth, of which the believer becomes a partaker in Christ. The emphasis of ἀλήθεια both here and in ver. 2 is caused by the antithesis to the πλάνοι (ver. 7). The bracketing of the words: καὶ οὐκ . . . τὴν ἀλήθειαν, “spoils the clearness of the connection, and is also logically not quite correct, because ver. 2 refers not only to ἐγὼ, but also to πάντες” (Lücke).

Ver. 2 states the cause of the love.—διὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν τὴν μένουσαν ἐν ἡμῖν] The idea μένειν signifies here, as in the First Epistle, firm, sure existence.—In ἡμῖν the apostle includes the loving and the loved (so also Braune).—The

¹ Hornejus: omnes fideles, non quidem qui in toto orbe tum temporis erant, sed qui in illis partibus et simul Dominam illam et liberos ejus norant.—Lücke: “πάντες κ.τ.λ., i.e. all Christians (perhaps of this place?) who know the Kyria and her children;” Braune agrees with this explanation, but would regard “as included, even those who would later become acquainted with her”—which is clearly unsuitable.

ἀγαπᾶν ἐν ἀληθείᾳ is based on the possession of the *ἀλήθεια*. — Carpzovius incorrectly connects these words with ver. 3. — By the addition: *καὶ μεθ' ἡμῶν ἔσται εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα*, the imperishable endurance of fellowship with the truth is declared (Düsterdieck, Braune), and it is not merely the wish for it that is expressed (Lücke, Ebrard). By *μετά* (as distinguished from *ἐν*) the objectivity of the truth is indicated (Braune). The irregularity of the construction, inasmuch as the finite verb is used instead of a participle (comp. A. Buttmann, p. 327; Winer, p. 510; VII. p. 533), serves to give prominence to the idea.

Ver. 3. The formula of greeting. It agrees substantially with that which is found in most of the N. T. Epistles; the prefixed *ἔσται μεθ' ἡμῶν* (*ὕμῶν*), however, is peculiar; the future indicates the wish as a certain expectation, which is based on the immediately preceding statement (Düsterdieck). If we take the reading *ἡμῶν* (see the critical notes), the apostle includes himself along with the readers of the Epistle, which indeed does not elsewhere occur in the salutatory formulae; *μετά* = "with." — *χάρις, ἔλεος, εἰρήνη*] just as in 1 and 2 Tim. and Tit. i. 4.¹ — *παρὰ Θεοῦ πατρός*] Instead of *παρά, ἀπό* is elsewhere regularly used in this connection, as *κ* reads here also; on the difference of the two prepositions, see Winer, p. 326; VII. p. 342. — To *Θεοῦ πατρός, ἡμῶν* is always added by Paul, except in the Pastoral Epistles. God is here called *πατήρ*, first of all in His relation to Christ, but also with the consciousness that in Christ He is the Father of believers also. — *καὶ παρὰ Ἰησ. Χρ. τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ πατρός*] similarly in the other Epistles of the N. T., only that here the sonship of Christ is specially indicated; the repetition of the preposition brings out the independence of the Son along with the Father. — The last addition: *ἐν ἀληθείᾳ καὶ ἀγάπῃ*, is peculiar to John; the *ἀλ.* and *ἀγάπη* are the two vital elements (Baumgarten-Crusius: fundamental features) of the believer, in which the divine

¹ The explanation of these words given on 1 Tim. i. 2 is regarded as unsatisfactory by Düsterdieck, although it is in substantial agreement with his own, only that it is not expressly stated that *χάρις* means "grace," *ἔλεος* "mercy," and *εἰρήνη* "peace," — which is surely self-evident, — but only the relation of the three ideas to one another, which is often erroneously interpreted, is pointed out.

manifestations of grace, mercy, and peace have to work (Düsterdieck): "the words contain an indication of the contents of the whole Epistle" (Ebrard); a Lapidè erroneously supplies: *ut perseveretis vel ut crescatis*. Grotius wrongly defines the relationship when he says: *per cognitionem veri et dilectionem mutuam*, nam *per hæc in nos Dei beneficia provocamus, conservamus, augemus*; in the first place, *ἐν* is not = *per*; and, in the second place, *our* conduct is not the cause of the divine *χάρις κ.τ.λ.*, but the relationship is the converse.

Ver. 4. The Epistle begins with the assurance of joy at the conduct of those to whom it is addressed. The preface to most of the Pauline Epistles is similar. This verse refers back to the preceding *ἐν ἀληθείᾳ*; ver. 5, on the other hand, to *ἐν ἀγάπῃ*. — *ἐχάριην λίαν*] not: "I have greatly rejoiced" (Luther); the aorist is to be kept in its own meaning. The apostle is speaking historically of the time at which he had the experience which he states in the following words. — *ὅτι εὔρηκα ἐκ τῶν τέκνων σου περιπατοῦντας ἐν ἀληθείᾳ*] *ἐκ τῶν τέκν.* is not = *τὰ τέκνα σου*; it is indicated by the *ἐκ* that John could not boast the *περιπατεῖν ἐν ἀλ.* of all,¹ but not that "he had not become acquainted with all" (Düsterdieck). Braune's observation is erroneous, that "as the article is wanting with *περιπατοῦντας*, it is not indicated that the other children were not walking *ἐν ἀλ.*" With *περιπατεῖν ἐν*, comp. John viii. 12; 1 John i. 6, 7; 3 John 3, 4, and several other passages. — *εὔρηκα* indicates a previous meeting with the children of the *κυρία*—and hence a previous sojourn of the apostle in the Church to which he is writing; incorrectly, Sander: "I have found as the result of my examination;" the preterite *ἐχάριην* does not suit this interpretation. — If *κυρία* be a proper noun, it remains uncertain where the apostle met with her children. Lücke, on account of ver. 12, considers it unlikely that the apostle had been in the family; "he seems to have met the *τέκνα* somewhere else without the mother" (so also Braune). Not only this uncertainty, but also the circumstance that John does not express himself further about the children who are not walking in the truth, indicates that he is not speaking of a family, but

¹ Ebrard appropriately: "It is a *delicate* way in which the presbyter covers the *blame* which he has to express in a mere *limitation of praise*."

of a Church, which is erroneously disputed by Braune.—*καθὼς ἐντολήν ἐλάβομεν*] *καθὼς* (which is not to be taken here, with Ebrard, argumentatively = “because indeed”) does not more particularly define the *περιπατεῖν* in itself, as if *ἐν ἀληθείᾳ* were only added adverbially for confirmation = “who in truth walk as,” etc.; but *καθὼς* refers to the *περιπατεῖν ἐν ἀληθ.*, and *ἀλήθεια* is Christian truth, as in ver. 3; thus: “*who are walking in the truth, according as we received commandment*” (Düsterdieck). By this, however, we are not to understand one particular commandment, but the obligation which is contained in the Christian faith to walk in the truth; *παρὰ τοῦ πατρός*] see ver. 3; the intervention of the Son is implied.

