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BIBLICAL COMMENTARY

ON THE

PROVERBS OF SOLOMON.

BY

FRANZ DELITZSCH, D.D.,
PROFESSOR OF THEOLOGY.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY

M. G. EASTON, D.D.

VOL. I.

EDINBURGH:

T. & T. CLARK, 38, GEORGE STREET.

1874.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.



THE volume which is here presented to English readers is the first of three which will contain the Solomonic writings. They form the last section of the "Keil and Delitzsch" series of Commentaries on the Books of the Old Testament Scriptures. The remaining volume on the Proverbs, as well as that on Ecclesiastes and the Canticles, which has also been prepared by Delitzsch, and is now in course of publication in Germany, will be issued with as little delay as possible.

In this translation I have endeavoured accurately to reproduce the original, so as to bring the student as much as possible into direct contact with the learned commentator himself. Any explanatory notes or words I have thought it right to add are enclosed in square brackets [], so as to be easily distinguishable. The Arabic and Syriac words occurring in the original have been, with very few exceptions, printed in English characters. In their vocalization I have followed the system of Forbes in his *Arabic Grammar*, so that the student will be readily able to restore the original. When nothing depends on the inflection of these words, the consonants only are printed.

It might appear superfluous in me to speak in commendation of the great work which is now drawing to a close; but a translator, since he has necessarily been in close fellowship with the author, may be expected to be in a position to offer an opinion on the character of the work on which he has been engaged; and I am sure that all my *collaborateurs* will concur with me in speaking of the volumes which form this commentary as monuments of deep

and careful research into the meaning of the sacred Scriptures. Whether or not we can in all cases accept the conclusions reached by the respected authors, no one can fail to see how elaborate and minute the investigation has been. These volumes are the ripest fruits of life-long study of the Old Testament. Their authors are exegetes who have won for themselves an honoured place in the foremost rank for their profound acquaintance with the Hebrew and its cognate languages. With a scholarship of rare compass and accuracy, they combine a reverent sympathy with the sacred Scriptures, and a believing appreciation of its saving truths.

The satisfaction I have had in the study of this work, and in spending so many of my leisure hours in rendering it into English, is greatly heightened by the reflection, that I have been enabled in this way to contribute to the number of exegetical works within reach of the English student. The exegetical study of God's word, which appears to be increasingly drawing the attention of theologians, and which has been so greatly stimulated by the Translations issued by the publishers of this work, cannot fail to have the most beneficial results. The minister of the gospel will find such study his best and truest preparation for his weighty duties as an expounder of Scripture, if prosecuted in the spirit of a devout recognition of the truth, that "*bene orasse est bene studuisse.*" Thus is he led step by step into a thorough and full understanding of the words and varying forms of expression used by those "holy men of old, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

DARVEL, *October 1874.*

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.



THE preparation of this Commentary on the *Mishle*, which was begun in 1869 (not without previous preparation), and twice interrupted by providential events, extended into the winter of 1872. There is now wanting to the completion of the Commentary on the Old Testament, undertaken by Dr. Keil and myself, only the Commentary on the Canticles and Ecclesiastes, which will form the concluding volume.

In the preparation of this Commentary on the Proverbs, I am indebted in varied ways to my friends Fleischer and Wetzstein. In the year 1836, Fleischer entered on his duties as Professor at Leipzig by delivering a course of lectures on the Book of the Proverbs of Solomon. I was one of his hearers, and am now so fortunate as to be able from his own MS. (begun 13th May, completed 9th September 1836) to introduce this beloved teacher into the number of interpreters of the Book of Proverbs. The assistance contributed by Wetzstein begins at chapter xxx., and consists in remarks on Mühlau's work on the Proverbs of Agur and Lemuel (1869), which my Dorpat friend placed at my disposal.

The exegetical apparatus has in the course of this work extended far beyond the list given at pp. 50, 51. I obtained the Commentary of the Caraites Ahron b. Joseph (1294), which was printed at Koslow (Eupatoria) in 1835, and had lent to me from the library of Dr. Hermann Lotze the Commentary by the Roman poet Immanuel [born at Rome about 1265], who was intimately associated with Dante, printed at Naples in 1487, and equal in value to a MS. Among the interpreters comprehended in the *Biblia Rabbinica*, I made use also of the Commentary of the Spanish

Menachem b. Salomo Meiri (1447), which first appeared in the Amsterdam *Bibelwerk*, and came under my notice in a more handy edition (Fürth, 1844) from the library of my dear friend and companion in study, Baer. To him I owe, among many other things, the comparison of several MSS., particularly of one brought from Arabia by Jacob Sappir, which has come into his possession.

In making use of the *Græcus Venetus*, I was not confined to Villoison's edition (1784). The only existing MS. (found in Venice) of this translation one of my young friends, von Gebhardt, has compared with the greatest care with Villoison's printed edition, in which he has found many false readings and many omissions. We have to expect from him a critical, complete edition of this singular translation, which, both as regards the knowledge its author displays of the Hebrew language and his skill in the Greek language, remains as yet an unsolved mystery.

The Index¹ (to the words etymologically explained in this Commentary) has been prepared by Dr. Hermann Strack, who, by his recently-published *Prolegomena ad Vetus Testamentum Hebraicum*, has shown himself to be a Hebraist of rare attainments.

Bacon, in his work *De Augmentis Scientiarum* (viii. 2), rightly speaks² of Solomon's proverbs as an unparalleled collection. May it be granted me, by the help of God, to promote in some degree the understanding of this incomparable Book, as to its history, its language, and its practical lessons!

LEIPZIG, 30th October 1872.

¹ Will be given with vol. ii.

² [In hoc genere autem nihil invenitur, quod ullo modo comparandum sit cum aphorismis illis, quos edidit rex Salomon; de quo testatur Scriptura *cor illi fuisse instar arenæ maris*: sicut enim arenæ maris universas orbis oras circumdant, ita et sapientia ejus omnia humana, non minus quam divina, complexa est. In aphorismis vero illis, præter alia majis theologica, reperies liquido haud pauca præcepta et monita civilia præstantissima, ex profundis quidem sapientiæ penetralibus scaturientia, atque in amplissimum varietatis campum excurrentia.]

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THE BOOK OF PROVERBS.

INTRODUCTION.



THE Book of Proverbs bears the external title **סֵפֶר מִשְׁלֵי**, which it derives from the words with which it commences. It is one of the three books which are distinguished from the other twenty-one by a peculiar system of accentuation, the best exposition of which that has yet been given is that by S. Baer,¹ as set forth in my larger *Psalmen-commentar*.² The memorial word for these three books, viz. Job, Mishle (Proverbs), and Tehillim (Psalms), is **אִמָּת**, formed from the first letter of the first word of each book, or, following the Talmudic and Masoretic arrangement of the books, **הָאִמָּת**.

Having in view the superscription **מִשְׁלֵי שְׁלֹמֹה**, with which the book commences, the ancients regarded it as wholly the composition of Solomon. The circumstance that it contains only 800 verses, while according to 1 Kings v. 12 (iv. 32) Solomon spake 3000 proverbs, R. Samuel bar-Nachmani explains by remarking that each separate verse may be divided into two or three allegories or apothegms (*e.g.* xxv. 12), not to mention other more arbitrary modes of reconciling the discrepancy.³ The opinion also of R. Jonathan, that Solomon first composed the Canticles, then the Proverbs, and last of all Ecclesiastes, inasmuch as the first corresponds⁴ with the spring-time of youth, the second with the wis-

¹ Cf. *Outlines of Hebrew Accentuation, Prose and Poetical*, by Rev. A. B. Davidson, D.D., Professor of Hebrew, Free Church College, Edinburgh, 1861, based on Baer's *Torath Emeth*, Rödelheim 1872.

² Vol. ii., ed. of 1860, pp. 477–511.

³ *Pesikta*, ed. Buber (1868), 34b, 35a. Instead of 800, the Masora reckons 915 verses in the Book of Proverbs.

⁴ *Schir-ha-Schirim Rabba*, c. i. f. 4a.

dom of manhood, and the third with the disappointment of old age, is founded on the supposition of the unity of the book and of its Solomonian authorship.

At the present day also there are some, such as Stier, who regard the Book of Proverbs from first to last as the work of Solomon, just as Klauss (1832) and Randegger (1841) have ventured to affirm that all the Psalms without exception were composed by David. But since historical criticism has been applied to Biblical subjects, that blind submission to mistaken tradition appears as scarcely worthy of being mentioned. The Book of Proverbs presents itself as composed of various parts, different from each other in character and in the period to which they belong. Under the hands of the critical analysis it resolves itself into a mixed market of the most manifold intellectual productions of proverbial poetry, belonging to at least three different epochs.

1. *The external plan of the Book of Proverbs, and its own testimony as to its origin.*—The internal superscription of the book, which recommends it, after the manner of later Oriental books, on account of its importance and the general utility of its contents, extends from ver. 1 to ver. 6. Among the moderns this has been acknowledged by Löwenstein and Maurer; for ver. 7, which Ewald, Bertheau, and Keil have added to it, forms a new commencement to the beginning of the book itself. The book is described as “The Proverbs of Solomon,” and then there is annexed the statement of its object. That object, as summarily set forth in ver. 2, is practical, and that in a twofold way: partly moral, and partly intellectual. The former is described in vers. 3–5. It presents moral edification, moral sentiments for acceptance, not merely to help the unwise to attain to wisdom, but also to assist the wise. The latter object is set forth in ver. 6. It seeks by its contents to strengthen and discipline the mind to the understanding of thoughtful discourses generally. In other words, it seeks to gain the moral ends which proverbial poetry aims at, and at the same time to make familiar with it, so that the reader, in these proverbs of Solomon, or by means of them as of a key, learns to understand such like apothegms in general. Thus interpreted, the title of the book does not say that the book contains proverbs of other wise men besides those of Solomon; if it did so, it would contradict itself. It is possible that the book contains proverbs

other than those of Solomon, possible that the author of the title of the book added such to it himself, but the title presents to view only the Proverbs of Solomon. If i. 7 begins the book, then after reading the title we cannot think otherwise than that here begin the Solomonic proverbs. If we read farther, the contents and the form of the discourses which follow do not contradict this opinion; for both are worthy of Solomon. So much the more astonished are we, therefore, when at x. 1 we meet with a new superscription, מִשְׁלֵי שְׁלֹמֹה, from which point on to xxii. 16 there is a long succession of proverbs of quite a different tone and form—short maxims, Mashals proper—while in the preceding section of the book we find fewer proverbs than monitory discourses. What now must be our opinion when we look back from this second superscription to the part i. 7–ix., which immediately follows the title of the book? Are i. 7–ix., in the sense of the book, not the “Proverbs of Solomon”? From the title of the book, which declares them to be so, we must judge that they are. Or are they “Proverbs of Solomon”? In this case the new superscription (x. 1), “The Proverbs of Solomon,” appears altogether incomprehensible. And yet only one of these two things is possible: on the one side, therefore, there must be a false appearance of contradiction, which on a closer investigation disappears. But on which side is it? If it is supposed that the tenor of the title, i. 1–6, does not accord with that of the section x. 1–xxii. 6, but that it accords well with that of i. 7–ix. (with the breadth of expression in i. 7–ix., it has also several favourite words not elsewhere occurring in the Book of Proverbs; among these, עֲרִמָּה, subtilty, and מִיָּסֶה, discretion, i. 4), then Ewald’s view is probable, that i.–ix. is an original whole written at once, and that the author had no other intention than to give it as an introduction to the larger Solomonic Book of Proverbs beginning at x. 1. But it is also possible that the author of the title has adopted the style of the section i. 7–ix. Bertheau, who has propounded this view, and at the same time has rejected, in opposition to Ewald, the idea of the unity of the section, adopts this conclusion, that in i. 8–ix. there lies before us a collection of the admonitions of different authors of proverbial poetry, partly original introductions to larger collections of proverbs, which the author of the title gathers together in order that he may give a comprehensive introduction to the larger collection contained in x. 1–xxii. 16. But such an origin of the section as Bertheau thus imagines

is by no means natural; it is more probable that the author, whose object is, according to the title of the book, to give the proverbs of Solomon, introduces these by a long introduction of his own, than that, instead of beginning with Solomon's proverbs, he first presents long extracts of a different kind from collections of proverbs. If the author, as Bertheau thinks, expresses indeed, in the words of the title, the intention of presenting, along with the "Proverbs of Solomon," also the "words of the wise," then he could not have set about his work more incorrectly and self-contradictorily than if he had begun the whole, which bears the superscription "Proverbs of Solomon" (which must be regarded as presenting the proverbs of Solomon as a key to the words of the wise generally), with the "words of the wise." But besides the opinion of Ewald, which in itself, apart from internal grounds, is more natural and probable than that of Bertheau, there is yet the possibility of another. Keil, following H. A. Hahn, is of opinion, that in the sense of the author of the title, the section i.-ix. is Solomonic as well as x.-xxii., but that he has repeated the superscription "Proverbs of Solomon" before the latter section, because from that point onward proverbs follow which bear in a special measure the characters of the *Mashal* (Hävernicks *Einl.* iii. 428). The same phenomenon appears in the book of Isaiah, where, after the general title, there follows an introductory address, and then in ii. 1 the general title is repeated in a shorter form. That this analogy, however, is here inapplicable, the further discussion of the subject will show.

The introductory section i. 7-ix., and the larger section x.-xxii. 16, which contains uniform brief Solomonic apothegms, are followed by a third section, xxii. 17-xxiv. 22. Hitzig, indeed, reckons x.-xxiv. 22 as the second section, but with xxii. 17 there commences an altogether different style, and a much freer manner in the form of the proverb; and the introduction to this new collection of proverbs, which reminds us of the general title, places it beyond a doubt that the collector does not at all intend to set forth these proverbs as Solomonic. It may indeed be possible that, as Keil (iii. 410) maintains, the collector, inasmuch as he begins with the words, "Incline thine ear and hear words of the wise," names his own proverbs generally as "words of the wise," especially since he adds, "and apply thine heart to my knowledge;" but this supposition is contradicted by the superscription of a fourth section, xxiv. 23 ff., which follows. This short section, an appendix to the

third, bears the superscription, "These things also are אִלְהִיִּים." If Keil thinks here also to set aside the idea that the following proverbs, in the sense of this superscription, have as their authors "the wise," he does unnecessary violence to himself. The ל is here that of authorship; and if the following proverbs are composed by the אִלְהִיִּים, "the wise," then they are not the production of the one חָכָם, "wise man," Solomon, but they are "the words of the wise" in contradistinction to "the Proverbs of Solomon."

The Proverbs of Solomon begin again at xxv. 1; and this second large section (corresponding to the first, x. 1-xxii. 16) extends to xxix. This fifth portion of the book has a superscription, which, like that of the preceding appendix, commences thus: "Also (עַל) these are proverbs of Solomon which the men of Hezekiah king of Judah collected." The meaning of the word הֶעֱתִיקוּ is not doubtful. It signifies, like the Arameo-Arabic נָסַח, to remove from their place, and denotes that the men of Hezekiah removed from the place where they found them the following proverbs, and placed them together in a separate collection. The words have thus been understood by the Greek translator. From the supplementary words αἱ ἀδιάκριτοι (such as exclude all διάκρισις) it is seen that the translator had a feeling of the important literary historical significance of that superscription, which reminds us of the labours of the poetical grammarians appointed by Pisistratus to edit older works, such as those of Hesiod. The Jewish interpreters, simply following the Talmud, suppose that the "also" (עַל) belongs to the whole superscription, inclusive of the relative sentence, and that it thus bears witness to the editing of the foregoing proverbs also by Hezekiah and his companions;¹ which is altogether improbable, for then, if such were the meaning of the words, "which the men of Hezekiah," etc., they ought to have stood after i. 1. The superscription xxv. 1 thus much rather distinguishes the following collection from that going before, as having been made under Hezekiah. As two appendices followed the "Proverbs of Solomon," x. 1-xxii. 16, so also two appendices the Hezekiah-gleanings of Solomonic proverbs. The former two appendices, however, originate in general from the "wise," the latter more definitely name the authors: the first, xxx., is by "Agur the son of Jakeh;" the second, xxxi.

¹ *Vid. B. Bathra, 15a.* From the fact that Isaiah outlived Hezekiah it is there concluded that the Hezekiah-collegium also continued after Hezekiah's death. Cf. Fürst on the *Canon of the O. T.* 1868, p. 78 f.

1-9, by a "King Lemuel." In so far the superscriptions are clear. The names of the authors, elsewhere unknown, point to a foreign country; and to this corresponds the peculiar complexion of these two series of proverbs. As a third appendix to the Hezekiah-collection, xxxi. 10 ff. follows, a complete alphabetical proverbial poem which describes the praiseworthy qualities of a virtuous woman.

We are thus led to the conclusion that the Book of Proverbs divides itself into the following parts:—(1) The title of the book, i. 1-6, by which the question is raised, how far the book extends to which it originally belongs; (2) the hortatory discourses, i. 7-ix., in which it is a question whether the Solomonic proverbs must be regarded as beginning with these, or whether they are only the introduction thereto, composed by a different author, perhaps the author of the title of the book; (3) the first great collection of Solomonic proverbs, x.-xxii. 16; (4) the first appendix to this first collection, "The words of the wise," xxii. 17-xxiv. 22; (5) the second appendix, supplement of the words of some wise men, xxiv. 23 ff.; (6) the second great collection of Solomonic proverbs, which the "men of Hezekiah" collected, xxv.-xxix.; (7) the first appendix to this second collection, the words of Agur the son of Jakeh, xxx.; (8) the second appendix, the words of King Lemuel, xxxi. 1-9; (9) third appendix, the acrostic ode, xxxi. 10 ff. These nine parts are comprehended under three groups: the introductory hortatory discourses with the general title at their head, and the two great collections of Solomonic proverbs with their two appendices. In prosecuting our further investigations, we shall consider the several parts of the book first from the point of view of the manifold forms of their proverbs, then of their style, and thirdly of their type of doctrine. From each of these three subjects of investigation we may expect elucidations regarding the origin of these proverbs and of their collections.

2. *The several parts of the Book of Proverbs with respect to the manifold forms of the proverbs.*—If the Book of Proverbs were a collection of popular sayings, we should find in it a multitude of proverbs of one line each, as *e.g.*, "Wickedness proceedeth from the wicked" (1 Sam. xxiv. 13); but we seek for such in vain. At the first glance, xxiv. 23b appears to be a proverb of one line; but the line "To have respect of persons in judgment is not good," is only the introductory line of a proverb which consists of several

lines, ver. 24f. Ewald is right in regarding as inadmissible a comparison of the collections of Arabic proverbs by Abu-Obeida, Meidani, and others, who gathered together and expounded the current popular proverbs, with the Book of Proverbs. Ali's Hundred Proverbs are, however, more worthy of being compared with it. Like these, Solomon's proverbs are, as a whole, the production of his own spirit, and only mediately of the popular spirit. To make the largeness of the number of these proverbs a matter of doubt were inconsiderate. Eichhorn maintained that even a god-like genius scarcely attains to so great a number of pointed proverbs and ingenious thoughts. But if we distribute Solomon's proverbs over his forty years' reign, then we have scarcely twenty for each year; and one must agree with the conclusion, that the composition of so many proverbs even of the highest ingenuity is no impossible problem for a "godlike genius." When, accordingly, it is related that Solomon wrote 3000 proverbs, Ewald, in his *History of Israel*, does not find the number too great, and Bertheau does not regard it as impossible that the collection of the "Proverbs of Solomon" has the one man Solomon as their author. The number of the proverbs thus cannot determine us to regard them as having for the most part originated among the people, and the form in which they appear leads to an opposite conclusion. It is, indeed, probable that popular proverbs are partly wrought into these proverbs,¹ and many of their forms of expression are moulded after the popular proverbs; but as they thus lie before us, they are, as a whole, the production of the technical *Mashal* poetry.

The simplest form is, according to the fundamental peculiarity of the Hebrew verse, the *distich*. The relation of the two lines to each other is very manifold. The second line may repeat the thought of the first, only in a somewhat altered form, in order to express this thought as clearly and exhaustively as possible. We call such proverbs *synonymous distichs*; as *e.g.* xi. 25:

A soul of blessing is made fat,

And he that watereth others is himself watered.

Or the second line contains the other side of the contrast to the statement of the first; the truth spoken in the first is explained in the second by means of the presentation of its contrary. We call such proverbs *antithetic distichs*; as *e.g.* x. 1:

¹ Isaac Euchel († 1804), in his *Commentary on the Proverbs*, regards xiv. 4a and xvii. 19b as such popular proverbs.

A wise son maketh his father glad,
And a foolish son is his mother's grief.

Similar forms, x. 16, xii. 5. Elsewhere, as xviii. 14, xx. 24, the antithesis clothes itself in the form of a question. Sometimes it is two different truths that are expressed in the two lines; and the authorization of their union lies only in a certain relationship, and the ground of this union in the circumstance that two lines are the minimum of the technical proverb—*synthetic* distichs; e.g. x. 18:

A cloak of hatred are lying lips,
And he that spreadeth slander is a fool.

Not at all infrequently one line does not suffice to bring out the thought intended, the begun expression of which is only completed in the second. These we call *integral* (*eingedankige*) distichs; as e.g. xi. 31 (cf. 1 Pet. iv. 18):

The righteous shall be recompensed on the earth—
How much more the ungodly and the sinner!

To these distichs also belong all those in which the thought stated in the first receives in the second, by a sentence presenting a reason, or proof, or purpose, or consequence, a definition completing or perfecting it; e.g. xiii. 14, xvi. 10, xix. 20, xxii. 28.¹ But there is also a fifth form, which corresponds most to the original character of the *Mashal*: the proverb explaining its ethical object by a resemblance from the region of the natural and every-day life, the *παραβολή* proper. The form of this *parabolic* proverb is very manifold, according as the poet himself expressly compares the two subjects, or only places them near each other in order that the hearer or reader may complete the comparison. The proverb is

¹ Such integral distichs are also xv. 3, xvi. 7, 10, xvii. 13, 15, xviii. 9, 13, xix. 26, 27, xx. 7, 8, 10, 11, 20, 21, xxi. 4, 13, 16, 21, 23, 24, 30, xxii. 4, 11, xxiv. 8, 26, xxvi. 16, xxvii. 14, xxviii. 8, 9, 17, 24, xxix. 1, 5, 12, 14. In xiv. 27, xv. 24, xvii. 23, xix. 27, the second line consists of one sentence with *ו* and the infin.; in xvi. 12, 26, xxi. 25, xxii. 9, xxvii. 1, xxix. 19, of one sentence with *כִּי*; with *כִּי* *וְ*, xviii. 2, xxiii. 17. The two lines, as xi. 31, xv. 11, xvii. 7, xix. 7ab, 10, xx. 27, form a conclusion *a minori ad majus*, or the reverse. The former or the latter clauses stand in grammatical relation in xxiii. 1, 2, 15 f., xxvii. 22, xxix. 21 (cf. xxii. 29, xxiv. 10, xxvi. 12, xxix. 20, with hypoth. perf., and xxvi. 26 with hypoth. fut.); in the logical relation of reason and consequence, xvii. 14, xx. 2, 4; in comparative relation, xii. 9, etc. These examples show that the two lines, not merely in the more recent, but also in the old Solomonic *Mashal*, do not always consist of two parallel members.

least poetic when the likeness between the two subjects is expressed by a verb; as xxvii. 15 (to which, however, ver. 16 belongs):

A continual dropping in a rainy day
And a contentious woman are alike.

The usual form of expression, neither unpoetic nor properly poetic, is the introduction of the comparison by כִּי [as], and of the similitude in the second clause by כִּי־כֵן [so]; as x. 26:

As vinegar to the teeth, and as smoke to the eyes,
So is the sluggard to them who give him a commission.

This complete verbal statement of the relation of likeness may also be abbreviated by the omission of the כִּי־כֵן ; as xxv. 13, xxvi. 11:

As a dog returning to his vomit—
A fool returning to his folly.

We call the parabolic proverbs of these three forms *comparisons*. The last, the abbreviated form of the comparative proverb, forms the transition to another kind of parabolic proverb, which we will call, in contradistinction to the comparative, the *emblematic*, in which the contrast and its emblem are loosely placed together without any nearer expression of the similitude; as e.g. xxvi. 20, xxvii. 17, 18, 20. This takes place either by means of the copulative *Vav*, וְ , as xxv. 25—

Cold water to a thirsty soul,
And good news from a far country.¹

Or without the *Vav*; in which case the second line is as the subscription under the figure or double figure painted in the first; e.g. xxv. 11 f., xi. 22:

A gold ring in a swine's snout—
A fair woman and without understanding.

These ground-forms of two lines can, however, expand into forms of several lines. Since the distich is the peculiar and most appropriate form of the technical proverb, so, when two lines are not sufficient for expressing the thought intended, the multiplication to

¹ This so-called *Vav adæquationis*, which appears here for the first time in the Proverbs as the connection between the figure and the thing itself without a verbal predicate (cf., on the other hand, Job v. 7, xii. 11, xiv. 11 f.), is, like the *Vav*, וְ , of comparison, only a species of that *Vav* of association which is called in Arab. *Waw alajam'a*, or *Waw alam'ayat*, or *Waw al'asatsahab* (vid. at Isa. xlii. 5); and since usage attributes to it the verbal power of *secum habere*, it is construed with the accus. Vid. examples in Freytag's *Arabum Proverbia*, among the recent proverbs beginning with the letter و (k).

four, six, or eight lines is most natural. In the *tetrastich* the relation of the last two to the first two is as manifold as is the relation of the second line to the first in the *distich*. There is, however, no suitable example of four-lined stanzas in antithetic relation. But we meet with *synonymous* tetrastichs, *e.g.* xxiii. 15 f., xxiv. 3 f., 28 f.; *synthetic*, xxx. 5 f.; *integral*, xxx. 17 f., especially of the form in which the last two lines constitute a proof passage beginning with 'פ, xxii. 22 f., or 'פ, xxii. 24 f., or without exponents, xxii. 26 f.; *comparative* without expressing the comparison, xxv. 16 f. (cf., on the other hand, xxvi. 18 f., where the number of lines is questionable), and also the *emblematical*, xxv. 4 f. :

Take away the dross from the silver,
And there shall come forth a vessel for the goldsmith;
Take away the wicked from before the king,
And his throne shall be established in righteousness.

Proportionally the most frequently occurring are tetrastichs, the second half of which forms a proof clause commencing with 'פ or 'פ. Among the less frequent are the *six-lined*, presenting (xxiii. 1-3, xxiv. 11 f.) one and the same thought in manifold aspects, with proofs interspersed. Among all the rest which are found in the collection, xxiii. 12-14, 19-21, 26-28, xxx. 15 f., xxx. 29-31, the first two lines form a prologue introductory to the substance of the proverb; as *e.g.* xxiii. 12-14 :

O let instruction enter into thine heart,
And apply thine ears to the words of knowledge.
Withhold not correction from the child;
For if thou beatest him with the rod—he dies not.
Thou shalt beat him with the rod,
And deliver his soul from hell.

Similarly formed, yet more expanded, is the *eight-lined stanza*, xxiii. 22-28 :

Hearken unto thy father that begat thee,
And despise not thy mother when she is old.
Buy the truth and sell it not:
Wisdom, and virtue, and understanding.
The father of a righteous man greatly rejoices,
And he that begetteth a wise child hath joy of him.
Thy father and thy mother shall be glad,
And she that bare thee shall rejoice.

The *Mashal* proverb here inclines to the *Mashal ode*; for this *octastich* may be regarded as a short *Mashal song*,—like the *alpha-*

betical Mashal psalm xxxvii., which consists of almost pure tetrastichs.

We have now seen how the distich form multiplies itself into forms consisting of four, six, and eight lines; but it also unfolds itself, as if in one-sided multiplication, into forms of three, five, and seven lines. *Tristichs* arise when the thought of the first line is repeated (xxvii. 22) in the second according to the synonymous scheme, or when the thought of the second line is expressed by contrast in the third (xxii. 29, xxviii. 10) according to the antithetic scheme, or when to the thought expressed in one or two lines (xxv. 8, xxvii. 10) there is added its proof. The parabolic scheme is here represented when the object described is unfolded in two lines, as in the comparison xxv. 13, or when its nature is portrayed by two figures in two lines, as in the emblematic proverb xxv. 20:

To take off clothing in cold weather,
Vinegar upon nitre,
And he that singeth songs to a heavy heart.

In the few instances of *pentastichs* which are found, the last three lines usually unfold the reason of the thought of the first two: xxiii. 4 f., xxv. 6 f., xxx. 32 f.; to this xxiv. 13 forms an exception, where the פ before the last three lines introduces the expansion of the figure in the first two. As an instance we quote xxv. 6 f.:

Seek not to display thyself in the presence of the king,
And stand not in the place of the great.
For better that it be said unto thee, "Come up hither,"
Than that they humble thee in the presence of the prince,
While thine eyes have raised themselves.

Of *heptastichs* I know of only one example in the collection, viz. xxiii. 6-8:

Eat not the bread of the jealous,
And lust not after his dainties;
For he is like one who calculates with himself:—
"Eat and drink," saith he to thee,
And his heart is not with thee.
Thy morsel which thou hast eaten must thou vomit up,
And thou hast wasted thy pleasant words.

From this heptastich, which one will scarcely take for a brief Mashal ode according to the compound strophe-scheme, we see that the proverb of two lines can expand itself to the dimensions

of seven and eight lines. Beyond these limits the whole proverb ceases to be מִשְׁלָּה in the proper sense; and after the manner of Ps. xxv., xxxiv., and especially xxxvii., it becomes a Mashal ode. Of this class of Mashal odes are, besides the prologue, xxii. 17-21, that of the drunkard, xxiii. 29-35; that of the slothful man, xxiv. 30-34; the exhortation to industry, xxvii. 23-27; the prayer for a moderate portion between poverty and riches, xxx. 7-9; the mirror for princes, xxxi. 2-9; and the praise of the excellent wife, xxxi. 10 ff. It is singular that this ode furnishes the only example of the alphabetical acrostic in the whole collection. Even a single trace of original alphabetical sequence afterwards broken up cannot be found. There cannot also be discovered, in the Mashal songs referred to, anything like a completed strophe-scheme; even in xxxi. 10 ff. the distichs are broken by tristichs intermingled with them.

In the whole of the first part, i. 7-ix., the prevailing form is that of the extended flow of the Mashal song; but one in vain seeks for strophes. There is not here so firm a grouping of the lines; on the supposition of its belonging to the Solomonic era, this is indeed to be expected. The rhetorical form here outweighs the purely poetical. This first part of the Proverbs consists of the following fifteen Mashal strains: (1) i. 7-19, (2) 20 ff., (3) ii., (4) iii. 1-18, (5) 19-26, (6) 27 ff., (7) iv. 1-v. 6, (8) 7 ff., (9) vi. 1-5, (10) 6-11, (11) 12-19, (12) 20 ff., (13) vii., (14) viii., (15) ix. In iii. and ix. there are found a few Mashal odes of two lines and of four lines which may be regarded as independent Mashals, and may adapt themselves to the schemes employed; other brief complete parts are only waves in the flow of the larger discourses, or are altogether formless, or more than octastichs. The octastich vi. 16-19 makes the proportionally greatest impression of an independent inwoven Mashal. It is the only proverb in which symbolical numbers are used which occurs in the collection from i. to xxix.:

There are six things which Jahve hateth,
And seven are an abhorrence to His soul:
Haughty eyes, a lying tongue,
And hands that shed innocent blood;
An heart that deviseth the thoughts of evil,
Feet that hastily run to wickedness,
One that uttereth lies as a false witness,
And he who soweth strife between brethren.

Such *numerical* proverbs to which the name מִשְׁלָּה has been given

by later Jewish writers (see my *Gesch. der jüd. Poesie*, pp. 199, 202) are found in xxx. With the exception of xxx. 7-9, 24-28 (cf. Sir. xxv. 1, 2), the numerical proverb has this peculiarity, found also in most of the numerical proverbs of Sirach (Sir. xxiii. 16, xxv. 7, xxvi. 5, 28), that the number named in the first parallel line is in the second (cf. Job v. 9) increased by one. On the other hand, the form of the *Priamel*¹ is used neither in the Book of Proverbs nor in that of Sirach. Proverbs such as xx. 10 ("Diverse weights, diverse measures—an abomination to Jahve are they both") and xx. 12 ("The hearing ear, the seeing eye—Jahve hath created them both"), to be distinguished from xvii. 3, xxvii. 21, and the like, where the necessary unity, and from xxvii. 3, where the necessary resemblance, of the predicate is wanting, are only a weak approach to the *Priamel*,—a stronger, xxv. 3, where the three subjects form the preamble ("The heaven for height, and the earth for depth, and the heart of kings—are unsearchable"). Perhaps xxx. 11-14 is a greater mutilated *Priamel*. Here four subjects form the preamble, but there is wanting the conclusion containing the common predicate. This, we believe, exhausts the forms of the *Mashal* in the collection. It now only remains to make mention of the *Mashal chain*, i.e. the ranging together in a series of proverbs of a similar character, such as the chain of proverbs regarding the fool, xxvi. 1-12, the sluggard, xxvi. 13-16, the tale-bearer, xxvi. 20-22, the malicious, xxvi. 23-28—but this form belongs more to the technics of the *Mashal collection* than to that of the *Mashal poetry*.

We now turn to the separate parts of the book, to examine more closely the forms of their proverbs, and gather materials for a critical judgment regarding the origin of the proverbs which they contain. Not to anticipate, we take up in order the separate parts of the arrangement of the collection. Since, then, it cannot be denied that in the introductory pædagogic part, i. 7-ix., notwithstanding its rich and deep contents, there is exceedingly little of the technical form of the *Mashal*, as well as generally of technical form at all. This part, as already shown, consists not of proper *Mashals*, but of fifteen *Mashal odes*, or rather, perhaps, *Mashal discourses*, didactic poems of the *Mashal* kind. In the flow of these discourses separate *Mashals* intermingle, which may either be regarded as independent, or, as

¹ [From *præambulum*, designating a peculiar kind of epigram found in the German poetry of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.]

i. 32, iv. 18 f., can easily be so understood. In the Mashal chains of chap. iv. and ix. we meet with proverbs that are synonymous (ix. 7, 10), antithetic (iii. 35, ix. 8), integral, or of one thought (iii. 29, 30), and synthetic (i. 7, iii. 5, 7), of two lines and of four lines variously disposed (iii. 9 f., 11 f., 31 f., 33 f.); but the parabolic scheme is not at all met with, separate proverbs such as iii. 27 f. are altogether without form, and keeping out of view the octastich numerical proverb, vi. 16–19, the thoughts which form the unity of separate groups are so widely expanded that the measure of the Mashal proper is far exceeded. The character of this whole part is not concentrating, but unfolding. Even the intermingling proverbs of two lines possess the same character. They are for the most part more like dissolved drops than gold coins with sharp outline and firm impress; as *e.g.* ix. 7:

He that correcteth the mocker getteth to himself shame;
And he that rebuketh the sinner his dishonour.

The few that consist of four lines are closer, more compact, more finished, because they allow greater space for the expression; *e.g.* iii. 9 f.:

Honour Jahve with thy wealth,
And with the first-fruits of all thine income:
And thy barns shall be filled with plenty,
And thy vats shall overflow with must.

But beyond the four lines the author knows no limits of artistic harmony; the discourse flows on till it has wholly or provisionally exhausted the subject; it pauses not till it reaches the end of its course, and then, taking breath, it starts anew. We cannot, moreover, deny that there is beauty in this new springing forth of the stream of the discourse with its fresh transparent waves; but it is a peculiar beauty of the rhetorically decomposed, dissolved Mashal, going forth, as it were, from its confinement, and breathing its fragrance far and wide.

The fifteen discourses, in which the Teacher appears twelve times and Wisdom three times, are neither of a symmetrically chiselled form nor of internally fashioned coherence, but yet are a garland of songs having internal unity, with a well-arranged manifoldness of contents. It is true that Bertheau recognises here neither unity of the contents nor unity of the formal character; but there is no Old Testament portion of like extent, and at the same time of more systematic internal unity, and which bears throughout a like formal

impress, than this. Bertheau thinks that he has discovered in certain passages a greater art in the form; and certainly there are several sections which consist of just ten verses. But this is a mere accident; for the first Mashal ode consists of groups of 1, 2, and 10 verses, the second of 8 and 6 verses, the third of 10 and 12, the fourth of 10 and 8, the fifth of 2 and 6, etc.—each group forming a complete sense. The 10 verses are met with six times, and if iv. 1-9 from the Peshito, and iv. 20-27 from the LXX., are included, eight times, without our regarding these decades as strophes, and without our being able to draw any conclusion regarding a particular author of these decade portions. In i. 20-33, Bertheau finds indeed, along with the regular structure of verses, an exact artistic formation of strophes (3 times 4 verses with an echo of 2). But he counts instead of the stichs the Masoretic verses, and these are not the true formal parts of the strophe.

We now come to the second part of the collection, whose superscription מְשָׁלֵי שְׁלֹמֹה can in no respect be strange to us, since the collection of proverbs here commencing, compared with i. 7-ix., may with special right bear the name *Mishle*. The 375 proverbs which are classed together in this part, x.-xxii. 16, without any comprehensive plan, but only according to their more or fewer conspicuous common characteristics (Bertheau, p. xii), consist all and every one of distichs; for each Masoretic verse falls naturally into two stichs, and nowhere (not even xix. 19) does such a distich proverb stand in necessary connection with one that precedes or that follows; each is in itself a small perfected and finished whole. The tristich xix. 7 is only an apparent exception. In reality it is a distich with the disfigured remains of a distich that has been lost. The LXX. has here two distichs which are wanting in our text. The second is that which is found in our text, but only in a mutilated form:

ὁ πολλὰ κακοποιῶν τελεσιουργεῖ κακίαν,
[He that does much harm perfects mischief.]

ὃς δὲ ἐρεθίζει λόγους οὐ σωθήσεται.

[And he that uses provoking words shall not escape.]

Perhaps the false rendering of

מרע רבים ישלם-רע
מרדף אמרים לא ימלט:

The friend of every one is rewarded with evil,
He who pursues after rumours does not escape.

But not only are all these proverbs distichs, they have also, not indeed without exception, but in by far the greatest number, a common character in that they are *antithetic*. Distichs of predominating antithetic character stand here together. Along with these all other schemes are, it is true, represented: the synonymous, xi. 7, 25, 30, xii. 14, 28, xiv. 19, etc.; the integral, or of one thought, xiv. 7, xv. 3, etc., particularly in proverbs with the comparative כִּי רַב , xii. 9, xv. 16, 17, xvi. 8, 19, xvii. 10, xxi. 19, xxii. 1, and with the ascending כִּי רַב הֵנּוּ [much more], xi. 31, xv. 11, xvii. 7, xix. 7, 10, xxi. 27; the synthetic, x. 18, xi. 29, xiv. 17, xix. 13; the parabolic, the most feebly represented, for the only specimens of it are x. 26, xi. 22; besides which I know not what other Bertheau could quote. We shall further see that in another portion of the book the parabolic proverbs are just as closely placed together as are the antithetic. Here almost universally the two members of the proverbs stand together in technical parallelism as thesis and antithesis; also in the synonymous proverbs the two members are the parallel rays of one thought; in the synthetic two monostichs occur in loose external connection to suffice for the parallelism as a fundamental law of the technical proverb. But also in these proverbs in which a proper parallelism is not found, both members being needed to form a complete sentence, verse and members are so built up, according to Bertheau's self-confirmatory opinion, that in regard to extent and the number of words they are like verses with parallel members.

To this long course of distichs which profess to be the *Mishle* of Solomon, there follows a course, xxii. 17–xxiv. 22, of “words of the wise,” prefaced by the introduction xxii. 17–21, which undeniably is of the same nature as the greater introduction, i. 7–ix., and of which we are reminded by the form of address preserved throughout in these “words of the wise.” These “words of the wise” comprehend all the forms of the *Mashal*, from those of two lines in xxii. 28, xxiii. 9, xxiv. 7, 8, 9, 10, to the *Mashal* song xxiii. 29–35. Between these limits are the tetrastichs, which are the most popular form, xxii. 22 f., 24 f., 26 f., xxiii. 10 f., 15 f., 17 f., xxiv. 1 f., 3 f., 5 f., 15 f., 17 f., 19 f., 21 f.,—pentastichs, xxiii. 4 f., xxiv. 13 f., and hexastichs, xxiii. 1–3, 12–14, 19–21, 26–28, xxiv. 11 f.;—of tristichs, heptastichs, and octastichs are at least found one specimen of each, xxii. 29, xxiii. 6–8, xxiii. 22–25. Bertheau maintains that there is a difference between the structure of these

proverbs and that of the preceding, for he counts the number of the words which constitute a verse in the case of the latter and of the former; but such a proceeding is unwarrantable, for the remarkably long Masoretic verse xxiv. 12 contains eighteen words; and the poet is not to be made accountable for such an arrangement, for in his mind xxiv. 11 f. forms a hexastich, and indeed a very elegant one. Not the *words* of the Masoretic verse, but the *stichs* are to be counted. Reckoning according to the *stichs*, I can discover no difference between these proverbs and the preceding. In the preceding ones also the number of the words in the *stichs* extends from two to five, the number two being here, however, proportionally more frequently found (*e.g.* xxiv. 4*b*, xxiv. 8*a*, 10*b*); a circumstance which has its reason in this, that the symmetry of the members is often very much disturbed, there being frequently no trace whatever of parallelism. To the first appendix to the "Proverbs of Solomon" there follows a second, xxiv. 23 ff., with the superscription, "These things also to the wise," which contains a hexastich, xxiv. 23*b*-25, a distich, ver. 26, a tristich, ver. 27, a tetrastich, ver. 28 f., and a Mashal ode, ver. 30 ff., on the sluggard—the last in the form of an experience of the poet like Ps. xxxvii. 35 f. The moral which he has drawn from this recorded observation is expressed in two verses such as we have already found at vi. 10 f. These two appendices are, as is evident from their commencement as well as from their conclusion, in closest relation to the introduction, i. 7-ix.

There now follows in xxv.-xxix. the second great collection of "Proverbs of Solomon," "copied out," as the superscription mentions, by the direction of King Hezekiah. It falls, apparently, into two parts; for as xxiv. 30 ff., a Mashal hymn, stands at the end of the two appendices, so the Mashal hymn xxvii. 23 ff. must be regarded as forming the division between the two halves of this collection. It is very sharply distinguished from the collection beginning with chap. x. The extent of the *stichs* and the greater or less observance of the parallelism furnish no distinguishing mark, but there are others worthy of notice. In the first collection the proverbs are exclusively in the form of distichs; here we have also some tristichs, xxv. 8, 13, 20, xxvii. 10, 22, xxviii. 10, tetrastichs, xxv. 4 f., 9 f., 21 f., xxvi. 18 f., 24 f., xxvii. 15 f., and pentastichs, xxv. 6 f., besides the Mashal hymn already referred to. The kind of arrangement is not essentially different from that in

the first collection; it is equally devoid of plan, yet there are here some chains or strings of related proverbs, xxvi. 1-12, 13-16, 20-22. A second essential distinction between the two collections is this, that while in the first the *antithetic* proverb forms the prevailing element, here it is the *parabolic*, and especially the *emblematic*; in xxv.-xxvii. are sentences almost wholly of this character. We say *almost*, for to place together proverbs of this kind exclusively is not the plan of the collector. There are also proverbs of the other schemes, fewer synonymous, etc., than antithetic, and the collection begins in very varied quodlibet: xxv. 2, an antithetic proverb; xxv. 3, a priamel with three subjects; xxv. 4 f., an emblematic tetrastich; xxv. 6 f., a pentastich; xxv. 8, a tristich; xxv. 9 f., a tetrastich, with the negative β ; xxv. 11, an emblematic distich ("Golden apples in silver caskets—a word spoken in a fitting way"). The antithetic proverbs are found especially in xxviii. and xxix.: the first and the last proverb of the whole collection, xxv. 2, xxix. 27, are antithetic; but between these two the comparative and the figurative proverbs are so prevalent, that this collection appears like a variegated picture-book with explanatory notes written underneath. In extent it is much smaller than the foregoing. I reckon 126 proverbs in 137 Masoretic verses.

The second collection of Solomon's proverbs has also several appendices, the first of which, xxx., according to the inscription, is by an otherwise unknown author, Agur the son of Jakeh. The first poem of this appendix presents in a thoughtful way the unsearchableness of God. This is followed by certain peculiar pieces, such as a tetrastich regarding the purity of God's word, xxx. 5 f.; a prayer for a moderate position between riches and poverty, vers. 7-9; a distich against slander, ver. 10; a priamel without the conclusion, vers. 11-14; the insatiable four (a *Midda*), ver. 15 f.; a tetrastich regarding the disobedient son, ver. 17; the incomprehensible four, vers. 18-20; the intolerable four, vers. 21-23; the diminutive but prudent four, vers. 24-28; the excellent four, vers. 29-31; a pentastich recommending prudent silence, ver. 32 f. Two other supplements form the conclusion of the whole book: the counsel of Lemuel's mother to her royal son, xxxi. 2-9, and the praise of the virtuous woman in the form of an alphabetical acrostic, xxxi. 10 ff.

After we have acquainted ourselves with the manifold forms of the technical proverbs and their distribution in the several parts of the collection, the question arises, What conclusions regarding the

origin of these several parts may be drawn from these forms found in them? We connect with this the conception of Ewald, who sees represented in the several parts of the collection the chief points of the history of proverbial poetry. The "Proverbs of Solomon," x. 1-xxii. 16, appear to him to be the oldest collection, which represents the simplest and the most ancient kind of proverbial poetry. Their distinguishing characteristics are the symmetrical two-membered verse, complete in itself, containing in itself a fully intelligible meaning, and the quick contrast of thesis and antithesis. The oldest form of the technical proverb, according to Ewald, is, according to our terminology, the antithetic distich, such as predominates in x. 1-xxii. 16. Along with these antithetic distichs we find here also others of a different kind. Ewald so considers the contrast of the two members to be the original fundamental law of the technical proverb, that to him these other kinds of distichs represent the diminution of the inner force of the two-membered verse, the already begun decay of the art in its oldest limits and laws, and the transition to a new method. In the "Proverbs of Solomon," xxv.-xxix., of the later collection, that rigorous formation of the verse appears already in full relaxation and dissolution: the contrast of the sense of the members appears here only exceptionally; the art turns from the crowded fulness and strength of the representation more to the adorning of the thought by means of strong and striking figures and forms of expression, to elegant painting of certain moral conditions and forms of life; and the more the technical proverb is deprived of the breath of a vigorous poetic spirit, so much the nearer does it approach to the vulgar proverb; the full and complete symmetry of the two members disappears, less by the abridgment of one of them, than by the too great extension and amplification of the two-membered proverb into longer admonitions to a moral life, and descriptions relating thereto. So the proverbial poetry passes essentially into a different form and manner. "While it loses in regard to internal vigorous brevity and strength, it seeks to gain again by means of connected instructive exposition, by copious description and detailed representation; breaking up its boldly delineated, strong, and yet simply beautiful form, it rises to oratorical display, to attractive eloquence, in which, indeed, though the properly poetical and the artistic gradually disappears, yet the warmth and easy comprehension are increased." In chap. i.-ix., the introduction of the older collection,

and xxii. 17-xxiv., of the first half of the supplement to the older collection (xxv.-xxix. is the second half), supplied by a later writer, the great change is completed, the growth of which the later collection of the "Proverbs of Solomon," particularly in xxv.-xxix., reveals. The symmetry of the two members of the verse is here completely destroyed; the separate proverb appears almost only as an exception; the proverbial poetry has passed into admonition and discourse, and has become in many respects lighter, and more flexible, and flowing, and comprehensible. "It is true that on the side of this later form of proverbial poetry there is not mere loss. While it always loses the excellent pointed brevity, the inner fulness and strength of the old proverbs, it gains in warmth, impressiveness, intelligibility; the wisdom which at first strives only to make its existence and its contents in endless manifoldness known, reaches this point at last, that having become clear and certain, it now also turns itself earnestly and urgently to men." In the later additions, chap. xxx. xxxi., appended altogether externally, the proverbial poetry has already disappeared, and given place to elegant descriptions of separate moral truths. While the creative passes into the background, the whole aim is now toward surprising expansion and new artistic representation.

This view of the progressive development of the course of proverbial poetry is one of the chief grounds for the determination of Ewald's judgment regarding the parts that are Solomonic and those that are not Solomonic in the collection. In x. 1-xxii. 16 he does not regard the whole as Solomon's, as immediately and in their present form composed by Solomon; but the breath of the Solomonic spirit enlivens and pervades all that has been added by other and later poets. But most of the proverbs of the later collection (xxv.-xxix.) are not much older than the time of Hezekiah; yet there are in it some that are Solomonic, and of the period next to Solomon. The collection stretches backward with its arms, in part indeed, as the superscription, the "Proverbs of Solomon," shows, to the time of Solomon. On the other hand, in the introduction, i.-ix., and in the first half of the appendix (xxii. 17-xxiv.), there is not found a single proverb of the time of Solomon; both portions belong to two poets of the seventh century B.C., a new era, in which the didactic poets added to the older Solomonic collection longer pieces of their own composition. The four small pieces, xxx. 1-14, 15-33, xxxi. 1-9, 10 ff., are of a still later date;

they cannot belong to an earlier period than the end of the seventh or the beginning of the sixth century B.C.

We recognise the penetration, the sensibility, the depth of thought indicated by this opinion of Ewald's regarding the origin of the book; yet for the most part it is not supported by satisfactory proof. If we grant that he has on the whole rightly construed the history of proverbial poetry, nevertheless the conclusion that proverbs which bear in themselves the marks of the oldest proverbial poetry belong to the Solomonic era, and that the others belong to a period more nearly or more remotely subsequent to it, is very fallacious. In this case much that is found in Sirach's Book of Proverbs must be Solomonic; and the *משלי אסף* of Isaac Satanow,¹ the contemporary of Moses Mendelssohn, as well as many other proverbs in the collection *מלך דרבנן*, and in the poetical works of other Jewish poets belonging to the middle ages or to later times, might be dated back perhaps a thousand years. Along with the general course of development the individuality of the poet is also to be taken into account; an ancient poet can, along with the formally completed, produce the imperfect, which appears to belong to a period of art that has degenerated, and a modern poet can emulate antiquity with the greatest accuracy. But Ewald's construction of the progress of the development of proverbial poetry is also in part arbitrary. That the two-membered verse is the oldest form of the technical proverb we shall not dispute, but that it is the two-membered antithetic verse is a supposition that cannot be proved; and that Solomon wrote only antithetic distichs is an absurd assertion, to which Keil justly replies, that the adhering to only one form and structure is a sign of poverty, of mental narrowness and one-sidedness. There are also other kinds of parallelism, which are not less beautiful and vigorous than the antithetic, and also other forms of proverbs besides the distich in which the thought, which can in no way be restrained within two lines, must necessarily divide itself into the branches of a greater number of lines. Thus I must agree with Keil in the opinion, that Ewald's assertion that in the Hezekiah-collection the strong form of the technical proverb is in full dissolution, contains an exaggeration. If the

¹ [Isaac Ha-Levi was born at Satanow (whence his name), in Russian Poland, 1732, died at Berlin 1802. Besides other works, he was the author of several collections of gnomes and apothegms in imitation of the Proverbs. *Id. Delitzsch Zur Gesch. der Jüd. Poesie*, p. 115.]

first collection, x. 1-xxii. 16, contains only two (x. 26, xi. 22) figurative proverbs, while it would be altogether foolish to deny that these two, because they were figurative proverbs, were Solomonic, or to affirm that he was the author of only these two, so it is self-evident that the Hezekiah-collection, which is principally a collection of figurative proverbs, must contain many proverbs in which a different kind of parallelism prevails, which has the appearance of a looser connection. Is it not probable that Solomon, who had an open penetrating eye for the greatest and the smallest objects of nature, composed many such proverbs? And is *e.g.* the proverb xxvi. 23,

Dross of silver spread over a potsherd—
Burning lips and a wicked heart,

less beautiful, and vigorous, and worthy of Solomon than any antithetic distich? If Ewald imagines that the 3000 proverbs which Solomon wrote were all constructed according to this one model, we are much rather convinced that Solomon's proverbial poetry, which found the distich and the tetrastich as forms of proverbs already in use, would not only unfold within the limits of the distich the most varied manifoldness of thought and form, but would also within the limits of the *Mashal* generally, run through the whole scale from the distich up to octastichs and more extensive forms. But while we cannot accept Ewald's criteria which he applies to the two collections, x. 1-xxii. 16 and xxv.-xxix., yet his delineation of the form and kind of proverbial poetry occurring in i.-ix., xxii. 17 ff., is excellent, as is also his conclusion, that these portions belong to a new and more recent period of proverbial poetry. Since in xxii. 17-21 manifestly a new course of "Words of the Wise" by a poet later than Solomon is introduced, it is possible, yea, not improbable, that he, or, as Ewald thinks, another somewhat older poet, introduces in i. 7-ix. the "Proverbs of Solomon" following, from x. 1 onward.

But if Solomon composed not only distichs, but also tristichs, etc., it is strange that in the first collection, x.-xxii. 16, there are exclusively distichs; and if he constructed not only contrasted proverbs, but equally figurative proverbs, it is as strange that in the first collection the figurative proverbs are almost entirely wanting, while in the second collection, xxv.-xxix., on the contrary, they prevail. This remarkable phenomenon may be partly explained if we could suppose that not merely the second collection,

but both of them, were arranged by the "men of Hezekiah," and that the whole collection of the Solomonic proverbs was divided by them into two collections according to their form. But leaving out of view other objections, one would in that case have expected in the first collection the proportionally great number of the antithetic distichs which stand in the second. If we regard both collections as originally one whole, then there can be no rational ground for its being divided in this particular way either by the original collector or by a later enlarger of the collection. We have therefore to regard the two portions as the work of two different authors. The second is by the "men of Hezekiah;" the first cannot be by Solomon himself, since the number of proverbs composed, and probably also written out by Solomon, amounted to 3000; besides, if Solomon was the author of the collection, there would be visible on it the stamp of his wisdom in its plan and order: it is thus the work of another author, who is certainly different from the author of the introductory *Mashal* poems, i. 7-ix. For if the author of the title of the book were not at the same time the author of the introduction, he must have taken it from some other place; thus it is inconceivable how he could give the title "*Proverbs of Solomon*," etc., i. 1-6, to poems which were not composed by Solomon. If i. 7-ix. is not by Solomon, then these *Mashal* poems are explicable only as the work of the author of the title of the book, and as an introduction to the "*Proverbs of Solomon*," beginning x. 1. It must be one and the same author who edited the "*Proverbs of Solomon*" x. 1-xxii. 16, prefixed i. 7-ix. as an introduction to them, and appended to them the "*Words of the Wise*," xxii. 17-xxiv. 22; the second collector then appended to this book a supplement of the "*Words of the Wise*," xxiv. 23 ff., and then the Hezekiah-collection of Solomonic proverbs, xxv.-xxix.; perhaps also, in order that the book might be brought to a close in the same form in which it was commenced, he added¹ the non-Solomonic proverbial poem xxx. f. We do not, however, maintain that the book has this origin, but only this, that on the supposition of the non-Solomonic origin of i. 7-ix. it cannot well have any other origin. But the question arises again, and more emphatically, How was it possible that the first collector left as gleanings to

¹ Zöckler takes xxiv. 23 ff. as a second appendix to the first principal collection. This is justifiable, but the second superscription rather suggests two collectors.

the second so great a number of distichs, almost all parabolical, and besides, all more than two-lined proverbs of Solomon? One can scarcely find the reason of this singular phenomenon in anything else than in the judgment of the author of the first collection as the determining motive of his selection. For when we think also on the sources and origin of the two collections, the second always presupposes the first, and that which is singular in the author's thus restricting himself can only have its ground in the freedom which he allowed to his subjectivity.

Before we more closely examine the style and the teaching of the book, and the conclusions thence arising, another phenomenon claims our attention, which perhaps throws light on the way in which the several collections originated; but, at all events, it may not now any longer remain out of view, when we are in the act of forming a judgment on this point.

3. *The repetitions in the Book of Proverbs.*—We find not only in the different parts of the collection, but also within the limits of one and the same part, proverbs which wholly or in part are repeated in the same or in similar words. Before we can come to a judgment, we must take cognizance as closely as possible of this fact. We begin with "The Proverbs of Solomon," x.—xxii. 16; for this collection is in relation to xxv.—xxix. certainly the earlier, and it is especially with respect to the Solomonic proverbs that this fact demands an explanation. In this earlier collection we find, (1) whole proverbs repeated in exactly the same words: xiv. 12 = xvi. 25;—(2) proverbs slightly changed in their form of expression: x. 1 = xv. 20, xiv. 20 = xix. 4, xvi. 2 = xxi. 2, xix. 5 = xix. 9, xx. 10 = xx. 23, xxi. 9 = xxi. 19;—(3) proverbs almost identical in form, but somewhat different in sense: x. 2 = xi. 4, xiii. 14 = xiv. 27;—(4) proverbs the first lines of which are the same: x. 15 = xviii. 11;—(5) proverbs with their second lines the same: x. 6 = x. 11, x. 8 = x. 10, xv. 33 = xviii. 12;—(6) proverbs with one line almost the same: xi. 13 = xx. 19, xi. 21 = xvi. 5, xii. 14 = xiii. 2, xiv. 31 = xvii. 5, xvi. 18 = xviii. 12, xix. 12 = xx. 2; comp. also xvi. 28 with xvii. 9, xix. 25 with xxi. 11. In comparing these proverbs, one will perceive that for the most part the external or internal resemblance of the surrounding has prompted the collector to place the one proverb in this place and the other in that place (not always indeed; for what reason e.g. could determine

the position of xvi. 25 and xix. 5, 9, I cannot say); then that the proverb standing earlier is generally, to all appearance, also the earlier formed, for the second of the pair is mostly a synonymous distich, which generally further extends antithetically one line of the first: cf. xviii. 11 with x. 15, xx. 10, 23 with xi. 1, xx. 19 with xi. 13, xvi. 5 with xi. 21, xx. 2 with xix. 12, also xvii. 5 with xiv. 31, where from an antithetic proverb a synthetic one is formed; but here also there are exceptions, as xiii. 2 compared with xii. 14, and xv. 33 with xviii. 12, where the same line is in the first case connected with a synonymous, and in the second with an antithetic proverb; but here also the contrast is so loose, that the earlier-occurring proverb has the appearance of priority.

We now direct our attention to the second collection, xxv.-xxix. When we compare the proverbs found here with one another, we see among them a disproportionately smaller number of repetitions than in the other collection; only a single entire proverb is repeated in almost similar terms, but in an altered sense, xxix. 20 = xxvi. 12; but proverbs such as xxviii. 12, 28, xxix. 2, notwithstanding the partial resemblance, are equally original. On the other hand, in this second collection we find numerous repetitions of proverbs and portions of proverbs from the first:—(1) Whole proverbs perfectly identical (leaving out of view insignificant variations): xxv. 24 = xxi. 9, xxvi. 22 = xviii. 8, xxvii. 12 = xxii. 3, xxvii. 13 = xx. 16;—(2) proverbs identical in meaning, with somewhat changed expression: xxvi. 13 = xxii. 13, xxvi. 15 = xix. 24, xxviii. 6 = xix. 1, xxviii. 19 = xii. 11, xxix. 13 = xxii. 2;—(3) proverbs with one line the same and one line different: xxvii. 21 = xvii. 3, xxix. 22 = xv. 18; cf. also xxvii. 15 with xix. 13. When we compare these proverbs with one another, we are uncertain as to many of them which has the priority, as *e.g.* xxvii. 21 = xvii. 3, xxix. 22 = xv. 18; but in the case of others there is no doubt that the Hezekiah-collection contains the original form of the proverb which is found in the other collection, as xxvi. 13, xxviii. 6, 19, xxix. 13, xxvii. 15, in relation to their parallels. In the other portions of this book also we find such repetitions as are met with in these two collections of Solomonic proverbs. In i. 7-ix. we have ii. 16, a little changed, repeated in vii. 5, and iii. 15 in viii. 11; ix. 10a = i. 7a is a case not worthy of being mentioned, and it were inappropriate here to refer to ix. 4, 16. In the first appendix of "the Words of the Wise," xxii. 17-xxiv. 22, single lines often repeat themselves in another con-

nection; cf. xxiii. 3 and 6, xxiii. 10 and xxii. 28, xxiii. 17 f. and xxiv. 13 f., xxii. 23 and xxiii. 11, xxiii. 17 and xxiv. 1. That in such cases the one proverb is often the pattern of the other, is placed beyond a doubt by the relation of xxiv. 19 to Ps. xxxvii. 1; cf. also xxiv. 20 with Ps. xxxvii. 38. If here there are proverbs like those of Solomon in their expression, the presumption is that the priority belongs to the latter, as xxiii. 27 cf. xxii. 14, xxiv. 5 f. cf. xi. 14, xxiv. 19 f. cf. xiii. 9, in which latter case the justice of the presumption is palpable. Within the second appendix of "the Words of the Wise," xxiv. 23 ff., no repetitions are to be expected on account of its shortness; yet is xxiv. 23 repeated from the Solomonian Mashal xxviii. 21, and as xxiv. 33 f. are literally the same as vi. 10 f., the priority is presumably on the side of the author of i. 7-ix., at least of the Mashal in the form in which he communicates it. The supplements xxx. and xxxi. afford nothing that is worth mention as bearing on our present inquiry,¹ and we may therefore now turn to the question, What insight into the origin of these proverbs and their collection do the observations made afford?

From the numerous repetitions of proverbs and portions of proverbs of the first collection of the "Proverbs of Solomon" in the Hezekiah-collection, as well as from another reason stated at the end of the foregoing section of our inquiry, we conclude that the two collections were by different authors; in other words, that they had not both "the men of Hezekiah" for their authors. It is true that the repetitions in themselves do not prove anything against the oneness of their authorship; for there are within the several collections, and even within i.-ix. (cf. vi. 20 with i. 8, viii.

¹ Quite the same phenomenon, Fleischer remarks, presents itself in the different collections of proverbs ascribed to the Caliph Ali, where frequently one and the same thought in one collection is repeated in manifold forms in a second, here in a shorter, there in a longer form. As a general principle this is to be borne in mind, that the East transmits unchanged, with scrupulous exactness, only religious writings regarded as holy and divine, and therefore these Proverbs have been transmitted unchanged only since they became a distinct part of the canon; before that time it happened to them, as to all in the East that is exposed to the arbitrariness of the changing spirit and the intercourse of life, that one and the same original text has been modified by one speaker and writer after another. Thus of the famous poetical works of the East, such e.g. as Firdusi's *Schah-Nameh* [*Book of the Kings*] and Sadi's *Garden of Roses*, not one ms. copy agrees with another.

10 f. with iii. 14 f.), repetitions, notwithstanding the oneness of their authorship. But if two collections of proverbs are in so many various ways different in their character, as x. 1-xxii. 16 and xxv.-xxix., then the previous probability rises almost to a certainty by such repetitions. From the form, for the most part anomalous, in which the Hezekiah-collection presents the proverbs and portions of proverbs which are found also in the first collection, and from their being otherwise independent, we further conclude that "the men of Hezekiah" did not borrow from the first collection, but formed it from other sources. But since one does not understand why "the men of Hezekiah" should have omitted so great a number of genuine Solomonic proverbs which remain, after deducting the proportionally few that have been repeated (for this omission is not to be explained by saying that they selected those that were appropriate and wholesome for their time), we are further justified in the conclusion that the other collection was known to them as one current in their time. Their object was, indeed, not to supplement this older collection; they rather regarded their undertaking as a similar people's book, which they wished to place side by side with that collection without making it superfluous. The difference of the selection in the two collections has its whole directing occasion in the difference of the intention. The first collection begins (x. 1) with the proverb—

A wise son maketh glad his father,
And a foolish son is the grief of his mother;

the second (xxv. 2) with the proverb—

It is the glory of God to conceal a thing,
And the glory of kings to search out a matter.

The one collection is a book for youth, to whom it is dedicated in the extended introduction, i. 7-ix.; the second is a people's book suited to the time of Hezekiah ("Solomon's Wisdom in Hezekiah's days," as Stier has named it), and therefore it takes its start not, like the first, from the duties of the child, but from those of the king. If in the two collections everything does not stand in conscious relation to these different objects, yet the collectors at least have, from the commencement to the close (cf. xxii. 15 with xxix. 26), these objects before their eyes.

As to the *time* at which the first collection was made, the above considerations also afford us some materials for forming a judgment. Several pairs of proverbs which it contains present to us

essentially the same sayings in older and more recent forms. Keil regards the proverbs also that appear less original as old-Solomonic, and remarks that one and the same poet does not always give expression to the same thoughts with the same pregnant brevity and excellence, and affirms that changes and reproductions of separate proverbs may proceed even from Solomon himself. This is possible; but if we consider that even Davidic psalms have been imitated, and that in the "Words of the Wise" Solomonic proverbs are imitated,—moreover, that proverbs especially are subject to changes, and invite to imitation and transformation,—we shall find it to be improbable. Rather we would suppose, that between the publication of the 3000 proverbs of Solomon and the preparation of the collection x.—xxii. 16 a considerable time elapsed, during which the old-Solomonic *Mashal* had in the mouths of the people and of poets acquired a multitude of accretions, and that the collector had without hesitation gathered together such indirect Solomonic proverbs with those that were directly Solomonic. But did not then the 3000 Solomonic proverbs afford to him scope enough? We must answer this question in the negative; for if that vast number of Solomonic proverbs was equal in moral-religious worth to those that have been preserved to us, then neither the many repetitions within the first collection nor the proportional poverty of the second can be explained. The "men of Hezekiah" made their collection of Solomonic proverbs nearly 300 years after Solomon's time; but there is no reason to suppose that the old book of the Proverbs of Solomon had disappeared at that time. Much rather we may with probability conclude, from the subjects to which several proverbs of these collections extend (husbandry, war, court life, etc.), and from Solomon's love for the manifold forms of natural and of social life, that his 3000 proverbs would not have afforded much greater treasures than these before us. But if the first collection was made at a time in which the old-Solomonic proverbs had been already considerably multiplied by new combinations, accretions, and imitations, then probably a more suitable time for their origination could not be than that of Jehoshaphat, which was more related to the time of Solomon than to that of David. The personality of Jehoshaphat, inclined toward the promotion of the public worship of God, the edification of the people, the administration of justice; the dominion of the house of David recognised and venerated far and wide among neighbouring

peoples ; the tendencies of that time towards intercourse with distant regions ; the deep peace which followed the subjugation of the confederated nations,—all these are features which stamped the time of Jehoshaphat as a copy of that of Solomon. Hence we are to expect in it the fostering care of the *Chokma*. If the author of the introduction and editor of the older book of Proverbs lived after Solomon and before Hezekiah, then the circumstances of the case most suitably determine his time as at the beginning of the reign of Jehoshaphat, some seventy years after Solomon's death. If in i.-ix. it is frequently said that wisdom was seen openly in the streets and ways, this agrees with 2 Chron. xvii. 7-9, where it is said that princes, priests, and Levites, sent out by Jehoshaphat (compare the Carolingian *missi*), went forth into the towns of Judah with the book of the law in their hands as teachers of the people, and with 2 Chron. xix. 4, where it is stated that Jehoshaphat himself "went out through the people from Beer-sheba to Mount Ephraim, and brought them back unto the Lord God of their fathers." We have an evidence of the fondness for allegorical forms of address at that time in 2 Kings xiv. 8-11 (2 Chron. xxv. 17-21), which is so far favourable to the idea that the allegorizing author of i.-ix. belonged to that epoch of history.

This also agrees with the time of Jehoshaphat, that in the first collection the kingdom appears in its bright side, adorned with righteousness (xiv. 35, xvi. 10, 12, 13, xx. 8), wisdom (xx. 26), grace and truth (xx. 28), love to the good (xxii. 11), divine guidance (xxi. 1), and in the height of power (xvi. 14, 15, xix. 12) ; while in the second collection, which immediately begins with a series of the king's sayings, the kingdom is seen almost only (with exception of xxix. 14) on its dark side, and is represented under the destructive dominion of tyranny (xxviii. 15, 16, xxix. 2), of oppressive taxation (xxix. 4), of the Camarilla (xxv. 5, xxix. 12), and of multiplied authorities (xxviii. 2). Elster is right when he remarks, that in x.-xxii. 16 the kingdom in its actual state corresponds to its ideal, and the warning against the abuse of royal power lies remote. If these proverbs more distinguishably than those in xxv.-xxix. bear the physiognomy of the time of David and Solomon, so, on the other hand, the time of Jehoshaphat, the son and successor of Asa, is favourable to their collection ; while in the time of Hezekiah, the son and successor of Ahaz, and father and predecessor of Manasseh, in which, through the sin of Ahaz, negotiations with the world-

kingdom began, that cloudy aspect of the kingdom which is borne by the second supplement, xxiv. 23-25, was brought near.

Thus between Solomon and Hezekiah, and probably under Jehoshaphat, the older Book of Proverbs contained in i.-xxiv. 22 first appeared. The "Proverbs of Solomon," x. 1-xxii. 16, which formed the principal part, the very kernel of it, were enclosed on the one side, at their commencement, by the lengthened introduction i. 7-ix., in which the collector announces himself as a highly gifted teacher and as the instrument of the Spirit of revelation, and on the other side are shut in at their close by "the Words of the Wise," xxii. 17-xxiv. 34. The author, indeed, does not announce i. 6 such a supplement of "the Words of the Wise;" but after these words in the title of the book, he leads us to expect it. The introduction to the supplement xxii. 17-21 sounds like an echo of the larger introduction, and corresponds to the smaller compass of the supplement. The work bears on the whole the stamp of a unity; for even in the last proverb with which it closes (xxiv. 21 f., "My son, fear thou Jahve and the king," etc.), there still sounds the same key-note which the author had struck at the commencement. A later collector, belonging to the time subsequent to Hezekiah, enlarged the work by the addition of the Hezekiah-portion, and by a short supplement of "the Words of the Wise," which he introduces, according to the law of analogy, after xxii. 17-xxiv. 22. The harmony of the superscriptions xxiv. 23, xxv. 1, favours at least the supposition that these supplements are the work of one hand. The circumstance that "the Words of the Wise," xxii. 17-xxiv. 22, in two of their maxims refer to the older collection of Solomonian proverbs, but, on the contrary, that "the Words of the Wise," xxiv. 23 ff., refer in xxiv. 23 to the Hezekiah-collection, and in xxiv. 33 f. to the introduction i. 7-ix., strengthens the supposition that with xxiv. 23 a second half of the book, added by another hand, begins. There is no reason for not attributing the appendix xxx.-xxxi. to this second collector; perhaps he seeks, as already remarked above, to render by means of it the conclusion of the extended Book of Proverbs uniform with that of the older book. Like the older collection of "Proverbs of Solomon," so also now the Hezekiah-collection has "Proverbs of the Wise" on the right and on the left, and the king of proverbial poetry stands in the midst of a worthy retinue. The second collector distinguishes himself from the first by this, that he never

professes himself to be a proverbial poet. It is possible that the proverbial poem of the "virtuous woman," xxxi. 10 ff., may be his work, but there is nothing to substantiate this opinion.

After this digression, into which we have been led by the repetitions found in the book, we now return, conformably to our plan, to examine it from the point of view of the forms of its language and of its doctrinal contents, and to inquire whether the results hitherto attained are confirmed, and perhaps more fully determined, by this further investigation.

4. *The Book of the Proverbs on the side of its manifoldness of style and form of instruction.*—We commence our inquiry with the relation in which x.-xxii. 16 and xxv.-xxix. stand to each other with reference to their forms of language. If the primary stock of both of these sections belongs indeed to the old time of Solomon, then they must bear essentially the same verbal stamp upon them. Here we of course keep out of view the proverbs that are wholly or partially identical. If the expression חֲרָרִי-בֶטֶן (the chambers of the body) is in the first collection a favourite figure (xviii. 8, xx. 27, 30), coined perhaps by Solomon himself, the fact that this figure is also found in xxvi. 22 is not to be taken into account, since in xxvi. 22 the proverb xviii. 8 is repeated. Now it cannot at all be denied, that in the first collection certain expressions are met with which one might expect to meet again in the Hezekiah-collection, and which, notwithstanding, are not to be found in it. Ewald gives a list of such expressions, in order to show that the old-Solomonic dialect occurs, with few exceptions, only in the first collection. But his catalogue, when closely inspected, is unsatisfactory. That many of these expressions occur also in the introduction i. 1-ix. proves, it is true, nothing against him. But בְּרִפְּאָה (health), xii. 18, xiii. 17, xiv. 30, xv. 4, xvi. 24, occurs also in xxix. 1; רָדַף (he pursueth), xi. 19, xii. 11, xv. 9, xix. 7, also in xxviii. 19; תַּטְּלָה (a tattler), xvi. 28, xviii. 8, also in xxvi. 20, 22; לֹא יִנְקָה (not go unpunished), xi. 21, xvi. 5, xvii. 5, also in xxviii. 20. These expressions thus supply an argument for, not against, the linguistic oneness of the two collections. The list of expressions common to the two collections might be considerably increased, e.g.: נִבְרָע (are unruly), xxix. 18, *Kal* xiii. 18, xv. 32; אֵין (he that hastens), xix. 2, xxi. 5, xxviii. 20, xxix. 19; מִדְּוִיִּים (of contentions), xxi. 9 (xxv. 24), xxi. 19, xxiii. 29, xxvi. 21, xxvii.

25. If it may be regarded as a striking fact that the figures of speech **מְקוֹר חַיִּים** (a fountain of life), x. 11, xiii. 14, xiv. 27, xvi. 22, and **עֵץ חַיִּים** (a tree of life), xi. 30, xiii. 12, xv. 4, as also the expressions **מְחַתָּה** (destruction), x. 14, 15, xiii. 3, xiv. 28, xviii. 7, x. 29, xxi. 15, **יֹפִי** (he uttereth), xii. 17, xiv. 5, 25, xix. 5, 9; **סָלַף** (perverteth), xiii. 6, xix. 3, xxi. 12, xxii. 12, and **סָלַף** (perverseness), xi. 3, xv. 4, are only to be found in the first collection, and not in that by the "men of Hezekiah," it is not a decisive evidence against the oneness of the origin of the proverbs in both collections. The fact also, properly brought forward by Ewald, that proverbs which begin with **שֵׁן** (there is),—e.g. xi. 24, "There is that scattereth, and yet increaseth still,"—are exclusively found in the first collection, need not perplex us; it is one peculiar kind of proverbs which the author of this collection has by preference gathered together, as he has also omitted all parabolic proverbs except these two, x. 26, xi. 22. If proverbs beginning with **שֵׁן** are found only in the first, so on the other hand the parabolic *Vav* and the proverbial perfect, reporting as it were an experience (cf. in the second collection, besides xxvi. 13, xxvii. 12, xxix. 13, also xxviii. 1, xxix. 9), for which Döderlein¹ has invented the expression *aoristus gnomicus*,² are common to both sentences. Another remark of Ewald's (*Jahrb.* xi. 28), that extended proverbs with **שֵׁן** are exclusively found in the Hezekiah-collection (xxix. 9, 3, xxv. 18, 28), is not fully established; in xvi. 27–29 three proverbs with **שֵׁן** are found together, and in xx. 6 as well as in xxix. 9 **שֵׁן** occurs twice in one proverb. Rather it strikes us that the article, not merely the punctatorially syncopated, but that expressed by **ה**, occurs only twice in the first collection, in xx. 1, xxi. 31; oftener in the second, xxvi. 14, 18, xxvii. 19, 20, 22. Since, however, the first does not wholly omit the article, this also cannot determine us to reject the linguistic unity of the second collection with the first, at least according to their primary stock.

But also what of the linguistic unity of i. 1–ix. with both of these, maintained by Keil? It is true, and merits all consideration, that a unity of language and of conception between i. 1–ix. and x.–xxii. 16 which far exceeds the degree of unity between x.–xxii. 16 and xxv.–xxix. may be proved. The introduction is bound with the

¹ *Reden u. Aufsätze*, ii. 316.

² A similar thing is found among German proverbs, e.g. : *Wer nicht mitsass, auch nicht mitass* (Whoso sat not, ate not).

first collection in the closest manner by the same use of such expressions as אָנִי (gathereth), vi. 8, x. 5; אֵינֶן (the middle, *i.e.* of the night, deep darkness), vii. 9, xx. 20; אַחֲרֵית (the end), v. 4, xxiii. 18, xxiv. 14; אֶכְרִי (fierce), v. 9, xvii. 11; בִּינָה (understanding), i. 2, xvi. 16; תְּבִינָה (understanding), ii. 6, iii. 19, xxi. 30; זָרָה (an adulteress), v. 3, xxii. 14, xxiii. 33; חָסֵר לֵב (lacking understanding), vi. 32, vii. 7, xii. 11; יוֹסֵף לֵמַד (will increase learning), i. 5, ix. 9, xvi. 21, 23; יָפִיחַ (uttereth), vi. 19, xiv. 5, xix. 5, 9; גָּלוּ (perverted), iii. 32, xiv. 2; מִדְּנִים (contention), vi. 14, 19, x. 12; מְרִפָּא (health), iv. 22, xii. 18, xiii. 17, xvi. 24 (deliverance, xxix. 1); נִפְחַ (are plucked up), ii. 22, xv. 25; לֹא יִנָּקָה (shall not be unpunished), vi. 29, xi. 21, xvi. 5; הִגָּעוּ (strengthened, *i.e.* the face), vii. 13, xxi. 29; עֵץ חַיִּים (tree of life), iii. 18, xi. 30, xiii. 12, xv. 4; עָרַב (becometh surety) and הִקָּעוּ (strikest hands) occurring together, vi. 1, xvii. 18, xxii. 26; פְּתִימִים and פְּתָאִים (simplicity, folly), i. 22, 32, viii. 5, ix. 6, xxiii. 3; קָרָו (to wink with the eyes), vi. 13, x. 10; קָרָה (a city), viii. 3, ix. 3, 14, xi. 11; רֵאשִׁית (the beginning), i. 7, xvii. 14; שֶׁכֶּל טוֹב (good understanding), iii. 4, xiii. 15; יִשְׁכְּנוּ-אֶרֶץ (shall dwell in the land), ii. 21, x. 30; שִׁלַּח מִדּוֹן (sendeth forth strife), vi. 14, xvi. 28; תְּהַפְּכוֹת (evil words), ii. 12, vi. 14, x. 31, xvi. 28; תּוֹרָה (instruction), i. 8, iii. 1, iv. 2, vii. 2, xiii. 14; תַּחֲשִׁיבָה (counsel), iii. 21, viii. 14, xviii. 1; תַּחְבּוּלוֹת (prudent measures), i. 5, xx. 18, xxiv. 6;—and these are not the only points of contact between the two portions which an attentive reader will meet with. This relation of i. 1–ix. 18 to x.–xxii. 16 is a strong proof of the internal unity of that portion, which Bertheau has called in question. But are we therefore to conclude, with Keil, that the introduction is not less of the old time of Solomon than x.–xxii. 16? Such a conclusion lies near, but we do not yet reach it. For with these points of contact there are not a few expressions exclusively peculiar to the introduction;—the expressions מִוֶּסֶף sing. (counsel), i. 4, iii. 21; עֲרֻמָּה (prudence), i. 4, viii. 5, 12; מְלִיצָה (an enigma, obscure maxim), i. 6; מַעַל (a path of life), ii. 9, iv. 11, 26; מִנְעִלָה, ii. 15, 18, v. 6, 21; אֵישׁוֹ (the apple of the eye), vii. 2, 9; גְּרִיזוֹת (the throat), i. 9, iii. 3, 22; the verbs אָתָה (cometh), i. 27, בָּלַם (make level or plain), iv. 26, v. 6, 21, and שָׁטָה (deviate), iv. 15, vii. 25. Peculiar to this section is the heaping together of synonyms in close connection, as “congregation” and “assembly,” v. 14, “lovely hind” and “pleasant roe,” v. 19; cf. v. 11, vi. 7, vii. 9, viii. 13, 31. This usage is,

however, only a feature in the characteristic style of this section altogether different from that of x. 1-xxii. 16, as well as from that of xxv.-xxix., of its disjointed diffuse form, delighting in repetitions, abounding in synonymous parallelism, even to a repetition of the same words (cf. *e.g.* vi. 2), which, since the linguistic and the poetic forms are here inseparable, we have already spoken of in the second part of our introductory dissertation. This fundamental diversity in the whole condition of the section, notwithstanding those numerous points of resemblance, demands for i. 1-ix. an altogether different author from Solomon, and one who is more recent. If we hold by this view, then these points of resemblance between the sections find the most satisfactory explanation. The gifted author of the introduction (i. 1-ix.) has formed his style, without being an altogether slavish imitator, on the Solomonic proverbs. And why, then, are his parallels confined almost exclusively to the section x. 1-xxii. 16, and do not extend to xxv.-xxix.? Because he edited the former and not the latter, and took pleasure particularly in the proverbs which he placed together, x. 1-xxii. 16. Not only are expressions of this section, formed by himself, echoed in his poetry, but the latter are for the most part formed out of germs supplied by the former. One may regard xix. 27, cf. xxvii. 11, as the germ of the admonitory addresses to the son, and xiv. 1 as the occasion of the allegory of the wise and the foolish woman, ix. Generally, the poetry of this writer has its hidden roots in the older writings. Who does not hear, to mention only one thing, in i. 7-ix. an echo of the old שמע (hear), Deut. vi. 4-9, cf. xi. 18-21? The whole poetry of this writer savours of the Book of Deuteronomy. The admonitory addresses i. 7-ix. are to the Book of Proverbs what Deuteronomy is to the Pentateuch. As Deuteronomy seeks to bring home and seal upon the heart of the people the תּוֹרָה of the Mosaic law, so do they the תּוֹרָה of the Solomonic proverbs.

We now further inquire whether, in the style of the two supplements, xxii. 17-xxiv. 22 and xxiv. 23 ff., it is proved that the former concludes the Book of Proverbs edited by the author of the general introduction, and that the latter was added by a different author at the same time with the Hezekiah-collection. Bertheau places both supplements together, and attributes the introduction to them, xxii. 17-21, to the author of the general introduction, i. 7-ix. From the fact that in ver. 19 of this lesser introduction ("I have taught

thee, אַתָּה, even thee") the pronoun is as emphatically repeated as in xxiii. 15 (לִבִּי גִם-אֶתְּךָ, cf. xxiii. 14, 19), and that נָעִים (sweet), xxii. 18, also occurs in the following proverbs, xxiii. 8, xxiv. 4, I see no ground for denying it to the author of the larger general introduction, since, according to Bertheau's own just observation, the linguistic form of the whole collection of proverbs has an influence on the introduction of the collector; with more justice from שְׂלֵשִׁים, xxii. 20 [only in *Keri*], as the title of honour given to the collection of proverbs, compared with נְיָרִים, viii. 6, may we argue for the identity of the authorship of both introductions. As little can the contemporaneousness of the two supplements be shown from the use of the pronoun, xxiv. 32, the שֵׁית לִבִּי (*animum advertere*, xxiv. 32), and יִנָּעַם (shall be delight) xxiv. 25, for these verbal points of contact, if they proved anything, would prove too much: not only the contemporaneousness of the two supplements, but also the identity of their authorship; but in this case one does not see what the superscription גִּם-אֱלֹהֵי הַחֲכָמִים (these also of the wise men), separating them, means. Moreover, xxiv. 33 f. are from vi. 10 f., and nearer than the comparison of the first supplement lies the comparison of יָנַעַם with ii. 10, ix. 17, אָדָם חָסֵר לֵב (a man lacking understanding) with xvii. 18, יִזְכָּרוּ with xxii. 14,—points of contact which, if an explanatory reason is needed, may be accounted for from the circumstance that to the author or authors of the proverbs xxiv. 23 ff. the Book of Proverbs i. 1–xxiv. 22 may have been perfectly familiar. From imitation also the points of contact of xxii. 17–xxiv. 22 may easily be explained; for not merely the lesser introduction, the proverbs themselves also in part strikingly agree with the prevailing language of i. 1–ix.: cf. אֲשֶׁר בִּרְרָה (go straight forward in the way), xxiii. 19, with iv. 14; חֲכָמוֹת (wisdom), xxiv. 7, with i. 20, ix. 1; and several others. But if, according to i. 7, we conceive of the older Book of Proverbs as accompanied with, rather than as without דְּבָרֵי חֲכָמִים (words of wise men), then from the similarity of the two superscriptions xxiv. 23, xxv. 1, it is probable that the more recent half of the canonical book begins with xxiv. 23, and we cannot therefore determine to regard xxiv. 23 ff. also as a component part of the older Book of Proverbs; particularly since xxiv. 23b is like xxviii. 21a, and the author of the introduction can scarcely have twice taken into his book the two verses xxiv. 33 f., which moreover seem to stand in their original connection at vi. 10f.

The supplements to the Hezekiah-collection, xxx. f., are of so peculiar a form, that it will occur to no one (leaving out of view such expressions as רָעַת קְרָשִׁים, knowledge of the Holy, xxx. 3, cf. ix. 10) to ascribe them to one of the authors of the preceding proverbs. We content ourselves here with a reference to Mühlau's work, *De Proverbiarum quæ dicuntur Aguri et Lemuelis origine atque indole*, 1869, where the Aramaic-Arabic colouring of this in all probability foreign section is closely investigated.