Vv. 5, 6. *καὶ νῦν ἐρωτῶ σε*] *νῦν* is used here, not temporally, but logically. Düsterdieck refers it to the immediately preceding subordinate clause: *καθὼς κ.τ.λ.*; Ebrard, on the other hand, to the idea *εὐρηκα κ.τ.λ.*; but it is more correctly referred to *ἐχάρην κ.τ.λ.*; the joy which the apostle felt is the cause of his present request (so also Brückner and Braune). John says *ἐρωτῶ* instead of the usual *παρακαλῶ*, as the *request* is suitable to the Church, as a *κυρία*. — *οὐχ ὡς ἐντολήν γράφω σοι καινὴν κ.τ.λ.*] Comp. 1 John ii. 7. — *ἵνα ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους*] dependent on *ἐρωτῶ*, comp. John xvii. 15, not on *ἐντολήν ἔχομεν* (Baumgarten-Crusius), “for this is used in a subordinate clause merely, and *ἐρωτῶ* would be without connection and without object” (Brückner). *ἵνα* states here also not merely the purpose, but the substance of the request (contrary to Braune). — Ver. 6. *καὶ αὕτη . . . ἵνα*] The same construction, 1 John v. 3. The apostle is not distinguishing the commandment of love from the other commandments (de Wette), but is describing the walking according to the commandments of God as the substance and essence of love; with justice, for, in the first place, only *that* love is moral—or more particularly, Christian—in its character which is founded on obedience toward God, and therefore “consists in the fulfilment of the commandments of God that regulate our relationship to our neighbour” (Ebrard); and, in the second place, the aim of all the divine commandments is nothing else than love. Brückner, Braune, and others here interpret *ἡ ἀγάπη* incorrectly of “Christian love simply,” including also the love of God and

Christ; the close connection of this sentence with the preceding one (ἡ ἀγάπη clearly refers back to ἵνα ἀγαπῶμεν ἀλλήλους) compels us to understand ἡ ἀγάπη of Christian brotherly love. The thought last expressed is specially emphasized by the following words. According to the reading: αὕτη ἡ ἐντολή ἐστι, we must translate: "*This commandment is (consists in this), as ye have heard from the beginning (no other than this), that ye should walk ἐν αὐτῇ.*" — ἡ ἐντολή resumes the preceding τὰς ἐντολὰς αὐτοῦ. the transition from the plural to the singular is not difficult; comp. 1 John iii. 22, 23. — ἵνα states the substance of the commandment, and ἐν αὐτῇ refers to ἀγάπη (de Wette-Brückner, Lücke, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune), and not to ἐντολή (Sander); for this would not only give an inadmissible tautology, but would also be contrary to John's mode of expression, in which the phrase: περιπατεῖν ἐν τῇ ἐντολῇ, does not appear. — By the intervening clause καθὼς ἠκούσατε, "a subordinate definition of the ἐντολή" (Lücke, de Wette) is not given, but it is observed that the readers have heard from the beginning what is the substance of the divine commandment; the apostle thereby refers back to what was said in ver. 5 (so also Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Brückner, Braune). The circle that results from this interpretation only serves to bring clearly out the identity of brotherly love and obedience toward God.¹

Ver. 7. In this verse the apostle addresses himself to the warning against the false teachers, whom he first more particularly characterizes. The ὅτι, with which the verse begins, indicates that the foregoing exhortation to mutual love has its origin in the fear of their being disturbed by the influence of the false teachers; but it is not to be inferred from this that ὅτι is grammatically dependent on ἐρωτῶ σε. It would be grammatically possible also to regard this verse as the premiss on which ver. 8 is based (Grotius, Carpzovius), but such a construction is at variance with the peculiarity of John's

¹ Köstlin incorrectly interprets (p. 218): "the old commandment, that we should love one another, means nothing else than that we should abide in what He has commanded us to believe." That ἰστέλι here denotes the command to believe (1 John iii. 23), finds no confirmation in the context. — Ebrard unjustifiably asserts that the obscurity of the expression in this verse is to be explained by the fact that the apostle intentionally alludes to some passages of the First Epistle, with which he assumes the Kyria to be familiar.

diction. — ὅτι πολλοὶ πλάνοι] The expression πλάνοι does not elsewhere appear in John; comp. on the other hand, Matt. xxvii. 63; 2 Cor. vi. 8; 1 Tim. iv. 1; instead of it in 1 John ii. 26: οἱ πλανῶντες ὑμᾶς. — With this passage may be compared 1 John ii. 18 ff., iv. 1. — ἐξῆλθον [εἰσῆλθον] εἰς τὸν κόσμον does not denote separation from the Church; κόσμος does not here form the antithesis of the ἐκκλησία τοῦ Θεοῦ; the sense is rather the same here as in John iv. 1. The difference between εἰσῆλθ. and ἐξῆλθ. is only this, that by the latter expression the point of departure is more definitely indicated. — οἱ μὴ ὁμολογοῦντες κ.τ.λ.] comp. 1 John iv. 2, 3; on the N. T. usage of the article before the participle after πολλοί, comp. Buttm. p. 254; μὴ ὁμολογεῖν = ἀρνεῖσθαι. The μὴ is not to be explained, with Winer (p. 428; VII. p. 450), by the fact that the participle refers to a representative class (= quicumque non profitentur), but it is used just as in 1 John iv. 3: ὁ μὴ ὁμολογεῖ; see on this passage. — Ἰησοῦν Χριστὸν ἐρχόμενον ἐν σαρκί] is to be taken just as the words 1 John iv. 2, that run almost exactly similarly. The present participle ἐρχόμενον, instead of which ἐληλυθότα is used there, expresses the idea in itself — apart from the idea of time; comp. John vi. 14; Bengel incorrectly: qui veniebat, with an appeal to 3 John 3, for in this passage ἐρχομένων and μαρτυρούντων, by their close connection with ἐχάρην, are distinctly indicated as imperfect participles; such a connection does not exist here, nor are we to interpret, with Baumgarten-Crusius: "He who *was* to come;" still more incorrectly Oecumenius takes it as future participle, referring it to the second coming of Christ. — οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ πλάνος καὶ ὁ ἀντίχριστος] οὗτος refers back to οἱ μὴ ὁμολογοῦντες κ.τ.λ. By ὁ πλάνος the apostle resumes the preceding πλάνοι; by ὁ ἀντίχριστος he adds a new characteristic. — The definite article indicates these ideas as familiar to the readers; the Antichrist of whom they have heard, comp. 1 John ii. 18. — The singular is here used in collective signification (Lücke); the many are the Antichrist, inasmuch as the same πνεῦμα τῆς πλάνης is in all; comp. further, the remarks on 1 John ii. 18.

Ver. 8. The warning against the deceivers. — βλέπετε ἑαυτοὺς] "take heed to yourselves;" βλέπειν with the refl.

pron. besides here only in Mark xiii. 9. — The construction *ἵνα* after *βλέπειν* only in 1 Cor. xvi. 10 besides; by *ἵνα* it is not the *purpose* ("take heed to yourselves, *sc.* of them, so that"), but the immediate object of their foresight that is stated (contrary to de Wette, Braune, and A. Buttm. p. 209).¹ — *ἵνα κ.τ.λ.*] Whatever be the correct reading, the thought remains essentially the same; the apostle warns his readers not to let themselves be deprived by the false teachers of the blessing, of which they became partakers through the evangelistic work. With the reading *ἐργασάμεθα* those who have worked are John and his associates; that *ἐν ὑμῖν*, or a similar phrase, must be put along with it for more particular definition (Lücke) is unfounded, as this more particular definition lies in the context itself; with the reading *ἐργάσασθε*, on the other hand, it is the work of the receivers of the Epistle themselves that is meant, who should just as little come short of the attainment of the blessing as the former. — The object of *ἐργάζεσθαι*, indicated by *ᾧ*, is not exactly the *μισθός*, which is also spoken of, but the work directly effected by the labour, the result or the fruit of it. Fruit had been obtained in the Church by means of the work (fruit of knowledge, love, etc.); it was of importance that they should not again be deprived of this fruit; this is expressed by *μὴ ἀπολέσητε*; their loss may also, however, be considered as a loss to those who had worked among them by the preaching of the gospel, so that, as far as the sense is concerned, the *Rcc. ἀπολέσωμεν* is perhaps justifiable; but the reading *ἀπολέσηται*: "that they (*ᾧ*) may not be lost," also gives good sense, so that no cause exists for regarding it, with Lücke, as a mere clerical error. — If, however, that which was directly obtained by the work be lost again, then the future reward (*μισθός*) promised to Christians also disappears; therefore the apostle antithetically adds: *ἀλλὰ μισθὸν πλήρη ἀπολάβητε*. With the reading *ἀπολάβωμεν* we might be disposed to understand by the reward

¹ Braune here adduces various passages of the N. T. in order to vindicate for the particle *ἵνα* the meaning of purpose ("so that"); but he has not paid attention to the distinction whether the verbal idea with which *ἵνα* is connected is absolute or relative (requiring supplement), and he has not reflected that if the clause beginning with *ἵνα* forms the supplement of the preceding verbal idea, *ἵνα* cannot be = "so that."

the heavenly gift which the apostle himself had to expect on account of his work; but he could not be deprived of this by the conduct of those among whom he had laboured, as it depends not on the result, but on the faithfulness of the work; by *μισθός*, therefore, must certainly be understood the reward which those to whom John is writing have to expect; for this, however, the reading *ἀπολάβετε* is plainly more suitable than *ἀπολάβωμεν* (so also Brückner). — *μισθὸν πλήρη* is not = *μισθὸν πόλυν* (Carpzovius), but: “full reward;” by *πλήρη* it is not meant that if they did not exhibit faithfulness they would receive only an imperfect reward, nor even that up to the present they had only received a part of the reward (Grotius, Aretius, Ebrard), but that the reward which, if they exhibit faithfulness, they shall obtain is a quite full reward, in which there is nothing lacking (Düsterdieck, Brückner).

Ver. 9 brings out clearly the importance of abiding in the truth. — *πᾶς ὁ προάγων καὶ μὴ μένων*] *προάγειν* and *μένειν* form a natural antithesis; *προάγειν* in the neuter sense: “to advance farther,” signifies here in reference to *διδασχῆ*: “to advance beyond the limits of the (Christian) doctrine,” and contains an ironical allusion to the pretensions of the false teachers to have advanced to a higher degree of knowledge.¹ The *Rec. παραβαίνων* means: “to pass by anything;” we must supply along with it either *τὴν διδασχῆν* (according to the analogy of *παραβαίνειν τὴν ἐντολήν*, Matt. xv. 3), or *ἀπὸ (ἐκ) τῆς διδασχῆς*; comp. Acts i. 25: *ἀποστολῆς ἀφ’ (Rec. ἐξ) ἧς παρέβη Ἰούδας*; it is clearly unwarrantable to supply the idea *ἐντολή* out of ver. 7. — *καὶ μὴ μένων ἐν τῇ διδασχῇ τοῦ Χριστοῦ*] comp. John viii. 31: *μένειν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ ἐμῷ*; 2 Tim. iii. 14. — *τοῦ Χριστοῦ* is not the objective (Sander, Ebrard, etc.), but the subjective genitive (Düsterdieck, Ewald, Braune); the doctrine which, proceeding from Christ, was proclaimed by the apostles. — *Θεὸν οὐκ ἔχει*] comp. 1 John ii. 23. The doctrine of Christ is the truth; he who has not the truth has not God; for in its deepest source the truth is the living God Himself. Weiss (p. 29) unsatisfactorily interprets *ἔχειν* of the mere “possession in know-

¹ When Braune rejects this with the remark: “there is a bitter truth in fact,” he did not consider in what connection the above was said.

ledge," in place of which, on p. 77, however, he says: "the possession effected by means of the contemplative knowledge of Christ," as if the latter were identical with the former. By the following sentence the same thought is expressed positively, and is completed by τὸν υἱόν, which is the cause of changing Θεός to πατήρ.¹

Ver. 10. Warning against fellowship with false teachers. εἴ τις ἔρχεται πρὸς ὑμᾶς] The more particular definition of the τις is contained in the following: καὶ . . . φέρει. The particle εἰ is used here because "the case is put as if actual" (Winer). The author assumes the ἔρχεσθαι as really occurring, and in reference to it gives the command: μὴ λαμβάνετε; if he had regarded the coming as a thing which might only possibly occur, he would have put εἰάν; hence it is unsuitable to say that εἴ τις is un-Johannean (Ebrard), "for it cannot be un-Johannean to assume a case as a reality" (Braune). — καὶ ταύτην τὴν διδαχὴν οὐ φέρει] τ. τ. διδ., namely, the διδ. τοῦ Χριστοῦ. The phrase φέρειν τ. διδ. only here in the N. T.; comp. the classical: μῦθον, ἀγγελίην φέρειν τινί. — On οὐ after εἰ, see Al. Buttm. p. 299. Grotius rightly says: non de iis qui alieni semper fuerunt ab ecclesia (1 Cor. v. 10), sed de iis qui volunt fratres haberi et doctrinam evertunt. It is only with this interpretation that the prohibition of the apostle can be correctly understood. — μὴ λαμβάνετε αὐτὸν εἰς οἰκίαν] is to be understood of the hospitable reception into our house, which is to be accorded to the brethren as such; the apostle therefore forbids the brotherly reception of such as bring not the doctrine of Christ, but another doctrine opposed to it, and are, accordingly, assiduous in asserting the latter. The limitation of the prohibition to the relationship of φιλοξενία (Rom. xii. 13; Heb. xiii. 2) finds no support in the words of the apostle. Now such a κρίσις was so much the more necessary the more the false teachers sought to abuse the Christian hospitality, in order to gain for themselves access to the Churches; comp. 2 Tim. iii. 6. — καὶ χαίρειν αὐτῷ μὴ λέγετε] It is arbitrary to limit this prohibi-

¹ According to Ebrard, this verse is a quotation of the passage 1 John ii. 23. But that this is not so is shown by the manifold deviations, the existence of which can otherwise be explained only by arbitrary conjectures in an artificial way.

tion, with Clemens Alex., to the salutatio, quae fiebat, postquam surgebatur ab oratione solemnī velut gaudii et pacis indicium; as well as to interpret it in *that* degree of generality which a Lapidē gives it when he says: vetat hic Joh. omne colloquium, omne consortium, omne commercium cum haereticis; just as little is it to be interpreted, with Vitringa (*de Synag. vet.* p. 759), of the excommunication proper. This prohibition is in closest connection with the preceding, and similarly refers to εἴ τις ἔρχεται πρὸς ὑμᾶς κ.τ.λ.; it is meant to strengthen the former; not merely the hospitable reception into the house, but also the friendly greeting of the false teacher, if he comes as a Christian brother, is not to take place¹ (comp. Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* II. 2, p. 339). The word χαίρειν, as a formula of salutation, appears frequently both in the classics and also in the N. T., especially in Epistles; see Wahl on this word.

Ver. 11. Confirmation of the preceding prohibition. — ὁ λέγων γὰρ αὐτῷ χαίρειν] The apostle mentions only this one thing, because what he says about it is self-evident in regard to the rest also. — κοινωνεῖ τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ τοῖς πονηροῖς] *i.e.* inasmuch as the χαίρειν λέγειν is not merely an outward display of politeness, but an expression of an intimate relation of fellowship. — By τὰ ἔργα τὰ πονηρά we are to understand, of course, the false doctrine, but, at the same time, along with this the whole evil character of the false teachers, which was very closely connected with their doctrine.²

Ver. 12. Justification of the shortness of the Epistle. — πολλὰ ἔχων ὑμῖν γράφειν] says the apostle, conscious as he was of having only given a few brief hints of that which was agitating his mind. — οὐκ ἐβουλήθην διὰ χάρτου καὶ μέλανος] From the idea γράφειν the more general idea of communication is to be supplied. — χάρτης "is the Egyptian

¹ Ebrard contradicts himself when, in opposition to the interpretation given here, he first maintains that χαίρειν λέγειν here is the "quite general idea of the greeting of conventional politeness," and afterwards interprets: "He who greets such a false teacher, *i.e.* keeps up personal acquaintance and conventional intercourse with him."