Having thus abundantly proved that the two groups of proverbs bearing the inscription מְשָׁלֵי שְׁכֵמָה are, as to their primary stock, truly old-Solomonic, though not without an admixture of imitations; that, on the contrary, the introduction, i. 7-ix., as well as the רַבְרֵי חֻכְמִים, xxii. 17-xxiv. and xxx. f., are not at all old-Solomonic, but belong to the editor of the older Book of Proverbs, which reaches down to xxiv. 22, so that thus the present book of the poetry of Solomon contains united with it the poems of the older editor, and besides of other poets, partly unknown Israelites, and partly two foreigners particularly named, Agur and Lemuel; we now turn our attention to the DOCTRINAL CONTENTS of the work, and ask whether a manifoldness in the type of instruction is noticeable in it, and whether there is perceptible in this manifoldness a progressive development. It may be possible that the Proverbs of Solomon, the Words of the Wise, and the Proverbial poetry of the editor, as they represent three eras, so also represent three different stages in the development of proverbial poetry. However, the Words of the Wise xxii. 17-xxiv. are so internally related to the Proverbs of Solomon, that even the sharpest eye will discover in them not more than the evening twilight of the vanishing Solomonic Mashal. There thus remain on the one side only the Proverbs of Solomon with their echo in the Words of the Wise, on the other the Proverbial Poems of the editor; and these present themselves as monuments of two sharply defined epochs in the progressive development of the Mashal.

The common fundamental character of the book in all its parts is rightly defined when we call it a Book of Wisdom. Indeed, with the Church Fathers not only the Book of Sirach and the Solomonic Apocrypha, but also this Book of Proverbs bears this title, which seems also to have been in use among the Jews, since Melito of Sardes adds to the title "Proverbs of Solomon," ἡ καὶ Σοφία; since, moreover, Eusebius (*H. E.* iv. 22) affirms, that not only Hege-

sippus and Irenæus, but the whole of the ancients, called the Proverbs of Solomon Πανάρετος Σοφία.¹ It is also worthy of observation that it is called by Dionysius of Alexandria ἡ σοφὴ βίβλος, and by Gregory of Nazianzum ἡ παιδαγωγικὴ σοφία. These names not only express praise of the book, but they also denote at the same time the circle of human intellectual activity from which it emanated. As the books of prophecy are a product of the נְבִיאִים, so the Book of the Proverbs is a product of the חֲכָמִים, σοφία, the human effort to apprehend the objective σοφία, and thus of φιλοσοφία, or the *studium sapientiæ*. It has emanated from the love of wisdom, to incite to the love of wisdom, and to put into the possession of that which is the object of love—for this end it was written. We need not hesitate, in view of Col. ii. 8, to call the Book of Proverbs a “philosophical” treatise, since the origin of the name φιλοσοφία is altogether noble: it expresses the relativity of human knowledge as over against the absoluteness of the divine knowledge, and the possibility of an endlessly progressive advancement of the human toward the divine. The characteristic ideas of a dialectic development of thought and of the formation of a scientific system did not primarily appertain to it—the occasion for this was not present to the Israelitish people: it required fructification through the Japhetic spirit to produce philosophers such as Philo, Maimonides, and Spinoza. But philosophy is everywhere present when the natural, moral, positive, is made the object of a meditation which seeks to apprehend its last ground, its legitimate coherence, its true essence and aim. In this view C. B. Michaelis, in his *Adnotationes uberiorēs in Hagiographa*, passes from the exposition of the Psalms to that of the Proverbs with the words, “From David’s closet, consecrated to prayer, we now pass into Solomon’s school of wisdom, to admire the greatest of philosophers in the son of the greatest of theologians.”²

¹ This name [meaning “wisdom, including all virtue”], there are many things to show, was common in Palestine. The Jerusalem Talmud, in a passage quoted by Krochmal, *Kerem Chemed*, v. 79, divides the canon into נְבִיאִים, חֲכָמִים, and חֻמְשֵׁי תוֹרָה. Rashi, in *Baba bathra*, 14b, calls Mishle (Proverbs) and Koheleth (Ecclesiastes) סְפָרֵי חֲכָמָה. The Book of Koheleth is called (*b. Megilla*, 7a), according to its contents, חֲכָמָתוֹ שֶׁל שְׁלֹמֹה. The Song bears in the Syriac version (the Peshito) the inscription *chekmetho dechekmetho*.

² “In hoc genere,” says Lord Bacon, *De Augmentis Scientiarum*, viii. 2, “nihil invenitur, quod ullo modo comparandum sit cum aphorismis illis, quos edidit rex Salomon, de quo testatur Scriptura, cor illi fuisse instar arenæ maris.

When we give the name *φιλοσοφία* to the tendency of mind to which the Book of Proverbs belongs, we do not merely use a current scientific word, but there is an actual internal relation of the Book of Proverbs to that which is the essence of philosophy, which Scripture recognises (Acts xvii. 27, cf. Rom. i. 19 f.) as existing within the domain of heathendom, and which stamps it as a natural product of the human spirit, which never can be wanting where a human being or a people rises to higher self-consciousness, and begins to reflect on the immediate self-consciousness and its operations in their changing relation to the phenomena of the external world. The mysteries of the world without him and of the world within him give man no rest, he must seek to solve them; and whenever he does that, he philosophizes, *i.e.* he strives after a knowledge of the nature of things, and of the laws which govern them in the world of phenomena and of events; on which account also Josephus, referring to Solomon's knowledge of nature, says (*Ant.* viii. 2. 5), οὐδεμίαν τούτων φύσιν ἠγνόησεν οὐδὲ παρήλθεν ἀνεξέταστον ἀλλ' ἐν πάσαις ἐφιλοσόφησεν. Cf. Irenæus, *Cont. Her.* iv. 27. 1: *eam quæ est in conditione (κτίσει) sapientiam Dei erponebat physiologie.*

The historical books show us how much the age of Solomon favoured philosophical inquiries by its prosperity and peace, its active and manifold commercial intercourse with foreign nations, its circle of vision extending to Tarshish and Ophir, and also how Solomon himself attained to an unequalled elevation in the extent of his human and secular knowledge. We also read of some of the wise men in 1 Kings v. 11, cf. Ps. lxxxviii. lxxxix., who adorned the court of the wisest of kings; and the *לִּמְּוִן*, which became, through his influence, a special branch of Jewish literature, is the peculiar poetic form of the *חֵכֶם*. Therefore in the Book of Proverbs we find the name *חֵכֶם לִּמְּוִן* (words of the wise) used for *מִלְּמִי* (proverbs); and by a careful consideration of all the proverbs in which mention is made of the *חֵכֶם*, one will convince

Sicut enim arenæ maris universas orbis oras circumdant, ita et sapientia ejus omnia humana non minus quam divina complexa est. In aphorismis vero illis præter alia magis theologica reperies liquido haud pauca præcepta et monita civilia præstantissima, ex profundis quidem sapientiæ penetralibus scaturientia atque in amplissimum varietatis campum excurrentia." Accordingly, in the same work Bacon calls the Proverbs of Solomon "insignes parabolas s. apbormos de divina atque morali philosophia."

himself that this name has not merely a common ethical sense, but begins to be the name of those who made wisdom, *i.e.* the knowledge of things in the depths of their essence, their special lifework, and who connected themselves together in oneness of sentiment and fellowship into a particular circle within the community. To this conclusion we are conducted by such proverbs as xiii. 20—

He that walketh with wise men becomes wise,
And whoever has intercourse with fools is destroyed ;

xv. 12—

The scorner loveth not that one reprove him :
To wise men he goeth not ;—

and by the contrast, which prevails in the Book of Proverbs, between מַצְחֵה (mockers) and חֲכָמִים (wise), in which we see that, at the same time with the striving after wisdom, scepticism also, which we call free thought, obtained a great ascendancy in Israel. Mockery of religion, rejection of God in principle and practice, a casting away of all fear of Jahve, and in general of all *δαιμονία*, were in Israel phenomena which had already marked the times of David. One may see from the Psalms that the community of the Davidic era is to be by no means regarded as furnishing a pattern of religious life : that there were in it גִּוִּים (Gentile nations) which were in no way externally inferior to them, and that it did not want for rejecters of God. But it is natural to expect that in the Solomonic era, which was more than any other exposed to the dangers of sensuality and worldliness, and of religious indifference and free-thinking latitudinarianism, the number of the מַצְחֵה increased, and that scepticism and mockery became more intensified. The Solomonic era appears to have first coined the name of מַצְחֵה for those men who despised that which was holy, and in doing so laid claim to wisdom (xiv. 6), who caused contention and bitterness when they spake, and carefully avoided the society of the חֲכָמִים, because they thought themselves above their admonitions (xv. 12). For in the psalms of the Davidic time the word מַצְחֵה is commonly used for them (it occurs in the Proverbs only in xvii. 21, with the general meaning of low fellow, Germ. *Bube*), and the name מַצְחֵה is never met with except once, in Ps. i. 1, which belongs to the post-Davidic era. One of the Solomonic proverbs (xxi. 24) furnishes a definite idea of this newly formed word :

An inflated arrogant man they call a scorner (מַצְחֵה),
One who acts in the superfluity of haughtiness.

By the self-sufficiency of his ungodly thoughts and actions he is distinguished from the פְּתִי (simple), who is only misled, and may therefore be reclaimed, xix. 25, xxi. 11; by his non-recognition of the Holy in opposition to a better knowledge and better means and opportunities, he is distinguished from the כְּסִיל (foolish, stupid), xvii. 16, the אָוִיל (foolish, wicked), i. 7, vii. 22, and the חָסֵר לֵב (the void of understanding), vi. 32, who despise truth and instruction from want of understanding, narrowness, and forgetfulness of God, but not from perverse principle. This name specially coined, the definition of it given (cf. also the similarly defining proverb xxiv. 8), and in general the rich and fine technical proverbs in relation to the manifold kinds of wisdom (בִּינָה, xvi. 16; מוֹסֵר, i. 8; תְּבוּנוֹת, xxi. 30; מְנַחֵם, v. 2; תַּחְבּוּלוֹת, i. 5, xii. 5; the הִוְסִיָּה first coined by the Chokma, etc.), of instruction in wisdom (לָמַד, i. 5; תּוֹרָה, iv. 2, vi. 23; רָעָה, to tend a flock, to instruct, x. 21; חָנֵף, xxii. 6; הוֹכֵחַ, xv. 12; לָקַח נַפְשׁוֹת, to win souls, vi. 25, xi. 30), of the wise men themselves (חֲכָם, xii. 15; נָבוֹן, x. 13; מוֹכִיחַ, a reprover, preacher of repentance, xxv. 12, etc.), and of the different classes of men (among whom also אָדָם אַחֲרֵי, one who steps backwards [retrograder], xxviii. 23)—all this shows that חֲכָמָה was at that time not merely the designation of an ethical quality, but also the designation of a science rooted in the fear of God to which many noble men in Israel then addicted themselves. Jeremiah places (xviii. 18) the חֲכָם along with the כֹּהֵן (priest) and נְבִיא (prophet); and if Ezek. (vii. 26) uses זָקֵן (old man) instead of חֲכָם, yet by reference to Job xii. 12 this may be understood. In his "Dissertation on the popular and intellectual freedom of Israel from the time of the great prophets to the first destruction of Jerusalem" (*Jahrbücher*, i. 96 f.), Ewald says, "One can scarcely sufficiently conceive how high the attainment was which was reached in the pursuit after wisdom (philosophy) in the first centuries after David, and one too much overlooks the mighty influence it exerted on the entire development of the national life of Israel. The more closely those centuries are inquired into, the more are we astonished at the vast power which wisdom so early exerted on all sides as the common object of pursuit of many men among the people. It first openly manifested itself in special circles of the people, while in the age after Solomon, which was peculiarly favourable to it, eagerly inquisitive scholars gathered around individual masters, until ever increasing schools were formed. But its influence gradually pene-

trated all the other pursuits of the people, and operated on the most diverse departments of authorship." We are in entire sympathy with this historical view first advanced by Ewald, although we must frequently oppose the carrying of it out in details. The literature and the national history of Israel are certainly not understood if one does not take into consideration, along with the נְבִיאָה (prophecy), the influential development of the חִכְמָה as a special aim and subject of intellectual activity in Israel.

And how was this *Chokma* conditioned—to what was it directed? To denote its condition and aim in one word, it was universalistic, or humanistic. Emanating from the fear or the religion of Jahve (יְהוָה, the way of the Lord, x. 29), but seeking to comprehend the spirit in the letter, the essence in the forms of the national life, its effort was directed towards the general truth affecting mankind as such. While prophecy, which is recognised by the *Chokma* as a spiritual power indispensable to a healthful development of a people (בְּאֵין חוֹזֵן יִפְרַע עִם, xxix. 18), is of service to the historical process into which divine truth enters to work out its results in Israel, and from thence outward among mankind, the *Chokma* seeks to look into the very essence of this truth through the robe of its historical and national manifestation, and then to comprehend those general ideas in which could already be discovered the fitness of the religion of Jahve for becoming the world-religion. From this aim towards the ideal in the historical, towards the everlasting same amid changes, the human (I intentionally use this word) in the Israelitish, the universal religion in the Jahve-religion (Jahvetum), and the universal morality in the Law, all the peculiarities of the Book of Proverbs are explained, as well as of the long, broad stream of the literature of the *Chokma*, beginning with Solomon, which, when the Palestinian Judaism assumed the rugged, exclusive, proud national character of Pharisaism, developed itself in Alexandrinism. Bertheau is amazed that in the Proverbs there are no warnings given against the worship of idols, which from the time of the kings gained more and more prevalence among the Israelitish people. "How is it to be explained," he asks (*Spr.* p. xlii.), "if the proverbs, in part at least, originated during the centuries of conflict between idolatry and the religion of Jahve, and if they were collected at a time in which this conflict reached its climax and stirred all ranks of the people—this conflict against the immorality of the Phœnician-Babylonian religion of nature, which must often have

led into the same region of the moral contemplation of the world over which this book moves?!" The explanation lies in this, that the *Chokma* took its stand-point in a height and depth in which it had the mingling waves of international life and culture under it and above it, without being internally moved thereby. It naturally did not approve of heathenism, it rather looked upon the fear of Jahve as the beginning of wisdom, and the seeking after Jahve as implying the possession of all knowledge (xxviii. 5, cf. 1 John ii. 20); but it passed over the struggle of prophecy against heathendom, it confined itself to its own function, viz. to raise the treasures of general religious-moral truth in the Jahve-religion, and to use them for the ennobling of the Israelites as men. In vain do we look for the name *יִצְחָק* in the Proverbs, even the name *תּוֹרָה* has a much more flexible idea attached to it than that of the law written at Sinai (cf. xxviii. 4, xxix. 18 with xxviii. 7, xiii. 14, and similar passages); prayer and good works are placed above sacrifice, xv. 8, xxi. 3, 27, —practical obedience to the teaching of wisdom above all, xxviii. 9. The Proverbs refer with special interest to Gen. i. and ii., the beginnings of the world and of the human race before nations took their origin. On this primitive record in the book of Genesis, to speak only of the *חַיַּיִל הַחַיָּה*, the figure of the tree of life (perhaps also of the fountain of life), found nowhere else in the Old Testament, leans; on it leans also the contrast, deeply pervading the Proverbs, between life (immortality, xii. 28) and death, or between that which is above and that which is beneath (xv. 24); on it also many other expressions, such, *e.g.*, as what is said in xx. 27 of the "spirit of man." This also, as Stier (*Der Weise ein König*, 1849, p. 240) has observed, accounts for the fact that *רוּחַ* occurs by far most frequently in the Book of Job and in the Solomonic writings. All these phenomena are explained from the general human universal aim of the *Chokma*.

When James (iii. 17) says that the "wisdom that is from above is first pure, then peaceable, gentle, easy to be entreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy," his words most excellently designate the nature and the contents of the discourse of wisdom in the Solomonic proverbs, and one is almost inclined to think that the apostolic brother of the Lord, when he delineates wisdom, has before his eyes the Book of the Proverbs, which raises to purity by the most impressive admonitions. Next to its admonitions to purity are those especially to

peacefulness, to gentle resignation (xiv. 30), quietness of mind (xiv. 33) and humility (xi. 2, xv. 33, xvi. 5, 18), to mercy (even toward beasts, xii. 10), to firmness and sincerity of conviction, to the furtherance of one's neighbour by means of wise discourse and kind help. What is done in the Book of Deuteronomy with reference to the law is continued here. As in Deuteronomy, so here, love is at the bottom of its admonitions, the love of God to men, and the love of men to one another in their diverse relations (xii. 2, xv. 9); the conception of $\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\eta\varsigma$ gives way to that of charity, of almsgiving ($\delta\iota\kappa\alpha\iota\omicron\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta = \epsilon\lambda\epsilon\eta\mu\omicron\sigma\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta$). Forgiving, suffering love (x. 12), love which does good even to enemies (xxv. 21 f.), rejoices not over the misfortune that befalls an enemy (xxiv. 17 f.), retaliates not (xxiv. 28 f.), but commits all to God (xx. 22),—love in its manifold forms, as that of husband and wife, of children, of friends,—is here recommended with New Testament distinctness and with deepest feeling. Living in the fear of God (xxviii. 14), the Omniscient (xv. 3, 11, xvi. 2, xxi. 2, xxiv. 11 f.), to whom as the final Cause all is referred (xx. 12, 24, xiv. 31, xxii. 2), and whose universal plan all must subserve (xvi. 4, xix. 21, xxi. 30), and on the other side active pure love to man—these are the hinges on which all the teachings of wisdom in the Proverbs turn. Frederick Schlegel, in the fourteenth of his *Lectures on the History of Literature*, distinguishes, not without deep truth, between the historico-prophetic books of the Old Testament, or books of the history of redemption, and the Book of Job, the Psalms, and the Solomonic writings, as books of aspiration, corresponding to the triple chord of faith, hope, charity as the three stages of the inner spiritual life. The Book of Job is designed to support faith amid trials; the Psalms breathe forth and exhibit hope amid the conflicts of earth's longings; the Solomonic writings reveal to us the mystery of the divine love, and the Proverbs that wisdom which grows out of and is itself eternal love. When Schlegel in the same lecture says that the books of the Old Covenant, for the most part, stand under the signature of the lion as the element of the power of will and spirited conflict glowing in divine fire, but that in the inmost hidden kernel and heart of the sacred book the Christian figure of the lamb rises up out of the veil of this lion strength, this may specially be said of the Book of Proverbs, for here that same heavenly wisdom preaches, which, when manifested in person, spake in the Sermon on the Mount, New Testament love in the midst of the Old Testament.

It is said that in the times before Christ there was a tendency to apocryphize not only the Song of Solomon and Ecclesiastes, but also the Book of Proverbs, and that for the first time the men of the Great Synagogue established their canonicity on the ground of their spiritual import; they became perplexed about the Proverbs, according to *b. Sabbath*, 30*b*, on account of such self-contradictory proverbs as xxvi. 4, 5, and according to *Aboth de-Rabbi Nathan*, c. 1, on account of such secular portions as that of the wanton woman, vii. But there is no need to allegorize this woman, and that self-contradiction is easily explained. The theopneustic character of the book and its claim to canonicity show themselves from its integral relation to the Old Testament preparation for redemption; but keeping out of view the book as a whole, it is self-evident that the conception of a practical proverb such as xiv. 4 and of a prophecy such as Isa. vii. 14 are very different phenomena of the spiritual life, and that in general the operation of the Divine Spirit in a proverb is different from that in a prophecy.

We have hitherto noted the character of the instruction set forth in the Proverbs according to the marks common to them in all their parts, but in such a way that we have taken our proofs only from the "Proverbs of Solomon" and the "Words of the Wise," with the exclusion of the introductory proverbial poems of the older editor. If we compare the two together, it cannot be denied that in the type of the instruction contained in the latter, the *Chokma*, of which the book is an emanation and which it has as its aim (לְרַעֲיָת חֻכְמָה, i. 2), stands before us in proportionally much more distinctly defined comprehension and form; we have the same relation before us whose adumbration is the relation of the instruction of wisdom in the Avesta and in the later Minochired (Spiegel, *Parsi-Grammatik*, p. 182 ff.). The *Chokma* appears also in the "Proverbs of Solomon" as a being existing in and for itself, which is opposed to ambiguous subjective thought (xxviii. 26); but here there is attributed to it an objectivity even to an apparent personality: it goes forth preaching, and places before all men life and death for an eternally decisive choice, it distributes the spirit to those who do not resist (i. 23), it receives and answers prayer (i. 28). The speculation regarding the *Chokma* is here with reference to Job xxviii. (cf. Prov. ii. 4, iii. 14 f., viii. 11, 19), and particularly to xxviii. 27, where a demiurgic function is assigned to wisdom, carried back to its source in eternity: it is the

medium by which the world was created, iii. 19; it was before the creation of the world with God as from everlasting, His son of royal dignity, viii. 22-26; it was with Him in His work of creation, viii. 27-30; after the creation it remained as His delight, rejoicing always before Him, and particularly on the earth among the sons of men, viii. 30 f. Staudenmaier (*Lehre von der Idee*, p. 37) is certainly not on the wrong course, when under this rejoicing of wisdom before God he understands the development of the ideas or life-thoughts intimately bound up in it—the world-idea. This development is the delight of God, because it represents to the divine contemplation the contents of wisdom, or of the world-idea founded in the divine understanding, in all its activities and inner harmonies; it is a calm delight, because the divine idea unites with the fresh and ever young impulse of life, the purity, goodness, innocence, and holiness of life, because its spirit is light, clear, simple, childlike, in itself peaceful, harmonious, and happy; and this delight is experienced especially on the earth among the sons of men, among whom wisdom has its delight; for, as the divine idea, it is in all in so far as it is the inmost life-thought, the soul of each being, but it is on the earth of men in whom it comes to its self-conception, and self-conscious comes forth into the light of the clear day. Staudenmaier has done the great service of having worthily estimated the rich and deep fulness of this biblical theologumenon of wisdom, and of having pointed out in it the foundation-stone of a sacred metaphysics and a means of protection against pantheism in all its forms. We see that in the time of the editor of the older Book of Proverbs the wisdom of the schools in its devotion to the chosen object of its pursuit, the divine wisdom living and moving in all nature, and forming the background of all things, rises to a height of speculation on which it has planted a banner showing the right way to latest times. Ewald rightly points to the statements in the introduction to the Proverbs regarding wisdom as a distinct mark of the once great power of wisdom in Israel; for they show us how this power learned to apprehend itself in its own purest height, after it had become as perfect, and at the same time also as self-conscious, as it could at all become in ancient Israel.

Many other appearances also mark the advanced type of instruction contained in the introduction. Hitzig's view (*Sprüche*, p. xvii. f.), that i. 6-ix. 18 are the part of the whole collection

which was earliest written, confutes itself on all sides; on the contrary, the views of Bleek in his *Introduction to the Old Testament*, thrown out in a sketchy manner and as if by a diviner, surprisingly agree with our own results, which have been laboriously reached and are here amply established. The advanced type of instruction in the introduction, i.—ix., appears among other things in this, that we there find the allegory, which up to this place occurs in Old Testament literature only in scattered little pictures built up into independent poetic forms, particularly in ix., where without any contradiction אִשָּׁת בְּסִילִית [a simple woman, v. 13] is an allegorical person. The technical language of the *Chokma* has extended itself on many sides and been refined (we mention these synonyms: חֲכָמָה, דָּעַת, בִּינָה, עֲרָמָה, מְנוּפָה, מוֹסֵר, תְּחִינָה); and the seven pillars in the house of wisdom, even though it be inadmissible to think of them as the seven liberal arts, yet point to a division into seven parts of which the poet was conscious to himself. The common address, בְּנִי [my son], which is not the address of the father to the son, but of the teacher to the scholar, countenances the supposition that there were at that time חֲכָמִים בְּנֵי, i.e. scholars of the wise men, just as there were "sons of the prophets" (נְבִיאִים), and probably also schools of wisdom. "And when it is described how wisdom spake aloud to the people in all the streets of Jerusalem, in the high places of the city and in every favourable place, does not one feel that such sublime descriptions could not be possible unless at that time wisdom were regarded by the people as one of the first powers, and the wise men truly displayed a great public activity?" We must answer this question of Ewald's in the affirmative.

Bruch, in his *Weisheitslehre der Hebräer*, 1851, was the first to call special attention to the *Chokma* or humanism as a peculiar intellectual tendency in Israel; but he is mistaken in placing it in an indifferent and even hostile relation to the national law and the national cultus, which he compares to the relation of Christian philosophy to orthodox theology. Oehler, in his *Grundzüge der alttestamentl. Weisheit*, which treats more especially of the doctrinal teachings of the Book of Job, judges more correctly; cf. also his comprehensive article, *Pädagogik des A. T.* in Schmid's *Pädagogischer Encyclopädie*, pp. 653—695 (partic. 677—683).

5. The Alexandrian Translation of the Book of Proverbs.—Of

highest interest for the history of the Book of Proverbs is the relation of the LXX. to the Hebrew text. One half of the proverbs of Agur (xxx. of the Hebrew text) are placed in it after xxiv. 22, and the other half after xxiv. 34; and the proverbs of King Lemuel (xxxi. 1-9 of the Hebrew text) are placed after the proverbs of Agur, while the acrostic proverbial poem of the virtuous woman is in its place at the end of the book. That transposition reminds us of the transpositions in Jeremiah, and rests in the one place as well as in the other on a misunderstanding of the true contents. The translator has set aside the new superscription, x. 1, as unsuitable, and has not marked the new beginning, xxii. 17; he has expunged the new superscription, xxiv. 23, and has done the same to the superscription, "The words of Agur" (xxx. 1), in two awkward explanations (*λόγον φυλασσομένος* and *τοὺς ἐμοὺς λόγους φοβήθητι*), and the superscription, "The words of Lemuel" (xxxi. 1), in one similar (*οἱ ἐμοὶ λόγοι εἴρηνται ὑπὸ Θεοῦ*), so that the proverbs of Agur and of Lemuel are without hesitation joined with those of Solomon, whereby it yet remains a mystery why the proverbs beginning with "The words of Agur" have been divided into two parts. Hitzig explains it from a confounding of the columns in which, two being on each page, the Hebrew ms. which lay before the translator was written, and in which the proverbs of Agur and of Lemuel (names which tradition understood symbolically of Solomon) were already ranked in order before ch. xxv. But besides these, there are also many other singular things connected with this Greek translation interesting in themselves and of great critical worth. That it omits i. 16 may arise from this, that this verse was not found in the original ms., and was introduced from Isa. lix. 7; but there are wanting also proverbs such as xxi. 5, for which no reason can be assigned. But the additions are disproportionately more numerous. Frequently we find a line added to the distich, such as in i. 18, or an entire distich added, as iii. 15; or of two lines of the Hebrew verse, each is formed into a separate distich, as i. 7, xi. 16; or we meet with longer interpolations, extending far beyond this measure, as that added to iv. 27. Many of these proverbs are easily re-translated into the Hebrew, as that added to iv. 27, consisting of four lines:

כי דרכי מימינים ידע יהוה
ועקשים דרכי משמאלים

הוא יפלא מעגלותיך
ארחותיך בשלום יצליח:

But many of them also sound as if they had been originally Greek; e.g. the lines appended to ix. 10, xiii. 15; the distich, vi. 11; the imperfect tristich, xxii. 14; and the formless trian, xxv. 10. The value of these enlargements is very diverse; not a few of these proverbs are truly thoughtful, such as the addition to xii. 13—

He who is of mild countenance findeth mercy;

He who is litigious crushes souls—

and singularly bold in imagery, as the addition to ix. 12—

He who supports himself by lies hunts after (רעה) the wind,

He catches at fluttering birds;

For he forsakes the ways of his own vineyard,

And wanders away from the paths of his own field,

And roams through arid steppes and a thirsty land,

And gathers with his hand withered heath.

The Hebrew text lying before the Alexandrian translators had certainly not all these additions, yet in many passages, such as xi. 16, it is indeed a question whether it is not to be improved from the LXX.; and in other passages, where, if one reads the Greek, the Hebrew words naturally take their place, whether these are not at least old Hebrew marginal notes and interpolations which the translation preserves. But this version itself has had its gradual historical development. The text, the *κοινή* (*communis*), proceeds from the Hexaplar text edited by Origen, which received from him many and diverse revisions; and in the times before Christ, perhaps (as Hitz. supposes), down to the second century after Christ, the translation itself, not being regarded as complete, was in the progress of growth, for not unfrequently two different translations of one and the same proverb stand together, as xiv. 22, xxix. 25 (where also the Peshito follows the LXX. after which it translates), or also interpenetrate one another, as xxii. 8, 9. These doubled translations are of historical importance both in relation to the text and to the interpretation of it. Along with the Books of Samuel and Jeremiah, there is no book in regard to which the LXX. can be of higher significance than the Book of Proverbs; we shall seek in the course of our exposition duly to estimate the text¹ as adopted by Bertheau (1847) and Hitzig (1858) in their

¹ Cf. also J. Gottlob Jäger's *Observationes in Proverbiorum Salomonis Versionem Alexandrinam*, 1788; de Lagarde's *Anmerkungen zur griech. Uebersetzung*

commentaries, and by Ewald in his *Jahrb.* xi. (1861) and his commentary (2d ed. 1867). The historical importance of the Egyptian text-recension is heightened by this circumstance, that the old Syrian translator of the Solomonic writings had before him not only the original text, but also the LXX.; for the current opinion, that the Peshito, as distinguished from the Syro-Hexaplar version, sprang solely from the original text with the assistance of the Targum, is more and more shown to be erroneous. In the Book of Proverbs the relation of the Peshito and Targum is even the reverse; the Targum of the Proverbs, making use of the Peshito, restores the Masoretic text,—the points of contact with the LXX. showing themselves here and there, are brought about¹ by the Peshito. But that Jerome, in his translation of the Vulgate according to the *Hebræa veritas*, sometimes follows the LXX. in opposition to the original text, is to be explained with Hitzig from the fact that he based his work on an existing Latin translation made from the LXX. Hence it comes that the two distichs added in the LXX. to iv. 27 remain in his work, and that instead of the one distich, xv. 6, we have two:—*In abundanti* (after the phrase בְּרֵב instead of תֵּבֵּ of the Masoretic text) *justitia virtus maxima est, cogitationes autem impiorum eradicabuntur. Domus* (בֵּית) *justi plurima fortitudo, et in fructibus impij conturbatio*; for Jerome has adopted the two translations of the LXX., correcting the second according to the original text.²

der Proverbien, 1863; M. Heidenheim's *Zur Textkritik der Proverbien*, in his *Quarterly Journal for German and English Theological Criticism and Investigation*, No. viii. (1865), and ix., xi. (1866). The text of the LXX. (cf. Angelo Mai's *Classici Auctores*, t. ix.) used by Procopius in his *Ἑρμηνεία εἰς τὰς παροιμίας* is peculiar, and here and there comes near to the Hebrew original. The scholion of Evagrius in the *Σχόλια εἰς τὰς παροιμίας* of Origen, edited by Tischendorf in his *Notitia*, 1860, from a MS. of Patmos, shows how soon even the Hexaplar text became ambiguous.

¹ Cf. Dathe, *De ratione consensus Versionis Syriacæ et Chaldaicæ Proverbiorum Salomonis* (1764), edited by Rosenmüller in his *Opuscula*. Maybaum, in the Treatise on the Language of the Targum to the Proverbs and its relation to the Syriac, in Merx's *Archiv*, ii. 66-93, labours in vain to give the priority to that of the Targum: the Targum is written from the Peshito, and here and there approaches the Hebrew text; the language is, with few differences, the Syriac of the original.

² The Ethiopic translation, also, is in particular points, as well as on the whole, dependent on the LXX., for it divides the Book of Proverbs into proverbs (παροιμίας), i. - xxiv., and instructions (παιδείαι) of Solomon, xxv. - xxxi. Vid. Dillmann in Ewald's *Jahrb.* v. 147, 150.

The fragments of the translations of Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, etc., contained in Greek and Syrian sources, have been recently collected, more perfectly than could have been done by Montfaucon, by Fried. Field, in his work *Origenis Hexaplorum quæ supersunt*, etc. (Oxonii, 1867, 4). Of special interest is the more recent translation of the original text, existing only in a ms. laid up in the Library of St. Mark [at Venice], executed in bold language, rich in rare and newly invented words, by an unknown author, and belonging to an age which has not yet been determined (*Græcus Venetus*): cf. d'Ansse de Villosion's *nova versio Græca Proverbiorum, Ecclesiastis, Cantici Canticorum*, etc., *Argentorati*, 1784; and also the *Animadversiones* thereto of Jo. Ge. Dahler, 1786.

The literature of the interpretation of the Book of Proverbs is found in Keil's *Einleitung in das A. T.* (1859), p. 346 f. [*Manual of Historico-Critical Introduction to the Old Testament*, translated by Professor Douglas, D.D., Free Church College, Glasgow. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. Vol. i. p. 468 f.]. The most important of the older linguistic works on this book is the commentary of Albert Schultens (*Lugduni Batavorum*, 1748, 4), whose service to the cause of Semitic philology and O. T. exegesis Mühlau has brought to remembrance in the Lutheran *Zeitschrift*, 1870, 1; Vogel's abstract (*Ilalæ*, 1769), prefaced by Semler, does not altogether compensate for the original work. From the school of Schultens, and also from that of Schröder, originate the *Anmerkungen* by Alb. Jac. Arnoldi, maternal grandson of Schultens, a Latin edition of which was published (*Lugduni Bat.* 1783) by Henr. Alb. Schultens, the grandson of Schultens by his son. Among the commentaries of English interpreters, that in Latin by Thomas Cartwright (*Amstelredami*, 1663, 4), along with the *Exposition of the Book of Proverbs* by Charles Bridges (4th ed., London, 1859), hold an honourable place. The *Critical Remarks on the Books of Job, Proverbs*, etc., by D. Durell (Oxford, 1772, 4), also merit attention. Of more recent commentaries, since Keil gave his list of the literature of the subject, have been published those of Elster (1858) and of Zückler (1867), forming a part of the theologico-homiletical *Bibelwerk* edited by J. P. Lange. Chaps. xxv.-xxix. Rud. Stier has specially interpreted in two works entitled *Der*

Weise ein König ["The Wise Man a King"], and *Salomonis Weisheit in Hiskiastagen* ["Solomon's Wisdom in the Days of Hezekiah"], 1849; and chapters xxx. xxxi. in a work entitled *Die Politik der Weisheit* ["The Politics of Wisdom"], 1850. Part III. (1865) of the new exegetico-critical *Aehrenlese* ["Gleanings"] of Fried. Böttcher, edited by Mühlau, furnishes 39 pages of remarks on the Proverbs. Leop. Dukes, author of the Rabbinical *Blumenlese* ["Anthology"], 1844, and the *Schrift zur rabbinischen Spruchkunde*, 1851, has published (1841) a commentary to the Proverbs in Cahen's French *Bibelwerk*. There also is furnished a list of Jewish interpreters down to the appearance of L. II. Loewenstein's Commentary (1838), which contains valuable contributions to the critical confirmation of the Masoretic text, in which Heidenheim's MS. remains, and also the Codex of 1294 mentioned in my preface to Baer's edition of the Psalter, and in the *Specimen Lectionum* of Baer's edition of Genesis, are made use of. Among Malbim's best works are, after his Commentary on Isaiah, that on the Mishle (Warsaw, 1867). [*Vide* Preface.]

I.

THE OLDER BOOK OF PROVERBS.

I.-XXIV.

SUPERSCRPTION AND MOTTO, I. 1-7.



THE external title, *i.e.* the Synagogue name, of the whole collection of Proverbs is מִשְׁלֵי (*Mishle*), the word with which it commences. Origen (Euseb. II. L. vi. 25) uses the name *Μισλώθ*, *i.e.* מִשְׁלֹּחַ, which occurs in the Talmud and Midrash as the designation of the book, from its contents. In a similar way, the names given to the Psalter, תְּהִלִּים and תְּהִלֹּת, are interchanged.

This external title is followed by one which the Book of Proverbs, viewed as to its gradual formation, and first the older portion, gives to itself. It reaches from i. 1 to ver. 6, and names not only the contents and the author of the book, but also commends it in regard to the service which it is capable of rendering. It contains "Proverbs of Solomon, the son of David, king of Israel." The books of the נְבוֹאָה and חִכְמָה, including the Canticles, thus give their own titles; among the historical books, that of the memoirs of Nehemiah is the only one that does so. מִשְׁלֵי has the accent *Dechî*, to separate¹ it from the following complex genitive which it governs, and מֶלֶךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל is made the second hemistich, because it belongs to שְׁלֹמֹה, not to דָּוִד.² As to the fundamental idea of the word מִשְׁלֵי, we refer to the derivation given in the *Gesch. der jud. Poesie*, p. 196, from מִשָּׁל, Aram. מִתָּל, root תָּל, Sanskr. *tul* (whence *tulâ*, balance, similarity), Lat. *tollere*; the comparison of the Arab. *mathal* leads to the same

¹ Norzi has erroneously accented מִשְׁלֵי with the accent *Munach*. The ם is besides the Masoretic *majusculum*, like the ב, ש, and א at the commencement of the Law, the Canticles, and Chronicles.

² If it had belonged to דָּוִד, then the sentence would have been accented thus: מִשְׁלֵי שְׁלֹמֹה בֶן־דָּוִד מֶלֶךְ יִשְׂרָאֵל.

conclusion. “מָשַׁל signifies, not, as Schultens and others after him affirm, *effigies ad similitudinem alius rei expressa*, from מָשַׁל in the primary signification *premere, premente manu tractare*; for the corresponding Arab. verb *mathal* does not at all bear that meaning, but signifies to stand, to present oneself, hence to be like, properly to put oneself forth as something, to represent it; and in the Hebr. also to rule, properly with עָל to stand on or over something, with בָּ to hold it erect, like Arab. *kam* with *b*, *rem administravit* [vid. *Jesaja*, p. 691]. Thus *e.g.*, Gen. xxiv. 2, it is said of Eliezer: וְהָמָשַׁל בְּכָל-אֲשֶׁר-לוֹ, who ruled over all that he (Abraham) had (Luther: was a prince over all his goods). Thus מָשַׁל, figurative discourse which represents that which is real, similitude; hence then parable or shorter apothegm, proverb, in so far as they express primarily something special, but which as a general symbol is then applied to everything else of a like kind, and in so far stands figuratively. An example is found in 1 Sam. x. 11 f. It is incorrect to conclude from this meaning of the word that such memorial sayings or proverbs usually contained comparisons, or were clothed in figurative language; for that is the case in by far the fewest number of instances: the oldest have by far the simplest and most special interpretations” (Fleischer). Hence *Mashal*, according to its fundamental idea, is that which stands with something = makes something stand forth = representing. This something that represents may be a thing or a person; as *e.g.* one may say Job is a *Mashal*, *i.e.* a representant, similitude, type of Israel (*vide* the work entitled עֵץ הַחַיִּים, by Ahron b. Elia, c. 90, p. 143); and, like Arab. *mathal* (more commonly *mithl* = מִשָּׁל, cf. מָשַׁל, Job xli. 25), is used quite as generally as is its etymological cogn. *instar* (*instare*). But in Hebr. *Mashal* always denotes representing discourse with the additional marks of the figurative and concise, *e.g.* the section which presents (Hab. ii. 6) him to whom it refers as a warning example, but particularly, as there defined, the gnome, the apothegm or maxim, in so far as this represents general truths in sharply outlined little pictures.

Ver. 2. Now follows the statement of the object which these proverbs subserve; and first, in general,

To become acquainted with wisdom and instruction,
To understand intelligent discourses.

They seek on the one side to initiate the reader in wisdom and instruction, and on the other to guide him to the understanding

of intelligent discourses, for they themselves contain such discourses in which there is a deep penetrating judgment, and they sharpen the understanding of him who engages his attention with them.¹ As Schultens has already rightly determined the fundamental meaning of ויד, frequently compared with the Sanskr. *vid*, to know (whence by gunating,² *vēda*, knowledge), after the Arab. *wad'a*, as *deponere*, *penes se condere*, so he also rightly explains חִכְמָה by *soliditas*; it means properly (from חָכַם, Arab. *hakm*, R. *hk*, *vide* under Ps. x. 8, to be firm, closed) compactness, and then, like *πυκνότης*, ability, worldly wisdom, prudence, and in the higher general sense, the knowledge of things in the essence of their being and in the reality of their existence. Along with wisdom stands the moral מוסר, properly discipline, i.e. moral instruction, and in conformity with this, self-government, self-guidance, from יָסַר = יָסַר, cogn. אָסַר, properly *adstrictio* or *constrictio*; for the ו of the noun signifies both *id quod* or *aliquid quod* (ὅ, τι) and *quod* in the conjunctive sense (ὅτι), and thus forms both a concrete (like מוסר = מואסר, fetter, chain) and an abstract idea. The first general object of the Proverbs is רָעַת, the reception into oneself of wisdom and moral edification by means of education and training; the second is to comprehend utterances of intelligence, i.e. such as proceed from intelligence and give expression to it (cf. אָמַר אֱמֶת, xxii. 21). בֵּין, *Kal*, to be distinguished (whence בֵּין, between, *constr.* of בֵּין, space between, interval), signifies in *Hiph.* to distinguish, to understand; בִּינָה is, according to the sense, the *n. actionis* of this *Hiph.*, and signifies the understanding as the capability effective in the possession of the right criteria of distinguishing between the true and the false, the good and the bad (1 Kings iii. 9), the wholesome and the pernicious.

Vers. 3-5. In the following, 2a is expanded in vers. 3-5, then 2b in ver. 6. First the immediate object:

- 3 To attain intelligent instruction,
Righteousness, and justice, and integrity;
- 4 To impart to the inexperienced prudence,
To the young man knowledge and discretion
- 5 Let the wise man hear and gain learning,
And the man of understanding take to himself rules of conduct.

¹ לָרִיעַת is rightly pointed by Löwenstein with *Dechi* after Cod. 1294; *vide* the rule by which the verse is divided, *Torath Emeth*, p. 51, § 12.

² [Guna = a rule in Sanskrit grammar regulating the modification of vowels.]

With **קָצַח**, denoting the reception into oneself, acquiring, is interchanged (cf. ii. 1) **קָחַת**, its synonym, used of intellectual reception and appropriation, which, contemplated from the point of view of the relation between the teacher and the learner, is the correlative of **תָּת**, *παρὰδιδόναι*, *tradere* (ix. 9). But **מוֹסֵר הַיָּבֵל** is that which proceeds from *chokma* and *musar* when they are blended together: discipline of wisdom, discipline training to wisdom; i.e. such morality and good conduct as rest not on external inheritance, training, imitation, and custom, but is bound up with the intelligent knowledge of the Why and the Wherefore. **הַשִּׁבֵּל**, as xxi. 16, is *inf. absol.* used substantively (cf. **הַשָּׁקֵט**, keeping quiet, Isa. xxxii. 17) of **שִׁבֵּל** (whence **שִׁבְלָה**, *intellectus*), to entwine, involve; for the thinking through a subject is represented as an interweaving, complicating, configuring of the thoughts (the syllogism is in like manner represented as **אֶשְׁבֵּל**, Aram. **קִנּוֹל**, a bunch of grapes), (with which also **סָבֵל**, a fool, and **הַסָּבִיל**, to act foolishly, are connected, from the confusion of the thoughts, the entangling of the conceptions; cf. Arab. *'ahl*, to understand, and *מַעְקֵל*). The series of synonyms (cf. xxiii. 23) following in 3b, which are not well fitted to be the immediate object to **לְקַחַת**, present themselves as the unfolding of the contents of the **מוֹסֵר הַיָּבֵל**, as meaning that namely which is dutiful and right and honest. With the frequently occurring two conceptions **צֶדֶק וּמִשְׁפָּט** (ii. 9), (or with the order reversed as in Ps. cxix. 121) is interchanged **מִשְׁפָּט וְצֶדֶק** (or with the order also reversed, xxi. 3). The remark of Heidenheim, that in **צֶדֶק** the conception of the *justum*, and in **צֶדֶקָה** that of the *aquum* prevails, is suggested by the circumstance that not **צֶדֶק** but **צֶדֶקָה** signifies *δικαιοσύνη* (cf. x. 2) in the sense of liberality, and then of almsgiving (*ἐλεημοσύνη*); but **צֶדֶק** also frequently signifies a way of thought and action which is regulated not by the letter of the law and by *talio*, but by love (cf. Isa. xli. 2, xlii. 6). *Tsedek* and *ts'dakah* have almost the relation to one another of integrity and justice which practically brings the former into exercise. **מִשְׁפָּט** (from **שָׁפַט**, to make straight, to adjust, cf. **שָׁבַט**, Arab. *sabīṭa*, to be smooth) is the right and the righteousness in which it realizes itself, here subjectively considered, the right mind.¹ **מִשְׁרֵי** (defect. for **מִישְׁרִים**, from **יָשַׁר**, to be straight, even) is plur. *tantum*; for its sing. **יָשַׁר**.

¹ According to Malbim, **מִשְׁפָּט** is the fixed objective right, **צֶדֶק** the righteousness which does not at once decide according to the letter of the law, but always according to the matter and the person.

(after the form מִיָּשׁוֹר) the form מִיָּשׁוֹר (in the same ethical sense, e.g. Mal. ii. 6) is used: it means thus a way of thought and of conduct that is straight, i.e. according to what is right, true, i.e. without concealment, honest, i.e. true to duty and faithful to one's word.

Ver. 4. This verse presents another aspect of the object to be served by this book: it seeks to impart prudence to the simple. The form פְּתָאִים (in which, as in פְּתִים, the פ plur. remains unwritten) is, in this mongrel form in which it is written (cf. vii. 7, viii. 5, ix. 6, xiv. 18, xxvii. 12), made up of פְּתִים (i. 22, 32, once written *plene*, פְּתִיִּים, xxii. 3) and פְּתָאִים (vii. 7). These two forms with פ and the transition of פ into פ are interchanged in the plur. of such nouns as פֶּתַח, segolate form, "from פֶּתַח (cogn. פָּתַח), to be open, properly the open-hearted, i.e. one whose heart stands open to every influence from another, the harmless, good-natured,—a *vox media* among the Hebrews commonly (though not always, cf. e.g. Ps. cxvi. 6) in *malam partem*: the foolish, silly, one who allows himself to be easily persuaded or led astray, like similar words in other languages—Lat. *simplex*, Gr. εὐήθης, Fr. *naïf*; Arab. *fatyn*, always, however, in a good sense: a high and noble-minded man, not made as yet mistrustful and depressed by sad experiences, therefore *juvenis ingenuus, vir animi generosi*" (Fl.). The פְּתָאִים, not of firm and constant mind, have need of עֲרָמָה; therefore the saying xiv. 15, cf. viii. 5, xix. 25. The noun עֲרָמָה (a fem. segolate form like חֲכָמָה) means here *calliditas* in a good sense, while the corresponding Arab. 'aram (to be distinguished from the verb 'aram, עָרַם, to peel, to make bare, *nudare*) is used only in a bad sense, of malevolent, deceptive conduct. In the parallel member the word נָעַר is used, generally (collectively) understood, of the immaturity which must first obtain intellectual and moral clearness and firmness; such an one is in need of *peritia et sollertia*, as Fleischer well renders it; for נָעַר is experimental knowledge, and מְקַמָּה (from מָקַם, according to its primary signification, to press together, *comprimere*; then, referred to mental concentration: to think) signifies in the sing., *sensu bono*, the capability of comprehending the right purposes, of seizing the right measures, of projecting the right plans.

Ver. 5. In this verse the infinitives of the object pass into inde-

¹ Like עֲפָאִים, Ps. civ. 12, וְכִצְבָאִים, 1 Chron. xii. 8, cf. *Michlol*, 196a. In vers. 22, 32, the mute פ is wanting.

pendent sentences for the sake of variety. That יִשְׁמַע cannot mean *audiet*, but *audiat*, is shown by ix. 9; but יִשְׁמַע is jussive (with the tone thrown back before לִשְׁמָע ; cf. x. 9, and xvi. 21, 23 where the tone is not thrown back, as also 2 Sam. xxiv. 3) with the consecutive *Vav* (ו) (= Arab. ف , *f*): let him hear, thus will

he . . . or, in order that he. Whoever is wise is invited to hear these proverbs in order to add learning (*doctrinam*) to that which he already possesses, according to the principle derived from experience, ix. 9, Matt. xiii. 12. The segolate לִשְׁמָע , which in *pausa* retains its שׁ (as also בִּשְׁמָע , יִשְׁמַע , צִמָּה , כִּלְקָה , צִדָּק , קָרָם , and others), means reception, and concretely what one takes into himself with his ear and mind; therefore learning (διδάχῃ with the object of the ἀποδοχή), as Deut. xxxii. 2 (parallel אִמְרָה , as iv. 2 תּוֹרָה), and then learning that has passed into the possession of the receiver, knowledge, science (Isa. xxix. 24, parall. בִּינָה). Schultens compares the Arab. *lakah*, used of the fructification of the female palm by the flower-dust of the male. The part. נִבֵּן (the *fn.* of which is found only once, Isa. x. 13) is the passive or the reflexive of the *Hiph.* נִבֵּן , to explain, to make to understand: one who is caused to understand or who lets himself be informed, and thus an intelligent person—that is one who may gain תְּחִבּוּלֹת by means of these proverbs. This word, found only in the plur. (probably connected with חִבֵּל , shipmaster, properly one who has to do with the תְּחִבּוּלִים , ship's ropes, particularly handles the sails, LXX. κυβέρνησις), signifies guidance, management, skill to direct anything (Job xxxii. 7, of God's skill which directs the clouds), and in the plur. conception, the taking measures, designs, in a good sense, or also (as in xii. 5) in a bad sense; here it means guiding thoughts, regulating principles, judicious rules and maxims, as xi. 14, prudent rules of government, xx. 18, xxiv. 6 of stratagems. Fl. compares the Arab. *tedbîr* (guidance, from דָּבַר , to lead cattle), with its plur. *tedâbîr*, and the Syr. *dubôro*, direction, management, etc.

Vcr. 6. The mediate object of these proverbs, as stated in ver. 2b, is now expanded, for again it is introduced in the infinitive construction:—The reader shall learn in these proverbs, or by means of them as of a key, to understand such like apothegms generally (as xxii. 17 ff.):

To understand proverb and symbol,
The words of wise men and their enigmas.

In the *Gesch. der jüd. Poesie*, p. 200 f., the derivation of the noun מְלִיצָה is traced from לָץ, primarily to shine, Sanskr. *las*, frequently with the meanings *ludere* and *lucere*; but the Arab. brings near another primary meaning. "מְלִיצָה, from Arab. root *las*, *flexit, torsit*, thus properly *oratio detorta, obliqua, non aperta*; hence לָץ, mocker, properly *qui verbis obliquis utitur*: as *IIiph.* לָץ, to scoff, but also *verba detorta retorquere, i.e. to interpret, to explain*" (Fl.). Of the root ideas found in חִידָה, to be sharp, pointed (חָר, perhaps related to the Sanskr. *katu*, sharp of taste, but not to *acutus*), and to be twisted (cf. אָזַר, אָזַר, עָקַר, harmonizing with the at present mysterious *catena*), the preference is given to the latter already, Ps. lxxviii. 2. "The Arab. *hād*, to revolve, to turn (whence *hid*, bend, turn aside!), thence חִידָה, *στροφή*, cunning, intrigue, as also enigma, dark saying, *perplexæ dictum*" (Fl.) The comparison made by Schultens with the Arab. *hidt* as the name of the knot on the horn of the wild-goat shows the sensible fundamental conception. In post-biblical literature חִידָה is the enigma proper, and מְלִיצָה poetry (with הִלָּצָה of poetical prose). The *Græc. Venet.* translates it ῥητοπέλας.

Ver. 7. The title of the book is followed by its motto, symbol, device:

The fear of Jahve is the beginning of knowledge;
Wisdom and discipline is despised by fools.

The first hemistich expresses the highest principle of the Israelitish *Chokma*, as it is found also in ix. 10 (cf. xv. 33), Job xxviii. 28, and in Ps. cxi. 10 (whence the LXX. has interpolated here two lines). רֵאשִׁית combines in itself, as ἀρχή, the ideas of *initium* (accordingly J. H. Michaelis: *initium cognitionis, a quo quisquis recte philosophari cupit auspiciū facere debet*) and *principium*, i.e. the basis, thus the root (cf. Mic. i. 13 with Job xix. 28).¹ Wisdom comes from God, and whoever fears Him receives it (cf. Jas. i. 5 f.). יִרְאָתָא יְהוָה is reverential subordination to the All-directing, and since designedly יְהוָה is used, and not אֱלֹהִים (ה), to the One God, the Creator and Governor of the world, who gave His law unto Israel, and also beyond Israel left not His holy will unattested; the reverse side of the fear of Jahve as the Most Holy One is יִרְאָתָא קְדָשָׁא, viii. 13 (post-biblical חֲסֵא קְדָשָׁא). The inverted placing

¹ In Sirach i. 14, 16, the Syr. has both times רֵאשִׁית חֲכָמָא; but in the second instance, where the Greek translation has ἀρχὴ σοφίας, שֵׁבַע חֲכָמָה (after Ps. xvi. 11) may have existed in the original text.

of the words 7b imports that the wisdom and discipline which one obtains in the way of the fear of God is only despised by the אִילִים, i.e. the hard, thick, stupid; see regarding the root-word אול, *coalescere, cohærere, incrassari*, der Prophet Jesaia, p. 424, and at Ps. lxxiii. 4. Schultens rightly compares *παχεῖς, crassi pro stupidis*.¹ בָּוֹ has the tone on the penult., and thus comes from בּוּ; the 3d pr. of בָּוֹה would be בָּוֹה or בָּוִי. The perf. (cf. ver. 29) is to be interpreted after the Lat. *oderunt* (Ges. § 126).

FIRST INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, I. 8-19.

WARNING AGAINST FELLOWSHIP WITH THOSE WHO SIN AGAINST THEIR NEIGHBOUR'S LIFE AND PROPERTY.

Vers. 8, 9. After the author has indicated the object which his Book of Proverbs is designed to subserve, and the fundamental principle on which it is based, he shows for whom he has intended it; he has particularly the rising generation in his eye:

- 8 Hear, my son, thy father's instruction,
And refuse not the teaching of thy mother;
9 For these are a fair crown to thy head,
And jewels to thy neck.

"My son," says the teacher of wisdom to the scholar whom he has, or imagines that he has, before him, addressing him as a fatherly friend. The N. T. representation of birth into a new spiritual life, 1 Cor. iv. 15, Philem. 10, Gal. iv. 19, lies outside the circle of the O. T. representation; the teacher feels himself as a father by virtue of his benevolent, guardian, tender love. Father and mother are the beloved parents of those who are addressed. When the Talmud understands אֱלֹהִים of God, אָמִים of the people (אֲמִי), that is not the grammatico-historic meaning, but the practical interpretation and exposition, after the manner of the Midrash. The same admonition (with נָצַר, keep, instead of שָׁמַע, hear, and מִצְוָה, command, instead of מִסְכָּר, instruction) is repeated in vi. 20, and what is said of the parents in one passage is in x. 1 divided into two synonymic parallel passages. The stricter

¹ Malbim's explanation is singular: the sceptics, from אִילִים, perhaps! This also is Heidenheim's view.

musar, which expresses the idea of sensible means of instruction (discipline), (xiii. 24, xxii. 15, xxiii. 13 f.), is suitably attributed to the father, and the *torah* to the mother, only administered by the word; Wisdom also always says תּוֹרַתִּי (*my torah*), and only once, viii. 10, מוֹסֵרִי (*my musar*).

Ver. 9. הֵם, which is also used in the neut. *illa*, e.g. Job xxii. 24, refers here to the paternal discipline and the maternal teaching. These, obediently received and followed, are the fairest ornament of the child. לְיָיָהּ, from לָהּ, to wind, to roll, Arab. *lawy* (from לוּ, whence also לָל = לָלֵל, as דָּוָר, to boil up, = דְּוָרִי), means winding, twisted ornament, and especially wreath; a crown of gracefulness is equivalent to a graceful crown, a *corolla gratiosa*, as Schultens translates it; cf. iv. 9, according to which, Wisdom bestows such a crown.¹ עֲנָקִים (or עֲנָקוֹת, Judg. viii. 26) are necklaces, jewels for the neck; denom. of the Arab. *'unek*, and Aram. עֵינֵק, the neck (perhaps from עָנַק = עָנָק, to oppress, of heavy burdens; cf. ἀνχίν, the neck). גִּרְגְּרוֹת is, like *fauces*, the throat by which one swallows (Arab. *garg'ara*, *tag'arg'ara*), a plur. extensive (Böttcher, § 695), and is better fitted than גִּרְוֹן to indicate the external throat; Ezekiel, however, uses (xvi. 11) *garon*, as our poet (iii. 3, 22, vi. 21) uses *garg'roth*, to represent the front neck.²

Ver. 10. The general counsel of ver. 9 is here followed by a more special warning:

My son, if sinners entice thee
Consent thou not.

The בְּנִי³ (*my son*) is emphatically repeated. The intensive form מַחֲסִיִּים signifies men to whom sin has become a habit, thus vicious, wicked. פָּתָה (*Pi.* of פָּתַח, to open) is not denom., to make or wish to make a פָּתִי; the meaning, to entice (harmonizing with *πείθειν*), פָּתָה obtains from the root-meaning of the *Kal*, for it is related to it as *pandere* (*januam*) to *patere*: to open, to make accessible, susceptible, namely to persuasion. The warning 10b is as brief as possible a call of alarm back from the abyss. In the form חֲבֵא (from חָבַה, to agree to, to be willing, see Wetstein on Job, p. 349)

¹ In לוֹיִת הֵן the הֵן has the conjunctive accent *shalsheleth*, on account of which the *Pesiq* accent (·) is omitted. This small *shalsheleth* occurs only eight times. See *Torath Emeth*, p. 36.

² The writing varies greatly. Here and at vi. 21 we have לְגִרְגְּרוֹתָהּ; at iii. 3, עַל-גִּרְגְּרוֹתָהּ; iii. 22, לְגִרְגְּרוֹתָהּ. Thus according to the Masora and correct texts.

³ The accent *Pazer* over the בְּנִי has the force of *Athnach*.

the preformative κ is wanting, as in חָמְרוּ, 2 Sam. xix. 14, cf. Ps. cxxxix. 20, Ges. § 68, 2, and instead of חָבְהּ (= חָאָבְהּ, 1 Kings xx. 8) is vocalized not חָבְהּ (cf. xi. 25), but after the Aram. חָבָא (cf. יִגְלִי); see Gen. xxvi. 29, and *Comment. on Isaiah*, p. 648; Gesen. § 75, 17.

Vers. 11-14. Of the number of wicked men who gain associates to their palliation and strengthening, they are adduced as an example whom covetousness leads to murder.

- 11 If they say, "Go with us, we will lurk for blood,
Lie in wait for the innocent without cause;
- 12 Like the pit we will swallow them alive
And in perfect soundness like them that go down to the grave.
- 13 We find all manner of precious treasure,
Fill our houses with spoil.
- 14 Thou shalt cast thy lot amongst us,
We all have only one purse."

Ver. 11. The verb אָרַב signifies *nectere*, to bind fast (from רָב, close, compact), (see under Isa. xxv. 11), and particularly (but so that it bears in itself its object without ellipsis) *insidias nectere* = *insidiari*. Regarding לָרֵם Fleischer remarks: "Either elliptically for לְשֹׁפְרֵי דָם (Jewish interp.), or, as the parallelism and the usage of the language of this book rather recommend, *per synecd.* for: for a man, with particular reference to his blood to be poured out (cf. our saying 'ein junges Blut,' a young blood = a youth, with the underlying conception of the blood giving colour to the body as shining through it, or giving to it life and strength), as Ps. xciv. 21." As in post-biblical Heb. בָּשָׂר וָדָם (or inverted, *αἷμα καὶ σάρξ*, Heb. ii. 14), used of men as such, is not so used in the O. T., yet דָּם, like נַפֶּשׁ, is sometimes used synecdochically for the person, but never with reference to the blood as an essentially constituent part of corporeality, but always with reference to violent putting to death, which separates the blood from the body (cf. my *System der bib. Psychologie*, p. 242). Here לָרֵם is explained by לָרְמִים, with which it is interchanged, Mic. vii. 2: let us lurk for blood (to be poured out). The verb צָפַן is never, like טָמַן (to conceal), connected with חֲבָלִים, מִקְשָׁים, רֶשֶׁת, פֶּה, מִקְשָׁים—thus none of these words is here to be supplied; the idea of gaining over one expressed in the organic root צָפַ (whence צָפָה, *diducendo obducere*) has passed over into that of restraining oneself, watching, lurking, hence צָפַן (cog. Aram. בָּמָן) in the sense of *speculari*, *insidiari*, interchanges with צָפָה (to spy), (cf. Ps. x. 8, lvi. 7 with xxxvii. 32). The adv. הֵנָּה (an old accus. from

יָן) properly means in a gracious manner, as a free gift (*δωρεάν*, *gratis* = *gratius*), and accordingly, without reward, also without cause, which frequently = without guilt; but it never signifies *sine effectu qui noceat*, i.e. with impunity (Löwenst.). We have thus either to connect together יָן חַנּוּן, "innocent in vain" (as יָן חַנּוּן, my enemies without a cause, Lam. iii. 52): his innocence helps him nothing whom God protects not against us notwithstanding his innocence (Schultens, Bertheau, Elster, and others); or connect חַנּוּן with the verb (lie in wait for), for which Hitzig, after the LXX., Syr., Rashi,¹ Ralbag, Immanuel, rightly decides in view of 1 Sam. xix. 5, xxv. 31; cf. also Job ix. 17, where the succession of the accents is the same (*Tarcha* transmuted from *Mugrash*). Frequently there are combined together in this חַנּוּן (cf. Isa. xxviii. 14 f.), that which the author thinks, and that which those whom he introduces as speaking think.

Vcr. 12. The first clause of this verse Hitzig translates: "as the pit (swallows) that which lives." This is untenable, because פֶּן with the force of a substantive (as *instar*, likeness) is regarded as a preposition, but not a conjunction (see at Ps. xxxviii. 14 f.). חַיִּים (the living) is connected with נִבְלָעִים, and is the accus. of the state (حال, according to the terminology of the Arab. grammarians) in which they will, with impunity, swallow them up like the pit (the insatiable, xxvii. 20, xxx. 16), namely, while these their sacrifices are in the state of life's freshness,² "the living,"—without doubt, like Ps. lv. 16, lxiii. 10, cxxiv. 3, in fact and in expression an allusion to the fate of the company of Korah, Num. xvi. 30, 33. If this is the meaning of חַיִּים, then חַיִּים מְטֵמְאִים as the parallel word means *integros* not in an ethical sense, in which it would be a synonym of נָקִי of ver. 11b (cf. xxix. 10 with Ps. xix. 14), but in a physical sense (*Græc. Venet. καὶ τελείους*; Parchon as Rashi, בְּרִיּוֹת וּשְׁלֵמִים, *vid. Böttcher, De Inferis*, § 293). This physical sense is claimed for חַיִּים, Job xxi. 23, for חַיִּים probably, Ps. lxxiii. 4, and why should not חַיִּים, used in the law regarding sacrifices (*e.g.* Ex. xii. 5, "without blemish") of the faultlessness of the victim,

¹ [Rashi, i.e. Rabbi Salomo Isaaki, of Troyes, died A.D. 1105. Ralbag, i.e. Rabbi Levi ben Gershon, usually referred to by Christian writers as Master Leo de Bannolis, or Gersonides, a native of Banolas near Gerona, died about 1342.]

² Only in this sense is the existing accentuation of this verse (cf. the Targ.) to be justified.

also signify such an one אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכְלוּ מֵהֶם (Isa. i. 6)? In the midst of complete external health they will devour them like those that go down to the grave (cf. Ps. xxviii. 1, lxxxviii. 5, with Isa. xiv. 19), i.e. like those under whose feet the earth is suddenly opened, so that, without leaving any trace behind, they sink into the grave and into Hades. The connection of the finite with the accus. of place, Ps. lv. 16, lies at the foundation of the genitive connection יוֹרְדֵי בּוֹר (with the tone thrown back): those that go down to the grave.

Vers. 13, 14.¹ To their invitation, bearing in itself its own condemnation, they add as a lure the splendid self-enriching treasures which in equal and just fellowship with them they may have the prospect of sharing. הֵן (from הֵן, *levem*, then *facilem esse, être aisé, à son aise*) means *aisance*, convenience, opulence, and concretely that by which life is made agreeable, thus money and possessions (Fleischer in Levy's *Chald. Wörterbuch*, i. 423 f.). With this הֵן with remarkable frequency in the *Mishle* יָקָר (from יָקָר, Arab. *wakar*, *grave esse*) is connected in direct contrast, according to its primary signification; cf. xii. 27, xxiv. 4: heavy treasures which make life light. Yet it must not be maintained that, as Schultens has remarked, this oxymoron is intended, nor also that it is only consciously present in the language. מָצָא has here its primitive appropriate signification of attaining, as Isa. x. 14 of reaching. שָׁלַל (from שָׁלַל, to draw from, draw out, from שָׁל, cf. שָׁלַח, שָׁלָה, Arab. *salab*, *Comm. on Isa.* p. 447) is that which is drawn away from the enemy, *exuvia*, and then the booty and spoil taken in war generally. מָלֵא, to fill with anything, make full, governs a double accusative, as the *Kal* (to become full of anything) governs only one. In ver. 14, the invitation shows how the prospect is to be realized. Interpreters have difficulty in conceiving what is here meant. Do not a share by lot and a common purse exclude one another? Will they truly, in the distribution of the booty by lot, have equal portions at length, equally much in their money-bags? Or is it meant that, apart from the portion of the booty which falls to every one by lot, they have a common purse which, when their business is ebbing, must supply the wants of the company, and on which the new companion can maintain himself beforehand? Or does it mean only that they will

¹ Here, in ver. 14, מוֹרֶלֶךְ is to be written with *Munach* (not *Methey*) in the second syllable; *vid. Torath Emeth*, p. 20. *Accentuationssystem*, vii. § 2.

be as mutually helpful to one another, according to the principle τὰ τῶν φίλων κοινά (*amicorum omnia communia*), as if they had only one purse? The meaning is perfectly simple. The oneness of the purse consists in this, that the booty which each of them gets, belongs not wholly or chiefly to him, but to the whole together, and is disposed of by lot; so that, as far as possible, he who participated not at all in the affair in obtaining it, may yet draw the greatest prize. This view harmonizes the relation between 14*b* and 14*a*. The common Semitic כֶּסֶף is even used at the present day in Syria and elsewhere as the name of the Exchange ("Börse") (plur. *akjās*); here it is the purse ("Kasse") (χρημάτων δοχείον, Procop.), which is made up of the profits of the business. This profit consists not merely in gold, but is here thought of in regard to its worth in gold. The apparent contradiction between distributing by lot and having a common purse disappears when the distribution by lot of the common property is so made, that the retaining of a stock-capital, or reserve fund, is not excluded.

Ver. 15. After the men are described against whose enticements a warning is given forth, the warning is emphatically repeated, and is confirmed by a threefold reason:

My son! go not in the way with them.
Keep back thy foot from their path.

If בְּדֶרֶךְ (in the way), taken alone, cannot be equivalent to אֶחָד (in one way), so is אִתָּם (with them) to be regarded as its determination.¹ Foot (not feet), as eye, hand, etc., is used where the members come less under consideration than what they unitedly bring about (iv. 26 f.). נִתְיַבֵּה, from יָבַה, signifies properly that which is raised, especially the (raised) footstep.

Ver. 16. The *first* argument to enforce the warning:

For their feet run to the evil,
And hasten to shed blood.

That this is their object they make no secret (ver. 11 ff.); but why is it that such an object as this should furnish no ground of warning against them, especially as on this beginning the stamp of that which is morally blamable is here impressed with לָרַע?

¹ The Arab. grammarians regard this as half determination, and call it *takhsys*; that אִתָּם has with them the force of a virtually co-ordinated attributive; while, according to the Arab. gram., it is also possible that בְּדֶרֶךְ, "in one way," is equivalent to on the common way, for in the indetermination sometimes there lies the conception not merely of *âhad*, but of *weahad*.

Besides, this circular movement of the thoughts is quite after the manner of this poet; and that ver. 16 is in his style, vi. 18 shows. The want of this distich (16b = Rom. iii. 15) in LXX. B. א. weighs heavier certainly than the presence of it in LXX. A. (Procop., Syro-Hexap.), since the translation is not independent, but is transferred from Isa. lix. 7; but if for the first time, at a later period, it is supplied in the LXX., yet it has the appearance of an addition made to the Hebr. text from Isa. lix. 7 (Hitzig, Lagarde); cf. *Comm. on Isaiah*, xl.-lxvi. לְעֵינֶיךָ is always pointed thus; for, as a regular rule, after ל as well as מ the aspiration disappears; but in Ezek. xvii. 17 בְּעֵינֶיךָ is also found, and in this case (cf. at Ps. xl. 15) the punctuation is thus inconsequent.

Ver. 17. The *second* argument in support of the warning.

For in vain is the net spread out
In the eyes of all (the winged) birds.

The interpretation *consersum est rete*, namely, with corn as a bait, which was put into circulation by Rashi, is inadmissible; for as little as הִזָּה (*Hiph.* of הָזָה) can mean to strew, can זָרָה mean to spread. The object is always that which is scattered (*gestreut*), not that which is spread (*bestreut*). Thus, *expansum est rete*, but not from מָזַר, *extendere*, from which מְזוֹרָה in this form cannot be derived (it would in that case be מְזוֹרָה), but from זָרָה, pass. of זָרָה, to scatter, spread out. The alluring net, when it is shaken out and spread, is, as it were, scattered, *ventilatur*. But if this is done incautiously before the eyes of the birds to be caught, they forthwith fly away. The principal stress lies on the בְּעֵינֵי (before the eyes) as the reason of the הִנֵּם (in vain), according to the saying of Ovid, *Quæ nimis apparent retia, vitat avis*. The *applicatio similitudinis* lying near, according to J. H. Michaelis, is missed even by himself and by most others. If the poet wished to say that they carried on their work of blood with such open boldness, that he must be more than a simpleton who would allow himself to be caught by them, that would be an unsuitable ground of warning; for would there not be equally great need for warning against fellowship with them, if they had begun their enticement with more cunning, and reckoned on greater success? Hitzig, Ewald, Zöckler, and others, therefore interpret חנם, not in the sense of

¹ The MS. Masora remarks לִית וְחָסֵר, and hence מְזוֹרָה is written defectively in the *Erfurt*, 1, 2, 3, *Frankf.* 1294, in the edition of Norzi and elsewhere.

in vain, inasmuch as they do not let themselves be caught; but: in vain, for they see not the net, but only the scattered corn. But according to the preceding, *הַרְשֵׁת* (the net) leads us to think only either of the net of the malicious designs, or the net of the alluring deceptions. Thus, as Ziegler has noticed, the warned ought to make application of the similitude to himself: Go not with them, for their intention is bad; go not with them, for if the bird flees away from the net which is spread out before it, thou wilt not surely be so blind as suffer thyself to be ensnared by their gross enticements. *בְּעֵל כְּנָף*: the furnished with the wing (wings in Eccles. x. 20); *בְּעֵל* forms the idea of property (lord).

Ver. 18. The causal conj. *כִּי* (for) in vers. 16 and 17 are co-ordinated; and there now follows, introduced by the conj. *ו* ("and"), a *third* reason for the warning:

And they lie in wait for their own blood,
They lay snares for their own lives.

The warning of ver. 16 is founded on the immorality of the conduct of the enticer; that of 17 on the audaciousness of the seduction as such, and now on the self-destruction which the robber and murderer bring upon themselves: they wish to murder others, but, as the result shows, they only murder themselves. The expression is shaped after ver. 11, as if it were: They lay snares, as they themselves say, for the blood of others; but it is in reality for their *own* blood: they certainly lie in wait, as they say; but not, as they add, for the innocent, but for their own lives (*ל'*). Instead of *לְרָחֵם*, there might be used *לְרַמְיָהֶם*, after Mic. vii. 2; but *לְנַפְשָׁם* would signify *ipsis* (post-biblical, *לְעַצְמָם*), while *לְנַפְשָׁתָם* leaves unobliterated the idea of the life: *animis ipsorum*; for if the O. T. language seeks to express *ipse* in any other way than by the personal pronoun spoken emphatically, this is done by the addition of *נַפֵּשׁ* (Isa. liii. 11). *וְהֵם* was on this account necessary, because ver. 17 has another subject (cf. Ps. lxiii. 10).

Ver. 19. An *epiphonema*:

Such is the lot of all who indulge in covetousness;
It takes away the life of its owner.

This language is formed after Job viii. 13. Here, as there, in the word *אֶרְחֹחַ*, the ideas of action and issue, manner of life and its result, are all combined. *בְּצֵעַ* signifies properly that which is cut off, a piece, fragment broken off, then that which one breaks off and takes to himself—booty, gain, particularly unjust gain

(xxviii. 16). לְעַצְמוֹ is he who is greedy or covetous. The subject to לְעַצְמוֹ is בְּצַדִּיק , covetousness, $\pi\lambda\epsilon\omicron\nu\epsilon\acute{\xi}\iota\alpha$ (see Isa. lvii. 17). As Hosea, iv. 11, says of three other things that they take away לֵב , the understanding ($\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$), so here we are taught regarding unjust gain or covetousness, that it takes away נַפְשׁ , the life ($\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$) (שׁוֹחֵט נַפְשׁ , to take away the life, 1 Kings xix. 10, Ps. xxxi. 14). לְעַצְמוֹ denotes not the possessor of unjust gain, but as an inward conception, like בְּעַל־אֵף , xxii. 24, cf. xxiii. 2, xxiv. 8, Eccles. x. 11, him of whom covetousness is the property. The sing. נַפְשׁ does not show that לְעַצְמוֹ is thought of as sing.; cf. xxii. 23, Ps. xxxiv. 23; but according to iii. 27, xvi. 22, Eccles. viii. 8, this is nevertheless probable, although the usage without the suffix is always עַצְמוֹ לְעַצְמוֹ , and not בְּעַצְמוֹ (of plur. intens. בְּעַצְמוֹת).

SECOND INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, I. 20-33.

DISCOURSE OF WISDOM TO HER DESPISERS.

After the teacher of wisdom has warned his disciples against the allurements of self-destroying sin, whose beastly demoniacal nature culminates in murder and robbery, he introduces Wisdom herself saying how by enticing promises and deterring threatenings she calls the simple and the perverse to repentance. Wisdom is here personified, *i.e.* represented as a person. But this personification presupposes, that to the poet wisdom is more than a property and quality of human subjectivity: she is to him as a divine power, existing independently, to submit to which is the happiness of men, and to reject which is their destruction. And also to the public appearance of wisdom, as it is here represented, there must be present objective reality, without which the power of conviction departs from the figure. The author must think on historical and biographical facts, on human organs (as 2 Chron. xvii. 7-9, cf. Wisd. vii. 27), through which, without words and in words, Wisdom delivers such addresses. But the figure cannot be so historical that it sustains only the relation to a definite time, and not to all time; it is a call to repentance, going forth to all time and to all places, which, divested of all the accidents of its externality, he here refers to its invisible divine background, when he begins in these words:

- 20 Wisdom cries, sounding loudly in the streets,
 She causes her voice to be heard in the chief streets.
 21 Over the places of greatest tumult she calleth ;
 In the porches of the gates, in the city, she speaketh forth her words.

Ver. 20. Looking to its form and vocalization, חִכְמוֹת may be an Aramaizing abstract formation (Gesen. ; Ew. 165, c ; Olsh. 219, b) ; for although the forms חִכְמוֹת and חִכְמוֹת are of a different origin, yet in חִכְמוֹת and חִכְמוֹת such abstract formations lie before us. The termination *ûth* is here, by the passing over of the *u* into the less obscure but more intensive *o* (cf. יְהוֹ in the beginning and middle of the word, and יְהוֹ יְהוֹ at the end of the word), raised to *ôth*, and thereby is brought near to the fem. plur. (cf. חִכְמוֹת, xiv. 1, *sapientia*, as our plur. of the neut. *sapiens*, חִכְמוֹת), approaching to the abstract. On the other hand, that חִכְמוֹת is sing. of abstract signification, is not decisively denoted by its being joined to the plur. of the predicate (for חִכְמוֹת here, as at viii. 3, is scarcely plur. ; and if חִכְמוֹת, xxiv. 7, is plur., חִכְמוֹת as the numerical plur. may refer to the different sciences or departments of knowledge) ; but perhaps by this, that it interchanges with חִכְמוֹת, Ps. xlix. 4, cf. Prov. xi. 12, xxviii. 16, and that an abstract formation from חִכְמוֹת (fem. of חִכְמוֹת, חִכְמוֹת), which besides is not concrete, was unnecessary. Still less is חִכְמוֹת = חִכְמוֹת a singular, which has it in view to change חִכְמוֹת into a proper name, for proof of which Hitzig refers to חִכְמוֹת, Ps. lxxviii. 15 ; the singular ending *ôth* without an abstract signification does not exist. After that Dietrich, in his *Abhandl.* 1846, has shown that the origin of the plur. proceeds not from separate calculation, but from comprehension,¹ and that particularly also names denoting intellectual strength are frequently plur., which multiply the conception not externally but internally, there is no longer any justifiable doubt that חִכְמוֹת signifies the all-comprehending, absolute, or, as Böttcher, § 689, expresses it, the full personal wisdom. Since such intensive plurals are sometimes united with the plur. of the predicate, as e.g. the monotheistically interpreted *Elohim*, Gen. xxxv. 7 (see *l. c.*), so חִכְמוֹת may be plur. On the other hand, the idea that it is a *forma mixta* of חִכְמוֹת (from חִכְמוֹת) and חִכְמוֹת (Job xxxix. 23) or חִכְמוֹת, the final sound in *ah* opposes. It may, however, be the emphatic form of the 3d fem. sing. of חִכְמוֹת ; for, that the

¹ In the Indo-Germanic languages the *s* of the plur. also probably proceeds from the prep. *sa* (*sam*) = *cum*. See Schleicher, *Compend. der vergl. Gram.* § 217.

Hebr. has such an emphatic form, corresponding to the Arab. *taktubanna*, is shown by these three examples (keeping out of view the suspicion of a corruption of the text, Olsh. p. 452), Judg. v. 26, Job xvii. 16, Isa. xxviii. 3; cf. *הַשְּׁלִיחָנָה*, Obad. 13 (see Caspari, *l.c.*), an example of the 2d masc. sing. of this formation. *רָנָן* (with *רָנָה*) is a word imitative of sound (*Schallwort*), used to denote "a clear-sounding, shrill voice (thence the Arab. *rannan*, of a speaker who has a clear, piercing voice); then the clear shrill sound of a string or chord of a bow, or the clear tinkle of the arrow in the quiver, and of the metal that has been struck" (Fl.). The meaning of *רְחֹבוֹת* is covered by *plateæ* (Luke xiv. 21), wide places; and *חָוָה*, which elsewhere may mean that which is without, before the gates of the city and courts, here means the "open air," in contradistinction to the inside of the houses.

Ver. 21. *הַמְּנִיחַ* (plur. of *הוֹמֵי*, the ground-form of *הוֹמָה*, from *הָמָה* = *הָמָה*), "they who are making noise;" for the epithet is poetically used (Isa. xxii. 2) as a substantive, crowded noisy streets or places. *רֹאשׁ* is the place from which on several sides streets go forth: cf. *ras el-ain*, the place where the well breaks forth; *ras en-nahr*, the place from which the stream divides itself; the sing. is meant distributively as little as at viii. 2. *פֶּתַח*, if distinguished from *שַׁעַר* (which also signifies cleft, breach), is the opening of the gate, the entrance by the gate. Four times the poet says that Wisdom goes forth preaching, and four times that she preaches publicly; the *בְּעִיר* used in five places implies that Wisdom preaches not in the field, before the few who there are met with, but in the city, which is full of people.

Ver. 22. The poet has now reached that part of his introduction where he makes use of the very words uttered by Wisdom:

How long, ye simple, will ye love simplicity,
And scorners delight in scorning,
And fools hate knowledge?

Three classes of men are here addressed: the *פְּתִימִים*, the simple, who, being accessible to seduction, are only too susceptible of evil; the *לְצִיִּים*, mockers, *i.e.* free-thinkers (from *לָצַץ*, Arab. *lus*, *flectere*, *torquere*, properly *qui verbis obliquis utitur*); and the *בְּסִילִים*, fools, *i.e.* the mentally imbecile and stupid (from *בָּסַל*, Arab. *kasal*, to be thick, coarse, indolent). The address to these passes immediately over into a declaration regarding them; cf. the same enallage, i. 27 f. *עֲרִמְתִּי* has the accent *Mahpach*, on account of the *Pasek* following; *vid. Torath*

Emeth, p. 26. Intentionally, Wisdom addresses only the פתים, to whom she expects to find soonest access. Between the futt., which express the continuing love and hatred, stands the perf. חָמְדוֹ, which expresses that in which the mockers found pleasure, that which was the object of their love. לָהֶם is the so-called *dat. ethicus*, which reflexively refers to that which is said to be the will and pleasure of the subject; as we say, "I am fond of this and that." The form תִּאֲהָבִי, Abulwalid, Parchon, and Kimchi regard as *Piel*; but תִּאֲהָבִי instead of תִּאֲהָבִי would be a recompensation of the virtual doubling, defacing the character of the *Piel*. Schultens regards it as a defectively written *Paiel* (in Syr.), but it is not proved that this conjugation exists in Hebr.; much rather תִּאֲהָבִי is the only possible *Kal* form with תִּאֲהָבִי without the pause, regularly formed from תִּאֲהָבִי (*vid.* Ewald, § 193, a). The division by the accent *Mercha-Mahpach* of the two words תִּאֲהָבִי פתִי is equal in value to the connecting of them by *Makkeph*; *vid.* Baer's *Psalterium*. p. x. In codd., and also in correct texts, תִּאֲהָבִי is written with the accent *Galgol* on the first syllable, as the servant of the *Mercha-Mahpach*. The *Gaja* is incorrectly here and there placed under the תִּי.

Ver. 23. To the call to thoughtfulness which lies in the complaint "How long?" there follows the entreaty:

Turn ye at my reproof!
Behold! I would pour out my Spirit upon you,
I would make you to know my words.

23a is not a clause expressive of a wish, which with the particle expressive of a wish, which is wanting, would be תִּשְׁכַּחֲנִי, or according to xxiii. 1 and xxvii. 23 would be תִּשְׁכַּחֲנִי. The הִנֵּה, introducing the principal clause, stamps 23a as the conditional clause; the relation of the expressions is as Isa. xxvi. 10, Job xx. 24. תִּשְׁכַּחֲנִי¹ is not equivalent to *si convertamini*, which would require תִּפְנִי, but to *si revertamini*; but לְתוֹכְחָתִי² does not therefore mean at my reproof, i.e. in consequence of it (*Hitzig*, after Num. xvi. 34), but it is a *constructio pragnans*: turning and placing yourselves under my reproof. With תוֹכַחַת there is supposed an ἔλεγχος (LXX., Symm.): bringing proof, conviction, punishment. If

¹ In the *Itagiographa* everywhere written *plene*, with exception of Job xvii. 10.

² The *Metheg* belongs to the ת, under which it should be placed (and not to the ש), as the commencing sound of the second syllable before the tone-syllable; cf. ver. 25.

they, leaving their hitherto accustomed way, permit themselves to be warned against their wickedness, then would Wisdom cause her words to flow forth to them, *i.e.* would without reserve disclose and communicate to them her spirit, cause them to know (namely by experience) her words. הִבִּיעַ (from נָבַע, R. נב; *vid. Genesis*, p. 635) is a common figurative word, expressive of the free pouring forth of thoughts and words, for the mouth is conceived of as a fountain (cf. xviii. 4 with Matt. xii. 34), and the *ῥῆσις* (*vid. LXX.*) as *ῥεύσις*; only here it has the Spirit as object, but parallel with רִבְרִי, thus the Spirit as the active power of the words, which, if the Spirit expresses Himself in them, are *πνεῦμα καὶ ζωή*, John vi. 63. The addresses of Wisdom in the Book of Proverbs touch closely upon the discourses of the Lord in the Logos-Gospel. Wisdom appears here as the fountain of the words of salvation for men; and these words of salvation are related to her, just as the λόγοι to the divine λόγος expressing Himself therein.

Vers. 24-27. The address of Wisdom now takes another course. Between vers. 23 and 24 there is a pause, as between Isa. i. 20 and 21. In vain Wisdom expects that her complaints and enticements will be heard. Therefore she turns her call to repentance into a discourse announcing judgment.

- 24 Because I have called, and ye refused;
 Stretched out my hand, and no man regarded;
 25 And ye have rejected all my counsel,
 And to my reproof have not yielded:
 26 Therefore will I also laugh at your calamity,
 Will mock when your terror cometh;
 27 When like a storm your terror cometh,
 And your destruction sweeps on like a whirlwind;
 When distress and anguish cometh upon you.

Commencing with וְנִ (which, like מִן, from נָגַח, to oppose, denotes the intention, but more the fundamental reason or the cause than, as מֵ, the motive or object), the clause, connected with וְנִ, *ego vicissim*, turns to the conclusion. As here וְנִ (as the word of Jahve) are connected by וְנִ to the expression of the *talio* in Isa. lxvi. 4, so also וְנִ, with its contrast וְנִ, Isa. i. 19 f. The construction *quoniam vocavi et renuistis* for *quoniam quum vocarem renuistis* (cf. Isa. xii. 1) is the common diffuse (*zerstreute*) Semitic, the paratactic instead of the periodizing style. The stretching out of the hand is, like the "spreading out" in Isa. lxxv. 2, significant of striving to beckon to the wandering, and to bring them near. Regarding

הקשיב, viz. אָזְנוֹ, to make the ear stiff (R. קט), *arrigere*, incorrectly explained by Schultens, after the Arab. *kashab*, *polire*, by *aurem purgare*, *vid. Isaiah*, p. 257, note.

Ver. 25. פָּרַע is synonymous with נָטַט, i. 8; cf. iv. 15 פָּרַעוּ, turn from it. Gesenius has inaccurately interpreted the phrase פָּרַע רֹאשׁ פֶּתֶר of the shaving off of the hair, instead of the letting it fly loose. פֶּתֶר means to loosen (= to lift up, syn. הִחַל), to release, to set free; it combines the meanings of loosening and making empty, or at liberty, which is conveyed in Arab. by فَرَّغَ and فَرَّغَ. The latter means, intrans., to be set free, therefore to be or to become free from occupation or business; with מִן of an object, to be free from it, i.e. to have accomplished it, to have done with it (Fl.). Thus: since ye have dismissed (*missum fecistis*) all my counsel (עֲצָה as לָדָה, from עָצָה, i.e. what I always would advise to set you right. אָבָה combines in itself the meanings of consent, i. 10, and compliance, i. 30 (with לְ), and, as here, of acceptance. The principal clause begins like an echo of Ps. ii. 4 (cf. Jer. xx. 7).

Vers. 26, 27. שָׁחַק, as xxxi. 25 shows, is not to be understood with בָּ; בָּ is that of the state or time, not of the object. Regarding אָרַ, *calamitas opprimens, obruens* (from אָרַ = אָרַ, to burden, to oppress), see at Ps. xxxi. 12. בָּא is related to יָאֲחֹזַק as arriving to approaching; פָּחַדָּם is not that for which they are in terror,—for those who are addressed are in the condition of carnal security,—but that which, in the midst of this, will frighten and alarm them. The *Chethîb* שָׁחַק is pointed thus, שָׁחַקָה (from שָׁחַק = שָׁחַק, as רָאָה, after the form רָאָה, אָהָבָה); the *Kerî* substitutes for this infinitive name the usual particip. שָׁחַק (where then the *Vav* is יתיר, “superfluous”), crashing (fem. of שָׁחַק), then a crash and an overthrow with a crash; regarding its root-meaning (to be waste, and then to sound hollow), see under Ps. xxxv. 8. סֹפָה (from סֹפָה = סָפָה), sweeping forth as a (see x. 25) whirlwind. The infinitive construction of 27a is continued in 27b in the finite. “This syntactical and logical attraction, by virtue of which a *modus* or *tempus* passes, by ו or by the mere parallel arrangement (as ii. 2), from one to another, attracted into the signification and nature of the latter, is peculiar to the Hebr. If there follows a new clause or section of a clause where the discourse takes, as it were, a new departure, that attraction ceases, and the original form of expression is resumed; cf. i. 22, where after the accent *Athnach* the future is returned to, as here

in 27c the infinitive construction is restored" (Fl.). The alliterating words זָרָה וְצָרָה, cf. Isa. xxx. 6, Zeph. i. 15, are related to each other as narrowness and distress (Hitzig); the Mashal is fond of the stave-rhyme.¹

Vers. 28-31. Then—this sublime preacher in the streets continues—distress shall teach them to pray :

- 28 Then shall they call on me, and I will not answer;
 They shall early seek after me, and not find me;
 29 Because that they hated knowledge,
 And did not choose the fear of Jahve.
 30 They have not yielded to my counsel,
 Despised all my reproof :
 31 Therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their way,
 And satiate themselves with their own counsels.

In the full emphatic forms, יִקְרָאֵנִי, they shall call on me, יִשְׁחַרְגֵּנִי, they shall seek me, and יִמְצְאוּנִי, they shall find me, the suffix י may be joined to the old plur. ending *un* (Gesenius, Olshausen, Böttcher); but open forms like יְבַרְכֵּנִי, He will bless him, יִכְבְּדֵנִי, He will honour me (from יִכְבְּדֵנִי), and the like, rather favour the conclusion that נ is epenthetic (Ew. § 250, *U*).² The address here takes the form of declaration: *Stultos nunc indignos censet ulteriori alloquio* (Mich.). It is that laughter and scorn, ver. 26, which here sounds forth from the address of the Judge regarding the incorrigible. שָׁחַר is denom. of שָׁחַר, to go out and to seek with the morning twilight, as also בָּקַר, Ps. xxvii. 5, perhaps to appear early, and usually (Arab.) *bakar* (I. II. IV.), to rise early, to be zealous (Lane: "He hastened to do or accomplish, or attain the thing needed"). Zückler, with Hitzig, erroneously regards vers. 29, 30 as the antecedent to ver. 31. With וַיֵּאָכְלוּ, "and they shall eat," the fut. announcing judgment are continued from ver. 28; cf. Deut. xxviii. 46-48. The conclusion after כִּי, "therefore because," or as usually expressed (except

¹ Jul. Ley, in his work on the *Metrical Forms of Hebrew Poetry*, 1866, has taken too little notice of these frequently occurring alliteration staves; Lagarde communicated to me (8th Sept. 1846) his view of the stave-rhyme in the Book of Proverbs, with the remark, "Only the Hebr. technical poetry is preserved to us in the O. T. records; but in such traces as are found of the stave-rhyme, there are seen the echoes of the poetry of the people; or notes passing over from it."

² In the Codd. יִקְרָאֵנִי is written; in this case the *Metheg* indicates the tone syllable: *vid. Torah Emeth*, p. 7 note, p. 21 note; and *Accentssystem*, ii. § 1, note. In יִשְׁחַרְגֵּנִי the *Rebia* is to be placed over the ג. In the *Silluk*-word יִמְצְאוּנִי it appears undoubtedly that the form is to be spoken as *Milel*, i.e. with tone on the penult.

here and Deut. iv. 37, cf. Gen. iv. 25), תַּחַת אֲשֶׁר (*avθ' ὧν*), is otherwise characterized, Deut. xxii. 29, 2 Chron. xxi. 12; and besides, אֲשֶׁר תַּחַת stands after (e.g. 1 Sam. xxvi. 21; 2 Kings xxii. 17; Jer. xxix. 19) oftener than before the principal clause. בָּחַר combines in itself the meanings of *eligere* and *diligere* (Fl.). The construction of אָבָה לְ (to be inclining towards) follows that of the analogous שָׁמַע לְ (to hear). Each one eats of the fruit of his way—good fruit of good ways (Isa. iii. 10), and evil fruit of evil ways. “The כֵּן, 31b, introduces the object from which, as a whole, that which one eats, and with which he is satisfied, is taken as a part, or the object from which, as from a fountain, satisfaction flows forth” (Fl.). In correct texts, וַיֵּאכְלוּ has the accent *Dechi*, and at the same time *Munach* as its servant. Regarding the laws of punctuation, according to which וַיִּמְעָצְתִּיהֶם (with *Munach* on the tone-syllable, *Tarcha* on the antepenult, and *Metheg* before the *Chateph-Patach*) is to be written, see Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 11, *Accentssystem*, iv. § 4. Norzi accents the word incorrectly with *Rebia Mugrash*. With the exception of Prov. xxii. 22, the pluralet¹ מוֹעֲצוֹת has always the meaning of ungodly counsels.

Vers. 32, 33. The discourse is now summarily brought to a close:

32 For the perverseness of the simple slays them,
And the security of fools destroys them.

33 But whoever hearkeneth to me dwells secure,
And is at rest from fear of evil.

Of the two interpretations of שׁוּב, a turning towards (with אָל and the like, conversion) or a turning away (with מֵאַחֲרַי or מֵעַל, desertion), in מְשׁוּבָה the latter (as in the *post-Bib.* תְּשׁוּבָה, repentance, the former) is expressed; apostasy from wisdom and from God are conjoined. שְׁלֵמָה is here *carnalis securitas*; but the word may also denote the external and the internal peace of the righteous, as שְׁלָמָן, whence שְׁלָמָן, Job xxi. 23, as a superlative is formed by the insertion of the ל of שָׁלֵם, is taken in *bonam et malam partem*. שְׁלָמָן is, according to the Masora (also in Jer. xxx. 10, xlv. 27, xlviii. 11), 3d perf. *Pilel* (Ewald, § 120, a), from the unused שָׁלַם, to be quiet: he has attained to full quietness, and enjoys such. The construction with כֵּן follows the analogy of כֵּן הֵנִיחַ (to give rest from), כֵּן שָׁקַט (to rest from), and the like. The negative interpretation of כֵּן, *sine ullo povere mali*

¹ [A plur. denoting unity in the circumstances, and a similarity in the relations of time and space.]

(Schultens, Ewald), is unnecessary; also Job xxi. 9 may be explained by "peace from terror," especially since שָׁלוֹם is derived from the root של, *extrahere*. פֶּחַד רָעָה, "fear of evil," one may perhaps distinguish from פֶּחַד רַע as the genitive of combination.

THIRD INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, II.

EARNEST STRIVING AFTER WISDOM AS THE WAY TO THE FEAR OF GOD AND TO VIRTUE.

The admonition so far has almost wholly consisted of warning and threatening. The teacher, directing back to the discipline of the paternal home, warns against fellowship in the bloody deeds of the covetous, which issue in self-murder; and Wisdom holds up before her despisers the mirror of the punishment which awaits them. Now the admonition becomes positive. The teacher describes separately the blessings of the endeavour after wisdom; the endeavour after wisdom, which God rewards with the gift of wisdom, leads to religious and moral knowledge, and this guards men on the way of life from all evil. The teacher accordingly interweaves conditions and promises:

- 1 My son, if thou receivest my words,
And keepest my commandments by thee;
- 2 So that thou inclinest thine ear unto wisdom,
Turnest thine heart to understanding;—
- 3 Yea, if thou callest after knowledge,
To understanding directest thy voice;
- 4 If thou seekest her as silver,
And searchest for her as for treasures:
- 5 Then shalt thou understand the fear of Jahve,
And find the knowledge of God.
- 6 For Jahve giveth wisdom:
From His mouth cometh knowledge and understanding.
- 7 He preserves for the upright promotion;
A shield for such as walk in innocence.
- 8 For He protects the paths of justice,
And guards the way of His saints.

The first בֵּן, with that which it introduces, vers. 1, 2, is to be interpreted as an exclamation, "O that!" (*O si*), and then as an optative, as Ps. lxxxi. 9, cxxix. 19. הִי . . . יָ, vers. 3–5, with

the inserted connecting clauses, would then be confirmatory, "for then." But since this poet loves to unfold one and the same thought in ever new forms, one has perhaps to begin the conditional premisses with ver. 1, and to regard **אִם כִּי** as a new commencement. Hitzig takes this **אִם כִּי** in the sense of *imo*: "much more if thou goest to meet her, *e.g.* by curious inquiry, not merely permittest her quietly to come to thee." **אִם** would then preserve its conditional meaning; and **כִּי**, as in Job xxxi. 18, Ps. cxxx. 4, since it implies an intentional negative, would receive the meaning of *imo*. But the sentences ranged together with **אִם** are too closely related in meaning to admit such a negative between them. **כִּי** will thus be confirmatory, not mediately, but immediately; it is the "for = yes" of confirmation of the preceding conditions, and takes them up again (Ewald, § 356 b, cf. 330 b) after the form of the conditional clause was given up. The **לִפְנֵי**, which in i. 11, 18 is the synonym of **לְפָנַי**, *speculari*, presents itself here, 1b, 7a, as the synonym of **לְפָנַי**, whence **לְפָנַי**, synon. of **לְפָנַי**, *recondita*; the group of sounds, **פֶּנ**, **נֶפֶס**, **נֶפֶס** (cf. also **פֶּנ**, in Arab. *dafan*, whence *dafynat*, treasure), express shades of the root representation of pressing together. The inf. of the conclusion **לְהִקְשִׁיב**, to incline (Gr. Venet. *ὡς ἀκροῶντο*), is followed by the accus. of the object **אָזְנוֹ**, thine ear, for **הִקְשִׁיב** properly means to stiffen (not to purge, as Schultens, nor to sharpen, as Gesenius thinks); cf. under Ps. x. 17. With **הִקְשִׁיב** are interchanged **בִּינָה**, which properly means that which is distinguished or separated, and **הַבְּחִינָה**, which means the distinguishing, separating, appellations of the capacity of distinguishing in definite cases and in general; but it does not represent this as a faculty of the soul, but as a divine power which communicates itself as the gift of God (*charisma*).

Vers. 3-8. Instead of **אִם כִּי** there is an old **אִל תְּקַרֵּי** (read not so, but thus), **אִם כִּי** (if thou callest understanding mother), which supposes the phrase **אִם כִּי** (LXX.) as traditional. If **אִם** were intended (according to which the Targ. in the *Bibl. rabbinica*, but not in Norzi's text, translates), then 3b would correspond; *vid.* vii. 4, cf. Job xvii. 14. Thus: Yea, if thou callest for understanding, *i.e.* callest her to thee (xviii. 6), invitest her to thee (ix. 15). The **וּ** of **וּבְקִי** is, with the exception of the imper. (*e.g.* **וּבְקִי**), always without the *Dagesh*. Ver. 4b belongs to the ideas in the Book of Job found in these introductory discourses, cf. Job iii. 21, as at ver.

¹ Regarding this formula, see Strack's *Prolegomena*, pp. 66-70.

14, Job iii. 22 (Ewald, *Sprüche*, p. 49). שפח (שפח), *scrutari*, proceeds, as שפח shows, from the primary meaning of a ditch, and is thus in its root-idea related to פח (to dig, search out). In the principal clause of ver. 5 the 'ה' is 'ה' as Ps. xix. 10, is the fear of Jahve as it ought to be, thus the reverence which is due to Him, the worshipping of Him as revealed. 'ה' and 'ה' are interchanged as שפח and 'ה' at ix. 10. שפח is knowledge proceeding from practice and experience, and thus not merely cognition (*Kenntnis*), but knowledge (*Erkenntnis*). The thoughts revolve in a circle only apparently. He who strives after wisdom earnestly and really, reaches in this way fellowship with God; for just as He gives wisdom, it is nowhere else than with Him, and it never comes from any other source than from Him. It comes (ver. 6) שפח (LXX. erroneously שפח), i.e. it is communicated through the medium of His word, Job xxii. 22, or also (for λόγος and πνεῦμα lie here undistinguished from one another) it is His breath (Book of Wisdom vii. 25: ἀτμὶς τῆς τοῦ Θεοῦ δυνάμεως καὶ ἀπόρροια τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δόξης εἰλικρινῆς); the inspiration (נשמה) of the Almighty (according to Job xxxii. 8) gives men understanding. In ver. 7a, whether שפח (*Chethib*) or שפח (*Keri*) is read, the meaning is the same. The former is the expression of the completed fact, as ἡτοίμασεν, 1 Cor. ii. 9, and is rightly preferred by LXX. and Syr., for one reluctantly misses the copula (since the thought is new in comparison with ver. 6). שפח should be written with the accent *Dechi*. The Chokma-word (besides in Proverbs and Job, found only in Mic. vi. 9 and Isa. xlviii. 29) שפח is a *Hiphal* formation (with the passing over of *ô* into *û*, as in שפח from שפח) (whence the pr. names שפח and שפח) = (Arab.) *wasy* and *asy*, to re-establish, to advance, *Hiphal*. of שפח = שפח, to stand, and thus means furtherance, i.e. the power or the gift to further, and concretely that which furthers and profits, particularly true wisdom and true fortune.¹ The derivation from שפח (viii. 21) is to be rejected, because "the formation would be wholly without analogy, so much the more because the ' of this word does not represent the place of the ' as

¹ I was formerly in error in regarding the word as a *Hophal* formation, and in assigning to it the primary signification of being in a state of realized existence, of reality, in contradistinction to appearance only. The objection of J. D. Michaelis, *Supplem.* p. 1167, *Non placent in linguis ejusmodi etyma metaphysica*, etc., does not apply here, since the word is a new one coined by the *Chokma*, but all the shades of meaning are naturally derived from the funda-

is seen from the Arab. ليس and the Syr. ܠܝܣ (Fl.);¹ and the derivation of שָׁטָה = שָׁטָה, to be smooth (Hitzig), passes over without any difficulty into another system of roots.² In the passage under consideration (ver. 7), הִתְאַדָּה signifies advancement in the sense of true prosperity. The parallel passage 7a clothes itself in the form of an apposition: (He) a shield (מָגֵן, *n. instr.* of מָגַן, to cover) for הַלְכֵי חַם, pilgrims of innocence (Fl.), *i.e.* such as walk in the way (the object-accus., as vi. 12, for which in x. 9 בָּ) of innocence. חַם is whole, full submission, moral faultlessness, which chooses God with the whole heart, seeks good without exception: a similar thought is found in Ps. lxxxiv. 12. לִבְנוֹר, 8a, is such an inf. of consequence as לְהַקְשִׁיב (ver. 2), and here, as there, is continued in the finite. The "paths of justice" are understood with reference to those who enter them and keep in them; parallel, "the way of His saints" (הַסִּידִי, he who cherishes חֶסֶד, earnest inward love to God), for that is just אֶרְחֵי צְדָקָה (xii. 28): they are הַלְכֵי צְדָקוֹת (Isa. xxxiii. 15). Instead of the *Mugrash*, the conjunctive *Tarcha* is to be given to יִרְדָּה.

Vers. 9–11. With the אָ repeated, the promises encouraging to the endeavour after wisdom take a new departure:

- 9 Then shalt thou understand righteousness, and justice,
And uprightness; every way of good.
- 10 For wisdom will enter into thine heart,
And knowledge will do good to thy soul;
- 11 Discretion will keep watch over thee,
Understanding will keep thee.

mental signification "furtherance" (cf. Seneca, *Deus stator stabilitorque est*). "תְּרַשִּׁיחָה, from Arab. *âsy* and *wasy*, to further by word and deed, to assist by counsel and act, to render help, whence the meanings *auxilium*, *salus*, and *prudens consilium*, *sapientia*, easily follow; cf. Ali's Arab. proverb, *واساك من تغافل* — 'He furthers thee, who does not trouble himself about thee.'

¹ The Arab. أيس (almost only in the negative لايس = لا يس), of the same signification as يس, with which the Aram. אִישׁ (אִישִׁי) is associated, pre-

supposes an آس (= آس), to be founded, to found, and is rightly regarded by the Arabs as an old segolate noun in which the verbal force was comprehended.

² The Arab. وسى and سوى are confounded in common usage (Wetstein, *Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitschr.* xxii. 19), but the roots وش and سئ are different; وش and سئ, on the contrary, are modifications of one root.

Regarding the ethical triad מִישָׁרִים [righteousness, rightness], מִשְׁפָּט [judgment], and צֶדֶק [rectitude], *vid.* i. 3. Seb. Schmid is wrong in his rendering, *et omnis via qua bonum aditur erit tibi plana*, which in comparison with Isa. xxvi. 7 would be feebly expressed. J. H. Michaelis rightly interprets all these four conceptions as object-accusatives; the fourth is the summarizing asyndeton (cf. Ps. viii. 7) breaking off the enumeration: *omnem denique orbitam boni*; Jerome, *bonam*: in this case, however, מִשְׁפָּט would be genitive (*vid.* xvii. 2). מַעֲנֵל is the way in which the chariot rolls along; in עָלָה there are united the root-conceptions of that which is round (נָל) and rolling (גָּל). Whether בִּי, ver. 10, is the argumentative "because" (according to the versions and most interpreters) or "for" ("denn," J. H. Michaelis, Ewald, and others), is a question. That with בִּי = "for" the subject would precede the verb, as at vers. 6, 21, and i. 32 (Hitzig), determines nothing, as ver. 18 shows. On the one hand, the opinion that בִּי = "because" is opposed by the analogy of the בִּי, ver. 6, following אֵל, ver. 5; the inequality between vers. 5-8 and ver. 9 ff. if the new commencement, ver. 9, at once gives place to another, ver. 10; the relationship of the subject ideas in vers. 10, 11, which makes ver. 11 unsuitable to be a conclusion from ver. 10. On the contrary, the promise not only of intellectual, but at the same time also of practical, insight into the right and the good, according to their whole compass and in their manifoldness, can be established or explained quite well as we thus read vers. 10, 11: For wisdom will enter (namely, to make it a dwelling-place, xiv. 33; cf. John xiv. 23) into thine heart, and knowledge will do good to thy soul (namely, by the enjoyment which arises from the possession of knowledge, and the rest which its certainty yields). רַעַת, ῥῆσις, is elsewhere fem. (Ps. cxxxix. 6), but here, as at viii. 10, xiv. 6, in the sense of τὸ ῥῥῶναι, is masc. In ver. 11 the contents of the אֵל תִּבִּין (ver. 9) are further explained. שָׁמַר עַל, of watching (for Job xvi. 16 is to be interpreted differently), is used only by our poet (here and at vi. 22). Discretion, i.e. the capacity of well-considered action, will hold watch over thee, take thee under protection; understanding, i.e. the capacity in the case of opposing rules to make the right choice, and in the matter of extremes to choose the right medium, will be bestowed upon thee. In מִנְצֶרֶת, as in Ps. lxi. 8, cxi. 2, 5, Deut. xxxiii. 9, etc., the first stem letter is not assimilated, in order that the word may have a

fuller sound; the writing פָּה for פֶּה is meant to affect the eye.¹

Vers. 12-15. As in vers. 10, 11, the אָן תִּבְנֶה ("then shalt thou understand," ver. 5) is expanded, so now the watching, preserving, is separately placed in view:

- 12 To deliver thee from an evil way,
From the man who speaks falsehood;
- 13 (From those) who forsake the ways of honesty
To walk in ways of darkness,
- 14 Who rejoice to accomplish evil,
Delight in malignant falsehood—
- 15 They are crooked in their paths,
And perverse in their ways.

That דֶּרֶךְ רָע is not genitival, *via mali*, but adjectival, *via mala*, is evident from דֶּרֶךְ לֹא־טוֹב , xvi. 29. From the evil way, *i.e.* conduct, stands opposed to the false words represented in the person of the deceiver; from both kinds of *contagium* wisdom delivers. תְּהַפְּכֹת (like the similarly formed תְּהַבְּלוֹת , occurring only as plur.) means misrepresentations, *viz.* of the good and the true, and that for the purpose of deceiving (xvii. 20), *fallacia*, *i.e.* intrigues in conduct, and lies and deceit in words. Fl. compares Arab. *ifk*, a lie, and *affak*, a liar. לְהַצִּילֶךָ has *Munach*, the constant servant of *Dechi*, instead of *Metheg*, according to rule (*Accentssystem*, vii. § 2). הַעֲזִיבִים (ver. 13) is connected with the collective עֲזִיבָה (cf. Judg. ix. 55); we have in the translation separated it into a relative clause with the abstract present. The vocalization of the article fluctuates, yet the expression הַעֲזִיבִים , like ver. 17 הַעֲזֹבֹת , is the better established (*Michlol* 53b); הַעֲזִיבִים is one of the three words which retain their *Metheg*, and yet add to it a *Munach* in the tone-syllable (*vid.* the two others, Job xxii. 4, xxxix. 26). To the "ways of honesty" (*Geradheit*) (cf. the adj. expression, Jer. xxxi. 9), which does not shun to come to the light, stand opposed the "ways of darkness," the *ἔργα τοῦ σκοτους*, Rom. xiii. 12, which designedly conceal themselves from God (Isa. xxix. 15) and men (Job xxiv. 15, xxxviii. 13, 15).

Ver. 14. In this verse the regimen of the מִן , 12b, is to be regarded as lost; the description now goes on independently. Whoever does not shrink back from evil, but gives himself up to deceit, who finally is at home in it as in his own proper life-element,

¹ For the right succession of the accents here, see *Torath Emeth*, p. 49, § 5; *Accentuationssystem*, xviii. § 3.

and rejoices, yea, delights in that which he ought to shun as something destructive and to be rejected. The neut. נָר is frequently an attributive genit., vi. 24, xv. 26, xxviii. 5; cf. טוב , xxiv. 25, which here, since הַחֲכִימֹת are those who in themselves are bad, does not separate, but heightens: *perversitates non simplices aut vulgares, sed pessimæ et ex omni parte vitiosæ* (J. H. Michaelis). With אֲשֵׁר (οἷτινες), ver. 15, this part is brought to a conclusion. Fleischer, Bertheau, and others interpret הַחֲכִימֹת , as the accus. of the nearer definition, as $\text{σκολιὸς τὸν νοῦν, τὰς πράξεις}$; but should it be an accus., then would we expect, in this position of the words, עֲקָשִׁי (Isa. lix. 8; Prov. x. 9, cf. ix. 15). עֲקָשִׁים is the pred.; for אֲנִי , like הָרָר , admits of both genders. יִגְלוֹתֶיךָ carries in it its subject הֵם ; לָהּ , like the Arab. *l'd, l'dl*, is a weaker form of לָר , *flectere, inclinare*, intrans. *recedere*: they are turned aside, inclined out of the way to the right and left in their walk (בָּ as xvii. 20).

Vers. 16-19. With the resumption of הַחֲצִילָהּ , the watchful protection which wisdom affords to its possessors is further specified in these verses:

- 16 To save thee from the strange woman,
From the stranger who useth smooth words;
- 17 Who forsakes the companion of her youth,
And forgets the covenant of her God;
- 18 For she sinks down to death together with her house,
And to the shadow of Hades her paths—
- 19 All they who go to her return not again,
And reach not the paths of life

The subject here continued is the fourfold wisdom named in vers. 10, 11. זָר signifies *alienus*, which may also be equivalent to *alius populi*, but of a much wider compass—him who does not belong to a certain class (e.g. the non-priestly or the laity), the person or thing not belonging to me, or also some other than I designate; on the other hand, נָכְרִי , *peregrinus*, scarcely anywhere divests itself of the essential mark of a strange foreign origin. While thus אִשָּׁה זָרָה is the non-married wife, נָכְרִיָּה designates her as non-Israelitish. Prostitution was partly sanctioned in the cultus of the Midianites, Syrians, and other nations neighbouring to Israel, and thus was regarded as nothing less than customary. In Israel, on the contrary, the law (Deut. xxiii. 18 f.) forbade it under a penalty, and therefore it was chiefly practised by foreign women (xxiii. 27, and cf. the

exception, Ruth ii. 10),¹—an inveterate vice, which spread itself particularly from the latter days of Solomon, along with general ungodliness, and excusing itself under the polygamy sanctioned by the law, brought ruin on the state. The *Chokma* contends against this, and throughout presents monogamy as alone corresponding to the institution and the idea of the relation. Designating marriage as the “covenant of God,” it condemns not only adulterous but generally promiscuous intercourse of the sexes, because unhallowed and thus unjustifiable, and likewise arbitrary divorce. Regarding the ancient ceremonies connected with the celebration of marriage we are not specially informed; but from ver. 17, Mal. ii. 14 (Ewald, Bertheau, Hitzig, but not Köhler), it appears that the celebration of marriage was a religious act, and that they who were joined together in marriage called God to witness and ratify the vows they took upon themselves. The perf. in the attributive clause אֲמַרְיָהּ הַחֲלִיקָהּ proceeds on the routine acquired in cajoling and dissembling: who has smoothed her words, *i.e.* learned to entice by flattering words (Fl.).

Vers. 17–19. אֶלְפִי, as here used, has nothing to do with the phylarch-name, similar in sound, which is a denom. of אֶלְפִי; but it comes immediately from אָלַף, to accustom oneself to a person or cause, to be familiar therewith (while the Aram. אָלַף, יָלַף, to learn, Pa. to teach), and thus means, as the synon. of רֵעַ, the companion or familiar associate (*vid.* Schultens). Parallels such as Jer. iii. 4 suggested to the old interpreters the allegorical explanation of the adulteress as the personification of the apostasy or of heresy. Ver. 18a the LXX. translate: ἔθετο γὰρ παρὰ τῷ θανάτῳ τὸν οἶκον αὐτῆς: she (the dissolute wife) has placed her house beside death (the abyss of death). This שָׂתָה [ἔθετο] is perhaps the original, for the text as it lies before us is doubtful, though, rightly understood, admissible. The accentuation marks בִּיתָה as the subject, but בֵּית is elsewhere always masc., and does not, like the rarer אִרְחָה, ver. 15, admit in usage a double gender; also, if the fem. usage were here introduced (Bertheau, Hitzig), then the predicate, even though בִּיתָה were regarded as fem., might be, in conformity with rule, שָׂתָה, as *e.g.* Isa. ii. 17. שָׂתָה is, as in Ps. xlv. 26, 3d pr. of שָׁחַ, Arab. *sākh*, to go down, to sink; the emendation שָׂתָה

¹ In Talmudic Heb. אֶרְמִיָּה (Aramean) has this meaning for the Biblical אֶרְמִיָּה.

(Joseph Kimchi) does not recommend itself on this account, that *שָׁחָה* and *שָׁחָה* mean, according to usage, to stoop or to bend down; and to interpret (*Ralbag*, *השפלה*) *שָׁחָה* transitively is inadmissible. For that reason *Aben Ezra* interprets *ביתה* as in apposition: to death, to its house; but then the poet in that case should say *אֶל-שָׁחָהּ*, for death is not a house. On the other hand, we cannot perceive in *ביתה* an accus. of the nearer definition (*J. H. Michaelis*, *Fl.*); the expression would here, as 15*a*, be refined without purpose. *Böttcher* has recognised *ביתה* as permutative, the personal subject: for she sinks down to death, her house, *i.e.* she herself, together with all that belongs to her; cf. the permutative of the subject, *Job* xxix. 3, *Isa.* xxix. 23 (*vid. comm. l.c.*), and the more particular statement of the object, *Ex.* ii. 6, etc. Regarding *רָפָה*, shadows of the under-world (from *רָפָה*, *synon.* *הָלָה*, weakened, or to become powerless), a word common to the Solomonic writings, *vid. Comment. on Isaiah*, p. 206. What ver. 18*b* says of the person of the adulteress, ver. 19 says of those who live with her *ביתה*, her house-companions. *בָּאִיהָ*, "those entering in to her," is equivalent to *בָּאִים אֵלֶיהָ*; the participle of verbs *eundi et veniendi* takes the accusative object of the finite as *gen.* in *st. constr.*, as *e.g.* i. 12, ii. 7, *Gen.* xxiii. 18, ix. 10 (cf. *Jer.* x. 20). The *וְיָשִׁיבֶנָּה*, with the tone on the ult., is a protestation: there is no return for those who practise fornication,¹ and they do not reach the paths of life from which they have so widely strayed.²

Vers. 20-22. With *לִמְעַן* there commences a new section, co-ordinating itself with the *לְהַצִּילְךָ* ("to deliver thee") of vers. 12, 16, unfolding that which wisdom accomplishes as a preserver and guide:

- 20 So that thou walkest in the good way,
And keepest the right paths.
21 For the upright shall inhabit the land,
And the innocent shall remain in it.
22 But the godless are cut off out of the land,
And the faithless are rooted out of it.

¹ One is here reminded of the expression in the *Aeneid*, vi. 127-129:

*Revocare gradum superasque evadere ad auras,
Hoc opēs, hoc labor est.*

See also an impure but dreadful Talmudic story about a dissolute Rabbi, *b. Aboda zara*, 17*a*.

² In correct texts *וְלֹא-יָשִׁיבֶנָּה* has the *Makkeph*. *Vid. Torah Emeth*, p. 41; *Accentuationssystem*, xs. § 2.

Wisdom—thus the connection—will keep thee, so that thou shalt not fall under the seductions of man or of woman; keep, in order that thou . . . לִמְעַן (from מַעֲנֶה = tendency, purpose) refers to the intention and object of the protecting wisdom. To the two negative designations of design there follows, as the third and last, a positive one. טוֹבִים (contrast to רָעִים, xiv. 19) is here used in a general ethical sense: the good (*Guten*, not *Gütigen*, the kind). שָׁמַר, with the object of the way, may in another connection also mean to keep oneself from, *cavere ab* (Ps. xvii. 4); here it means: carefully to keep in it. The promise of ver. 21 is the same as in the *Mashal* Ps. xxxvii. 9, 11, 22; cf. Prov. x. 30. אֶרֶץ is Canaan, or the land which God promised to the patriarchs, and in which He planted Israel, whom He had brought out of Egypt; not the earth, as Matt. v. 5, according to the extended, unlimited N. T. circle of vision. יִמְלְאוּ (*Milel*) is erroneously explained by Schultens: *funiculis bene firmis irroborabunt in terra*. The verb יָמַר, Arab. *watar*, signifies to yoke (whence יָתַר, a cord, rope), then intrans. to be stretched out in length, to be hanging over (*vid.* Fleischer on Job xxx. 11); whence יָתַר, residue, Zeph. ii. 9, and after which the LXX. here renders *ὑπολειφθήσονται*, and Jerome *permanebunt*. In 22*b* the old translators render יִפְתּוּ as the fut. of the pass. נִפְתָּ, Deut. xxviii. 63; but in this case it would be יִפְתּוּ. The form יִפְתּוּ, pointed יִפְתּוּ, might be the *Niph.* of פָּתַח, but פָּתַח can neither be taken as one with נִפְתָּ, of the same meaning, nor with Hitzig is it to be vocalized יִפְתּוּ (*Hoph.* of נִפְתָּ); nor, with Büttcher (§ 1100, p. 453), is יִפְתּוּ to be regarded as a veritable fut. *Niph.* יִפְתּוּ is, as at xv. 25, Ps. lii. 7, active: *evellant*; and this, with the subj. remaining indefinite (for which J. H. Michaelis refers to Hos. xii. 9), is equivalent to *evellentur*. This indefinite "they" or "one" ("man"), Fleischer remarks, can even be used of God, as here and Job vii. 3,—a thing which is common in Persian, where *e.g.* the expression rendered *hominem ex pulvere fecerunt* is used instead of the fuller form, which would be rendered *homo a Deo ex pulvere factus est*. בּוֹנֵי בָּיִת bears (as בָּנֵי proves) the primary meaning of concealed, *i.e.* malicious (treacherous and rapacious, Isa. xxxiii. 1), and then faithless men.¹

¹ Similar is the relation in Arab. of *labbasā* to *libās* (لَبَّاسٌ); it means to make a thing unknown by covering it; whence *telbis*, deceit, *mulebbis*, a falsifier.

FOURTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, III. 1-18.

EXHORTATION TO LOVE AND FAITHFULNESS, AND SELF-SACRIFICING DEVOTION TO GOD, AS THE TRUE WISDOM.

The foregoing Mashal discourse seeks to guard youth against ruinous companionship; this points out to them more particularly the relation toward God and man, which alone can make them truly happy, vers. 1-4.

- 1 My son, forget not my doctrine,
And let thine heart keep my commandments;
- 2 For length of days, and years of life,
And peace, will they add to thee.
- 3 Let not kindness and truth forsake thee:
Bind them about thy neck,
Write them on the tablet of thy heart,
- 4 And obtain favour and true prudence
In the eyes of God and of men.

The admonition takes a new departure. *תורתִי* and *מִצְוֹתַי* refer to the following new discourse and laws of conduct. Here, in the midst of the discourse, we have *יָצַר* and not *יִצְרָה*; the non-assimilated form is found only in the conclusion, e.g. ii. 11, v. 2. The plur. *יוֹסִיפוּ* (ver. 2) for *תוֹסִיפוּנָה* (they will bring, add) refers to the doctrine and the precepts; the synallage has its ground in this, that the fem. construction in Hebrew is not applicable in such a case; the vulgar Arab. also has set aside the forms *jaktubna, taktubna*. "Extension of days" is continuance of duration, stretching itself out according to the promise, Ex. xx. 12; and "years of life" (ix. 11) are years—namely, many of them—of a life which is life in the full sense of the word. *חַיִּים* has here the pregnant signification *vita vitalis*, *βίος βιωτός* (Fl.). *שָׁלוֹם* (R. *שָׁלֵם*) is pure well-being, free from all that disturbs peace or satisfaction, internal and external contentment.

Ver. 3. With this verse the doctrine begins; *אַל* (not *לֹא*) shows that 3a does not continue the promise of ver. 2. *חָסַד* (R. *חֶסֶד*, *stringere, afficere*) is, according to the prevailing usage of the language, well-affectedness, it may be of God toward men, or of men toward God, or of men toward one another—a loving disposition, of the same meaning as the N. T. *ἀγάπη* (vid. e.g. Hos. vi. 6). *אַמְתָּה* (from *אָמַת*), continuance, a standing to one's promises, and not

falsifying just expectations; thus fidelity, *πίστις*, in the inter-related sense of *fides* and *fidelitas*. These two states of mind and of conduct are here contemplated as moral powers (Ps. lxi. 8, xliii. 3), which are of excellent service, and bring precious gain; and 4b shows that their ramification on the side of God and of men, the religious and the moral, remains radically inseparable. The suffix *־ת* does not refer to the doctrine and the precepts, but to these two cardinal virtues. If the disciple is admonished to bind them about his neck (*vid.* i. 9, cf. iii. 22), so here reference is made, not to ornament, nor yet to protection against evil influences by means of them, as by an amulet¹ (for which proofs are wanting), but to the signet which was wont to be constantly carried (Gen. xxxviii. 18, cf. Cant. viii. 6) on a string around the neck. The parallel member 3c confirms this; 3b and 3c together put us in mind of the *Tephilim* (phylacteries), Ex. xiii. 16, Deut. vi. 8, xi. 18, in which what is here a figure is presented in external form, but as the real figure of that which is required in the inward parts. *לֹהֵט* (from *לָהַט*, Arab. *lah*, to begin to shine, e.g. of a shooting star, gleaming sword; *vid.* Wetzstein, *Deutsche morgenl. Zeitschr.* xxii. 151 f.) signifies the tablet prepared for writing by means of polish; to write love and fidelity on the tablet of the heart, is to impress deeply on the heart the duty of both virtues, so that one will be impelled to them from within outward (Jer. xxxi. 33).

Ver. 4. To the admonitory imper. there follows here a second, as iv. 4, xx. 13, Amos v. 4, 2 Chron. xx. 20, instead of which also the *perf. consec.* might stand; the counsellor wishes, with the good to which he advises, at the same time to present its good results. *שֵׁכַל* is (1 Sam. xxv. 3) the appearance, for the Arab. *shakl* means *forma*, as uniting or binding the lineaments or contours into one figure, *σχήμα*, according to which *שֵׁכַל טוֹב* may be interpreted of the pleasing and advantageous impression which the well-built external appearance of a man makes, as an image of that which his internal excellence produces; thus, favourable view, friendly judgment, good reputation (Ewald, Hitzig, Zöckler). But everywhere else (xiii. 15; Ps. cxi. 10; 2 Chron. xxx. 22) this phrase means good, i.e. fine, well-becoming insight, or prudence; and *שֵׁכַל*

¹ Fleischer is here reminded of the giraffe in the Jardin des Plantes, the head of which was adorned by its Arabic keeper with strings and jewels, the object of which was to turn aside the '*ain*' (the bad, mischievous look) from the precious beast.

has in the language of the *Mishle* no other meaning than *intellectus*, which proceeds from the inwardly forming activity of the mind. He obtains favour in the eyes of God and man, to whom favour on both sides is shown; he obtains refined prudence, to whom it is on both sides adjudicated. It is unnecessary, with Ewald and Hitzig, to assign the two objects to God and men. In the eyes of both at the same time, he who carries love and faithfulness in his heart appears as one to whom *יָהוָה* and *יִשְׂרָאֵל* must be adjudicated.

Vers. 5-8. Were "kindness and truth" (ver. 3) understood only in relation to men, then the following admonition would not be interposed, since it proceeds from that going before, if there the quality of kindness and truth, not only towards man, but also towards God, is commended :

- 5 Trust in Jahve with thy whole heart,
And lean not on thine own understanding.
- 6 In all thy ways acknowledge Him,
And He will make plain thy paths.
- 7 Be not wise in thine own eyes;
Fear Jahve, and depart from evil.
- 8 Health will then come to thy navel,
And refreshing to thy bones.

From God alone comes true prosperity, true help. He knows the right way to the right ends. He knows what benefits us. He is able to free us from that which does us harm: therefore it is our duty and our safety to place our confidence wholly in Him, and to trust not to our own judgment. The verb *בָּטַח*, Arab. *bath*, has the root-meaning *expandere*, whence perhaps, by a more direct way than that noted under Ps. iv. 6, it acquires the meaning *confidere*, to lean with the whole body on something, in order to rest upon it, strengthened by *עַל*, if one lean wholly—Fr. *se reposer sur quelqu'un*; Ital. *riposarsi sopra alcuno*,—like *הִשָּׁן* with *עַל*, to lean on anything, so as to be supported by it; with *עַל*, to support oneself on anything (Fl.). *דָּעִי* (the same in form as *יָדַעְתִּי*, Num. xi. 12) is not fully represented by "acknowledge Him;" as in 1 Chron. xxviii. 9 it is not a mere theoretic acknowledgment that is meant, but earnest penetrating cognizance, engaging the whole man. The practico-mystical *דָּעִי*, in and of itself full of significance, according to O. and N. T. usage, is yet strengthened by *toto corde*. The heart is the central seat of all spiritual soul-strength; to love God with the whole heart is to concentrate the whole inner life on the active

contemplation of God, and the ready observance of His will. God requites such as show regard to Him, by making plain their path before them, *i.e.* by leading them directly to the right end, removing all hindrances out of their way. אֶחָתִיד has *Cholem* in the first syllable (*vid.* Kimchi's *Lex.*).¹ "Be not wise in thine own eyes" is equivalent to *ne tibi sapiens videre*; for, as J. H. Michaelis remarks, *confidere Deo est sapere, sibi vero ac suae sapientiae, desipere*. "Fear God and depart from evil" is the twofold representation of the εὐσεβεία, or practical piety, in the *Chokma* writings: Prov. xvi. 6, the Mashal psalm xxxiv. 10, 15, and Job xxviii. 28 cf. i. 2. For מַרַע סָר, the post-biblical expression is יָרָא חָטָא.

Ver. 8. The subject to חָתִי (it shall be) is just this religious-moral conduct. The conjectural reading קְבִיטָרָה (Clericus), לְשָׂרָה = לְשָׂאָרָה (Ewald, Hitzig), to thy flesh or body, is unnecessary; the LXX. and Syr. so translating, generalize the expression, which is not according to their taste. שָׂר, (from שָׂרַר, Arab. *sarr*, to be fast, to bind fast,) properly, the umbilical cord (which the Arabs call *surr*, whence the denom. *sarra*, to cut off the umbilical cord of the new-born); thus the navel, the origin of which coincides with the independent individual existence of the new-born, and is as the firm centre (cf. Arab. *saryr*, foundation, basis, Job, p. 487) of the existence of the body. The system of punctuation does not, as a rule, permit the doubling of ר, probably on account of the prevailing half guttural, *i.e.* the uvular utterance of this sound by the men of Tiberias.² לְשָׂרָה here, and שָׂרָה at Ezek. xvi. 4, belong to the exceptions; cf. the expanded duplication in שָׂרָרָה, Cant. vii. 3, to which a chief form שָׂרַר is as little to be assumed as is a הָרָר to הָרַר. The ἀπ. γεγενῆσθαι, רָפְאוֹת, healing, has here, as מְרַפֵּא, iv. 22, xvi. 24, and תְּרַפֶּה, Ezek. xlvii. 12, not the meaning of restoration from sickness, but the raising up of enfeebled strength, or the confirming of that which exists; the navel comes into view as the middle point of the *vis vitalis*. שָׂקִי is a *Piel* formation, corresponding to the abstract *Kal* formation רָפְאוֹת; the Arab. سَقَى, used transit.

(to give to drink), also سَقَى (cf. *Pu.* Job xxi. 24) and أَسْقَى, like

¹ In the *st. constr.* ii. 19, and with the grave suff. ii. 15, *š* instead of *ō* is in order; but Ben-Asher's אֶחָתִיד, Job xiii. 27, cf. xxxiii. 11, is an inconsistency.

² See my work, *Physiologie u. Musik in ihrer Bedeutung für Grammatik besonders die hebräische*, pp. 11-13.

the Hebr. **הִשָּׂקָה** (*Hiph.* of **שָׁקָה**, to drink); the infin. **שָׁקֵי** means, to the obliterating of the proper signification, distribution, benefaction, showing friendship, but in the passage before us is to be explained after Job xxi. 24 (the marrow of his bones is well watered; Arnheim—full of sap) and xv. 30. Bertheau and Hitzig erroneously regard ver. 8 as the conclusion to ver. 7, for they interpret **רַבְחָא** as the subject; but had the poet wished to be so understood, he should have written **וְהָיָה**. Much rather the subject is devotion withdrawn from the evil one and turned to God, which externally proves itself by the dedication to Him of earthly possessions.

Ver. 9 Honour Jahve with thy wealth,
And with the first-fruits of all thine increase :
10 Then shall thy barns be filled with plenty,
And thy vats overflow with must.

It may surprise us that the Chokma, being separated from the ceremonial law, here commends the giving of tithes. But in the first place, the consciousness of the duty of giving tithes is older than the Mosaic law, Gen. xxviii. 22; in this case, the giving of tithes is here a general ethical expression. **עֲשֵׂה** and **מַעֲשֵׂה** do not occur in the Book of Proverbs; in the post-biblical phraseology the tithes are called **הַלֵּק הַגְּבוֹהָה**, the portion of the Most High. **בָּבֵר**, as the Arab. *wakkra*, to make heavy, then to regard and deal with as weighty and solemn (*opp.* **קָלֵל**, to regard and treat as light, from **קָלֵל** = Arab. *hān*, to be light). **הֵךְ**, properly lightness in the sense of *aisance*, opulency, forms with **בָּבֵר** an *oxymoron* (*fac Jovam gravem de levitate tua*), but one aimed at by the author neither at i. 13 nor here. **כֵּן** (in **מִהוֹנֵן** and **כֵּן**, ver. 9) is in both cases partitive, as in the law of the Levitical tenths, Lev. xxvii. 30, and of the *Challa* (heave-offering of dough), Num. xv. 21, where also **וְהָיָה** (in Heb. vii. 4, *ἀκροθίτια*) occurs in a similar sense, cf. Num. xviii. 12 (in the law of the *Theruma* or wave-offering of the priests), as also **וְהָיָה** in the law of the second tenths, Deut. xiv. 22, cf. Num. xviii. 30 (in the law of the tenths of the priests). Ver. 10. With *apodosis imperativi* the conclusion begins. **שָׂבַע**, satisfaction, is equivalent to fulness, making satisfied, and that, too, richly satisfied; **וְהָיָה** also is such an accusative, as verbs of filling govern it, for **פָּרַץ**, to break through, especially to overflow, signifies to be or become overflowing full (Job i. 10). **נָזַח** (from **נָזַח**,

Chald. ܐܣܢ, Syr. *âsan*, to lay up in granaries) is the granary, of the same meaning as the Arab. *âkhzan* (from *khazan* = ܠܚܝܬ, Isa. xxiii. 18, *recondere*), whence the Spanish *magazen*, the French and German *magazin*. ܐܬܬ (from ܐܬܬ, Arab. *wakab*, to be hollow) is the vat or tub into which the must flows from the wine-press (ܬܐܬ or ܬܐܬܐ), *λάκκος* or *ὑπολήνιον*. Cf. the same admonition and promise in the prophetic statement of Mal. iii. 10-12.

Vers. 11, 12. The contrast here follows. As God should not be forgotten in days of prosperity, so one should not suffer himself to be estranged from Him by days of adversity.

- 11 The school of Jahve, my son, despise thou not,
Nor loathe thou His correction;
12 For Jahve correcteth him whom He loveth,
And that as a father his son whom he loveth

Vid. the original passage Job v. 17 f. There is not for the Book of Job a more suitable motto than this tetrastich, which expresses its fundamental thought, that there is a being chastened and tried by suffering which has as its motive the love of God, and which does not exclude sonship.¹ One may say that ver. 11 expresses the problem of the Book of Job, and ver. 12 its solution. מוסר, *παιδεία*, we have translated "school," for מוסר, *παιδεύειν*, means in reality to take one into school. *Ahdung* [punishment] or *Rüge* [reproof] is the German word which most corresponds to the Hebr. מוסר or מוסר. מוסר (whence here the prohibitive מוסר with אל) means to experience loathing (disgust) at anything, or aversion (vexation) toward anything. The LXX. (cited Heb. xii. 5 f.), *μηδὲ ἐκλύου*, nor be faint-hearted, which joins in to the general thought, that we should not be frightened away from God, or let ourselves be estranged from Him by the attitude of anger in which He appears in His determination to inflict suffering. In 12a the accentuation leaves it undefined whether יהוה as subject belongs to the relative or to the principal clause; the traditional succession of accents, certified also by Ben Bileam, is יהוה יאמר יאמר, for this passage belongs to the few in which more than three servants (viz. *Mahpach*, *Mercha*, and three *Munachs*) go before the *Athnach*.² The further peculiarity is here to be observed, that אֵת,

¹ Here Procop. rightly distinguishes between *παιδεία* and *τιμωρία*.

² *Vid.* *Torath Emeth*, p. 19; *Accentuationssystem*, vi. § 6; the differences between Ben-Asher and Ben-Naphtali in the Appendixes to *Biblia Rabbinica*; *Dachselt's Biblia Accentuata*, and *Pinner's Prospectus*, p. 91 (Odessa, 1845).

although without the *Makkeph*, retains its *Segol*, besides here only in Ps. xlvii. 5, lx. 2. 12*b* is to be interpreted thus (cf. ix. 5*b*): "and (that) as a father the son, whom he loves." The ו is explanatory, as 1 Sam. xxviii. 3 (Gesenius, § 155, 1*a*), and יִצְחָק (which one may supplement by אֱהוּ or בֵּן) is a defining clause having the force of a clause with אֲשֶׁר. The translation, *et ut pater qui filio bene cupit*, is syntactically (cf. Isa. xl. 11) and accentually (*vid.* 13*b*) not less admissible, but translating "and as a father he holds his son dear," or with Hitzig (after Jer. xxxi. 10, a passage not quite syntactically the same), "and holds him dear, as a father his son" (which Zöckler without syntactical authority prefers on account of the 2*d* modus, cf. *e.g.* Ps. li. 18), does not seem a right parallel clause, since the giving of correction is the chief point, and the love only the accompanying consideration (xiii. 24). According to our interpretation, יִצְחָק is to be carried forward in the mind from 12*a*. The LXX. find the parallel word in יִצְחָק, for they translate *μαστιγοῖ δὲ πάντα υἱόν, ὃν παραδέχεται*, and thus have read יִצְחָק or יִצְחָק.

Vers. 13-15. Such submission to God, the All-wise, the All-directing, who loves us with fatherly affection, is wisdom, and such wisdom is above all treasures.

- 13 Blessed is the man who has found wisdom,
And the man who has gained understanding;
14 For better is her acquisition than the acquisition of silver,
And her gain than fine gold.
15 More precious is she than corals;
And all thy jewels do not equal her value.

The imperfect יִצְחָק, which as the *Hiph.* of פָּקַד, *exire*, has the general meaning *educere*, interchanges with the perfect יָצָא. This bringing forth is either a delivering up, *i.e.* giving out or presenting, Isa. lviii. 10, Ps. cxl. 9, cxliv. 13 (cf. יָצָא, Arab. *nafak*, to give out, to pay out), or a fetching out, getting out, receiving, viii. 35, xii. 2, xviii. 22. Thus 13*a* reminds one of the parable of the treasure in the field, and 13*b* of that of the goodly pearl for which the ἑμπορος who sought the pearl parted with all that he had. Here also is declared the promise of him who trades with a merchant for the possession of wisdom; for פָּקַד and פָּקַד (both, as Isa. xxiii. 3, 18, xlv. 15, from פָּקַד, the latter after the forms יָצָא, יָצָא, without our needing to assume a second primary form, פָּקַד) go back to the root-word פָּקַד, to trade, go about as a trader,

with the fundamental meaning *ἐμπορεύεσθαι* (LXX.); and also the mention of the pearls is not wanting here, for at all events the meaning "pearls" has blended itself with פְּנִיִּים, which is a favourite word in the Mashal poetry, though it be not the original meaning of the word. In 14b פְּנִיִּים is surpassed by חָרָו (besides in the Proverbs, found only in this meaning in Ps. lxxviii. 14), which properly means ore found in a mine, from חָרַץ, to cut in, to dig up, and hence the poetic name of gold, perhaps of gold dug out as distinguished from molten gold. Hitzig regards χρυσός as identical with it; but this word (Sansk. without the ending *hir*, Zend. *zar*) is derived from *ghar*, to glitter (*vid.* Curtius). תְּבוּאָתָהּ we have translated "gain," for it does not mean the profit which wisdom brings, the tribute which it yields, but the gain, the possession of wisdom herself.

Ver. 15. As regards פְּנִיִּים, for which the *Kethib* has פְּנִיִּים, the following things are in favour of the fundamental meaning "corals," viz.: (1.) The name itself, which corresponds with the Arab. فَنّ; this word, proceeding from the root-idea of shooting forth, particularly after the manner of plants, means the branch and all that raises or multiplies itself branch-like or twig-like (Fleischer). (2.) The redness attributed to the פְּנִיִּים, Lam. iv. 7, in contradistinction to the pure whiteness attributed to snow and milk (*vid.* at Job xxviii. 18). The meaning of the word may, however, have become generalized in practice (LXX. in *loc.* λίθων πολυτελών, *Græc. Venet.* λιθιδίων); the meaning "pearls," given to it in the Job-Targum by Rashi, and particularly by Bochart, lay so much the nearer as one may have wrought also corals and precious stones, such as the carbuncle, sardius, and sapphire, into the form of pearls. יָקָרָה, in consequence of the retrogression of the tone, has *Munach* on the *penult.*, and that as an exception, as has been remarked by the Masora, since in substantives and proper names terminating in הָ the נכנס אחר, *i.e.* the receding of the tone, does not elsewhere appear, *e.g.* יָפָה הִיא, Gen. xii. 14, בָּרָה הִיא, Cant. vi. 9, יָצָרָה הִיא, Jer. xxx. 7. "חָפֶזֶן is first *abstr.*, a being inclined to something, lust, will, pleasure in anything, then also *concr.*, anything in which one has pleasure, what is beautiful, precious; cf. نفيس شئى, hence حجارة نفيسة, precious stones" (Fleischer). תָּוָה with תָּ means to be an equivalent (purchase-price,

exchange) for anything; the most natural construction in Arab. as well as in Hebr. is that with ל, to be the equivalent of a thing (*vid.* at Job xxxiii. 27); the ב is the *Beth pretii*, as if one said in Arab.: *biabi anta* thou art in the estimate of my father, I give it for thee. One distinctly perceives in vers. 14, 15, the echo of Job xxviii. This tetrastich occurs again with a slight variation at viii. 10, 11. The Talmud and the Midrash accent it so, that in the former the expression is וכל-חפצים, and in the latter וכל-חפצך, and they explain the latter of precious stones and pearls (אבנים טובות ומרגליות).

Vers. 16-18. That wisdom is of such incomparable value is here confirmed:

- 16 Length of days is in her right hand;
 In her left, riches and honour.
 17 Her ways are pleasant ways,
 And all her paths are peace.
 18 A tree of life is she to those that lay hold upon her,
 And he who always holdeth her fast is blessed.

As in the right hand of Jahve, according to Ps. xvi. 11, are pleasures for evermore, so Wisdom holds in her right hand "length of days," viz. of the days of life, thus life, the blessing of blessings; in her left, riches and honour (viii. 18), the two good things which, it is true, do not condition life, but, received from Wisdom, and thus wisely, elevate the happiness of life—in the right hand is the chief good, in the left the *προσθήκη*, Matt. vi. 33. Didymus: *Per sapientiæ dextram divinarum rerum cognitio, ex qua immortalitatis vita oritur, significatur; per sinistram autem rerum humanarum notitia, ex qua gloria opumque abundantia nascitur.* The LXX., as between 15a and 15b, so also here after ver. 16, interpolate two lines: "From her mouth proceedeth righteousness; justice and mercy she bears upon her tongue,"—perhaps translated from the Hebr., but certainly added by a reader.

Ver. 17. דרכי-נעים are ways on which one obtains what is agreeable to the inner and the outer man, and which it does good to enjoy. The parallel שְׁלוֹם is not a genitive to נְתִיבוֹת to be supplied; the paths of Wisdom are themselves שְׁלוֹם, for she brings well-being on all sides and deep inward satisfaction (peace). In regard to נְתִיבָה, *via eminens, elata*, Schultens is right (*vid.* under i. 15);¹ נְתִיבוֹתָהּ has *Munach*, and instead of the *Metheg*, *Tarcha*, *vid.* under i. 31b.

¹ The root is not תָּכַח, to grope, but נָתַח; whence Arab. *natt*, to bubble up, *natá*, to raise oneself, to swell up, etc.

The figure of the tree of life the fruit of which brings immortality, is, as xi. 30, xv. 4 (cf. xiii. 12), Rev. ii. 7, taken from the history of paradise in the Book of Genesis. The old ecclesiastical saying, *Lignum vitæ crux Christi*, accommodates itself in a certain measure, through Matt. xi. 19, Luke xi. 49, with this passage of the Book of Proverbs. אֲחַזְּקָהּ means to fasten upon anything, more fully expressed in Gen. xxi. 18, to bind the hand firm with anything, to seize it firmly. They who give themselves to Wisdom, come to experience that she is a tree of life whose fruit contains and communicates strength of life, and whoever always keeps fast hold of Wisdom is blessed, i.e. to be pronounced happy (Ps. xli. 3, *vid.* under Ps. cxxxvii. 8). The predicate אַשְׁרֵי, blessed, refers to each one of the חֹזְקֵיהָ, those who hold her, cf. xxvii. 16, Num. xxiv. 9. It is the so-called distributive singular of the predicate, which is freely used particularly in those cases where the plur. of the subject is a participle (*vid.* under ver. 35).

FIFTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, III. 19-26.

THE WORLD-CREATIVE WISDOM AS MEDIATRIX OF DIVINE PROTECTION.

O son, guard against seducers (i. 8 ff.); listen to the warning voice of Wisdom (i. 20 ff.); seek after Wisdom: she is the way to God, comes from God, and teaches thee to shun the wicked way and to walk in the way that is good (ii.); thou shalt obtain her if, renouncing self-confidence, thou givest thyself unreservedly to God (iii. 1-18)—these are the four steps, so far, of this introductory *παράδεισις*. Each discourse contributes its own to present vividly and impressively what Wisdom is and what she procures, her nature and her blessings. From her hand come all good gifts of God to men. She is the tree of life. Her place between God and men is thus that of a mediatrix.

Vers. 19, 20. This place of a mediatrix—the speaker here now continues—she had from the beginning. God's world-creating work was mediated by her:

19 Jahve hath by wisdom founded the earth,
Established the heavens by understanding.

20 By His knowledge the water-floods broke forth,
And the sky dropped down dew.

That wisdom is meant by which God planned the world-idea, and now also wrought it out; the wisdom in which God conceived the world ere it was framed, and by which also He gave external realization to His thoughts; the wisdom which is indeed an attribute of God and a characteristic of His actions, since she is a property of His nature, and His nature attests itself in her, but not less, as appears, not from this group of tetrastichs, but from all that has hitherto been said, and from the personal testimony, viii. 22 ff., of which it is the *præludium*, she goes forth as a divine power to which God has given to have life in herself. Considered apart from the connection of these discourses, this group of verses, as little as Jer. x. 2, Ps. civ. 24, determines regarding the attributive interpretation; the Jerusalem Targum, I., when it translates, Gen. i. 1, בְּרֵאשִׁית בְּחִכְמָתָא (בְּחִכְמָתָא), combines viii. 22 with such passages as this before us. יָסַד (here with the tone thrown back) properly signifies, like the Arab. *wasad*, to lay fast, to found, for one gives to a fact the firm basis of its existence. The parallel *Pil.* of בָּן (Arab. *kān*, cogn. בָּן, see on *Isaiah*, p. 691) signifies to set up, to restore; here equivalent to, to give existence.

Ver. 20. It is incorrect to understand 20*a*, with the Targ., of division, *i.e.* separating the water under the firmament from the water above the firmament; נִבְקַע is spoken of water, especially of its breaking forth, Gen. vii. 11, Ex. xiv. 21, cf. Ps. lxxiv. 15, properly dividing itself out, *i.e.* welling forth from the bowels of the earth; it means, without distinguishing the primordial waters and the later water-floods confined within their banks (cf. Job xxxviii. 8 f., Ps. civ. 6-8), the overflowing of the earth for the purpose of its processes of cultivation and the irrigation of the land. תְּהוֹמוֹת (from תָּהַם = הָהָם, to groan, to roar) are chiefly the internal water stores of the earth, Gen. xlix. 25, Ps. xxxiii. 7. But while 20*a* is to be understood of the waters under the firmament, 20*b* is to be interpreted of those above. שִׁתְּתָק (from שָׁתַק, Arab. *shak*, *comminuere*, *attenuare*) properly designates the uppermost stratum of air thinly and finely stretching itself far and wide, and then poetically the clouds of heaven (*vid.* under Ps. lxxvii. 18). Another name, עֲרִיפִים, comes from עָרַף, which is transposed from רָעַף (here used in 20*b*), Arab. *r'af*, to drop, to run. The טָל added on the object accusative represents synecdochically all the waters coming down from heaven

and fructifying the earth. This watering proceeds from above (ורעפו); on the contrary, the endowing of the surface of the earth with great and small rivers is a fundamental fact in creation (נבקע).

Vers. 21–22. From this eminence, in which the work of creation presents wisdom, exhortations are now deduced, since the writer always expresses himself only with an ethical intention regarding the nature of wisdom :

- 21 My son, may they not depart from thine eyes—
 Preserve thoughtfulness and consideration,
 22 And they will be life to thy soul
 And grace to thy neck.

If we make the synonyms of wisdom which are in 21*b* the subject *per prolepsin* to אֵל-יִלּוּי (Hitzig and Zöckler), then 19–20 and 21–22 clash. The subjects are wisdom, understanding, knowledge, which belong to God, and shall from Him become the possession of those who make them their aim. Regarding לָח, *obliquari, deflectere*, see under ii. 15, cf. iv. 21; regarding תִּשְׁיָה (here *defective* after the Masora, as rightly in Vened. 1515, 1521, and Nissel, 1662), see at ii. 7; יִלּוּי for תִּלְוִיָּה, see at iii. 2*b*. The LXX. (cf. Heb. ii. 1) translate without distinctness of reference: *νὴ ἐ μὴ παραρρῶνς* (*παραρρῶνς*), let it not flow past, *i.e.* let it not be unobserved, hold it always before thee; the Targ. with the Syr. render לָח נִילֵא, *ne vilesceat*, as if the words were אֵל-יִלּוּי. In 22*a* the *synallage generis* is continued: יִהְיֶה for יִתְהַיֶּה. Regarding נִרְנָה, see at i. 9. By wisdom the soul gains life, divinely true and blessed, and the external appearance of the man grace, which makes him pleasing and gains for him affection.

Vers. 23–26. But more than this, wisdom makes its possessor in all situations of life confident in God :

- 23 Then shalt thou go thy way with confidence,
 And thy foot shall not stumble.
 24 When thou liest down, thou art not afraid,
 But thou layest thyself down and hast sweet sleep.
 25 Thou needest not be afraid of sudden alarm,
 Nor for the storm of the wicked when it breaketh forth.
 26 For Jahve will be thy confidence
 And keep thy foot from the snare.

The לִבְטַח (cf. our "*bei guter Laune*" = in good cheer), with ל of the condition, is of the same meaning as the conditional adverbial accusative בְּטַח, x. 9, i. 33. Ver. 23*b* the LXX. translate *ὁ δὲ*

πούς σου οὐ μὴ προσκόψῃ, while, on the contrary, at Ps. xci. 12 they make the person the subject (μήποτε προσκόψῃς τὸν κ.τ.λ.); here also we retain more surely the subject from 23*a*, especially since for the intrans. of נָנַח (to smite, to push) a *Ilithpa*. הִתְנַנַּח is used Jer. xiii. 16. In ver. 24 there is the echo of Job xi. 18, and in ver. 25 of Job v. 21. 24*b* is altogether the same as Job v. 24*b*: *et decumbes et suavis erit somnus tuus = si decubueris, suavis erit*. The hypothetic perf., according to the sense, is both there and at Job xi. 18 (cf. Jer. xx. 9) oxytoned as *perf. consec.* Similar examples are vi. 22, Gen. xxxiii. 13, 1 Sam. xxv. 31, cf. Ewald, § 357*a*. עָרַבָה (of sleep as Jer. xxxi. 26) is from עָרַב, which in Hebr. is used of pleasing impressions, as the Arab. *ariba* of a lively, free disposition. הָיָה, *somnus* (nom. *actionis* from הָיָה, with the ground-form *sina* preserved in the Arab. *lidat*, vid. Job, p. 284, note), agrees in inflexion with הָיָה, *annus*. אֵל, ver. 25*a*, denies, like Ps. cxxi. 3, with emphasis: be afraid only not = thou hast altogether nothing to fear. Schultens rightly says: *Subest species prohibitionis et tanquam abominationis, ne tale quicquam vel in suspicionem veniat in mentemve cogitando admittatur*. פֶּחַד here means terror, as i. 26 f., the terrific object; פֶּחַדָּם (with the accus. *om*) is the virtual genitive, as xxvi. 2 חֶזֶק (with accus. *am*). Regarding שָׁאָה, see under i. 27. The genitive רִשְׁעִים may be, after Ps. xxxvii. 17, the *genit. subjecti*, but still it lies nearer to say that he who chooses the wisdom of God as his guiding star has no ground to fear punishment as transgressors have reason to fear it; the שָׁאָה is meant which wisdom threatens against transgressors, i. 27. He needs have no fear of it, for wisdom is a gift of God, and binds him who receives it to the giver: Jahve becomes and is henceforth his confidence. Regarding ב *essentia*, which expresses the closest connection of the subject with the predicate which it introduces, see under Ps. xxxv. 2. As here, so also at Ex. xviii. 4, Ps. cxviii. 7, cxlvi. 5, the predicate is a noun with a pronominal suffix. בָּסָל is, as at Ps. lxxviii. 7, Job xxxi. 24, cognate to מִבְּטָח and מִקְוֶה,¹ the object and ground of confidence. That the word in other connections may mean also foolhardiness, Ps. xlix. 14, and folly, Eccles. vii. 25 (cf. regarding בָּסָל, which in Arab. as *belid* denotes the dull, in Hebr. fools, see under i. 22), it follows that it proceeds from the fundamental con-

¹ According to Malbim, מִקְוֶה is the expectation of good, and בָּסָל, confidence in the presence of evil.

ception of fulness of flesh and of fat, whence arise the conceptions of dulness and slothfulness, as well as of confidence, whether confidence in self or in God (see Schultens *l.c.*, and Wünsche's *Hosea*, p. 207 f.). לָכַד is taking, catching, as in a net or trap or pit, from לָכַד, to catch (cf. Arab. *lakida*, to fasten, III. IV. to hold fast); another root-meaning, in which Arab. *lak* connects itself with *nak*, נָקַד, to strike, to assail (whence *al-lakdat*, the assault against the enemy, *Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitsch.* xxii. 140), is foreign to the Hebr. Regarding the כֶּן of כִּלְכֹּד, Fleischer remarks: "The כֶּן after verbs of guarding, preserving, like נִשְׁמַר and נִצָּר, properly expresses that one by those means holds or seeks to hold a person or thing back from something, like the Lat. *defendere, tueri aliquem ab hostibus, a periculo.*"¹

SIXTH INTRODUCTORY MASAL DISCOURSE, III. 27-35.

EXHORTATION TO BENEVOLENCE AND RECTITUDE.

The promise in which it terminates, designates the close of the fifth discourse. The sixth differs from it in this, that, like none of the preceding, it adds proverb to proverb. The first series recommends love to one's neighbour, and the second warns against fellowship with the uncharitable.

Vers. 27, 28. The first illustration of neighbourly love which is recommended, is readiness to serve:

¹ Hitzig rejects iii. 22-26 as a later interpolation. And why? Because iii., which he regards as a complete discourse, consists of twice ten verses beginning with כִּנִּי. In addition to this symmetry other reasons easily reveal themselves to his penetration. But the discourses contained in chap. i.-ix. do not all begin with כִּנִּי (*vid.* i. 20); and when it stands in the beginning of the discourse, it is not always the first word (*vid.* i. 8); and when it occurs as the first word or in the first line, it does not always commence a new discourse (*vid.* i. 15 in the middle of the first, iii. 11 in the middle of the fourth); and, moreover, the Hebr. poetry and oratory does not reckon according to verses terminated by *Soph Pasuk*, which are always accented distichs, but they in reality frequently consist of three or more lines. The rejected verses are in nothing unlike those that remain, and which are undisputed; they show the same structure of stichs, consisting for the most part of three, but sometimes also only of two words (cf. iii. 22b with i. 9b, 10b), the same breadth in the course of the thoughts, and the same accord with Job and Deuteronomy.

- 27 Refuse no manner of good to him to whom it is due
When it is in thy power to do it.
28 Say not to thy neighbour, "Go, and come again,
To-morrow I will give it," whilst yet thou hast it.

Regarding the intensive plur. בְּעָלָי with a sing. meaning, see under i. 19. The form of expression without the suffix is not בְּעָלִי but בְּעַל טוֹב; and this denotes here, not him who does good (בעל as Arab. *dhw* or *ṣahab*), but him to whom the good deed is done (cf. xvii. 8), i.e. as here, him who is worthy of it (בעל as Arab. *ahl*), him who is the man for it (Jewish interp.: מִי שֶׁהוּא רָאוּי לוֹ). We must refuse nothing good (nothing either legally or morally good) to him who has a right to it (כִּינֵעַ כֵּן as Job xxii. 7, xxxi. 16),¹ if we are in a condition to do him this good. The phrase יִשְׁלַח יָדִי, Gen. xxxi. 29, and frequently, signifies: it is belonging to (practicable) the power of my hand, i.e. I have the power and the means of doing it. As יָד signifies the haughty, insolent, but may be also used in the neuter of insolent conduct (*vid.* Ps. xix. 14), so אֵל signifies the strong, but also (although only in this phrase) strength. The *Keri* rejects the plur. יָדַי, because elsewhere the hand always follows אֵל in the singular. But it rejects the plur. לְרַעֲיָךְ (ver. 28) because the address following is directed to one person. Neither of these emendations was necessary. The usage of the language permits exceptions, notwithstanding the *usus tyrannus*, and the plur. לְרַעֲיָךְ may be interpreted distributively: to thy fellows, it may be this one or that one. Hitzig also regards לְרַעֲיָךְ as a singular; but the mas. of רָעָה, the ground-form of which is certainly *raʿj*, is רָעָה, or shorter, רָע. לֵךְ הָיָה does not mean: forth! go home again! but: go, and come again. שׁוּב, to come again, to return to something, to seek it once more.² The וֹ of וְיִשְׁ אַתָּה is, as 29b, the conditional: *quum sit penes te, sc. quod ei des*. "To-morrow shall I give" is less a promise than a delay and putting off, because it is difficult for him to alienate himself from him who makes the request. This

¹ Accentuate אֵל-חֲמֻנֶּה טוֹב, not אֵל-חֲמֻנֶּה טוֹב. The doubling of the *Makkeph* is purposeless, and, on the contrary, the separating of טוֹב from מִבְּעָלָי by the *Dechi* (the separating accent subordinate to *Athnach*) is proper. It is thus in the best mss.

² Thus also (Arab.) *rajʿ* is used in Thaalebi's *Confidential Companion*, p. 24, line 3, of Flügel's ed. Admission was prevented to one Hasehmid, then angry he sought it once more; he was again rejected, then he sought it not again (Arab. *fin yrajʿ*), but says, etc. Flügel has misunderstood the passage. Fleischer explains *rajʿ*, with reference to Prov. iii. 28, by *revenir à la charge*.

holding fast by one's own is unamiable selfishness; this putting off in the fulfilment of one's duty is a sin of omission—οὐ γὰρ οἶδας, as the LXX. adds, *τί τέξεται ἢ ἐπιούσα*.

Ver. 29. A second illustration of neighbourly love is harmlessness:

Devise not evil against thy neighbour,
While he dwelleth securely by thee.

The verb *חָרַץ*, *χαράσσειν*, signifies to cut into, and is used of the *faber ferrarius* as well as of the *tignarius* (*Isaiah*, p. 463), who with a cutting instrument (*חֲרִיץ*, *Gen.* iv. 22) works with metal or wood, and from his profession is called *חָרָץ*. But the word means as commonly to plough, *i.e.* to cut with the plough, and *חֲרִיץ* is used also of a ploughman, and, without any addition to it, it always has this meaning. It is then a question whether the metaphorical phrase *חָרַץ רָעָה* signifies to fabricate evil, cf. *dolorum faber*, *mendacia procudere*, *ψευδῶν καὶ ἀπατῶν τέκτων*, and the Homeric *κακὰ φρεσὶ βυσσοδομεύειν* (Fleischer and most others), or to plough evil (Rashi, Ewald, etc.). The Targ., Syriac, and Jerome translate *חָרַץ*, without deciding the point, by *moliri*; but the LXX. and *Græcus Venet.* by *τεκταίνειν*. The correctness of these renderings is not supported by *Ezek.* xxi. 36, where *חָרָשֵׁי מַשְׁחִית* are not such as fabricate destruction, but smiths who cause destruction; also *מַחְרִישׁ*, 1 Sam. xxiii. 9, proves nothing, and probably does not at all appertain to *חָרַץ* *incidere* (Keil), but to *חָרַץ* *silere*, in the sense of *dolose moliri*. On the one hand, it is to be observed from *Job* iv. 8, *Ios.* x. 13, cf. *Ps.* cxxix. 3, that the meaning *avare malum* might connect itself with *חָרַץ רָעָה*; and the proverb of *Sirach* vii. 12, *μη ἀροτρία ψεύδος ἐπ' ἀδελφῷ σου*, places this beyond a doubt. Therefore in this phrase, if one keeps before him a clear perception of the figure, at one time the idea of fabricating, at another that of ploughing, is presented before us. The usage of the language in the case before us is more in favour of the latter than of the former. Whether *יָשָׁב אִתּוֹ* means to dwell together with, or as Böttcher, to sit together with, after *Ps.* i. 1, xxvi. 4 f., need not be a matter of dispute. It means in general a continued being together, whether as sitting, *Job* ii. 13, or as dwelling, *Judg.* xvii. 11.¹ To take advantage of the regardlessness of him who imparts

¹ Accentuate *לְבָטָח* *וְהוּא יִשְׁכַּח*. It is thus in correct texts. The *Rebia Mugrash* is transformed, according to the *Accentuationssystem*, xviii. § 2.

to us his confidence is unamiable. Love is doubly owing to him who resigns himself to it because he believes in it.

Ver. 30. A third illustration of the same principle is peaceableness :

Contend not with a man without a cause,
When he has inflicted no evil upon thee.

Instead of תִּרִיב, or as the *Keri* has amended it תִּרִיב, the abbreviated form תִּרִב or תִּרִב would be more correct after אֵל; רִיב or רִיב (from רִב, to be compact) means to fall upon one another, to come to hand-blows, to contend. Contending and quarrelling with a man, whoever he may be, without sufficient reason, ought to be abandoned; but there exists no such reason if he has done me no harm which I have to reproach him with. נָמַל רָעָה with the accus. or dat. of the person signifies to bring evil upon any one, *malum inferre*, or also *referre* (Schultens), for נָמַל (cogn. נָמַר) signifies to execute, to complete, accomplish,—both of the initiative and of the requital, both of the anticipative and of the recompensing action; here in the former of these senses.

Vers. 31, 32. These exhortations to neighbourly love in the form of warning against whatever is opposed to it, are followed by the warning against fellowship with the loveless :

31 Be not envious toward the man of violence,
And have no pleasure in all his ways.

32 For an abhorrence to Jahve is the perverse,
But with the upright is His secret.

The conceptions of jealousy and envy lie in קִנְיָה (derived by Schultens from קָנָה, Arab. *kand*, *intensius rubere*) inseparable from each other. The LXX., which for תִּקְנָה reads תִּקְנָה (κτῆσις), brings the envy into 31b, as if the words here were וְאֵל-תִּתְחַר, as in Ps. xxxvii. 1, 7 (there the LXX. has μὴ παραζήλου, here μηδὲ ζηλώσης). There is no reason for correcting our text in accordance with this (substituting תִּתְחַר for תִּתְחַר as Hitzig does), because בְּכָל-יְדָכֶי would be too vague an expression for the object of the envy, while אֶל-תִּתְחַר altogether agrees with it; and the contrary remark, that בְּבָחַר is fundamentally no בָּחַר, fails, since (1) בָּחַר frequently expresses pleasure in anything without the idea of choice, and (2) "have not pleasure in all his ways" is in the Hebrew style equivalent to "in any one of his ways;" Ewald, § 323b. He who does "violence to the law" (Zeph. iii. 4) becomes thereby, according to the common course of the world, a person who is feared, whose autho-

riches, power, and resources are increased, but one must not therefore envy him, nor on any side take pleasure in his conduct, which in all respects is to be reprobated; for the גִּלְיוֹן, *inflexus, tortuosus* (*vid. ii. 15*), who swerves from the right way and goes in a crooked false way, is an object of Jahve's abhorrence, while, on the contrary, the just, who with a right mind walks in the right way, is Jahve's סוֹד—an echo of Ps. xxv. 14. סוֹד (סֹד, to be firm, compressed) means properly the being pressed together, or sitting together (*cf. the Arab. wisād, wisādt, a cushion, divan, corresponding in form to the Hebr. יְסוֹד*) for the purpose of private communication and conversation (הַיְסוֹד), and then partly the confidential intercourse, as here (*cf. Job xxix. 4*), partly the private communication, the secret (*Amos iii. 7*). LXX., ἐν δὲ δίκαιοις [οὗ] συνεδριάζει. Those who are out of the way, who prefer to the simplicity of right-doing all manner of crooked ways, are contrary to God, and He may have nothing to do with them; but the right-minded He makes partakers of His most intimate intercourse, He deals with them as His friends.

Ver. 33. The prosperity of the godless, far from being worthy of envy, has as its reverse side the curse:

The curse of Jahve is in the house of the godless,
And the dwelling of the just He blesseth.

מָאָרָה (a curse), like מִסְלָה (a highway, from סָלַל), is formed from חָרַר (*cf. Arab. harr, detestari, abhorrere, a word-imitation of an interjection used in disagreeable experiences*). The curse is not merely a deprivation of external goods which render life happy, and the blessing is not merely the fulness of external possessions; the central-point of the curse lies in continuous disquiet of conscience, and that of the blessing in the happy consciousness that God is with us, in soul-rest and peace which is certain of the grace and goodness of God. The poetic נֶחֱד (from נָח = Arab. *nwy, tetendit aliquo*) signifies the place of settlement, and may be a word borrowed from a nomad life, since it denotes specially the pasture-ground; *cf. xxiv. 15* (Fleischer). While the curse of God rests in the house of the wicked (*vid. Köhler on Zech. v. 4*), He blesses, on the contrary, the dwelling-place of the righteous. The LXX. and Jerome read יִבְרָךְ, but יִבְרָךְ is more agreeable, since God continues to be the subject.

Ver. 34. His relation to men is determined by their relation to Him.

As for the scorers, He scorneth them,
But to the lowly He giveth grace.

Most interpreters render the verse thus: "If the scorner He (even He, in return) scorneth, so He (on the other hand) giveth grace to the lowly." For the sequence of the words in the consequence, in which the precedence of the verb is usual, *e.g.* Lev. xii. 5, we are referred to xxiii. 18, cf. xxiv. 14; but why had the poet placed the two facts in the relation of condition and consequence? The one fact is not the consequence but the reverse of the other, and accordingly they are opposed to each other in coordinated passages, Ps. xviii. 26 f. The *Vav* in such antitheses has generally the meaning of "and on the other hand," *e.g.* Job viii. 20, while the LXX., Targ., Syriac, and Jerome altogether pass over the עַל as if it did not exist. Ziegler translates: "Truly! the scorner He scorneth;" but an affirmative עַל does not exist, the asseveration after the manner of an oath is negative. Bertheau's expedient would be more acceptable, by which he makes the whole of ver. 34 the protasis to ver. 35; but if this were intended, another subject would not enter into ver. 35. Thus 34a and 34b are two independent parallel passages; עַל-לַמְסִיחִים is the protasis: if as regards the scorers, *i.e.* if His conduct is directed to the scorers, so He scorneth. The וְ denotes relation, and in this elliptical usage is like the וְ of superscription, *e.g.* Jer. xxiii. 9. אֲנִי is the emphatic *αὐτός*: He on the contrary, and in a decisive way (Ewald, § 314ab). Instead of לַמְסִיחִים there might have been used לַמְסִיחִים (for לַמְסִיחִים , where it occurs as a governing word, has the accusative, xix. 28, Ps. cxix. 51), but we do not miss the object: if it relates to scorers (thus also Löwenstein translates), so it is He in return who scorneth. The LXX. renders it: *κύριος ὑπερηφάνους ἀντιτάσσεται, ταπεινοῖς δὲ δίδωσι χάριν*; cf. Jas. iv. 6, 1 Pet. v. 5. אֲנִי is used as a name of God (*Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitschr.* xvi. 400), on which account it is rendered like יהוה by *κύριος*. A *ὑπερήφανος* (appearing above others, *i.e.* overbearing) is the רָם , according to the definition xxi. 24. The expression of the *talio* is generalized in *ἀντιτάσσεται* (resists them). For עַל-לַמְסִיחִים the *Kerī* has עַל-לַמְסִיחִים : עַל (from עָנָה , the ground-form עָנָה , Arab. *'anaw*) is the lowly (*ταπεινός*), or he who bends himself, *i.e.* the gentle and humble, the patient, and the passive עָנָה , he who is bowed down, the suffering; but the limits of the conception are moveable, since in עַל is presupposed the possession of fruit-virtues gained in the school of affliction,

Ver. 35. This group of the proverbs of wisdom now suitably closes with the fundamental contrast between the wise and fools :

The wise shall inherit honour,
But fools carry away shame.

If we take יִבְסִילִים as the object, then we can scarcely interpret the clause : shame sweeps fools away (Umbreit, Zöckler, Bertheau), for הָרִים [Hiph. of רָם] signifies (Isa. lvii. 14, Ezek. xxi. 31) "to raise up anything high and far," not "to sweep away." Preferable is the rendering : τὸὺς δ' ἀφρονὰς ὑψοῖ ἀτίμια (Græc. Venet., and similarly Jerome), i.e. only to it do they owe their celebrity as warning examples (Ewald), to which Oetinger compares "whose glory is in their shame," Phil. iii. 19;¹ but קָלֹן is the contrary of כְּבוֹד (glory, Hab. ii. 16), and therefore is as much an object conception as is the latter, 35a. If it is the object, then if we take מְרִים from מָר after the form of לָן, Neh. xiii. 21 = מְמִירִים (Hos. iv. 7), it might be rendered : Yet fools exchange shame (Löwenstein). But מָר, like the Arab. *mr*, transire, means properly to pass over or to wander over; it is intransitive, and only in Hiph. signifies actively to exchange. מְרִים thus will be the participle of הָרִים; the plur. taken distributively (fools=whoever is only always a fool) is connected with the singular of the predicate. This change in the number is here, however, more difficult than at iii. 18, and in other places, where the plur. of the part. permits the resolution into a relative clause with *quicunque*, and more difficult than at xxviii. 1, where the sing. of the predicate is introduced by attraction; wherefore מְרִים may be an error in transcribing for מְרִימִים or מְרִימִי (Büttcher). J. H. Michaelis (after the Targ. and Syr.) has properly rendered the clause : "*stulti tollunt ignominiam tanquam portionem suam*," adding "*quæ derivato nomine תְּרוּמָה dicitur*." הָרִים signifies, in the language of the sacrificial worship and of worship generally, to lift off from anything the best portion, the legitimate portion due to God and the priesthood (*vid.* at iii. 9); for which reason Rashi glosses מְרִים by מְפָרִישׁ לוֹ, and Ralbag by מְנִיחַ לוֹ. See xiv. 29. Honour is that which the wise inherit, it falls to them unsought as a possession, but fools receive shame as the offal (*viz.* of their foolish conduct). The fut. and part. are significantly interchanged. The life of the wise ends in glory, but

¹ Jona Gerundi renders it otherwise : "But shame raises the fools high;" i.e. only the infamous, he who has no sense of honour, makes much advancement out of fools.

fools inherit shame; the fruit of their conduct is shame and evermore shame.

SEVENTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, IV.-V. 6.

RECOLLECTIONS OF HIS FATHER'S HOUSE.

The means are not yet exhausted by which the teacher of wisdom seeks to procure acceptance for his admonitions and warnings, and to give them emphasis. He has introduced the importance of his person in order that he might gain the heart of the disciple, and has presented as speaker, instead of himself, the revered person of Wisdom herself, who seeks to win, by means of warnings and promises, the souls of men.