² De Wette's remark, justly rejected by Brückner, is utterly erroneous: "This prohibition finds its justification in polemic zeal, and the necessity for defence against what seemed fatal to the maintenance of the Church. We, with the sure foundation of the Christian Church, and in accordance with the

paper (papyrus), and probably the finer augustan sort, which served for letters (Hug, *Einl.* I. 106);" de Wette. — μέλαν, besides here, only in 3 John 13; 2 Cor. iii. 3. The following words: ἀλλὰ ἐλπίζω, state the reason of οὐκ ἐβουλήθη; by ἀλλά the reason is expressed in the form of an antithesis. — γενέσθαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς] In the phrase: γίγνεσθαι πρὸς, the ideas of motion and of rest are both included; comp. γιγν. εἰς, Acts xxi. 17, xxv. 15; the construction with πρὸς: 1 Cor. xvi. 10; comp. John x. 35; Acts x. 13, etc. — καὶ στόμα πρὸς στόμα λαλῆσαι] An imitation of the Hebrew פֶּה לִפְתָּח פֶּה, Num. xii. 8; comp. πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον, 1 Cor. xiii. 12. Similar combinations in the classics also; Xen. *Mem.* ii. 6. 32, στόμα πρὸς στόμα is used of a kiss. — ἵνα ἡ χάρα κ.τ.λ.] comp. 1 John i. 4. With the reading ἡμῶν (see the critical notes) mutual joy is meant; comp. Rom. i. 11, 12.

Ver. 13. Presentation of the greeting from the children of the κυρία's sister. If κυρία were a proper noun, we would have to suppose that the sister had either already died, or was not with her children near the apostle, as he would otherwise certainly have mentioned her. — Such uncertain hypotheses are removed by the correct explanation of κυρία; now it is self-evident that the ἀδελφή is the Church from which John wrote this Epistle — and the τέκνα, therefore, are its individual members; on τῆς ἐκλεκτῆς, comp. ver. 1.

higher view, then perhaps impossible, that man even in his errors still remains man, and an object of esteem and love, see in it impatience." — Difficult though it may be under present circumstances, considering the development which doctrine has taken, in many particular cases rightly to apply what is here said by John, yet it must still be regarded as a valid maxim, not only that the Christian should remain conscious of the antithesis between anti-Christianity and Christianity, but also that he should not deny this consciousness in his conduct towards his neighbour. — Besser unjustifiably seeks to make use of the expression of the apostle as a weapon against union.

Ἰωάννου ἐπιστολὴ τρίτη.

THE superscription runs in B Σ : Ἰωάννου $\bar{\gamma}$; in C: Ἰω. ἐπιστολὴ $\bar{\gamma}$; in G: ἐπιστολὴ τρίτη τοῦ ἁγίου ἀποστόλου Ἰωάννου; in the Elzev. ed.: Ἰωάννου τοῦ ἀποστόλου ἐπιστολὴ καθολικὴ τρίτη.

Ver. 3. Σ omits γάρ. — Ver. 4. In some min. is found, plainly as a correction, ταύτης instead of τούτων. — Instead of ἔχω, B (teste Majo) has ἔχων (not mentioned by Buttm.), and instead of χαράν, B 7, 35, Vulg. etc., read: χαρίν; Buttm. has retained the *Rec.* — Instead of the *Rec.* ἐν ἀληθείᾳ (according to C** G K Σ , Thph. Oec.), A B C* etc., read: ἐν τῇ ἀλ., which Lachm. and Tisch. have accepted; the omission of the article is explained by the preceding ἐν ἀλ., ver. 3. — Ver. 5. ἐργάσθ] *Rec.* according to B C G K S, all the min. Thph. Oec. (Tisch.). Lachm., following A, Vulg. (operaris), has accepted ἐργάζη, which, however, appears to be only an alteration on account of the present ποιεῖς. — Instead of καὶ εἰς τοὺς ξένους (*Rec.* according to G K, etc.), καὶ τοῦτο ξένους must be read, with A B C Σ , etc., most of the versions, Lachm. and Tisch. — Ver. 6. Ewald arbitrarily conjectures: οἷς ἐμαρτύρησα. — The reading of C: ποιήσας προπέμψεις, is clearly a correction. — Ver. 7. After ὀνόματος the Elzev. ed., following several min. and some vss., has αὐτοῦ, which is found in none of the greater MSS. (nor, according to Tisch. 7, in B). Buttm. has accepted this αὐτοῦ, and that, too, as the reading of B; Tisch. 2 also ascribes it to this codex, but with the remark: e sil. collat. Reiche says: Lachm.: falso codicem B pro C αὐτοῦ citat. Codicem B αὐτοῦ non habere nunc e Maji atque Kuenii et Cobeti edit. constat. — On the reading ἐξῆλθαν (Lachm. Tisch. 7), comp. 2 John 7. — Instead of ἐθνῶν, *Rec.* according to G K, etc., Lachm. and Tisch. have with justice accepted ἐθνικῶν, which is the reading of A B C Σ and many others; Reiche, however, regards ἐθνῶν as the original reading. — Ver. 8. ἀπολαμβάνειν] *Rec.* following C** G K, etc. Instead of it A B C* Σ , etc., read ὑπολαμβάνειν, which Lachm. and Tisch. have accepted, and in favour of which Reiche also declares himself. Both words are, in the signification in which they are here used, ἄπ. λεγόμενα; the overwhelming authorities are in favour of ὑπολ. — Instead of τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, Σ * reads τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, clearly a correction. — Ver. 9. After ἔγραψα, A B C Σ (Lachm. Tisch.) read τι. The *Rec.* is only supported by G K, some min. etc.¹ Two min.: 29, 66**, have ἄν τι; and

¹ Reiche incorrectly says: lectiones variae a rec. discedentes singulae non satis testatae sunt; whereas the overwhelming evidences decide in favour of τι

some others ἄν without τι; the Vulg.: scripsissam forsitan. These readings have arisen from an erroneous interpretation of the thought. — Ver. 10. Instead of βουλομένους is found in C, several min. Vulg.: ἐπιδεχομένους; a correction. — In \aleph the preposition ἐκ is wanting before τῆς ἐκκλησίας. — Ver. 11. The δὲ between ὁ and κακοποιῶν (*Rec.*) is, according to almost all the authorities, to be deleted; it was interpolated to mark the antithesis. — Ver. 12. In Cod. C, to the words τῆς ἀληθείας, τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ is further prefixed. In A the reading is uncertain; according to the statement of Tisch., A* probably reads “ἐκκλησίας” instead of ἀληθείας; Lachm. states the reading thus: “ἀλη. . . θίας corr. A, . . . θίας pr. A.” — οἶδατε] *Rec.* according to G K, etc., several vss. Thph. Occ. (Tisch.). In A B C \aleph , Vulg. etc., on the other hand, is found: οἶδας, which Griesb. recommended, and Lachm. accepted. — If the overwhelming evidences were not for οἶδας, we might regard it as a correction, as οἶδατε seemed objectionable in an Epistle addressed to one person. — Ver. 13. Instead of γράφειν (*Rev.* according to G K, etc., Occ.), the reading of A B C \aleph , etc., almost all versions, Thph.: γράψαι σοι, accepted by Lachm. and Tisch., is to be preferred. — The reading in A: οὐκ ἐβουλήθη, instead of οὐ θέλω, has originated in 2 John 12. — Though the *Rec.* (according to G K, etc., Thph. Occ.) has γράψαι at the close of the verse, A B C \aleph , etc., here read: γράφειν, which is justly accepted by Lachm. and Tisch. The pronoun σοι is put after the verb in A, etc., Vulg. etc. (Lachm.); most of the authorities, however, decide in favour of its position before the verb (Tisch.). — Ver. 14. Instead of the *Rec.* ἰδεῖν σε (G K \aleph , several versions, etc.), σε ἰδεῖν is probably to be read, with A B C, etc. (Lachm. Tisch.). Ver. 15. Instead of οἱ φίλοι, A has οἱ ἀδελφοί; clearly a correction. — \aleph sol. has ἄσπασαι for ἀσπάζου. — Only a few codd. (G some min. etc.) have at the close the word ἀμήν. — The subscription runs in A B \aleph : Ἰωάννου 7; in G: ἐπιστολὴ 7 τοῦ ἀγίου ἀποστόλου Ἰωάννου; in other codd. still more prolix.