Chap. iv. 1-4. He now confirms and explains the command to duty which he has placed at the beginning of the whole (i. 8). This he does by his own example, for he relates from the history of his own youth, to the circle of disciples by whom he sees himself surrounded, what good doctrine his parents had taught him regarding the way of life :

- 1 Hear, ye sons, the instruction of a father,
And attend that ye may gain understanding ;
- 2 For I give to you good doctrine,
Forsake not my direction !
- 3 For I was a son to my father,
A tender and only (son) in the sight of my mother.
- 4 And he instructed me, and said to me :
" Let thine heart hold fast my words :
Observe my commandments and live ! "

That בָּנִים in the address comes here into the place of בְּנִי, hitherto used, externally denotes that בְּנִי in the progress of these discourses finds another application : the poet himself is so addressed by his father. Intentionally he does not say אֲבִיָּם (cf. i. 8) : he does not mean the father of each individual among those addressed, but himself, who is a father in his relation to them as his disciples ; and as he manifests towards them fatherly love, so also he can lay claim to paternal authority over them. לִרְעָה is rightly vocalized, not לִרְעָה. The words do not give the object of attention, but the design, the aim. The combination of ideas in רְעָה בִּינָה (cf. i. 2),

which appears to us singular, loses its strangeness when we remember that דעת means, according to its etymon, deposition or reception into the conscience and life. Regarding לָמַד, apprehension, reception, lesson = doctrine, *vid.* i. 5. נָתַתִּי is the perf., which denotes as fixed and finished what is just now being done, Gesenius, § 126, 4. עָבַד is here synonym of עָשָׂה, i. 8, and the contrary of עָזַר, xxviii. 4. The relative *factum* in the perfect, designating the circumstances under which the event happened, regularly precedes the chief *factum* וַיִּתֵּן; see under Gen. i. 2 f. Superficially understood, the expression 3a would be a platitude; the author means that the natural legal relation was also confirming itself as a moral one. It was a relation of many-sided love, according to 3a: he was esteemed of his mother—לִפְנֵי, used of the reflex in the judgment, Gen. x. 9, and of loving care, Gen. xvii. 18, means this—as a tender child, and therefore tenderly to be protected (כִּי as Gen. xxxiii. 13), and as an only child, whether he were so in reality, or was only loved as if he were so. יָחִיד (Aq., Sym., Theod., *μονογενής*) may with reference to number also mean *unice dilectus* (LXX. ἀγαπώμενος); cf. Gen. xxii. 2, יָחִידָהּ (where the LXX. translate τὸν ἀγαπητόν, without therefore having יָדִידָהּ before them). לִפְנֵי is maintained by all the versions; לִבְנֵי is not a variant.¹ The instruction of the father begins with the jussive, which is pointed² יִתְחַזֵּק to distinguish it from יִתְחַזֵּק on account of the *δ*. The LXX. has incorrectly ἐπειδέτω, as if the word were יִסְמַח; Symmachus has correctly κατεχέτω. The imper. וְתָהָה is, as vii. 2, Gen. xx. 7, more than וְתָהָה; the teacher seeks, along with the means, at the same time their object: Observe my commandments, and so become a partaker of life! The Syriac, however, adds וְתוֹרָתִי כְּאֵשׁוֹן עֵינֶיךָ [and my instruction as the apple of thine eye], a clause borrowed from vii. 2.

Vers. 5, 6. The exhortation of the father now specializes itself:

5 Get wisdom, get understanding;

Forget not and turn not from the words of my mouth.

¹ In some editions לִבְנֵי is noted as *Keri* to לִפְנֵי, but erroneously and contrary to the express evidence of the Masora, which affirms that there are two passages in which we ought to read not לִפְנֵי, but לִבְנֵי, viz. Ps. lxxx. 3 and Prov. iv. 3.

² The writing of יִתְחַזֵּק with the grave *Metheg* (*Gaja*) and *Kamets-Chatuph* (*ô*) is that of Ben Asber; on the other hand, יִתְחַזֵּק with *Cholem* (*ô*) and the permanent *Metheg* is that of Ben Naphtali; *vid. Michlol* 21a (under the verbal form 25), § 30.

- 6 Forsake her not, so shall she preserve thee;
Love her, so shall she keep thee.

Wisdom and understanding are (5a) thought of as objects of merchandise (cf. xxiii. 23, iii. 14), like the one pearl of great price, Matt. xiii. 46, and the words of fatherly instruction (5b), accordingly, as offering this precious possession, or helping to the acquisition of it. One cannot indeed say correctly אֶל-תִּשְׁכַּח מֵאַחֲרַיִם (Ps. cii. 5); and in this sense אֶל-תִּשְׁכַּח goes before, or also the accus. object, which in אֶל-תִּשְׁכַּח the author has in his mind, may, since he continues with אֶל-תִּשְׁכַּח, now not any longer find expression as such. That the אֶמְרַיִם are the means of acquiring wisdom is shown in ver. 6, where this continues to be the primary idea. The verse, consisting of only four words, ought to be divided by *Mugrash*; ¹ the *Vav* (ו) in both halves of the verse introduces the *apodosis imperativi* (cf. e.g. iii. 9 f., and the *apodosis prohibitivi*, iii. 21 f.). The actual representation of wisdom, ver. 5, becomes in ver. 6 personal.

Vers. 7-9. Referring to ver. 5, the father further explains that wisdom begins with the striving after it, and that this striving is itself its fundamental beginning:

- 7 The beginning of wisdom is "Get wisdom,"
And with [um, at the price of] all thou hast gotten get understanding.
8 Esteem her, so shall she lift thee up;
She will bring thee honour if thou dost embrace her.
9 She will put on thine head a graceful garland,
She will bestow upon thee a glorious diadem.

In the motto of the book, i. 7, the author would say that the fear of Jahve is that from which all wisdom takes its origin. יִרְאַת יְהוָה (i. 7) is the subject, and as such it stands foremost. Here he means to say what the beginning of wisdom consists in. רֵאשִׁית חִכְמָה is the subject, and stands forth as such. The predicate may also be read קְנֵה-חִכְמָה (= קְנֵה), after xvi. 16. The beginning of wisdom is (consists in) the getting of wisdom; but the imperative קְנֵה, which also Aq., Sym., Theod. (κατῆσαι), Jerome, Syr., Targ. express (the LXX. leaves ver. 7 untranslated), is supported by 7b. Hitzig, after Mercier, De Dieu, and Döderlein, translates the verse

¹ According to correct readings in codd. and older editions, וְתִשְׁכַּח has also indeed *Rebia Mugrash*, and אֶחָבָה, *Mercha* (with *Zinnorith*); *vid. Torah Emeth*, p. 47, § 6; *Accentuationssystem*, xviii. § 1, 2; and regarding the *Zinnorith*, see *Liber Psalmorum Hebraicus* by S. Baer, p. xii.

thus: "the highest thing is wisdom; get wisdom," which Zöckler approves of; but the reasons which determine him to this rendering are subtleties: if the author had wished himself to be so understood, he ought at least to have written the words **רִאשִׁית הַחֵכְמָה**. But **רִאשִׁית הַחֵכְמָה** is a genitive of relation, as is to be expected from the relativity of the idea **רִאשִׁית**, and his intention is to say that the beginning of wisdom consists in the proposition **קִנְיָה חֵכְמָה** (cf. the similar formula, Eccles. xii. 13); this proposition is truly the *lapis philosophorum*, it contains all that is necessary in order to becoming wise. Therefore the Greek *σοφία* called itself modestly *φιλοσοφία*; for *ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς* the Book of Wisdom has, vi. 18, *ἡ ἀληθεστάτη παιδείας ἐπιθυμία*. In 7b the proposition is expressed which contains the *specificum* helping to wisdom. The **אֶ** denotes price: give all for wisdom (Matt. xiii. 46, 44); no price is too high, no sacrifice too great for it.

Ver. 8. The meaning of the **אִפְּךָ גֵּבִי** is determined by **רומם** in the parallel clause; **גֵּבִי** signifies to raise, exalt, as a way or dam by heaping up; the *Pilpel*, here tropical: to value or estimate highly. Böttcher interprets well: hold it high in price, raise it (as a purchaser) always higher, make offer for it upon offer. The LXX. (approved by Bertheau), *περιχαράκωσον αὐτήν*, circumvallate it, i.e. surround it with a wall (**סִלְלָהּ**)—a strange and here unsuitable figure. Hold it high, says the author, and so it will reward¹ thee with a high place, and (with chiasmic transposition of the performance and the consequence) she will honour² thee if (**ἐάν**) thou lovingly embracest her. **חִבְּבָהּ** is used of embracing in the pressure of tender love, as in the Canticles ii. 6, viii. 3; the *Piel* is related to the *Kal* as *amplexari* to *amplecti*. Wisdom exalts her admirers, honours her lovers, and makes a man's appearance pleasant, causing him to be revered when he approaches. Regarding **לִי־תִתֶּנּוּ**, *vid.* i. 9. **מִנֵּן**, to deliver up (Gen. xiv. 20), to give up (Hos. xi. 8), is connected in the free poetic manner with two accusatives, instead of with an accus. and dat. LXX. has *ὑπερασπίσῃ*, but one does not defend himself (as with a shield) by a wreath or crown.

¹ Löwenstein has rightly **וְחִיָּתָהּ**, *vid.* my preface to Baer's *Genesis*, p. vii.

² We read **תְּכַבֵּדְךָ**, not **תְּכַבֵּדְךָ** (Hahn) or **תְּכַבֵּדְךָ** (Löwenstein); the tone lies on the *penult.*, and the tone-syllable has the point *Tsere*, as in **וְיִנְיָךְ**, Deut. xxxii. 7; *vid.* *Michlol* 66b.

Vers. 10-12. There is no reason for the supposition that the warning which his father gave to the poet now passes over into warnings given by the poet himself (Hitzig); the admonition of the father thus far refers only in general to the endeavour after wisdom, and we are led to expect that the good doctrines which the father communicates to the son as a *viaticum* will be further expanded, and become more and more specific when they take a new departure.

- 10 Hearken, my son, and receive my sayings,
So shall the years of life be increased to thee.
- 11 In the way of wisdom have I taught thee,
Guided thee in the paths of rectitude.
- 12 When thou goest, thy step shall not be straitened;
And if thou runnest, thou shalt not stumble.

Regarding קָח (לָקַח) of appropriating reception and taking up in *succum et sanguinem*, *vid.* i. 3; regarding שְׁנוֹת חַיִּים, years not merely of the duration of life, but of the enjoyment of life, iii. 2; regarding מַעְגָּל (מַעְגָּלָה), path (track), ii. 9; regarding הַדֶּרֶךְ, of the department and subject of instruction, Ps. xxv. 8. The perfects, ver. 11, are different from בְּתַחֲמֵי, 2a; they refer to rules of life given at an earlier period, which are summarily repeated in this address. The way of wisdom is that which leads to wisdom (Job xxviii. 23); the paths of rectitude, such as trace out the way which is in accordance with the rule of the good and the right. If the youth holds to this direction, he will not go on in darkness or uncertainty with anxious footsteps; and if in youthful fervour he flies along his course, he will not stumble on any unforeseen obstacle and fall. יָצַר is as a metaplastic fut. to צָרַר or צָר, to be narrow, to straiten, formed as if from יָצַר. The Targ. after Aruch,¹ לֹא תִשְׁנֹק אֶרְחֶךָ, thou shalt not need to bind together (*constringere*) or to hedge up thy way.

Vers. 13-17. The exhortations attracting by means of promises, now become warnings fitted to alarm:

- 13 Hold fast to instruction, let her not go;
Keep her, for she is thy life.
- 14 Into the path of the wicked enter not,
And walk not in the way of the evil.

¹ [R. Nathan ben Jeziel, A.D. 1106, who is usually styled by the Jewish writers בַּעַל עֵרְבָן, *Auctor Aruch*, author of a Talmudical Lexicon.]

- 15 Avoid it, enter not into it;
Turn from it and pass away.
16 For they cannot sleep unless they do evil,
And they are deprived of sleep unless they bring others to ruin.
17 For they eat the bread of wickedness,
And they drink the wine of violence.

Elsewhere מִנְסָר means also self-discipline, or moral religious education, i. 3; here discipline, i.e. parental educative counsel. תָּרַף is the segolated fut. apoc. *Hiph.* (indic. תִּרְפֶּה) from *tarp*, cf. the imper. *Hiph.* תִּרְרָה from *harp*. נִצָּרָה is the imper. *Kal* (not *Piel*, as Aben Ezra thinks) with *Dagesh dirimens*; cf. the verbal substantive נִצָּרָה, Ps. cxli. 3, with similar *Dagesh*, after the form יִקְרָה, Gen. xlix. 10. מִנְסָר (elsewhere always masc.) is here used in the fem. as the synonym of the name of wisdom: keep her (instruction), for she is thy life,¹ i.e. the life of thy life. In ver. 14 the godless (*vid.* on the root-idea of רָשָׁע under Ps. i. 1) and the habitually wicked, i.e. the vicious, stand in parallelism; בּוֹא and אֵשֶׁר are related as entering and going on, *ingressus* and *progressus*. The verb אֵשֶׁר signifies, like יָשָׁר, to be straight, even, fortunate, whence אֵשֶׁר = Arab. *yusār*, happiness, and to step straight out, ix. 6, of which meanings אֵשֶׁר is partly the intensive, as here, partly the causative, xxiii. 19 (elsewhere causative of the meaning, to be happy, Gen. xxx. 13). The meaning *progređi* is not mediated by a supplementary אֵשֶׁר; the derivative אֵשֶׁר (אֵשֶׁר), a step, shows that it is derived immediately from the root-idea of a movement in a straight line. Still less justifiable is the rendering by Schultens, *ne vestigia imprimas in via malorum*; for the Arab. *áththr* is denom. of *ithr*, אֵתֶר, the primitive verb roots of which, *athr*, אֵתֶר = אֵשֶׁר, are lost.

Ver. 15. On פָּרַעְתָּהוּ, avoid it (the way), (*opp.* אָהַז, Job xvii. 9; תָּמַךְ, Ps. xvii. 5), see under i. 25. שָׁטָה, elsewhere (as the Arab. *shatt*, to be without measure, insolent) used in *malam partem*, has here its fundamental meaning, to go aside. מֵעָלַי (expressed in French by *de dessus*, in Ital. by *di sopra*) denotes: so that thou comest not to stand on it. עָבַר means in both cases *transire*, but the second instance, "to go beyond (farther)" (cf. 2 Sam. xv. 22, and under Hab. i. 11), coincides with "to escape, *evadere*."

Ver. 16. In the reason here given the perf. may stand in the con-

¹ Punctuate כִּי הִיא; the *Zinnorith* represents the place of the *Makkeph*, *vid. Torah Emeth*, p. 9.

ditional clauses as well as in Virgil's *Et si non aliqua nocuisses, mortuus esses*; but the fut., as in Eccles. v. 11, denotes that they (the רָעִים and the רָשָׁעִים) cannot sleep, and are deprived of their sleep, unless they are continually doing evil and bringing others into misery; the interruption of this course of conduct, which has become to them like a second nature, would be as the interruption of their diet, which makes them ill. For the *Kal* יִשְׁכַּח, which here must have the meaning of the person sinning (cf. ver. 19), and would be feeble if used of the confirmed transgressors, the *Keri* rightly substitutes the *Hiphil* יִשְׁכַּח, which occurs also 2 Chron. xxv. 8, there without an object, in the meaning to cause to fall, as the contrast of עָזַר (to help).

Ver. 17. The second ו introduces the reason of their bodily welfare being conditioned by evil-doing. If the poet meant: they live on bread which consists in wickedness, i.e. on wickedness as their bread, then in the parallel sentence he should have used the word הָרָם; the genitives are meant of the means of acquisition: they live on unrighteous gain, on bread and wine which they procure by wickedness and by all manner of violence or injustice. On the etymon of הָרָם (Arab. *hamas*, *durum*, *asperum*, *vehementem esse*), *vid.* Schultens; the plur. הָרָמִים belongs to a more recent epoch (*vid.* under 2 Sam. xxii. 49 and Ps. xviii. 49). The change in the tense represents the idea that they having eaten such bread, set forth such wine, and therewith wash it down.

Vers. 18, 19. The two ways that lie for his choice before the youth, are distinguished from one another as light is from darkness:

- 18 And the path of the just is like the brightness of the morning light,
Which shines more and more till the perfect day.
- 19 The way of the wicked is deep darkness,
They know not at what they stumble.

The Hebr. style is wont to conceal in its *Vav* (ו) diverse kinds of logical relations, but the *Vav* of 18a may suitably stand before 19a, where the discontinuance of this contrast of the two ways is unsuitable. The displacing of a *Vav* from its right position is not indeed without example (see under Ps. xvi. 3); but since ver. 19 joins itself more easily than ver. 18 to ver. 17 without missing a particle, thus it is more probable that the two verses are to be transposed, than that the ו of וְאִרְחֵם (ver. 17) is to be prefixed to וְרָחַק (ver. 18). Sinning, says ver. 16, has become to the godless as

a second nature, so that they cannot sleep without it; they must continually be sinning, adds ver. 17, for thus and not otherwise do they gain for themselves their daily bread. With reference to this fearful self-perversion to which wickedness has become a necessity and a condition of life, the poet further says that the way of the godless is כְּצֵלֶךְ ,¹ as deep darkness, as the entire absence of light: it cannot be otherwise than that they fall, but they do not at all know whereat they fall, for they do not at all know wickedness as such, and have no apprehension of the punishment which from an inward necessity it brings along with it; on the contrary, the path of the just is in constantly increasing light—the light of knowledge, and the light of true happiness which is given² in and with knowledge. On בְּמָה *vid.* under Isa. ii. 22; it is מְכִשּׁוֹל , $\sigma\kappa\acute{\alpha}\nu\delta\alpha\lambda\omicron\nu$, that is meant, stumbling against which (cf. Lev. xxvi. 37) they stumble to their fall. נֶגֶד ,³ used elsewhere than in the Bible, means the morning star (Venus), (Sirach l. 4, Syr.); when used in the Bible it means the early dawn, the light of the rising sun, the morning light, 2 Sam. xxiii. 4, Isa. lxii. 1, which announces itself in the morning twilight, Dan. vi. 20. The light of this morning sunshine is הוֹלֵךְ וְאוֹר , going and shining, i.e. becoming ever brighter. In the connection of הוֹלֵךְ וְאוֹר it might be a question

¹ In good mss. and printed copies the כ has the *Patach*, as Kimchi states the rule in *Michlol* 45a: $\text{כָּל בְּאֵנִים פָּתַח, כָּל בְּאֵלָה פָּתַח}$.

² Hitzig inverts the order of vers. 18 and 19, and connects the כִּי of 16a immediately with ver. 19 (for the way of the wicked . . .). He moreover regards vers. 16, 17 as an interpolation, and explains ver. 16 as a gloss transforming the text of ver. 19. "That the wicked commit wickedness," says Hitzig, "is indeed certain (1 Sam. xxiv. 14), and the warning of ver. 15 ought not to derive its motive from their energy in sinning." But the warning against the way of the wicked is founded not on their energy in sinning, but on their bondage to sin: their sleep, their food and drink—their life both when they sleep and when they wake—is conditioned by sin and is penetrated by sin. This foundation of the warning furnishes what is needed, and is in nothing open to objection. And that in vers. 16 and 19 לֹא יָרְעוּ and לֹא יִרְעוּ , נִגְזָה and כָּאֶפְלָה seem to be alike, does not prove that ver. 16 originated as a parallel text from ver. 19—in the one verse as in the other the thoughts are original.

³ Böttcher, under 2 Sam. xxiii. 4, explains נֶגֶד of the brightness striking against, conquering (cf. נֶגַה , נִגַּה) the clouds; but *ferire* or *percutere* lies nearer (cf. נָנַע , Ezek. xvii. 10, נָנַח , Ps. cxxi. 6, and the Arab. *darb*, used of strong sensible impressions), as Silius, iv. 329, says of the light: *percussit lumine campos*.

whether **אִוֵּר** is regarded as gerundive (Gen. viii. 3, 5), or as participle (2 Sam. xvi. 5, Jer. xli. 6), or as a participial adjective (Gen. xxvi. 13, Judg. iv. 24); in the connection of **הִלָּךְ אִוֵּר**, on the contrary, it is unquestionably the gerundive: the partic. denoting the progress joins itself either with the partic., Jon. i. 11, or with the participial adjective, 2 Sam. iii. 1, 2 Chron. xvii. 12, or with another adjective formation, 2 Sam. xv. 12, Esth. ix. 4 (where **וַיִּדָּל** after **וַיִּדָּל** of other places appears to be intended as an adjective, not after 2 Sam. v. 10 as gerundive). Thus **וַיִּשְׁבֹּחַ**, 1 Sam. ii. 26, will be participial after the form **בָּשָׁם**, being ashamed (Ges. § 72, 1); cf. **בֹּשָׁם**, Zech. x. 5, **קֹשֶׁם**, 2 Kings xvi. 7. “**נִבְּזוּ הַיּוֹם**” quite corresponds to the Greek *τὸ σταθρὸν τῆς ἡμέρας, ἡ σταθρὰ μεσημβρία* (as one also says *τὸ σταθρὸν τῆς νυκτός*), and to the Arabic *قائمة الظهيرة* and *قائمة النهار*. The figure is probably derived from the balance (cf. Lucan's *Pharsalia*, lib. 9: *quum cardine summo Stat librata dies*): before and after midday the tongue on the balance of the day bends to the left and to the right, but at the point of midday it stands directly in the midst” (Fleischer). It is the midday time that is meant, when the clearness of day has reached its fullest intensity,—the point between increasing and decreasing, when, as we are wont to say, the sun stands in the zenith (=Arab. *samt*, the point of support, i.e. the vertex). Besides Mark iv. 28, there is no biblical passage which presents like these two a figure of gradual development. The progress of blissful knowledge is compared to that of the clearness of the day till it reaches its midday height, having reached to which it becomes a knowing of all in God, xxviii. 5, 1 John ii. 20.

Vers. 20-22. The paternal admonition now takes a new departure:

- 20 My son, attend unto my words,
Incline thine ear to my sayings.
- 21 Let them not depart from thine eyes;
Keep them in the midst of thine heart.
- 22 For they are life to all who get possession of them,
And health to their whole body.

Regarding the *Hiph.* **הִלָּךְ** (for **הִלִּי**), ver. 21, formed after the Chaldee manner like **הִלִּי, הִנִּי, הִסִּי**, *vid.* Gesenius, § 72, 9;—Ewald, § 114, c, gives to it the meaning of “to mock,” for he interchanges

it with הָלִין, instead of the meaning to take away, *efficere ut recedat* (cf. under ii. 15). This supposed causative meaning it has also here: may they = may one (*vid.* under ii. 22) not remove them from thine eyes; the object is (ver. 20) the words of the paternal admonition. Hitzig, indeed, observes that "the accusative is not supplied;" but with greater right it is to be remarked that יָלִין (fut. *Hiph.* of לָן) and יִלֹּץ (fut. *Kal* of יָלַץ) are not one and the same, and the less so as הָלִין is not, like הָלִין, intrinsically transitive. Here and there יָלִין occurs, but the masoretical and grammatical authorities (*e.g.* Kimchi) demand יִלֹּץ. The plur. לְבָנֵי יָלִין is continued, 22b, in the sing., for that which is said refers to each one of the many (iii. 18, 28, 35). מָצָא is fundamentally an active conception, like our "*finden*," to find; it means to attain, to produce, to procure, etc. מְרַפָּא means, according as the מ is understood of the "that = *ut*" of the action or of the "what" of its performance, either health or the means of health; here, like רַפְּאוּת, iii. 8, not with the underlying conception of sickness, but of the fluctuations connected with the bodily life of man, which make needful not only a continual strengthening of it, but also its being again and again restored. Nothing preserves soul and body in a healthier state than when we always keep before our eyes and carry in our hearts the good doctrines; they give to us true guidance on the way of life: "Godliness has the promise of this life, and of that which is to come." 1 Tim. iv. 8.

Vers. 23-27. After this general preface the exhortation now becomes special:

- 23 Above all other things that are to be guarded, keep thy heart,
For out from it life has its issues.
- 24 Put away from thee perverseness of mouth,
And waywardness of lips put far from thee.
- 25 Thine eyes should look straight forward,
And thine eyelids look straight to the end before thee.
- 26 Make even the path of thy feet,
And let all thy ways be correct.
- 27 Turn not aside to the right and to the left;
Remove thy foot from evil.

Although מִשְׁמֶרֶת in itself and in this connection may mean the object to be watchfully avoided (*cavendi*) (*vid.* under ii. 20b): thus the usage of the language lying before us applies it, yet only as denoting the place of watching or the object *observandi*; so that it is not to be thus explained, with Raschi and others: before

all from which one has to protect himself (*ab omni re cavenda*), guard thine heart; but: before all that one has to guard (*præ omni re custodienda*), guard it as the most precious of possessions committed to thy trust. The heart, which according to its etymon denotes that which is substantial (*Kernhafte*) in man (cf. Arab. *lubb*, the kernel of the nut or almond), comes here into view not as the physical, but as the intellectual, and specially the ethical *centrum*.

Ver. 24. The *מַצְוֹת* are the point of a thing, *e.g.* of a boundary, from which it goes forth, and the linear course proceeding from thence. If thus the author says that the *מַצְוֹת הַיָּיִם* go out from the heart,¹ he therewith implies that the life has not only its fountain in the heart, but also that the direction which it takes is determined by the heart. Physically considered, the heart is the receptacle for the blood, in which the soul lives and rules; the pitcher at the blood-fountain which draws it and pours it forth; the chief vessel of the physically self-subsisting blood-life from which it goes forth, and into which it disembogues (*Syst. der bib. Psychol.* p. 232). What is said of the heart in the lower sense of corporeal vitality, is true in the higher sense of the intellectual soul-life. The Scripture names the heart also as the intellectual soul-centre of man, in its concrete, central unity, its dynamic activity, and its ethical determination on all sides. All the radiations of corporeal and of soul life concentrate there, and again unfold themselves from thence; all that is implied in the Hellenic and Hellenistic words *νοῦς*, *λόγος*, *συνείδησις*, *θυμός*, lies in the word *καρδία*; and all whereby *בָּשָׂר* (the body) and *נֶפֶשׁ* (the spirit, *anima*) are affected comes in *לֵב* into the light of consciousness (*Id.* p. 251). The heart is the instrument of the thinking, willing, perceiving life of the spirit; it is the seat of the knowledge of self, of the knowledge of God, of the knowledge of our relation to God, and also of the law of God impressed on our moral nature; it is the workshop of our individual spiritual and ethical form of life brought about by self-activity,—the life in its higher and in its lower sense goes out from it, and receives from it the impulse of the direction which it takes; and how earnestly, therefore, must we feel ourselves admonished, how sacredly bound to preserve the heart in purity (Ps. lxxiii. 1), so that from this spring of life may

¹ The correct form here is *בִּי-מִמְנוֹ*, with the *Makkeph* *בי*.

go forth not mere seeming life and a caricature of life, but a true life well-pleasing to God! How we have to carry into execution this careful guarding of the heart, is shown in ver. 24 and the golden rules which follow. Mouth and lips are meant (ver. 24) as instruments of speech, and not of its utterance, but of the speech going forth from them. *מִשְׁפָּה*, *distorsio*, refers to the mouth (vi. 12), when what it speaks is disfiguring and deforming, thus falsehood as the contrast of truth and love (ii. 12); and to the lips *לִשָּׁה*, when that which they speak turns aside from the true and the right to side-ways and by-ways. Since the *Kametz* of such *abstracta*, as well of verbs *ו'ע* like *רָמַח*, Ezek. xxxii. 5, as of verbs *ה'ל* like *נָלִית*, Isa. xlv. 13, *הוֹחַ*, Isa. xxviii. 18, is elsewhere treated as unalterable, there lies in this *לִשָּׁה* either an inconsistency of punctuation, or it is presupposed that the form *לִשָּׁה* was vocalized like *שָׁבַח* = *שָׁבִית*, Num. xxi. 29.

Ver. 25. Another rule commends gathering together (concentration) in opposition to dissipation. It is also even externally regarded worthy of consideration, as Ben-Sira, ix. 5, expresses it: *μη περιβλέπου ἐν ῥύμαις πόλεως* — purposeless, curious staring about operates upon the soul, always decentralizing and easily defiling it. But the rule does not exhaust itself in this meaning with reference to external self-discipline; it counsels also straightforward, unswerving directness toward a fixed goal (and what else can this be in such a connection than that which wisdom places before man?), without the turning aside of the eye toward that which is profitless and forbidden, and in this inward sense it falls in with the demand for a single, not squinting eye, Matt. vi. 22, where Bengel explains *ἀπλούς* by *simplex et bonus, intentus in cælum, in Deum, unice*. *נָחַ* (R. *נָךְ*) means properly fixing, or holding fast with the look, and *נָגַד* (as the Arab. *najad*, to be clear, to be in sight, shows) the rising up which makes the object stand conspicuous before the eyes; both denote here that which lies straight before us, and presents itself to the eye looking straight out. The naming of the *עֵצָה* (from *עָצָה*, to flutter, to move tremblingly), which belongs not to the seeing apparatus of the eye but to its protection, is introduced by the poetical parallelism; for the eyelids, including in this word the twinkling, in their movement follow the direction of the seeing eye. On the form *יִצְרֶה* (fut. *IIiph.* of *יָצַר*, to be straight), defective according to the Masora, with the *Jod* audible, cf. Hos. vii. 12, 1 Chron. xii. 2, and under

Gen. viii. 17; the softened form הַיָּשִׁיר does not occur, we find only הַיָּשִׁיר or הַיָּשִׁיר.

Ver. 26. The understanding of this rule is dependent on the right interpretation of פָּלַס, which means neither "weigh off" (Ewald) nor "measure off" (Hitzig, Zöckler). פָּלַס has once, Ps. lviii. 3, the meaning to weigh out, as the denom. of פָּלָס, a level, a steel-yard;¹ everywhere else it means to make even, to make level, to open a road: *vid.* under Isa. xxvi. 7, xl. 12. The admonition thus refers not to the careful consideration which measures the way leading to the goal which one wishes to reach, but to the preparation of the way by the removal of that which prevents unhindered progress and makes the way insecure. The same meaning appears if פָּלַס, of cognate meaning with פָּלַן, denoted first to level, and then to make straight with the level (Fleischer). We must remove all that can become a moral hindrance or a dangerous obstacle in our life-course, in order that we may make right steps with our feet, as the LXX. (Heb. xii. 13) translate. 26b is only another expression for this thought. הָכֵן דֶּרֶכּוֹ (2 Chron. xxvii. 6) means to give a direction to his way; a right way, which keeps in and facilitates the keeping in the straight direction, is accordingly called נָכוֹן דֶּרֶךְ; and "let all thy ways be right" (cf. Ps. cxix. 5, LXX. κατευθυνθεισας) will thus mean: see to it that all the ways which thou goest lead straight to the end.

Ver. 27. In closest connection with the preceding, 27a cautions against by-ways and indirect courses, and 27b continues it in the briefest moral expression, which is here הָסִיר רַגְלְךָ מִכְרַע instead of סִיר מִכְרַע, iii. 7, for the figure is derived from the way. The LXX. has other four lines after this verse (27), which we have endeavoured to retranslate into the Hebrew (Introd. p. 47). They are by no means genuine; for while in 27a right and left are equivalent to by-ways, here the right and left side are distinguished as that of truth and its contrary; and while there [in LXX.] the ὁρθὰς τροχιάς ποιεῖν is required of man, here it is promised as the operation of God, which is no contradiction, but in this similarity of expression betrays poverty of style. Hitzig disputes also the genuineness of the Hebrew ver. 27. But it continues explanatorily ver. 26, and is related to it, yet not as a gloss, and in the general

¹ The Arabic word *teflis*, said to be of the same signification (a balance), and which is given in the most recent editions of Gesenius' Lexicon, has been already shown under Job xxxvii. 16 to be a word devoid of all evidence.

relation of 26 and 27a there comes a word, certainly not unwelcome, such as 27b, which impresses the moral stamp on these thoughts.

That with ver. 27 the admonition of his father, which the poet, placing himself back into the period of his youth, reproduces, is not yet concluded, the resumption of the address *יְהוָה*, v. 1, makes evident; while on the other hand the address *יְהוָה* in v. 7 shows that at that point there is advance made from the recollections of his father's house to conclusions therefrom, for the circle of young men by whom the poet conceives himself to be surrounded. That in v. 7 ff. a subject of the warning with which the seventh address closes is retained and further prosecuted, does not in the connection of all these addresses contradict the opinion that with v. 7 a new address begins. But the opinion that the warning against adultery does not agree (Zöckler) with the designation *יְהוָה*, iv. 3, given to him to whom it is addressed, is refuted by 1 Chron. xxii. 5, 2 Chron. xiii. 7.

Chap. v. 1-6. Here a fourth rule of life follows the three already given, iv. 24, 25, 26-27:

- 1 My son, attend unto my wisdom,
And incline thine ear to my prudence,
- 2 To observe discretion,
And that thy lips preserve knowledge.
- 3 For the lips of the adulteress distil honey,
And smoother than oil is her mouth;
- 4 But her end is bitter like wormwood,
Sharper than a two-edged sword.
- 5 Her feet go down to death,
Her steps cleave to Hades.
- 6 She is far removed from entering the way of life,
Her steps wander without her observing it.

Wisdom and understanding increase with the age of those who earnestly seek after them. It is the father of the youth who here requests a willing ear to his wisdom of life, gained in the way of many years' experience and observation. In ver. 2 the inf. of the object is continued in the *finitum*, as in ii. 2, 8. *מְזִמּוֹת* (*vid.* on its etymon under i. 4) are plans, projects, designs, for the most part in a bad sense, intrigues and artifices (*vid.* xxiv. 8), but also used of well-considered resolutions toward what is good, and hence of the purposes of God, Jer. xxiii. 20. This noble sense of the word *מְזִמּוֹת*, with its plur., is peculiar to the introductory portion (i.-ix.)

of the Book of Proverbs. The plur. means here and at viii. 12 (placing itself with תְּבִינָה and תְּבִינָה, *vid.* p. 68) the reflection and deliberation which is the presupposition of well-considered action, and שָׁמַר is thus not otherwise than at xix. 8, and everywhere so meant, where it has that which is obligatory as its object: the youth is summoned to careful observation and persevering exemplification of the *quidquid agas, prudenter agas et respice finem*. In 2b the *Rebia Mugrash* forbids the genitive connection of the two words שְׂפָתַיךָ וְרַעַת שְׂפָתַיךָ; we translate: *et ut scientiam labia tua tueantur*. Lips which preserve knowledge are such as permit nothing to escape from them (Ps. xvii. 3b) which proceeds not from the knowledge of God, and in Him of that which is good and right, and aims at the working out of this knowledge; *vid.* Köhler on Mal. ii. 7. שְׂפָתַיךָ (from שָׂפָה, Arab. *shafat*, edge, lip, properly that against which one rubs, and that which rubs itself) is fem., but the usage of the language presents the word in two genders (cf. 3a with xxvi. 23). Regarding the pausal יָצָרוּ for יָצְרוּ, *vid.* under iii. 1, ii. 11. The lips which distil the honey of enticement stand opposite to the lips which distil knowledge; the object of the admonition is to furnish a protection against the honey-lips.

Ver. 3. נָרְה denotes the wife who belongs to another, or who does not belong to him to whom she gives herself or who goes after her (*vid.* ii. 16). She appears here as the betrayer of youth. The poet paints the love and amiableness which she feigns with colours from the Canticles, iv. 11, cf. v. 16. נָפֶת denotes the honey flowing of itself from the combs (נִיפֶת), thus the purest and sweetest; its root-word is נָפַף, which means to shake, vibrate, and only mediately (when the object is a fluid) to scatter, sprinkle, but, as Schultens has observed, a verb נָפַת = Arab. *nafat*, to bubble, to spring up, *nafath*, to blow, to spit out, to pour out. Parchon places the word rightly under נָפֶת (while Kimchi places it under נָפַף after the form נִפְּתָה), and explains it by חֲלוֹת דְּבַשׁ הַיָּצִיא מִן הַחוֹמֶת (the words רִבֵּשׁ הַיָּצִיא should have been used): the honey which flows from the cells before they are broken (the so-called virgin honey). The mouth, הָקָה = Arab. *hink* (from הִנָּק, Arab. *hanak*, imbue, *e.g.*, after the manner of Beduins, the mouth of the newly-born infant with date-honey), comes into view here, as at viii. 7, etc., as the instrument of speech: smoother than oil (cf. Ps. lv. 22), it shows itself when it gives forth amiable, gentle, impressive words (ii. 16, vi. 24); also our "schmeicheln" (= to

flatter, caress) is equivalent to to make smooth and fair; in the language of weavers it means to smooth the warp.

Vers. 4, 5. In verse 4 the reverse of the sweet and smooth external is placed opposite to the attraction of the seducer, by whose influence the inconsiderate permits himself to be carried away: her end, *i.e.* the last that is experienced of her, the final consequence of intercourse with her (cf. xxiii. 32), is bitter as wormwood, sharp as a two-edged sword. The O. T. language regards bitterness and poison as related both in meaning and in reality; the word לַעֲנָה (Aq. ἀψύγσιον = wormwood) means in Arab. the curse. חֶרֶב בַּיִת is translated by Jerome after the LXX., *gladius biceps*; but פִּיבֵּית means double-edged, and חֶרֶב שְׁנֵי פִּיּוֹת (Judg. iii. 16) means a double-edged sword. Here the plur. will thus poetically strengthen the meaning, like ξίφος πολύστομον, that which devours, as if it had three or four edges (Fl.). The end in which the disguised seduction terminates is bitter as the bitterest, and cutting as that which cuts the most: self-condemnation and a feeling of divine anger, anguish of heart, and destructive judgment. The feet of the adulteress go downward to death. In Hebr. this *descendentes ad mortem* is expressed by the genitive of connection; מָוֶת is the genitive, as in יוֹרֵרִי בּוֹר, i. 12; elsewhere the author uses יוֹרֵרוֹת אֶל, vii. 27, ii. 18. Death, מָוֶת (so named from the stretching of the corpse after the stiffness of death), denotes the condition of departure from this side as a punishment, with which is associated the idea of divine wrath. In שְׁאוֹל (sinking, abyss, from שָׁאַל, R. של, χαλᾶν, *vid.* under Isa. v. 14), lie the ideas of the grave as a place of corruption, and of the under-world as the place of incorporeal shadow-life. Her steps hold fast to Hades is equivalent to, they strive after Hades and go straight to it; similar to this is the Arab. expression, *hdhâ âldrb yâkhdh âly âlbld*: this way leads straight forward to the town (Fl.).

Ver. 6. If we try to connect the clause beginning with פֶּן with 5b as its principal sentence: she goes straight to the abyss, so that by no means does she ever tread the way of life (thus *e.g.* Schultens), or better, with 6b: never more to walk in the way of life, her paths fluctuate hither and thither (as *Gr. Venet.* and Kamphausen in Bunsen's *Bibelwerk*, after Bertheau and Ewald, translate); then in the former case more than in the latter the difference of the subject opposes itself, and in the latter, in addition, the לֹא תִקַּע, only disturbing in this negative clause. Also by the arrangement of

the words, 6a appears as an independent thought. But with Jewish expositors (Rashi, Aben-Ezra, Ralbag, Malbim, etc.) to interpret **עֲשֵׂה**, after the Talmud (*b. Mo'ed katan* 9a) and Midrash, as an address is impracticable; the warning: do not weigh the path of life, affords no meaning suitable to this connection—for we must, with Cartwright and J. H. Michaelis, regard 6a as the antecedent to 6b: *ne forte semitam vitæ ad sequendum eligas, te per varios deceptionum mæandros abripit ut non noveris, ubi locorum sis*; but then the continuation of the address is to be expected in 6b. No, the subject to **עֲשֵׂה** is the adulteress, and **וְיִשְׁמַח** is an intensified **וְיִשְׂמַח**. Thus the LXX., Jerome, Syr., Targ., Luther, Geier, Nolde, and among Jewish interpreters Heidenheim, who first broke with the tradition sanctioned by the Talmud and the Midrash, for he interpreted 6a as a negative clause spoken in the tone of a question. But **וְיִשְׁמַח** is not suitable for a question, but for a call. Accordingly, Böttcher explains: *viam vitæ ne illa complanare studeat!* (**עֲשֵׂה** in the meaning *complanando operam dare*). But the adulteress as such, and the striving to come to the way of life, stand in contradiction: an effort to return must be meant, which, because the power of sin over her is too great, fails; but the words do not denote that, they affirm the direct contrary, viz. that it does not happen to the adulteress ever to walk in the way of life. As in the warning the independent **וְיִשְׁמַח** may be equivalent to *cave ne* (Job xxxii. 13), so also in the declaration it may be equivalent to *absit ut*, for **וְיִשְׁמַח** (from **וְיִשְׂמַח**, after the forms **וְיִשְׂמַח** = Arab. *banj*, **וְיִשְׁמַח** = Arab. *'asj*) means turning away, removal. Thus: Far from taking the course of the way of life (which has life as its goal and reward)—for **וְיִשְׁמַח**, to open, to open a road (Ps. lxxviii. 50), has here the meaning of the open road itself—much rather do her steps wilfully stagger (Jer. xiv. 10) hither and thither, they go without order and without aim, at one time hither, at another time thither, without her observing it; i.e. without her being concerned at this, that she thereby runs into the danger of falling headlong into the yawning abyss. The unconsciousness which the clause **וְיִשְׁמַח** expresses, has as its object not the falling (Ps. xxxv. 8), of which there is here nothing directly said, but just this staggering, vacillation, the danger of which she does not watch against. **וְיִשְׁמַח** has *Mercha* under the *y* with *Zinnorith* preceding; it is *Milra* [an oxytone] (*Michlol* 111b); the punctuation varies in the accentuation of the form without evident reason:

Olsh. § 233, p. 285. The old Jewish interpreters (and recently also Malbim) here, as also at ii. 16, by the זרה [strange woman] understand heresy (מינות), or the philosophy that is hostile to revelation; the ancient Christian interpreters understood by it folly (Origen), or sensuality (Procopius), or heresy (Olympiodorus), or false doctrine (Polychronios). The LXX., which translates, ver. 5, רגליה by τῆς ἀφροσύνης οἱ πόδες, looks toward this allegorical interpretation. But this is unnecessary, and it is proved to be false from v. 15-20, where the זרה is contrasted with the married wife.

EIGHTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, V. 7-23.

WARNING AGAINST ADULTERY AND COMMENDATION OF MARRIAGE.

With v. 1-6, which like iv. 20 commences it once more, the seventh discourse is brought to a conclusion. The address בְּנִי is three times repeated in similar connections, iv. 10, 20, v. 1. There is no reason for breaking off the fatherly admonition (introduced with the words, "And he said to me," iv. 4), which was addressed to the author in the period of his youth, earlier than here, where the author again resumes the שְׁמָעִי בְּנִים with which he had begun (iv. 1) this seventh narrative address. That after the father has ceased speaking he does not express himself in a rounded manner, may be taken as a sign that toward the end he had become more and more unmindful of the rôle of the reporter, if this יְעֹתָה בְּנִים following, with which he realizes for his circle of hearers the admonition which had been in part addressed to himself, does not prove the contrary.

Vers. 7-11. The eighth discourse springs out of the conclusion of the seventh, and connects itself by its reflective מִעֲלֶיךָ so closely with it that it appears as its continuation; but the new beginning and its contents included in it, referring only to social life, secures its relative independence. The poet derives the warning against intercourse with the adulteress from the preceding discourse, and grounds it on the destructive consequences.

- 7 And now, ye sons, hearken unto me,
And depart not from the words of my mouth.

- 8 Hold thy path far from her neighbourhood,
 And come not to the door of her house !
 9 That thou mayest not give the freshness of thy youth to another,
 Nor thy years to the cruel one ;
 10 That strangers may not sate themselves with thy possessions,
 And the fruit of thy toils come into the house of a stranger,
 11 And thou groanest at the end,
 When thy flesh and thy body are consumed.

Neither here nor in the further stages of this discourse is there any reference to the criminal punishment inflicted on the adulterer, which, according to Lev. xx. 10, consisted in death, according to Ezek. xvi. 40, cf. John viii. 5, in stoning, and according to a later traditional law, in strangulation (פְּנִיָּה). Ewald finds in ver. 14 a play on this punishment of adultery prescribed by law, and reads from ver. 9 f. that the adulterer who is caught by the injured husband was reduced to the state of a slave, and was usually deprived of his manhood. But that any one should find pleasure in making the destroyer of his wife his slave is a far-fetched idea, and neither the law nor the history of Israel contains any evidence for this punishment by slavery or the mutilation of the adulterer, for which Ewald refers to Grimm's *Deutsche Rechtsaltertümer*. The figure which is here sketched by the poet is very different. He who goes into the net of the wanton woman loses his health and his goods. She stands not alone, but has her party with her, who wholly plunder the simpleton who goes into her trap. Nowhere is there any reference to the husband of the adulteress. The poet does not at all think on a married woman. And the word chosen directs our attention rather to a foreigner than to an Israelitish woman, although the author may look upon harlotry as such as heathenish rather than Israelitish, and designate it accordingly. The party of those who make prostitutes of themselves consists of their relations and their older favourites, the companions of their gain, who being in league with her exhaust the life-strength and the resources of the befooled youth (Fl.). This discourse begins with נִשְׁתַּחֲוֶה, for it is connected by this concluding application (cf. vii. 24) with the preceding.

Vers. 8, 9. In verse 8, one must think on such as make a gain of their impurity. מִכֶּלֶל, Schultens remarks, with reference to Ezek. xxiii. 18, *crebrum in rescisso omni commercio*: כֶּלֶל denotes the departure, and לֵב the nearness, from which one must remove himself to a distance. Regarding הִיא (ver. 9), which primarily, like our

Pracht (*bracht* from *brechen* = to break) [pomp, magnificence], appears to mean fulness of sound, and then fulness of splendour, see under Job xxxix. 20; here there is a reference to the freshness or the bloom of youth, as well as the years, against the sacrifice of which the warning is addressed—in a pregnant sense they are the fairest years, the years of youthful fulness of strength. Along with אֲחֵרִים the *singulare-tantum* אֲכָרִי (*vid.* Jer. l. 42) has a collective sense; regarding the root-meaning, *vid.* under Isa. xiii. 9. It is the *adj. relat.* of אֲכָרִי after the form אֲכָרִי, which is formed not from אָרָה, but from an unknown verb אָרָה. The ancients referred it to death and the devil; but the אֲכָרִי belongs to the covetous society, which impels ever anew to sin, which is their profit, him who has once fallen into it, and thus brings bodily ruin upon him: they are the people who stand far aloof from this their sacrifice, and among them are barbarous, rude, inexorably cruel monsters (*Unmenschen*) (*Græcus Venetus*, τῶ ἀπανθρωπῶ), who rest not till their victim is laid prostrate on the ground and ruined both bodily and financially.

Ver. 10. This other side of the ruin ver. 10 presents as an image of terror. For הוֹר refers to the person in his stately appearance, but בֵּית to his possessions in money and goods; for this word, as well as in the strikingly similar passage Hos. vii. 9, is used as the synonym of הֵיל (Gen. xxxiv. 29, etc.), in the sense of ability, estate. This meaning is probably mediated by means of a metonymy, as Gen. iv. 12, Job xxxi. 39, where the idea of the capability of producing is passed over into that of the produce conformable to it; so here the idea of work-power passes over into that of the gain resulting therefrom. וְעֲצָבֶיךָ (and thy toils) is not, like בִּתְחֵלָה, the accusative governed by יִשְׁבְּעֵי; the carrying over of this verb disturbs the parallelism, and the statement in the passage besides does not accord therewith, which, interpreted as a virtual predicate, presents 10b as an independent prohibitive clause: *neve sint labores tui in domo peregrini*, not *peregrina*; at least נִכְרִי according to the usage of the language is always personal, so that בֵּית נִכְרִי (cf. Lam. v. 2), like מַלְבוּשׁ נִכְרִי, Zeph. i. 8, is to be explained after עֵיר נִכְרִי, Judg. xix. 12. עָצַב (from עָצַב, Arab. *'asab*, to bind fast, to tie together, then to make effort, *ποιεῖν*, *laborare*) is difficult work (x. 22), and that which is obtained by it; Fleischer compares the Ital. *i miei sudori*, and the French *mes sueurs*.

Ver. 11. The füt. יִשְׁבְּעֵי and the יִהְיֶי needed to complete 10b are

continued in ver. 11 in the *consec. perf.* נִהַךְ, elsewhere of the hollow roaring of the sea, Isa. v. 30, the growling of the lion, xxviii. 15, here, as also Ezek. xxiv. 23, of the hollow groaning of men; a word which echoes the natural sound, like הוּה, הִנֵּה. The LXX., with the versions derived from it, has καὶ μεταμεληθήσῃ, i.e. נִחַם (the *Niph.* נִחַם, to experience the sorrow of repentance, also an echo-word which imitates the sound of deep breathing)—a happy *quid pro quo*, as if one interchanged the Arab. *naham*, *fremere*, *anhelare*, and *nadam*, *pœnitere*. That wherein the end consists to which the deluded youth is brought, and the sorrowful sound of despair extorted from him, is stated in 11*b*: his flesh is consumed away, for sensuality and vexation have worked together to undermine his health. The author here connects together two synonyms to strengthen the conception, as if one said: All thy tears and thy weeping help thee nothing (Fl.); he loves this heaping together of synonyms, as we have shown at p. 33. When the blood-relation of any one is called שָׂאֵר בְּצִירוֹ, Lev. xviii. 6, xxv. 49, these two synonyms show themselves in subordination, as here in close relation. שָׂאֵר appears to be closely connected with שְׂרִירִים, muscles and sinews, and with שֵׁר, the umbilical cord, and thus to denote the flesh with respect to its muscular nature adhering to the bones (Mic. iii. 2), as שָׂרֵר denotes it with respect to its tangible outside clothed with skin (*vid.* under *Isaiah*, p. 418).

Vers. 12-14. The poet now tells those whom he warns to hear how the voluptuary, looking back on his life-course, passes sentence against himself.

- 12 And thou sayest, "Why have I then hated correction,
And my heart despised instruction!
13 And I have not listened to the voice of my teachers,
Nor lent mine ear to my instructors?
14 I had almost fallen into every vice
In the midst of the assembly and the congregation!"

The question 12*a* (here more an exclamation than a question) is the combination of two: How has it become possible for me? How could it ever come to it that . . . Thus also one says in Arab.: *Kyf f'alat hadhâ* (Fl.). The regimen of אֵי in 12*b* is becoming faint, and in 13*b* has disappeared. The *Kal* נָא (as i. 30, xv. 5) signifies to despise; the *Piel* intensively, to condemn and reject (R. נָא, *pungere*).

Ver. 13. שָׂאֵר signifies to cleave to anything in hearing, as

בִּרְאָהּ is to do so in seeing; שָׁמַע לְ yet more closely corresponds with the classic ἑπακούειν, *obedire*, e.g. Ps. lxxxix. 9; שָׁמַע בְּקוֹל is the usual phrase for "hearken!"

Ver. 14. בְּמַעַט with the perf. following is equivalent to: it wanted but a little that this or that should happen, e.g. Gen. xxvi. 10. It is now for the most part thus explained: it wanted but a little, and led astray by that wicked companionship I would have been drawn away into crime, for which I would then have been subjected to open punishment (Fl.). Ewald understands רָע directly of punishment in its extreme form, stoning; and Hitzig explains כָּל-רָע by "the totality of evil," in so far as the disgraceful death of the criminal comprehends in it all other evils that are less. But כָּל-רָע means, either, into every evil, misfortune, or into every wickedness; and since רָע, in contradistinction to לֵב (Hitzig compares Ezek. xxxvi. 5), is a conception of a species, then the meaning is equivalent to *in omni genere mali*. The reference to the death-punishment of the adulteress is excluded thereby, though it cannot be denied that it might be thought of at the same time, if he who too late comes to consider his ways were distinctly designated in the preceding statements as an adulterer. But it is on the whole a question whether כָּל-רָע is meant of the evil which follows sin as its consequence. The usage of the language permits this, cf. 2 Sam. xvi. 8, Ex. v. 19, 1 Chron. vii. 23, Ps. x. 6, but not less the reference to that which is morally bad, cf. Ex. xxxii. 22 (where Keil rightly compares with 1 John v. 19); and הִיָּיתִי (for which in the first case one expected נִפְלֵיתִי, I fell into, *vid.* xiii. 17, xvii. 20, xxviii. 14) is even more favourable to the latter reference. Also בְּתוֹךְ קָהָל וְעָרָה (cf. on the heaping together of synonyms under 11b), this paraphrase of the *palam ac publice*, with its בְּתוֹךְ (cf. Ps. cxi. 1, 2 Chron. xx. 14), looks rather to a heightening of the moral self-accusation. He found himself in all wickedness, living and moving therein in the midst of the congregation, and thereby giving offence to it, for he took part in the external worship and in the practices of the congregation, branding himself thereby as a hypocrite. That by the one name the congregation is meant in its civil aspect, and by the other in its ecclesiastical aspect, is not to be supposed: in the congregation of the people of the revealed law, the political and the religious sides are not so distinguished. It is called without distinction קָהָל and עָרָה (from יָעַר). Rather we would say that קָהָל is the whole *ecclesia*, and עָרָה the whole of its representatives; but

also the great general council bears sometimes the one name (Ex. xii. 3, cf. 21) and sometimes the other (Deut. xxxi. 30, cf. 28) —the placing of them together serves thus only to strengthen the conception.

Vers. 15-17. The commendation of true conjugal love in the form of an invitation to a participation in it, is now presented along with the warning against non-conjugal intercourse, heightened by a reference to its evil consequences.

- 15 Drink water from thine own cistern,
And flowing streams from thine own fountain.
- 16 Shall thy streams flow abroad,
The water-brooks in the streets!
- 17 Let them belong to thyself alone,
And not to strangers with thee.

One drinks water to quench his thirst; here drinking is a figure of the satisfaction of conjugal love, of which Paul says, 1 Cor. vii. 9, *κρείσσόν ἐστι γαμήσαι ἢ πυροῦσθαι*, and this comes into view here, in conformity with the prevailing character of the O. T., only as a created inborn natural impulse, without reference to the poisoning of it by sin, which also within the sphere of married life makes government, moderation, and restraint a duty. Warning against this degeneracy of the natural impulse to the πάθος ἐπιθυμίας authorized within divinely prescribed limits, the apostle calls the wife of any one τὸ ἐαυτοῦ σκεῦος (cf. 1 Pet. iii. 7). So here the wife, who is his by covenant (ii. 17), is called "cistern" (בּוֹר)¹ and "fountain" (בְּיָר) of the husband to whom she is married. The figure corresponds to the sexual nature of the wife, the expression for which is בְּקֶבֶד; but Isa. li. 1 holds to the natural side of the figure, for according to it the wife is a pit, and the children are brought out of it into the light of day. Aben-Ezra on Lev. xi. 36 rightly distinguishes between בּוֹר and בָּאָר: the former catches the rain, the latter wells out from within. In the former, as Rashi in *Erubin* ii. 4 remarks, there are מִים מְכֻסִּים, in the latter חַיִּים מִים. The post-biblical Hebrew observes this distinction less closely (*vid.* Kimchi's *Book of Roots*), but the biblical throughout; so far the *Kerî*, Jer. vi. 7, rightly changes בּוֹר into the form בְּיָר, corresponding to the Arab. *byar*. Therefore בּוֹר is the cistern, for the making of which חָצַב, Jer. ii. 13, and בָּאָר the well, for the formation of which

¹ The LXX. translate ἀποὶ ἑωὺ ἀγγείων, i.e. מְבֹרֵי (vid. Lagarde).

חפר, Gen. xxi. 30, and ברה, xxvi. 25, are the respective words usually employed (*vid.* Malbim, *Sifra* 117*b*). The poet shows that he also is aware of this distinction, for he calls the water which one drinks from the בור by the name מים, but on the other hand that out of the באר by the name נוֹזְלִים, running waters, *fluenta*; by this we are at once reminded of Cant. iv. 15, cf. 12. The בור offers only stagnant water (according to the *Sohar*, the בור has no water of its own, but only that which is received into it), although coming down into it from above; but the באר has living water, which wells up out of its interior (מִתּוֹךְ, 15*b*, intentionally for the mere מן), and is fresh as the streams from Lebanon (נוֹל, properly *labi*, to run down, cf. אָל, *placide ire*, and generally *ire*; زال, *loco cedere*, *desinere*; جَلَّ, IV., to cause to glide back, *deglutire*, of the gourmand).

What a valuable possession a well of water is for nomads the history of the patriarchs makes evident, and a cistern is one of the most valuable possessions belonging to every well-furnished house. The figure of the cistern is here surpassed by that of the fountain, but both refer to the seeking and finding satisfaction (cf. the opposite passage, xxiii. 27) with the wife, and that, as the expressive possessive suffixes denote, with his legitimate wife.

Ver. 16. Here we meet with two other synonyms standing in a similar relation of progression. As צֶיֶן denotes the fountain as to its point of outflow, so מַעְיָן (*n. loci*) means water flowing above on the surface, which in its course increases and divides itself into several courses; such a brook is called, with reference to the water dividing itself from the point of outflow, or to the way in which it divides, פִּלְגִי (from פָּלַג, Job xxxviii. 25), Arab. *faloj* (as also the Ethiop.) or *falj*, which is explained by *nahar saghayr* (Fl.).¹ We cannot in this double figure think of any reference to the generative power in the *sperma*; similar figures are the waters of Judah, Isa. xlviii. 1, and the waters of Israel flowing forth as if from a bucket, Num. xxiv. 7, where זרע is the parallel word to מים, cf. also the proper name מִזְבֵּחַ (from מוּ = מוֹ from מָזַח, *diffluere*), *aqua h.e. semen patris*, and שִׁגְלָה, Deut. xxviii. 30, = Arab. *sajal* (whence *sajl* = שִׁגְלָה, *situla*), which is set aside by the *Keri*. Many interpreters

¹ The latter idea (*vid.* under Ps. i. 3) lies nearer, after Job xxxviii. 25: the brook as dividing channels for itself, or as divided into such; *fali* (*faloj*) signifies, according to the representation Isa. lviii. 8, also like *fajr*, the morning-light (as breaking forth from a cleft).

have by הַצֵּה and בְּרִחְבוֹת been here led into the error of pressing into the text the exhortation not to waste the creative power in sinful lust. The LXX. translates יִצְוֹ by ὑπερεκχέισθω; but Origen, and also Clemens Alexandrinus, used the phrase μὴ ὑπερεκχέισθω, which is found in the Complut., Ald., and several codd., and is regarded by Lagarde, as also Cappellus, as original: the three Göttingen theologians (Ewald, Bertheau, and Elster) accordingly make the emendation יִצְוֹ לֹא. But that μὴ of the LXX. was not added till a later period; the original expression, which the Syro-Hexapl. authorizes, was ὑπερεκχέισθω without μὴ, as also in the version of Aquila, διασκορπιζέσθωσαν without μὴ (*vid.* Field). The Hebrew text also does not need לֹא. Clericus, and recently Hitzig, Zöckler, Kamphausen, avoid this remedy, for they understand this verse interrogatively—an expedient which is for the most part and also here unavailing; for why should not the author have written יִצְוֹ אִם? Schultens rightly remarks: *nec negationi nec interrogationi ullus hic locus*, for (with Fleischer and von Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*, ii. 2, 402) he regards ver. 16 as a conclusion: *tunc exundabunt*; so that he strengthens the summons of ver. 15 by the promise of numerous descendants from unviolated marriage. But to be so understood, the author ought to have written יִצְוֹ. So, according to the text, יִצְוֹ as jussive continues the *imper.* שִׁתָּה (15a), and the full meaning according to the connection is this: that within the marriage relation the generative power shall act freely and unrestrained. חַרְן and רִחְבוֹת denote (i. 20) the space free from houses, and the ways and places which lead towards and stretch between them; חַרְן (from חָרַן, Arab. *khass*, to split, *seorsim ponere*) is a very relative conception, according as one thinks of that which is without as the contrast of the house, the city, or the country. Here חַרְן is the contrast of the person, and thus that which is anywhere without it, whereto the exercise of its manly power shall extend. The two figurative expressions are the description of the *libero flumine*, and the contrast, that restriction of self which the marriage relation, according to 1 Cor. vii. 3-5, condemns.

Ver. 17. That such matters as these are thought of, is manifest from this verse. As זֶרַע comprehends with the cause (*sperma*) the effect (posterity), so, in ver. 16, with the *effusio roboris virilis* is connected the idea of the beginnings of life. For the subjects of ver. 17 are the *effusiones seminis* named in ver. 16. These in their

effects (ver. 17) may belong to thee alone, viz. to thee alone (לְבַדְּךָ, properly in thy separateness) within thy married relation, not, as thou hast fellowship with other women, to different family circles, *Aben-Ezra* rightly regards as the subject, for he glosses thus: הפלגים שהם הבנים הנשרים, and *Immanuel* well explains יְהִידְלְךָ by יתיחסו לך. The child born out of wedlock belongs not to the father alone, he knows not to whom it belongs; its father must for the sake of his honour deny it before the world. Thus, as *Grotius* remarks: *ibi sere ubi prolem metas*. In יְהִי וְאֵין the יְהִי is continued. It is not thus used adverbially for לָא, as in the old classic Arabic *lyas* for *l'* (Fl.), but it carries in it the force of a verb, so that יְהִי, according to rule, in the sense of וְלֹא יְהִי = וְלֹא הָיָה, continues it.

Vers. 18-20. With ver 18 is introduced anew the praise of conjugal love. These three verses, 18-21, have the same course of thought as 15-17.

- 18 Let thy fountain be blessed,
And rejoice in the wife of thy youth.
- 19 The lovely hind and the graceful gazelle—
May her bosom always charm thee;
In her love mayest thou delight thyself evermore.
- 20 But why wilt thou be fascinated with a stranger,
And embrace the bosom of a foreign woman?

Like בַּר and בָּרָא, בָּקָר is also a figure of the wife; the root-word is קָר, from קָר, כָּר, the meanings of which, to dig and make round, come together in the primary conception of the round digging out or boring out, not קָר = קָרַר, the *Iliph.* of which means (Jer. vi. 7) to well out cold (water). It is the fountain of the birth that is meant (cf. בָּקָר of the female עֲרֵבָה, e.g., Lev. xx. 18), not the procreation (LXX., ἡ σὴ φλέψ, viz. φλέψ γονίμη); the blessing wished for by him is the blessing of children, which בָּרָא so much the more distinctly denotes if בָּרַךְ, Arab. *barak*, means to spread out, and בָּרָא thus to cause a spreading out. The בָּן, 18b, explains itself from the idea of drawing (water), given with the figure of a fountain; the word בָּאֵשֶׁת found in certain codices is, on the contrary, prosaic (Fl.). Whilst שִׂמַּח מִן is found elsewhere (Eccles. ii. 20, 2 Chron. xx. 27) as meaning almost the same as שִׂמַּח בְּ; the former means rejoicing from some place, the latter in something. In the genitive connection, "wife of thy youth" (cf. ii. 17), both of these significations lie: thy youthful wife, and she who was chosen by thee in thy youth, according as we refer the suffix to the whole idea or only to the second member of the chain of words.

Ver. 19. The subject, 19a, set forth as a theme courts love for her who is to be loved, for she presents herself as lovely. אֵילָת is the female of the stag, which may derive its name אֵיל from the weapon-power of its horns, and יַעֲלָה (from עָל, Arab. *w'al*, to climb), that of the wild-goat (עָל); and thus properly, not the gazelle, which is called צִיִּי on account of its elegance, but the chamois. These animals are commonly used in Semitic poetry as figures of female beauty on account of the delicate beauty of their limbs and their sprightly black eyes. אֶהְבֵּים signifies always sensual love, and is interchanged in this erotic meaning (vii. 18) with דוּרִים. In 19b the predicate follows the subject. The *Græc. Venet.* translates as if the word were דוּרִיה, and the *Syr.* as if it were דוּרִיחַ, but Aquila rightly translates *τίτθαι αὐτῆς*. As *τίτθος* is derived (*vid.* Curtius, *Griech. Etymologie*, Nr. 307) from *dhā*, to suck (causative, with *anu*, to put to sucking), so דָּר, דָּר, דָּר, Arab. *thady* (commonly in dual *thadjain*), from דָּרָה, Arab. *thdy*, *rigare*, after which also the verb דָּרַג is chosen: she may plentifully give thee to drink; figuratively equivalent to, refresh or (what the Aram. דָּרַי precisely means) fascinate¹ thee, satisfy thee with love. דָּרִים also is an erotic word, which besides in this place is found only in Ezekiel (xxiii. 3, 8, 21). The LXX. obliterates the strong sensual colouring of this line. In 19c it changes תִּשְׁנֶנָּה into תִּשְׁנֶנָּה, *πολλοστος ἔση*, perhaps also because the former appeared to be too sensual. Moses ha-Darshan

(in Rashi) proposes to explain it after the Arab. ساجى, to cover, to cast over, to come over anything (III. = עָסַק, to employ oneself with something): engage thyself with her love, *i.e.* be always devoted to her in love. And Immanuel himself, the author of a Hebrew Divan expatiating with unparalleled freedom in erotic representations, remarks, while he rightly understands תִּשְׁנֶנָּה of the fascination of love: קורא התמדת השקו אפילו באשתו שגגה, he calls the husband's continual caressing of the wife an error. But this moral side-glance lies here at a distance from the poet. He speaks here of a morally permissible love-ecstasy, or rather, since תִּשְׁנֶנָּה excludes that which is extraordinary, of an intensity of love connected with the feeling of superabundant happiness. שָׁגָה properly signifies to err from the way, therefore figuratively, with ב of a matter, like

¹ Many editions have here בָּקָלָה; but this *Dagesh*, which is contrary to rule, is to be effaced.

delirare ea, to be wholly captivated by her, so that one is no longer in his own power, can no longer restrain himself—the usual word for the intoxication of love and of wine, xx. 1 (Fl.).


Ver. 20. The answer to the Why? in this verse is: no reasonable cause,—only beastly sensuality, only flagitious blindness can mislead thee. The ב of בָּוֶרָה is, as 19b and Isa. xxviii. 7, that of the object through which one is betrayed into intoxication. חָק (thus, according to the Masora, four times in the O. T. for חָק)

properly means an incision or deepening, as حَجَر (from حَجَرَ, *cohibere*), the front of the body, the part between the arms or the female breasts, thus the bosom, Isa. xl. 11 (with the swelling part of the clothing, *sinus vestis*, which the Arabs call *jayl*), and the lap; חֶבֶק (as iv. 8), to embrace, corresponds here more closely with the former of these meanings; also elsewhere the wife of any one is called אֵימַת חֶיקוֹ or הַשְׁכַּבְתָּ בְּחֶיקוֹ, as she who rests on his breast. The ancients, also J. II. Michaelis, interpret vers. 15–20 allegorically, but without thereby removing sensual traces from the elevated N. T. consciousness of pollution, striving against all that is fleshly; for the *castum cum Sapientia conjugium* would still be always represented under the figure of husband and wife dwelling together. Besides, though זֶה might be, as the contrast of חֲכָמָה, the personified lust of the world and of the flesh, yet 19a is certainly not the חֲכָמָה, but a woman composed of flesh and blood. Thus the poet means the married life, not in a figurative sense, but in its reality—he designedly describes it thus attractively and purely, because it bears in itself the preservative against promiscuous fleshly lust.

Vers. 21–23. That the intercourse of the sexes out of the married relationship is the commencement of the ruin of a fool is now proved.

- 21 For the ways of every one are before the eyes of Jahve,
And all his paths He marketh out.
- 22 His own sins lay hold of him, the evil-doer,
And in the bands of his sins is he held fast.
- 23 He dies for the want of correction,
And in the fulness of his folly he staggers to ruin.

It is unnecessary to interpret נֶכַח as an adverbial accusative: straight before Jahve's eyes; it may be the nominative of the predicate: the ways of man (for אִישׁ is here an individual, whether man or woman) are an object (properly, fixing) of the eyes

of Jahve. With this the thought would suitably connect itself: *et omnes orbitas ejus ad amussim examinat*; but פָּלַץ, as the denom. of פָּלַץ, Ps. lviii. 3, is not connected with all the places where the verb is united with the obj. of the way, and Ps. lxxviii. 50 shows that it has there the meaning to break through, to open a way (from פָּלַץ, to split, cf. Talmudic פָּלַץ, opened, accessible, from פָּלַץ, , *perfodere, fodiendo viam, aditum sibi aperire*). The opening

of the way is here not, as at Isa. xxvi. 7, conceived of as the setting aside of the hindrances in the way of him who walks, but generally as making walking in the way possible: man can take no step in any direction without God; and that not only does not exempt him from moral responsibility, but the consciousness of this is rather for the first time rightly quickened by the consciousness of being encompassed on every side by the knowledge and the power of God. The dissuasion of ver. 20 is thus in ver. 21 grounded in the fact, that man at every stage and step of his journey is observed and encompassed by God: it is impossible for him to escape from the knowledge of God or from dependence on Him. Thus opening all the paths of man, He has also appointed to the way of sin the punishment with which it corrects itself: "his sins lay hold of him, the evil-doer." The suffix ׀ does not refer to עֹשֶׂה of ver. 21, where every one without exception and without distinction is meant, but it relates to the obj. following, the evil-doer, namely, as the explanatory permutative annexed to the "him" according to the scheme, Ex. ii. 6; the permutative is distinguished from the apposition by this, that the latter is a forethought explanation which heightens the understanding of the subject, while the former is an explanation afterwards brought in which guards against a misunderstanding. The same construction, xiv. 13b, belonging to the *syntaxis ornata* in the old Hebrew, has become common in the Aramaic and in the modern Hebrew. Instead of יִלְכְּדוּהוּ (ver. 22), the poet uses poetically יִלְכְּדוּהוּ; the interposed נ may belong to the emphatic ground-form יִלְכְּדוּהוּ, but is epenthetic if one compares forms such as קִבְּלוּ (R. קב), Num. xxiii. 13 (cf. p. 73). The הַפְּתָחוֹ governed by הַבְּלִי, *laquei* (הַבְּלִי, *tormina*), is either *gen. exeg.*: bands which consist in his sin, or *gen. subj.*: bands which his sin unites, or better, *gen. possess.*: bands which his sin brings with it. By these bands he will be held fast, and so will die: he (הוא referring to the person described) will die in insubordination (Symm. εὐ

ἀπαιδευσίαν), or better, since רב and אֵין are placed in contrast: in want of correction. With the יִשְׁנָה (ver. 23b), repeated purposely from ver. 20, there is connected the idea of the overthrow which is certain to overtake the infatuated man. In ver. 20 the sense of moral error began already to connect itself with this verb. אֵין is the right name of unrestrained lust of the flesh. אֵול is connected with אָל, the belly; אָל, Arab. *āl*, to draw together, to condense, to thicken (*Isaiah*, p. 424). *Dummheit* (stupidity) and the Old-Norse *dumba*, darkness, are in their roots related to each other. Also in the Semitic the words for blackness and darkness are derived from roots meaning condensation. אֵוִיל is the mind made thick, darkened, and become like crude matter.

NINTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, VI. 1-5.

WARNING AGAINST INCONSIDERATE SURETYSHIP.

The author does not return to the subject of chastity till the twelfth discourse, vi. 20 ff. Between the eighth and the twelfth three other groups of moral proverbs are introduced, which are neither connected with one another nor with the eight discourses which precede them. Must we therefore, with Hitzig and Kamphausen, hold vi. 1-5, 6-11, 12-19, to be an interpolation here introduced from some other place? We find here the fondness for synonyms and words similar in sound peculiar to the author of the introduction, vi. 2, 3, 5, and meet with the same interchange of words, vi. 4, cf. iv. 25, and figurative expressions, vi. 18, cf. iii. 29 (חַרֵּשׁ), word-formations, vi. 10 (חֶבֶק), cf. iii. 8 (שִׁקֵּי), ideas, vi. 12, cf. iv. 28 (עֲקֻשׁוֹת פֶּה), vi. 14, cf. ii. 12, 14 (הַחִפְכוֹת), and constructions, vi. 12 (הוֹלֵךְ עֲקֻשׁוֹת פֶּה), cf. ii. 7 (הֹלֵכֵי חֵם); like delineations of character, vi. 18b, cf. i. 16, and threatenings, vi. 15, cf. i. 26 f., iii. 25—as many marks of identity of the authorship as could be expected. And what had moved the interpolators to introduce the three groups of proverbs, vi. 1-5, 6-11, 12-19, just here? In vain does Hitzig seek to extract from chap. v. certain words and ideas common to it with chap. vi. which shall make it clear that the groups of proverbs in question are here an interpolation; the points of contrast are not prominent. If now the poet has already in iii.

1-18, but still more in iii. 27 ff., connected together all manner of rules of life without any close or visible connection, it is not strange if at vi. 1, where besides the כִּי denotes the new section, he breaks off to a new subject out of the fulness of his matter; and the connection wanting between vi. 1 and v. 23, as well as between iii. 27 and iii. 26, does not therefore warrant critical suspicion.

Vers. 1-5. The author warns against suretyship; or rather, he advises that if one has made himself surety, he should as quickly as possible withdraw from the snare.

- 1 My son, if thou hast become surety for thy neighbour,
Hast given thy hand for another;
- 2 Thou art entangled in the words of thy mouth,
Ensnared in the words of thy mouth.
- 3 Do this then, my son, and free thyself—
For thou hast come under the power of thy neighbour—
Go, instantly entreat and importune thy neighbour.
- 4 Give no sleep to thine eyes,
And no slumber to thine eyelids;
- 5 Tear thyself free like a gazelle from his hand,
And as a bird from the hand of the fowler.

The chief question here is, whether לְאַחֵר after עָרַב introduces him for whom or with whom one becomes surety. Elsewhere עָרַב (R. רַב, whence also אָרַב, *nectere*, to twist close and compact) with the accusative of the person means to become surety for any one, to represent him as a surety, xi. 15, xx. 16 (xxvii. 13), Gen. xliii. 9, xliv. 33 (as with the accusative of the matter, to pledge anything, to deposit it as a pledge, Jer. xxx. 21, Neh. v. 3, = שָׁם, Arab. *wad'a*, Job xvii. 3); and to become surety with any one is expressed, xvii. 18, by לְפָנַי. The phrase לְאַחֵר is not elsewhere met with, and is thus questionable. If we look to ver. 3, the רֵעַ (רֵעִי) mentioned there cannot possibly be the creditor with whom one has become surety, for so impetuous and urgent an application to him would be both purposeless and unbecoming. But if he is meant for whom one has become surety, then certainly לְרֵעִי is also to be understood of the same person, and לְ is thus *dat. commodi*; similar to this is the Targumic עֲרִיבְתָּא עַל, suretyship for any one, xvii. 18, xxii. 26. But is the אֲרֵר, 1b, distinguished from רֵעַר, the stranger with whom one has become surety? The parallels xi. 15, xx. 16, where אֲרֵר denotes the person whom one represents, show that in both lines one and the same person is meant; אֲרֵר is in the Proverbs

equivalent to רֵעַ, each different from the person in the discourse, v. 17, xxvii. 2,—thus, like רֵעַ, denotes not the friend, but generally him to whom one stands in any kind of relation, even a very external one, in a word, the fellow-creatures or neighbours, xxiv. 23 (cf. the Arab. *sahbk* and *karynk*, which are used as vaguely and superficially). It is further a question, whether we have to explain לְב: if thou hast given thine hand to another, or for another. Here also we are without evidence from the usage of the language; for the phrase כָּפַל יָדָיו, or merely יָדָיו, appears to be used of striking the hand in suretyship where it elsewhere occurs without any further addition, xvii. 18, xxii. 26, xi. 15; however, Job xvii. 3, נִתְּקָה לִי יָד, appears the same: to strike into the hand of any one, *i.e.* to give to him the hand-stroke. From this passage Hitzig concludes that the surety gave the hand-stroke, without doubt in the presence of witnesses, first of all of the creditor, to the debtor, as a sign that he stood for him. But this idea is unnatural, and the “without doubt” melts into air. He on whose hand the stroke falls is always the person to whom one gives suretyship, and confirms it by the hand-stroke. Job also, *i.e.*, means to say: who else but Thou, O Lord, could give to me a pledge, *viz.* of my innocence? If now the וְ, ver. 1b, is, as we have shown, not the creditor,¹ but the debtor, then is the לְ the *dat. commodi*, as 1a, and the two lines perfectly correspond. כָּפַל properly means to drive, to strike with a resounding noise, cogn. with the Arab. *wak'a*, which may be regarded as its *intrans.* (Fl.); then particularly to strike the hand or with the hand. He to whom this hand-pledge is given for another remains here undesignated. A new question arises, whether in ver. 6, where נִקְשׁ (*illaqueari*) and נִלְכַּד (*comprehendi*) follow each other as Isa. viii. 15, cf. Jer. l. 24, the hypothetical antecedent is continued or not. We agree with Schultens, Ziegler, and Fleischer against the continuance of the אִם. The repetition of the בְּאִמְרֵי פִיךָ (cf. ii. 14) serves rightly to strengthen the representation of the thought: thou, thou thyself and no other, hast then ensnared thyself in the net; but this strengthening of the expression would greatly lose in force

¹ A translation by P. Joseph Joel of Fulda, 1787, whose autograph Ms. Baer possesses, renders the passage not badly thus:—“My son, if thou hast become surety for thy friend, and hast given the hand to another, then thou art bound by thy word, held by thy promise. Yet do what I say to thee, my son: Be at pains as soon as thou canst to get free, otherwise thou art in the power of thy friend; shun no trouble, be urgent with thy friend.”

by placing ver. 2 in the antecedent, while if ver. 2 is regarded as the conclusion, and thus as the principal proposition, it appears in its full strength.

Ver. 3. The new commencement needs no particle denoting a conclusion; the **וְכֵן**, making the summons emphatic (cf. 2 Kings x. 10, frequently in interrogative clauses), connects it closely enough. **נָתַתְּ**, *neut.*, refers to what follows. The **ו** before **הִנֵּנִי** is explanatory, as we say in familiar language: Be so good as tell me, or do me the favour to come with me; while no Frenchman would say, *Faites-moi le (ce) plaisir et venez avec moi* (Fl.).¹ The clause **וְכֵן בְּיָדְךָ**² is not to be translated: in case thou art fallen into the hand of thy neighbour; for this is represented (vers. 1, 2) as having already in fact happened. On two sides the surety is no longer *sui juris*: the creditor has him in his hand; for if the debtor does not pay, he holds the surety, and in this way many an honourable man has lost house and goods, Sirach xxix. 18, cf. viii. 13;—and the debtor has him, the surety, in his hand; for the performance which is due, for which the suretyship avails, depends on his conscientiousness. The latter is here meant: thou hast made thy freedom and thy possessions dependent on the will of thy neighbour for whom thou art the surety. The clause introduced with **כִּי** gives the reason for the call to set himself free (**הִנֵּנִי** from **נָצַל**, R. **נָצַל**, **נָצַל**, to draw out or off); it is a parenthetical sentence. The meaning of **הִתְרַשֵּׁם** is certain. The verb **רָפַס** (**רָפַס**, **רָפַס**) signifies to stamp on, *calcare*, *conculcare*; the *Kamûs*³ explains *rafas* by *rakad balarjal*. The *Ilithpa* might, it is true, mean to conduct oneself in a trampling manner, to tread roughly, as **הִתְרַשֵּׁם**, and the medial *Niph.* **נִפְּסָה**, to conduct oneself speaking (in an impassioned manner); but Ps. lxxviii. 31 and the analogy of **הִתְרַשֵּׁם** favour the meaning to throw oneself in a stamping manner, *i.e.* violently, to the ground, to trample upon oneself,—*i.e.* let oneself be trampled upon, to place oneself in the attitude of most earnest humble prayer. Thus the *Græc. Venet.*

¹ For the right succession of the accents here (three serviles before the *Pazer*), *vid. Torah Emeth*, p. 30; *Accentuationssystem*, xii. § 4. According to Ben-Naphtali, *Mercha* is to be given to the **נָתַתְּ**.

² The *Zinnorith* before the *Mahpach* in these words represents at the same time the *Makkeph*. But Ben-Naphtali differs here from Ben-Asher, for he adopts the *Makkeph* and rejects the *Zinnorith*; *vid. Torah Emeth*, p. 16, and my *Psalmencomm.* Bd. ii. (1860), p. 460, note 2.

³ [El-Feyroozábádec's *Kamûs*, a native Arabic Lexicon; *vid. Lane's Arab. Lex.* Bk. i. pt. 1, p. xvii.]

παύθητι, Rashi ("humble thyself like to the threshold which is trampled and trode upon"), Aben-Ezra, Immanuel ("humble thyself under the soles of his feet"); so Cocceius, J. H. Michaelis, and others: *conculcandum te præbe*. יִרְהַב is more controverted. The Talmudic-Midrash explanation (*b. Joma*, 87a; *Bathra*, 173b, and elsewhere): take with thee in great numbers thy friends (יִרְהַב = הִרְבֵּה), is discredited by this, that it has along with it the explanation of הִתְרַפֵּס by (יֵר) תִּהְיֶה פֶּם, *solve palmam (manus)*, i.e. pay what thou canst. Also with the meaning to rule (Parchon, Immanuel), which יִרְהַב besides has not, nothing is to be done. The right meaning of יִרְהַב is to rush upon one boisterously, Isa. iii. 5. יִרְהַב means in general to be violently excited (Arab. *rahiba*, to be afraid), and thus to meet one, here with the accusative: assail impetuously thy neighbour (viz. that he fulfil his engagement). Accordingly, with a choice of words more or less suitable, the LXX. translates by παρόξυνε, Symm., Theodotion by παρόρησσον, the Græc. Venet. by ἐνίσχυσον, the Syr. (which the Targumist copies) by גָּרַר (*solicita*), and Kimchli glosses by: lay an arrest upon him with pacifying words. The Talmud explains יִרְהַב as plur.;¹ but the plur., which was permissible in iii. 28, is here wholly inadmissible: it is thus the *plena scriptio* for יִרְהַב with the retaining of the third radical of the ground-form of the root-word (יִרְהַב = יִרְהַב), or with י as *mater lectionis*, to distinguish the pausal-form from that which is without the pause; cf. xxiv. 34. LXX., Syr., Jerome, etc., rightly translate it in the sing. The immediateness lying in יִרְהַב (cf. ὕπαγε, Matt. v. 24) is now expressed as a duty, ver. 4 f. One must not sleep and slumber (an expression quite like Ps. cxxxii. 4), not give himself quietness and rest, till the other has released him from his bail by the performance of that for which he is surety. One must set himself free as a gazelle or as a bird, being caught, seeks to dis-entangle itself by calling forth all its strength and art.

Ver. 5. The naked מִיד is not to be translated "immediately;" for in this sense the word is rabbinical, not biblical. The versions (with exception of Jerome and the Græc. Venet.) translate as if the word were מִפֶּה [out of the snare]. Bertheau prefers this reading, and Böttcher holds יִצֵּד [a hunter] to have fallen out after מִיד. It is not a parallelism with reservation; for a bird-catcher is not at

¹ There is here no distinction between the *Kethib* and the *Keri*. The Masora remarks, "This is the only passage in the Book of Proverbs where the word is written with *Yod* (י);" it thus recognises only the undisputed יִרְהַב.

the same time a gazelle-hunter. The author, if he has so written, has conceived of מִיר, as at 1 Kings xx. 42, as absolute, and connected it with הִנָּעַל : tear thyself free like the gazelle from the hand into which thou hast fallen (Hitzig); according to which, the section should be accentuated thus : הִנָּעַל כַּעֲבִי מִיָּד. זָבִי, Aram. זָבִי, Arab. *zaby*, is the gazelle (Arab. *ghazāl*), so called from its elegance ; צִפּוֹר, the bird, from its whistling (צַפַּר, Arab. *ṣafar*, R. צַפַּר, cf. Arab. *ṣaffârat*, the whistling of a bird), Arab. *ṣafar*, whistler (with prosthesis, 'aṣafwar, warbler, *Psalm*. p. 794). The bird-catcher is called יָקוֹשׁ (from יָקַשׁ, after the form יָכַל, cog. קָשׁ, Isa. xxix. 21, יָקַשׁ, R. קַשׁ), after the form בָּנוֹר (fem. בְּנוֹרָה), or יָקָשׁ ; one would think that the *Kametz*, after the form *kâtul* (*vid.* under Isa. i. 17), must here be fixed, but in Jer. v. 26 the word is vocalized יָקוֹשִׁים.

TENTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, VI. 6-11.

CALL TO THE SLUGGARD TO AWAKE.

Altera parænesis (remarks J. H. Michaelis) *ad debitorem potius directa, sicut prima ad fidejussorem*. But this connection is a subtle invention. These brief proverbial discourses, each of which forms a completed whole, have scarcely been *a priori* destined for this introduction to the Salomonic Book of Proverbs edited by the author ; but he places them in it ; and that he so arranges them that this section regarding sluggards follows that regarding sureties, may have been occasioned by accidental points of contact of the one with the other (cf. לֵךְ, 6a, with 3b ; שְׁנוֹת . . . הַנוּמוֹת, ver. 10, with ver. 4), which may also further determine the course in which the proverbs follow each other.

Vers. 6-8. As Elihu (Job xxxv. 11) says that God has set the beasts as our teachers, so he sends the sluggard to the school of the ant (*Ameise*), so named (in Germ.) from its industry (*Emsigkeit*) :

- 6 Go to the ant, sluggard ;
Consider her ways, and be wise !
- 7 She that hath no judge,
Director, and ruler :
- 8 She prepareth in summer her food,
Has gathered in harvest her store.