Ver. 1. Superscription. On ὁ πρεσβύτερος, see the *Intro.* sec. 1. With regard to the person of Caius nothing particular is known; that he is identical with one of two (or three) Caiuses who are mentioned as friends and helpers of the Apostle Paul (comp. Acts xix. 29, xx. 4; 1 Cor. i. 14; and Rom. xvi. 23), is at least improbable.¹ It is also un-

being original. That B reads ἱγραψας (Reiche), has not been observed either by Tischendorf 7 or by Buttmann. Should it be the case, it must be regarded merely as a clerical error.

¹ Lücke thinks that if he was one of these, he would only be the Caius of

certain whether he is the same person as the Caius who, according to the *Constitt. Apostol.* vii. 46, is said to have been appointed by John as bishop in Pergamos (Mill., Whiston). That he was presbyter of the Church (Köstlin) does not follow from ver. 8. The apostle expresses his love to Caius in the epithet *τῷ ἀγαπητῷ*; how sincere it was is shown by the fact that he not only adds: *ὃν ἐγὼ ἀγαπῶ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ* (comp. with this 2 John 1), but also addresses him three times in the Epistle by *ἀγαπητέ*. On *ἐν ἀλ.* Oecumenius here well observes: *ἐν ἀληθείᾳ ἀγαπᾷ ὁ κατὰ Κύριον ἀγαπῶν ἐνδιαθέτω ἀγάπῃ*.

Ver. 2. Instead of with the usual formula of greeting, the Epistle begins with a wish for the welfare of Caius. — *περὶ πάντων*] *πάντων* is not masculine (Paulus: "on account of all, i.e. for the good of all"), but neuter. Several commentators, Beza, Castellio, Wahl, Lücke (1st ed.), Ewald, Düsterdieck, etc., interpret *περὶ πάντων* = *πρὸ πάντων* here, and connect it with *εὐχομαι*; but *usus loquendi* and thought are opposed to this. Although *περί* in some passages in Homer indicates precedence, yet this signification is utterly foreign to the LXX. and the N. T.; besides, it is not to be supposed that the apostle would have so specially emphasized the wish referring to the external circumstances of life; *περὶ πάντων*, with most of the commentators (even Lücke, 2d ed.), is rather to be connected with *σε εὐδοδοῦσθαι* (though not with *ὑγιαίνειν*) in its usual signification: "*in regard to all things*." In reply to the objection which has been made out of the position of the words, Lücke with justice remarks: "it is put first with rhetorical emphasis, corresponding to *ἡ ψυχὴ*, which is compared with it, at the end." — *εὐχομαι*] it is true, means also "to pray" (Jas. v. 15), but usually: "*to wish*," so here also; that with John it was an *εὐχεσθαι πρὸς τὸν Θεόν*, is self-evident. — *σε εὐδοδοῦσθαι καὶ ὑγιαίνειν*] *εὐδοδοῦσθαι*, besides here, is only found in Rom. i. 10 and 1 Cor. xvi. 2; in both passages it means: "*to be fortunate*" (see Meyer on Rom. i. 10); similarly it signifies here also prosperity; comp. the detailed account of the usage of the word in the classics

Derbe (Acts xx. 4); yet he states no reason for this opinion, but merely refers to Wolf's *Curæ*; Wolf, however, regards it as probable that he was the same as the Caius mentioned in 1 Cor. i. 14, whom he distinguishes as the Corinthian Caius from the Caius of Derbe.

and in the LXX. by Lücke and Düsterdieck on this passage. — The apostle wishes that it may go well and happily with Caius in all *external* circumstances; that it is just these he has in view in πάντων, is clear from the contrasted ψυχῇ. By means of ὑγιαίνειν (= “to be in health,” comp. Luke v. 31, vii. 10, and other passages) one element of the general εὐδοῦσθαι is brought specially out. It is not to be inferred from the wish which is expressed that Caius had been ill (Düsterdieck). — καθὼς εὐδοῦταί σου ἡ ψυχῇ] By the prosperity of the soul of Caius, to which the external welfare was to correspond, it is not the *natural* condition, as the sequel shows, but the Christian state of salvation that is to be understood.

Ver. 3. Confirmation of the foregoing statement. — ἐχάρην γὰρ λίαν] see on 2 John 4. When and why the apostle felt such a joy is stated in the two following participial sentences, of which, however, as far as the sense is concerned, the first is subordinate to the second; à Mons: lorsque les frères qui sont venus ont rendu témoignage. — μαρτυρεῖν, with the dative of the thing: “to testify of anything;” comp. vv. 6, 12; John iii. 26, v. 33, xviii. 37. — By σου τῇ ἀληθείᾳ it is not the truth in the objective sense (Calovius: veritas evangelii) in so far as Caius had received it, but the truth in the subjective sense, that is to be understood (so also Lücke, Düsterdieck, Braune, etc.): the inner Christian life, which is born of the truth, is itself truth; some commentators incorrectly limit the idea to a single element of it; e.g. Lorinus to liberalitas. — The addition: καθὼς σὺ ἐν ἀληθείᾳ περιπατεῖς (comp. 2 John 4), serves as an explanation of the preceding: “namely how thou,” etc. In the fact that the brethren testified that Caius was *walking* in the truth, they bore a testimony to the truth that was in him. The sentence is not “a direct sentence” (Baumgarten-Crusius: “as thou indeed art living in accordance with the truth”) by which “John adds his testimony to that of the brethren (Besser) in order to confirm it” (Ebrard), but “an indirect sentence” (Brückner) dependent on μαρτυρούντων, on which a special emphasis is laid, as also the ἀκούω in ver. 4 shows (so also Düsterdieck, Braune). σὺ is emphatically used in contrast to those who do not walk ἐν ἀληθείᾳ.

Ver. 4 serves as confirmation of ἐχάρην λίαν. — μείζοτεραν] Grotius: est ad intendendam significationem comparativus e comparativo factus; similar formations occur in the classical language of poets and later writers; see Winer, p. 65; VII. p. 67; in the N. T. comp. Eph. iii. 8. — τούτων οὐκ ἔχω χαρὰν ἵνα κ.τ.λ. — “I have not a greater joy than this, that;” τούτων is not used for ταύτης, but “as an indefinite word is to be connected with the more definite ἵνα” (Lücke); some commentators incorrectly supply “ἥ” before ἵνα. John xv. 13 is to be compared with this passage; only that ταύτης is used there, but it does not refer, however, to something preceding, but finds its explanation in the following ἵνα.¹ — τὰ ἐμὰ τέκνα, not “all Christians;” but neither merely the converts of John, but the members of the Churches which were under the special fatherly direction of the apostle (so also Braune).