The *Dechî* written mostly under the ה separates the inseparable. The thought, Go to the ant, sluggard! permits no other distinction than in the vocative; but the *Dechî* of הֵאֱלֵנִי is changed into *Munach*¹ on account of the nature of the *Athnach*-word, which consists of only two syllables without the counter-tone. The ant has for its Hebrew-Arabic name נִמְלָה, from the R. נם (*Isaiah*, p. 687), which is first used of the sound, which expresses the idea of the low, dull, secret,—thus of its active and yet unperceived motion; its Aramaic name in the Peshîto, ܢܡܠܐ, and in the Targ. ܢܡܠܐ (also Arab. *sumsum*, *sinsim*, of little red ants), designates it after its quick activity, its busy running hither and thither (*vid.* *Fleischer in Levy's Chald. Wörterb.* ii. 578). She is a model of unwearied and well-planned labour. From the plur. הֵנִי it is to be concluded that the author observed their art in gathering in and laying up in store, carrying burdens, building their houses, and the like (*vid.* the passages in the Talmud and Midrash in the *Hamburg Real-Encyclopädie für Bibel und Talmud*, 1868, p. 83 f.). To the ant the sluggard (עֲצֵל, Aram. and Arab. عَظْل, with the fundamental idea of weight and dulness) is sent, to learn from her to be ashamed, and to be taught wisdom.

Ver. 7. This relative clause describes the subject of ver. 8 more fully: it is like a clause with כִּי כַּמֶּנֶּה, *quamquam*.² The community of ants exhibits a peculiar class of workers; but it is not, like that of bees, composed of grades terminating in the queen-bee as the head. The three offices here named represent the highest judiciary, police, and executive powers; for הַיָּדֵן (from הָיָה, to distinguish, with the ending *in*, *vid.* *Jesurun*, p. 215 s.) is the judge; הַשֹּׁטֵר (from שָׁטַר, Arab. *satr*, to draw lines, to write) is the overseer (in war the director, controller), or, as Saalschütz indicates the province of the *schotrim* both in cities and in the camp, the office of police; מְשִׁלֵּם (*vid.* *Isaiah*, p. 691), the governors of the whole state organism subordinated to the *schoftim* and the *schotrim*. The Syr., and the Targ. slavishly following it, translate קָצִין by הַקָּצֵר (harvest), for they interchange this word with קָצִיר.

Ver. 8. In this verse the change of the time cannot be occasioned by this, that קָצִיר and קָצִין are distinguished as the earlier and the

¹ Cod. 1294 accentuates הֵאֱלֵנִי; and that, according to Ben-Asher's rule, is correct.

² Ver. 7 is commonly halved by *Rebia*; but for the correct accentuation, *vid.* *Torath Emeth*, p. 48, § 3.

later period of the year; for חַד (= Arab. *kayt*, from *kāt*, to be glowing hot, cf. Arab. *kghyyt* of the glow of the mid-day heat) is the late summer, when the heat rises to the highest degree; but the son of the Shunammite succumbed to the sun-stroke in the time of harvest (2 Kings iv. 18 f.). Löwenstein judiciously remarks that חַד refers to immediate want, חַדָּה to that which is future; or, better, the former shows them engaged in persevering industry during the summer glow, the latter as at the end of the harvest, and engaged in the bringing home of the winter stores. The words of the procuring of food in summer are again used by Agur, Prov. xxx. 25; and the Aramaic fable of the *ant and the grasshopper*,¹ which is also found among those of Æsop and of Syntipas, serves as an illustration of this whole verse. The LXX. has, after the "Go to the ant," a proverb of five lines, ἡ πορεύθητι πρὸς τὴν μέλισσαν. Hitzig regards it as of Greek origin; and certainly, as Lagarde has shown, it contains idiomatic Greek expressions which would not occur to a translator from the Hebrew. In any case, however, it is an interpolation which disfigures the Hebrew text by overlading it.

Vers. 9-11. After the poet has admonished the sluggard to take the ant as an example, he seeks also to rouse him out of his sleepiness and indolence:

- 9 How long, O sluggard, wilt thou lie?
When wilt thou rise up from thy sleep?
- 10 "A little sleep, a little slumber,
A little folding of the hands to rest!"
- 11 So comes like a strong robber thy poverty,
And thy want as an armed man.

Vers. 9, 10. The awakening cry, ver. 9, is not of the kind that Paul could have it in his mind, Eph. v. 14. חַד has, as the vocative, *Pasek* after it, and is, on account of the *Pasek*, in correct editions accentuated not with *Munach*, but *Mercha*. The words, ver. 10, are not an ironical call (sleep only yet a little while, but in truth a long while), but *per mimesin* the reply of the sluggard with which he turns away the unwelcome disturber. The plurals with חַד sound like self-delusion: yet a little, but a sufficient! To fold the hands, i.e. to cross them over the breast, or put them into the bosom, denotes also, Eccles. iv. 5, the idler. חַדָּה, *complicatio*

¹ Vid. Goldberg's *Chofes Matmonim*, Berlin 1845; and Landsberger's Berlin Graduation Thesis, *Fabulæ aliquot Aramææ*, 1846, p. 28.

(cf. in Livy, *compressis quod aiunt manibus sidere*; and Lucan, ii. 292, *compressas tenuisse manus*), is formed like שָׁקַי, iii. 8, and the inf. שָׁקַי like חָסַר, x. 21, and שָׁפַל, xvi. 19. The *perf. consec.* connects itself with the words heard from the mouth of the sluggard, which are as a hypothetical antecedent thereto: if thou so sayest, and always again sayest, then this is the consequence, that suddenly and inevitably poverty and want come upon thee. That מְהֵלֵךְ denotes the *grassator*, i.e. vagabond (Arab. *dawwar*, one who wanders much about), or the robber or foe (like the Arab. *'aduw*, properly *transgressor finium*), is not justified by the usage of the language; מְהֵלֵךְ signifies, 2 Sam. xii. 4, the traveller, and מְהֵלֵךְ is one who rides quickly forward, not directly a *κακὸς ὁδοιπόρος* (LXX.).

Ver. 11. The point of comparison, 11a, is the unforeseen, as in quick march or assault (Böttcher), and 11b the hostile and irretrievable surprise; for a man in armour, as Hitzig remarks, brings no good in his armour: he assails the opponent, and he who is without defence yields to him without the possibility of withstanding him. The LXX. translate בָּאִישׁ מִן by ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς δρομεύς (cf. δρομεύς = מְהֵלֵךְ, Job vii. 6, LXX., Aq.), for what reason we know not. After ver. 11 they interpose two other lines: "but if thou art assiduous, thy harvest will come to thee as a fountain, but want will go away ὥσπερ κακὸς δρομεύς." Also this "bad runner" we must let go; for Lagarde's retranslation, וּמַחֲסֵר כְּחֵטְ בָּאִישׁ נָמַן, no one can understand. The four lines, vers. 10, 11, are repeated in the appendix of Words of the Wise, xxiv. 33 f.; and if this appendix originated in the time of Hezekiah, they may have been taken therefrom by the poet, the editor of the older Book of Proverbs. Instead of מְהֵלֵךְ, בְּמַהֲלֵךְ is there used (so comes forward thy poverty, i.e. again and again, but certainly moving forward); and instead of מַחֲסֵר, מוֹחֲסֵר is written, as also here, ver. 6, for מִשְׁנֵהָר is found the variant מִשְׁנֵהָרִית with Jod as *mater lectionis* of the pausal *Segol*.

ELEVENTH INTRODUCTORY MASIAL DISCOURSE, VI. 12-19.

WARNING AGAINST DECEIT AND MALICE.

There follows now a *third* brief series of instructions, which run

to a conclusion with a deterring prospect similar to the foregoing.

- 12 A worthless man, a wicked man,
Is he who practiseth falsehood with his mouth ;
- 13 Who winketh with his eyes, scrapeth with his foot,
Pointeth with his fingers.
- 14 Malice is in his heart,
He deviseth evil at all times,
He spreadeth strife.
- 15 Therefore suddenly his destruction shall come,
Suddenly shall he be destroyed, and there is no remedy.

It is a question, what is the subject and what the predicate in ver. 12. Thus much is clear, that upon him who is here described according to his deceitful conduct the sentence of condemnation shall fall. He who is so described is thus subject, and אָדָם בְּלִיעַל is without doubt predicate. But does the complex subject begin with אִישׁ אֶחָד? Thus *e.g.* Hitzig: "A worthless man is the wicked man who . . ." But the interchange of אָדָם and אִישׁ is a sign of parallel relation; and if 12*b* belonged attributively to אִישׁ אֶחָד, then since אִישׁ הָאֶחָד is not used, it ought at least to have been continued by הַהוּא. The general moral categories, 12*a*, are thus predicates, as was indeed besides probable; the copious division of the subject demands also in point of style a more developed predicate. xvi. 27 is simpler in plan, and also logically different. There the expression is, as is usual, אִישׁ בְּלִיעַל. Since אָדָם אֶחָד is not possible, the author uses instead בְּלִיעַל. This word, composed of בָּלִי and לֵעַל (from לָעַל, לֵעַל, to be useful, to be good for), so fully serves as one word, that it even takes the article, 1 Sam. xxv. 25. It denotes worthlessness, generally in a chain of words in the genitive, but also the worthless, Job xxxiv. 18; and it is to be so taken here, for אָדָם does not form a *constructivus*, and never governs a genitive. בְּלִיעַל is thus a virtual adjective (as *nequam* in *homo nequam*); the connection is like that of אָדָם רָצָע, xi. 7, and elsewhere, although more appositional than this pure attributive. Synonymous with בְּלִיעַל is אֶחָד (from *an*, to breathe), wickedness, *i.e.* want of all moral character. Thus worthless and wicked is he who practises deceit with his mouth (cf. iv. 24), *i.e.* who makes language the means of untruthfulness and uncharitableness. עֲקִישׁוֹת פֶּה is meant in a moral sense, but without excluding that distortion of the mouth which belongs to the mimicry of the malicious. It is the accus. of the object; for הָקָה is also bound in a moral sense with the accusative

of that which one practises, *i.e.* dealing with, exercises himself in, ii. 7, xxviii. 18, Isa. xxxiii. 15.

Ver. 13. קִירָן בְּעֵינָיו is translated according to the sense: who winks (*nictat*) with his eyes; but that is not the proper meaning of the word, for קִירָן is used not only of the eyes, x. 10 (cf. xvi. 30, *qui oculos morsicat* or *connivet*), Ps. xxxv. 19, but also of the lips, xvi. 30. Thus Löwenstein's explanation: who opens up the eyes, is incorrect. The verb קִירָן unites in it the meanings of قَرَصَ, to pinch off with a sharp implement, and قَرَضَ, with a blunt instrument (Arab. *mikrad*, pincers). It means to pince, to nip, as Arab. *kars*, pincer,—*e.g.* *kars balskyn alarsasat*, he cuts off with the knife the leaden seal,—hence frequently, to nip together the eyes, provincially: to wink (“*zwickern*,” frequent. of “*zwicken*,” to nip) with the eyes—the action of the deceiver, who thereby gives the sign to others that they help or at least do not hinder him from bantering and mocking, belying and deceiving a third person (Fl.); cf. Ali's proverb, “O God, pardon to us the culpable winking with the eye (*ramzat*),” and Fleischer's notes thereon, the *Proverbs of Ali*, p. 100 f.

That the words which follow, מוֹלֵל בְּרַגְלָיו, are meant of discourse, *i.e.* the giving of signs, with the feet, and, so to say, significant *oratio pedestris* (LXX., Aben-Ezra, Bertheau, Hitzig, and others), is very improbable, since the usage of language has set apart the *Piel* מוֹלֵל for the meaning *loqui*, and מוֹלֵל admits another suitable signification, for מוֹלֵל means in Talmudic *fricare*, *confricare*,—*e.g.* הַמּוֹלֵל מִלִּלּוֹת, he who grinds the parched ears of corn (*b. Beza* 12b; *Ma'seroth*, iv. 5),—after which Syr., Targ., חָכַם (stamping), Aq. *τρίβων*, Symm. *προστριβων*, Jerome, (*qui*) *terit pede*, and Rashi מַשְׁבִּיטָה (grinding, scratching); it means one who scrapes with his feet, draws them backwards and forwards on the ground in order thereby to give a sign to others; also the Arab. مَلَّ, *levem et agilcm esse*, which as the synonym of اسرع is connected with فى of the way, signifies properly to move the feet quickly hither and thither (Fl.).¹ מָרָה

¹ The root-idea of the Arab. *mall* is unquietness of motion; the Arab. noun *malli* signifies the glow with its flickering light and burning: glowing ashes, inner agitation, external haste; Arab. *malil* (مَلَّل) is the feverish patient, but also one quickly hastening away, and generally an impatient or hasty person (*vid.* Wetstein in Baudissin in his *Job. Tischendorfianus*, vii. 6). The grinding

appears here, in accordance with its primary signification (*projicere*, *sc. brachium* or *digitum* = *monstrare*), connected with בָּאַצְעָהָי; another expression for this scornful, malicious δακτυλοδεικνεῖν is יָלַח אֶצְבָּעוֹ, Isa. lviii. 9.

Ver. 14. In this verse is continued the description of the subject, only once returning to the *particip.* The clauses are arranged independently, but logically according to the complex conception of the subject. תְּהַפְּכוֹת are just the knaveries, *i.e.* the malicious wickedness which comes to light in word and deportment as עֲקִיבוֹת פֶּה. Regarding the double figure of the smithy and of agriculture underlying חָרַשׁ, *machinari*, *vid.* at iii. 29, and regarding the omission of the הוּא to חָרַשׁ, at Ps. vii. 10. The phrase יָלַח מְרִנִּים (as ver. 19, xvi. 28), to let loose disputes, so that they break forth, reminds us rather of the unfettering of the winds by Æolus than of the casting in of the apple of discord. Instead of מְרִנִּים the *Kerî* has מְרִנִּים; on the other hand, מְרִנִּים remains uncorrected vi. 19, x. 12. The form מְרִנִּים occurs once, xviii. 18, and its *constr.* מְרִנִּי once, xix. 13. Everywhere else the text has מְרִנִּים, for which the *Kerî* has מְרִנִּים, xviii. 19, xxi. 9, 19, xxiii. 29, xxv. 24, xxvi. 21, xxvii. 15. The forms מְרִנִּי and מְרִנִּי are also recognised: the former stands alone without any analogous example; the latter is compared at least with מָצַר, Arab. *maṣûl* (*Psalmen*, p. 163, 3). Probably these two forms are warranted by Gen. xxv. 2, cf. xxxvii. 28, 36, where מְרִנִּי and מְרִנִּי occur as the names of two sons of Abraham by Keturah. But the national name מְרִנִּים is no reason for the seven times laying aside of the regular form מְרִנִּים, *i.e.* מְרִנִּים, which is the plur. of מְרִנִּי after the forms מְאֹרִים, מְעֹרִים, although מְרִנִּים, after the forms מְבַלְשִׁים, מְצִיָּקִים, is also found.

Ver. 15. With the 14th verse the description terminates. A worthless and a wicked person is he who does such things. The point lies in the characteristic out of which the conclusion is drawn: therefore his ruin will suddenly come upon him, etc. Regarding יָרַע, the root-meaning of which is illustrated by Amos ii. 13, *vid.* at i. 26. יָרַע is an old accus. of an absol. יָרַע, of the same meaning as יָרַע, used as an adverbial accus., both originating in the root-idea of splitting, opening, breaking out and breaking forth. "Shall be

is made by means of a quick movement hither and thither; and so also is speaking, for the instrument of speech, particularly the tongue, is set in motion. Only the meaning *præcidere*, *circumcidere*, does not connect itself with that root-idea: מָל in this signification appears to be a nuance of מָר, *stringere*.

broken to pieces" (as a brittle potter's vessel, Ps. ii. 9, Isa. xxx. 14, Jer. xxix. 11) is a frequent figure for the destruction (שָׁבַר) of an army (cf. Arab. *ânksar âljysh*), of a city or a state, a man. וְאִין continues the שָׁבַר as xxix. 1: there shall be as it were no means of recovery for his shattered members (Fl.). Without the *Vav* this וְאִין מְרַבֵּא would be a clause conceived of accusatively, and thus adverbially: without any healing.

Vers. 16-19. What now follows is not a separate section (Hitzig), but the corroborative continuation of that which precedes. The last word (מְרִיבִים, strife) before the threatening of punishment, 14b, is also here the last. The thought that no vice is a greater abomination to God than the (in fact satanical) striving to set men at variance who love one another, clothes itself in the form of the numerical proverb which we have already considered, pp. 12, 13. From that place we transfer the translation of this example of a *Midda*:—

- 16 There are six things which Jahve hateth,
And seven are an abhorrence to His soul:
- 17 Haughty eyes, a lying tongue,
And hands that shed innocent blood;
- 18 An heart that deviseth the thoughts of evil,
Feet that hastily run to wickedness,
- 19 One that uttereth lies as a false witness,
And he who soweth strife between brethren.

The sense is not, that the six things are hateful to God, and the seventh an abomination to Him besides (Löwenstein); the *Midda*-form in Amos i. 3-ii. 6, and in the proverb in Job v. 19, shows that the seven are to be numbered separately, and the seventh is the *non plus ultra* of all that is hated by God. We are not to translate: *sex hæcce odit*, for הָטָה, הָטָה (הָטָה) points backwards and hitherwards, but not, as אָלָה, forwards to that immediately following; in that case the words would be שֵׁשׁ אֵלֶּה, or more correctly שֵׁשׁ הָאֵלֶּה. But also Hitzig's explanation, "These six things (viz. vers. 12-15) Jahve hateth," is impossible; for (which is also against that *hæcce*) the substantive pronoun הֵמָּה, הֵנָּה (הֵמָּה, הֵנָּה) is never, like the Chald. הֵמֶן (הֵמֶן), employed as an accus. in the sense of אֵתְּהֶם, אֵתְּהֶן, it is always (except where it is the virtual gen. connected with a preposition) only the nom., whether of the subject or of the predicate; and where it is the nom. of the predicate, as Deut. xx. 15, Isa. li. 19, substantival clauses precede in which הֵנָּה (הֵמָּה) repre-

sents the substantive verb, or, more correctly, in which the logical copula resulting from the connection of the clause itself remains unexpressed. Accordingly, 'שָׁנָא ה' is a relative clause, and is therefore so accentuated here, as at xxx. 15 and elsewhere: *sex (sunt) ea quæ Deus odit, et septem (sunt) abominatio animæ ejus*. Regarding the statement that the soul of God hates anything, *vid.* at Isa. i. 14. תועבת, an error in the writing occasioned by the numeral (*vid.* xxvi. 25), is properly corrected by the *Keri*; the poet had certainly the singular in view, as iii. 32, xi. 1, when he wrote תועבת. The first three characteristics are related to each other as mental, verbal, actual, denoted by the members of the body by means of which these characteristics come to light. The virtues are taken all together as a body (organism), and meekness is its head. Therefore there stands above all, as the sin of sins, the *mentis elatæ tumor*, which expresses itself in *elatum (grande) supercilium*: שְׁנִיִּים רְמוֹת, the feature of the רָם, haughty (cf. Ps. xviii. 28 with 2 Sam. xxii. 28), is the opposite of the feature of the שָׁח עֵינַיִם, Job xxii. 29; עֵץ is in the O. T. almost always (*vid.* Cant. iv. 9) fem., and adjectives of course form no dual. The second of these characteristics is the lying tongue, and the third the murderous hands. רָם הַיָּדַיִם is innocent blood as distinguished from רָם הַיָּדַיִם, the blood of the innocent, Deut. xix. 13.¹

Ver. 18. The fourth characteristic is a deceitful heart. On חָרַשׁ, *vid.* ver. 14, iii. 29, and on אָזַן, ver. 12. The fifth: feet running with haste to evil; לָרָעָה as לָרָע in Isa. lix. 7, echoing the distich i. 16, as here, 17^b and 18^b. The connection מִהֵרָ לָרֶץ, *propere cucurrit* (contrast לְאַחֵר), is equivalent to מִהֵרָ.

Ver. 19. The sixth: "A speaker of lies, a tongue of falsehood," is hateful to God. It is one subject which is thus doubly characterized. פְּזוּזִים are fictions, and שֶׁקֶר is the disfiguring (*deformatio*) of the actual facts. They are purposely placed together in this connection. The derivations of these synonyms are obscure; Fürst gives to the former the root-idea of spinning (properly knotting together), and to the latter that of painting. כּוֹבֵד is introduced

¹ The writing רָם follows the Masoretic rule, *vid.* Kimchi, *Michlol* 205b, and Heidenheim under Deut. xix. 10, where in printed editions of the text (also in Norzi's) the irregular form נָקִי רָם is found. Besides, the *Metheg* is to be given to רָם־, so that one may not read it *dom*, as e.g. שֶׁשׁ־מֵאוֹת, Gen. vii. 11, that one may not read it שֶׁשֶׁ־.

to support יִשָּׁקֵר.¹ It would also be verbally permissible to interpret יָד שָׁקֵר in the sense of עֲדוּת שָׁקֵר, like xxv. 18, as in apposition to כֹּזְבִים; but in the nearest parallel, xiv. 15, the idea is personal, for it is said of the עַד שָׁקֵר that he breathes out lies. In that place there can be no doubt that the clause is a verbal one, and יָפִיחַ *finitum*, viz. *Hiph.* of פָּיַח. This *Hiph.* signifies elsewhere also *sufflare*, xx. 8, *afflure*, Ps. x. 5, Ezek. xxi. 36, *perflare*, Cant. iv. 16, *anhelare* (*desiderare*), Ps. xii. 6, Hab. ii. 3, but with כֹּזְבִים, *efflare*, a synonym to דִּבֶּר, as הִפִּיעַ and הִפִּיחַ, which has (cf. xii. 17) no secondary meaning in use, but is mostly connected with כֹּזְבִים, not without reference to the fact that that which is false is without reality and is nothing more than הַבֵּל וְרוּחַ. But what kind of a form is יָפִיחַ, where it is not, as xiv. 5, the predicate of a verbal clause, but in connection with כֹּזְבִים, as here and at xiv. 25, xix. 5, 9 (once with אֲמוֹנָה, xii. 17), is the subject of a substantival clause? That which lies nearest is to regard it as a noun formed from the *fut. Hiph.* Such formations we indeed meet only among proper names, such as יָקִים, יָכִין, יָאִיר; however, at least the one *n. appell.* יָרִיב (an adversary) is found, which may be formed from the *Hiph.* as well as from the *Kal*. But should not the *constr.* of יָפִיחַ after the form יָרִיב be יָפִיחַ? One does not escape from this consideration by deriving יָפִיחַ, after the forms יָנִיעַ, יָחִיל, יָדִיר, יָשִׁישׁ, and the like, from a secondary verb יָפַח, the existence of which is confirmed by Jer. iv. 31, and from which also יָפַח, Ps. xxvii. 12, appears to be derived, although it may be reduced also, after the form יָרַב (with יָרִיב), to הִפִּיחַ. But in this case also one expects as a connecting form יָפִיחַ like יָדִיר, as in reality יָפַח from יָפַח (cf. שָׁמַח, אָבַל, from שָׂמַח, אָבַל). Shall it now be assumed that the *Kametz* is treated as fixed? This were contrary to rule, since it is not naturally long. Thus the connection is not that of the genitive. But if יָפִיחַ were a substantive formed with the preformative of the second *modus* like יָלָקִיט [1 Sam. xvii. 40], or were it a participial intensive form of active signification such as נִכְבֵּיחַ, then the verbal force remaining in it is opposed to the usage of the language. There remains nothing further, therefore, than to regard יָפִיחַ as an attributive put in the place of a noun: one who breathes out; and there is a homogeneous example of this, for in any other way we cannot explain יוֹסִיף, Eccles. i. 18. In 19b the numeral proverb reaches its point. The chief of all that God hates is he who takes

¹ Isaak Albo thus distinguishes these synonyms in his dogmatic, bearing the title סֵפֶר עֲקָרִים, ii. 27.

a fiendish delight in setting at variance men who stand nearly related. Thus this brief proverbial discourse rounds itself off, coming back again to 14b as a refrain.

TWELFTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, VI. 20 ff.

WARNING AGAINST ADULTERY, BY REFERENCE TO ITS FEARFUL CONSEQUENCES.

After these three smaller sections, the teacher of wisdom returns here to the theme of the eighth: Warning against sins of the flesh, whose power and prevalence among men is so immeasurably great, that their terrible consequences cannot sufficiently be held up before them, particularly before youth.

20 Keep, my son, the commandment of thy father,
And reject not the instruction of thy mother.

21 Bind them to thy heart evermore,
Fasten them about thy neck.

The suff. *-ēm* refers to the good doctrine (cf. vii. 3) pointed out by מִצְוָה and מוֹרָה; the masc. stands, as is usual (e.g. i. 16, v. 2), instead of the fem. Regarding the figure, reminding us of the Tefillin and of Amuletes for perpetual representation, *vid.* under iii. 3. Similarly of persons, Cant. viii. 6. The verb עָנָה (only here and Job xxxi. 36) signifies to bend, particularly to bend aside (Arab. *'ind*, bending off, going aside; accus. as adv., aside, *apud*), and to bend up, to wind about, *circumpliare*.

Ver. 22. The representation of the good doctrine is now personified, and becomes identified with it.

When thou walkest, it will guide thee;
When thou liest down, it will keep watch over thee;
And when thou wakest, it will talk with thee.

The subject is the doctrine of wisdom, with which the representation of wisdom herself is identified. The futures are not expressive of a wish or of an admonition, but of a promise; the form of the third clause shows this. Thus, and in the same succession as in the *schema* Deut. vi. 7, cf. xi. 19, are the three circumstances of the outward life distinguished: going, lying down, and rising up. The punctuation בְּהֵאָנֶכְךָ, found here and there, is Ben-Naphtali's

variant; Ben-Asher and also the *Textus rec.* reject the *Metheg* in this case, *vid.* Baer's *Metheg-Setzung*, § 28. The verb נָתַתָּה, with its *Iliph.* in a strengthened *Kal*-signification, is more frequently found in the Psalms than in the Proverbs; the Arab. نَتَلَ shows that it properly signifies to direct (*dirigere*), to give direction, to move in a definite direction. נָשָׂא with עַל, to take into protection, we had already ii. 11; this author has favourite forms of expression, in the repetition of which he takes delight. With lying down, sleeping is associated. הִתְקַצְיוֹת is, as Ps. cxxix. 18, the *hypoth. perf.*, according to Ewald, § 357a: *et ut expergefactus es, illa te compellabit.* Bertheau incorrectly: she will make thee thoughtful. But apart from the fact that there is no evidence of the existence of this *Iliph.* in the language of the Bible, the personification demands a clearer figure. שִׁיתָ (שִׁית) signifies mental speech and audible speech (Gen. xxiv. 63, poet., in the Talmudic¹ a common word); with בּ, speaking concerning something (*fabulari de*), Ps. lxi. 13; with the accus., that which is said of a thing, Ps. cxlv. 5, or the address, briefly for לְ שִׁיתָ, Job xii. 8 (as מִן with accus. iv. 9 = לְ מִן): when thou art awake, wisdom will forthwith enter into conversation with thee, and fill thy thoughts with right matter, and give to thy hands the right direction and consecration.

Ver. 23. Since in הָיָא the idea of wisdom and of wholesome doctrine lie in one another, the author can proceed with proof:

For a lamp is the commandment, and instruction a light (Jerome, *et lex lux*);

And a way of life, disciplinary reproofs.

That חוּרָה has here not the positive, specifically Israelitish sense, but the generalized sense of instruction in conformity with truth regarding the will of God and the duty of man, *vid.* p. 42. This instruction mediated by man, but of divine origin, is אֹר, light, which enlightens the man who submits to it; and the commandment, מִצְוָה, which directs men in every case to do what is right, and forbids that which is wrong (including the prohibition Lev. iv. 2), is נֵר, a lamp which, kindled at that light, enlightens all the darkness of ignorance with reference to human conduct and its consequences.

¹ The conjecture thrown out by Wetstein, that (Arab.) *shykh* is equivalent to מְשִׁיחַ (מְשִׁיחַ), speaker, is untenable, since the verb *shakh*, to be old, a so-called *munsarif*, i.e. conjugated throughout, is used in all forms, and thus is certainly the root of *shykh*.

אור and נר are related to each other as general and particular, primary and derivative. Löwenstein accentuates incorrectly וְהוֹרָה אֹר instead of אֹר וְהוֹרָה (as the Cod. 1294 and the 3 Erfurt Codd.); *vid.* on the retrogression of the tone, not existing here, under iii. 15. The gen. מוֹפֵר denotes the object or character of the admonition: not disciplinary in the external sense of the word, but rather moral, having in view discipline in the sense of education, *i.e.* moral edification and elevation. Such corrections are הַדָּרֶךְ הַיָּשָׁר, the way to true life, direction how to obtain it.

Ver. 24. The section thus closes:

To keep thee from the vile woman,
From the flattery of the strange tongue.

Regarding the genitive connection אִשְׁתֵּי רָע, a woman of a wicked character, *vid.* under ii. 14; and regarding the adjectival connection לְשׁוֹן נְכַרִּיהַ, under ver. 17; the strange tongue is the tongue (לְשׁוֹן) of the strange (foreign) woman (*vid.* p. 81), alluring with smooth words (ii. 16). Ewald, Bertheau: from her of a smooth tongue, the stranger, as Symm., Theod., ἀπὸ λειστογλώσσου ξένης; but חִלְקֶת is a substantive (Gen. xxvii. 16), and as a fem. adj. form is without an example. Rather חִלְקֶת לְשׁוֹן is to be regarded as the first member and נְכַרִּיהַ as the second of the *st. constr.*, for the former constitutes one idea, and לְשׁוֹן on this account remains unabbreviated; cf. Ps. lxxviii. 22, Isa. xxviii. 1; but (1) this syntactical phenomenon is yet problematical, *vid.* Friedr. Philippi, *Wesen und Ursprung des St. Constr.* p. 17; and (2) the supposition of such an anomaly is here unnecessary.

The *proœmium* of these twelve proverbial discourses is now at an end. Wisdom herself begins striking the note of the Decalogue:

- 25 Long not for her beauty in thy heart,
And let her not catch thee with her eyelids;
26 Because for a harlot one cometh down to a piece of bread,
And a man's wife lieth in wait for a precious soul.

The warning 25a is in the spirit of the "thou shalt not covet," Ex. xx. 17, and the ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ, Matt. v. 28, of the Preacher on the Mount. The Talmudic proverb עבירה קצו מעבירה הרהורי (Joma 29a) means only that the imagination of the sinful act exhausts the body even more than the act itself. The warning, "let her not catch thee with her eyelids," refers to her (the adulteress's) coquettish ogling and amorous winking. In the reason

added, beginning with **כִּי בָעֵר** (thus it is to be punctuated), there is the appositional connection **אֲשֶׁה זֶנֶה**, Gesen. § 113; the idea of **זֶנֶה** goes over into 26b. "**כִּבְרֵךְ לָחֶם** [= **כִּרְכֵּךְ**, R. **כִּר**, to round, *vid.* at Gen. xlix. 5], properly a circle of bread, is a small round piece of bread, such as is still baked in Italy (*pagnotta*) and in the East (Arab. *kurs*), here an expression for the smallest piece" (Fl.). **בָּעֵר** (*constr.* of **בָּעַר**), as Job ii. 4, Isa. xxxii. 14, is used in the sense of *ὑπέρ*, *pro*, and with **עַל** there is connected the idea of the coming down to this low point. Ewald, Bertheau explain after the LXX., *τιμὴ γὰρ πόρνης ὄση καὶ ἐνὸς ἄρτου, γυνὴ δὲ ἀνδρῶν τιμὴς ψυχὰς ἀγρεύει*. But nothing is said here of price (reward); the parallelism is synonymous, not antithetic: he is doubly threatened with loss who enters upon such a course. The adulterer squanders his means (xxix. 3) to impoverishment (*vid.* the mention of a loaf of bread in the description of poverty 1 Sam. ii. 36), and a man's wife (but at the same time seeking converse with another) makes a prey of a precious soul; for whoever consents to adulterous converse with her, loses not perhaps his means, but certainly freedom, purity, dignity of soul, yea, his own person. **צַד** comprehends—as **צִידֹן**, fisher's town [Zidon], Arab. *syād*, hunter and fisher, show—all kinds of hunting, but in Hebr. is used only of the hunting of wild beasts. The root-meaning (cf. **צָרַה**) is to spy, to seize.

Vers. 27-29. The moral necessity of ruinous consequences which the sin of adultery draws after it, is illustrated by examples of natural cause and effect necessarily connected:

- 27 Can one take fire in his bosom
And his clothes not be burned?
- 28 Or can any one walk over burning coals
And his feet not be burned?
- 29 So he that goeth to his neighbour's wife,
No one remains unpunished that toucheth her.

We would say: Can any one, without being, etc.; the former is the Semitic "extended (paratactic)¹ construction." The first **וְאֵל** has the conjunctive *Shalsheleth*. **וְהָרָה** signifies to seize and draw forth a brand or coal with the fire-tongs or shovel (**מִדְּהָרָה**, the instrument for this); cf. Arab. *khât*, according to Lane, "he seized or snatched

¹ [The *πααρατακτικὸς χρόνος* denotes the imperfect tense, because it is still extended to the future.]

away a thing;” the form יִחַת is *Kal*, as יִחַת (vid. Köhler, *De Tetragrammate*, 1867, p. 10). יִחַ (properly indentation) is here not the lap, but, as Isa. xl. 11, the bosom.

Ver. 28. A second example of destructive consequences naturally following a certain course is introduced with עַם of the double question. נִחַלִּים (from נִחַל, after the form נִחַ, but for which נִחַל is used) is the regular modification of *gahhalim* (Gesen. § 27, 2). The fem. נִחַלִּי is followed here (cf. on the other hand i. 16) by the rhythmically full-sounding form נִחַלִּינִי (retaining the distinction of gender), from נִחַ, Arab. *kwy*, to burn so that a brand-mark (נִחַ, Isa. iii. 24, *cauterium*) remains.

Ver. 29. The instruction contained in these examples here follows: τὸ εἰς πῦρ καὶ εἰς γυναῖκα ἐμπεσεῖν σου ἰνὰ ἄρχῃ (Pythagoras in *Maximi Eclog.* c. 39). לֹא בִּוֹל is here, as the second in Ps. li. 1, a euphemism, and בִּוֹל, to come in contact with, means, as לֹא נִגַּע, to touch, Gen. xx. 6. He who goes in to his neighbour's wife shall not do so with impunity (יִנָּחֵם). Since both expressions denote fleshly nearness and contact, so it is evident he is not guiltless.

Vers. 30, 31. The thief and the adulterer are now placed in comparison with one another, in such a way that adultery is supposed to be a yet greater crime.

- 30 One does not treat the thief scornfully if he steals
To satisfy his craving when he is hungry ;
31 Being seized, he may restore sevenfold,
Give up the whole wealth of his house.

For the most part 30a is explained: even when this is the case, one does not pass it over in the thief as a bagatelle. Ewald remarks: לֹא בִּוֹל stands here in its nearest signification of overlooking, whence first follows that of contemning. But this “nearest” signification is devised wholly in favour of this passage;—the interpretation, “they do not thus let the thief pass,” is set aside by Cant. viii. 1, 7; for by 31b, cf. Cant. viii. 7b, and 34a, cf. Cant. viii. 6a, it is proved that from ver. 30 on, reminiscences from the Canticles, which belong to the literature of the Chokma, find their way into the Mashal language of the author. Hitzig's correct supposition, that לֹא בִּוֹל always signifies positive contemning, does not necessitate the interrogative interpretation: “Does not one despise the thief if . . . ?” Thus to be understood, the author ought to have written כִּי אִם כִּי נִחַ. Michaelis rightly: *furtum licet merito pro infami*

in republica habetur, tamen si cum adulterio comparatur, minus probrosum est. Regarding עֲשֵׂה in the sense of appetite, and even throat and stomach, *vid. Psychologie*, p. 204. A second is, that the thief, if he is seized (but we regard נֶאֱסָר not as the *hypoth. perf.*, but as the *part. deprehensus*), may make compensation for his crime. The fut. עֲשֵׂה thus to be understood as the potential lies near from this, that a sevenfold compensation of the thing stolen is unheard of in the Israelitish law; it knows only of a twofold, fourfold, fivefold restoration, Ex. xxi. 37, xxii. 1-3, 8 (cf. Saalschütz, *Mos. Recht*, p. 554 ff.). This excess over that which the law rendered necessary leads into the region of free-will: he (the thief, by which we are now only to think of him whom bitter necessity has made such) may make compensation sevenfold, *i.e.* superabundantly; he may give up the whole possessions (*vid.* on פֶּן at i. 13) of his house, so as not merely to satisfy the law, but to appease him against whom he has done wrong, and again to gain for himself an honoured name. What is said in vers. 30 and 31 is perfectly just. One does not condemn a man who is a thief through poverty, he is pitied; while the adulterer goes to ruin under all circumstances of contempt and scorn. And: theft may be made good, and that abundantly; but adultery and its consequences are irreparable.

Vers. 32, 33. Here there is a contrast stated to ver. 30:

32 He who commits adultery (*adulterans mulierem*) is beside himself,
A self-destroyer—who does this.

33 He gains stripes and disgrace,
And his reproach is never quenched.

הִנָּה, which primarily seems to mean *excedere*, to indulge in excess, is, as also in the Decalogue, cf. Lev. xx. 10, transitive: ὁ μοιχεύων γυναῖκα. Regarding being mad (*herzlos* = *heartless*) = *amens* (*excors*, *vecors*), *vid. Psychologie*, p. 254. מְשֻׁחָחִית נַפְשׁוֹ is he who goes to ruin with wilful perversity. A self-murderer—*i.e.* he intends to ruin his position and his prosperity in life—who does it, viz. this, that he touches the wife of another. It is the worst and most inextinguishable dishonouring of oneself. Singularly Behaji: who annihilates it (his soul), with reference to Deut. xxi. 12, Eccles. iv. 17, where עֵשֶׂה would be equivalent to מַלְא, καταργεῖν, which is untrue and impossible.¹ נֶגֶד refers to the corporal punishment in-

¹ Behaji ought rather to have referred to Zeph. iii. 19, Ezek. vii. 27, xxii. 14; but there עֵשֶׂה אֵת means *agere cum aliquo*, as we say: mit jemandem abrechnen (to settle accounts with any one).

flicted on the adulterer by the husband (Deut. xvii. 8, xxi. 5); Hitzig, who rejects ver. 32, refers it to the stripes which were given to the thief according to the law, but these would be called מִצָּה (מִצְוָה). The punctuation נָגַע וְקָלָן is to be exchanged for נָגַע וְקָלָן (Löwenstein and other good editors). נָצַף has a more active signification than our "finden" (to find): *consequitur*, τυγχάνει.

Vers. 34, 35. One who has been stolen from is to be appeased, but not the injured husband.

34 For jealousy is the fury of a husband,

And he spareth not in the day of vengeance.

35 He regardeth not any ransom,

And is not contented though thou offerest to him gifts ever so great.

The connection marks קִנְיָה as the subject; for it respects carnal intercourse with another's wife. Jealousy is not usually הֲמָה, the glow of anger (from חָם, as שִׁנְיָה from שָׁן), but הֲמַת־נָפֶר (constr. as שִׁנְיָה), the glow of a man's anger, who with the putting forth of all his manly strength will seek satisfaction to his wounded honour. נָפֶר, here significant for אִשָּׁה, with the fundamental idea of strength, firmness; cf. Arab. *jabr*, to make fast, to put right again something broken in pieces, particularly a broken vessel, hence *Algebra*, properly the operation by which an incomplete magnitude is completed (Fl.). The following הֲלֹא־יִחַבֵּל (with the orthophonic *Dagesh*, as ver. 25 יִחַבֵּד, and with *Makkeph*) is connected with נָפֶר, with definite reference to the man whom the faithless guest has made a cuckold. When the day comes in which the adultery brought to light demands and admits of vengeance, then, wounded in his right and in his honour, he knows no mercy; he pays no regard to any atonement or recompense by which the adulterer seeks to appease him and induce him not to inflict the punishment that is due: he does not consent, even though thou makest ever so great the gift whereby thou thinkest to gain him. The phrase נָשָׂא פָנִים, πρόσσωπον λαμβάνειν, signifies elsewhere to receive the countenance, i.e. the appearance and the impression of a man, i.e. to let it impress one favourably; here it is used of the כִּפָּר, i.e. the means by which covering, i.e. non-punishment, pardon of the crime, impunity of the guilty, is obtained. Regarding אָבָה, to consent to, *vid.* at i. 10. שָׁחַר, Aram. שָׁחַר, is a gift, particularly bribery. That the language may again finally assume the form of an address, it beautifully rounds itself off.

THIRTEENTH INTRODUCTORY MASIAL DISCOURSE, VII.

WARNING AGAINST ADULTERY BY THE REPRESENTATION OF ITS
ABHORRENT AND DETESTABLE NATURE AS SEEN IN AN
EXAMPLE.

The fearful desolation which adultery, and in general the sin of uncleanness, occasions in the life of the individual who is guilty of it, as well as in society, does not suffer the author of this discourse, directed to youth, to abandon his theme, which he has already treated of under different aspects. He takes up his warning once more, strengthens it by an example he himself had witnessed of one who fell a sacrifice to this sin, and gives it a very impressive conclusion, ver. 24 ff.

The introduction first counsels in general to a true appreciation of these well-considered life-rules of wisdom.

- 1 My son, keep my words,
And treasure up my commandments with thee.
- 2 Keep my commandments, and thou shalt live;
And my instruction as the apple of thine eye.
- 3 Wind them about thy fingers,
Write them on the tablet of thy heart.

The LXX. has after ver. 1 another distich; but it here disturbs the connection. Regarding וְעַיִן, *vid.* at ii. 1; וְעַיִן refers, as there, to the sphere of one's own character, and that subjectively. Regarding the *imper.* וְעַיִן, which must here be translated according to its sense as a conclusion, because it comes in between the objects governed by שָׁמַר, *vid.* at iv. 4. There וְעַיִן is punctuated with *Silluk*; here, according to Kimchi (*Michlol* 125a), with *Segol-Athnach*, וְעַיִן, as in the *Cod. Erfurt.* 2 and 3, and in the editions of Athias and Clodius, so that the word belongs to the class פִּתְחוֹן בְּאַחַת (with short instead of long vowel by the pausal accent): no reason for this is to be perceived, especially as (iv. 4) the *Tsere* (é from *aj*) which is characteristic of the *imper.* remains unchanged. Regarding וְעַיִן, Arab. *insân el-'ain*, the little man of the eye, i.e. the apple of the eye, named from the miniature portrait of him who looks into it being reflected from it, *vid.* at Ps. xvii. 8; the ending *ôn* is here diminutive, like Syr. *achuno*, little brother, *ʿruno*, little son, and the like. On ver. 3, *vid.* at vi. 21, iii. 3. The חֲפִילֵי שֵׁל יָד

¹ חֲפִילֵי, *prayer-fillets, phylacteries.*]

were wound seven times round the left arm and seven times round the middle finger. The writing on the table of the heart may be regarded as referring to Deut. vi. 9 (the *Mezuzoth*).¹

Vers. 4, 5. The subject-matter of this earnest warning are the admonitions of the teacher of wisdom, and through him of Wisdom herself, who in contrast to the world and its lust is the worthiest object of love, and deserves to be loved with the purest, sincerest love:

- 4 Say to wisdom: "Thou art my sister!"
And call understanding "Friend;"
5 That they may keep thee from the strange woman,
From the stranger who useth smooth words.

The childlike, sisterly, and friendly relationship serves also to picture forth and designate the intimate confidential relationship to natures and things which are not flesh and blood. If in Arabic the poor is called the brother of poverty, the trustworthy the brother of trustworthiness, and *abu, um* (أبو, أم), *achu, ucht*, are used in manifold ways as the expression for the interchangeable relation between two ideas; so (as also, notwithstanding Ewald, § 273*b*, in many Hebr. proper names) that has there become national, which here, as at Job xvii. 14, xxx. 29, mediated by the connection of the thoughts, only first appears as a poetic venture. The figurative words of ver. 4 not merely lead us to think of wisdom as a personal existence of a higher order, but by this representation it is itself brought so near, that אָחִי easily substitutes itself, ii. 3, in the place of אָח. אָחִי of Solomon's address to the bride brought home is in its connection compared with Book of Wisdom viii. 2. While the *ōth* of אָחִי by no means arises from abstr. *ūth*, but *achōth* is derived from *achajath*, מוֹרֵעַ (as Ruth ii. 1, cf. מוֹרֵעַ, iii. 2), here by *Mugrash* מוֹרֵעַ, properly means acquaintance, and then the person known, but not in the superficial sense in which this word and the Arab. *ma'arfat* are used (e.g. in the Arabic phrase quoted by Fleischer, *kanna aṣḥāb ṣarna m'aaraf*—*nous étions amis, nous en sommes plus que de simples connaissances*), but in the sense of familiar, confidential alliance. The *infin.* לִימְרֵךְ does not need for its explanation some intermediate thought to be introduced: *quod eo conducet tibi ut* (Mich.), but connects itself immediately as the purpose: bind wisdom to thyself and thyself to wisdom thus

¹ [=the *door-posts*, afterwards used by the Jews to denote the passages of Scripture written on the door-posts.]

closely that thou mayest therewith guard thyself. As for the rest, *vid.* ii. 16; this verse repeats itself here with the variation of one word.

How necessary it is for the youth to guard himself by the help of wisdom against the enticements of the wanton woman, the author now shows by a reference to his own observation.

- 6 For through the window of my house,
From behind the lattice I looked out;
7 Then saw I among the simple ones,
Discerned among the young people, a youth devoid of
understanding.

וַיִּרְאֶה refers indeed to the immediately following clause, yet it actually opens up the whole following exemplification. The connection with ver. 5 would be closer if instead of the extended Semitic construction it were said: *nam quum . . . prospicerem vidi, etc.* חַלּוֹן (from חָלַל, to bore through) is properly a place where the wall is bored through. נֶשֶׁת (from נָשַׁת = Arab. *shaniba*, to be agreeable, cool, fresh) is the window-lattice or lattice-window, *i.e.* lattice for drawing down and raising up, which keeps off the rays of the sun. אֶרְאֶה signifies primarily to make oneself long in order to see, to stretch up or out the neck and the head, *καταδοκεῖν*, Arab. *atal*, *atal'a*, and *tatal'a* of things, *imminere*, to overtop, to project, to jut in; cf. Arab. *askaf* of the ostrich, long and bent, with respect to the neck stretching it up, *sakaf*, *abstr.* crooked length. And עָרַב is thus used, as in Arab. *duna*, but not *b'ad*, is used: so placed, that one in relation to the other obstructs the avenue to another person or thing: "I looked forth from behind the lattice-window, *i.e.* with respect to the persons or things in the room, standing before the lattice-window, and thus looking out into the open air" (Fleischer). That it was far in the night, as we learn at ver. 9, does not contradict this looking out; for apart from the moon, and especially the lighting of the streets, there were star-lit nights, and to see what the narrator saw there was no night of Egyptian darkness. But because it was night 6a is not to be translated: I looked about among those devoid of experience (thus *e.g.* Löwenstein); but he saw among these, observed among the youths, who thus late amused themselves without, a young man whose want of understanding was manifest from what further happened. Bertheau: that I might see, is syntactically impossible. The meaning of נֶשֶׁת is not determined by the

אָבִינָה following, but conversely אָבִינָה stands under the operation of וְ (= אָבִינָה, Neh. xiii. 7), characterizing the historic *aorist*. Regarding פָּתִי, *vid.* at i. 4. בָּנִים is the masc. of בָּנוּת, Arab. *benât* in the meaning maiden. בָּבָנִים has in correct texts, according to the rules of the accents, the *ב* *raphatum*.¹

Now follows, whither he saw the young fop [*Laffen*] then go in the darkness.

- 8 Going up and down the street near her corner,
And he walked along the way to her house,
9 In the twilight, when the day declined,
In the midst of the night and deep darkness.

We may interpret לִבֵּר as appos.: *juvenem amentem, ambulantem*, or as the predicate accus.: *vidi juvenem . . . ambulantem*; for that one may so express himself in Hebrew (cf. *e.g.* Isa. vi. 1, Dan. viii. 7), Hitzig unwarrantably denies. The passing over of the *part.* into the *finite*, 8b, is like ii. 14, 17, and that of the *inf.* i. 27, ii. 8. לִבֵּק, Arab. *suk* (dimin. *suweika*, to separate, from *sikkat*, street, alley), still means, as in former times, a broad street, a principal street, as well as an open place, a market-place where business is transacted, or according to its etymon: where cattle are driven for sale. On the street he went backwards and forwards, yet so that he kept near to her corner (*i.e.* of the woman whom he waited for), *i.e.* he never withdrew himself far from the corner of her house, and always again returned to it. The corner is named, because from that place he could always cast a look over the front of the house to see whether she whom he waited for showed herself. Regarding פָּתִי for פָּתִיחָה, *vid.* at Ps. xxvii. 5: a primary form פָּתִי has never been in use; פָּתִים, Zech. xiv. 10, is plur. of פָּתִיחָה. אָצֵל (from אָצַל, Arab. *wasl*, to bind) is, as a substantive, the side (as the place where one thing connects itself with another), and thus as a preposition it means (like *juxta* from *jungere*) beside, Ital. *allato*. וְרֵקֶה is the object. accus., for thus are construed verbs *eundi* (*e.g.* Hab. iii. 12, Num. xxx. 17, cf. xxi. 22).

Ver. 9. The designations of time give the impression of progress to a climax; for Hitzig unwarrantably denies that לִבֵּק means the twilight; the Talmud, *Berachoth* 3b, correctly distinguishes חַרְי לִבֵּק two twilights, the evening and the morning twilight. But the idea is not limited to this narrow sense, and does not need this,

¹ Regarding the Targ. of vii. 6, 7, *vid.* Perles, *Etymologische Studien*, 1871, p. 9.

since the root-word לָצַף (*vid.* at Isa. xl. 24) permits the extension of the idea to the whole of the cool half (evening and night) of the entire day; cf. the parallel of the adulterer who veils himself by the darkness of the night and by a mask on his countenance, Job xxiv. 15 with Jer. xiii. 16. However, the first group of synonyms, בִּלְצָף בַּעֲרֵב יוֹם (with the *Cod. Frankf.* 1294, to be thus punctuated), as against the second, appears to denote an earlier period of the second half of the day; for if one reads, with Hitzig, יוֹם בַּעֲרֵב (after Judg. xix. 9), the meaning remains the same as with בַּעֲרֵב יוֹם, viz. *adesperascente die* (Jerome), for עֲרַב = Arab. *gharab*, means to go away, and particularly to go under, of the sun, and thus to become evening. He saw the youth in the twilight, as the day had declined (κέκλικεν, Luke xxiv. 29), going backwards and forwards; and when the darkness of night had reached its middle, or its highest point, he was still in his lurking-place. אֵיטוֹן לַיְלָה, apple of the eye of the night, is, like the Pers. *dili scheb*, heart of the night, the poetic designation of the middle of the night. Gusset incorrectly: *crepusculum in quo sicut in oculi pupilla est nigredo sublustris et quasi mistura lucis ac tenebrarum*. אֵיטוֹן is, as elsewhere לֵב, particularly the middle; the application to the night was specially suitable, since the apple of the eye is the black part in the white of the eye (Hitzig). It is to be translated according to the accus., in *pupilla noctis et caligine* (not *caliginis*); and this was probably the meaning of the poet, for a ב is obviously to be supplied to אֵיטוֹן.

Finally, the young man devoid of understanding sees his waiting rewarded: like meets like.

- 10 And, lo, a woman coming to meet him,
In the attire of an harlot and of subtle heart.
- 11 Boisterous is she, and ungovernable;
Her feet have no rest in her own house.
- 12 At one time before her door, at another in the street,
And again at every corner she places herself on the watch.

“Ver. 12 (Hitzig) expresses what is wont to be, instead of a single event, ver. 11, viz. the custom of a street harlot. But she who is spoken of is not such an one; lurking is not applicable to her (cf. Job xxxi. 9), and, ver. 11, it is not meant that she is thus inclined.” But Hitzig’s rendering of ver. 11, “she was boisterous . . . in her house her feet had no rest,” is inaccurate, since neither אֵיטוֹן nor שָׁכַנָּה is used. Thus in vers. 11 and 12 the poet gives a charac-

teristic of the woman, introduced by וְהִנֵּה into the frame of his picture, which goes beyond that which then presented itself to his eyes. We must with ver. 12 reject also ver. 11; and even that would not be a radical improvement, since that characteristic lying behind the evident, that which was then evident begins with לֵב וְנִצְרָתָהּ (and subtle in heart). We must thus suppose that the woman was not unknown to the observer here describing her. He describes her first as she then appeared. שִׁית Hitzig regards as equivalent to שִׁיחַ, similitude (from שָׁחַ), and why? Because שִׁית does not mean "to lay against," but "to place." But Ex. xxxiii. 4 shows the contrary, and justifies the meaning attire, which the word also has in Ps. lxxiii. 6. Meiri less suitably compares 2 Kings ix. 30, but rightly explains תָּקַן (dressing, ornament), and remarks that שִׁית elliptical is equivalent to בִּשְׂמֹנֶת. It is not the nominative (Bertheau), but the accusative, as תְּכֵנִית, Ps. cxliv. 12, Ewald, § 279d. How Hitzig reaches the translation of לֵב וְנִצְרָתָהּ by "and an arrow in her heart" (*et saucia corde*¹), one can only understand by reading his commentary. The usage of the language, iv. 23, he remarks, among other things, would stamp her as a virtuous person. As if a phrase like לֵב וְנִצְרָתָהּ could be used both *sensu bono* and *sensu malo*! One can guard his heart when he protects it carefully against moral danger, or also when he purposely conceals that which is in it. The *part. נִצְרָתָהּ* signifies, Isa. i. 8, besieged (blockaded), Ezek. xvi. 12, protected, guarded, and Isa. xlviii. 6, lxxv. 4, concealed, hidden. Ewald, § 187b, refers these three significations in the two passages in Isaiah and in the passage before us to נִצְרָתָהּ, *Niph. נִצְרָתָהּ* (as נִצָּל); but (1) one would then more surely take נִצְרָתָהּ (cf. נִצְרָתָהּ) as the verbal stem; (2) one reaches the idea of the concealed (the hidden) easier from that of the preserved than from that of the confined. As one says in Lat. *homo occultus, tectus, abstrusus*, in the sense of *κρυφίους*, so it is said of that woman נִצְרָתָהּ, not so much in the sense of *retenta cor*, *h.e. quæ quod in corde haberet non pandebat*, Fr. *retenue* (Cocc.), as in the sense of *custodita cor, quæ intentionem cordis mentemque suam callide novit premere* (Mich.): she is of a hidden mind, of a concealed nature; for she feigns fidelity to her husband and flatters her paramours as her only beloved, while in truth she loves none, and each of them is to her only a means to an end, viz. to the indulgence of her worldly sensual desire. For, as the author further

¹ Virgil's *Æneid*, iv. 1.

describes her, she is הַמְּקַחַת (fem. of הִמָּךְ = הִמָּךְ, as i. 21, Isa. xxii. 2), *tumultuosa*, externally as internally impetuous, because full of intermingling lust and deceit (*opp.* ἡσύχιος, 1 Pet. iii. 4, 1 Tim. ii. 11), and בְּרָרָה, self-willed, not minding the law of duty, of discretion, or of modesty (from בָּרַר, Arab. *sharr*, *pervicacem*, *malum esse*). She is the very opposite of the noiseless activity and the gentle modesty of a true house-wife, rude, stubborn, and also vagrant like a beast in its season (Hos. iv. 14): *in domo ipsius residere nequeunt pedes ejus*; thus not οἰκουρός or οἰκουργός (Tit. ii. 5), far removed from the genuine woman-like εἶσω ἡσυχον μένειν δόμων¹—a *radt*, as they call such a one in Arab. (Wünsche on Hos. xii. 1), or as she is called in Aram. נִפְקַחַת בָּרָא.

Ver. 12. This verse shows how she conducts herself when she wanders abroad. It is no common street-walker who is designated (no “*Husterin*,” Arab. *kahlbt*, after which also the female demon-name (Arab.) *se’alā* is explained), but that licentious married wife, who, no better than such a strumpet when she wanders abroad, hunts after lovers. The alternating פָּצַם (properly a stroke) Fleischer compares with the Arab. synonyms, *marrt*, a going over, *karrt*, a going back, *una volta*, *una fiata*, *une fois* (Orelli, *Synon. der Zeit und Ewigkeit*, p. 51). Regarding חוץ, *vid.* at v. 16: it is the free space without, before the house-door, or also before the gate of the city; the parallelism speaks here and at i. 20 more in favour of the former signification.

Ver. 13. After this digression the poet returns to the subject, and further describes the event as observed by himself.

And she laid hold on him and kissed him;
Put on a bold brow and said to him.

The verb נִשָּׁק is here, after its primary signification, connected with the dat.: *osculum fixit ei*. Thus also Gen. xxvii. 26 is construed, and the *Dagesh* in לו is, as there, *Dag. forte conj.*, after the law for which the national grammarians have coined the technical name אחי מרחיק (*veniens e longinquo*, “coming out of the distance,” i.e. the attraction of a word following by one accented on the penult.). The penult.-accenting of נִשָּׁקָה is the consequence of the retrogression of the accent (נכח אחר), which here, where the word from the first had the penult. only with *Metheg*, and thus with half a tone, brings with it the *dageshing* of the לו following, as the original

¹ Eurip. *Iherac*.

penultima-accenting of וְהָיְתָה does of the בִּי which follows it, for the reading בִּי by Löwenstein is contrary to the laws of punctuation of the *Textus receptus* under consideration here.¹ As בִּי and לוֹ have received the doubling *Dagesh*, so on the other hand, according to Ewald, § 193*b*, it has disappeared from הָעֵדָה (written with *Raphe* according to Kimchi, *Michlol* 145*a*). And as נִשְׁקָה has the tone thrown back, so the proper pausal וְהָיְתָה is accented on the ult., but without attracting the לוֹ following by dageshing, which is the case only when the first of the two words terminates in the sound of *ā* (*āh*). הָיָה פִּנִּי is said of one who shows firmness or hardness of countenance (Arab. *slabt alwajh*), i.e. one who shows shamelessness, or, as we say, an iron forehead (Fl.).

She laid hold on him and kissed him, both of which actions were shameless, and then, assuming the passivity and modesty befitting the woman, and disregarding morality and the law, she said to the youth :

- 14 "To bring peace-offerings was binding upon me,
To-day have I redeemed my vows.
15 Therefore am I come out to meet thee,
To seek thy face, and have found thee."

We have translated שְׁלָמִים וְהָיְתָה "peace-offerings," proceeding on the principle that שָׁלַם (sing. only Amos v. 22, and on the Phœnician altar at Marseilles) denotes contracting friendship with one (from שָׁלַם, to hold friendly relationship), and then the gifts having this in view; for the idea of this kind of offering is the attestation and confirmation of communion with God. But in view of the derivatives שְׁלָמִים and שָׁלַם, it is perhaps more appropriate to combine שָׁלַם with שָׁלַם, to discharge perfectly, and to translate it thank-payment-offering, or with v. Hofmann, a due-offering, where not directly thank-offering; for the proper eucharistic offering, which is the expression of thanks on a particular occasion, is removed from the species of the *Shelamin* by the addition of the words עַל-חֹדֶה (Lev. vii. 12-25). The characteristic of the *Shelamin* is the division of the flesh of the sacrifice between Jahve and His priests on the one side, and the person (or persons) bringing it on the other side: only one part of the flesh of the sacrifice was Jahve's, consumed by fire (Lev. iii. 16); the priests received one part; those who brought the offering received back another part

¹ Vid. Baer's *Torath Emet*, p. 29 sq., and *Psalmen-Commentar* under Ps. lii. 5.

as it were from the altar of God, that they might eat it with holy joy along with their household. So here the adulteress says that there was binding upon her, in consequence of a vow she had taken, the duty of presenting peace-offerings, or offerings that were due; to-day (she reckons the day in the sense of the *dies civilis* from night to night) she has performed her duties, and the *שְׁלָמִים* have yielded much to her that she might therewith regale him, her true lover; for with *עֲלֶיָּהּ* she means to say that even the prospect of the gay festival which she can prepare for him moved her thus to meet him. This address of the woman affords us a glimpse into the history of the customs of those times. The *Shelamim* meals degenerated in the same manner as our *Kirmsen*.¹ Secularization lies doubly near to merrymaking when the law sanctions this, and it can conceal itself behind the mask of piety. Regarding *שָׁחַר*, a more exact word for *בָּקֹץ*, *vid.* at i. 28. To seek the countenance of one is equivalent to to seek his person, himself, but yet not without reference to the wished-for look [*aspectus*] of the person.

Thus she found him, and described to him the enjoyment which awaited him in eating and drinking, then in the pleasures of love.

16 " My bed have I spread with cushions,

Variegated coverlets, Egyptian linen ;

17 I have sprinkled my couch

With myrrh, aloes, and cinnamon.

18 Come then, we will intoxicate ourselves with love till the morning,

And will satisfy ourselves in love."

The noun *עֶרֶשׂ*, from *עָרַשׁ*, = Arab. '*arash, edificare, fabricari*, signifies generally the wooden frame; thus not so much the bed within as the erected bed-place (cf. Arab. '*arsh*, throne, and '*arysh*, arbour). This bedstead she had richly and beautifully cushioned, that it might be soft and agreeable. *רָכַב*, from *רָב*, signifies to lay on or apply closely, thus either *vincire* (whence the name of the necklace, Gen. xli. 42) or *sternere* (different from *רָפַר*, Job xvii. 13, which acquires the meaning *sternere* from the root-meaning to raise up from under, *sublevare*), whence *מְרִבָּדִים*, cushions, pillows, *stragulae*. Böttcher punctuates *מְרִבָּדִים* incorrectly; the *ב* remains aspirated, and the connection of the syllables is looser than in *מְרִבָּה*, Ewald, § 88*d*. The *מְרִבָּה* beginning the second half-verse is in no case an adjective to *מְרִבָּדִים*, in every case only *appos.*, pro-

¹ [*Kirmse* = anniversary of the dedication of a church, village *fête*.]

bably an independent conception; not derived from קֶטֶב (cogn. קֶצֶב), to hew wood (whence Arab. *ḥatab*, fire-wood), according to which Kimchi, and with him the *Græc. Venet.* (περιξύστοις), understands it of the carefully polished bed-poles or bed-boards, but from קֶטֶב = Arab. *khateba*, to be streaked, of diverse colours (*vid.* under Ps. cxliv. 12), whence the Syriac *nachtabto*, a figured (striped, checkered) garment. Hitzig finds the idea of coloured or variegated here unsuitable, but without justice; for the pleasantness of a bed is augmented not only by its softness, but also by the impression which its costliness makes on the eye. The following אֶטֶן מִצָּרִים stands in an appositional relation to חֲטָבוֹת, as when one says in Arabic *taub-un dibāḡ-un*, a garment brocade = of brocade. אֶטֶן (after the Syr. for אֶטֶן, as אֶטֶן) signifies in the Targum the cord (*e.g.* Jer. xxxviii. 6), like the Arab. *tunub*, Syr. (*e.g.* Isa. liv. 2) *tānob*; the root is טָן, not in the sense of to bind, to wind (Dietr.), but in the sense of to stretch; the thread or cord is named from the extension in regard to length, and אֶטֶן is thus thread-work, whether in weaving or spinning.¹ The fame of Egyptian manufactures is still expressed in the Spanish *aclabtea*, fine linen cloth, which is equivalent to the modern Arabic *el-kobtīje* (*kibtīje*); they had there particularly also an intimate acquaintance with the dye stuffs found in the plants and fossils of the country (Klemm's *Culturgeschichte*, v. 308-310).

Vers. 17, 18. These verses remind us of expressions in the Canticles. There, at iv. 14, are found the three names for spicery as here, and one sees that מֵר אֶהְיֶה are not to be connected genitively: there are three things, accented as in the title-verse i. 3. The myrrh, מֵר (*Balsamodendron myrrha*), belongs, like the frankincense, to the species of the *Amyris*, which is an exotic in Palestine not less than with us; the aromatic quality in them does not arise from the flowers or leaves, so that Cant. i. 13 leads us to think of a bunch of myrrh, but from the resin oozing through the bark (*Gummi myrrhæ* or merely *myrrha*), consisting of bright glossy red or golden-yellow grains more or less transparent. אֶהְיֶה (used by Balaam, Num. xxiv. 6) is the Semitic Old-Indian name of the aloë, *agaru* or *aguru*; the aromatic quality is in the wood of the *Aquilaria agallocha*, especially its root (*agallochum* or

¹ Hence perhaps the Greek *ἰδών*, which Fick in his *Vergl. Wörterbuch* connects with the Arab. verb-root *radh*, to bind, wind, clothe, but not without making thereto interrogation marks.

lignum aloes) dried in the earth,—in more modern use and commerce the inspissated juice of its leaves. קָנָה is *κιννάμωμον* (like כָּנָה, a Semitic word¹ that had come to the Greeks through the Phœnicians), the cinnamon, *i.e.* the inner rind of the *Laurus cinnamomum*. The myrrh is native to Arabia; the aloë, as its name denotes, is Indian; the cinnamon in like manner came through Indian travellers from the east coast of Africa and Ceylon (Taprobane). All these three spices are drugs, *i.e.* are dry apothecaries' wares; but we are not on that account to conclude that she perfumed (Hitzig) her bed with spices, *viz.* burnt in a censer, an operation which, according to Cant. iii. 6, would rather be designated קָטַרְתִּי. The verb נָהַף (only here as *Kal*) signifies to lift oneself up (*vid.* under Ps. xlviii. 13), and transitively to raise and swing hither and thither (= הִנִּיף); here with a double accusative, to besprinkle anything out of a vessel moved hither and thither. According to this sense, we must think of the three aromas as essences in the state of solution; cf. Ex. xxx. 22–33, Esth. ii. 12. Hitzig's question, "Who would sprinkle bed-sheets with perfumed and thus impure water?" betrays little knowledge of the means by which even at the present day clean linen is made fragrant. The expression רָחַף רוּרִים sounds like שָׁכַר רוּרִים, Cant. v. 1, although there רוּרִים is probably the *voc.*, and not, as here, the *accus.*; רָחַף is the *Kal* of רָחַץ, v. 19, and signifies to drink something copiously in full draughts. The verbal form עָלַם for עָלָן is found besides only in Job xx. 18, xxxix. 13; the *Hitpa.* signifies to enjoy oneself greatly, perhaps (since the *Hitpa.* is sometimes used reciprocally, *vid.* under Gen. ii. 25) with the idea of reciprocity (Targ. חָתַר לְחַר). We read *bo'habim* with *Chateph-Kametz* after Ben-Asher (*vid.* Kimchi's *Lex.*); the punctuation בְּחֻתְבִּים is that of Ben-Naphtali.

The adulteress now deprives the youth of all fear; the circumstances under which her invitation is given are as favourable as possible.

19 " For the man is not at home,
He has gone on a long journey.

¹ Myrrh has its name כָּר from the bitterness of its taste, and קָנָה appears to be a secondary formation from קָנָה, whence קָנָה, reed; cf. the names of the cinnamon, *cannella*, Fr. *cannelle*. *Cinnamum* (κιννάμωμον) is only a shorter form for *cinnamomum*. Pliny, *Hist. Nat.* xii. 19 (42), uses both forms indiscriminately.

20 He has taken the purse with him ;
He will not return home till the day of the full moon."

It is true that the article stands in הַאִישׁ, Arab. *alm'ar-fat*, i.e. serves to define the word : the man, to whom here κατ' ἑξοχῆν and alone reference can be made, viz. the husband of the adulteress (Fl.) ; but on the other side it is characteristic that she does not say אִישִׁי (as e.g. Gen. xxix. 32), but ignores the relation of love and duty in which she is placed to him, and speaks of him as one standing at a distance from her (Aben-Ezra). Erroneously Vogel reads בְּבֵיתוֹ after the Targ. instead of בְּבֵיתוֹ. We say in Hebr. אֵינוּ בְּבֵיתוֹ, *il n'est pas chez soi*, as we say לָקַח בְּיָדוֹ, *il a pris avec soi* (cf. Jer. xxxviii. 10). מֵרָחוֹק Hitzig seeks to connect with the verb, which, after Isa. xvii. 13, xxii. 3, is possible ; for the Hebr. מֵרָחוֹק (מִן־הָרָחוֹק), far off, has frequently the meaning from afar, for the measure of length is determined not from the point of departure outward, but from the end, as e.g. Homer, *Il.* ii. 456 : ἔκαθεν δέ τε φαίνεται αὐγῇ, from afar the gleam is seen, i.e. shines hither from the distance. Similarly we say in French, *il vient du côté du nord*, he comes from the north, as well as *il va du côté du nord*, he goes northwards. But as we do not say : he has gone on a journey far off, but : on a distant journey, so here מֵרָחוֹק is virtually an adj. (vid. under Isa. v. 26) equivalent to רְחוֹקָה (Num. ix. 10) : a journey which is distant = such as from it he has a long way back. Michaelis has well remarked here : *ut timorem ei penitus adimat, veluti per gradus incedit*. He has undertaken a journey to a remote point, but yet more : he has taken money with him, has thus business to detain him ; and still further : he has even determined the distant time of his return. צְרוּרֵי־הַכֶּסֶף (thus to be written after Ben-Asher, vid. Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 41) is the purse (from צָרַר, to bind together), not one of many, but that which is his own. The terminus precedes 20b to emphasize the lateness ; vid. on נֶקְמָה under Ps. lxxxi. 4. *Græc. Venet.* ἡ ἡμέρα τοῦ καιροῦ, after Kimchi and others, who derive כָּסָה (כסה) from the root כס, to reckon, and regard it as denoting only a definite time. But the two passages require a special idea ; and the Syr. *ḥēso*, which in 1 Kings xii. 32, 2 Chron. vii. 10, designates the time from the 15th day of the month, shows that the word denotes not, according to the Talmud, the new moon (or the new year's day), when the moon's disk begins to cover itself, i.e. to fill (יתכסה), but the full moon, when it is covered, i.e. filled ; so that thus the time of the night-

scene here described is not that of the last quarter of the moon (Ewald), in which it rises at midnight, but that of the new moon (Hitzig), when the night is without moonlight. Since the derivation of the word from כסא (כסה), to cover, gives the satisfactory idea of the covering or filling of the moon's disk, we do not seek after any other; Dietrich fixes on the root-idea of roundness, and Hitzig of vision (כסה = ככה, טכה; *vid.*, on the contrary, under Ps. cxliii. 9). The ל is that of time at which, in which, about which, anything is done; it is more indefinite than א would be. He will not return for some fourteen days.

The result:—

- 21 She beguiled him by the fulness of her talking,
By the smoothness of her lips she drew him away.

Here is a climax. First she brought him to yield, overcoming the resistance of his mind to the last point (cf. 1 Kings xi. 3); then drove him, or, as we say, hurried him wholly away, viz. from the right path or conduct (cf. Deut. xiii. 6, 11). With הִטְאוּ (הִטְאוּהוּ) as the chief *factum*, the past imperf. is interchanged, 21b. Regarding לָקַח, see above, p. 56. Here is the rhetoric of sin (Zückler); and perhaps the לָקַח of 20a has suggested this antiphrastic לָקַח to the author (Hitzig), as הִלָּק (the inverted לָקַח, formed like שִׁפֵּל, which is the *abstr.* of שִׁפַּל as that is of הִלָּק) and תְּהִיטָה are reciprocally conditioned, for the idea of the slippery (Ps. lxxiii. 18) connects itself with הִלָּק.

What followed:—

- 22 So he goes after her at once
As an ox which goeth to the slaughter-house,
And as one bereft of reason to the restraint of fetters,
23 As a bird hastens to the net,
Without knowing that his life is at stake—
Till the arrow pierces his liver.

The *part.* הִלָּק (thus to be accentuated according to the rule in Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 25, with *Mercha* to the tone-syllable and *Mahpach* to the preceding open syllable) preserves the idea of the fool's going after her. מִתְאָדָם (suddenly) fixes the point, when he all at once resolves to betake himself to the rendezvous in the house of the adulteress, now a *κεκρωθελς*, as the LXX. translates, i.e., as we say, a simpleton who has gone on the lime-twig. He follows her as an ox goes to the slaughter-house, unconscious that

he is going thither to be slaughtered; the LXX. ungrammatically destroying the attributive clause: ὥσπερ δὲ βοῦς ἐπὶ σφαγῇ ἀγεται. The difficulties in וְכַעֲבֹם (thus punctuated, after Kimchi, with a double *Segol*, and not וְכַעֲבֹם, as is frequently the case) multiply, and it is not to be reconciled with the traditional text. The ox appears to require another beast as a side-piece; and accordingly the LXX., Syr., and Targ. find in עֹבֶם a dog (to which from אֵיל they also pick out אֵיִל, a stag), Jerome a lamb (*et quasi agnus* כֶּבֶשׂ), Rashi a venomous serpent (perhaps after ἔχιδνα?), Löwenstein and Malbim a rattlesnake (נָחִשׁ מְעִלְעֵל after עֹבֶם); but all this is mere conjecture. Symmachus' σκιρτῶν (ἐπὶ δεσμῶν ἄφρων) is without support, and, like the favourite rendering of Schelling, *et sicut saliens in vinculum cervus* (אֵיל), is unsuitable on account of the unsemitic position of the words. The noun עֹבֶם, plur. עֹבֵמִים, signifies, Isa. iii. 18, an anklet as a female ornament (whence ver. 16 the denom. עֹבֵם, to make a tinkling of the anklets). In itself the word only means the fetter, *compes*, from עָבַם, Arab. 'akas, 'akash, *contrahere, constringere* (*vid.* Fleischer under Isa. lix. 5); and that it can also be used of any kind of means of checking free movement, the Arab. 'ikās, as the name of a cord with which the camel is made fast by the head and forefeet, shows. With this signification the interpretation is: *et velut pedicā* (= וְכַעֲבֹם) *implicatus ad castigationem stulti*, he follows her as if (bound) with a fetter to the punishment of the fool, *i.e.* of himself (Michaelis, Fleischer, and others). Otherwise Luther, who first translated "in a fetter," but afterwards (supplying לְ, not בְּ): "and as if to fetters, where one corrects fools." But the ellipsis is harsh, and the parallelism leads us to expect a living being in the place of עֹבֶם. Now since, according to Gesenius, עֹבֶם, fetter, can be equivalent to a fettered one neither at Isa. xvii. 5, xxi. 17, nor Prov. xxiii. 28 (according to which עֹבֶם must at least have an active personal signification), we transpose the nouns of the clause and write וְכַאֲוִיל אֶל-מוֹסֵר עֹבֶם, he follows her as a fool (*Psychol.* p. 292) to correction (restraint) with fetters; or if אִוִּיל is to be understood not so much physically as morally, and refers to self-destroying conduct (Ps. cvii. 7): as a madman, *i.e.* a criminal, to chains. The one figure denotes the fate into which he rushes, like a beast devoid of reason, as the loss of life; and the other denotes the fate to which he permits himself to be led by that woman, like a criminal by the officer, as the loss of freedom and of honour.

Ver. 23. The confusion into which the text has fallen is continued in this verse. For the figure of the deadly arrow connects itself neither with that of the ox which goes to the slaughter-house, nor with that of the madman who is put in chains: the former is not killed by being shot; and with the latter, the object is to render him harmless, not to put him to death. The LXX. therefore converts לַיִּשׁ into לַיִּשׁ, a stag, and connects the shooting with an arrow with this: ἡ ὡς ἔλαφος τοξεύματι πεπληγὼς εἰς τὸ ἦπαρ. But we need no encroachment on the text itself, only a correct placing of its members. The three thoughts, ver. 23, reach a right conclusion and issue, if with מֶרְחָם אֶפְסֹר לֹא־חָפֵץ (here *Merchamahpach*) a new departure is begun with a comparison: he follows her with eager desires, like as a bird hastens to the snare (*vid.* regarding פֶּחַ, a snare, and מִיָּמָה, a noose, under Isa. viii. 15). What then follows is a continuation of 22a. The subject is again the youth, whose way is compared to that of an ox going to the slaughter, of a culprit in chains, and of a fool; and he knows not (*non novit*, as iv. 19, ix. 18, and according to the sense, *non curat*, iii. 6, v. 6) that it is done at the risk of his life (כְּנַפְּוֹ as 1 Kings ii. 23, Num. xvii. 3), that his life is the price with which this kind of love is bought (נֶחֱמָה, *neut.*, as not merely Eccles. ii. 1 and the like, but also *e.g.* Lev. x. 3, Esth. ix. 1)—that does not concern him till (עַד = עַד אִשׁׁר or עַד כִּי) the arrow breaks or pierces through (פָּקַע as Job. xvi. 13) his liver, *i.e.* till he receives the death-wound, from which, if not immediately, yet at length he certainly dies. Elsewhere the part of the body struck with a deadly wound is called the reins or loins (Job, etc.), or the gall-bladder (Job xx. 25); here the liver, which is called כִּבֵּד, Arab. *kebid*, perhaps as the organ in which sorrowful and painful affections make themselves felt (*cf.* Æschylus, *Agam.* 801: δῆγμα λύπης ἐφ' ἦπαρ προσικνεῖται), especially the latter, because the passion of sensual love, according to the idea of the ancients, reflected itself in the liver. He who is love-sick has *jecur ulcerosum* (Horace, *Od.* i. 25. 15); he is diseased in his liver (*Psychol.* p. 268). But the arrow is not here the arrow of love which makes love-sick, but the arrow of death, which slays him who is ensnared in sinful love. The befooled youth continues the disreputable relation into which he has entered till it terminates in adultery and in lingering disease upon his body, remorse in his soul, and dishonour to his name, speedily ending in inevitable ruin both spiritually and temporally.

Vers. 24, 25. With וַיִּסַּח, as at v. 7, the author now brings his narrative to a close, adding the exhortation deduced from it:

- 24 And now, ye children, give ear unto me,
And observe the words of my mouth!
25 Let not thine heart incline to her ways,
And stray not in her paths.

The verb וַיִּסַּח (whence *jēst*, like *jēt*, iv. 15, with long *ē* from *i*) the author uses also of departure from a wicked way (iv. 15); but here, where the portraiture of a faithless wife (a כֹּזֶבֶת) is presented, the word used in the law of jealousy, Num. v., for the trespass of an אִשֵּׁת אִישׁ is specially appropriate. וַיִּסַּח is interchanged with וַיִּהַר (cf. Gen. xxi. 14): wander not on her paths, which would be the consequence of straying on them. Theodotion: καὶ μὴ πλανηθῆς ἐν ἀτραποῖς αὐτῆς, with καὶ, as also Syr., Targ., and Jerome. The Masora reckons this verse to the 25 which have לֵא at the beginning and וְלֵא at the middle of each clause (*vid.* Baer in the *Luth. Zeitschrift*, 1865, p. 587); the text of Norzi has therefore correctly וְלֵא, which is found also in good MSS. (*e.g.* the Erfurt, 2 and 3).

Vers. 26, 27. The admonition, having its motive in that which goes before, is now founded on the emphatic *finale*:

- 26 For many are the slain whom she hath caused to fall,
And many are her slain.
27 A multiplicity of ways to hell is her house,
Going down to the chambers of death.

The translation "for many slain has she laid low" (Syr., Targ., Jerome, Luther) is also syntactically possible; for רַבִּים can be placed before its substantive after the manner of the demonstratives and numerals (*e.g.* Neh. ix. 28, cf. אַחֵר, Cant. iv. 9), and the accentuation which requires two servants (the usual two *Munachs*) to the *Athnach* appears indeed thus to construe it. It is otherwise if רַבִּים here meant *magni* (thus *e.g.* Ralbag, and recently Bertheau), and not *multi*; but רַבִּים and עַצְמִים stand elsewhere in connection with each other in the signification many and numerous, Ps. xxxv. 18, Joel ii. 2, Mic. iv. 3. "Her slain" are those slain by her; the part. pass. is connected with the genitive of the actor, *e.g.* ix. 18; cf. (Arab.) *katyl almhabbt*, of one whom love kills (Fl.). With ver. 27 cf. ii. 18, ix. 18. In 27a, בֵּיתָהּ is not equivalent to בֵּיתָהּ after viii. 2, also not elliptical and equivalent to דַּרְכֵי בֵּיתָהּ; the former is unnecessary, the latter is in no case established by Ps.

xlv. 7, Ezra x. 13, nor by Deut. viii. 15, 2 Kings xxiii. 17 (see, on the other hand, Philippi's *Status Constructus*, pp. 87-93). Rightly Hitzig has: her house forms a multiplicity of ways to hell, in so far as adultery leads by a diversity of ways to hell. Similarly the subject and the predicate vary in number, xvi. 25, Ps. cx. 3, Job xxvi. 13, Dan. ix. 23, and frequently. If one is once in her house, he may go in this or in that way, but surely his path is to destruction: it consists of many steps to hell, such as lead down (רִדָּה, fem. Isa. xxxvii. 34, masc. Isa. xxx. 21) to the extreme depths of death (cf. Job ix. 9, "chambers of the south" = its remotest regions veiling themselves in the invisible); for הָרֵר (Arab. *khiddr*) is the part of the tent or the house removed farthest back, and the most private (Fl.). These הָרֵרִים, cf. עֲמָקֵי שְׂאוֹל, ix. 18, approach to the conception of גִּהֶנֶם, which is afterwards distinguished from שְׂאוֹל.

FOURTEENTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, VIII.

A DISCOURSE OF WISDOM CONCERNING HER EXCELLENCE AND HER GIFTS.

The author has now almost exhausted the ethical material; for in this introduction to the Solomonic Book of Proverbs he works it into a memorial for youth, so that it is time to think of concluding the circle by bending back the end to the beginning. For as in the beginning, i. 20 ff., so also here in the end, he introduces Wisdom herself as speaking. There, her own testimony is delivered in contrast to the alluring voice of the deceiver; here, the daughter of Heaven in the highways inviting to come to her, is the contrast to the adulteress lurking in the streets, who is indeed not a personification, but a woman of flesh and blood, but yet at the same time as the incarnate ἀπάτη of worldly lust. He places opposite to her Wisdom, whose person is indeed not so sensibly perceptible, but who is nevertheless as real, coming near to men in a human way, and seeking to win them by her gifts.

- 1 Doth not Wisdom discourse,
And Understanding cause her voice to be heard?
- 2 On the top of the high places in the way,
In the midst of the way, she has placed herself.

3 By the side of the gates, at the exit of the city,
At the entrance to the doors, she calleth aloud.

As **הָיָה** points to that which is matter of fact, so **הָלַח** calls to a consideration of it (cf. xiv. 22); the question before the reader is doubly justified with reference to i. 20 ff. With **תְּבוּנָה**, **הַכְּמוּה** is interchanged, as e.g. ii. 1-6; such names of wisdom are related to its principal name almost as **אֱלֹהִים**, **עֲלִין**, and the like, to **יְהוָה**. In describing the scene, the author, as usual, heaps up synonyms which touch one another without coming together.

Ver. 2. By **מְרִמִּים** Hitzig understands the summit of a mountain, and therefore regards this verse as an interpolation; but the "high places" are to be understood of the high-lying parts of the city. There, on the way which leads up and down, she takes her stand.

עָלִי = **עָלִי**, old and poetic for **עַל**, signifies here "hard by, close to," properly, so that something stands forward over the edge of a thing, or, as it were, passes over its borders (Fl.). The **בֵּית**, Hitzig, as Bertheau, with LXX., Targ., Jerome, interpret prepositionally as a strengthening of **בֵּין** (in the midst); but where it once, Ezek. i. 27, occurs in this sense, it is fully written **בֵּית ל**. Here it is the *accus. loci* of the substantive; "house of the ascent" (Syr. *bêth urchotho*) is the place where several ways meet, the uniting point, as **אֶם הַרְרָךְ** (Ezek. xxi. 26), the point of departure, exit; the former the cross-way, as the latter the separating way. Thus Immanuel: the place of the frequented streets; Meiri: the place of the ramification (more correctly, the concentration) of the ways. **נִצָּנָה** signifies more than **קָמָה** (she raises herself) and **עָמְרָה** (she goes thither); it means that she plants herself there.

Ver. 3. In this verse Bertheau finds, not inappropriately, the designations of place: on this side, on that side, and within the gate. **לְיָד**, at the hand, is equivalent to at the side, as Ps. cxl. 6. **לְפִי**, of the town, is the same as **לְפֶתַח**, ix. 14, of the house: at the mouth, i.e. at the entrance of the city, thus where they go out and in. There are several of these ways for leaving and entering a city, and on this account **מְבוֹא פֶתָחַיִם** are connected: generally where one goes out and in through one of the gates (doors). **מְבוֹא**, fully represented by the French *avenue*, the space or way which leads to anything (Fl.). There she raises her voice, which sounds out far and wide; *vid.* concerning **תִּרְנָה** (*Græc. Venet.* incorrectly, after Rashi, *ἀλαλάξουσι*), at i. 20.

Now begins the discourse. The exordium summons general attention to it with the emphasis of its absolute truth :

- 4 " To you, ye men, is my discourse addressed,
And my call is to the children of men !
- 5 Apprehend, O ye simple ones, what wisdom is ;
And, ye fools, what understanding is.
- 6 Hear, for I will speak princely things,
And the opening of my lips is upright.
- 7 For my mouth uttereth truth,
And a wicked thing is an abomination to my lips.
- 8 The utterances of my mouth are in rectitude,
There is nothing crooked or perverse in them.
- 9 To the men of understanding they are all to the point,
And plain to those who have attained knowledge."