Vv. 5, 6. Praise of Caius for his φιλοξενία, induced by that which he exhibited towards the brethren (ver. 3). — πιστὸν ποιεῖς ὃ ἐὰν κ.τ.λ.] By πιστόν the conduct (ποιεῖς) of Caius, which he had shown towards the brethren, is described as faithful, i.e. corresponding to the Christian profession. Ebrard's view, that πιστὸν ποιεῖν is = the classical πιστόν (= πίστιν) ποιεῖσθαι in the sense of “to give a pledge of faithfulness, a guarantee,” cannot be grammatically justified. By ἐὰν (= ἄν) the idea is generalized: “everything whatever.” — εἰς τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς καὶ τοῦτο ξένους] With the construction ἐργάζεσθαι εἰς, comp. Matt. xxvi. 10. By καὶ τοῦτο it is brought out that the ἀδελφοί to whom Caius is showing his love are ξένοι; even with the reading καὶ εἰς τοὺς ξένους the thought remains the same: καί, namely, is expegetically used = “and that too;” as the ξένοι were Christians, they cannot be distinguished from the ἀδελφοί; Lücke takes καί in a specializing sense: “and particularly or especially;” but it is not brotherly love in general, but just the φιλοξενία, that is the subject here. That is to say, the apostle in this praise has specially in view what Caius had done to the brethren who

¹ In opposition to Meyer, who says on the passage cited: “the usual view, according to which ἵνα is taken as the explanation of ταύτης, does not correspond to the idea of purpose which is contained in ἵνα,” it may be observed that in the usus loquendi of the N. T. ἵνα has by no means retained the idea of purpose in its distinctness, and often serves, in reference to the demonstrative pronoun, to state the meaning of the latter.

had come to him (the Ap. : ver. 3), and who are also spoken of in vv. 6 and 7; these, however, were ξένοι.¹ — Ver. 6. οἱ ἐμαρτύρησάν σου τῇ ἀγάπῃ ἐνώπιον ἐκκλησίας] That οἱ “dis-sociates the concrete representation of some from the generic representation of ξένοι” (de Wette) is incorrect; it rather refers directly to the previously-mentioned *strange brethren*. By ἐνώπιον ἐκκλησίας we are not to think of the Church to which Caius belonged, but of that in which John was sojourning. — οὓς καλῶς ποιήσεις κ.τ.λ.] The same brethren that had come from Caius to John wanted to return thither again, in order from thence to continue their missionary journey (ver. 7). John now recommends them to the loving care of Caius. — οὓς are not others (de Wette), but the same as were spoken of in the preceding sentence. The combination of the future ποιήσεις and the aorist participle προπέμψας is strange, as the two verbs do not denote two different actions, but the καλῶς ποιεῖν consists in the προπέμπειν; it is different in Mark xiii. 13, Acts xxiv. 25, Rom. xv. 28, where two different actions are placed in connection with one another, and the aorist participle is used in the sense of the fut. exacti (see Winer, p. 306; VII. p. 321). This has not been properly noticed by the commentators. The explanation of Düsterdieck: “The aorist form is to be explained by the fact that the good deed will consist in this, that Caius will have worthily brought the brethren forward,” does not solve the difficulty, as the good deed consists in the bringing them forward itself. The apostle may have used the aorist, however, in the feeling that “the action of Caius is only completed when he has accomplished the equipment and escort of the brethren” (Braune). The same connection is found in Eurip. *Orest.* 1210 ff.: εὐτυχίσομεν . . . ἐλόντες, which Matthiae (*Ausf. Gramm.*, 2d ed. p. 1087) translates: “if we are so fortunate as to take;”² in accordance with which we may translate here also: “thou shalt act worthily to accompany

¹ The present ποιεῖς is not opposed to this view, as it would seem to be; it is explained by the fact that the apostle regards the single, special case, as an evidence of the φιλοξενία of Caius in general.

² The whole passage in Euripides runs:—

ἤξῃ δ' ἰς οἶκους Ἑρμίου τίνος χρόνου;
ὥς πᾶλλα γ' ἵππας, εἴπῃρ εὐτυχίσομεν,
κάλλισθ' ἰλόττις σκύμνον ἀντισίου δοκῶ.

them." Luther incorrectly: "thou hast done well that thou hast sent them on their journey;" in the revised ed. 1867 correctly: "thou shalt do well if thou sendest them on their journey." Ebrard arbitrarily conjectures: *ἐποίησας*. — It is quite evident from the connection with the sequel, that by *καλῶς ποιήσεις* John wants to encourage Caius to the *προπέμπειν*. The reading *ποιήσας προπέμψεις* means: "whom thou, after thou hast treated them well, shalt bring forward on their journey." — With *καλῶς ποιεῖν*, comp. Acts x. 13, Phil. iv. 14; with *προπέμπειν* = "to fit out for a journey," Rom. xv. 24, 1 Cor. xvi. 6, 16, Tit. iii. 13. — *ἀξίως τοῦ Θεοῦ* (comp. 1 Thess. ii. 12; Col. i. 10) does not belong to *καλ. ποιήσεις*, but to *προπέμψας* = "as worthy of God, with all care and love" (Lücke).

Ver. 7. Confirmation of the exhortation that has been uttered: the brethren deserve such help, for, etc. *ὑπὲρ γὰρ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐξήλθαν*] With the *Rec.* reading: *ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ*, *αὐτοῦ* refers back to *τοῦ Θεοῦ*; but this *αὐτοῦ* is to be regarded as an interpolation; *τὸ ὄνομα* (without *αὐτοῦ*) is neither "the Christian doctrine or religion," nor "the name of the brethren" (Paulus: "because they were called missionaries"), but "the name of Christ" (Lücke, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Sander, Braune, etc.), as in Acts v. 41 (according to the correct reading); comp. also Jas. ii. 7, and *Ignatii ep. ad Ephes.* cap. 3 and 7. — *ὑπὲρ* is here used in the same sense as in Rom. i. 6, and *ἐξέρχεσθαι* as in Acts xv. 40 (Lücke, de Wette, Baumgarten-Crusius, Sander, Braune, etc.); so that the sense is: for the sake of the name of Christ, *i.e.* for the spread of it, they went forth (as missionaries). Several commentators (Beza, Schmidius, Bengel, Carpzovius, Wolf) connect *ἐξήλθαν* with *ἀπὸ τῶν ἐθνικῶν* [*ἔθνων*] in the sense: *expulsi sunt a paganis*; but this idea is arbitrarily imported into *ἐξήλθαν*; ¹ besides, the connection with *ἀπὸ τ. ἐθν.* is unsuitable, because then the words *μηδὲν λαμβάνοντες* remain too indefinite. The assertion of Wolf, that *λαμβάνειν* is not construed with *ἀπό*, is refuted by Matt. xvii. 25. By the addition: *μηδὲν λαμ-*

¹ Grotius, indeed, correctly connects *ἀπὸ τ. ἰδν.* with *λαμβάνοντις*, but interprets *ἐξήλθον*: a Judaea ejecti sunt per Judaeos incredulos; the erroneous idea that the apostle considered the *Jews* as the antithesis of the Gentiles has clearly led him to this arbitrary interpretation.

βάνοντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἐθνικῶν, the necessity of assisting these brethren is brought out. The present participle is either used in the imperfect sense (ver. 3), or—as is more probable—it is used in order to indicate the μηδὲν λαμβάνειν ἀπὸ τ. ἐθν. as the maxim of these missionaries (so also Düsterdieck and Braune). It is very usual to regard this maxim as the same as that which Paul took for his, and of which he speaks in passages like 1 Cor. ix. 18; 2 Cor. xi. 7 ff., xii. 16 ff.; 1 Thess. ii. 9 ff.; but ἀπὸ τῶν ἐθνικῶν (= ἔθνων, comp. Matt. vi. 7, xviii. 17) does not suit this; the maxim of Paul was not to make the care for his support an obligation on the Churches among which he laboured, but here it is *heathen* that are spoken of. It was by *these* that these missionary brethren would not allow themselves to be assisted, because they did not want to build up Christ's work by the wealth of the heathen, but trusted to Christians that in Christian love they would provide for them what was needful.¹