Ilitzig rejects this section, 4-12, as he does several others in viii. and ix., as spurious. But if this preamble, which reminds us of Elihu, is not according to every one's taste, yet in respect of the circle of conception and thought, as well as of the varying development of certain fundamental thoughts, it is altogether after the manner of the poet. The terminology is one that is strange to us ; the translation of it is therefore difficult ; that which is given above strives at least not to be so bad as to bring discredit on the poet. The tautology and flatness of ver. 4 disappears when one understands אִשָּׁרִים and בְּנֵי אָדָם like the Attic *ἄνδρες* and *ἄνθρωποι* ; *vid.* under Isa. ii. 9, liii. 3 (where אִשָּׁרִים, as here and Ps. cxli. 4, is equivalent to בְּנֵי אָדָם, Ps. xlix. 3, iv. 3). Wisdom turns herself with her discourses to high and low, to persons of standing and to the *proletariat*. The verbal clause 4a interchanges with a noun clause 4b, as frequently a preposition with its noun (*e.g.* ver. 8a) completes the whole predicate of a semistich (Fl.).

Ver. 5. Regarding אִשָּׁרִים, *calliditas*, in a good sense, *vid.* at i. 4 ; regarding בְּתָאִים, those who are easily susceptible of good or bad, according to the influence that is brought to bear upon them, *vid.* also i. 4 ; and regarding בְּכִילִים, the intellectually heavy, dull persons in whom the flesh burdens the mind, *vid.* at i. 22. לֵב is parallel with עֵרְמָה, for the heart (according to its Semitic etymon, that which remains fast, like a kernel, the central-point) is used for the understanding of which it is the seat (*Psychol.* p. 249), or heartedness = intelligence (cf. חֵסֶד-לֵב, vi. 32 = *ἄνους* or *ἄλογος*). We take עֵרְמָה and לֵב as objective, as we have translated : that which is in both, and in which they consist. Thus הִקִּין, which is a favourite word

with this author, has both times the simple transitive meaning of the gain of understanding into the nature and worth of both; and we neither need to interpret the second הָבִינִי in the double transitive meaning, "to bring to understanding," nor, with Hitzig, to change it into יְהִינִי [direct, *i.e. applicate*].

Ver. 6. That to which Wisdom invites, her discourse makes practicable, for she speaks of נִידִים. Hitzig interprets this word by *conspicua*, manifest truths, which the *Græc. Venet.* understands to be *ἐναντία*, after Kimchi's interpretation: truths which one makes an aim and object (נִיד) on account of their worth. Fürst, however, says that נִיד, from נָיַד, Arab. *najad*, means to be elevated, exalted, and thereby visible (whence also הִנִּיר, to bring to light, to bring forward); and that by נִידִים, as the plur. of this נִיד, is to be understood *princeps* in the sense of *principalia*, or *præstantia* (LXX. *σεμνά*; Theodot. *ἡγεμονικά*; Jerome, *de rebus magnis*) (cf. νόμος βασιλικός of the law of love, which surpasses the other laws, as kings do their subjects), which is supported by the similar expression, xxii. 20. But that we do not need to interpret נִידִים as *abstr.*, like מִיִּשְׁרָיִם, and as the *acc. adverb.*: in noble ways, because in that case it ought to be נִידוֹת (Berth.), is shown by xxii. 20, and also xvi. 13; cf. on this neuter use of the masc., Ewald, § 172a. "The opening of my lips (*i.e.* this, that they open themselves, not: that which they disclose, lay open) is upright" is to be regarded as *metonymia antecedentis pro conseq.*: that which I announce is . . .; or also as a poetic attribution, which attributes to a subject that which is produced by it (cf. iii. 17b): my discourse bearing itself right, brings to light (Fl.). xxiii. 16, cf. 31, is parallel both in the words and the subject; מִיִּשְׁרָיִם, that which is in accordance with fact and with rectitude, uprightness (*vid.* at i. 3), is a word common to the introduction (i.-ix.), and to the first appendix to the first series of Solomonian Proverbs (xxii. 17-xxiv. 22), with the Canticles. In Cant. v. 16 also, as here (cf. v. 3, Job vi. 30), the word palate [*Gaumen*] is used as the organ of speech.

Ver. 7. הִי continues the reason (begun in ver. 6) for the Harken! (cf. i. 15-17, iv. 16 f.); so that this second reason is co-ordinated with the first (Fl.). Regarding אָזְנִי, *vid.* at iii. 3; הֵנָּה, here of the palate (cf. Ps. xxxvii. 30), as in xv. 28 of the heart, has not hitherto occurred. It signifies quiet inward meditation, as well as also (but only poetically) discourses going forth from

¹ *Vid.* the *Hebr. Zeitschrift*, רחוק, 1856, p. 112.

it (*vid.* at Ps. i. 2). The contrary of truth, *i.e.* moral truth, is רָעָה, wickedness in words and principles,—a *segolate*, which retains its *Segol* also in *pausa*, with the single exception of Eccles. iii. 16.

Vers. 8, 9. The א of בִּצְרוּק is that of the close connection of a quality with an action or matter, which forms with a substantive *adverbia* as well as virtual *adjectiva*, as here: *cum rectitudine (conjuncta i. e. vera) sunt omnia dicta oris mei* (Fl.); it is the ב of the distinctive attribute (Hitzig), certainly related to the ב *essentiæ* (iii. 26, according to which Schultens and Bertheau explain), which is connected with the abstract conception (*e.g.* Ps. xxxiii. 4), but also admits the article designating the gender (*vid.* at Ps. xxix. 4). The opposite of בִּצְרוּק (here in the sense of *veracitas*, which it means in Arab.) is נִפְתָּל וְעָקַט, *dolosum ac perversum*. עָקַט (cf. Gesen. § 84, 9) is that which is violently bent and twisted, *i.e.* estranged from the truth, which is, so to speak, parodied or caricatured. Related to it in meaning, but proceeding from a somewhat different idea, is נִפְתָּל. נִפְתָּל, used primarily of threads, cords, ropes, and the like, means to twist them, to twine them over and into one another, whence נִפְתָּל, a line or string made of several intertwisted threads (cf. فتيلة, a wick of a candle or lamp); *Niph.*, to be twisted, specifically *luctari*, of the twisting of the limbs, and figuratively to bend and twist oneself, like the crafty (*versutus*) liars and deceivers, of words and thoughts which do not directly go forth, but by the crafty twistings of truth and rectitude, *opp.* נָכוֹן, נָכוֹן (Fl.). There is nothing of deception or error in the utterances of wisdom; much rather they are all נִבְחִים, straight out from her (cf. Isa. lvii. 2), going directly out, and without circumlocution directed to the right end for the intelligent, the knowing (cf. Neh. x. 29); and יְשָׁרִים, straight or even, giving no occasion to stumble, removing the danger of erring for those who have obtained knowledge, *i.e.* of good and evil, and thus the ability of distinguishing between them (Gesen. § 134, 1),—briefly, for those who know how to estimate them.

Her self-commendation is continued in the resumed address :

- 10 "Receive my instruction, and not silver,
And knowledge rather than choice gold!
- 11 For wisdom is better than corals,
And all precious jewels do not equal her.
- 12 I, Wisdom, inhabit prudence,
And the knowledge of right counsels is attainable by me."

Instead of לֹא-בָכָה influenced by קָחַהּ , is וְאֵל-בָּכָה with תִּקְחֶהּ to be supplied; besides, with most Codd. and older editions, we are to accentuate קָחַהּ מִיֶּסֶדֶר with the erasure of the *Makkeph*. "Such negations and prohibitions," Fleischer remarks, "are to be understood comparatively: instead of acquiring silver, rather acquire wisdom. Similar is the old Arabic لَا النَّارَ , the fire, and not

the disgrace! Also among the modern Arabic proverbs collected by Burekhardt, many have this form, e.g. No. 34, *alhajamat balafas wala alhajaj alanas*, Better to let oneself be cut with the axe than to beg for the favour of another" 10b is to be translated, with Jerome, Kimchi, and others: and knowledge is more precious than fine gold (נִבְהֵר , neut.: *auro pretiosius*); and in view of xvi. 16, this construction appears to be intended. But Fleischer has quite correctly affirmed that this assertatory clause is unsuitably placed as a parallel clause over against the preceding imperative clause, and, what is yet more important, that then ver. 11 would repeat *idem per idem* in a tautological manner. We therefore, after the Aramaic and Greek translators, take בָּכָה נִבְהֵר together here as well as at ver. 19, inasmuch as we carry forward the קָחַהּ : *et scientiam præ auro lectissimo*, which is also according to the accentuation. Equally pregnant is the $\text{מִתְהַרֵּץ בָּהּ$ of the passage iii. 14, 15, which is here varied.

Ver. 12 follows ver. 11 = iii. 15 as a justification of this estimating of wisdom above all else in worth. Regarding גָּאָה with *Gaja*, *vid.* the rule which the accentuation of this word in the three so-called metrical books follows in Merx' *Archiv*, 1868, p. 203 (cf. Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 40). We translate: *ego sapientia incolo sollertiam*, for the verb שָׁבַח is construed with the accusative of the object, ii. 21, x. 30, Ps. xxxvii. 3 (cf. וָגֵר , Ps. v. 5), as well as with בָּ , Gen. xxvi. 2, Ps. lxxix. 37. Wisdom inhabits prudence, has settled down, as it were, and taken up her residence in it, is at home in its whole sphere, and rules it. Bertheau not unsuitably compares οἰκῶν with μόνος ἔχων , 1 Tim. vi. 16. Regarding כִּינֹמֶת , *vid.* i. 4, v. 2. It denotes well-considered, carefully thought out designs, plans, conclusions, and רָעַתָּהּ is here the knowledge that is so potent. This intellectual power is nothing beyond wisdom, it is in her possession on every occasion; she strives after it not in vain, her knowledge is defined according to her wish. Wisdom describes herself here personally with regard to that which she bestows on men who receive her.

Far remote is the idea that 13a is dependent on אָמַץ (I acquire) (Löwenstein, Bertheau). With this verse begins a new series of thoughts raising themselves on the basis of the fundamental clause 13a. Wisdom says what she hates, and why she hates it:

13 "The fear of Jahve is to hate evil;
Pride and arrogance, and an evil way
And a deceitful mouth, do I hate."

If the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom (ix. 10, i. 7), then wisdom, personally considered, stands before all else that is to be said of her in a relation of homage or reverence toward God corresponding to the fear of God on the part of man; and if, as the premiss 13a shows, the fear of God has as its reverse side the hatred of evil, then there arises what Wisdom says in אֶנְאִי (I hate) of herself. Instead of the *n. actionis* אֶנְאִי (hatred), formed in the same way with אֶרָא, which, admitting the article, becomes a substantive, the author uses, in order that he might designate the predicate as such (Hitzig), rather the *n. actionis* אֶנְאִי, which is indeed also a noun, but is not used substantively; אֶנְאִי as אֶנְאִי, Jer. xxix. 10. אֶנְאִי, Judg. viii. 1, is equivalent to אֶנְאִי like אֶנְאִי, the becoming dry, אֶנְאִי, the being able; cf. (Arab.) *shanat*, hating, *malât*, well-being, *karât*, reading (Fl.). The evil which Wisdom hates is now particularized as, vi. 16-19, the evil which Jahve hates. The virtue of all virtues is humility; therefore Wisdom hates, above all, self-exaltation in all its forms. The *paronomasia* אֶנְאִי אֶנְאִי (pride and haughtiness) expresses the idea in the whole of its contents and compass (cf. Isa. xv. 6, iii. 1, and above at i. 27). אֶנְאִי (from אֶנְאִי, the nominal form), that which is lofty = pride, stands with אֶנְאִי, as Job iv. 10, אֶנְאִי, that which is high = arrogance. There follows the *viam mali*, representing the sins of walk, i.e. of conduct, and *os fullax* (vid. at ii. 12), the sins of the mouth. Hitzig rightly rejects the interpunctuation אֶנְאִי, and prefers אֶנְאִי. In consequence of this *Dechlî* (*Tiphcha init.*), אֶנְאִי אֶנְאִי have in Codd. and good editions the servants *Asla* and *Illuj* (vid. Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 11); Aben-Ezra and Moses Kimchi consider the *Asla* erroneously as disjunctive, and explain אֶנְאִי by *et os = axioma meum*, but *Asla* is conjunctive, and has after it the *naphatum*.

After Wisdom has said what she hates, and thus what she is not, she now says what she is, has, and promises:

- 14 " Mine is counsel and promotion ;
 I am understanding, mine is strength.
 15 By me kings reign,
 And rulers govern justly.
 16 By me princes rule, and nobles—
 All judges of the earth."

Whoever gives anything must himself possess it; in this sense Wisdom claims for herself counsel, promotion (in the sense of offering and containing that which is essentially and truly good; *vid.* concerning חִשְׁבָּה, ii. 7), and energy (*vid.* Eccles. vii. 19). But she does not merely possess כֹּחַ; this is much rather her peculiar nature, and is one with her. That ver. 14 is formed after Job xii. 13, 16 (Hitzig) is possible, without there following thence any argument against its genuineness. And if ver. 15 f., and Isa. xxxii. 1, x. 1, stand in intentional reciprocal relation, then the priority is on the side of the author of the Proverbs. The connection gives to the laconic expression its intended comprehensiveness. It is not meant that Wisdom has the highest places in the state to give, but that she makes men capable of holding and discharging the duties of these.

Ver. 15b. Here we are led to think of legislation, but the usage of the language determines for the *Po.* חָק only the significations of commanding, decreeing, or judging; צֶדֶק is the object. accus., the opposite of חֲקֵי אֲיָתָן (decrees of unrighteousness), Isa. x. 1. חָק is a poetic word, from חָק = Arab. *razuma*, to be heavy, weighty, then to be firm, incapable of being shaken, figuratively of majestic repose, dignity (cf. פָּבוֹר and עָרָר) in the whole external *habitus*, in speech and action such as befits one invested with power (Fl.).

Ver. 16a. We may not explain the second clause of this verse: *et ad ingenua impelluntur quicunque terræ imperant*, for נָרִיב is adj. without such a verbal sense. But besides, נָרִיבִים is not pred., for which it is not adapted, because, with the obscuring of its ethical signification (from נָרִב, to impel inwardly, viz. to noble conduct, particularly to liberality), it also denotes those who are noble only with reference to birth, and not to disposition (Isa. xxxii. 8). Thus נָרִיבִים is a fourth synonym for the highly exalted, and כָּל-שֹׁפְטֵי אֶרֶץ is the summary placing together of all kinds of dignity; for שֹׁפְטִים unites in itself references to government, administration of justice, and rule. כָּל is used, and not וְכָל—a so-called *asyndeton summativum*.

Instead of אָרָן (LXX.) there is found also the word צָרָק (Syr., Targ., Jerome, *Græc. Venet.*, adopted by Norzi after Codd. and Neapol. 1487). But this word, if not derived from the conclusion of the preceding verse, is not needed by the text, and gives a summary which does not accord with that which is summed up (מלכים, רונים, שרים, נדיבים); besides, the Scripture elsewhere calls God Himself שופט צרָק (Ps. ix. 5; Jer. xi. 20). The Masoretic reading¹ of most of the editions, which is also found in the Cod. Hillel (סֵפֶר הלל), merits the preference.

The discourse of Wisdom makes a fresh departure, as at ver. 13: she tells how, to those who love her, she repays this love:

- 17 "I love them that love me,
And they that seek me early find me.
- 18 Riches and honour are with me,
Durable riches and righteousness.
- 19 Better is my fruit than pure and fine gold,
And my revenue (better) than choice silver.
- 20 In the way of righteousness do I walk,
In the midst of the paths of justice.
- 21 To give an inheritance to them that love me
And I fill their treasures."

The Chethib אֶהְבֵּיהָ (*ego hos qui eam amant redamo*), Gesenius, *Lehrgeb.* § 196, 5, regards as a possible synallage (*eam = me*), but one would rather think that it ought to be read אֶהְבֵּי ה' (= יהוה). The ancients all have the reading אֶהְבֵּי אֶהֱבֶה (= אֶהְבֶּה, with the change of the *ê* into *é*, and the compression of the radical *א*; cf. אֶמֶר, אֶמֶר, i. 10) is the form of the *fut. Kal*, which is inflected אֶתְאַהְבֵּי, i. 22. Regarding אֶהְבֵּי (the *Græc. Venet.* well: *οὐδὲρβρίζοντες μοι*), *vid.* i. 28, where the same *epenth. fut.* form is found.

Ver. 18. In this verse part of iii. 16 is repeated, after which אֶתִּי is meant of possession (*mecum* and *penes me*). Regarding הָן, *vid.* i. 13; instead of the adjective יָקָר there, we have here עָתֵק. The verb עָתֵק signifies *promoveri*, to move forwards, whence are derived the meanings old (cf. *ætās propecta*, advanced age), venerable for age, and noble, free (cf. עָתִיק, Isa. xxviii. 9, and Arab. *'atylk*, manu-

¹ If the Masoretes had read שֹׁפְטֵי צָרָק, then would they have added the remark לֹא ("it does not further occur"), and inserted the expression in their Register of Expressions, which occurs but once, *Masora finalis*, p. 62.

² [One of the most ancient and celebrated Codd. of the Heb. Scriptures, called Hillel from the name of the man who wrote it. *Vid.* Strack's *Prolegomena*, p. 112 It was written about A.D. 600.]

missus), unbound, the bold. Used of clothing, עָנִיָּק (Isa. xxiii. 18) expresses the idea of venerable for age. עָנִיָּק used of possessions and goods, like the Arab. *'ātak*, denotes such goods as increase during long possession as an inheritance from father to son, and remain firm, and are not for the first time gained, but only need to be inherited, *opes perennes et firmæ* (Schultens, Gesenius' *Thesaur.*, Fleischer), although it may be also explained (which is, however, less probable with the form עָנִיָּק) of the idea of the venerable from *opes superbæ* (Jerome), splendid opulence. עֲנִיָּקָה is here also a good which is distributed, but properly the distributing goodness itself, as the Arab. *ṣadakat*, influenced by the later use of the Hebrew צִדְקָה (*δικαιοσύνη* = *ἐλεημοσύνη*), denotes all that which God of His goodness causes to flow to men, or which men bestow upon men (Fl.). Righteousness is partly a recompensative goodness, which rewards, according to the law of requital, like with like; partly communicative, which, according to the law of love without merit, and even in opposition to it, bestows all that is good, and above all, itself; but giving itself to man, it assimilates him to itself (*vid.* Ps. xxiv. 7), so that he becomes צַדִּיק, and is regarded as such before God and men, ver. 19.

The fruit and product of wisdom (the former a figure taken from the trees, iii. 18; the latter from the sowing of seed, iii. 9) is the gain and profit which it yields. With תְּרוּמָה, viii. 10, iii. 14, פֶּן is here named as the place of fine gold, briefly for כֶּסֶף טָהוֹר, solid gold, gold separated from the place of ore which contains it, or generally separated gold, from פָּנָה, violently to separate metals from base mixtures; Targ. בְּהָבָא אוֹכְרִין, gold which has stood the fire-test, *obrussa*, of the crucible, Greek *ἄβρυζον*, Pers. *ebriṣ*, Arab. *ibriṣ*. In the last clause of this verse, as also in 10b, נִבְהָר is to be interpreted as pred. to תְּבוּאָתִי, but the balance of the meaning demands as a side-piece to the כֶּסֶף וְכֶסֶף (19a) something more than the mere כֶּסֶף. In 20f. the reciprocal love is placed as the answer of love under the point of view of the requiting righteousness. But recompensative and communicative righteousness are here combined, where therefore the subject is the requital of worthy pure love and loving conduct, like with like. Such love requires reciprocal love, not merely cordial love, but that which expresses itself outwardly.

Vers. 20, 21. In this sense, Wisdom says that she acts strictly according to justice and rectitude, and adds (21) wherein this her

conduct manifests itself. The *Piel* הִלֵּךְ expresses firm, constant action; and הִתְחַלָּה means that she turns from this line of conduct on no side. הִתְחַלָּה is distinguished from הִתְחַלָּה, as *ut possidendam tribuam* from *possidendam tribuendo*; the former denotes the direction of the activity, the latter its nature and manner; both combine if we translate *ita ut* . . .¹ Regarding the origin of שֵׁ, *vid.* at ii. 7; it denotes the being founded, thus *substantia*, and appears here, like the word in mediæval Latin and Romanic (Ital. *sustanza*, Span. *substancia*), and like οὐσία and ὑπαρξίς (τὰ ὑπάρχοντα) in classic Greek, to denote possessions and goods. But since this use of the word does not elsewhere occur (therefore Hitzig explains שֵׁ = לֵּ שֵׁ, I have it [= *præsto est*]), and here, where Wisdom speaks, שֵׁ connects itself in thought with הִתְחַלָּה, it will at least denote real possession (as we also are wont to call not every kind of property, but only landed property, *real* possession), such possession as has real worth, and that not according to commercial exchange and price, but according to sound judgment, which applies a higher than the common worldly standard of worth. The *Pasek* between אֶחָד and שֵׁ is designed to separate the two *Jods* from each other, and has, as a consequence, for לְהַנְחִיל אֶחָד the accentuation with *Tarcha* and *Mercha* (*vid.* *Accentssystem*, vi. § 4; cf. *Torath Emeth*, p. 17, § 3). The carrying forward of the inf. with the finite, 21b, is as i. 27, ii. 2, and quite usual.

Ver. 22. Wisdom takes now a new departure, in establishing her right to be heard, and to be obeyed and loved by men. As the Divine King in Ps. ii. opposes to His adversaries the self-testimony: "I will speak concerning a decree! Jahve said unto me: Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten Thee;" so Wisdom here unfolds her divine patent of nobility: she originates with God before all creatures, and is the object of God's love and joy, as she also has the object of her love and joy on God's earth, and especially among the sons of men:

"Jahve brought me forth as the beginning of His way,
As the foremost of His works from of old."

The old translators render קָנִי (with *Kametz* by *Dechi*; *vid.* under Ps. cxviii. 5) partly by verbs of creating (LXX. ἐκτίσε, Syr.

¹ Bicsenthal combines the etymologically obscure הִתְחַלָּה with נָחַל: to make to flow into, so that נָחַל denotes inheritance in contradistinction to acquisition; while נָחַלָה, in contradistinction to יִרְשָׁה, denotes the inheritance rather of many than of the individual.

Targ. חִכְמָה), partly by verbs of acquiring (Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, Venet. ἐκτήσατο; Jerome, *possedit*); Wisdom appears also as created, certainly not without reference to this passage, Sir. i. 4, προτέρα πάντων ἐκτίσται σοφία; i. 9, αὐτὸς ἐκτίσεν αὐτήν; xxiv. 8, ὁ κτίσας με. In the christological controversy this word gained a dogmatic signification, for they proceeded generally on the identity of σοφία ὑποστατική (*sapientia substantialis*) with the *hypostasis* of the Son of God. The Arians used the ἐκτίσέ με as a proof of their doctrine of the *filius non genitus, sed factus*, i.e. of His existence before the world began indeed, but yet not from eternity, but originating in time; while, on the contrary, the orthodox preferred the translation ἐκτήσατο, and understood it of the co-eternal existence of the Son with the Father, and agreed with the ἐκτίσε of the LXX. by referring it not to the actual existence, but to the position, place of the Son (Athanasius: *Deus me creavit regem* or *caput operum suorum*; Cyrill.: *non condidit secundum substantiam, sed constituit me totius universi principium et fundamentum*). But (1) Wisdom is not God, but is God's; she has personal existence in the Logos of the N. T., but is not herself the Logos; she is the world-idea, which, once projected, is objective to God, not as a dead form, but as a living spiritual image; she is the archetype of the world, which, originating from God, stands before God, the world of the idea which forms the medium between the Godhead and the world of actual existence, the communicated spiritual power in the origination and the completion of the world as God designed it to be. This wisdom the poet here personifies; he does not speak of the personal Logos, but the further progress of the revelation points to her actual personification in the Logos. And (2) since to her the poet attributes an existence preceding the creation of the world, he thereby declares her to be eternal, for to be before the world is to be before time. For if he places her at the head of the creatures, as the first of them, so therewith he does not seek to make her a creature of this world having its commencement in time; he connects her origination with the origination of the creature only on this account, because that *à priori* refers and tends to the latter; the power which was before heaven and earth were, and which operated at the creation of the earth and of the heavens, cannot certainly fall under the category of the creatures around and above us. Therefore (3) the translation with ἐκτίσεν has nothing against it, but it is different from the κτίσις of the

heavens and the earth, and the poet has intentionally written not בְּרָאָה, but קָנִי. Certainly קָנָה, Arab. *knā*, like all the words used of creating, refers to one root-idea: that of forging (*vid.* under Gen. iv. 22), as בָּרָא does to that of cutting (*vid.* under Gen. i. 1); but the mark of a commencement in time does not affix itself to קָנָה in the same way as it does to בָּרָא, which always expresses the divine production of that which has not hitherto existed. קָנָה comprehends in it the meanings to create, and to create something for oneself, to prepare, *parare* (*e.g.* Ps. cxxxix. 13), and to prepare something for oneself, *comparare*, as *κτίζειν* and *κτᾶσθαι*, both from *ksh*, to build, the former expressed by *struere*, and the latter by *sibi struere*. In the קָנִי, then, there are the ideas, both that God produced wisdom, and that He made Himself to possess it; not certainly, however, as a man makes himself to possess wisdom from without, iv. 7. But the idea of the bringing forth is here the nearest demanded by the connection. For רִאשִׁית יְרֵכּוֹ is not equivalent to בְּרִאשִׁית רֵכְבוֹ (Syr., Targ., Luther), as Jerome also reads: *Ita enim scriptum est: ADONAI CANANI BRESITH DERCHIO* (*Ep. cxi. ad Cyprian.*); but it is, as Job xl. 19 shows, the second accusative of the object (LXX., Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion). But if God made wisdom as the beginning of His way, *i.e.* of His creative efficiency (*cf.* Rev. iii. 14 and Col. i. 15), the making is not to be thought of as acquiring, but as a bringing forth, revealing this creative efficiency of God, having it in view; and this is also confirmed by the חוֹלְלָהּ (*genita sum*; *cf.* Gen. iv. 1, קָנִי, *genui*) following. Accordingly, קֶדֶם מִפְעֻלָּי (foremost of His works) has to be regarded as a parallel second object. accusative. All the old translators interpret קֶדֶם as a preposition [before], but the usage of the language before us does not recognise it as such; this would be an Aramaism, for קֶדֶם, Dan. vii. 7, frequently קֶדְמָקֶדֶם (Syr., Targ.), is so used. But as קֶדֶם signifies previous existence in space, and then in time (*vid.* Orelli, *Zeit und Ewigkeit*, p. 76), so it may be used of the object in which the previous existence appears, thus (after Sir. i. 4): *πρωτέραν τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ* (Hitzig).

Ver. 23. A designation of the When? expressed first by מִנְּקִי (Isa. xlviii. 8, *cf.* xl. 21), is further unfolded:

“From everlasting was I set up,
From the beginning, from the foundations of the earth.”

That מִנְּקִי cannot be translated: I was anointed = consecrated, *vid.* at Ps. ii. 6. But the translation also: I was woven = wrought

(Hitzig, Ewald, and previously one of the Greeks, *ἐδιώσθην*), does not commend itself, for נָשָׂא (Ps. cxxxix. 15), used of the embryo, lies far from the metaphorical sense in which נָשָׂא = Arab. *nasaj*, *texere*, would here be translated of the origin of a person, and even of such a spiritual being as Wisdom; נִסְּתָהּ, as the LXX. reads (*ἐθεμελιώσέ με*), is not once used of such. Rightly Aquila, *κατεστάθην*; Symmachus, *προκεχειρίσμαι*; Jerome, *ordinata sum*. Literally, but unintelligibly, the Gr. *ἑνετ. κέχυμαι*, according to which (cf. Sir. i. 10) Böttcher: I was poured forth = formed, but himself acknowledging that this figure is not suitable to personification; nor is it at all likely that the author applied the word, used in this sense of idols, to the origin of Wisdom. The fact is, that נָשָׂא, used as seldom of the anointing or consecration of kings as נָשָׂא, passes over, like נָשָׂא (נִסְּתָהּ), צֶנֶחַ (נִצְּנָה, a pillar), and נָשָׂא (נִסְּתָהּ), from the meaning of pouring out to that of placing and appointing; the mediating idea appears to be that of the pouring forth of the metal, since נָשָׂא, Dan. xi. 8, like נָשָׂא, signifies a molten image. The Jewish interpreters quite correctly remark, in comparing it with the princely name נָשָׂא [cf. Ps. lxxxiii. 12] (although without etymological insight), that a placing in princely dignity is meant. Of the three synonyms of *æternitas a parte ante*, נִסְּתָהּ points backwards into the infinite distance, נִסְּתָהּ into the beginning of the world, נִסְּתָהּ not into the times which precede the origin of the earth, but into the oldest times of its gradual arising; this נִסְּתָהּ it is impossible to render, in conformity with the Hebr. use of language: it is an extensive plur. of time, Böttcher, § 697. The נִסְּתָהּ repeated does not mean that the origin and greatness of Wisdom are contemporaneous with the foundation of the world; but that when the world was founded, she was already an actual existence.

This her existence before the world began is now set forth in yet more explicit statements:

- 24 "When there were as yet no floods was I brought forth,
When as yet there were no fountains which abounded with water;
25 For before the mountains were settled,
Before the hills was I brought forth,
26 While as yet He had not made land and plains,
And the sum of the dust of the earth."

The description is poetical, and affords some room for imagination. By תְּהוֹמוֹת are not intended the unrestrained primeval waters, but, as also iii. 20, the inner waters, treasures of the earth; and conse-

quently by מַעְיָנוֹת, not the fountains of the sea on this earth (Ewald, after Job xxxviii. 16), but the springs or places of springs (for מַעַן is *n. loci* to עַן, a well as an eye of the earth; *vid.* Gen. xvi. 7), by means of which the internal waters of the earth communicate themselves to the earth above (cf. Gen. vii. 11 with xlix. 25). נִבְרַיִם (abounding with water) is a descriptive *epitheton* to מַעְיָנוֹת, which, notwithstanding its fem. plur., is construed as masc. (cf. v. 16). The Masora does not distinguish the thrice-occurring נִבְרַיִם according to its form as written (Isa. xxiii. 8, 9). The form נִבְרַיִם (which, like בְּתִים, would demand *Metheg*) is to be rejected; it is everywhere to be written נִבְרַיִם (Ewald, § 214b) with *Pathach*, with *Dagesh* following; *vid.* Kimchi, *Michlol* 61b. Kimchi adds the gloss מְעִי מֵי רַבִּים, which the *Gr. Venet.*, in accordance with the meaning of נִבְרַיִם elsewhere, renders by *πηγαῖς δεδοξασμένων ὑδάτων* (as also Büttcher: the most honoured = the most lordly); but Meiri, Immanuel, and others rightly judge that the adjective is here to be understood after Gen. xiii. 2, Job xiv. 21 (but in this latter passage בָּרַב does not mean "to be numerous"): loaded = endowed in rich measure.

Ver. 25. Instead of בִּצְלוֹ, in (yet) non-existence (24), we have here חֲרָם, a subst. which signifies cutting off from that which already exists (*vid.* at Gen. ii. 5), and then as a particle *nondum* or *antequam*, with אֲ always *antequam*, and in ver. 26 עַד־לָא, so long not yet (this also originally a substantive from עָקַה, in the sense of progress). With הִתְיַצְּעוּ (were settled) (as Job xxxviii. 6, from יָצַע, to impress into or upon anything, *imprimere, infigere*) the question is asked: wherein? Not indeed: in the depths of the earth, but as the Caraites Ahron b. Joseph answers, אֶל־קֶרֶקַע הַיָּם, in the bottom of the sea; for out of the waters they rise up, Ps. civ. 8 (cf. at Gen. i. 9).

Ver. 26. אֶרֶץ חֲרוּצוֹת is either, connecting the whole with its part: *terra cum campis*, or אֶרֶץ gains by this connection the meaning of land covered with buildings, while חֲרוּצוֹת the expanse of unoccupied land, or the free field outside the towns and villages (cf. בר, Arab. *barrytt*) (Fl.), *vid.* Job v. 10, xviii. 17 (where we have translated "in the steppe far and wide"); and regarding the fundamental idea, *vid.* above at v. 16. Synonymous with אֶרֶץ, as contrast to חֲרוּצוֹת, is תְּבֵל, which like יָבֵל (produce, wealth) comes from יָבַל, and thus denotes the earth as fruit-bearing (as אֲדָמָה properly denotes the *humus* as the covering of earth). Accordingly,

with Ewald, we may understand by ראש עפרות, "the heaps of the many clods of the fertile arable land lying as if scattered on the plains." Hitzig also translates: "the first clods of the earth." We do not deny that עפרות may mean clods of earth, i.e. pieces of earth gathered together, as Job xxviii. 6, עפרת זהב, gold ore, i.e. pieces of earth or ore containing gold. But for clods of earth the Heb. language has the nouns רֶגֶב and כְּנִרְפָּה; and if we read together עפרות, plur. of the collective עפר (dust as a mass), which comes as from a *n. unitatis* עפרה, and ראש, which, among its meanings in poetry as well as in prose, has also that of the sum, i.e. the chief amount or the total amount (cf. the Arab. *rās al-mâl*, the capital, τὸ κεφάλαιον), then the two words in their mutual relation yield the sense of the sum of the several parts of the dust, as of the atoms of dust (Cocceius; Schultens, *summam pulverum orbis habitabilis*); and Fleischer rightly remarks that other interpretations, as *ab initio pulveris orbis, præcipua quæque orbis terrarum, caput orbis terrarum* (i.e. according to Rashi, the first man; according to Umbreit, man generally), leave the choice of the plur. עפרות unintelligible. Before these creatures originated, Wisdom was, as she herself says, and emphatically repeats, already born; חוללתִי is the passive of the *Pilel* חלל, which means to whirl, to twist oneself, to bring forth with sorrow (Aquila, Theodotion, ὠδινύθην; Græc. Venet. 24a, ἐπέλασμαι, 25b, ὠδινῆμαι), then but poet. generally to beget, to bring forth (xxv. 23, xxvi. 10).

Ver. 27. But not only did her existence precede the laying of the foundation of the world; she was also actively taking part in the creative work:

"When He prepared the heavens, I was there,

When He measured out a circle for the mirror of the multitude of waters."

Again a sentence clothed with two designations of time. The adv. of place עֵצָה is used, chiefly poetically, for עֵת, *eo tempore* (Arab. *thumm*, in contradistinction to *thamm*, *eo loco*); but here it has the signification of place, which includes that of time: Wisdom was there when God created the world, and had then already long before that come into existence, like as the servant of Jahve, Isa. xlviii. 16, with just such a עֵצָה עֵת, says that He is there from the time that the history of nations received a new direction, beginning with Cyrus. עֵצָה signifies to give a firm position or a definite direction. Thus Job xxviii. 27 of Wisdom, whom the Creator places before Himself as a pattern (ideal); here, as Jer. x. 12, Ps.

lxv. 7, of the setting up, restoring throughout the whole world. In the parallel member, וְהָיָה , corresponding to וַיִּבְרָא , appears necessarily to designate the circle or the vault of the heavens (Job xxii. 14), which, according to the idea of the Hebrews, as in Homer, rests as a half-globe on the outermost ends of the disc of the earth surrounded with water, and thus lies on the waters. *Vid.* Hupfeld under Ps. xxiv. 2. This idea of the ocean girdling the earth is introduced into the O. T. without its being sanctioned by it. The LXX. ($\kappa\alpha\iota \delta\tau\epsilon \acute{\alpha}\phi\acute{\omega}\rho\iota\zeta\epsilon \tau\acute{o}\nu \acute{\epsilon}\alpha\nu\tau\omicron\upsilon \theta\rho\acute{o}\nu\omicron\nu \acute{\epsilon}\pi' \acute{\alpha}\nu\acute{\epsilon}\mu\omega\nu$) appears to understand וְהָיָה of the waters above; but וְהָיָה never has this meaning, וַיִּבְרָא (Job ix. 8, xxxvi. 30) might rather be interpreted of the ocean of the heavens. The passage in accordance with which this before us is to be expounded is Job xxvi. 10: He has set a limit for the surface of the waters, *i.e.* describing over them a circle setting bounds to their region. So here, with the exchange of the functions of the two words: when He marked out a circle over the surface of the multitude of waters, *viz.* to appoint a fixed region (מִקְוָה , Gen. i. 10) for them, *i.e.* the seas, fountains, rivers, in which the waters under the heavens spread over the earth. קָטַף signifies *incidere, figere*, to prescribe, to measure off, to consign, and directly to mark out, which is done by means of firm impressions of the graver's tools. But here this verb is without the *Dagesh*, to distinguish between the infinitive and the substantive קָטַף (his statute or limit); for correct texts have קָטַף (*Michlol* 147a); and although a monosyllable follows, yet there is no throwing back of the tone, after the rule that words terminating in *o* in this case maintain their ultima accentuation (*e.g.* מִשְׁכָּנוֹ , Num. xxiv. 23). Fleischer also finally decides for the explanation: *quum delinearet circulum super abyssu*, when He marked out the region of the sea as with the circle.

In 28, 29, these two features of the figure of the creation of the world return (the beginning of the firmament, and the embankment of the under waters); hence we see that the discourse here makes a fresh start with a new theme:

- 28 " When He made firm the ether above,
 When He restrained the fountains of the waters;
 29 When He set to the sea its bounds,
 That the waters should not pass their limits;
 When He settled the pillars of the earth;
 30 Then was I with Him as director of the work,
 And was delighted day by day,
 Rejoicing always before Him,

31 Rejoicing in His earth,
And having my delight in the children of men."

We have, with Symmachus, translated שֶׁחַקִּים (from שָׁחַק, Arab. *shak*, to grind, to make thin) by αἰθέρα, for so the fine transparent strata of air above the hanging clouds are called—a poetic name of the firmament רָקִיעַ. The making firm מָצַח is not to be understood locally, but internally of the spreading out of the firmament over the earth settled for continuance (an expression such as Ps. lxxviii. 23). In 28b the Masora notices the plur. עֵינֹת instead of עֵינֹת with לֵית as *unicum* (cf. *Michlol* 191a); the transition of the sound is as in מִלֵּית from *galajta*. The inf. מָצַח appears on the first look to require a transitive signification, as the LXX. and the Targ., the *Græc. Venet.* and Luther (*da er festiget die Brönnen der tieffen* = when He makes firm the fountains of the deep) have rendered it. Elster accordingly believes that this signification must be maintained, because מָ here introduces creative activity, and in itself is probably the transitive use of מָצַח, as the Arab. 'azz shows: when He set His רַי against the עֵינֹת (Isa. xliii. 16). But the absence of the subject is in favour of the opinion that here, as everywhere else, it is intransitive; only we may not, with Hitzig, translate: when the fountains of the flood raged wildly; but, since 28b, if not a creative efficiency, must yet express a creative work, either as Ewald, with reference to מִצְחָ, fortress: when they became firm, or better as Fleischer, with reference to מִים עֵינֹת: when they broke forth with power, with strong fulness. Whether the suff. of מָצַח, 29a, refers back to the sea or to Jahve, is decided after the parallel בִּי. If this word is equivalent to its coast (cf. Ps. civ. 9), then both suffixes refer to the sea; but the coast of the sea, or of a river, is called מִצְחָ, not מָצַח, which only means *ostium* (mouth), not *ora*. Also Isa. xix. 7 will require to be translated: by the mouth of the Nile; and that בִּי, Ps. cxxiii. 2, may denote the under edge, arises from this, that a coat has a mouth above as well as below, i.e. is open. Thus both suff. are to be referred to God, and בִּי is to be determined after Job xxiii. 12. The clause beginning with וּמִים corresponds in periodizing discourse to a clause with *ut*, Ewald, § 338. בְּחֻקֹּי is the same form, only written *plene*, as ver. 27, בְּחֻקֹּי = בְּחֻקֹּי.¹

¹ One might regard it as modified from בְּחֻקֹּי; but that שְׁחָקִי, Ps. xcii. 12, is modified from שְׁחָקִי, or שְׁחָקִי, Gen. xlix. 26, from שְׁחָקִי, is by no means certain.

Ver. 30. In this sentence, subordinating to itself these designations of time, the principal question is as to the meaning of חֲסִידָא. Hofmann's interpretation (*Schriftbew.* i. 97) "continually" (*inf. absol.* in an adverbial sense) is a judicious idea, and חֲסִידָא, to endure, remains indeed in חֲסִידָא (stability); but in this sense, which חֲסִידָא represents, it is not otherwise used. Also מְחַסְדֵּי (believing, trusting) of the Targ. (*Græc. Venet.* πίστις, as if the word used were חֲסִידָא) is linguistically inadmissible; the Hebr. מְחַסְדֵּי corresponds to the Aram. *haimēn*. One of these two only is possible: חֲסִידָא means either *opifex* or *alumnus*. The meaning *alumnus* (Aquila, *τιθηνομένη*; Meïri and Malbim, חֲסִידָא בְּחִיק הָאֵל, ἐν τῷ κόλπῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ) would derive the word from חָסַד, to support, make firm, take care of; the form ought to have a passive sense (Symm. Theod. ἐστηρικμένη), as חָסַד, twined, pressed, strong, great, and be pointed חָסַד (with a moveable *ā*, different from the form חָסַד, Isa. i. 17); and חֲסִידָא, in the meaning nursling, foster-child, favourite (Schultens, Euchel, Elster, and others, also Rashi and Kimchi, who all find in חֲסִידָא the meaning of education, חָסַד), would place itself with חֲסִידָא, fostered, Lam. iv. 5, חֲסִידָא, fosterer, חֲסִידָא, foster-mother. This is the meaning of the word according to the connection, for Wisdom appears further on as the child of God; as such she had her joy before Him; and particularly God's earth, where she rejoiced with the sons of men, was the scene of her mirth. But on this very account, because this is further said, we also lose nothing if חֲסִידָא should be interpreted otherwise. And it is otherwise to be interpreted, for Wisdom is, in consequence of קָנִי (viii. 22), and חֲסִידָא, which is twice used (viii. 24, 25), God's own child; but the designation חֲסִידָא would make Him to be the חֲסִידָא of Wisdom; and the child which an חֲסִידָא bears, Num. xi. 12, and fosters, Esth. ii. 7, is not his own. Hence it follows that חֲסִידָא in this signification would be an ἀπαξ λεγόμενον; on the other hand, it really occurs elsewhere, Jer. lii. 15 (*vid.* Hitzig *l.c.*), in the sense of *opifex*. This sense, which recommends itself to Ewald, Hitzig, Bertheau, and Zückler, lies also at the foundation of the ἀρμόζουσα of the LXX., מַחֲסִידָא of the Syr., the *cuncta componens* of Jerome, and the designation of Wisdom as ἡ τῶν πάντων τεχνίτις of the Book of Wisdom vii. 21. The workmaster is called חֲסִידָא, for which, Cant. vii. 2, חֲסִידָא, or rather חֲסִידָא (*ommán*), Aram. and Mishn. חֲסִידָא; not, perhaps, as he whom one entrusts with something in whom one confides or may confide in a work (*vid.* Fleischer, *loc.*), but from חָסַד, to be firm, as

one who is strong in his art, as perhaps also the right hand, which has the name יָמִינִי as being the *artifex* among the members. The word occurs also as an adjective in the sense of "experienced, skilful," and does not form a fem. according to the use of the word in this case before us, only because handicraft (אֲמִנָּה) belongs to men, and not to women; also in the Greek, *δημιουργός*, in the sense of τὰ δημόσια (εἰς τὸ δημόσιον) ἐργαζόμενος, has no fem.; and in Lat., *artifex* is used as a substantive (e.g. in Pliny: *artifex omnium natura*), like an adj. of double gender. It is thus altogether according to rule that we read אֲמִנָּה and not אֲמִינָה (after the form בְּנוּיָה); also we would make a mistake if we translated the word by the German "*Werkmeisterin*" [work-mistress, directress] (Hitzig), for it is intended to be said that she took up the place of a workmaster with Him, whereby chiefly the artistic performances of a חָרֵטֶשׁ [artificer] are thought of. This self-designation of Wisdom is here very suitable; for after she has said that she was brought forth by God before the world was, and that she was present when it was created, this אֲמִנָּה now answers the question as to what God had in view when He gave to Wisdom her separate existence, and in what capacity she assisted in the creation of the world: it was she who transferred the creative thoughts originally existing in the creative will of God, and set in motion by His creative order, from their ideal into their real effectiveness, and, as it were, artistically carried out the delineations of the several creatures; she was the mediating cause, the demiurgic power which the divine creative activity made use of, as is said, iii. 19, "Jahve has by Wisdom founded the earth," and as the Jerusalem Targ. Gen. i. 1, in connection with Prov. viii. 22, translates: בְּחִיכְמָא בְּרָא יְיָ יֵת שְׂמִינָא יֵת אֶרֶץ.

But—this is now the question—does the further unfolding of the thoughts here agree with this interpretation of אֲמִנָּה? That we may not misunderstand what follows, we must first of all represent to ourselves, that if אֲמִנָּה meant the foster-child, Wisdom could not yet, in what follows, be thought of as a little child (Num. xi. 12), for that would be an idea without any meaning; to rejoice [*spielen* = play] is certainly quite in accordance with youth, as 2 Sam. ii. 14 shows (where שָׂחָק לפני is said of the sportive combat of youthful warriors before the captain), not exclusively little children. So, then, we must guard against interpreting יִשְׂעִיָּעִים with the LXX. and Syr., in the sense of שְׂעִיָּעִי, —an interpretation which the

Targ., Jerome, the *Græc. Venet.*, and Luther have happily avoided ; for mention is not made here of what Wisdom is for Jahve, but of what she is in herself. The expression is to be judged after Ps. cix. 4 (cf. Gen. xii. 2), where Hitzig rightly translates, "I am wholly prayer;" but Böttcher, in a way characteristic of his mode of interpretation, prefers, "I am ointment" (*vid. Neue Aehrenlese*, No. 1222). The delight is meant which this mediating participation in God's creating work imparted to her—joy in the work in which she was engaged. The plural *עַמְּשֵׁי* is to be understood here, not after Jer. xxxi. 20, but after Isa. xi. 8, Ps. cxix. 70, where its root-word, the *Pilpel* *עַמְּשֵׁי* (proceeding from the primary meaning of caressing, *demulcere*), signifies intransitively: to have his delight somewhere or in anything, to delight oneself,—a synonym to the idea of play (cf. Aram. *עָשָׂה*, *Ethpe.* to play, *Ethpa.* to chatter); for play is in contrast to work, an occupation which has enjoyment in view. But the work, *i.e.* the occupation, which aims to do something useful, can also become a play if it costs no strenuous effort, or if the effort which it costs passes wholly into the background in presence of the pleasure which it yields. Thus Wisdom daily, *i.e.* during the whole course of creation, went forth in pure delight; and the activity with which she translated into fact the creative thoughts was a joyful noise in the sight of God, whose commands she obeyed with childlike devotion; cf. 2 Sam. vi. 21, where David calls his dancing and leaping before the ark of the covenant a *שִׁמְחָה לִפְנֵי ה'*. But by preference, her delight was in the world, which is illustrated from the Persian *Minokhired*, which personifies Wisdom, and, among other things, says of her: "The creation of the earth, and its mingling with water, the springing up and the growth of the trees, all the different colours, the odour, the taste, and that which is pleasing in everything—all that is chiefly the endowment and the performance of Wisdom."¹ She also there says that she was before all celestial and earthly beings, the first with Ormuzd, and that all that is celestial and earthly arose and also remains in existence by her. But the earth was the dearest object of her delight in the whole world; to help in establishing it (iii. 19) was her joyful occupation; to fashion it, and to provide it with the multiplicity of existences designed for it, was the most pleasant part of her creative activity. For the earth is the abode of man, and the heart-pleasure of Wisdom was with (*עִמָּה*, prep.)

¹ *Vid. Spiegel's Grammatik der Pûrsisprache*, p. 162, cf. 182.

the children of men; with them she found her high enjoyment, these were her peculiar and dearest sphere of activity.

Ver. 31. Since the statements of Wisdom, as to her participation in the creation of the world, are at this point brought to a close, in this verse there is set forth the intimate relation into which she thus entered to the earth and to mankind, and which she has continued to sustain to the present day. She turned her love to the earth for the sake of man, and to man not merely as a corporeal, but especially as a spiritual being, to whom she can disclose her heart, and whom, if he receives her, she can bring back to God (Book of Wisdom vii. 27). There are not here express references to Gen. i. or ii. In יום יום (day for day, as Gen. xxxix. 10, cf. Esth. ii. 4, יום יום) we have not to think of the six days of creation. But inasmuch as the whole description goes down to בְּנֵי אָדָם as its central-point, it denotes that creation came to its close and its goal in man. The connection of חַבֵּל אֶרֶץ is as Job xxxvii. 12, where אֶרֶץ for אֶרֶץ is wholly, as אֵלֶּה, חֲרָקָה, and the like, an original accusative.

Ver. 32. After that Wisdom has shown in vers. 22-31 how worthy her fellowship is of being an object of desire from her mediating place between God and the world, she begins with this verse (as vii. 24, v. 7) the hortatory (*paränetische*) concluding part of her discourse:

"And now, ye sons, hearken unto me,
And salvation to those who keep my ways!"

The LXX. omits ver. 33, and obviates the disturbing element of וְאֵשֶׁר, 32b, arising from its וְ, by a transposition of the stichs. But this וְאֵשֶׁר is the same as the *καὶ μακάριος*, Matt. xi. 6; the organic connection lies hid, as Schleiermacher (*Hermeneutik*, p. 73) well expresses it, in the mere sequence; the clause containing the proof is connected by וְ with that for which proof is to be assigned, instead of subordinating itself to it with כִּי. Such an exclamatory clause has already been met with in iii. 13; there אָדָם follows as the governed genitive, here a complete sentence (instead of the usual participial construction, נִשְׁמְרֵי דָרְכֵי) forms this genitive, Gesen. § 123, 3, Anm. 1.

The summons 32a, and its reason 32b, are repeated in these verses which follow:

33 "Hear instruction, and be wise,
And withdraw not.

- 34 Blessed is the man who hears me,
Watching daily at my gates,
Waiting at the posts of my doors!
35 For whosoever findeth me has found life,
And has obtained favour from Jahve;
36 And whosoever misseth me doeth wrong to himself;
All they who hate me love death."

The *imper.* וְחָכְמוּ, 33a (*et sapite*), is to be judged after iv. 4, וְחָיָה, cf. the *Chetlib*, xiii. 20; one sees this from the words וְאֶל-חַפְזֵי which follow, to which, after xv. 32, as at iv. 13, to וְאֶל-חַפְזֵי מִן הַיָּם is to be placed as object: and throw not to the winds (*ne missam faciat*; *vid.* regarding פָּרַע at i. 25), viz. instruction (*disciplinam*).

Ver. 34. The וְאֶשְׁרֵי here following שְׂמַעְי is related to it as assigning a motive, like the וְאֶשְׁרֵי (ver. 32b) following שְׂמַעְי; according to the Masora, we have to write אֶשְׁרֵי with *Mercha*, and on the first syllable *Gaja* (*vid.* Baer's *Torath Emeth*, pp. 26, 29; cf. under Ps. i. 1). לְשָׂקֵר signifies to watch, not in the sense of *ad vigilandum*, but *vigilando*, as Isa. v. 22, xxx. 1; Ewald, § 380d. In contradistinction to הָעֵיר and הָקִין, which denote watching as the consequence of wakefulness or an interruption of sleep, שָׂקֵר signifies watching as a condition, and that as one which a person willingly maintains (*Psychol.* p. 275), the intentional watching (cf. Arab. *shakidha*, to fix penetrating eyes upon anything), with עַל of the place and object and aim (Jer. v. 6; cf. הָעֵיר עַל, Job viii. 6). The plurals בְּלִהָוֹת (*fores*, as חֲמוּת, Jer. i. 18, *mænia*) and בְּהַחֲיִים are amplifying plur. of extension, suggesting the idea of a palace or temple; בְּזוֹת (*postes portæ, in quibus cardines ejus moventur*, from זָז, to move hither and thither) is intended to indicate that he to whom the discourse refers holds himself in closest nearness to the entrance, that he might not miss the moment when it is opened, or when she who dwells there presents herself to view. "The figure is derived from the service of a court: Wisdom is honoured by her disciples, as a queen or high patroness; cf. Samachschari's *Golden Necklaces*, Pr. 35: Blessed is the man who knocks only at God's door, and who departs not a nail's breadth from God's threshold" (Fl.).

Ver. 35. This verse gives the reason for pronouncing those happy who honour Wisdom. The *Chetlib* is בִּי מִצָּיִ מִצָּיִ חַיִּים, but the passing over into the sing. 35b is harsh and objectionable; the *Ker:* rightly regards the second מִצָּיִ as a mistaken repetition of the first, and substitutes בִּי מִצָּיִ מִצָּיִ חַיִּים, with which the וְהִמָּיָה (ver.

36a) of the antithesis agrees. Regarding *לֹא־יָצָא*, for which, less accurately, *לֹא־יָצָא* (only with the *Dechi* without *Metheg*) is generally written, *vid. Accentuationssystem*, vii. § 2. *יָצָא*, to get out = reach, exchanged with *יָצָא*, iii. 13 (*vid. there*); according to its etymon, it is connected with *יָצָא*, of him from or by whom one has reached anything; here, as xii. 2, xviii. 22, God's favour, *favorem a Jova impetravit*.

Ver. 36. *לֹא־יָצָא* may, it is true, mean "my sinning one = he who sins against me (*לֹא־יָצָא*)," as *יָצָא* is frequently equivalent to *עָלַי* *קָמַי*; but the contrast of *לֹא־יָצָא* places it beyond a doubt that *חָטָא* stands here in its oldest signification: to miss something after which one runs (xix. 2), seeks (Job v. 24), at which one shoots (*IIph. Judg. xx. 16*), etc., *id non attingere quod petitur*, Arab. *âkhta*, to miss, opposite to *âṣab*, to hit (Fl.). Just because it is the idea of missing, which, ethically applied, passes over into that of sin and guilt (of fault, mistake, false step, "*Fehls, Fehlers, Fehltritts*"), *חָטָא* can stand not only with the accusative of the subject in regard to which one errs, Lev. v. 16, but also with the accusative of the subject which one forfeits, *i.e.* misses and loses, xx. 2, cf. IIab. ii. 10; so that not only *חָטָא נַפְשִׁי*, xv. 32 (*animam suam nihili facit*), but also *חָטָא נַפְשִׁי*, xx. 2 (*animam suam pessumdat*), is synonymous with *חָטָא נַפְשִׁי* (*animæ suæ h. e. sibi ipsi injuriam facit*). Whoever misses Wisdom by taking some other way than that which leads to her, acts suicidally: all they who wilfully hate (*Piel*) wisdom love death, for wisdom is the tree of life, iii. 18; wisdom and life are one, 35a, as the Incarnate Wisdom saith, John viii. 51, "If a man keep my sayings, he shall never see death." In the Logos, Wisdom has her self-existence; in Him she has her personification, her justification, and her truth.

FIFTEENTH INTRODUCTORY MASHAL DISCOURSE, IX.

A DOUBLE INVITATION: THAT OF WISDOM, AND THAT OF HER RIVAL, FOLLY.

The preceding discourse pronounces those happy who, having taken their stand at the portal of Wisdom, wait for her appearance and her invitation. There is thus a house of Wisdom as there is a

house of God, Ps. lxxxiv. 11 ; and if now the discourse is of a house of Wisdom, and of an invitation to a banquet therein (like that in the parable, Matt. xxii., of the invitation to the marriage feast of the king's son), it is not given without preparation :

- 1 Wisdom hath builded for herself an house,
Hewn out her seven pillars ;
- 2 Hath slaughtered her beasts, mingled her wine ;
Hath also spread her table ;
- 3 Hath sent out her maidens ; she waiteth
On the highest points of the city.

Regarding חִכְמוֹת, *vid.* at i. 20. It is a *plur. excellentiæ*, which is a variety of the *plur. extensivus*. Because it is the expression of a plural unity, it stands connected (as for the most part also אֱלֹהִים, *Deus*) with the sing. of the predicate. The perfects enumerate all that Wisdom has done to prepare for her invitation. If we had a parable before us, the perf. would have run into the historical וַתַּשְׁלֵחַ; but it is, as the הִקְרִיא shows, an allegorical picture of the arrangement and carrying out of a present reality. Instead of בָּנְתָה לָּהּ בֵּית, there is בָּנְתָה בֵּיתָהּ, for the house is already in its origin represented as hers, and 1b is to be translated : she has hewn out her seven pillars (Hitzig); more correctly : her pillars, viz. seven (after the scheme רָעָה רָעָהָם, Gen. xxxvii. 2); but the construction is closer. שָׁבַע is, altogether like Ex. xxv. 37, the accusative of the second object, or of the predicate after the species of *verba*, with the idea : to make something, turn into something, which take to themselves a double accusative, Gesen. § 139, 2 : *excidit columnas suas ita ut septem essent*. Since the figure is allegorical, we may not dispense with the interpretation of the number seven by the remark, "No emphasis lies in the number" (Bertheau). First, we must contemplate architecturally the house with seven pillars : "They are," as Hitzig rightly remarks, "the pillars of the מִסְכָּתוֹ (porch) [*vid.* Bachmann under Judg. iii. 23, and Wetstein under Ps. cxliv. 12, where חָטַב is used of the cutting out and hewing of wood, as חָצַב of the cutting out and hewing of stone] in the inner court, which bore up the gallery of the first (and second) floors : four of these in the corners and three in the middle of three sides ; through the midst of these the way led into the court of the house-floor [the area]." But we cannot agree with Hitzig in maintaining that, with the seven pillars of viii. and ix., the author looks back to the first seven chapters (Arab. *ābwab*, gates) of this book ; we think other-

wise of the component members of this Introduction to the Book of Proverbs; and to call the sections of a book "gates, שַׁעֲרִים," is a late Arabico-Jewish custom, of which there is found no trace whatever in the O. T. To regard them also, with Heidenheim (cf. Dante's Prose Writings, translated by Streckfuss, p. 77), as representing the seven liberal arts (שִׁבְעַת חֻכְמוֹת) is impracticable; for this division of the *artes liberales* into seven, consisting of the *Trivium* (Grammar, Rhetoric, and Dialectics) and *Quadrivium* (Music, Arithmetic, Geometry, and Astronomy), is not to be looked for within the old Israelitish territory, and besides, these were the sciences of this world which were so divided; but wisdom, to which the discourse here refers, is wholly a religious-moral subject. The Midrash thinks of the seven heavens (שִׁבְעַת רִקְיעִים), or the seven climates or parts of the earth (שִׁבְעַת אֲרָצוֹת), as represented by them; but both references require artificial combinations, and have, as also the reference to the seven church-eras (Vitrunga and Chr. Ben. Michaelis), this against them, that they are rendered probable neither from these introductory proverbial discourses, nor generally from the O. T. writings. The patristic and middle-age reference to the seven sacraments of the church passes sentence against itself; but the old interpretation is on the right path, when it suggests that the seven pillars are the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost. The seven-foldness of the manifestation of the Spirit, already brought near by the seven lamps of the sacred candelabra (the מְנוֹרָה), is established by Isa. xi. 2 (*vid. l.c.*); and that Wisdom is the possessor and dispenser of the Spirit she herself testifies, i. 23. Her Spirit is the "Spirit of wisdom;" but at the same time, since, born of God, she is mediatrix between God and the world, also the "Spirit of Jahve." He is the "spirit of understanding," the "spirit of counsel," and the "spirit of might" (Isa. xi. 2); for she says, viii. 14, "Counsel is mine, and reflection; I am understanding, I have strength." He is also the "spirit of knowledge," and the "spirit of the fear of the Lord" (Isa. xi. 2); for fear and the knowledge of Jahve are, according to ix. 14, the beginning of wisdom, and essentially wisdom itself.

Ver. 2. If thus the house of Wisdom is the place of her fellowship with those who honour her, the system of arrangements made by her, so as to disclose and communicate to her disciples the fulness of her strength and her gifts, then it is appropriate to understand by the seven pillars the seven virtues of her nature

communicating themselves (apocalyptically expressed, the *ἐπὶ πνεύματα*), which bear up and adorn the dwelling which she establishes among men. Flesh and wine are figures of the nourishment for the mind and the heart which is found with wisdom, and, without asking what the flesh and the wine specially mean, are figures of the manifold enjoyment which makes at once strong and happy. The segolate *n. verbale* *טבח*, which vii. 22 denoted the slaughtering or the being slaughtered, signifies here, in the concrete sense, the slaughtered ox; Michaelis rightly remarks that *טבח*, in contradistinction to *זבח*, is the usual word for *mactatio extrasacrificialis*. Regarding *יין* *מסך*, *vid.* under Isa. v. 22; it is not meant of the mingling of wine with sweet scents and spices, but with water (warm or cold), and signifies simply to make the wine palatable (as *κερανύναι*, *temperare*); the LXX. *ἐκέρασεν εἰς κρατῆρα*, *κρατήρ* is the name of the vessel in which the mixing takes place; they drank not *ἄκρατον*, but *κεκρασμένον ἄκρατον*, Rev. xiv. 10. The frequently occurring phrase *עָרַךְ שֻׁלְחָן* signifies to prepare the table (from *שָׁלַח*, properly the unrolled and outspread leather cover), viz. by the placing out of the dishes (*vid.* regarding *עָרַךְ*, under Gen. xxii. 9).

Ver. 3. The verb *קָרָא*, when a feast is spoken of, means to invite; *קָרָאִים*, ver. 18 (cf. 1 Sam. ix. 13, etc.), are the guests. *יַעְרוּחֶיהָ* the LXX. translates *τοὺς ἐαυτῆς δούλους*, but certainly here the disciples are meant who already are in the service of Wisdom; but that those who are invited to Wisdom are thought of as feminine, arises from the tasteful execution of the picture. The invitation goes forth to be known to all far and wide, so that in her servants Wisdom takes her stand in the high places of the city. Instead of *בְּרָאשׁ*, viii. 2, i. 21, there is used here the expression *עַל-נָפִי*. We must distinguish the Semitic *נָפִי* (= *ganf*), wings, from *נָנָה* = *בָּנָה*, to cover, and *נָה* (= *gaff* or *ganf*), the bark, which is derived either from *נָהָה* or *נָהָה*, *جَنَف*, *convexus, incurvus et extrinsecus gibber fuit*, hence originally any surface bent outwards or become crooked (cf. the roots *cap*, *caf*, *נָה*, *נָה*, *נָה*, etc.), here the summit of a height (Fl.); thus not *super alis* (after the analogy of *πτερύγιον*, after Suidas = *ἀκρωτήριον*), but *super dorsis* (as in Lat. we say *dorsum montis*, and also *viv*).

Now follows the street-sermon of Wisdom inviting to her banquet:

- 4 " Who is simple? let him come hither!"
 Whoso wanteth understanding, to him she saith:
 5 " Come, eat of my bread,
 And drink of the wine which I have mingled!
 6 Cease, ye simple, and live,
 And walk straight on in the way of understanding."

The question *מִי פְתִי* (thus with *Munach*, not with *Makkeph*, it is to be written here and at ver. 16; *vid.* Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 40), *quis est imperitus*, is, as Ps. xxv. 12, only a more animated expression for *quisquis est*. The retiring into the background of the *נְעָרוֹת* (servants), and the immediate appearance of Wisdom herself, together with the interruption, as was to be expected, of her connected discourses by the *וְאָמְרָה לֹא*, are signs that the pure execution of the allegorical representation is here at an end. Hitzig seeks, by the rejection of vers. 4, 5, 7-10, to bring in a logical sequence; but these interpolations which he cuts out are yet far more inconceivable than the proverbial discourses in the mouth of Wisdom, abandoning the figure of a banquet, which besides are wholly in the spirit of the author of this book. That Folly invites to her, ver. 16, in the same words as are used by Wisdom, ver. 4, is not strange; both address themselves to the simple (*vid.* on *פְתִי* at i. 4) and those devoid of understanding (as the youth, vii. 7), and seek to bring to their side those who are accessible to evil as to good, and do not fully distinguish between them, which the emulating *devertat huc* of both imports. The fourth verse points partly backwards, and partly forwards; 4a has its introduction in the *תְּקַרָּה* of ver. 3; on the contrary, 4b is itself the introduction of what follows. The setting forth of the *nom. absolutus* *חֲסִירֵי לֵב* is conditioned by the form of 4a; the *מִי* (cf. 4a) is continued (in 4b) without its needing to be supplied: *excors* (= *si quis est excors*) *dicit ei* (not *dixit*, because syntactically subordinating itself to the *תְּקַרָּה*). It is a nominal clause, whose virtual predicate (the devoid of understanding is thus and thus addressed by her) is in ver. 16.

Ver. 5. The plur. of the address shows that the simple (inexperienced) and the devoid of understanding are regarded as essentially one and the same class of men. The *אֲחַר* after *לָהֶם* and *וְשָׂתֶה* proceeds neither from the idea of eating into (hewing into) anything, nor from the eating with anything, *i.e.* inasmuch as one makes use of it, nor of pampering oneself with anything (as *אֲחַר*); Michaelis at last makes a right decision (cf. Lev. xxii. 11, Judg.

xiii. 16, Job xxi. 25, and particularly אֶלֶּם , Ps. cxli. 4): *communicationem et participationem in re fruenda denotat*; the LXX. $\phi\acute{\alpha}\gamma\epsilon\tau\epsilon\ \tau\acute{\omega}\nu\ \epsilon\mu\acute{\omega}\nu\ \alpha\rho\tau\omega\upsilon\upsilon$. The attributive מִסְכָּתִי stands with backward reference briefly for מִסְכָּתִי . That Wisdom, ver. 2, offers flesh and wine, but here presents bread and wine, is no contradiction, which would lead us, with Hitzig, critically to reject vers. 4 and 5 as spurious; לֶחֶם is the most common, all-comprehensive name for nourishment. Bertheau suitably compares Jahve's invitation, Isa. lv. 1, and that of Jesus, John vi. 35.

Ver. 6. That פְּתָאִים is a plur. with abstract signification (according to which the four Greek and the two Aramæan translations render it; the *Græc. Venet.*, however, renders $\tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \nu\eta\pi\iota\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$) is improbable; the author forms the abstr. ver. 13 otherwise, and the expression here would be doubtful. For פְּתָאִים is here to be rendered as the object-accus.: leave the simple, i.e. forsake this class of men (Ahron b. Joseph; Umbreit, Zückler); or also, which we prefer (since it is always a singular thought that the "simple" should leave the "simple"), as the vocative, and so that עֲזָבֵנִי means not absolutely "leave off" (Hitzig), but so that the object to be thought of is to be taken from פְּתָאִים : give up, leave off, viz. the simple (Immanuel and others; on the contrary, Rashi, Meiri, and others, as Ewald, Bertheau, decide in favour of פְּתָאִים as *n. abstr.*). Regarding וְחַיִּי , for *et vivetis*, *vid.* iv. 4. The LXX., paraphrasing: $\epsilon\iota\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\varsigma\ \alpha\iota\omega\omicron\nu\alpha\ \beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\epsilon\upsilon\sigma\eta\tau\epsilon$. אֲשֶׁר is related to אֲשֶׁר (אֲשֶׁר) as דָּרַךְ to דָּרַךְ ; the *Piel*, not in its intrans. (*vid.* iv. 14) but in its trans. sense (Isa. i. 17, iii. 12, etc.), shows that the idea of going straight out and forwards connects itself therewith. The peculiarity of the פְּתִי is just the absence of character.

In what now follows the discourse of Wisdom is continued; wherefore she directs her invitation to the simple, i.e. those who have not yet decided, and are perhaps susceptible of that which is better:

- 7 "He who correcteth a scorner draweth upon himself insult;
And he who communicateth instruction to a scorner, it is a dishonour to him.
- 8 Instruct not a scorner, lest he hate thee;
Give instruction to the wise, so he will love thee.
- 9 Give to the wise, and he becomes yet wiser;
Give knowledge to the upright, and he gains in knowledge."

Zückler thinks that herewith the reason for the summons to the "simple" to forsake the fellowship of men of their own sort, is

assigned (he explains 6a as Ahron b. Joseph: (הפררו מן הפרהים); but his remark that, under the term "simple," mockers and wicked persons are comprehended as belonging to the same category, confounds two sharply distinguished classes of men. לץ is the freethinker who mocks at religion and virtue (*vid.* i. 22), and רשע the godless who shuns restraint by God and gives himself up to the unbridled impulse to evil. The course of thought in ver. 7 and onwards shows why Wisdom, turning from the wise, who already are hers, directs herself only to the simple, and those who are devoid of understanding: she must pass over the לץ and רשע, because she can there hope for no receptivity for her invitation; she would, contrary to Matt. vii. 6, "give that which is holy to the dogs, and cast her pearls before swine." יסר, παιδεύειν (with the prevailing idea of the bitter lesson of reproof and punishment), and הוכיח, ἐλέγχειν, are interchangeable conceptions, Ps. xciv. 10; the ל is here exponent of the object (to bring an accusation against any one), as ver. 8, xv. 12 (otherwise as Isa. ii. 4, xi. 4, where it is the *dat. commodi*: to bring unrighteousness to light, in favour of the injured). יסר לץ is pointed with *Mahpach* of the penultima, and thus with the tone thrown back. The *Pasek*, placed in some editions between the two words, is masoretically inaccurate. He who reads the moral to the mocker brings disgrace to himself; the incorrigible replies to the goodwill with insult. Similar to the לץ here, is מרים *tollit* = *reportat*, iii. 35, iv. 27. In 7b מומו is by no means the object governed by גמולתו: and he who shows to the godless his fault (Meiri, Arama, Löwenstein: על-מומו = מומו, and thus also the *Græc. Venet.* μῶμον ἐαυτῷ, *scil.* λαμβάνει); plainly מומו is parallel with קלן. But מומו does not also subordinate itself to לץ as to the object. parallel קלן: *maculam sibi met scil. acquirit*; for, to be so understood, the author ought at least to have written מומו לץ. Much rather מומו is here, as at Deut. xxxii. 5, appos., thus pred. (Hitzig), without needing anything to be supplied: his blot it is, viz. this proceeding, which is equivalent to מומו הוא ליה (Targ.), *opprobrio ipsi est*. Zöckler not incorrectly compares Ps. cxv. 7 and Eccles. v. 16, but the expression (*macula ejus = ipsi*) lies here less remote from our form of expression. In other words: Whoever correcteth the mockers has only to expect hatred (אל-תוכח) with the tone thrown back, according to rule; cf., on the contrary, Judg. xviii. 25), but on the other hand, love from the wise.

Ver. 8. The ו in וְיֵאָהֲבֶךָ is that of consequence (*apodosis imperativi*): so he will love thee (as also Ewald now translates), not: that he may love thee (Syr., Targ.), for the author speaks here only of the consequence, not of something else, as an object kept in view. The exhortation influences the mocker less than nothing, so much the more it bears fruit with the wise. Thus the proverb is confirmed *habenti dabitur*, Matt. xiii. 12, xxv. 29.

Ver. 9. If anything is to be supplied to לָקַח, it is לָקַח (iv. 2); but חָן, *tradere, παραδιδόναι*, is of itself correlat. of לָקַח, *accipere* (post-bibl. קָבַל), *παραλαμβάνειν*, e.g. Gal. i. 9. לָקַח = to communicate knowledge, דַּעַת, follows the analogy of לָקַח, to impart instruction, הוֹכִיחַ. Regarding the jussive form וְיִסְפֶּךָ in the *apod. imper.*, vid. Gesen. § 128, 2. Observe in this verse the interchange of חָכֶם and צֶדֶק! Wisdom is not merely an intellectual power, it is a moral quality; in this is founded her receptivity of instruction, her embracing of every opportunity for self-improvement. She is humble; for, without self-will and self-sufficiency, she makes God's will her highest and absolutely binding rule (iii. 7).

These words naturally follow:

10 "The beginning of wisdom is the fear of Jahve,
And the knowledge of the Holy One is understanding."

This is the highest principle of the Chokma, which stands (i. 7) as a motto at the beginning of the Book of Proverbs. The LXX. translate רֵאשִׁית there (i. 7), and תְּהִלָּת here, by ἀρχή. Gusset distinguishes the two synonyms as *pars optima* and *primus actus*; but the former denotes the fear of God as that which stands in the uppermost place, to which all that Wisdom accomplishes subordinates itself; the latter as that which begins wisdom, that which it proposes to itself in its course. With יְהוָה is interchanged, ii. 5, אֱלֹהִים, as here קְדֹשִׁים, as the internally multiplicative plur. (Dietrich, *Abhandlungen*, pp. 12, 45), as xxx. 3, Josh. xxiv. 9, Hos. xii. 1, of God, the "Holy, holy, holy" (Isa. vi. 3), i.e. Him who is absolutely Holy. Michaelis inaccurately, following the ancients, who understood not this non-numerical plur.: *cognitio quæ sanctos facit et sanctis propria est*. The דַּעַת, parallel with יִרְאַת, is meant of lively practical operative knowledge, which subordinates itself to this All-holy God as the normative but unapproachable pattern.

Ver. 11. The singular reason for this proverb of Wisdom is now given:

“ For by me will thy days become many,
And the years of thy life will be increased.”

Incorrectly Hitzig: “and years of life will increase to thee;” הוֹסִיף is always and everywhere (*e.g.* also Job xxxviii. 11) transitive. In the similar passage, iii. 2, יוֹסִיפוֹ had as its subject the doctrine of Wisdom; here חכמה and בינה it is not practicable to interpret as subj., since 11a Wisdom is the subject discoursing—the expression follows the scheme, *dicunt eos = dicuntur*, as *e.g.* Job vii. 3; Gesen. § 137—a concealing of the operative cause, which lies near, where, as ii. 22, the discourse is of severe judgment, thus: they (*viz.* the heavenly Powers) will grant to thee years of life (יָמִים in a pregnant sense, as iii. 2) in rich measure, so that constantly one span comes after another. But in what connection of consequence does this stand with the contents of the proverb, ver. 10? The ancients say that the clause with כִּי refers back to ver. 5 f. The vers. 7–10 (according also to Fl.) are, as it were, parenthetic. Hitzig rejects these verses as an interpolation, but the connection of ver. 11 with 5 f. retains also something that is unsuitable: “steps forward on the way of knowledge, for by me shall thy days become many;” and if, as Hitzig supposes, ver. 12 is undoubtedly genuine, whose connection with ver. 11 is in no way obvious, then also will the difficulty of the connection of vers. 7–10 with the preceding and the succeeding be no decisive mark of the want of genuineness of this course of thought. We have seen how the progress of ver. 6 to 7 is mediated: the invitation of Wisdom goes forth to the receptive, with the exclusion of the irrecoverable. And ver. 11 is related to ver. 10, as the proof of the cause from the effect. It is the fear of God with which Wisdom begins, the knowledge of God in which above all it consists, for by it is fulfilled the promise of life which is given to the fear of God, x. 27, xiv. 27, xix. 23, cf. Deut. iv. 40, and to humility, which is bound up with it, x. 17.

Ver. 12. This wisdom, resting on the fear of God, is itself a blessing to the wise:

“ If thou art wise, thou art wise for thyself;
And if thou mockest, thou alone shalt bear it.”

The LXX., with the Syr., mangle the thought of 12a, for they translate: if thou art wise for thyself, so also thou wilt be wise for thy neighbour. The *dat. commodi* הֵלֵךְ means that it is for the personal advantage of the wise to be wise. The contrast expressed

by Job xxii. 2 f.: not profitable to God, but to thyself (Hitzig), is scarcely intended, although, so far as the accentuation is antithetic, it is the nearest. The perf. **הִלָּצָה** is the hypothetical; Gesen. § 126, 1. To bear anything, viz. anything sinful (**חַטָּא** or **עָוֹן**), is equivalent to, to atone for it, Job xxxiv. 2, cf. Num. ix. 13, Ezek. xxiii. 35. Also 12b is a contrast scarcely aimed at. Wisdom is its own profit to man; libertinism is its own disgrace. Man decides, whenever he prefers to be wise, or to be a mocker of religion and of virtue, regarding his own weal and woe. With this *nota bene* the discourse of Wisdom closes.

The poet now brings before us another figure, for he personifies Folly working in opposition to Wisdom, and gives her a feminine name, as the contrast to Wisdom required, and thereby to indicate that the seduction, as the 13th proverbial discourse (chap. vii.) has shown, appears especially in the form of degraded womanhood:

- 13 The woman Folly [*Frau Thorheit*] conducts herself boisterously,
Wantonness, and not knowing anything at all;
- 14 And hath seated herself at the door of her house,
On a seat high up in the city,
- 15 To call to those who walk in the way,
Who go straight on their path.

The connection of **אִשָּׁת בְּכִלְיוֹת** is genitival, and the genitive is not, as in **אִשָּׁת רָע**, vi. 24, specifying, but appositional, as in **בְּחִיצִין** (*vid.* under Isa. i. 8). **הוֹטִיָּה** [boisterous] is pred., as vii. 11: her object is sensual, and therefore her appearance excites passionately, overcoming the resistance of the mind by boisterousness. In 13b it is further said who and how she is. **בְּתִיָּה** she is called as wantonness personified. This abstract **בְּתִיָּה**, derived from **בָּתִּי**, must be vocalized as **אֶבְתִּירִיָּה**; Hitzig thinks it is written with *a* on account of the following *u* sound, but this formation always ends in *ijjûth*, not *ajjûth*. But as from **הָיָה** as well **הָיִין** = **הָיִין** as **הָיִין** is formed, so from **בָּתִּיָּה** as well **בְּתִיָּה** like **הָיִין**, or **בְּתִיָּה** like **לָוִיָּה**, as **רָעִיָּה**, as **בְּתִיָּה** (instead of which **בְּתִיָּה** is preferred) can be formed; Kimchi rightly (*Michlol* 181a) presents the word under the form **בְּעִלְיָה**. With **וּבָלָה** (xiv. 7) poetic, and stronger than **לָא**, the designation of the subject is continued; the words **וּבְלִי־רָעָה פֶּה** (thus with *Mercha* and without *Makkeph* following, **רָעָה** is to be written, after Codd. and old editions) have the value of an adjective: and not knowing anything at all (**לֹא יָדָעָה**, as Num. xxiii. 3, Job xiii. 13, and here in the negative clause, as in prose **לֹא יָדָעָה**), i.e. devoid of

all knowledge. The Targ. translates explanatorily: not recognising טַבָּתָא, the good; and the LXX. substitutes: she knows not shame, which, according to Hitzig, supposes the word בִּלְטָה, approved of by him; but כלמה means always *pudefactio*, not *pudor*. To know no כלמה would be equivalent to, to let no shaming from without influence one; for shamelessness the poet would have made use of the expression וּבִלְיִירָעָה בִּשְׁתָּה. In וַיִּשְׁכַּח the declaration regarding the subject beginning with הוֹמִיָּה is continued: Folly also has a house in which works of folly are carried on, and has set herself down by the door (לְפֶתַח as לָפִי, viii. 3) of this house; she sits there עַל־כִּפֶּא. Most interpreters here think on a throne (LXX. ἐπὶ δίφρου, used especially of the *sella curulis*); and Zückler, as Umbreit, Hitzig, and others, connecting genitiv. therewith מִרְמֵי קִרְתָּ, changes in 14b the scene, for he removes the "high throne of the city" from the door of the house to some place elsewhere. But the sitting is in contrast to the standing and going on the part of Wisdom on the streets preaching (Evagrius well renders: *in molli ignavaque sella*); and if כִּפֶּא and house-door are named along with each other, the former is a seat before the latter, and the accentuation rightly separates by *Mugrash* כִּפֶּא from מִרְמֵי קִרְתָּ. "According to the accents and the meaning, מִרְמֵי קִרְתָּ is the *acc. loci*: on the high places of the city, as viii. 2 f." (Fl.) They are the high points of the city, to which, as Wisdom, ver. 3, viii. 2, so also Folly, her rival (wherefore Ecces. x. 6 does not appertain to this place), invites followers to herself. She sits before her door to call לְעֹבְרֵי דֶרֶךְ (with *Munach*, as in Cod. 1294 and old editions, without the *Makkeph*), those who go along the way (genitive connection with the supposition of the accusative construction, *transire viam*, as ii. 7), to call (invite) הַמְּיָשָׁרִים (to be pointed with ט *raphatum* and *Gaja* going before, according to Ben-Asher's rule; *vid. Methegsetz.* § 20), those who make straight their path, i.e. who go straight on, directly before them (cf. Isa. lvii. 2). The participial construction (the schemes *amans Dei* and *amans Deum*), as well as that of the verb קָרָא (first with the dat. and then with the accus.), interchange.

The woman, who in her own person serves as a sign to her house, addresses those who pass by in their innocence (לְתָפִים, 2 Sam. xv. 11):

16 "Whoso is simple, let him turn in hither!"

And if any one is devoid of understanding, she saith to him:

17 "Stolen waters taste sweet,
And the bread of secrecy is pleasant."

פְּתִי (folly, simplicity) has a side accessible to good and its contrary : Wisdom is connected with the one side, and Folly with the other. And as the חֶסֶד-לֵב offers a *vacuum* to Wisdom which may perhaps be filled with the right contents, so is this *vacuum* welcome to Folly, because it meets there no resistance. In this sense, ver. 16 is like ver. 4 (excepting the addition of a connecting and of a concluding וְ: *et si quis excors, tum dicit ei*) ; the word is the same in both, but the meaning, according to the two speakers, is different. That to which they both invite is the pleasure of her fellowship, under the symbol of eating and drinking ; in the one case it is intellectual and spiritual enjoyment, in the other sensual. That Wisdom offers (ix. 5) bread and wine, and Folly water and bread, has its reason in this, that the particular pleasure to which the latter invites is of a sensual kind ; for to drink water out of his own or out of another fountain is (iii. 15-20) the symbol of intercourse in married life, or of intercourse between the unmarried, particularly of adulterous intercourse. מַיִם זָנוּיִם (correct texts have it thus, without the *Makkeph*) is sexual intercourse which is stolen from him who has a right thereto, thus carnal intercourse with אִשָּׁת אֵישׁ ; and כְּתָרִים לֶחֶם קְתָרִים, which, because it is contrary to the law, must seek (cf. *furtum*, secret love intrigue) concealment (סְתָרִים, extensive plur., as מַעְמָקִים ; Böttcher, § 694). Just such pleasure, after which one wipes his mouth as if he had done nothing (xxx. 20), is for men who are without wisdom sweet (מֶדֶק, Job xx. 12) and pleasant ; the prohibition of it gives to such pleasure attraction, and the secrecy adds seasoning ; and just such enjoyments the כְּסִילוֹת, personified carnality, offers. But woe to him who, befooled, enters her house !

He goes within :

18 And he knows not that the dead are there ;
In the depths of Hades, her guests.

How near to one another the house of the adulteress and Hades are, so that a man passes through the one into the other, is already stated in ii. 18, vii. 28. Here, in the concluding words of the introduction to the Book of Proverbs, addressed to youth, and for the most part containing warnings against sinful pleasures, these two further declarations are advanced : the company assembled in the house of lewdness consists of רְפָאִים, i.e. (cf. p. 83) the old, worn-out, who are only in appearance living, who have gone down

to the seeming life of the shadowy existence of the kingdom of the dead; her (בסיליה) invited ones (cf. vii. 26, her slaughtered ones) are in the depths of Hades (not in the valleys, as Umbreit, Löwenstein, and Ewald translate, but in the depths, Aquila, Symmachus, Theodotion, ἐπὶ τοῖς βαθέσι; for עֲמָקִי is not only plur. to עֲמָק, but also *per metaplasmum* to עֲמָק, xxv. 3, as אֲמָרִי to אֲמָר, thus in תַּחְתִּיתִּי (Deut. xxxii. 22); they have forsaken the fellowship of the life and of the love of God, and have sunk into the deepest destruction. The house of infamy into which Folly allures does not only lead to hell, it is hell itself; and they who permit themselves to be thus befooled are like wandering corpses, and already on this side of death are in the realm of wrath and of the curse.¹

FIRST COLLECTION OF SOLOMONIC PROVERBS, X.-XXII. 16.

The superscription, מִשְׁלֵי שְׁלֹמֹה, here shows that now we have reached that which the title of the book, i. 1-6, presented to view. Here we have the commencement of that collection of Solomonic Proverbs which under this title forms, together with the introduction, i. 7-ix., the Older Book of Proverbs. The introduction is disproportionately long. It is the manner of the editor to extend himself in length and breadth; and besides, an educational zeal in behalf of youth, and his aim, which was without doubt to put them on their guard against certain prevailing moral evils of his time, make him thus persuasive; and if he detains his readers so long from the proper Solomonic Proverbs, yet this might be excused from the circumstance, that though his introduction does not strictly consist of Proverbs of Solomon, yet it consists of proverbs after the manner of Solomon, *i.e.* of proverbs which, as to their contents and form, take their structure from the pattern of those of Solomonic authorship.

In this introduction, i.-ix., there are larger sections of interconnected thoughts having one common aim. Even in vi. 1-19 there are manifestly three proverbial discourses distinguished from one another, shorter indeed, yet containing one fundamental thought.

¹ The LXX. has considerable additions introduced after ver. 18, as also after ver. 12, of which we shall elsewhere speak.

Such proverbs as are primarily designed to form one completed little whole of themselves, are not here to be met with. On the contrary, the Solomonic collection which now follows consists of pure distichs, for the most part antithetical, but at the same time going over all the forms of the technical proverb, as we have already shown; *vid.* p. 16. Accordingly the exposition must from this point onward renounce reproduced combinations of thought. The succession of proverbs here is nevertheless not one that is purely accidental or without thought; it is more than a happy accident when three of the same character stand together; the collector has connected together proverb with proverb according to certain common characteristics (Bertheau). And yet more than that: the mass separates itself into groups, not merely succeeding one another, but because a certain connection of ideas connects together a number of proverbs, in such a way that the succession is broken, and a new point of departure is arrived at (Hitzig). There is no comprehensive plan, such as Oetinger in his summary view of its contents supposes; the progressive unfolding follows no systematic scheme, but continuously wells forth. But that the editor, whom we take also to be the arranger of the contents of the book, did not throw them together by good chance, but in placing them together was guided by certain reasons, the very first proverb here shows, for it is chosen in conformity with the design of this book, which is specially dedicated to youth:

- 1 A wise son maketh glad his father;
A foolish son is his mother's grief.

One sees here quite distinctly (cf. Hos. xiii. 13) that עָבֵר (from עָבַר, properly to be thick, stout, solid, as *πικνός* = *σφοδός*) is primarily a practical and ethical conception. Similar proverbs are found further on, but consisting of synonymous parallel members, in which either the father both times represents the parents, as xvii. 21, xxiii. 24, or father and mother are separated, each being named in different members, as xvii. 25, xxiii. 25, and particularly xv. 20, where 20a = 1a of the above proverb. It is incorrect to say, with Hitzig, that this contrast draws the division after it: the division lies nearer in the synonymous distichs, and is there less liable to be misunderstood than in the antithetic. Thus, from this proverb before us, it might be concluded that grief on account of a befooled son going astray in bypaths, and not coming to the right way, falls principally on the mother, as (Sir. iii. 9) is often the

case in unfortunate marriages. The idea of the parents is in this way only separated, and the two members stand in suppletive interchangeable relationship. וְיִשְׁמַח is the middle of the clause, and is the usual form in connection; וְיִשְׁמַח is the pausal form. וְיִשְׁמַח from וְיִשְׁמַח (ינה), has *pass.* \hat{u} , as וְיִשְׁמַח , *act.* \hat{o} . "The expression of the *pred.* 1b is like iii. 17, viii. 6, x. 14 f.; cf. e.g. Arab. *âlastakṣa furkat*, oversharpening is dividing, i.e. effects it [inquiries become or lead to separation] (cf. our proverb, *Allzuscharf macht schartig* = too much sharpening makes full of notches); Burckhardt, *Sprüchw.* Nr. 337" (Fl.).

Ver. 2. There follows now a series of proverbs which place possessions and goods under a moral-religious point of view:

Treasures of wickedness bring no profit;
But righteousness delivers from death.

The LXX. and Aquila translate ἀνόμους (ἀσεβείς) . וְיִשְׁמַח (to profit) with the accus. is possible, Isa. lvii. 12, but וְיִשְׁמַח one does not use by itself; it requires a genitive designating it more closely. But also וְיִשְׁמַח of the Targ., *παρὰ νόμων* of Symmachus, fails; for the question still remains, to whom? Rightly Syr., Jerome, Theodotion, and the Quinta: *ἀσεβείας*, cf. iv. 17, Mic. iv. 10; Luke xvi. 9, *μαμωνᾶς τῆς ἀδικίας*. Treasures to which wickedness cleaves profit not, viz. him who has collected them through wickedness. On the contrary, righteousness saves from death (2b = xi. 4b, where the parallelism makes it clear that death as a judgment is meant). In Deut. xxiv. 13 it had been already said that compassionate love is "righteousness before the Lord," the cardinal virtue of the righteousness of life. Faith (Hab. ii. 4) is its soul, and love its life. Therefore *δικαιοσύνη* and *ἐλεημοσύνη* are interchangeable ideas; and it ought not to be an objection against the Apocrypha that it repeats the above proverb, *ἐλεημοσύνη ἐκ θανάτου ῥύεται*, Tob. iv. 10, xii. 9, Sir. iii. 30, xxix. 12, for Dan. iv. 24 also says the very same thing, and the thought is biblical, in so far as the giving of alms is understood to be not a dead work, but (Ps. cxii. 9) the life-activity of one who fears God, and of a mind believing in Him and resting in His word.

Ver. 3. Another proverb, the members of which stand in chiasmic relation to those of the preceding:

Jahve does not suffer the soul of the righteous to hunger;
But the craving of the godless He disappointeth.

The thought is the same as xiii. 25. There, as also at vi. 30, the

soul is spoken of as the faculty of desire, and that after nourishment, for the lowest form of the life of the soul is the impulse to self-preservation. The parallel חַיָּה , in which LXX. and Ar. erroneously find the meaning of חַיָּה , life, the Syr. Targ. the meaning of חַיָּה , possession, means the desire, without however being related to חַיָּה (Berth.); it is the Arab. *hawān*, from חַיָּה , Arab. *haway*, which, from the fundamental meaning $\chi\alpha\iota\upsilon\epsilon\upsilon$, *hiare*, to gape, yawn, signifies not only unrestrained driving along, and crashing overthrow (cf. xi. 6, xix. 13), but also the breaking forth, *ferri in aliquid*, whence חַיָּה , Arab. *hawān*, violent desire, in Hebr. generally (here and Ps. lii. 9, Mic. vii. 3) of desire without limits and without restraint (cf. the plur. *āhawā*, arbitrary actions, caprices); the meanings deduced from this important verbal stem (of which also חַיָּה , חַיָּה , *accidere*, and then *esse*, at least after the Arabic conception of speech, is an offshoot) are given by Fleischer under Job xxxvii. 6, and after Fleischer by Ethé, *Schlafgemach der Phantasie*, ii. p. 6f. The verb חַיָּה signifies to push in the most manifold shades, here to push forth, *repellere*, as 2 Kings iv. 27 (cf. Arab. *hadhaf*, to push off = to discharge); the fut. is invariably חַיָּה , like חַיָּה . God gives satisfaction to the soul of the righteous, viz. in granting blessings. The desire of the wicked He does not suffer to be accomplished; it may appear for a long time as if that which was aimed at was realized, but in the end God pushes it back, so that it remains at a distance, because contrary to Him. Instead of וְהוּא רָשָׁעִים , some editions (Plantin 1566, Bragadin 1615) have וְהוּא רָשָׁעִים , but, in opposition to all decided testimony, only through a mistaken reference to xi. 6.

Ver. 4. There follow two proverbs which say how one man fails and another succeeds:

He becomes poor who bears a sluggish hand;
But the hand of the diligent maketh rich.

These three proverbs, xix. 15, xii. 24, 27, are similar. From the last two it is seen that רָמִיָּה is a subst., as also from Ps. cxx. 2 f. (לִשְׁוֹן רָמִיָּה , from a crafty tongue) that it is an adjunct., and from Lev. xiv. 15 f. (where רָמִיָּה is fem.) that it may be at the same time an adjunct. here also. The masc. is רָמִי , like טָרִיָּה , but neither of these occur; "the fundamental idea is that of throwing oneself down lazily, when one with unbent muscles holds himself no longer erect and stretched, Arab. *taramy*" (Fl.). The translation: deceitful balances (Löwenstein after Rashi), is contrary to biblical usage,

which knows nothing of כף in this Mishnic meaning. But if כף is here regarded as fem., then it cannot be the subject (Jerome, *egestatem operata est manus remissa*), since we read עֲטָה, not עָטָה. But ראש also is not suitable as the subject (LXX., Syr., Targ.), for poverty is called רֵשׁ, רֵשׁ, רֵשׁ; on the contrary, רֵשׁ, plur. רֵשִׁים or רֵאשִׁים, is used adjectively. Since now the adjct. רֵשׁ, 1 Sam. xii. 14, is also written ראש, it may be translated: Poor is he who . . . (Bertheau); but we much rather expect the statement of that which happens to such an one, thus: Poor will he be . . . ראש, 3 *præt.* = רֵשׁ, Ps. xxxiv. 11, with the same (grammatically incorrect) full writing as קאם, Hos. x. 14. In the conception of the subject, כְּפִירְמִיָּה, after Jer. xlviii. 10, is interpreted as the accus. of the manner (Berth.: whoever works with sluggish hand); but since עֲטָה רְמִיָּה (in another sense indeed: to practise cunning) is a common phrase, Ps. lii. 4, ci. 7, so also will כְּפִירְמִיָּה be regarded as the object: *qui agit manum remissam*, whoever carries or moves such a hand (Hitzig). In 4b working is placed opposite to bearing: the diligent hand makes rich, *ditat* or *divitias parit*; but not for itself (Gesen. and others: becomes rich), but for him who bears it. The diligent man is called חָרִיץ, from חָרַץ, to sharpen, for, as in ὀξύς, *acer*, sharpness is transferred to energy; the form is the same as חֲלוּק, smooth (for the *ā* is unchangeable, because recompensative), a kindred form to קטול like חֲמוּץ, and Arab. *fā'ûl* as *fashawsh*, a boaster, wind-bag, either of active (as חָרַץ, חֲלוּק) or (as עֲפֹר, חָרִיץ, חֲלוּק) of passive signification.

Ver. 5. There is now added a proverb which, thus standing at the beginning of the collection, and connecting itself with ver. 1, stamps on it the character of a book for youth:

He that gathereth in summer is a wise son;
But he that is sunk in sleep in the time of harvest is a son that
causeth shame.

Von Hofmann (*Schriftb.* ii. 2. 403) rightly interprets בֶּן מִטְבִּיל and בֶּן מִכְרִשׁ, with Cocceius and others, as the subject, and not with Hitzig as predicate, for in nominal clauses the rule is to place the predicate before the subject; and since an accurate expression of the inverted relation would both times require הוא referring to the subject, so we here abide by the usual syntax: he that gathers in summer time is . . . Also the relation of the members of the sentence, xix. 26, is a parallel from which it is evident that the misguided son is called מְבִישׁ as causing shame, although in הַבִּישׁ

the idea to put to shame (=to act so that others are ashamed) and to act shamefully (disgracefully), as in השביל the ideas to have insight and to act intelligently, lie into one another (cf. xiv. 35); the root-meaning of השביל is determined after שִׁבַּל, which from שָׂבַל, *complicare*, designates the intellect as the faculty of intellectual configuration. בּוֹשׁ, properly *disturbari*, proceeds from a similar conception as the Lat. *confundi* (*pudore*). קָיִן and קָצִיר fall together, for קָיִן (from קָיִן = קָא, to be glowing hot) is just the time of the קָצִיר; *vid.* under Gen. viii. 22. To the activity of a thoughtful ingathering, אָגַר, for a future store (*vid.* vi. 7), stands opposed deep sleep, *i.e.* the state of one sunk in idleness. נָרַם means, as Schultens has already shown, *somno penitus obrui, omni sensu obstructo et oppilato quasi*, from נָרַם, to fill, to shut up, to conclude; the derivation (which has been adopted since Gesenius) from the Arab. word having the same sound, رَم, *stridere*, to shrill, to rattle (but not *sternere*, to snore), lies remote in the *Niph.*, and also contradicts the usage of the word, according to which it designates a state in which all free activity is bound, and all reference to the external world is interrupted; cf. תָּרַחֲמָה, xix. 15, of dulness, apathy, somnolency in the train of slothfulness. The LXX. has here one distich more than the Hebr. text.

Ver. 6. There now follow two proverbs regarding the blessings and the curses which come to men, and which flow forth from them. Here, however, as throughout, we take each proverb by itself, that it might not appear as if we had a tetrastich before us. The first of these two antithetic distichs is:

Blessings (come) on the head of the just;
But violence covereth the mouth of the godless.

Blessings are, without being distinguished, bestowed as well as prayed for from above. Regarding the undistinguished uses of בְּרָאָה (of a recompense of reward), בְּרָאָה (of penal recompense), and עֲלִירָאָה (especially of punishment), *vid.* under Gen. xlix. 26. If we understand, with Ewald, Bertheau, Elster, Zöckler, and others, the two lines after ver. 11, xix. 28, cf. x. 18: the mouth of the wicked covers (hides under a mask) violence, inasmuch as he speaks words of blessing while thoughts of malediction lurk behind them (Ps. lxii. 5), then we renounce the sharpness of the contrast. On the contrary, it is preserved if we interpret וַיִּפֹּךְ as object: the violence that has gone out from it covereth the mouth

of the wicked, *i.e.* it falls back upon his foul mouth; or as Fleischer (and Oetinger almost the same) paraphrases it: the deeds of violence that have gone forth from them are given back to them in curses and maledictions, so that going back they stop, as it were, their mouth, they bring them to silence; for it is unnecessary to take פִּי synecdochically for פָּנֵי (cf. *e.g.* Ps. lxi. 8), since in פְּרִכּוֹת 6a are perhaps chiefly meant blessings of thankful acknowledgment on the part of men, and the giving prominence to the mouth of the wicked from which nothing good proceeds is well accounted for. The parallels do not hinder us thus to explain, since parts of proverbs repeating themselves in the Book of Proverbs often show a change of the meaning (*vid.* p. 24 f.). Hitzig's conjecture, יִכְפֶּה (better יִכְפֶּה), is unnecessary; for elsewhere we read, as here, that חַמַּס (violence), *jure talionis*, covers, יִכְפֶּה, the wicked, Hab. ii. 17, or that he, using "violence," therewith covers the whole of his external appearance, *i.e.* gives to it the branded impress of the unrighteousness he has done (*vid.* Köhler under Mal. ii. 16).

Ver. 7. Thus, as ver. 6 says how it goes with the righteous and the wicked in this life, so this verse tells how it fares with them after death:

The memory of the righteous remains in blessings,
And the name of the godless rots.

The tradition regarding the writing of זָכַר with five (זִכָּר) or six points (זִכְר) is doubtful (*vid.* Heidenheim in his ed. of the Pentateuch, *Me'or Enajim*, under Ex. xvii. 14); the Cod. 1294 and old printed copies have here זִכָּר. Instead of לְבָרָהּ, יִבְרָהּ might be used; the phrase הִיא לְקִלְלָה (*opp.* הִיא לְבָרָה, often used by Jeremiah), subordinate to the substantival clause, paraphrases the passive, for it expresses a growing to something, and thus the entrance into a state of endurance. The remembrance of the righteous endures after his death, for he is thought of with thankfulness (זִכָּר = זִכְרָה, the usual appendix to the name of an honoured, beloved man who has died), because his works, rich in blessing, continue; the name of the godless, on the contrary, far from continuing fresh and green (Ps. lxii. 17) after his departure, becomes corrupt (רָקַב, from רָק, to be or to become thin, to dissolve in fine parts, *tabescere*), like a worm-eaten decayed tree (Isa. xl. 20). The Talmud explains it thus, *Joma* 38b: foulness comes over their name, so that we call no one after their name. Also the idea suggests itself, that his name becomes corrupt, as it were, with his

bones; the Mishna, at least *Ohaloth* ii. 1, uses דָּבָר of the dust of corruption.

Ver. 8. There follows now a series of proverbs in which reference to sins of the mouth and their contrary prevails:

He that is wise in heart receives precepts;

But he that is of a foolish mouth comes to ruin.

אִישׁ לֵב, wise-hearted, is one whose heart is דָּבָר, xxiii. 15; in a word, a נָבוֹן, a person of understanding or judgment, xvi. 21. Such an one does not make his own knowledge the *ne plus ultra*, nor does he make his own will the *noli me tangere*; but he takes commands, i.e. instructions directing or prohibiting, to which he willingly subordinates himself as the outflow of a higher knowledge and will, and by which he sets bounds and limits to himself. But a fool of the lips, i.e. a braggart blunderer, one pleasing himself with vain talk (xiv. 23), falls prostrate, for he thinks that he knows all things better, and will take no pattern; but while he boasts himself from on high, suddenly all at once—for he offends against the fundamental principle of common life and of morality—he comes to lie low down on the ground. The Syr. and Targ. translate לֵב by, he is caught (Bertheau, ensnared); Aquila, Vulgate, Luther, δαρήσεται, he is slain; Symmachus, βασανισθήσεται; but all without any support in the usage of the language known to us. Theodotion, φυρήσεται, he is confounded, is not tenable; Joseph Kimchi, who after David Kimchi, under Hos. iv. 14, appeals in support of this meaning (יִשְׁחַבֵּט, similarly Parchon: יִחְבֵּל) to the Arabic, seems to think on *iltibās*, confusion. The demonstrable meanings of the verb לָבַט are the following: 1. To occasion trouble. Thus *Mechilta*, under Ex. xvii. 14, לָבַטוֹ, one has imposed upon him trouble; *Sifri*, under Num. xi. 1, נִחְלַבְטוּ, we are tired, according to which Rashi: he fatigues himself, but which fits neither to the subj. nor to the contrast, which is to be supposed. The same may be said of the meaning of the Syr. لَبَط, to drive on, to press, which without doubt accords with the former meaning of the word in the language of the Midrash. 2. In Arab. *labat* (R. *lab*, vid. Wünsche's *Hos.* p. 172), to throw any one down to the earth, so that he falls with his whole body his whole length; the passive وَلَبِט, to be thus thrown down by another, or to throw oneself thus down, figuratively of one who falls hopelessly into evil and destruction (Fl.). The Arabic verb is also used of the springing run of the animal ridden on (to gallop), and of the being lame (to hop), according to

which in the Lex. the explanations, he hurries, or he wavers hither and thither, are offered by Kimchi (*Græc. Venet. πλανηθήσεται*). But the former of these explanations, *corruit* (= *in calamitatem ruit*), placed much nearer by the Arabic, is confirmed by the LXX. ὑποσκελισθήσεται, and by the *Berëshith rabba*, c. 52, where לבט is used in the sense to be ruined (= נכשל). Hitzig changes the passive into the active: "he throws the offered לקח scornfully to the ground," but the contrast does not require this. The wanton, arrogant boasting lies already in the designation of the subj. אויל שפתים; and the sequel involves, as a consequence, the contrasted consequence of ready reception of the limitations and guidance of his own will by a higher.

Ver. 9. The form of this verse is like the eighth, word for word:

He that walketh in innocence walketh securely;
But he that goeth in secret ways is known.

The full form of בתום does not, as Hitzig supposes, stand in causal connection with the *Dechî*, for the consonant text lying before us is at least 500 years older than the accentuation. For הִלֵּךְ תֹם at ii. 7, there is here הִלֵּךְ בְּתוֹם חוֹם = הִלֵּךְ בְּרִדְךָ חוֹם; so יִמְעָקֵשׁ יִרְדִּי denotes, after ii. 15, such an one אֲשֶׁר יִרְדִּי עֲקָשִׁים. Expressed in the language of the N. T., חוֹם is the property of the ἀπλούς or ἀκέραιος, for the fundamental idea of fulness is here referred to full submission, full integrity. Such an one goes בְּטָח (*Aquila, ἀμερίμῳως*), for there is nothing designedly concealed by him, of which he has reason to fear that it will come to the light; whoever, on the contrary, makes his ways crooked, i.e. turns into crooked ways, is perceived, or, as we might also explain it (*vid.* under Gen. iv. 15): if one (*qui = si quis*) makes his ways crooked, then it is known—nothing, however, stands opposed to the reference of יִדְרֵי to the person: he is finally known, i.e. unmasked (LXX. Jerome, γνωσθήσεται, *manifestus fiet*). Usually it is explained: he is knowing, clever, with the remark that נודע is here the passive of הודיע (Gesen., Ewald, Hitzig); *Hiph.* to give to feel; *Niph.* to become to feel, properly to be made to know (Luth.: made wise); but the passive of the *Hiph.* is the *Hoph.* Such a *Niph.* in which the causative (not simply transitive) signification of the *Hiph.* would be applied passively is without example (*vid.* Ewald, § 133a); the meaning of Jer. xxxi. 19 also is: after I have become known, i.e. been made manifest, uncovered, drawn into the light.

Ver. 10. This verse contains another proverb, similarly formed, parallel with the half of ver. 8:

He that winketh with the eye causeth trouble;
And a foolish mouth comes to ruin.

Regarding the winking or nipping, *i.e.* the repeated nipping of the eyes (cf. *nictare*, frequent. of *nicēre*), as the conduct of the malicious or malignant, which aims at the derision or injury of him to whom it refers, *vid.* under vi. 13; there קרן was connected with א of the means of the action; here, as Ps. xxxv. 19, cf. Prov. xvi. 30, it is connected with the object accus. He who so does produces trouble (heart-sorrow, xv. 13), whether it be that he who is the butt of this mockery marks it, or that he is the victim of secretly concerted injury; וְאִי is not here used impersonally, as xiii. 10, but as xxix. 15, cf. Lev. xix. 28, xxiv. 20, in the sense of the cause. 10b forms a striking contrast to 10a, according to the text of the LXX.: *ὁ δὲ ἐλέγχων μετὰ παρρησίας εἰρηνοποιεῖ*. The Targ., however, abides, contrary to the Syr., by the Hebrew text, which certainly is older than this its correction, which Ewald and Lagarde unsuccessfully attempt to translate into Hebrew. The foolish mouth, here understood in conformity with 10a, is one who talks at random, without examination and deliberation, and thus suddenly stumbles and falls over, so that he comes to lie on the ground, to his own disgrace and injury.

Ver. 11. Another proverb, similar to the half of ver. 6:

A fountain of life is the mouth of the righteous;
But the mouth of the godless hideth violence.

If we understand 11b wholly as 6b: *os improborum obteget violentia*, then the meaning of 11a would be, that that which the righteous speaks tends to his own welfare (Fl.). But since the words spoken are the means of communication and of intercourse, one has to think of the water as welling up in one, and flowing forth to another; and the meaning of 11b has to accommodate itself to the preceding half proverb, whereby it cannot be mistaken that מַחַד (violence), which was 6b subj., bears here, by the contrast, the stamp of the obj.; for the possibility of manifold windings and turnings is a characteristic of the Mashal. In the Psalms and Prophets it is God who is called מַחַד הַיְיָ, Ps. xxxvi. 10, Jer. ii. 13, xvii. 13; the proverbial poetry plants the figure on ethical ground, and understands by it a living power, from which wholesome effects accrue to its possessor, xiv. 27, and go forth from him to others,

xiii. 14. Thus the mouth of the righteous is here called a fountain of life, because that which he speaks, and as he speaks it, is morally strengthening, intellectually elevating, and inwardly quickening in its effect on the hearers; while, on the contrary, the mouth of the godless covereth wrong (*violentiam*), i.e. conceals with deceitful words the intention, directed not to that which is best, but to the disadvantage and ruin of his neighbours; so that words which in the one case bring to light a ground of life and of love, and make it effectual, in the other case serve for a covering to an immoral, malevolent background.

Ver. 12. Another proverb of the different effects of hatred and of love:

Hate stirreth up strife,
And love covereth all transgressions.

Regarding מְרִיבִים, for which the *Keri* elsewhere substitutes מְרַחֲמִים, *vid.* under vi. 14. Hatred of one's neighbour, which is of itself an evil, has further this bad effect, that it calls forth hatred, and thus stirreth up strife, feuds, factions, for it incites man against man (cf. מְרִיב, Job iii. 8); on the contrary, love covers not merely little errors, but also greater sins of every kind (מְרַחֲמִים), viz. by pardoning them, concealing them, excusing them, if possible, with mitigating circumstances, or restraining them before they are executed. All this lies in the covering. James, however, gives it, v. 20, another rendering: love covers them, viz. from the eyes of a holy God; for it forgives them to the erring brother, and turns him from the error of his way. The LXX. improperly translate πάντας δὲ τοὺς μὴ φιλονεικοῦντας κελόπτει φιλία; but Peter (1 Pet. iv. 8) as well as James, but none of the Greek versions: ἡ ἀγάπη καλύψει πλῆθος ἁμαρτιῶν. The Romish Church makes use of this passage as a proof for the introduction of the *fides formata*, viz. *caritate*, in justification, which is condemned in the *Apology of the Augsburg Confession*; and, indeed, the *multitudo peccatorum* is not meant of the sins of him who cherishes love, but of the sins of the neighbour. Sin stirs up hatred in men in their relation to one another; but love covers the already existing sins, and smooths the disturbances occasioned by them.

Ver. 13. There follow now two other proverbs on the use and abuse of speech:

On the lips of the man of understanding wisdom is found;
And the rod for the back of the fool.

With Löwenstein, Hitzig, and others, it is inadmissible to regard לִשְׁנָת as second subject to הַפֶּה. The mouth itself, or the word of the mouth, may be called a rod, viz. a rod of correction (Isa. xi. 4); but that wisdom and such a rod are found on the lips of the wise would be a combination and a figure in bad taste. Thus 13b is a clause by itself, as Luther renders it: "but a rod belongs to the fool's back;" and this will express a contrast to 13a, that while wisdom is to be sought for on the lips of the man of understanding (cf. Mal. ii. 7), a man devoid of understanding, on the contrary, gives himself to such hollow and corrupt talk, that in order to educate him to something better, if possible, the rod must be applied to his back; for, according to the Talmudic proverb: that which a wise man gains by a hint, a fool only obtains by a club. The rod is called מַדְבֵּה, from מָדַב, to be smooth, to go straight down (as the hair of the head); and the back נֶאֱבָר, from נָבַר, to be rounded, i.e. concave or convex.

Ver. 14 Wise men store up knowledge;

But the mouth of the fool is threatening destruction.

Ewald, Bertheau, Hitzig, Oetinger: "The mouth of the fool blunders out, and is as the sudden falling in of a house which one cannot escape from." But since מִשְׁלֵה is a favourite *Mishle*-word to denote the effect and issue of that which is dangerous and destructive, so the sense is perhaps further to be extended: the mouth of the fool is for himself (xiii. 3) and others a near, i.e. an always threatening and unexpectedly occurring calamity; unexpectedly, because suddenly he blunders out with his inconsiderate shame-bringing talk, so that such a fool's mouth is to every one a *præsens periculum*. As to יִצְפֵּנִי, it is worthy of remark that in the Beduin, ضَعْنُ, fut. i, signifies to be still, to be thoughtful, to be absorbed in oneself (vid. Wetstein on Job, p. 281). According to Codd. and editions, in this correct, יִכְּרֵ is to be written instead of יִכְּרֵ אֵיל; vid. the law concerning the *Makkeph* in the three poetical books, Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 40.

A pair of proverbs regarding possession and gain.

Ver. 15. Regarding possession:

The rich man's wealth is his strong city;

The destruction of the poor is their poverty.

The first line=xviii. 11. One may render the idea according to that which is internal, and according to that which is external; and the proverb remains in both cases true. As יָד may mean, of itself alone,

power, as means of protection, or a bulwark (Ps. viii. 3), or the consciousness of power, high feeling, pride (Judg. v. 21) ; so קְרִיתָ עָוֹן may be rendered as an object of self-confidence, and מִתְחַתָּה, on the contrary, as an object of terror (Jer. xlviii. 39) : the rich man, to whom his estate (*vid.* on הוֹן, p. 63) affords a sure reserve and an abundant source of help, can appear confident and go forth energetically ; on the contrary, the poor man is timid and bashful, and is easily dejected and discouraged. Thus *e.g.* Oetinger and Hitzig. But the objective interpretation is allowable, and lies also much nearer : the rich man stands thus independent, changes and adversities cannot so easily overthrow him, he is also raised above many hazards and temptations ; on the contrary, the poor man is overthrown by little misfortunes, and his despairing endeavours to save himself, when they fail, ruin him completely, and perhaps make him at the same time a moral outlaw. It is quite an experienced fact which this proverb expresses, but one from which the double doctrine is easily derived : (1) That it is not only advised, but also commanded, that man make the firm establishing of his external life-position the aim of his endeavour ; (2) That one ought to treat with forbearance the humble man ; and if he always sinks deeper and deeper, one ought not to judge him with unmerciful harshness and in proud self-exaltation.

Ver. 16. Regarding gain :

The gain of the righteous tendeth to life ;
The income of the godless to sin.

Intentionally, that which the righteous receives is called פְּעֻלָּה (as Lev. xix. 13), as a reward of his labour ; that which the godless receives is called תְּבִנָּה, as income which does not need to be the reward of labour, and especially of his own immediate labour. And with לָחֵץ, לָחֵץ, לָחֵץ runs parallel, from the supposition that sin carries the germ of death in itself. The reward of his labour serves to the righteous to establish his life, *i.e.* to make sure his life-position, and to elevate his life-happiness. On the contrary, the income of the godless serves only to ruin his life ; for, made thereby full and confident, he adds sin to sin, whose wages is death. Hitzig translates : for expiation, *i.e.* to lose it again as atonement for past sins ; but if חַיִּים and חֲטָאת are contrasted with each other, then חֲטָאת is death-bringing sin (viii. 35 f.).

The group of proverbs now following bring again to view the

good and bad effects of human speech. The seventeenth verse introduces the transition :

Ver. 17 There is a way to life when one gives heed to correction ;
And whoever disregards instruction runs into error.

Instead of אֶרֶץ חַיִּים (v. 6), there is here אֶרֶץ לִחַיִּים ; and then this proverb falls into rank with ver. 16, which contains the same word לִחַיִּים. The accentuation denotes אֶרֶץ as subst. ; for אֶרֶץ [way, road] = אֶרֶץ [a wayfarer, part. of אָרַץ] would, as טָשַׁע, Lev. xi. 7, נָטַע, Ps. xciv. 9, have the tone on the ultima. It is necessary neither to change the tone, nor, with Ewald, to interpret אֶרֶץ as *abstr. pro concreto*, like הָלַךְ, for the expression “wanderer to life” has no support in the *Mishle*. Michaelis has given the right interpretation: *via ad vitam est si quis custodiat disciplinam*. The syntactical contents, however, are different, as e.g. 1 Sam. ii. 13, where the participle has the force of a hypothetical clause ; for the expression : “a way to life is he who observes correction,” is equivalent to : he is on the way to life who . . . ; a variety of the manner of expression : “the porch was twenty cubits,” 2 Chron. iii. 4, particularly adapted to the figurative language of proverbial poetry, as if the poet said : See there one observant of correction—that (viz. the שֹׁמֵר [שָׁמַר, to watch] representing itself in this שֹׁמֵר) is the way to life. מוֹכֵחַת and מוֹכֵר are related to each other as παιδεία and ἀεργος ; עֹזֵב [עָזַב, to leave, forsake] is equivalent to παῖδεία and ἀεργος ; בָּלַתִּי שֹׁמֵר מִתְּעָה would be unsuitable as a contrast in the causative sense : who guides wrong, according to which Bertheau understands 17a, that only he who observes correction can guide others to life. We expect to hear what injuries he who thinks to raise himself above all reproach brings on himself. Hitzig, in his Commentary (1858), for this reason places the *Hithpa.* מִתְּעָה (rather write מִתְּעָה) in the place of the *Hiph.* ; but in the *Comm. on Jeremiah* (1866), xlii. 20, he rightly remarks : “To err, not as an involuntary condition, but as an arbitrary proceeding, is suitably expressed by the *Hiph.*” In like manner הִגִּיעַ, הוֹסִיף (to touch), הִרְחִיק (to go to a distance), denote the active conduct of a being endowed with reason ; Ewald, § 122, c. Jewish interpreters gloss מִתְּעָה by supplying נִשְׁעוּ ; but it signifies only as inwardly transitive, to accomplish the action of the תְּעוּת.

Ver. 18 He that hideth hatred is a mouth of falsehood ;
And he that spreadeth slander is a fool.

The LXX., καλύπτουσιν ἔχθραν χεῖλα δίκαια, which Ewald pre-

fers, and which has given occasion to Hitzig to make a remarkable conjecture ("He who conceals hatred, close lips," which no one understands without Hitzig's comment. to this his conjecture). But (1) to hide hatred (cf. ver. 11, xxvi. 24) is something altogether different from to cover sin (ver. 12, xvii. 9), or generally to keep anything secret with discretion (x. 13); and (2) that *δίκαια* is a corrupt reading for *ἀδικα* (as Grabe supposes, and Symmachus translates) or *δόλια* (as Lagarde supposes, and indeed is found in Codd.). Michaelis well remarks: *odium tectum est dolosi, manifesta sycophantia stultorum*. Whoever conceals hateful feelings behind his words is שִׁפְתֵי-יִשְׁקָר, a mouth of falsehood (cf. the month of the fool, ver. 14); one does not need to supply אִשׁ, but much rather has hence to conclude that a false man is simply so named, as is proved by Ps. cxx. 3. There is a second moral judgment, 18b: he who spreadeth slander (וְיִמְצֵא, according to the Masoretic writing: he who divulges it, the correlate to הָבִיא, to bring to, Gen. xxxvii. 2) is a *Thor* [fool, stupid, dull], כָּסִיל (not a *Narr* [fool, godless person], אִשִּׁיל); for such slandering can generally bring no advantage; it injures the reputation of him to whom the רִבְיָה, i.e. the secret report, the slander, refers; it sows discord, has incalculable consequences, and finally brings guilt on the tale-bearer himself.

Ver. 19 In a multitude of words transgression is not wanting;
But he who restrains his lips shows wisdom.

We do not, with Bertheau, understand 19a: by many words a transgression does not cease to be what it is; the contrast 19b requires a more general condemnation of the multitude of words, and לֹא עָלָל not only means to cease from doing (to leave off), and to cease from being (to take away), but also not at all to do (to intermit, Ezek. iii. 11; Zech. xi. 12), and not at all to be (to fail, to be absent), thus: *ubi verborum est abundantia non deest peccatum* (Fl.). Michaelis suitably compares *πολυλογία πολλὰ σφάλματα ἔχει* by Stobæus, and כָּל הַמְרַבֵּה דְּבָרִים מְבִיא חַטָּא in the tractate *Abot* i. 17, wherewith Rashi explains the proverb. פִּשְׁעֵי is not here, as elsewhere, e.g. Ps. xix. 14, with special reference to the sin of falling away from favour, apostasy, but, like the post-biblical עֲבָרָה, generally with reference to every kind of violation (פִּשְׁעֵי = فسق *dirumpere*) of moral restraint; here, as Jansen remarks, *peccatum sive mendacii, sive detractiois, sive alterius indiscretæ læsionis, sive*

vanitatis, sive denique verbi otiosi. In 19b it is more appropriate to regard מִשְׁבִּיל as the present of the internal transitive (*intelligenter agit*) than to interpret it in the attributive sense (*intelligens*).

Ver. 20 Choice silver is the tongue of the righteous ;
But the heart of the godless is little worth.

Choice silver is, as viii. 19, cf. 10, pure, freed from all base mixtures. Like it, pure and noble, is whatever the righteous speaks; the heart, *i.e.* the manner of thought and feeling, of the godless is, on the contrary, like little *instar nihili*, *i.e.* of little or no worth, Arab. *yasway kályla* (Fl.). LXX.: the heart of the godless ἐκλείψει, *i.e.* יָמַט, at first arrogant and full of lofty plans, it becomes always the more dejected, discouraged, empty. But 20a leads us to expect some designation of its worth. The Targ. (according to which the Peshito is to be corrected; *vid.* Levy's *Wörterbuch*, ii. 26): the heart of the godless is מִתְחַח (from נָחַח), refuse, dross. The other Greek versions accord with the text before us.

Ver. 21 The lips of the righteous edify many ;
But fools die through want of understanding.

The LXX. translate 21a: the lips of the righteous ἐπίσταται ὑψηλά, which would at least require יָדָעוּ רַבּוֹת. יָדָעוּ is, like the post-bibl. פָּרְנָם (*vid.* the *Hebr. Römerbrief*, p. 97), another figure for the N. T. οἰκοδομεῖν: to afford spiritual nourishment and strengthening, to which Fleischer compares the ecclesiastical expressions: *pastor, ovile ecclesiar, les ouailles*; יָדָעוּ means leader, Jer. x. 21, as well as teacher, Eccles. xii. 11, for it contains partly the prevailing idea of leading, partly of feeding. יָדָעוּ stands for תִּרְעִינָה, as ver. 32, v. 2. In 21b, Bertheau incorrectly explains, as Euchel and Michaelis: *stulti complures per dementem unum moriuntur*; the fool has truly enough in his own folly, and needs not to be first drawn by others into destruction. וְחָסַר is not here the connective form of חָסַר (Jewish interpreters: for that reason, that he is such an one), nor of חָסַר (Hitzig, Zöckler), which denotes, as a concluded idea, *penuria*, but like רָחַב, xxi. 4, שָׁכַב, vi. 10, and שָׁפַל, xvi. 19, *infin.*: they die by want of understanding (cf. v. 23); this *amentia* is the cause of their death, for it leads fools to meet destruction without their observing it (Hos. iv. 6).

Three proverbs which say that good comes from above, and is as a second nature to the man of understanding:

Ver. 22 Jahve's blessing—it maketh rich ;
And labour addeth nothing thereto

Like 24a, הָיָה limits the predicate to this and no other subject: "all depends on God's blessing." Here is the first half of the *ora et labora*. The proverb is a compendium of Ps. cxxvii. 1, 2. 22b is to be understood, according to ver. 2 of this Solomonic psalm, not that God adds to His blessing no sorrow, much rather with the possession grants at the same time a joyful, peaceful mind (LXX., Targ., Syriac, Jerome, Aben-Ezra, Michaelis, and others), which would require the word עֲלֵיָהּ; but that trouble, labour, *i.e.* strenuous self-endeavours, add not (anything) to it, *i.e.* that it does not associate itself with the blessing (which, as the Jewish interpreters rightly remark, is, according to its nature, הוֹסַפָּה, as the curse is חֲסָרָה) as the *causa efficiens*, or if we supply *quidquam*, as the complement to עִמָּוּ [along with it]: nothing is added thereto, which goes along with that which the blessing of God grants, and completes it. Thus correctly Rashi, Luther, Ziegler, Ewald, Hitzig, Zöckler. The now current accentuation, וְלֹא יוֹסֵף עֲצָב עִמָּוּ, is incorrect. Older editions, as Venice 1525, 1615, Basel 1618, have וְלֹא-יוֹסֵף עֲצָב עִמָּוּ, the transformation of וְלֹא-יוֹסֵף עֲצָב. Besides, עֲצָב has double Segol (*vid.* Kimchi's *Lex.*), and יוֹסֵף is written, according to the Masora, in the first syllable *plene*, in the last *defective*.

Ver. 23 Like sport to a fool is the commission of a crime ;
And wisdom to a man of understanding.

Otherwise Löwenstein : to a fool the carrying out of a plan is as sport ; to the man of understanding, on the contrary, as wisdom. וְזָמָה, from זָמַם, to press together, mentally to think, as Job xvii. 11, and according to Gesenius, also Prov. xxi. 27, xxiv. 9. But וְזָמָה has the prevailing signification of an outrage against morality, a sin of unchastity ; and especially the phrase וְזָמָה וְזָמָה is in Judg. xx. 6 and in Ezekiel not otherwise used, so that all the old interpreters render it here by *patrare scelus*; only the Targum has the equivocal עֲבֵידָתָא עֲבֵידָתָא; the Syriac, however, ܕܢܫܐ ܨܠܐ. Sinful conduct appears to the fool, who places himself above the solemnity of the moral law, as sport ; and wisdom, on the contrary, (appears as sport) to a man of understanding. We would not venture on this acceptance of וְזָמָה if וְזָמָה were not attributed, viii. 30 f., to wisdom itself. This alternate relationship recommends itself by the indetermination of וְזָמָה, which is not favourable to the interpretation :

sed sapientiam colit vir intelligens, or as Jerome has it: *sapientia autem est viro prudentia*. The subjects of the antithesis chiasmatically combine within the verse: חכמה, in contrast to wicked conduct, is acting in accordance with moral principles. This to the man of understanding is as easy as sporting, just as to the fool is shameless sinning; for he follows in this an inner impulse, it brings to him joy, it is the element in which he feels himself satisfied.

Ver. 24 That of which the godless is afraid cometh upon him,
And what the righteous desires is granted to him.

The formation of the clause 24a is like the similar proverb, xi. 27b; the subject-idea has there its expression in the genitival *annexum*, of which Gen. ix. 6b furnishes the first example; in this passage before us it stands at the beginning, and is, as in ver. 22, emphatically repeated with הִיא מִגִּוְרָה, properly the turning oneself away, hence shrinking back in terror; here, as Isa. lxvi. 4, of the object of fear, parallel to מִתְאַוֶּה, wishing, of the object of the wish. In 24b Ewald renders יָתֵן as adj. from יָתַן (whence יָתֵן), after the form פָּתַח, and translates: yet to the righteous desire is always green. But whether יָתֵן is probably formed from יָתַן, and not from נָתַן, is a question in xii. 12, but not here, where wishing and giving (fulfilling) are naturally *correlata*. Hitzig corrects יָתֵן, and certainly the supplying of ה' is as little appropriate here as at xiii. 21. Also a "one gives" is scarcely intended (according to which the Targ., Syr., and Jerome translate passively), in which case the Jewish interpreters are wont to explain יָתַן, *scil.* הֵנִיחַ; for if the poet thought of יָתַן with a personal subject, why did he not rescue it from the dimness of such vague generality? Thus, then, יָתַן is, with Böttcher, to be interpreted as impersonal, like xiii. 10, Job xxxvii. 10, and perhaps also Gen. xxxviii. 28 (Ewald, § 295a): what the righteous wish, that there is, *i.e.* it becomes actual, is fulfilled. In this we have not directly and exclusively to think of the destiny at which the godless are afraid (Heb. x. 27), and toward which the desire of the righteous goes forth; but the clause has also truth which is realized in this world: just that which they greatly fear, *e.g.* sickness, bankruptcy, the loss of reputation, comes upon the godless; on the contrary, that which the righteous wish realizes itself, because their wish, in its intention, and kind, and content, stands in harmony with the order of the moral world.

There now follows a series of proverbs, broken by only one dissimilar proverb, on the immoveable continuance of the righteous:

Ver. 25 When the storm sweeps past, it is no more with the wicked;
But the righteous is a building firm for ever.

If ver. 25 is connected with ver. 24 is shown in the Book of Wisdom v. 15 (the hope of the wicked like chaff which the wind pursues). The Aram., Jerome, and *Græc. Venet.* interpret כ of comparison, so that the destruction of the godless is compared in suddenness and rapidity to the rushing past of a storm; but then ריח ought to have been used instead of סופה; and instead of רשע with the *ἡ apodosis*, a disturbing element in such a comparison, would have been used יחלה רשע, or at least רשע אץ. The thought is no other than that of Job xxi. 18: the storm, which is called סופה, from סף, to rush forth, is meant, as sweeping forth, and כ the temporal, as Ex. xi. 4 (LXX. *παταροπορευμένης καταιγίδος*), with *ἡ apod.* following, like *e.g.*, after a similar member of a temporal sentence, Isa. x. 25. סופה is a figure of God-decreed calamities, as war and pestilence, under which the godless sink, while the righteous endure them; cf. with 25a, i. 27, Isa. xxviii. 18; and with 25b, iii. 25, Hab. ii. 4, Ps. xci. "An everlasting foundation," since עולם is understood as looking forwards, not as at Isa. lviii. 12, backwards, is a foundation capable of being shaken by nothing, and synecdoch. generally a building. The proverb reminds us of the close of the Sermon on the Mount, and finds the final confirmation of its truth in this, that the death of the godless is a penal thrusting of them away, but the death of the righteous a lifting them up to their home. The righteous also often enough perish in times of war and of pestilence; but the proverb, as it is interpreted, verifies itself, even although not so as the poet, viewing it from his narrow O. T. standpoint, understood it; for the righteous, let him die when and how he may, is preserved, while the godless perishes.

Ver. 26. This proverb stands out of connection with the series:

As vinegar to the teeth, and as smoke to the eyes,
So is the sluggard to them who give him a commission.

A parabolic proverb (*vid.* p. 9), *priamel*-like in its formation (p. 13). Here and there לטש is found with *Mugrash*, but in correct texts it has *Rebîa-magnum*; the verse is divided into two by *Athnach*, whose subordinate distributive is (*Accentssystem*, xi. § 1) *Rebîa-magnum*. Smoke makes itself disagreeably perceptible to the sense of smell, and particularly to the eyes, which it causes to smart so that they overflow with tears; wherefore Virgil speaks of it as *amarus*, and Horace *lacrimosus*. חמץ (from חמץ, to be sour,

harsh) signifies properly that which is sour, as *acetum*, ὄξος; here, after the LXX. ὄμφαξ, the unripe grapes, but which are called בָּצָר (בָּצֵר) (*vid.* under Job xv. 33), by which the Syr., here following the LXX., translates, and which also in the Talmud, *Demai* i. 1, is named חֲמִץ, after a doubtful meaning (*vid.* Aruch, and on the other side Rashi), thus: vinegar, which the word commonly means, and which also accords with the object of the comparison, especially if one thinks of the sharp vinegar-wine of the south, which has an effect on the teeth denoted by the Hebr. verb רָחַח, as the effect of smoke is by כָּחַח (Fl.). The plur. לְשִׁלָּחִי is that of the category, like xxii. 21, xxv. 13; the parallel וְזִנְיָ of the latter passage does not at least make it necessary to regard it, like this, as a *plur. excellentiæ* (Bertheau, Hitzig, Ewald). They who send a sluggard, *i.e.* who make him their agent, do it to their own sorrow; his slothfulness is for them, and for that which they have in view, of dull, *i.e.* slow and restrained, of biting, *i.e.* sensibly injurious operation.

From this point the proverbs fall into the series connecting themselves with ver. 25:

Ver. 27 The fear of Jahve multiplies the days of life;
But the years of the godless are shortened.

This parable, like ver. 25, also corresponds with the O. T. standpoint, having in view the present life. The present-life history confirms it, for vice destroys body and soul; and the fear of God, which makes men contented and satisfied in God, is truly the right principle of longevity. But otherwise also the pious often enough die early, for God carries them away מִפְּנֵי הָרָעָה [from the face of the evil], Isa. lvii. 1 f.; or if they are martyrs for the truth (Ps. xlv. 23, cf. lx. 6), the verification of the above proverb in such cases moves forward (Wiscl. iv. 7 ff.) into eternity, in which the life of the pious continues for ever, while that of the godless loses itself with his death in the state of everlasting death. ix. 11, cf. iii. 2, resembles 27a. Instead of תִּקְוַתְךָ, תִּקְוַתְךָ was to be expected; but the flexion does not distinguish the transitive קָצַר (Arab. *kaṣara*) and intransitive קָצַר (Arab. *kaṣura*) as it ought.

Ver. 28 The expectation of the righteous is gladness,
And the hope of the godless comes to nothing.

תִּחְלָה as well as תִּקְוָה proceed on the fundamental idea of a strained earnest looking back upon something, the same fundamental idea which in another view gives the meaning of strength (חֵיל, Arab. *ḥayl*; *kuwwat*, *kuwiyy*, cf. גִּדָּל, Arab. *jdl*, *plectere*, and גִּדּוּל, *strong* and

strength). The substantival clause 28a denotes nothing more than : it is gladness (cf. iii. 17, all their steps are gladness), but which is equivalent to, it is that in its issue, *in gaudium desinit*. Hitzig's remark that חוּלָה is the chief idea for hope and fear, is not confirmed by the usage of the language; it always signifies joyful, not anxious, expectation; cf. the interchange of the same two synonyms xiii. 7, and חוּלָה, Ps. cxii. 10, instead of חֵקֶה (here and Job viii. 13). While the expectation of the one terminates in the joy of the fulfilment, the hope of the other (אֲבִיר, R. בר, to separate) perishes, i.e. comes to nothing.

Ver. 29 Jahve's way is a bulwark to the righteous;
But ruin to those that do evil.

Of the two meanings which כִּיעוֹ (כִּיעוֹן) has : a stronghold from יָעַן, and asylum (=Arab. *m'adz*) from עָן, the contrast here demands the former. חֵקֶה and חוּלָה, understood objectively, are the two O. T. names of true religion. It means, then, the way which the God of revelation directs men to walk in (Ps. cxliii. 8), the way of His precepts, Ps. cxix. 27, His way of salvation, Ps. lxvii. 3 (4); in the N. T. ἡ ὁδὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ, Matt. xxii. 16, Acts xviii. 25 f.; cf. ἡ ὁδὸς simply, Acts ix. 2, xxiv. 14. This way of Jahve is a fortress, bulwark, defence for innocence, or more precisely, a disposition wholly, i.e. unreservedly and without concealment, directed toward God and that which is good. All the old interpreters, also Luther, but not the *Græc. Venet.*, translate as if the expression were לָחֶם; but the punctuation has preferred the *abstr. pro concreto*, perhaps because the personal חֶם nowhere else occurs with any such prefix; on the contrary, חֵם is frequently connected with ב, כ, ל. לחם דרך, *integro viæ (vitæ)*, are by no means to be connected in one conception (Ziegler, Umbr., Elster), for then the poet ought to have written כִּיעוֹ יְהוָה לַחֶם-דֶּרֶךְ. 29b cannot be interpreted as a thought by itself : and ruin (*vid.* regarding מִחְתָּה, *ruina*, and subjectively *consternatio*, ver. 16) comes to those who do evil; but the thought, much more comprehensive, that religion, which is for the righteous a strong protection and safe retreat, will be an overthrow to those who delight only in wickedness (*vid.* on חֵם, p. 143), is confirmed by the similarly formed distich, xxi. 15. Also almost all the Jewish interpreters, from Rashi to Malbim, find here expressed the operation of the divine revelation set over against the conduct of men,—essentially the same as when the Tora or the Chokma present to men for their choice life and death; or the gospel of salvation,

according to 2 Cor. ii. 15, is to one the savour of life unto life, to another the savour of death unto death.

Ver. 30 The righteous is never moved ;
But the godless abide not in the land.

Love of home is an impulse and emotion natural to man ; but to no people was fatherland so greatly delighted in, to none was exile and banishment from fatherland so dreadful a thought, as it was to the people of Israel. Expatriation is the worst of all evils with which the prophets threatened individuals and the people, Amos vii. 17, cf. Isa. xxii. 17 f. ; and the history of Israel in their exile, which was a punishment of their national apostasy, confirms this proverb and explains its form ; cf. ii. 21 f., Ps. xxxvii. 29. לֹא is, like ix. 13, the emphatic No of the more elevated style ; נִמְוֹת, the opposite of נִבְנוֹת, xii. 3 ; and שָׁכַן signifies to dwell, both inchoative : to come to dwell, and consecutive : to continue to dwell (e.g. Isa. lvii. 15, of God who inhabiteth eternity). In general, the proverb means that the righteous fearlessly maintains the position he takes ; while, on the contrary, all they who have no hold on God lose also their outward position. But often enough this saying is fulfilled in this, that they, in order that they may escape disgrace, became wanderers and fugitives, and are compelled to conceal themselves among strangers.

Ver. 31. For the third time the favourite theme already handled in three appendixes is taken up :

The mouth of the righteous bringeth forth wisdom,
And the tongue of falsehood shall be rooted up.

Regarding the biblical comparison of thoughts with branches, and of words with flowers and fruits, *vid.* my *Psychol.* p. 181 ; and regarding the root נָב (with its weaker אָב), to swell up and to spring up (to well, grow, etc.), *vid.* what is said in the *Comm. on Genesis* on נִבְיָא, and in *Isaiah* on אָב. We use the word נָב of that which sprouts or grows, and לִבְבֵּי of that which causes that something sprout ; but also נָב may, after the manner of verbs of being full (iii. 10), of flowing (Gesen. § 138, 1, Anm. 2), take the object accus. of that from which anything sprouts (xxiv. 31), or which sprouting, it raises up and brings forth (cf. Isa. lvii. 19). The mouth of the righteous sprouts, brings forth (in Ps. xxxvii. 30, without a figure, יִשְׁפָּה, i.e. utters) wisdom, which in all relations knows how to find out that which is truly good, and suitable for the end intended, and happy to unriddle difficult complications.

The conception of wisdom, in itself practical (from חכם, to be thick = solid, firm), here gains such contents by the contrast: the tongue—whose character and fruit is falsehood, which has its delight in intentional perversions of fact, and thus increaseth complications (*vid.* regarding תְּהַבֵּיחַ, ii. 12)—is rooted up, whence it follows as regards the mouth of the righteous, that it continues for ever with that its wholesome fruit.

Ver. 32 The lips of the righteous know what is acceptable;

But the mouth of the godless is mere falsehood.

Hitzig, instead of יָדַעַן, reads יָבֵעַן; the ἀποσταζει [they distil or send forth] of the LXX. does not favour this, for it is probably only a corruption of ἐπιστάται, which is found in several MSS. The *Græc. Venet.*, which translates ποιμανοῦσι, makes use of a MS. which it sometimes misreads. The text does not stand in need of any emendations, but rather of a corrected relation between the clauses, for the relation of 31a with 32b, and of 32a with 31b, strongly commends itself (Hitzig); in that case the explanation lies near: the lips of the righteous find what is acceptable, viz. to God. But this thought in the Mashal language is otherwise expressed (xii. 2 and paral.); and also 32a and 32b fit each other as contrasts, if by רָצִין, as xi. 27, xiv. 9, is to be understood that which is acceptable in its widest generality, equally then in relation to God and man. It is a question whether יָדַעַן means that they have knowledge of it (as one *e.g.* says יָדַע כִּפְּרִי, to understand writing, *i.e.* the reading of it), or that they think thereupon (cf. xxvii. 23). Fundamentally the two ideas, according to the Hebrew conception of the words, lie in each other; for the central conception, perceiving, is biblically equivalent to a delighted searching into or going towards the object. Thus: the lips of the righteous think of that which is acceptable (רָצִין, cogn. to רָץ, gracefulness; χάρις, Col. iv. 6); while the mouth of the godless is mere falsehood, which God (the wisdom of God) hates, and from which discord on all sides arises. We might transfer יָדַעַן to 32b; but this line, interpreted as a clause by itself, is stronger and more pointed (Fl.)

The next three proverbs treat of honesty, discretion, and innocence or dove-like simplicity:

xi. 1 Deceitful balances are an abomination to Jahve;

But a full weight is His delight.

The very same proverb, with slightly varied expression, is found in xx. 23; and other such like proverbs, in condemnation of false

and in approbation of true balances, are found, xx. 10, xvi. 11; similar predicates, but connected with other subjects, are found at xii. 22, xv. 8. "An abomination to Jahve" is an expression we have already twice met with in the introduction, iii. 32, vi. 16, cf. viii. 7; *תועבה* is, like *תועה*, a participial noun, in which the active conception of abhorring is transferred to the action accomplished. *רצון* is in post-biblical Hebr. the designation of the *arbitrium* and the *voluntas*; but here *רצונו* signifies not that which God wishes, but that which He delights in having. "מְרָמָה" (here for the first time in Proverbs), from *רָמָה*, the *Piel* of which means (xxvi. 19) *aliquem dolo et fraude petere*. *אֶבֶן*, like the Pers. *sanak*, *sanakh*, Arab. *ṣajat*, a stone for weight; and finally, without any reference to its root signification, like Zech. v. 8, *אבן העופרת*, a leaden weight, as when we say: a horseshoe of gold, a chess-man of ivory."

Ver. 2. Now follows the Solomonic "Pride goeth before a fall."

There cometh arrogance, so also cometh shame;
But with the humble is wisdom.

Interpreted according to the Hebr.: if the former has come, so immediately also comes the latter. The general truth as to the causal connection of the two is conceived of historically; the fact, confirmed by many events, is represented in the form of a single occurrence as a warning example; the preterites are like the Greek *aoristi gnomici* (vid. p. 32); and the perf., with the *fut. consec.* following, is the expression of the immediate and almost simultaneous consequence (vid. at Hab. iii. 10): has haughtiness (*זָרָן* after the form *לָצֵן*, from *זָר*, to boil, to run over) appeared, then immediately also disgrace appeared, in which the arrogant behaviour is overwhelmed. The harmony of the sound of the Hebr. *זָרָן* and *קָלֹן* cannot be reproduced in German [nor in English]; Hitzig and Ewald try to do so, but such a *quid pro quo* as "*Kommt Unglimpf kommt an ihn Schimpf*" [there comes arrogance, there comes to him disgrace] is not a translation, but a distortion of the text. If, now, the antithesis says that with the humble is wisdom, wisdom is meant which avoids such disgrace as arrogance draws along with it; for the *צַנִּי* thinks not more highly of himself than he ought to think (R. *צַנ*, *subsidere, demitti*, *Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitsch.* xxv. 185).

Ver. 3 The integrity of the upright guideth them;

But the perverseness of the ungodly destroyeth them.

To the upright, *יֵשָׁרִים*, who keep the line of rectitude without turn-

ing aside therefrom into devious paths (Ps. cxxv. 4 f.), stand opposed (as at ii. 21 f.) the ungodly (faithless), בְּנֵי יִם, who conceal (from בְּנֵי, to cover, whence יָבֵן = בְּנֵי) malicious thoughts and plans. And the contrast of הִתְחַלּוּ, integrity = unreserved loving submission, is הִלָּצוּ, a word peculiar to the Solomonic Mashal, with its verb הִלָּץ (*vid.* p. 32). Hitzig explains it by the Arab. *saraf*, to step out, to tread over; and Ewald by *lafat*, to turn, to turn about ("treacherous, false step"), both of which are improbable. Schul-tens compares *salaf* in the meaning to smear (R. הָלַךְ, ἁλεί-φειν; cf. regarding such secondary formations with שׁ preceding, Hupfeld on Ps. v. 7), and translates here, *lubricitas*. But this rendering is scarcely admissible. It has against it lexical tradition (Menahem: מוֹטָה, wavering; Parchon: הָיוּ, falsifying; Kimchi: תָּוַע, misrepresentation, according to which the *Græc. Venet.* σκο-λιότης), as well as the methodical comparison of the words. The Syriac has not this verbal stem, but the Targum has הִלָּצוּ in the meaning to distort, to turn the wrong way (σκολιουῖν, στρεβλοῖν), Prov. x. 10, and Esth. vi. 10, where, in the second Targum, הִתְחַלּוּ means "his mouth was crooked." With justice, therefore, Gesenius in his *Thesaurus* has decided in favour of the funda-mental idea *pervertere*, from which also the Peshito and Saadia proceed; for in Ex. xxiii. 8 they translate (Syr.) *mhapék* (it, the gift of bribery, perverts) and (Arab.) *tazyf* (= הִלָּץ, it falsifies). Fl. also, who at xv. 4 remarks, "הִלָּצוּ, from הִלָּץ, to stir up, to turn over, so that the lowermost becomes the uppermost," gives the pre-ference to this primary idea, in view of the Arab. *salaf*, *invertere terram conserendi causa*. It is moreover confirmed by *salaf*, *præcedere*, which is *pervertere* modified to *prævertere*. But how does הִלָּצוּ mean *perversio* (Theod. ὑποσκελισμός), in the sense of the overthrow prepared for thy neighbour? The parallels demand the sense of a condition peculiar to the word and conduct of the godless (treacherous), xxii. 12 (cf. Ex. xxiii. 8), xix. 3, thus *perversitas*, perversity; but this as contrary to truth and recti-tude (*opp.* הִתְחַלּוּ), "perverseness," as we have translated it, for we understand by it want of rectitude (dishonesty) and untruthful-ness. While the sincerity of the upright conducts them, and, so to say, forms their *salvus conductus*, which guards them against the danger of erring and of hostile assault, the perverseness of the treacherous destroys them; for the disfiguring of truth avenges itself against them, and they experience the reverse of the proverb,

"*das Ehrlich währt am längsten*" (honesty endures the longest). The *Chethib* וְשֶׁרֶם (וְשֶׁרֶם) is an error of transcription; the *Keri* has the proper correction, וְשֶׁרֶם = וְשֶׁרֶם, Jer. v. 6. Regarding שֶׁרֶם (whence שֶׁרֶם), which, from its root-signification of making close and fast, denotes violence and destruction, *vid.* under Gen. xvii.

Three proverbs in praise of צדקה:

Ver. 4 Possessions are of no profit in the day of wrath;
But righteousness delivereth from death.

That which is new here, is only that possessions and goods (*vid.* regarding הֶחָרָה, p. 63) are destitute of all value in the day of the μέλλουσα ὀργή; for יוֹם עֲרִירָה, the day of wrath breaking through the limits (of long-suffering), has the same meaning as in the prophets; and such prophetic words as Isa. x. 3, Zeph. i. 18, and, almost in the same words, Ezek. vii. 19, are altogether similar to this proverb. The LXX., which translates ἐν ἡμέρᾳ ἐπαγωγῆς, harmonizes in expression with Sir. v. 8, cf. ii. 2. Theodotion translates אִי, xxvii. 10, by ἐπαγωγῆ (providence, fate).

Ver. 5 The righteousness of the blameless smootheneth his way,
And by his own wickedness doth the wicked fall.

With the יָשָׁרִים (cf. i. 12), formed after the passive, more than with יָשָׁר, is connected the idea of the perfected, but more in the negative sense of moral spotlessness than of moral perfection. The rectitude of a man who seeks to keep his conscience and his character pure, maketh smooth (יָשָׁר, as iii. 6, not of the straightness of the line, but of the surface, evenness) his life's path, so that he can pursue his aim without stumbling and hindrance, and swerving from the direct way; while, on the contrary, the godless comes to ruin by his godlessness—that by which he seeks to forward his interests, and to make a way for himself, becomes his destruction.

Ver. 6 The rectitude of the upright saveth them,
And in their own covetousness are the faithless taken.

The integrity of those who go straight forward and straight through, without permitting themselves to turn aside on crooked ways, delivers them from the snares which are laid for them, the dangers they encounter; while, on the contrary, the faithless, though they mask their intentions ever so cunningly, are ensnared in their passionate covetousness: the mask is removed, they are convicted, and are caught and lost. Regarding הַיָּבֵה, abyss, overthrow, also stumbling against anything = covetousness, *vid.* at x. 3, and under Ps. v. 10. The form of the expression 6b follows the scheme, "in

the image of God created He man," Gen. ix. 6. The subject is to be taken from the genitive, as is marked by the accentuation, for it gives *Mugrash* to the וְיִהְיֶה, as if it were the principal form, for וְיִהְיֶה.

Three proverbs regarding destruction and salvation :

Ver. 7 When a godless man dies, his hope cometh to nought,
And the expectation of those who stand in fulness of strength
is destroyed.

We have already remarked in the Introduction that אדם is a favourite word of the Chokma, and the terminological distinction of different classes and properties of men (*vid.* pp. 40, 42); we read, vi. 12, אָדָם בְּלִיָּעַל, and here, as also Job xx. 29, xxvii. 13, אָדָם, cf. xxi. 29, אָדָם, but generally only אָדָם is used. A godless man, to whom earthly possessions and pleasure and honour are the highest good, and to whom no means are too base, in order that he may appease this his threefold passion, rocks himself in unbounded and measureless hopes; but with his death, his hope, *i.e.* all that he hoped for, comes to nought. The LXX. translate *τελευτήσαντος ἀνδρὸς δικαίου οὐκ ἔλλυται ἐλπίς*, which is the converse of that which is here said, 7a: the hope of the righteous expects its fulfilment beyond the grave. The LXX. further translate, τὸ δὲ καύχημα (תְּהִלָּה) τῶν ἀσεβῶν ἔλλυται; but the distich in the Hebr. text is not an antithetic one, and whether אָדָם may signify the wicked (thus also the Syr., Targ., Venet., and Luther), if we regard it as a brachyology for אָדָם אָדָם, or as the plur. of an adj. אָדָם, after the form אָדָם (Elazar b. Jacob in Kimchi), or wickedness (Zöckler, with Hitzig, "the wicked expectation"), is very questionable. Yet more improbable is Malbim's (with Rashi's) rendering of this אָדָם, after Gen. xlix. 3, Ps. lxxviii. 51, and the Targ. on Job xviii. 12, of the children of the deceased; children *gignuntur ex robore virili*, but are not themselves the *robur virile*. But while אָדָם is nowhere the plur. of אָדָם in its ethical signification, it certainly means in Ps. lxxviii. 51, as the plur. of אָדָם, manly strength, and in Isa. xl. 26, 29 the fulness of strength generally, and once, in Hos. ix. 4, as plur. of אָדָם in its physical signification, derived from its root-meaning *anhelitus* (Gen. xxxv. 18, cf. Hab. iii. 7), deep sorrow (a heightening of the אָדָם, Deut. xxxvi. 14). This latter signification has also been adopted: Jerome, *expectatio sollicitorum*; Bertheau, "the expectation of the sorrowing;" Ewald, "continuance of sorrow;" but the meaning of this

in this connection is so obscure, that one must question the translators what its import is. Therefore we adhere to the other rendering, "fulness of strength," and interpret אָנִים as the opposite of אֵין אָנִים, Isa. xl. 29, for it signifies, *per metonymiam abstracti pro concr.*, those who are full of strength; and we gain the meaning that there is a sudden end to the expectation of those who are in full strength, and build their prospects thereon. The two synonymous lines complete themselves, in so far as אָנִים gains by אִם רֶשַׁע the associated idea of self-confidence, and the second strengthens the thought of the first by the transition of the expression from the fut. to the preterite (Fl.). וְחָלַת has, for the most part in recent impressions, the *Mugrash*; the correct accentuation, according to codices and old impressions, is וְחָלַת אִנִּים (*vid.* Baer's *Torath Emeth*, p. 10, § 4).

Ver. 8 The righteous is delivered from trouble,
And the godless comes in his stead.

The succession of the tenses gives the same meaning as when, periodizing, we say: while the one is delivered, the other, on the contrary, falls before the same danger. נָחֵלַן (*vid.* under Isa. lviii. 11) followed by the historical tense, the expression of the principal fact, is the perfect. The statement here made clothes itself after the manner of a parable in the form of history. It is true there are not wanting experiences of an opposite kind (from that here stated), because divine justice manifests itself in this world only as a prelude, but not perfectly and finally; but the poet considers this, that as a rule destruction falls upon the godless, which the righteous with the help of God escapes; and this he realizes as a moral motive. In itself תִּתְּחַי may also have only the meaning of the exchange of places, but the LXX. translate ἀντ' αὐτοῦ, and thus in the sense of representation the proverb appears to be understood in connection with xxi. 18 (*cf.* the prophetic-historical application, Isa. xliii. 4). The idea of atonement has, however, no application here, for the essence of atonement consists in the offering up of an innocent one in the room of the guilty, and its force lies in the offering up of self; the meaning is only, that if the divinely-ordained linking together of cause and effect in the realms of nature and of history brings with it evil, this brings to the godless destruction, while it opens the way of deliverance for the righteous, so that the godless becomes for the righteous the

בִּזְרִי, or, as we might say in a figure of similar import, the lightning conductor.

Ver. 9 The wicked with his mouth prepareth destruction for his neighbour;
But by knowledge the righteous are delivered from it.

The LXX. translate, ἐν στόματι ἀσεβῶν παγὶς (חֲזָר?) πολίταις, αἰσθησὶς δὲ δίκαιοις εὐδοξία (חֲזָר). There is no reason for changing (with Hitzig and Ewald) the text, which in the form in which it is here translated was before all other translators (Aq., Symmachus, Theodotion, Syr., Targ., Jerome). The accentuation, which separates the two instrumental statements by greater disjunctives from that which follows, is correct. The "three" Greek versions [viz. of Aquila, Theodotion, and Symmachus] translate חֲזָר by ὑποκριτής, which it means in the modern idiom; but in the ancient Hebr. it signifies, him who is resolved upon evil, as in Arab. *hanyf*, him who is resolved upon that which is right: he who turns aside to evil enters on a path far removed from that which is right. In יִשְׁחִית one is reminded (without any etymological reason) of שָׁחַת (pit), and so in יִחְלָצֵם of מִשְׁחִיתוֹתָם (Ps. cvii. 20) or a similar word; but בִּרְעֵת contains the reference, in this connection not easy to be mistaken, to the hostile purposes of the wicked masked by the words of the mouth, which are seen through by the righteous by virtue of knowledge which makes them acquainted with men. This penetrating look is their means of deliverance.

Three proverbs follow relating to the nature of city and national life, and between them two against mockery and backbiting:

Ver. 10 In the prosperity of the righteous the city rejoiceth;
And if the wicked come to ruin, there is jubilation.

The א of בִּטְחָה denotes the ground but not the object, as elsewhere, but the cause of the rejoicing, like the א, 10b, and in the similar proverb, xxix. 2, cf. xxviii. 12. If it goes well with the righteous, the city has cause for joy, because it is for the advantage of the community; and if the wicked (godless) come to an end, then there is jubilation (substantival clause for חֲזָר), for although they are honoured in their lifetime, yet men breathe freer when the city is delivered from the tyranny and oppression which they exercised, and from the evil example which they gave. Such proverbs, in which the city (*civitas*) represents the state, the πόλις the πολιτεία, may, as Ewald thinks, be of earlier date than the days of an Asa or Jehoshaphat; for "from the days of Moses and Joshua to the days of David and Solomon, Israel was a great nation, divided

indeed into many branches and sections, but bound together by covenant, whose life did not at all revolve around one great city alone." We value such critical judgments according to great historical points of view, but confess not to understand why קריה must just be the chief city and may not be any city, and how on the whole a language which had not as yet framed the conception of the state (post-bibl. מדינה), when it would describe the community individually and as a whole, could speak otherwise than of city and people.

Ver. 11 By the blessing of the upright a city is exalted,
But by the mouth of the godless it is broken down.

This verse is related, in the way of confirming it, to ver. 10. The LXX., which omits ver. 4, here omits 10b and 11a, and combines 10a and 11b into one proverb (*vid.* Lagarde). The meaning is clear: "by the benedictions and pious prayers of the upright a city rises always to a higher eminence and prosperity; while, on the contrary, the deceitful, arrogant, blasphemous talk of the godless brings ruin to it" (Fl.). The nearest contrast to "by the blessing of the upright" would be "by the cursing of the wicked," but not in the sense of the poet, who means to say that the city raises itself by the blessing of the upright, and on the contrary, when godless men are exalted, then by their words (whose blessing is no better than their curse) it comes to ruin. קרת (= קריה) occurs only four times in Proverbs, and in Job xxix. 7.

Ver. 12. There now follow two proverbs which refer to the intercourse of private life.

He who mocketh his neighbour is devoid of understanding;
But the intelligent man remaineth silent.

xiv. 21 is a proverb similarly beginning with בן לרעהו; xiii. 13 is another beginning with בן לרבר. From this one sees that בן ל (cf. בן ל, Isa. xxxvii. 22) does not mean a speaking contemptuously in one's presence; as also from vi. 30, that contemptuous treatment, which expresses itself not in mockery but in insult, is thus named; so that we do not possess a German [nor an English] expression which completely covers it. Whoever in a derisive or insulting manner, whether it be publicly or privately, degrades his neighbour, is unwise (בן סרל as pred., like vi. 32); an intelligent man, on the contrary, keeps silent, keeps his judgment to himself, abstains from arrogant criticisms, for he knows that he is not infallible, that he is not acquainted with the heart, and he pos-

sesses too much self-knowledge to raise himself above his neighbour as a judge, and thinks that contemptuous rejection, unamiable, reckless condemnation, does no good, but on the contrary does evil on all sides.

Ver. 13 He who goeth about tattling revealeth secrets;

But he who is of a faithful spirit concealeth a matter.

The tattler is called רָכִיל (intensive form of רָכַל), from his going hither and thither. אֲנִשֵּׁי רָכִיל, Ezek. xxii. 9, are men given to tattling, backbiters; הוֹלֵךְ רָכִיל (cf. Lev. xix. 16), one of the tattlers or backbiters goes, a divulger of the matter, a tell-tale. It is of such an one that the proverb speaks, that he reveals the secret (סוֹד, properly the being close together for the purpose of private intercourse, then that intercourse itself, *vid.* at Ps. xxv. 14); one has thus to be on his guard against confiding in him. On the contrary, a נֶאֱמָן רִיחַ, *firmus (fidus) spiritu*, properly one who is established, or reflexively one who proves himself firm and true (*vid.* at Gen. xv. 6), conceals a matter, keeps it back from the knowledge and power of another. Zückler rightly concludes, in opposition to Hitzig, from the parallelism that the הוֹלֵךְ רָכִיל is subject; the arrangement going before also shows that this is the "ground-word" (Ewald); in xx. 19a the relation is reversed: the revealer of secrets is rightly named (cf. Sir. xxvii. 16, ὁ ἀποκαλύπτων μυστήρια, κ.τ.λ.).

Ver. 14 Where there is no direction a people fall;

But where there is no want of counsellors there is safety.

Regarding תִּתְּכִלּוֹת, *vid.* at i. 5. There it means rules of self-government; here, rules for the government of the people, or, since the *pluralis* denotes a multiplicity in unity, circumspect *κυβέρνησις*. With 14b, xxiv. 6b (where direction in war, as here in peace, is spoken of, and the meaning of the word specializes itself accordingly) agrees; cf. also xv. 22b. Hitzig criticises the proverb, remarking, "we who have the longest resorted to many counsellors, as a consequence of the superabundance have learned to say, 'Too many cooks spoil the broth,' and, 'He who asks long, errs.'" But the truth of the clause 14b is in modern times more fully illustrated in the region of ecclesiastical and political affairs; and in general it is found to be true that it is better with a people when they are governed according to the laws and conclusions which have resulted from the careful deliberation of many competent and authorized men, than when their fate is entrusted

unconditionally to one or to a few. The proverb, it must be acknowledged, refers not to counsellors such as in Isa. iii. 3, but as in Isa. i. 26.

Ver. 15. There follow now two proverbs regarding kindness which brings injury and which brings honour:

It fares ill, nothing but ill, with one who is surety for another;
But he who hateth suretyship remaineth in quietness.

More closely to the original: It goes ill with him; for the proverb is composed as if the writer had before his eyes a definite person, whom one assails when he for whom he became security has not kept within the limits of the performance that was due. Regarding עֲרַב with the accus. of the person: to represent one as a surety for him, and יָר as denoting the other (the stranger), *vid.* at vi. 1. The meaning of יָר יָרֹעַ is seen from xx. 16a. יָרֹעַ is, like xiii. 20, the *fut. Niph.* of רָעַע, or of רָעַע = רָעַע, after the forms יָעֹר, יָעֹר (Olsk. § 265e). The added יָר has, like עֲרִיבָה, Hab. iii. 9, the same function as the *inf. absol. (intensivus)*; but as the *infin. form* יָר could only be *inf. constr.* after the form יָרֵךְ, Jer. v. 26, the *infinitive absol.* must be יָרֵךְ: thus יָר is an accus., or what is the same, an adverbial adj.: he is badly treated (maltreated) in a bad way, for one holds him to his words and, when he cannot or will not accomplish that which is due in the room of him for whom he is bail, arrests him. He, on the contrary, who hates חֻקָּיִם has good rest. The persons of such as become surety by striking the hands cannot be meant, but perhaps people thus becoming surety by a hand-stroke,—such sureties, and thus such suretyship, he cannot suffer; חֻקָּיִם approaches an abstract [“striking hands,” instead of “those who strike hands”] in connection with this שֵׁנָה, expressing only a strong impossibility, as חֻבָּלִים, Zech. ii. 7, 14, means uniting together in the sense of combination.

Ver. 16 A gracious woman retaineth honour,
And strong men retain riches.

The LXX. had אִשָּׁה חַלְלָה (not אִשָּׁה חַלָּה) in view: γυνή εὐχάριστος ἐρείπει ἀνδρὶ δόξαν,—this ἀνδρὶ is an interpolation inserted for the sake of the added line, θρόνος δὲ ἀτιμίας γυνή μισοῦσα δίκαια. The proverb thus expanded is on both sides true: an amiable woman (*gratiosa*) brings honour to her husband, gives him relief, while one who hates the right (that which is good, gentle) is a disgraceful vessel (opp. כְּבוֹד, Isa. xxii. 23), which disfigures the

household, makes the family unloved, and lowers it. But the commencing line, by which 16*b* is raised to an independent distich, is so much the more imperfect: *πλούτου ὀκνηροὶ ἐνδεεῖς γίνονται*; for that the negligent (idle) bring it not to riches, is, as they are wont in Swabia to call such truisms, a *Dinsenwahrheit*. But it is important that the translation of 16*b*, οἱ δὲ ἀνδρεῖοι ἐρείδονται πλούτῳ (the Syr. has "knowledge" for riches), presupposes the phrase *יְחִיזִים* (cf. x. 4, LXX.), and along with it this, that *יְחִיזִים* is so rendered as if the words were *יְחִיזִים בְּעִשִׂי*, is to be regarded as unhistorical. If we now take the one proverb as it is found in the Hebr. text, then the repetition of the *חַמֵּךְ* in the two lines excites a prejudice in favour of it. The meaning of this otherwise difficult *חַמֵּךְ* is missed by Löwenstein and Zückler: a gracious woman retaineth honour (Symm. *ἀνθέξεται δόξης*); for (1) *חַמֵּךְ חַיִּל* would better agree with this predicate, and (2) it is evident from xxix. 23 that *חַמֵּךְ כְּבוֹד* is not to be understood in the sense of *firmiter tenere*, but in the inchoative sense of *consequi honorem*, whence also the *ἐγείρει ἀνδρῶν* of the LXX. It is true that xxxi. 30 states that "grace (*חַסֵּד*) is nothing," and that all depends on the fear of God; but here the poet thinks on "grace" along with the fear of God, or he thinks on them as not separated from each other; and since it is doubly true, which is moreover besides this true, that a wife of gracious outward appearance and demeanour obtains honour, her company is sought, she finds her way into the best society, they praise her attractive, pleasant appearance, and that the husband also of such a wife participates to some extent in this honour. Experience also confirms it, that the *אֲרִיזִים*, strong men, obtain riches (cf. Isa. xlix. 25); and this statement regarding the *אֲרִיזִים* fits better as a contrast to 16*a*, as a like statement regarding the *חַרְוִיזִים*, diligent, for the *אֲרִיזִים* (from *אָרַז*, to place in terror, Ps. x. 18), whose power consists in terrorism or violence, is the most direct contrast of a wife, this *σκευὸς ἀσθενέστερον*, who by heart-winning attraction makes yet better conquests: she thereby obtains a higher good, viz. honour, while the former gains only riches, for "a name" (viz. a good one) "is better than great riches," xxii. 1. If we read *חַרְוִיזִים*, this thoughtful contrast is lost.

Three proverbs regarding benevolence:

Ver. 17 The benevolent man doeth good to his own soul,
And the violent man brings trouble on his own flesh.

Many interpreters reverse the relation of subject and predicate

(Targ. only in 17*b*, after the phrase וְחַסְדִּיבִיר, for which the Syr. has only (חֲסִידִיבִיר): *qui sibi ipsi benefacit, is quidem erga alios quoque benignus præsумitur, quum caritas ordinata a se ipsa incipiat; qui vero carnem suam male habet, est crudelis erga alios* (Michaelis). But this cannot be established; for certainly it occurs that whoever does good to himself does good also to others, and that whoever is hard against himself also judges and treats others harshly; but in by far the greatest number of cases the fact is this, that he who does not deny anything to himself is in relation to others an egoist, and this is not a "benevolent man;" and, on the contrary, that he who denies to himself lawful enjoyments is in relation to others capable of self-denial and self-sacrifice, and thus is the contrast of a "violent man." The word of Sirach, xiv. 5, ὁ ποιητὴς ἑαυτοῦ τίνα ἀγαθὸς ἔσται, to which Bertheau appeals, alludes to the niggard, and it is true indeed that this עֲבֵר יִשְׂאֹר, but not every עֲבֵר יִשְׂאֹר, is a niggard. Thus the "benevolent man" and the "violent man" will be the two subject conceptions, and as it is said of the benevolent (חֲסִידִיבִיר as e.g. Hos. vi. 6, of a more restricted sense, as Isa. lvii. 1) that he does good (בִּיטָל, viz. טוב, xxxi. 12), so of the violent (unmerciful) (אֲכַבֵּר as xii. 20, Jer. vi. 23, l. 42) that he brings evil on his own flesh (LXX. αὐτοῦ σῶμα); for יִשְׂאֹר as a parallel word to נִפְשִׁי (cf. p. 195) signifies not blood-relations (Symm., Jerome, Luther, and Grotius), but it has here, as at Mic. iii. 2, its nearest signification, from which it then comes to signify those who are of our flesh and blood. But for that reason the meaning of the poet cannot be that given by Elster: "he who exercises benevolence toward others creates within himself a determination which penetrates his whole being with generous and fruitful warmth, as on the other hand the feeling of hatred deprives the heart of him who cherishes it of the true fountain of life." If this were meant, then soul and spirit, not soul and flesh, would stand in parallelism. The weal and woe refers thus to the divine retribution which requites the conduct of a man toward his neighbours, according to its character, with reward or punishment (Hitzig, Zöckler).

Ver. 18. Man consists of body and soul. In regard to both, benevolence brings its reward, and hatred its punishment.

The godless acquires deceptive gain;

But he that soweth righteousness, a true reward.

Jerome makes 18*b* an independent clause, for he translates it as if

the word were written *וְלֹאֵרֶ*; the Syr. and Targ. also, as if *עֲקָרָהּ* (his fidelity is his reward). But according to the text as it stands, *עֲקָרָהּ* extends its regimen to both parts of the verse; to make is here equivalent to, to work out, to acquire, *περιποιεῖσθαι*, as Gen. xxxi. 1, Jer. xvii. 11, etc. The labour of the godless has selfishness as its motive, and what he acquires by his labour is therefore "delusive gain,"—it is no blessing, it profits him not (x. 2), and it brings him no advantage (x. 16). He, on the contrary, acquires truth, i.e. a truly profitable and enduring reward, who sows right-doing, or better: good-doing, by which we also, as the biblical moral in *צְדָקָה*, think principally of well-doing, unselfish activity and self-sacrificing love. Hos. x. 12 speaks of sowing which has only *צְדָקָה* as the norm; and how *צְדָקָה* is understood is seen from the parallel use of *חֶסֶד* [piety]. The "true reward" is just the harvest by which the sowing of the good seed of noble benevolent actions is rewarded.

Ver. 19 Genuine righteousness reaches to life,
And he who pursues evil does it to his death.

The LXX. translate *νὸς δίκαιος*, and the Syrian follows this unwarrantable *quid pro quo*; the Bible uses the phrase *בְּיָעוּלָהּ* and the like, but not *בְּנִצְרָהּ*. The *Græc. Venet.* (translating *οὐδὲν*) deprives the distich of its supposed independence. The Targ. renders *כִּן* with the following *ו* as correlates, *sic . . . uti*; but *כִּן* in comparative proverbs stands naturally in the second, and not in the first place (*vid.* p. 10). Without doubt *כִּן* is here a noun. It appears to have a personal sense, according to the parallel *וְיִמְרָרָהּ*, on which account Elster explains it: he who is firm, steadfast in righteousness, and Zöckler: he who holds fast to righteousness; but *כִּן* cannot mean "holding fast," nor does *מְכֻנָּן*;—"fast" does not at all agree with the meaning of the word, it means upright, and in the ethical sense genuine; thus Ewald better: "he who is of genuine righteousness," but "genuine in (of) righteousness" is a tautological connection of ideas. Therefore we must regard *כִּן* as a substantival neuter, but neither the *rectum* of Cocceius nor the *firmum* of Schultens furnishes a naturally expressed suitable thought. Or is *כִּן* a substantive in the sense of 2 Kings vii. 31? The word denotes the pedestal, the pillar, the standing-place; but what can the basis refer to here (Euchel)? Rather read "aim" (Oetinger) or "direction" (Löwenstein); but *כִּן* does not take its meaning from the *IIph.* *כִּי־כִן*. One might almost

assume that the *Chokma*-language makes כֵּן, *taliter*, a substantive, and has begun to use it in the sense of *qualitas* (like the post-bibl. אֵיכוּה), so that it is to be explained: the quality of righteousness tendeth to life. But must we lose ourselves in conjectures or in modifications of the text (Hitzig, כִּנִּים, as a banner), in order to gain a meaning from the word, which already has a meaning? We say דִּבֶּר כֵּן, to speak right (Num. xxvii. 7), and עָשׂוֹת כֵּן, to do right (Eccles. viii. 10); in both cases כֵּן means standing = consisting, steadfast, right, *recte*. The contrast is לֹא-כֵן, 2 Kings vii. 9, which is also once used as a substantive, Isa. xvi. 6: the unrighteousness of his words. So here כֵּן is used as a substantive connected in the genitive, but not so that it denotes the right holding, retaining of righteousness, but its right quality,—אֱמֻנָה-שְׁלֵצִירָה, as Rashi explains it, *i.e.*, as we understand it: genuineness, or genuine showing of righteousness, which is not mere appearance without reality. That בְּנִים denotes such people as seek to appear not otherwise than what they truly are, is in favour of this interpretation. Such genuine righteousness as follows the impulse of the heart, and out of the fulness of the heart does good, has life as its result (xix. 23), an inwardly happy and externally a prosperous life; on the other hand, he who wilfully pursues evil, and finds in it satisfaction, brings death upon himself: he does it to his death, or if we make (which is also possible) דָּרָךְ the subject: it tends to his death. Thus in other words: Love is life; hatred destroys life.

The following proverbs are especially directed, as connected with this כֵּן, against the contradiction of the external appearance and of the masked internal nature.

Ver. 20 An abomination to Jahve are the crookedly dishonest of heart,
And they who are of honest walk are His delight.

We read, ii. 15, viii. 8, עֲקֹשׁ (the form of the transgressions); but here, where the "crookedness" is transferred to the heart, we require another word, which renders the idea of falseness, the contrary of directness, lying in it, without any mixture of the fundamental conception *flexuosus* or *tortuosus*. בְּהָטִיטִי דֶרֶךְ are not only those whose walk is externally without offence and blameless, but, in conformity with the contrast, those whose manner of conduct proceeds from a disposition that is pure, free from deception and concealment. Jerome, *et voluntas ejus in iis qui simpliciter ambulant*. But the word is not בְּהָטִיטִי; they [the upright] are

themselves His רַעְיוֹן (xi. 1) [delight]: He regards them, and only them, with satisfaction.