Ver. 8 indicates "the highest point of view for Christian φιλοξενία" (Lücke). — ἡμεῖς οὖν] ἡμεῖς emphatically forms the antithesis to οἱ ἐθνικοί; as they take nothing from the *Gentiles*, *we Christians* are bound to take an interest in them; ὀφείλομεν ὑπολαμβάνειν τοὺς τοιούτους] ὑπολαμβάνειν is just as little used in the N. T. in the sense of hospitable reception (Oec. ὑποδέχεσθαι) as the ἀπολαμβάνειν that is found in the *Rec.* In the classics it appears (but not ἀπολαμβάνειν) both in this meaning and in the modified signification: "*to support*" (so in Strabo: οἱ εὐποροὶ τοὺς ἐνδεεῖς ὑπολαμβάνουσι); so it is to be taken here also, and in connection with it the play upon words, between λαμβάνοντες and ὑπο . . . λαμβάνειν, must not be overlooked. — ἵνα συνεργοὶ γινώμεθα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ] Confirmation of ὀφείλομεν. The dative τῇ ἀληθ. is not dependent on συν; Vulg.: ut cooperatores simus veritatis; Luther: "so that we may be helpers of the truth" (so Grotius, Bengel, Besser, etc.), but it is the dative of reference, and συν refers back to τοὺς τοιούτους (Brückner, Düsterdieck, Ebrard, Braune): "so that we may be their fellow-workers for the truth;" comp. 2 Cor. viii. 23; Col. iv. 11, where instead of the dative the preposition εἰς is used.

¹ Ewald unsuitably deduces this maxim from the command of Christ, Matt. x. 8-10.

Vv. 9, 10. Notice of Diotrephes. — ἔγραψά τι τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ] The τι, which according to the authorities is probably genuine, does not serve, as Lücke rightly remarks, to intensify = “something important,” but rather to weaken = “something, a little.” — The reading: ἔγραψα ἄν (Vulg.: scripsissem forsitan), has originated in the idea that the apostle would not write an epistle, of the unsuccessfulness of which he was previously convinced. The Church to which the apostle wrote is not that from which the brethren (ver. 7) went forth (Bengel, Besser), but that to which Caius belonged. The opinion that this writing is the so-called First Epistle of John (Wolf, Storr, etc.) is just as untenable as the view that it is the Second Epistle of John (Ewald, Besser, etc.), for the contents of these two have nothing in common with the circumstances which are here alluded to. This writing must, according to the context in which it is mentioned, have treated of the reception or support of the missionary brethren. If it was only such a short occasional writing, it is easily intelligible how it may have been lost; besides, however, it is natural to suppose that it was withheld from the Church by Diotrephes. — ἀλλ’ ὁ φιλοπρωτεύων αὐτῶν Διοτρεφῆς οὐκ ἐπιδέχεται ἡμᾶς] In these words the apostle expresses the experience which he had had of Diotrephes. It may be assumed that the apostle wrote to the Church of Diotrephes in regard to the reception of the missionary brethren, and that the bearers of the Epistle reported to him the conduct of Diotrephes, which he now tells to Caius. As to the more particular circumstances of Diotrephes nothing further is known. From what John says about him, it cannot be inferred either that he was presbyter, or that he was deacon of the Church; yet the contrary conclusion cannot either be drawn. When Grotius represents him as an opponent of the Jewish-Christians, and others, on the contrary, regard him as a false teacher of Jewish or Gnostic views, these are unfounded conjectures; if either the one or the other were the case, John would certainly have indicated it. John only accuses him of one thing, namely, the φιλοπρωτεύειν, from which his unchristian conduct resulted. φιλοπρωτεύειν is a ἄπ. λεγ.; yet in the later Greek writers φιλόπρωτος and φιλοπρωτεία appear. The scholion in Matthiae rightly explains ὁ φιλοπρωτεύων by : ὁ ὑφαρπάζων τὰ πρωτεία;

he ambitiously arrogated to himself the highest authority in the Church, which made himself an opponent of the apostle. By what means he was able to obtain validity for this assumption we do not know; perhaps by assembling the Church in his house. — αὐτοῦ refers to ἐκκλησία, as a collective idea. — οὐκ ἐπιδέχεσθαι ἡμᾶς] ἐπιδέχεσθαι, in the N. T. only here and in ver. 10, means “to receive;” it is incorrect to change ἡμᾶς into “our epistles or exhortations” (Grotius, Lücke, de Wette, etc.). In the fact that Diotrephes rejected the communication of the apostle, and refused to receive the brethren recommended in it, he justly obtained rejection for himself (so also Braune). It is unnecessary, therefore, to ascribe to ἐπιδέχεσθαι here the modified meaning: “to accept, to let pass,” in which it appears in the classics. Ver. 10. διὰ τοῦτο, ἐὰν ἔλθω, ὑπομνήσω κ.τ.λ.] Though, in the absence of John, Diotrephes resisted his authority, yet John hoped by his presence to obtain for it its due weight, and therefore he had resolved to come himself to that Church and personally to oppose the intrigues of Diotrephes. — With ὑπομνήσω, which is here used with the secondary signification of blame, it is not necessary to supply αὐτόν; although Diotrephes is meant, yet John did not write αὐτόν, because he had in view at the same time all those who adhered to him (so Braune correctly); comp. 2 Tim. ii. 14. In what the ἔργα of Diotrephes, to which the apostle intends the ὑπομιμνήσκω to refer, consisted, the following participial clauses state.¹ — λόγος πονηροῖς φλυαρῶν ἡμᾶς] φλυαρεῖν (in the N. T. a ἄπ. λεγ.; the adj. φλύαρος, 1 Tim. v. 13) = nugari; Oecumenius paraphrases it by λουδορεῖν, κακολογεῖν: this, however, does not express the idea of the chatter *that says nothing* which is contained in φλυαρεῖν. The verb, in itself intransitive, is here construed with the accusative (as θριαμβεύω, Col. ii. 15; μαθητεύω, Matt. xxviii. 19), thus: “he prates against us slanderously with wicked words.” — καὶ μὴ ἀρκούμενος ἐπὶ τούτοις] Diotrephes did not content himself with φλυαρεῖν against the apostle alone (ἀρκεῖσθαι is only here used in construction with ἐπὶ; else-

¹ Ewald strangely overlooks the following words when, after translating the preceding words, he says: “But the author cannot dwell on this painful incident; he breaks off abruptly, to turn back to the good, exclaiming: Beloved!” etc.

where the dative is found : Luke iii. 14 ; Heb. xiii. 5, and other passages); he injured the brethren also. — οὔτε αὐτὸς ἐπιδέχεται τοὺς ἀδελφούς καὶ κ.τ.λ.] With οὔτε the following καὶ corresponds ; αὐτός is contrasted with τοὺς βουλομένους. — There is no reason to take ἐπιδέχεσθαι here in a different sense from that of ver. 9, although it takes a different bearing towards different persons, one way in regard to the apostle, another way in regard to the ἀδελφοί, who are here mentioned, and who are to be regarded as ξένοι ; they are the same as were spoken of previously (ver. 7, etc.). — With τοὺς βουλομένους we are to understand ἐπιδέχεσθαι αὐτούς (C reads just ἐπιδεχομένους instead of βουλ.) ; there were therefore some persons in the Church who were ready to receive the strangers, in opposition to Diotrephes ; but Diotrephes did not permit it, nay, he opposed them with all force. — καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἐκβάλλει] It is not τοὺς ἀδελφούς, but τοὺς βουλομένους that is the object. — ἐκβάλλειν ἐκ τῆς ἐκκλησίας signifies expulsion from the Church, as the object is not τοὺς ἀδελφούς, but τοὺς βουλομένους ; the expression is arbitrarily weakened if we understand by it merely that “Diotrephes no longer admitted those who opposed him to the meetings of the Church which he held in his house” (Braune). The common opinion is, that Diotrephes had actually already expelled some persons from the Church, whether irregularly by means of faction, or with arrogant violence, or whether by intrigues he had brought about resolutions of the Church to that effect ; but it is also possible that the apostle describes as an act of Diotrephes what he in his pride had threatened to do, so that the expression then is one of keen irony. — If arbitrary hypotheses are not admitted, we must regard as the cause of the behaviour of Diotrephes only his vanity— which showed itself in his φιλοπρωτεύειν. By the way in which a part of the Church (especially Caius) had interested itself in the strangers, and had been mentioned in John’s communications on the subject, Diotrephes, in his vanity, had probably felt offended, and this had excited his anger, which led him to the conduct which John rebukes in such simple but severe words.

Ver. 11. From the special case the apostle deduces an exhortation of general import. — μὴ μιμῶ τὸ κακόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ

ἀγαθόν] On μιμεῖσθαι, comp. especially Heb. xiii. 7. — The expressions: τὸ κακόν and τὸ ἀγαθόν, can so much the less be regarded as un-Johannean (de Wette) as in John v. 29 the corresponding antithesis: τὰ ἀγαθά and τὰ φαῦλα, is found, and in John xviii. 23 the neuter singular τὸ κακόν. The additional sentence: ὁ ἀγαθοποιῶν . . . τὸν Θεόν, expresses the same thought that frequently appears in the First Epistle of John, especially in chap. iii. 6. — The ideas: ἀγαθοποιεῖν and κακοποιεῖν, are to be taken quite generally, and must not be limited to the special virtue of benevolence (a Lapide, Lorinus, Grotius, Paulus); comp. 1 Pet. ii. 14, 15, 20, iii. 6, 17. — The corresponding expressions: ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι and ἐώρακέναι τὸν Θεόν, are used also in the First Epistle of John; but why the Johannean: οὐκ ἔγνω τὸν Θεόν (1 John iv. 8), should be more conformable to the style of John than the equally Johannean: οὐχ ἐώρακε τὸν Θεόν (1 John iii. 6), as Lücke and de Wette think, is not quite perceptible.

Ver. 12. As the apostle, by μὴ μιμοῦ τὸ κακόν, has warned Caius against imitation of Diotrephes, so he now puts Demetrius before him as an example for imitation—corresponding to ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν. Who this Demetrius was, however, and where he had his abode, is not stated. Ebrard thinks that he had been one of the βουλόμενοι (ver. 10) in the Church of Diotrephes, and had perhaps been excommunicated by him: but in *that* case Caius must have known him, so that he did not require this strong testimony of the apostle in his favour: the view that he was the bearer of the Epistle (Düsterdieck, Lücke, etc.) is more probable. — μεμαρτύρηται refers—in accordance with John's usage of the perfect—not merely to a past, but also to a present record. μαρτυρεῖσθαι frequently appears in the same absolute way as here, especially in the Acts; comp. chap. vi. 3, x. 22, and passim. — πάντων is not to be extended to the heathen, with Occumenius and Theophylact, but refers to the Church to which Demetrius belonged; Ebrard incorrectly understands by it "the brethren," vv. 10, 7, 5; the apostle would have distinctly mentioned them, and besides, the πάντων, which is clearly used emphatically, would be unsuitable in reference to them. — καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας] Whilst the commentators are agreed in this, that the truth is here personified, they deviate widely from one

another in their more particular definition of the idea; most of them understand by it the life of Demetrius as that which testifies for him, whether they interpret ἀλήθεια = reality (Hornejus: ipsa rei veritas; Grotius: res ipsae) or as the life itself, in so far as it is a testimony to his virtue (Beausobre: c'est à dire, que sa conduite est un témoin réel de sa vertu). This, however, is incorrect, as both the expression itself (αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια) and also its position (between πάντες and ἡμεῖς) indicate that the apostle meant by ἡ ἀλήθεια something objectively contrasted with Demetrius. Düsterdieck (with whom Braune agrees) has rightly perceived this; but as he at the same time retains the reference to the life, he finds the testimony of the objective Christian truth in the fact that it gives commandments to man, and that inasmuch as Demetrius fulfils them, it is by these commandments that the truth bears a good testimony to him. But apart from the fact that this introduction of the commandments cannot be justified, the whole interpretation has something too artificial to permit of its being regarded as correct. The hypothetical interpretation of Lücke: "if the infallible Christian truth, comp. ver. 3, itself were asked, it would give him a good testimony" (similarly Schlichting), does not suit the positive μεμαρτύρηται. It is too far-fetched, with Baumgarten-Crusius, to regard the result of the Christian activity of Demetrius as the testimony of the truth to him. A simple, clear idea would be brought out if, with Sander, we could regard it as "a special testimony which John had received through the Holy Ghost in reference to Demetrius;" but there is no justification for this. The correct way will be to interpret ὑπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀληθείας in close connection with ὑπὸ πάντων, and to conclude that the apostle adds the former in order to bring out the fact that the good report of all has its origin not merely in their human judgment, but in the testimony of the ἀλήθεια which dwells in them (so also Brückner); and that the expression αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια is not merely a personification, but is a description of the Holy Ghost (comp. 1 John v. 6: τὸ πνεῦμά ἐστιν ἡ ἀλήθεια). The opinion that αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια, in contrast with πάντες, cannot be the truth that produces their testimony, and that testifies for Demetrius (Ebrard,¹ Braune), is refuted by John xv. 26, 27,

¹ Ebrard's view—that we are here "to consider the truth as a power and

as here, in a quite similar way, the testimony of the Spirit of truth is conjoined with the testimony of the disciples, the latter being produced and confirmed by the former. — To the testimony of *all* the apostle further specially adds his *own*: καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ μαρτυροῦμεν] By καὶ . . . δέ a stronger emphasis is laid on ἡμεῖς. — With καὶ οἶδας κ.τ.λ., comp. John xix. 35, xxi. 24. — By the reading: οἶδατε, Caius and his friends are addressed together.

Vv. 13, 14. The same thoughts as in 2 John 12; even the expression is little different; this agreement is most naturally explained by the contemporaneousness of the two Epistles. — πολλὰ εἶχον γράψαι] “*I would have many things to write to thee, but . . .*,” as in Acts xxv. 22; comp. Winer, p. 253; VII. p. 265; A. Buttmann, p. 187 (de Wette); an ἄν is not omitted. Düsterdieck and Ebrard translate: “I had much to write,” unsuitably, because the apostle is not speaking of the past, but of the present. — Instead of paper (Second John), it is the κάλαμος, “*the writing-reed*,” that is mentioned as the writing material along with the ink. — On ἐλπίζω δὲ κ.τ.λ., see εἰάν ἐλθω, ver. 10.

Ver. 15. εἰρήνη σοι] The blessing at the end of the First Epistle of Peter runs similarly; comp. besides, Gal. vi. 16; Eph. vi. 23; 2 Thess. iii. 16 (also Rom. xv. 33; 2 Cor. xiii. 11; 1 Thess. v. 23; Heb. xiii. 20). — ἀσπάζονται σε οἱ φίλοι κ.τ.λ.] It is in harmony with the character of the Epistle, as a private communication, that John does not send greetings from the whole Church, but from the special friends of Caius, and so also commissions him with greetings only to his (the apostle's) φίλοι. The latter was the more natural, as indeed a part of the Church was at enmity with John. — Οὐ κατ' ὄνομα, comp. John x. 3; it belongs to ἀσπάζου, and is = ὀνομαστί (see Meyer on this passage); the personal relationship is thereby emphasized, as Caius is to greet every one of the friends specially (by name).

might showing itself in the life of Demetrius; the truth which mightily showed itself in him in those days in the relations with Diotrephes, without doubt (!) in the fact that for the sake of the ἀλήθεια he endured serious ill-treatment or suffering” — is clearly affected, apart from other defects, by arbitrary imputations.