Ver. 21 Assuredly [the hand to it] the wicked remaineth not unpunished,
But the seed of the righteous is delivered.

The LXX. render here, as xvi. 5, where the יָד יָד repeats itself, *χειρὶ χειρας ἐμβαλὼν ἀδίκως*, which is not to be understood, as Evagrius supposes, of one that can be bribed, but only of a violent person; the Syr. and Targ. have the same reference; but the subject is certainly יָד, and a governing word, as נָשָׂא (2 Sam. xx. 21), is wanting, to say nothing of the fact that the phrase "one hand against the other" would require the words to be יָד בְּיָד. Jerome and the *Græc. Venet.*, without our being able, however, to see their meaning. The translation of the other Greek versions is not given. The Jewish interpreters offer nothing that is worthy, as *e.g.* Immanuel and Meiri explain it by "immediately," which in the modern Hebr. would require מִיָּד, and besides is not here suitable. The Midrash connects with 21a the earnest warning that he who sins with the one hand and with the other does good, is nevertheless not free from punishment. Schultens has an explanation to give to the words which is worthy of examination: hand to hand, *i.e.* after the manner of an inheritance *per posteros* (Ex. xx. 5), resting his opinion on this, that Arab. *yad* (cf. יָד, Isa. lvi. 5) is used among other significations in that of authorizing an inheritance. Gesenius follows him, but only urging the idea of the sequence of time (cf. Pers. *dest bedest*, hand to hand = continuing after one another), and interprets יָד בְּיָד as Fleischer does: *ab ætate in ætatem non (i.e. nullo unquam tempore futuro) erit impunis scelestus, sed posterī justorum salvi erunt.* According to Böttcher, "hand to hand" is equivalent to from one hand to another, and this corresponds to the thought expressed in Plutarch's *de sera numinis vindicta*: if not immediately, yet at last. We may refer in vindication of this to the fact that, as the Arab. lexicographers say, *yad*, used of the course of time, means the extension (*madd*) of time, and then a period of time. But for the idea expressed by *nunquam*, or *neutiquam*, or *tandem aliquando*, the language supplied to the poet a multitude of forms, and we do not see why he should have selected just this expression with its primary meaning *alternatim* not properly agreeing with the connection. Therefore we prefer with Ewald to regard יָד יָד as a formula of confirmation derived from the common speech of the

people: hand to hand (ל as in לָדֵי, Job xvii. 3), *i.e.* the hand for it [I pledge it, guarantee it] (Bertheau, Hitzig, Elster, Zückler). But if 21a assures by the pledge of the hand, and as it were lays a wager to it, that the wicked shall not go unpunished, then the genitive in יָדֵי צַדִּיקִים is not that of dependence by origin, but, as Isa. lxxv. 23, i. 4, the genitive of apposition, for זֶרַע here, as דֹּר, Ps. xxiv. 6, cxii. 2, denotes a oneness of like origin and of like kind, but with a preponderance of the latter. נִמְלֵט is the 3d *pret.*, which by the preceding fut. retains the reference to the future: the merited punishment comes on the wicked, but the generation of the righteous escapes the judgment. רָע has the ר dagheshed (*Michlol* 63b) according to the rule of the רֶחֶק, according to which the consonant first sounded after a word terminating in an accented *a* or *é* is doubled, which is here, as at xv. 1, done with the ר.

Ver. 22 A golden ring in a swine's snout,—
A fair woman and without delicacy.

This is the first instance of an emblematical proverb in which the first and second lines are related to each other as figure and its import, *vid.* p. 9. The LXX. translates rhythmically, but by its ὠσπερ . . . οὕτως it destroys the character of this picture-book proverbial form. The nose-ring, נֶזֶם, generally attached to the right nostril and hanging down over the mouth (*vid.* Lane's *Manners*, *etc.*) is a female ornament that has been in use since the time of the patriarchs (Gen. xxiv. 47). If one supposes such a ring in a swine's snout, then in such a thing he has the emblem of a wife in whom beauty and the want of culture are placed together in direct contrast. טַעַם is taste carried over into the intellectual region, the capability of forming a judgment, Job xii. 20, and particularly the capability of discovering that which is right and adapted to the end in view, 1 Sam. xxv. 33 (of Abigail), here in accordance with the figure of a beast with which the ideas of uncleanness, shamelessness, and rudeness are associated, a mind for the noble, the fine, the fitting, that which in the higher and at the same time intellectual and ethical sense we call tact (*fine feeling*); קִרְיָה (*alienata*) denotes the want of this capacity, not without the accompanying idea of self-guilt.

Ver. 23 The desire of the righteous is nothing but good,
The expectation of the godless is presumption.

This is usually explained with Fleischer: If the righteous wish for

anything, their wish reaches to no other than a fortunate issue; but if the godless hope for anything, then there is to them in the end as their portion, not the good they hoped for, but wrath (x. 28, cf. xi. 4). However, that עֲבָרָה is at once to be understood thus, as יום עֲבָרָה, and that the phrase is to be rendered: the hope of the godless is God's wrath, is doubtful. But עֲבָרָה denotes also want of moderation, and particularly in the form of presumption, xxi. 24, Isa. xvi. 6; and thus we gain the thought that the desire of the righteous is directed only to that which is good, and thus to an object that is attainable because well-pleasing to God, while on the contrary the hope of the godless consists only in the suggestions of their presumption, and thus is vain self-deceit. The punctuation חֲזוֹת צְדִיקִים is contrary to rule; correct texts have חֲזוֹת צְדִיקִים, for *Dechl* stands before *Athnach* only if the *Athnach*-word has two syllables (*Torath Emeth*, p. 43; *Accentssystem*, xviii. § 4).

Three proverbs regarding giving which is not loss but gain.

Ver. 24 There is one who giveth bounteously, and he increaseth still more;
And (there is) one who withholdeth what is due, only to his loss.

The first of the proverbs with יֵשׁ (there is), which are peculiar to the first collection (*vid.* p. 32). The meaning is, that the possessions of the liberal giver do not decrease but increase, and that, on the contrary, the possessions of the niggardly do not increase but decrease. מִפְּנֵי is not to be understood after Ps. cxii. 9. Instead of וְנוֹקֵף עוֹד the three Erfurt codd. have וְנוֹקֵף (with retrogression of the tone?), which Hitzig approves of; but the traditional phrase which refers (*et qui augetur insuper*) וְנוֹסֵף not to the possession of him who scattereth, but to himself, is finer in the expression. In the characteristic of the other, מִיֵּשֶׁר is commonly interpreted comparatively: *plus æquo* (Cocceius) or *justo* (Schelling). But מִן after הִשָּׁדֶה is to be regarded as governed by it, and יֵשֶׁר denotes not competence, riches, as Arab. *yusr* (Bertheau, Zöckler), also not uprightness = beneficence (Midrash, מִן הַצְדִּיקָה), but duty, uprightness, as Job xxxiii. 23, where it denotes that which is advantageous to man, as here that which befits him: he who holds back, namely himself, from that which is due to himself, and thus should permit to himself, such an one profits nothing at all by this ἀφειδία (17b, Col. ii. 23), but it tends only to loss to him, only to the lessening of that which he possesses. We shall meet with this (לְמַחְסוֹר) xiv. 23, and frequently again—it is a common Mashal formula (cf. καὶ τόσῳ μᾶλλον ὑστερεῖται, Sir. xi. 11). The

cause of the strange phenomenon that the liberal gains and the niggardly loses is not here expressed, but the following proverb gives the explanation of it:

Ver. 25 A liberal soul [soul of blessing] is made fat,
And he that watereth others is also watered.

A synonymous distich (*vid.* p. 7). A soul of blessing is one from whom blessings go out to others, who is even a blessing to all with whom he comes into fellowship; בִּרְכָה denotes also particularly the gifts of love, 1 Sam. xxv. 27, בִּרְה denotes, if the Arab. is right, which derives it from the fundamental idea "to spread out:" to cause to increase and prosper by means of word and deed. The blessing which goes out from such a soul comes back again to itself: תִּרְשֶׁן (as xiii. 4, xxviii. 25), it is made fat, gains thereby sap and strength in fulness; the *Pual* refers to the ordinance of God; xxii. 9 is kindred in meaning to this *anima benefica pinguescit*. In 25b יִרְא is the Aramaic form of writing, but without the Aramaic vocalization (cf. i. 10 תִּרְא, Isa. xxi. 12 וִירְא). Perhaps the א makes it noticeable that here a different word from יִרְא, morning rain, is used; however, Symm. translates πρωϊνός, and the *Græc. Venet.* (Kimchi following it) ὑετός. As a rule, we do not derive יִרְא from יִרְא, of which it would be the *Hophal* (= יִרְא, as הִרְע, Lev. iv. 23, = הִרְע) (Ewald, § 131 f.); for the idea *conspersgitur*, which the *Ho.* of the *Hiph.* יִרְא, Hos. vi. 3, expresses, is, as correlate to מִרְא, as a parallel word to תִּרְשֶׁן, one not of equal force. Jerome was guided by correct feeling, for he translates: *et qui inebriat ipse quoque inebriabitur*. The stem-word is certainly יִרְא, whether it is with Hitzig to be punctuated יִרְא = יִרְא, or with Fleischer we are to regard יִרְא as derived *per metathesin* from יִרְא, as for Arab. *áráy* (to cause to see) is used¹ the vulgar Arab. *áway* (in the Syr. Arab.) and *áway* (in the Egypt. Arab.). We prefer the latter, for the passing of יִרְא (from יִרְא) into יִרְא is according to rule, *vid.* at xxiii. 21.

Ver. 26 Whoso withholdeth corn, him the people curse;
But blessing is on the head of him that selleth it.

This proverb is directed against the corn-usurer, whose covetousness and deceitful conduct is described Amos viii. 4–8. But whilst it is there said that they cannot wait till the burdensome

¹ Hitzig's comparison of *rawaâ*, *finem respicere*, as transposed from *waray* is incorrect; the former verb, which signifies to consider, thus appears to be original.

interruption of their usurious conduct on account of the sacred days come to an end, the figure here is of a different aspect of their character: they hold back their stores of corn in the times of scarcity, for they speculate on receiving yet higher prices for it. בָּר (from בָּרַר, to purify, to be pure) is thrashed grain, cf. Arab. *burr*, wheat, and *nakky* of the cleaning of the grain by the separation from it of the tares, etc. (Fl.); the word has *Kametz*, according to the Masora, as always in pause and in the history of Joseph. מָנַע has *Munach* on the syllable preceding the last, on which the tone is thrown back, and *Metheg* with the *Tsere* as the sign of a pause, as i. 10 בָּנָע (vid. p. 67). מִשְׁבִּיר, *qui annonam vendit*, is denom. of שָׁבַר, properly that which is crushed, therefore grain (Fl.). לְאִשִּׁים, which we would understand in the Proph. of nations, are here, as at xxiv. 24, the individuals of the people. The בְּרָכָה which falls on the head of the charitable is the thanks of his fellow-citizens, along with all good wishes.

That self-sacrificing endeavour after the good of others finds its reward in the thought encircling the following proverbs.

Ver. 27 He that striveth after good, seeketh that which is pleasing;
And he that searcheth after evil, it shall find him.

Here we have together three synonyms of seeking: בָּקַשׁ (R. בָּק, *findere*), which has the general meaning *quærere*, from the root-idea of penetrating and pressing forwards; דָּרַשׁ (R. דָּר, *terere*), which from the root-idea of trying (proving) corresponds to the Lat. *studere*; and שָׁחַר (whence here שָׁחַר instead of מִשְׁחַר, as דָּבַר instead of מְדַבֵּר), which means *mane*, and thus *sedulo quærere* (vid. at i. 28). From 27b, where by רָעָה is meant evil which one prepares for another, there arises for טוב the idea of good thoughts and actions with reference to others. He who applies himself to such, seeks therewith that which is pleasing, i.e. that which pleases or does good to others. If that which is pleasing to God were meant, then this would have been said (cf. xii. 2); the idea here is similar to x. 32, and the word יִבְקֹשׁ is used, and not יִמְצֵא, because reference is not made to a fact in the moral government of the world, but a description is given of one who is zealously intent upon good, and thus of a noble man. Such an one always asks himself (cf. Matt. vii. 12): what will, in the given case, be well-pleasing to the neighbour, what will tend to his true satisfaction? Regarding the punctuation here, שָׁחַר, vid. at ver. 26. The subject תְּבוֹאֵשׁ, which, x. 24, stands as the fundamental idea, here follows

from the governed נָעַר, which may be the gen. (Ps. xxxviii. 13) as well as the accus.

Ver. 28 He that trusteth in his riches shall fall,

And the righteous shall flourish like the green leaf.

יָפֹא (plene after the Masora) as well as the figure נִכְעָלָה (cf. for the punctuation נִכְעָלָה, x. 26) are singular, but are understood if one observes that in 28a a withered tree, and in 28b a tree with leaves ever green, hovers before the imagination of the poet (cf. Ps. i. 3, Jer. xvii. 8). The proud rich man, who on the ground of his riches appears to himself to be free from danger, goes on to his ruin (יָפֹא as xi. 5, and frequently in the Book of Proverbs), while on the contrary the righteous continues to flourish like the leaf—they thus resemble the trees which perennially continue to flourish anew. Regarding עֹלָה as originally collective (Symm. θάλλος), vid. at Isa. i. 30, and regarding פָּרַח (R. פָּר, to break), here of the continual breaking forth of fresh-growing leaf-buds, vid. at Isa. xi. 1. The apostolic word names this continual growth the metamorphosis of believers, 2 Cor. ii. 18. The LXX. has read נִכְעָלָה (approved by Hitzig): and he who raiseth up the righteous.

Ver. 29 He that troubleth his own household shall inherit the wind,

And a fool becomes servant to the wise in heart.

Jerome well translates: *qui conturbat domum suam*, for עָבַר closely corresponds to the Lat. *turbare*; but with what reference is the troubling or disturbing here meant? The Syr. translates 29a doubly, and refers it once to deceit, and the second time to the contrary of avarice; the LXX., by ὁ μὴ συμπεριφερόμενος τῇ ἑαυτοῦ οἰκῇ, understands one who acts towards his own not unsociably, or without affability, and thus not tyrannically. But עָבַר xi. 17, is he who does not grudge to his own body that which is necessary; עָבַר יִשְׂרָאֵל is applied to Elijah, 1 Kings xviii. 17, on account of whose prayer there was a want of rain; and at xv. 27 it is the covetous who is spoken of as עָבַר בֵּיתוֹ. The proverb has, accordingly, in the man who “troubles his own house” (Luth.), a niggard and sordid person (Hitzig) in view, one who does not give to his own, particularly to his own servants, a sufficiency of food and of necessary recreation. Far from raising himself by his household arrangements, he shall only inherit wind (יִנְחָל, not as the Syr. translates, יִנְחָל, in the general signification to inherit, to obtain, as iii. 35, xxviii. 10, etc.), i.e. he goes always farther and farther back (for he deprives his servants of all pleasure and love

for their work in seeking the prosperity of his house), till in the end the reality of his possession dissolves into nothing. Such conduct is not only loveless, but also foolish; and a foolish person (*vid.* regarding לֵאמֹל at i. 7) has no influence as the master of a house, and generally is unable to maintain his independence: "and the servant is a fool to him who is wise of heart." Thus the LXX. (cf. also the LXX. of x. 5), Syr., Targ., Jerome, *Græc. Venet.*, Luth. construe the sentence. The explanation, *et servus stulti cordato (sc. addicitur)*, i.e. even the domestics of the covetous fool are at last partakers in the wise beneficence (Fl.), places 29b in an unnecessary connection with 29a, omits the verb, which is here scarcely superfluous, and is not demanded by the accentuation (cf. *e.g.* xix. 22b).

Ver. 30 The fruit of the righteous is a tree of life,
And the wise man winneth souls.

The LXX. translate, ἐκ καρποῦ δικαιοσύνης φύεται δένδρον ζωῆς; Hitzig takes thence the word פֶּרִי; but this translation discredits itself by the unnatural reversal of the relation of fruit and tree. The fruit of the righteous is here not the good which his conduct brings to him, as Isa. iii. 10, Jer. xxxii. 19, but his activity itself proceeding from an internal impulse. This fruit is a tree of life. We need to supplement פֶּרִי [fruit] as little here as אֹרֶחַ [a traveller] at x. 17; for the meaning of the proverb is, that the fruit of the righteous, i.e. his external influence, itself is a tree of life (*vid.* p. 32), namely for others, since his words and actions exert a quickening, refreshing, happy influence upon them. By this means the wise (righteousness and wisdom come together according to the saying of the *Chokma*, i. 7a) becomes a winner of souls (לָקַח as vi. 25, but taken in *bonam partem*), or, as expressed in the N. T. (Matt. iv. 19), a fisher of men, for he gains them not only for himself, but also for the service of wisdom and righteousness.

Ver. 31 Lo, the righteous findeth on earth his reward;
How much more the godless and the sinner!

The particles אִם כִּי signify properly, interrogatively: Shall it yet be said that . . .; it corresponds to the German "*geschweige denn*" [*nedum*] (Fl.). הֵן is already in bibl. Hebr. in the way of becoming a conditional particle; it opens, as here, the antecedent of a *gradatio a minori ad majus* introduced by כִּי אִם, Job xv. 15 f., xxv. 5 f., cf. הֵן (הנה) with וְאִיךָ following, Gen. xlv. 8, 2 Sam. xii. 18. xiii. 13 presents itself as the nearest parallel to הֵן אִם, where it means, to

be rewarded. It is a *vocabulum anceps*, and denotes full requital, *i.e.*, according to the reference, either righteous reward or righteous punishment. If 30a is understood of reward, and 30b of punishment, then the force of the argument in the conclusion consists in this, that the righteous can put forth no claim to a recompense, because his well-doing is never so perfect as not to be mingled with sin (Eccles. vii. 20; Ps. cxliii. 2); while, on the contrary, the repression of the wicked, who, as עֲשֵׂה as to his intention, and נִרְיָה as to his conduct, actually denies his dependence on God, is demanded by divine holiness. But the conclusion is not stringent, since in the relation of God to the righteous His dispensation of grace and faithfulness to promises also come into view, and thus in both cases עֲשֵׂה appears to require the same interpretation: if the righteous does not remain unrevengeed, so much more shall not the godless and the sinner remain . . ., or how much less shall the godless and the sinner remain so. Thus the *Græc. Venet.*, Θεῶν ὁ δίκαιος ἐν τῇ γῇ ἀποτιθήσεται; thus also Luther, and among the moderns Löwenstein and Elster. Of the proverb so understood the LXX. version, εἰ ὁ μὲν δίκαιος μόλις (μόγισ) σώζεται, ὁ ἀσεβὴς καὶ ἁμαρτωλὸς ποῦ φανείται (cf. 1 Pet. iv. 18), may be a free translation, for in the עֲשֵׂה there certainly lies, according to the sense, a עֲשֵׂה עֲשֵׂה. Also עֲשֵׂה has the principal tone, not עֲשֵׂה. The thought: even on this side (on earth), lies beyond the sphere of the O. T. consciousness. The earth is here the world of man.

Three proverbs on knowledge, the favour of God, firmness and the means thereto.

xii. 1 He loveth correction who loveth knowledge,

And he hateth instruction who is without reason.

It is difficult in such cases to say which is the relation of the ideas that is intended. The sequence of words which lies nearest in the Semitic substantival clause is that in which the predicate is placed first; but the subject may, if it is to be made prominent, stand at the head of the sentence. Here, 1b, the placing of the subject in advance recommends itself: one who hates instruction is devoid of reason. But since we have no reason in 1a to invert the order of the words as they lie together, we take the conceptions placed first in both cases as the predicates. Thus: he who loves knowledge shows and proves that he does so by this, that he willingly puts himself in the place of a learner; and devoid of reason is he who with aversion rejects reproof, which is designed to guard him from

future mistakes and false steps. Regarding the punctuation אֶהְיֶה רָעָה (with *Mercha* on the ante-penult. and the העמרה-sign on the penult.), *vid.* at xi. 26 f., i. 19. In 1b the *Munach* in מוֹכַחַח is transformed from *Mugrash* (*Accentssystem*, xviii. § 2), as in xv. 10b. בָּעֵר (cf. xxx. 2) is a being who is stupid as the brute cattle (בָּעִיר, from בָּעַר, to graze, cattle of all kinds; Arab. *b'ayr*, the beast κατ' ἐξ., i.e. the camel); as a *homo brutus* is compared to a בְּהֵמָה (Ps. xlix. 21, lxxiii. 22), and is called Arab. *behymt*, from *bahym*, "shut up" (spec. *dabb*, a bear; *thwr*, an ox; *hamâr*, an ass) (Fl.).

Ver. 2 A good man obtaineth favour with Jahve,
But the man of wicked devices He condemns.

He who is an אִישׁ מְצִיטוֹת (xiv. 17, cf. Ps. xxxvii. 7) is defined in xxiv. 8 (cf. p. 39): he is a man of devices (*vid.* regarding the etymon, p. 56), namely, that are wicked, one who contrives evil against his neighbour. The meaning of the subject-conception טוב is defined according to this, although in itself also it is clear, for טוב, used of God (e.g. Ps. lxxiii. 1, lxxxvi. 5) and of men (xiii. 22, xiv. 14), denotes the good (*bonus*) in the sense of the benevolent (*benignus*); the Scripture truths, that God is love, that love is the essence of goodness and is the fulfilling of the law, are so conformed to reason, that they stamp themselves as immediate component parts of the human consciousness. A טוב is thus a man who acts according to the ruling motive of self-sacrificing love; such an one obtains (*vid.* on יָצִיק, *educit* = *adipiscitur*, at iii. 13) the favour of God, He is and shows Himself kind to him, while on the contrary He condemns the wicked intriguer. Hitzig translates: the former of intrigues is punishable (as the Syr.: is condemned; Targ.: his contrivance is shattered to pieces); but to become a רָשָׁע = *reus* רֵשָׁעִי does not denote, but either to practise רָשָׁע, Job xxxiv. 12, or to set forth as רָשָׁע = to condemn, Isa. l. 9. Taken in the former signification (Jerome, *impie agit*), a declaration is made which is not needed, since the moral badness already lies in the reference of the subject: thus יִרְשָׁע will be used also of Jahve. In proof that the poet did not need to say וְאֶחָדֵינוּ, Zöckler rightly points to x. 6, Job xxii. 29.

Ver. 3 A man does not stand by wickedness,
But the root of the righteous remains unmoved.

In רָשָׁע there lies the idea of want of inward stay (*vid.* at Ps. i. 1); in a manner of thought and of conduct which has no stay in God and His law, there can be expected no external endurance, no solidity.

The righteous, on the contrary, have their root in God; nothing can tear them from the ground in which they are rooted, they are as trees which no storm outroots. The very same thought is clothed in other words in x. 25, and another statement regarding the root of the righteous is found at xii. 12.

We now place together vers. 4-12. One proverb concerning the house-wife forms the beginning of this group, and four regarding the management of the house and business form the conclusion.

Ver. 4 A good [*brave*] wife is the crown of her husband,
But as rottenness in his bones is one that causeth shame.

As xi. 16 says of אִשָּׁת חַן, the pleasant wife (חַן = *χάρις*), that she obtaineth honour, so this proverb of אִשָּׁת חַיִּיל, the good wife (חַיִּיל = *ἀρετή*, *virtus*), that she raises her husband to higher honour: she is for his self-consciousness *στέφανος καυχήσεως* (1 Thess. ii. 19), and is also to him such a crown of honour before the world (cf. xxxi. 23). On the contrary, a מְבִישָׁה, conducting herself shamefully (cf. regarding the double meaning of this *Mishle* word, which only here occurs in the fcn., at x. 5), is to her husband *instar cariei in ossibus*. רָקָב (רָקַב, x. 7) denotes both the *caries* and the worm-hole (cf. Job xli. 19, עֵץ רָקֵב, worm-eaten wood). Like as the *caries* slowly but continuously increases, till at last the part of the body which the bone bears and the whole life of the man falls to ruin; so an unhappy marriage gnaws at the marrow of life, it destroys the happiness of life, disturbs the pursuit, undermines the life of the husband.

Ver. 5 The thoughts of the righteous are justice,
The counsels of the godless are deceit.

They are so, that is, in their contents and their aim. To the righteous are ascribed מַחֲשָׁבוֹת, namely, simple and clear; to the godless, תַּחְבֻּלוֹת, carefully thought out, prudently thought through schemes and measures (regarding the word and the idea, *vid.* p. 57), but on that very account not simple, because with a tendency; for the righteous have an objective rule, namely, that which is right in the sight of God and of men, but the godless have only a selfish purpose, which they seek to attain by deceiving, and at the cost of, their neighbour.

Ver. 6 The word of the godless is to lie in wait for the blood of others,
But the mouth of the upright delivereth them.

Our editions have דברי רשעים, but the right sequence of the accents (in Cod. 1294 and elsewhere) is רברי רשעים; the logical relation in this transformation, which is only rhythmically conditioned, remains the same. The vocalization wavers between ארב, which would be imper., and ארב, which is infin., like ארב, xxv. 7, ארב, xxi. 11, ארב, Gen. iii. 11. However one punctuates it, the infin. is intended in any case, in which the expression always remains sketchy enough: the words of the godless are lying in wait for blood, i.e. they are calculated to bring others to this, into the danger of their lives, e.g. before the tribunal by false charges and false witness. ארב is the accus. of the object; for instead of ארב לרב (i. 11), to lurk for blood, a shorter expression, ארב ארב, is used (Ewald, § 282a). The suffix of ארב might appear, after xi. 6a, to refer back to the ארב; but the thought that their mouth saves the upright, that they thus know to speak themselves out of the danger, is by far less appropriate (*vid.*, on the contrary, ברעת, xi. 9) than the thought that the mouth of the upright delivereth from danger those whose lives are threatened by the godless, as is rightly explained by Ewald, Bertheau, Elster. The personal subject or object is in the Mashal style often to be evolved from the connection, e.g. xiv. 26, xix. 23.

Ver. 7 The godless are overturned and are no more,
But the house of the righteous stands.

Bertheau and Zöckler explain: The wicked turn about, then are they no more; i.e. as we say: it is over with them "in the turning of a hand." The noun in the *inf. absol.* may certainly be the subject, like xvii. 12, as well as the object (Ewald, § 328c), and ארב may be used of the turning about of oneself, Ps. lxxviii. 9, 2 Kings v. 26, 2 Chron. ix. 12. That explanation also may claim for itself that ארב nowhere occurs with a personal object, if we except one questionable passage, Isa. i. 7. But here the interpretation of the ארב as the object lies near the contrast of בית, and moreover the interpretation of the ארב, not in the sense of *στροφήσθαι* (LXX.), but of *καταστροφήσθαι* (Syr., Targ., Jerome, *Græc. Venet.*, Luther), lies near the contrast of ארב. The *inf. absol.* thus leaves the power from which the catastrophe proceeds indefinite, as the *pass. יהפכו* would also leave it, and the act de-

¹ Elias Levita, in his note to the root פה in Kimchi's *Wörterbuch*, reads ארב, and so also do 6 codd. in Kennicot. But ארב is masculine.

signedly presented in a vague manner to connect with 1 the certain consequences therewith, as xxv. 4 f., as if to say: there comes only from some quarter an unparalleled overthrow which overwhelms the godless; thus no rising up again is to be thought on, it is all over with them; while, on the contrary, the house of the righteous withstands the storm which sweeps away the godless.

Ver. 8 According to the measure of his intelligence is a man praised,
And whoever is of a perverse mind is despised.

Everywhere in the *Mishle* שְׁכָל has no other meaning than *intellectus* (*vid.* p. 87). The praise which is given to a man measures itself שְׁכָלוֹ (punctuate לְפִי־שְׁכָלוֹ, according to *Torath Emeth*, p. 41, *Accentssystem*, xx. § 1), *i.e.* according to the measure (so לְפִי is used in the oldest form of the language) of his intelligence, or as we may also say, of his culture; for in these proverbs, which make the fear of God the highest principle, שְׁכָל means also understanding of moral excellence, not merely the intellectual superiority of natural gifts. הֵלֵל is here a relative conception of manifold gradations, but it does not mean renown in general, but good renown. Parallel with שְׁכָלוֹ, לֵב refers to the understanding (*νοῦς*); the rendering of Löwenstein, "who is of false heart," is defective. נֶפֶשׁ (synon. of נֶפֶשׁ and נֶפֶשׁ, but nowhere else interchanging with it) means here *a vero et recto detortus et aversus* (Fl.). Such a man who has not a good understanding, nor any certain rule of judgment, falls under contempt (*Græc. Venet.* τῷ ὀντωτῇ εἰς μυσσαγμόν, after the false reading of יהוה instead of יהיה), *i.e.* he defames himself by his crooked judgment of men, of things and their relations, and is on this account in no position rightly to make use of them.

Ver. 9 Better is he who is lowly and has a servant,
Than he that makes himself mighty and is without bread.

This proverb, like xv. 17, commends the middle rank of life with its quiet excellences. נִקְלָה (like 1 Sam. xviii. 23), from קָלָה, cognate with קָלַל, Syr. 'kly, to despise, properly *levi pendere, levem habere* (whence קָלִיל, scorn, disgrace), here of a man who lives in a humble position and does not seek to raise himself up. Many of the ancients (LXX., Symmachus, Jerome, Syr., Rashi, Luther, Schultens) explain לוֹ יַעֲבֹד by, and is a servant to himself, serves himself; but in that case the words would have been וְעָבַד לְנַפְשׁוֹ (Syr. דִּמְשַׁשְׁשׁ נִפְשָׁה), or rather וְעָבַד הוּא לוֹ. יַעֲבֹד would be more appropriate, as thus pointed by Ziegler, Ewald, and Hitzig. But if one adheres to the traditional reading, and interprets this, as it

must be interpreted: *et cui servus* (Targ., *Græc. Venet.*), then that supplies a better contrast to *וְהָיָה לְחָם*, for "the first necessity of an oriental in only moderate circumstances is a slave, just as was the case with the Greeks and Romans" (Fl.). A man of lowly rank, who is, however, not so poor that he cannot support a slave, is better than one who boasts himself and is yet a beggar (2 Sam. iii. 29). The *Iithpa.* often expresses a striving to be, or to wish to appear to be, what the adj. corresponding to the verb states, e.g. *הַתְּעִשָּׂר, הַתְּנַגִּיל*; like the Greek middles, *εξεσθαι, αζεσθαι*, cf. *הַתְּחַבֵּם* and *σοφίζεσθαι*. So here, where with Fleischer we have translated: who makes himself mighty, for *בָּבָר*, *gravem esse*, is etymologically also the contrast of *קָלָה*. The proverb, Sirach x. 26: *κρείσσων ἐργαζόμενος καὶ περισσεύων ἐν πᾶσι, ἢ δοξαζόμενος καὶ ἀπορῶν ἄρτων* (according to the text of Fritzsche), is a half remodelling, half translation of this before us.

Ver. 10 The righteous knows how his cattle feel,
And the compassion of the godless is cruel.

The explanation: the righteous taketh care for the life of his beast (Fl.), fails, for 10a is to be taken with Ex. xxiii. 9; *נַפְשׁוֹ* signifies also the state of one's soul, the frame of mind, the state of feeling; but *יָדַע* has, as in the related proverb, xxvii. 23, the meaning of careful cognizance or investigation, in conformity with which one acts. If the *Torâ* includes in the law of the Sabbath (Ex. xx. 10, xxiii. 12) useful beasts and cattle, which are here especially meant, and secures to them the reward of their labour (Deut. xxv. 4); if it forbids the mutilation, and generally the giving of unnecessary pain, to beasts; if it enjoins those who take a bird's nest to let the dam escape (Deut. xxii. 6 f.),—these are the prefigurations of that *רַעַת נַפְשׁ בְּהֵמָה*, and as the God of the *Torâ* thus appears at the close of the Book of Jonah, this wonderful apology (*defensio*) of the all-embracing compassion, the God also of the world-history in this sympathy for the beasts of the earth as the type of the righteous.

In 10b most interpreters find an oxymoron: the compassion of the godless is compassionless, the direct opposite of compassion; i.e. he possesses either altogether no compassion, or he shows such as in its principle, its expression, and in its effects is the opposite of what it ought to be (Fl.). Bertheau believes that in the sing. of the predicate *אֲכַזְרִי* he is justified in translating: the compassion of the wicked is a tyranny. And as one may speak of a loveless love, i.e. of a love which in its principle is nothing else than selfishness, so

also of a compassionless compassion, such as consists only in gesture and speech, without truth of feeling and of active results. But how such a compassionless compassion toward the cattle, and one which is really cruel, is possible, it may be difficult to show. Hitzig's conjecture, חַסִּדִּים, sprang from this thought: the most merciful among sinners are cruel—the sinner is as such not חַסִּדִּים. The LXX. is right in the rendering, τὰ δὲ σπλάγχνα τῶν ἀσεβῶν ἀνελεήμονα. The noun חַסִּדִּים means here not compassion, but, as in Gen. xliii. 30 (LXX. *ἔντερα* or *ἔγκατα*) and 1 Kings iii. 26 (LXX. *μήτρα*), has the meaning the bowels (properly tender parts, cf. Arab. *rakhuma*, to be soft, tender, with *rīm*), and thus the interior of the body, in which deep emotions, and especially strong sympathy, are wont to be reflected (cf. Hos. x. 8). The singular of the predicate אֶחָד arises here from the unity of the subject-conception: the inwards, as Jer. l. 12, from the reference of the expression to each individual of the many.

Ver. 11 He that tilleth his own ground is satisfied with bread,

And he that followeth after vain pursuits is devoid of understanding.

Yet more complete is the antithetic parallelism in the *doublette*, xxviii. 19 (cf. also Sir. xx. 27a). The proverb recommends the cultivation of the field as the surest means of supporting oneself honestly and abundantly, in contrast to the grasping after vain, i.e. unrighteous means of subsistence, windy speculations, and the like (Fl.). רֵיקִים are here not persons (Bertheau), but things without solidity and value (LXX. *μάταια*; Aquila, Theodotion, *κενά*), and, in conformity with the contrast, not real business. Elsewhere also the mas. plur. discharges the function of a neut. noun of multitude, *vid.* רֵיקִים, *principalia*, viii. 6, and רֵיקִים, Ps. xix. 14—one of the many examples of the imperfect use of the gender in Hebr.; the speaker has in רֵיקִים, *vana et inania*, not אֶלֶּם (Judg. ix. 4), but רֵיקִים (Deut. xxxii. 47) in view. The LXX. erroneously at xxviii. 19, and Symmachus and Jerome at both places understand רֵיקִים of slothfulness.

Ver. 12 The godless lusteth after the spoil of evil-doers;

But the root of the righteous shoots forth.

This translation is at the same time an explanation, and agrees with Fleischer's "the godless strives by unrighteous gain like the wicked (iv. 14) to enrich himself, namely, as must be understood from the antithetic members of the parallelism, in vain, without thereby making progress and gaining anything certain. The preterite, as

xi. 2, 8, etc., places the general true proposition as a separate historic principle derived from experience. In 12*b* יָתֵן stands elliptically or pregnantly: *edet, scil. quod radix edere solet, sobolem stirpis, ramorum, etc.*, as in the Arab. *natan* and *ânatan* are specially used without an obj. of the spontaneousness of an odour." מַצֹּד (from צָד, to spy, to hunt) is elsewhere the instrument of the hunt (a net), here the object and end of it. If the words had been מַצֹּדֵי רָעִים, then we would explain after מַצֹּדֵי רָעִים, Ps. lxxviii. 49 (*vid. comm. on*), and אֵשֶׁת רָע, vi. 24; but in the difference of number, רָעִים will not be the qualitative but the subjective personal genitive: *capturam qualem mali captant*. Ewald, who understands רָעִים, 11*b*, of good-for-nothing-fellows, interprets רָעִים here, on the contrary, as neuter (§ 172*b*): the desire of the wicked is an evil net, *i.e.* wherein he catches all manner of evil for himself. The LXX. has here two proverbs, in which מַצֹּד occurs in the plur. and in the sense of ὀχυρώματα; 12*b* of the Hebr. text is rendered: αἱ δὲ ῥίζαι τῶν εὐσεβῶν ἐν ὀχυρώμασι, which Schleusner explains *innota erunt*. The Hebr. text can gain nothing from this variation. That the LXX. read וְשָׂרֵשׁ צְדִיקִים אֵתֵן is not probable, since they nowhere thus translate אֵתֵן. But Reiske and Ziegler have, like Ewald and Hitzig, combined יָתֵן of this proverb with אֵתֵן from אֵתֵן (Arab. *wâtin*), *firmum, perennem esse*. Hitzig translates the distich, after emending the text of 12*a* by the help of the LXX. and the Arab.: the refuge of the wicked is crumbling clay, but the root of the righteous endures (יָתֵן from אֵתֵן). Böttcher also reads חֲמֵר instead of חֲמֵר, and translates (*vid. p. 192, l. 11*): the refuge of the wicked is miry clay, but the root of the righteous holdeth fast (יָתֵן = Arab. *wâtin*). But this derivation of a verb יָתֵן is not necessary. The *Græc. Venet.* rightly, ῥίζα δὲ δικάλων δώσει. The obj. is self-evident. Rashi reads מִה שְׁהוּא רָאִי לִיתֵן וְהוּא הַפְּרִי. So also Schul-tens. The root giveth, is equivalent to, it is productive in bringing forth that which lies in its nature. That the root of the righteous endures (תַּחֲמִים) is otherwise expressed, xii. 3.

Proverbs regarding injurious and beneficial words, wise hearing and prudent silence.

Ver. 13 In the transgression of the lips there lies a dangerous snare;
The righteous escapeth from trouble.

The consecutive *modus* (וַיֵּצֵא) is here of greater weight than *e.g.* at xi. 8, where the connection follows without it (וַיָּבֵא) from the idea of the change of place. The translation: but the right-

eous . . . restores מְשִׁיב (מְשִׁיב), and ignores the syllogistic relation of the members of the proverb, which shows itself here (cf. the contrary, xi. 9) to a certain degree by מְשִׁיב. Ewald displaces this relation, for he paraphrases: "any one may easily come into great danger by means of inconsiderate words; yet it is to be hoped that the righteous may escape, for he will guard himself against evil from the beginning." He is right here in interpreting מְשִׁיב and מְשִׁיב as the designation of danger into which one is betrayed by the transgressions of his lips, but "inconsiderate words" are less than מְשִׁיב. One must not be misled into connecting with מְשִׁיב the idea of missing, or a false step, from the circumstance that מְשִׁיב means a step; both verbs have, it is true, the common R. ש with the fundamental idea of placing apart or separating, but מְשִׁיב has nothing to do with מְשִׁיב (step = placing apart of the legs), but denotes (as Arab. *fusuwk* *fisk*, from the primary meaning *diruptio*, *diremtio*) a sinning, breaking through and breaking off the relation to God (cf. *e.g.* xxviii. 24), or even the restraints of morality (x. 19). Such a sinning, which fastens itself to, and runs even among the righteous, would not be called מְשִׁיב, but rather מְשִׁיב (xx. 9). According to this the proverb will mean that sinful words bring into extreme danger every one who indulges in them—a danger which he can with difficulty escape; and that thus the righteous, who guards himself against sinful words, escapes from the distress (cf. with the expression, Eccles. vii. 18) into which one is thereby betrayed. מְשִׁיב is the descriptive and expressive epithet to מְשִׁיב (cf. Eccles. ix. 12): a bad false trap, a malicious snare, for מְשִׁיב is the snare which closes together and catches the bird by the feet. This proverb is repeated at xxix. 6, peculiarly remodelled. The LXX. has after ver. 13 another distich:

He who is of mild countenance findeth mercy;

He who is litigious oppresseth souls.

(נִפְשָׁה, or rather, more in accordance with the Hebrew original: oppresses himself, נִפְשָׁה.)

Ver. 14 From the fruit which the mouth of the man bringeth forth is he satisfied with good,

And what the hands of the man accomplish returns back to him.

The proverb finds its final verification in the last judgment (cf. Matt. xii. 37), but it is also illustrated in the present life. If the mouth of a man bringeth forth fruit,—namely, the fruit of wholesome doctrine, of right guidance, of comforting exhortation, of

peace-bringing consolation for others,—this fruit is also to his own advantage, he richly enjoys the good which flows out of his own mouth, the blessing he bestows is also a blessing for himself. The same also is the case with the actions of a man. That which is done, or the service which is rendered by his hands, comes back to him as a reward or as a punishment. *נָסַח* signifies primarily accomplishment, execution, and is a twofold, double-sided conception: a rendering of good or evil, and merit on the side of men (whether merited reward or merited punishment), as well as recompense, requital on the side of God. The first line is repeated, somewhat altered, at xiii. 2, xviii. 20. The whole proverb is prophetically echoed in Isa. iii. 10 f. The *Keri* *כִּי־יִשָּׁאֵל* has Jahve as the subject, or rather the subject remains undefined, and “one requites him” is equivalent to: it is requited to him. The *Chethib* seems to us more expressive; but this use of the active with the undefined subject, instead of the passive, is certainly as much in the *Mishle* style (cf. xiii. 21) as the development of the subject of the clause from a foregoing genitive.

Ver. 15 The way of the fool is right in his own eyes,
But the wise listeneth to counsel.

Other proverbs, like xvi. 2, say that generally the judgment of a man regarding his character does not go beyond a narrow subjectivity; but there are objective criteria according to which a man can prove whether the way in which he walks is right; but the fool knows no other standard than his own opinion, and however clearly and truly one may warn him that the way which he has chosen is the wrong way and leads to a false end, yet he obstinately persists;¹ while a wise man is not so wise in his own eyes (iii. 7) as not to be willing to listen to well-meant counsel, because, however careful he may be regarding his conduct, yet he does not regard his own judgment so unerring as not to be inclined ever anew to try it and let it stand the test. Ewald has falsely construed: yet whoever hears counsel is wise. In consequence of the contrast, *אֱוִיל* and *חָכָם* are the subject ideas, and with *לִשְׁמָע לְעֵצָה* is brought forward that which is in contrast to the self-complacency of the fool, the conduct of the wise man.

¹ *Vid.* kindred proverbs by Carl Schulze, *Die libt. Sprichwörter der deutschen Sprache* (1860), p. 50, and M. C. Wahl's *Das Sprichwort in der heb.-aram. Literatur, u.s.w.* (1871), p. 31.

Ver. 16. The relations of the subject and the predicate are the same as in the preceding verse.

The fool makes known his vexation on the same day [at once],
On the contrary, the prudent man hideth the offence.

Very frequently in these proverbs the first line is only defined by the adducing of the second, or the second holds itself in the light of the first. A post-bibl. proverb says that a man is known by three things: by his כּוּם (his behaviour in drinking), his כּוּם (his conduct in money transactions), and his כּוּם (his conduct under deep inward excitement). So here: he is a fool who, if some injury is done to him, immediately shows his vexation in a passionate manner; while, on the contrary, the prudent man maintains silence as to the dishonour that is done to him, and represses his displeasure, so as not to increase his vexation to his own injury. Passionless retaliation may in certain cases be a duty of self-preservation, and may appear to be necessary for the protection of truth, but passionate self-defence is always of evil, whether the injury which is inflicted be justifiable or unjustifiable. Regarding עָרוּם, *callidus*, *vid.* p. 56; Schultens' comparison of the Greek γεγυμνασμένος is only a conceit in want of better knowledge. Regarding בָּקָה (only here and at ver. 23) with מְכַפֶּה, as שָׁחַר (only xi. 27) with מְשַׁחַר, *vid.* Ewald, § 170a. בְּיוֹם signifies on the self-same day = without delay, immediately, and is well translated by the LXX. αὐθιμέρον. With another object, 16b is repeated in 23a.

Most of the remaining parables of this section refer to the right use and the abuse of the tongue.

Ver. 17 He that breathes the love of truth, utters that which is right;
But a lying tongue, deceit.

This verse is similar in meaning to xiv. 5 (where 5b = vi. 19a); the second line of the distich = xiv. 25b. Everywhere else יָפִיתָ קְדוּבִים stand together, only here יָפִיתָ is joined to אֱמֻנָה; *vid.* regarding this יָפִיתָ forming an attributive clause, and then employed as an adjective, but with distinct verbal force, at vi. 19. Viewed superficially, the proverb appears tautological; it is not so, however, but places in causal connection the internal character of men and their utterances: whoever breathes אֱמֻנָה, truth or conscientiousness (the property of the אֱמֻנָה, *vid.* at Ps. xii. 2), *i.e.* lets the voice of this be heard in his utterances, such an one speaks צֶדֶק, *i.e.* uprightness, integrity, that which is correct, right (Isa. xlv. 19, cf. xli. 26), in relation to truth in general, and to the present case in particular;

but he who עַר שְׁקָרִים, i.e. he who, against better knowledge and the consciousness of untruth, confirms by his testimony (from עַר, *revertere*, to say again and again), therewith gives utterance to his impure character, his wicked intention, proceeding from delight in doing evil or from self-interest, and diverted towards the injury of his neighbour. As אַמּוֹנָה and מִרְמָה correspond as statements of the contents of the utterances, so נֶדֶק and שְׁקָרִים as statements of their motive and aim. מְרַמֶּה is obj. accus. of the יָבִיד (from הִבִּיד, to bring to light, cf. נָגַד, visibility) to be supplied, not the pred. nom. *dolorum structor*, as Fleischer poetically finds.

Vcr. 18 There is that babbleth like the thrusts of a sword,
But the tongue of the wise is healing.

The second (cf. xi. 24) of the proverbs beginning with שֵׁן. The verb פָּטָה (פָּטֵא), peculiar to the Hebr., which in the modern Hebr. generally means "to speak out" (פָּתָא in the grammar: the pronunciation) (according to which the LXX., Syr., and Targ. translate it by אָמַר), means in biblical Hebr., especially with reference to the binding of oneself by an oath (Lev. v. 4), and to solemn protestations (Num. xxx. 7, 9, according to which Jerome, *promittit*): to utter incautiously in words, to speak without thought and at random, referred erroneously by Gesenius to the R. בָּט, to be hollow, probably a word imitative of the sound, like the Greek βατταρίζειν, to stammer, and βαττολογεῖν, to babble, which the lexicographers refer to a talkative person of the name of Βάττος, as our "salbadern" [=to talk foolishly] owes its origin to one Jenaer Bader on the Saal. Theod. and the Græc. Venet. give the false reading בּוֹטָה (πεισιθώς). פָּתֵא פִּי מְרַמֶּה stands *loco accusativi*, the פִּי being regarded as a noun: (*effutians verba*) *quæ sunt instar confossionum gladii* (Fl.). We also call such a man, who bridles his loquacity neither by reflection nor moderates it by indulgent reference to his fellow-men, a *Schwertmaul* (sword-mouth) or a *Schandmaul* (a mouth of shame = slanderer), and say that he has a tongue like a sword. But on the other hand, the tongue of the wise, which is in itself pure gentleness and a comfort to others, since, far from wounding, rather, by means of comforting, supporting, directing exhortation, exercises a soothing and calming influence. Regarding רָפָא, whence מְרַפֵּא, Dietrich in Gesenius' *Lex.* is right. The root-meaning of the verb רָפָא (cognate רָפָה, to be loose, *IIiph.* to let go, *IIithpa.* xviii. 9, to show oneself slothful) is, as the Arab. kindred word *rafá, rafa, raf, rawf (ráf)* shows,

that of stilling, softening, soothing, whence arises the meaning of healing (for which the Arab. has *ṭabb* and *'alkh*); the meaning to repair, to mend, which the Arab. *rafā* and *rafa* have, does not stand in a prior relation to to heal, as might appear from Job xiii. 4, but is a specializing of the general idea of *reficere* lying in *mitigare*, just as the patcher is called ἀκέστρια = ἡπήτρια,¹ from ἀκέομαι, which means equally to still and to heal. Since thus in רפא the meanings of mitigating and of healing are involved, it is plain that מרפא, as it means healing (the remedy) and at the same time (cf. *θεραπεῖα*, Rev. xxii. 2) the preservation of health, iv. 22, vi. 15, xvi. 24, xxix. 1, so also may mean mildness (here and xv. 4), tranquillity (xiv. 30; Eccles. x. 4, calm patience in contrast to violent passion), and refreshing (xiii. 17). Oetinger and Hitzig translate here "medicine;" our translation, "healing (the means of healing)," is not essentially different from it.

Ver. 19 The lip of truth endures for ever,

But the lying tongue only while I wink with the eye.

None of the old translators understood the phrase וְעַד-אֲרִיזָה; the *Venet.* also, which follows Kimchi's first explanation, is incorrect: ἕως ῥῆξιν, till I split (shatter) it (the tongue). Abulwalīd is nearer the correct rendering when he takes אֲרִיזָה as a noun = רִנָּה with *He parag.* Ahron b. Joseph is better in rendering the phrase by: until I make a רגע, and quite correct if רגע (from רָנַע = Arab. *raḡ*, which is used of the swinging of the balance) is taken in the sense of a twinkling of the eye (Schultens: *vibramen*); cf. Orelli's *Die hebr. Synonyme der Zeit und Ewigkeit*, p. 27 f., where the synonyms for a twinkling of the eye, a moment, are placed together. עַד (properly progress) has in this phrase the meaning, while, so long as, and the cohortative signifies, in contradistinction to אֲרִיזָה, which may also denote an unwilling movement of the eyelids, a movement proceeding from a free determination, serving for the measurement of a short space of time, Ewald, § 228a. אֲרִיזָה, Jer. xlix. 19, l. 44, where Ewald takes אֲרִיזָה כִּי אֲרִיזָה (when I . . .) in the same sense as אֲרִיזָה here, which is more appropriate than the explanation of Hitzig, who regards כִּי as opening the principal clause, and attaches to הֲרִינֵה the quite too pregnant signification "to need (for an action) only a moment." The lip of truth, i.e. the lip which speaketh truth, endures for ever

¹ Whether *πάπτειν*, explained neither by Curtius nor by Flick, stands in a relation to it, we leave out of view.

(for truth, $\text{אֱמֶת} = \text{אֲנִיָּה}$, is just the enduring); but the tongue of falsehood is only for a moment, or a wink of the eye, for it is soon convicted, and with disgrace brings to silence; for a post-bibl. Aram. proverb says: $\text{קִשְׁטָא קָאִי שְׁקֵרָא לֹא קָאִי}$, the truth endures, the lie endures not (*Schabbath* 104a), and a Hebrew proverb: $\text{הַשֶּׁקֶר אֵין לוֹ רַגְלִים}$, the lie has no feet (on which it can stand).¹

Ver. 20 Deceit is in the heart of him who deviseth evil,
But those who devise peace cause joy.

Regarding the figure of forging, fabricating (LXX., Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, τεκταίνειν), or of ploughing, which underlies the phrase חָרַשׁ רָע , *moliri malum*, *vid.* at iii. 29. That deceit is in the heart of him who deviseth evil ($\text{בְּלִב־חָרָשִׁי רָע}$, as is correctly punctuated *e.g.* by Norzi) appears to be a platitude, for the חָרַשׁ רָע is as such directed against a neighbour. But in the first place, 20a in itself says that the evil which a man hatches against another always issues in a fraudulent, malicious deception of the same; and in the second place, it says, when taken in connection with 20b, where שִׂמְחָה is the parallel word to מִרְמָה , that with the deception he always at the same time prepares for him sorrow. The contrast to חָרַשׁ רָע is יוֹעֵצִי שְׁלוֹם , and thus denotes not those who give counsel to contending parties to conclude peace, but such as devise peace, viz. in reference to the neighbour, for יֵעֵן means not merely to impart counsel, but also mentally to devise, to resolve upon, to decree, 2 Chron. xxv. 16, Isa. xxxii. 7 f.; cf. יֵעֵן עַל , Jer. xlix. 30. Hitzig and Zöckler give to שְׁלוֹם the general idea of welfare (that which is salutary), and interpret the שִׂמְחָה as the inner joy of the good conscience. Certainly שְׁלוֹם (R. *של*, *extrahere*, in the sense of deliverance from trouble) means not only peace as to the external relationship of men with each other, but also both internal and external welfare. Thus it is here meant of external welfare; Hitzig rightly compares Jer. xxix. 11 with Nahum i. 11 to the contrast between שְׁלוֹם and רָע . But as מִרְמָה is not self-deception, but the deception of another, so also שִׂמְחָה is not the joy of those who devise the device in their hearts for the deception of others, but the joy they procure for others. Thoughts of peace for one's neighbour are always thoughts of procuring joy for him, as thoughts of evil are thoughts of deceit, and thus of procuring sorrow for him. Thus לִי־יוֹעֵצִי is an abbreviated expression for יֵעֵצֵנִי וּבִלְבִּי.

¹ *Vid. Duke's Rabbin. Blumenlese* (1844), p. 231.

Ver. 21 No evil befalls the righteous,
But the godless are full of evil.

Ilitzig translates חַסַּד "sorrow," and Zöckler "injury;" but the word signifies evil as ethical wickedness, and although it may be used of any misfortune in general (as in חַסַּד־יָמָיו, *opp.* בְּרִיָּאָה); thus it denotes especially such sorrow as is the harvest and product of sin, xxii. 8, Job iv. 8, Isa. lix. 4, or such as brings after it punishment, IIab. iii. 7, Jer. iv. 15. That it is also here thus meant the contrast makes evident. The godless are full of evil, for the moral evil which is their life-element brings out of itself all kinds of evil; on the contrary, no kind of evil, such as sin brings forth and produces, falls upon the righteous. God, as giving form to human fortune (Ex. xxi. 13), remains in the background (cf. Ps. xci. 10 with v. 1 f.); *vid.* regarding אָנָה, the weaker power of עָנָה, to go against, to meet, to march against, Fleischer, Levy's *Chald. Wört-buch*, 572.

Ver. 22 Lying lips are an abhorrence to Jahve,
And they that deal truly are His delight.

The frame of the distich is like xi. 1, 20. אֱמֻנָה is probity as the harmony between the words and the inward thoughts. The LXX., which translates ὁ δὲ ποιῶν πίστεις, had in view עֲשֵׂה אֱמוּנִים (עֲשֵׂה אֱמֻנִים, cf. Isa. xxvi. 2); the text of all other translations agrees with that commonly received.

Ver. 23 A prudent man conceals knowledge,
And a heart-fool proclaims imbecility.

In 23a ver. 16b is repeated, only a little changed; also 16a corresponds with 23a, for, as is there said, the fool knows not how to keep his anger to himself, as here, that a heart-fool (cf. the lying mouth, 22a) proclaims (trumpets forth), or as xiii. 16 says, displays folly without referring to himself the *si tacuisses*. To this forward charlatan blustering, which intends to preach wisdom and yet proclaims in the world mere folly, *i.e.* nonsense and imbecility, and thereby makes itself troublesome, and only to be laughed at and despised, stands in contrast the relation of the אָדָם עָרוֹם, *homo callidus*, who possesses knowledge, but keeps it to himself without bringing it forth till an occasion presents itself for setting it forth at the right place, at the right time, and to the right man. The right motive also regulates such silence as well as modesty. But this proverb places it under the point of view of prudence.

We take verses 24–28 together as a group. In these verses

the subject is the means of rising (in the world), and the two ways, the one of which leads to error, and the other to life.

Ver. 24 The hand of the diligent attains to dominion,
But slothfulness will become tributary.

In x. 4 *רַבִּיָּה* was adj., but to *כִּי* standing beside it; here it is to be regarded as adj. to *יָד* (sluggish hand) supplied from 24*a*, but may be equally regarded as a subst. (slothfulness) (*vid.* at ver. 27). Regarding *תְּרִיבִין*, *vid.* p. 211. *כִּס* signifies tribute and service, *i.e.* tributary service rendered to a master. In xi. 29*b* *עֲבָד* stands for it. It is still the experience of to-day, as it was of Solomon's time, that slothfulness (indolence) brings down to a state of servitude, if not even deeper, but that vigorous activity raises to dominion or to the position of a master, *i.e.* to independence, wealth, respect, and power.

Ver. 25 Trouble in the heart of a man boweth it down,
And a friendly word maketh it glad.

The twofold anomaly that *רָצָה* is construed as masc. and *לֵב* as fem. renders the text doubtful, but the LXX., Syr., Targum, which introduce another subject, *φοβερός λόγος* (*רָבִיָּה מְרִיָּה*?), do not improve it; Theodotion's is preferable, who translates *μέριμνα ἐν καρδίᾳ ἀνδρὸς κατέσχει αὐτόν*, and thus reads *יִשְׁחָחֵהוּ*. But the rhyme is thereby lost. As *כְּבוֹד*, Gen. xlix. 6, so also may *לֵב* be used as fem., for one thereby thinks on נֶפֶשׁ; the plur. *לְבוֹת* (*לְבָבוֹת*), according to which in Ezek. xvi. 30 we find the sing. *לְבָה*, may also conform to this. And *יִשְׁחָחֵהוּ* as pred. to *רָצָה* follows the scheme ii. 10*b*, perhaps not without attractional co-operation after the scheme *קִשַׁת נְבָרִים חֲתִים*, 1 Sam. ii. 4. *הִשְׁחָחֵהוּ*, from *שָׁחַח*, occurs only here; but *הִשְׁחָחֵהוּ*, from *שָׁחַח*, occurs only twice. *רָבִיָּה טוֹב* designates in the book of Joshua and in Kings (1 Kings viii. 56) the divine promise; here it is of the same meaning as 1 Kings xii. 7: an appeasing word. Who has not in himself had this experience, how such a word of friendly encouragement from a sympathizing heart cheers the sorrowful soul, and, if only for a time, changes its sorrow into the joy of confidence and of hope!

Ver. 26 The righteous looketh after his pastures,
But the way of the godless leadeth them into error.

In 26*a* no acceptable meaning is to be gained from the traditional mode of vocalization. Most of the ancients translate *יִתֵּר* as part. to *יִתֵּר*, as it occurs in post-bib. Hebr., *e.g.* *חֲבָה יִתֵּרָה*, prevailing, altogether peculiar love. Thus the Targum, *טִב מִן הַבְּרִיָּה*; Venet.

πεπερίττεται (after Kimchi); on the other hand, Aquila, active: περισσεύων τὸν πλησίον (making the neighbour rich), which the meaning of the *Kal* as well as the form יְהִי oppose; Luther, "The righteous man is better than his neighbour," according to which Fleischer also explains, "Probably יְהִי from יֵהְיֶה, πλεονάζειν, has the meaning of πλεόν ἔχων, πλεονεκτῶν, he gains more honour, respect, riches, etc., than the other, viz. the unrighteous." Yet more satisfactory Ahron b. Joseph: not the nobility and the name, but this, that he is righteous, raises a man above others. In this sense we would approve of the *præstantior altero justus*, if only the two parts of the proverb were not by such a rendering wholly isolated from one another. Thus יְהִי is to be treated as the fut. of יֵהְיֶה. The Syr. understands it of right counsel; and in like manner Schultens explains it, with Cocceius, of intelligent, skilful guidance, and the moderns (*e.g.* Gesenius) for the most part of guidance generally. Ewald rather seeks (because the proverb-style avoids the placing of a fut. verb at the commencement of the proverb [but cf. xvii. 10]) to interpret יְהִי as a noun in the sense of director, but his justification of the fixed *ā* is unfounded. And generally this sense of the word is exposed to many objections. The verb הָיָה signifies, after its root, to go about, "to make to go about," but is, however, not equivalent to, to lead (wherefore Böttcher too ingeniously derives יְהִי = יֵהְיֶה from אָהָר = אָהָר); and wherefore this strange word, since the Book of Proverbs is so rich in synonyms of leading and guiding! The *Hiph.* הִיָּהֵם signifies to send to spy, Judg. i. 23, and in this sense the poet ought to have said יְהִי לְרֵעֵהוּ: the righteous spies out (the way) for his neighbour, he serves him, as the Targum-Talmud would say, as הִיָּהֵם. Thus connected with the obj. accus. the explanation would certainly be: the righteous searches out his neighbour (Löwenstein), he has intercourse with men, according to the maxim, "*Tran schau wem.*" But why not רֵעֵהוּ, but מְרֵעֵהוּ, which occurs only once, xix. 7, in the *Mishle*, and then for an evident reason? Therefore, with Döderlein, Dathe, J. D. Michaelis, Ziegler, and Hitzig, we prefer to read מְרֵעֵהוּ; it is at least not necessary, with Hitzig, to change יְהִי into יֵהְיֶה, since the *Hiphil* may have the force of the intens. of the *Kal*, but יְהִי without the jussive signification is a poetic licence for יֵהְיֶה. That הָיָה can quite well be used of the exploring of the pasture, the deriv. יֵהְיֶה, Job xxxix. 18, shows. Thus altered, 26a falls into an appropriately contrasted relation to 26b. The way of the godless

leads them into error; the course of life to which they have given themselves up has such a power over them that they cannot set themselves free from it, and it leads the enslaved into destruction: the righteous, on the contrary, is free with respect to the way which he takes and the place where he stays; his view (regard) is directed to his true advancement, and he looketh after his pasture, *i.e.* examines and discovers, where for him right pasture, *i.e.* the advancement of his outer and inner life, is to be found. With מְרֵעָה there is a combination of the thought of this verse with the following, whose catch-word is צִידוֹ, his prey.

Ver. 27 The slothful pursues not his prey;

But a precious possession of a man is diligence.

The LXX., Syr., Targ., and Jerome render יִחְרֹךְ in the sense of obtaining or catching, but the verbal stem חרך nowhere has this meaning. When Fleischer remarks, חֲרָךְ, ἄπ. λεγ., probably like לָכַךְ, properly to entangle in a noose, a net, he supports his opinion by reference to חֲרָכִים, which signifies lattice-windows, properly, woven or knitted like a net. But חֲרָךְ, whence this חֲרָכִים, appears to be equivalent to the Arab. *khark*, *fissura*, so that the plur. gives the idea of a manifoldly divided (lattice-like, trellis-formed) window. The Jewish lexicographers (Menahem, Abulwalid, Parchon, also Juda b. Koreish) all aim at that which is in accord with the meaning of the Aram. חֲרָךְ, to singe, to roast (= Arab. *harak*): the slothful roasteth not his prey, whether (as Fürst presents it) because he is too lazy to hunt for it (Berth.), or because when he has it he prepares it not for enjoyment (Ewald). But to roast is צָלָה, not חָרַךְ, which is used only of singeing, *e.g.* the hair, and roasting, *e.g.* ears of corn, but not of the roasting of flesh, for which reason Joseph Kimchi (*vid.* Kimchi's *Lex.*) understands צִידוֹ of wild fowls, and יִחְרֹךְ of the singeing of the tips of the wings, so that they cannot fly away, according to which the Venet. translates οὐ μενεῖ . . . ἡ θήρα αὐτοῦ. Thus the Arab. must often help to a right interpretation of the ἄπ. λεγ. Schultens is right: *Verbum harak, חרך, apud Arabes est movere, ciere, excitare, κινεῖν generatim, et speciatim excitare prædam e cubili, κινεῖν τῇ θήρᾱ.* The Lat. *agitare*, used of the frightening up and driving forth of wild beasts, corresponds with the idea here, as *e.g.* used by Ovid, *Metam.* x. 538, of Diana:

Aut pronos lepores aut celsum in cornua cervum

Aut agitat damas.

Thus יִחְרֹךְ together with צִידוֹ gains the meaning of hunting, and

generally of catching the prey. רַמְיָה is here incarnate slothfulness, and thus without ellipse equivalent to איש רמיה. That in the contrasted clause חרוץ does not mean ἀποτόμως, decreed (Löwenstein), nor gold (Targ., Jerome, Venet.), nor that which is excellent (Syr.), is manifest from this contrast as well as from x. 4, xii. 24. The clause has from its sequence of words something striking about it. The LXX. placed the words in a different order: κτῆμα δὲ τίμιον ἀνὴρ καθαρὸς (חרוץ in the sense of Arab. *khālas*). But besides this transposition, two others have been tried: הן אדם חרוץ יקר, the possession of an industrious man is precious, and הן יקר אדם חרוץ, a precious possession is that (supply הן) of an industrious man. But the traditional arrangement of the words gives a better meaning than these modifications. It is not, however, to be explained, with Ewald and Bertheau: a precious treasure of a man is one who is industrious, for why should the industrious man be thought of as a worker for another and not for himself? Another explanation advanced by Kimchi: a valuable possession to men is industry, has the twofold advantage that it is according to the existing sequence of the words, and presents a more intelligible thought. But can חרוץ have the meaning of תְּרִיצִית (the being industrious)? Hitzig reads חָרוֹץ, to make haste (to be industrious). This is unnecessary, for we have here a case similar to x. 17, where שׁוֹמֵר for שׁוֹמֵר is to be expected: a precious possession of a man is it that, or when, he is industrious, חרוץ briefly for הַיְּתוֹ חרוץ. The accentuation fluctuates between יקר והֶחָדָם (so e.g. Cod. 1294), according to which the Targum translates, and יקר והֶחָדָם יקר, which, according to our explanation, is to be preferred.

Ver. 28 In the path of righteousness is life,
And the way of its path is immortality.

All the old versions to the Venet. give אֶל instead of אֶל־, and are therefore under the necessity of extracting from וְדַרְךְ נְתִיבָה a meaning corresponding to this, *eis θάνατον*, in which they are followed by Hitzig: "a devious way leadeth to death." But נְתִיבָה (נְתִיבָה) signifies step, and generally way and street (*vid.* at i. 15), not "devious way," which is expressed, Judg. v. 6, by עֶקְלָלוֹת אֲרָחוֹת. And that אֶל is anywhere punctuated thus in the sense of אֶל is previously improbable, because the Babylonian system of punctuation distinguishes the negative אֶל with a short *Pathach*, and the prepositional אֶל (Arab. *ilā*) with a short *Chirek*, from each other

(*vid.* Pinsker, *Einkl.* p. xxii. f.); the punctuation 2 Sam. xiii. 16, Jer. li. 3, gives no support to the opinion that here אל is vocalized thus in the sense of אל, and it is not to be thus corrected. Nothing is more natural than that the Chokma in its constant contrast between life and death makes a beginning of expressing the idea of the *ἀθανασία* (*vid.* p. 42), which Aquila erroneously read from the אל-מות, Ps. xlviii. 15. It has been objected that for the formation of such negative substantives and noun-adjectives לא (*e.g.* לא-אל, לא-עם) and not אל is used; but that אל also may be in close connection with a noun, 2 Sam. i. 13 shows. There אל-טל is equivalent to אל יהי טל, according to which it may also be explained in the passage before us, with Luther and all the older interpreters, who accepted אל in its negative signification: and on (the א governing) the way . . . is no death. The negative אל frequently stands as an intensifying of the objective לא; but why should the Chokma, which has already shown itself bold in the coining of new words, not apply itself to the formation of the idea of immortality?: the idol name אליל is the result of a much greater linguistic boldness. It is certain that אל is here not equivalent to אל; the Masora is therefore right in affirming that נחִיבָהּ is written with *He raphatum pro mapicato* (*vid.* Kimchi, *Michlol* 31a, and in the *Lex.*), cf. 1 Sam. xx. 20, *vid.* Büttcher, § 418. Thus: the way of their step is immortality, or much rather, since דֶּרֶךְ is not a fixed idea, but also denotes the going to a distance (*i.e.* the journey), the behaviour, the proceeding, the walk, etc.: the walking (the stepping over and passing through) of their way is immortality. Rich in synonyms of the way, the Hebrew style delights in connecting them with picturesque expressions; but דֶּרֶךְ always means the way in general, which divides into אֲרוֹחוֹת or נְחִיבוֹת (Job vi. 18, Jer. xviii. 5), and consists of such (Isa. iii. 16). The distich is synonymous: on the path of righteousness (accentuate צִדִּיקָה) is life meeting him who walks in it, and giving itself to him as a possession, and the walking in its path is immortality (cf. iii. 17, x. 28); so that to go in it and to be immortal, *i.e.* to be delivered from death, to be exalted above it, is one and the same thing. If we compare with this, xiv. 32b, it is obvious that the Chokma begins (*vid.* *Psychol.* p. 410) to break through the limits of this present life, and to announce a life beyond the reach of death.

The proverb xii. 28 is so sublime, so weighty, that it manifestly

forms a period and conclusion. This is confirmed from the following proverb, which begins like x. 1 (cf. 5), and anew stamps the collection as intended for youth :

xiii. 1 A wise son is his father's correction ;
But a scorner listens not to rebuke.

The LXX., which the Syr. follows, translate *Υἱὸς πανουργὸς ὑπήκοος πατρί*, whence it is not to be concluded with Lagarde that they read *נִסְר* in the sense of a *Ni. tolerantivum*; they correctly understood the text according to the Jewish rule of interpretation, "that which is wanting is to be supplied from the context." The Targ. had already supplied *שׁמַע* from 1*b*, and is herein followed by Hitzig, as also by Glassius in the *Philologia sacra*. But such an ellipse is in the Hebr. style without an example, and would be comprehensible only in passionate, hasty discourse, but in a language in which the representation *filius sapiens disciplinam patris audit* numbers among the anomalies is not in general possible, and has not even its parallel in Tacitus, *Ann.* xiii. 56: *desse nobis terra, in qua vivamus—in qua moriemur, non potest*, because here the primary idea, which the one expression confirms, the other denies, and besides no particle, such as the *ו* of this passage before us, stands between them. Böttcher therefore maintains the falling out of the verb, and writes *יִבֵּן* before *בֵּן*; but one says not *בֵּן מוֹסֵר*, but *שׁמַע מוֹסֵר*, i. 8, iv. 1, xix. 27. Should not the clause, as it thus stands, give a sense complete in itself? But *מוֹסֵר* can hardly, with Schulteus and Ewald, be taken as *part. Hoph.* of *יָסַר*: one brought up by his father, for the usage of the language knows *מוֹסֵר* only as *part. Hoph.* of *סָר*. Thus, as Jerome and the *Venet.* translate: a wise son is the correction of his father, *i.e.* the product of the same, as also Fleischer explains, "Attribution of the cause, the ground, as elsewhere of the effect." But we call that which one has trained (vegetable or animal) his *Zucht* (= *παιδεία* in the sense of *παιδευμα*). To the wise son (x. 1) who is indebted to the *מוֹסֵר אב* (iv. 1), stands opposed the *לֵץ* (*vid.* i. 22), the mocker at religion and virtue, who has no ear for *נִפְעָרָה*, strong and stern words which awaken in him a wholesome fear (cf. xvii. 10, Jude 23: *ἐν φόβῳ*).

Ver. 2 From the fruit of the mouth of a man he himself enjoys good ;
But the delight of the godless is violence.

2*a* = xii. 14*a*, where *יִשְׁבַּע* for *יִאכַל*. A man with a fruit-bringing mouth, himself enjoys also the blessing of his fruit-producing

speech; his food (cf. βρῶμα, John iv. 34) is the good action in words, which in themselves are deeds, and are followed by deeds; this good action affords enjoyment not merely to others, but also to himself. Ewald and Bertheau attract יֹאכַל to 2b; so also does Fleischer: "the violence which the בְּנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל wish to do to others turns back upon themselves; they must eat it also, i.e. bear its evil consequences." The thought would then be like x. 6: *os improborum obteget violentia*, and "to eat violence" is parallel to "to drink (xxvi. 6) violence (injury)." But wherefore then the naming of the soul, of which elsewhere it is said that it hungers or satiates itself, but never simply (but cf. Luke xii. 19) that it eats? On the contrary, נֶפֶשׁ means also *appetitus*, xxiii. 2, and particularly wicked desire, Ps. xxvii. 12; here, as Ps. xxxv. 25, the object of this desire (*Psychol.* p. 202). Regarding בְּנֵי־יִשְׂרָאֵל, *vid.* above, p. 85. There are such as do injury in a cunning deceitful manner to their neighbour to their own advantage. While the former (the righteous) distributes to his neighbour from the inner impulse without having such a result in view, yet according to God's direction he derives enjoyment himself therefrom: the desire of the latter goes to סָרִי, ἀδικία, and thus to the enjoyment of good unrighteously and violently seized.

Ver. 3 He that guardeth his mouth keepeth his soul;

He that openeth wide his lips, to him it is destruction.

3a is extended in xxi. 23 to a distich. Mouth and soul stand in closest interchangeable relation, for speech is the most immediate and continuous expression of the soul; thus whoever guards his mouth keeps his soul (the *Venet.*, with excellent rendering of the synonym, ὁ τηρῶν τὸ στόμα ἑαυτοῦ φυλάσσει τὴν ψυχὴν ἑαυτοῦ), for he watches that no sinful vain thoughts rise up in his soul and come forth in words, and because he thus keeps his soul, i.e. himself, safe from the destructive consequences of the sins of the tongue. On the contrary, he who opens wide his lips, i.e. cannot hold his mouth (LXX. ὁ δὲ προπετὴς χεῖλεσιν), but expresses unexamined and unconsidered whatever comes into his mind and gives delight, he is destruction to himself (supply הוּא), or to him it is destruction (supply הוּא); both interpretations are possible, the parallelism brings nearer the former, and the parallel xviii. 7 brings nearer the latter. פִּי means to spread (Schultens: *diducere cum ruptura vel ad rupturam usque*), here the lips, *Pih.* Ezek. xvi. 25, the legs, Arab. *fashkh*, *farshkh*; *vid.* regarding the R. פִּי, to extend, to

spread out, Fleischer in the supplements to the *A. L. Z.* 1843, col. 116. Regarding the *Mishle* word מְחַתֵּה, *vid.* under x. 14.

Ver. 4. The three proverbs (1-3) which refer to hearing and speaking are now followed by a fourth which, like vers. 2 and 3, speaks of the נַפְשׁוֹ.

The soul of the sluggard desires, yet has not;
But the soul of the industrious is richly satisfied.

The view that the *o* in נַפְשׁוֹ is the *cholem compaginivis*, Böttcher, § 835, meets with the right answer that this would be the only example of a vocal *casus* in the whole of gnomic poetry; but when on his own part (*Neue Aehrenlese*, § 1305) he regards נַפְשׁוֹ as the accus. of the nearer definition (= בְּנַפְשׁוֹ), he proceeds inadvertently on the view that the first word of the proverb is מְחַתֵּה, while we read מְחַתֵּה, and נַפְשׁוֹ is thus the nom. of the subject. נַפְשׁוֹ עָצֵל means "his (the sluggard's) soul" (for עָצֵל occurs as explanatory permutative briefly for עָצֵל נַפְשׁוֹ, as מְחַתֵּה פְּרִיָּה means "its branches (i.e. of the fruitful tree)," Isa. xvii. 6. One might, it is true, add ה to the following word here, as at xiv. 13; but the similar expression appertaining to the *syntax ornata* occurs also 2 Sam. xxii. 33, Ps. lxxi. 7, and elsewhere, where this is impracticable. Meiri appropriately compares the scheme Ex. ii. 6, she saw him, viz. the boy. With reference to the נֶאֱמַר here violently (cf. xxviii. 1) introduced, Böttcher rightly remarks, that it is an adverb altogether like *nequidquam*, xiv. 6, xx. 4, Ps. lxxviii. 21, etc., thus: *appetit nequidquam anima ejus, scilicet pigri*. 4b shows the meaning of the desire that has not, for there נִחַשׁ occurs, a favourite strong *Mishle* word (xi. 25, xxviii. 25, etc.) for abundant satisfaction (the LXX. here, as at xxviii. 25, ἐν ἐπιμελείᾳ, sc. ἔσονται, instead of which, Montfaucon supposed *πιμελεία*, which is, however, a word not authenticated). The slothful wishes and dreams of prosperity and abundance (cf. xxi. 25 f., a parallel which the Syr. has here in view), but his desire remains unsatisfied, since the object is not gained but only lost by doing nothing; the industrious gain, and that richly, what the slothful wishes for, but in vain.

Ver. 5. Two proverbs of the character of the righteous and of the effect of righteousness:

A deceitful thing the righteous hateth;
But the godless disgraceth and putteth to shame.

With דְּבַר in the sphere of an intelligible generality (as here of falsehood, or Ps. xli. 9 of worthlessness) a concrete event is in

view, as with דָּבָר in the following plur. a general fact is separated into its individual instances and circumstances (*vid.* at Ps. lxxv. 4); for דָּבָר means not only the word in which the soul reveals itself, but also any fact in which an inner principle or a general fact or a whole comes forth to view. The righteous hateth all that bears in it the character of a falsehood (punctuate דָּבָר־שָׁקֶר with *Gaja*, cf. xii. 19), but the godless . . . Should we now, with Bertheau, Hitzig, and others, translate "acteth basely and shamefully"? It is true that both *Hiph.* may be regarded as transitive, but this expression gives no right contrast to 5a, and is pointless. We have seen at x. 5 that הָבִישׁ, like הִשְׁבִּיל, has also a causative signification: to put to shame, *i.e.* bring shame upon others, and that xix. 26, where טָבִיט וַיְחַפֵּיר are connected, this causative signification lies nearer than the intrinsically transitive. Thus it will also here be meant, that while the righteous hateth all that is false or that is tainted by falsehood, the godless on the contrary loves to disgrace and to put to shame. But it is a question whether יִבְאִישׁ is to be derived from בָּאֵשׁ = בֹּשֶׁט, and thus is of the same meaning as יָבִישׁ; הַבְּאִישׁ, Isa. xxx. 5, which there signifies *pudefactum esse*, is pointed הַבְּאִישׁ, and is thus derived from a בָּשׁ = בֹּשֶׁט, *vid.* 2 Sam. xix. 6. But יִבְאִישׁ occurs also as *Hiph.* of בָּאֵשׁ, and means transitively to make of an evil savour, Gen. xxxiv. 30, cf. Ex. v. 21, as well as intransitively to come into evil savour, 1 Sam. xxvii. 12. In this sense of *putidum faciens*, bringing into evil savour, יִבְאִישׁ occurs here as at xix. 26, suitably along with יַחַפֵּיר; xix. 26 is the *putidum facere* by evil report (slander), into which the foolish son brings his parents, here by his own evil report, thus to be thought of as brought about by means of slander. The old translators here fall into error; Luther renders both *Hiphils* reflexively; only the *Venet.* (after Kimchi) is right: ὀξώσει (from an ὀξοῦν as trans. to ὀξεῖν) καὶ ἀτιμώσει, he makes to be of ill odour and dishonours.

Ver. 6 Righteousness protecteth an upright walk,
And godlessness bringeth sinners to destruction.

The double thought is closely like that of xi. 5, but is peculiarly and almost enigmatically expressed. As there, צִדְקָה and רִצְּיוֹנָה are meant of a twofold inner relation to God, which consists of a ruling influence over man's conduct and a determination of his walk. But instead of naming the persons of the רִצְּיוֹנִי רֶגֶךָ and הַצְּדִיקִים as the objects of this influence, the proverb uses the abstract expression, but with personal reference, הַמִּשְׁפָּחָה and הַמִּטָּה, and

designates in two words the connection of this twofold character with the principles of their conduct. What is meant by *הִצָּר* and *תִּסְלַף* proceeds from the contrasted relationship of the two (cf. xxii. 12). *נָצַר* signifies *observare*, which is not suitable here, but also *tueri* (*τηρεῖν*), to which *סָלַף* (*vid.* at xi. 3, and in Gesen. *Thesaurus*), not so much in the sense of "to turn upside down," *pervertere* (as xi. 3, Ex. xxiii. 8), as in the sense of "to overthrow," *evertere* (as e.g. xxi. 12), forms a fitting contrast. He who walks forth with an unfeigned and untroubled pure mind stands under the shield and the protection of righteousness (cf. with this *proso-popeia* Ps. xxv. 21), from which such a walk proceeds, and at the same time under the protection of God, to whom righteousness appertains, is well-pleasing; but he who in his conduct permits himself to be determined by sin, godlessness (cf. Zech. v. 8) from which such a love for sin springs forth, brings to destruction; in other words: God, from whom the *רָשָׁע*, those of a perverse disposition, tear themselves away, makes the sin their snare by virtue of the inner connection established by Him between the *רָשָׁע* and the destruction (Isa. ix. 17). In the LXX. this 6th verse was originally wanting; the translation in the version of Aquila, in the Complut. and elsewhere, which the Syr. follows, falsely makes *חטא* the subj.: *τοὺς δὲ ἄσεβεις φάλους ποιεῖ ἁμαρτία*.

Ver. 7. Two proverbs of riches and poverty:—

There is one who maketh himself rich and hath nothing;

There is another who representeth himself poor amid great riches.

A sentence which includes in itself the judgment which xii. 9 expresses. To the *Hithpa*. *הִתְכַּבֵּר* (to make oneself of importance) there are associated here two others, in the meaning to make oneself something, without anything after it, thus to place oneself so or so, Ewald, § 124a. To the clauses with *י* there is supplied a self-intelligible *ל*.

Ver. 8 A ransom for a man's life are his riches;

But the poor heareth no threatening.

Bertheau falls into error when he understands *נִשְׁעָרָה* of warning; the contrast points to threatening with the loss of life. The wealth of the rich before the judgment is not here to be thought of; for apart from this, that the *Torá* only in a single case permits, or rather ordains (Ex. xxi. 29 f.), ransom from the punishment of death, and declares it in all other cases inadmissible, Num. xxxv. 31 f. (one might indeed think of an administration of

justice not strictly in accordance with the Mosaic law, or altogether accessible to bribery), 8*b* does not accord therewith, since the poor in such cases would fare ill, because one would lay hold on his person. But one may think *e.g.* on waylayers as those introduced as speaking i. 11–14. The poor has no room to fear that such will threateningly point their swords against his breast, for there is nothing to be got from him: he has nothing, one sees it in him and he is known as such. But the rich is a valuable prize for them, and he has to congratulate himself if he is permitted to escape with his life. Also in the times of war and commotion it may be seen that riches endanger the life of their possessor, and that in fortunate cases they are given as a ransom for his life, while his poverty places the poor man in safety. To לֹא שָׁמַעַתָּה Hitzig fittingly compares Job iii. 18, xxxix. 7: he does not hear, he has no need to hear. Michaelis, Umbreit, Löwenstein (who calls to remembrance the state of things under despotic governments, especially in the East) also explain 8*b* correctly; and Fleischer remarks: *pauper minas hostiles non audit, i.e. non minatur ei hostis*. Ewald's syntactic refinement: "Yet he became poor who never heard an accusation," presents a thought not in harmony with 8*a*.

The three following proverbs in vers. 9–11 have at least this in common, that the two concluding words of each correspond with one another almost rhythmically.

Ver. 9 The light of the righteous burneth joyously,
And the lamp of the godless goeth out.

The second line = xxiv. 20*b*, cf. xx. 20. In the Book of Job xviii. 5 *f.*, אִור רְשָׁעִים יִדָּעַךְ and יָרוּ עָלֶיךָ יִדָּעַךְ (cf. xxi. 17) stand together, and there is spoken of (xxix. 3) a divine יָר as well as a divine אִור which enlightens the righteous; however, one must say that the poet, as he, vi. 3, deliberately calls the *Torā* אִור, and the commandment, as derived from it and separated, נֵר, so also here designedly calls the righteous אִור, viz. אִור הַיּוֹם (iv. 18, cf. 2 Pet. i. 19), and the godless נֵר, viz. נֵר רְלוֹק,—the former imparts the sunny daylight, the latter the light of tapers set in darkness. The authentic punctuation is אִור־צִדִּיקִים, Ben-Naphtali's is 'צ' אִור without *Makkeph*. To יִשְׁמָחָהּ Hitzig compares the "laughing tongue of the taper" of Meidāni, iii. 475; Kimchi also the "laughing, *i.e.* amply measured span, מִטְפַּח שׂוֹמֵךְ," of the Talmud; for the light laughs when it brightly shines, and increases rather than decreases; in Arab. *samūha* has in it the idea of joy directly related to that of liberality. The

LXX. translates מַשִּׁי incorrectly by διαπαντός, and has a distich following ver. 9, the first line of which is ψυχὰὶ δόλῳ (הַנֶּפֶשׁ בְּשֶׁמֶר?) πλανῶνται ἐν ἁμαρτίαις, and the second line is from Ps. xxxvii. 21b.

Ver. 10 Nothing comes by pride but contention ;

But wisdom is with those who receive counsel.

The restrictive כִּי (only) does not, according to the sense, belong to מִן (by pride), but to מַשִּׁי, *vid.* under Ps. xxxii. 6 and Job ii. 10. Of כִּי = there is, *vid.* under x. 24. Bertheau's "one causes" is not exact, for "one" [*man*] is the most general personal subject, but כִּי is in such cases to be regarded as impersonal: by pride is always a something which causes nothing but quarrel and strife, for the root of pride is egoism. Line second is a variant to xi. 2b. *Bescheidenheit* (modesty) is in our old [German] language exactly equivalent to *Klugheit* (prudence). But here the מַשִּׁי are more exactly designated as permitting themselves to be advised; the elsewhere reciprocal נִינִי has here once a tolerative signification, although the reciprocal is also allowable: with such as reciprocally advise themselves, and thus without positiveness supplement each his own knowledge by means of that of another. Most interpreters regard 10b as a substantival clause, but why should not כִּי be carried forward? With such as permit themselves to be advised, or are not too proud to sustain with others the relation of giving and receiving, there is wisdom, since instead of hatred comes wisdom—the peaceful fruit resulting from an interchange of views.

Ver. 11 Wealth by means of fraud always becomes less ;

But he that increaseth it by labour gains always more.

We punctuate הֵקֶם-הַמָּהָל (with *Makkeph*, as in Ven. 1521, Antw. 1582, Frank-on-the-Oder 1595, Gen. 1618, Leyden 1662), not הֵקֶם מַהָל (as other editions, and *e.g.* also Löwenstein); for the meaning is not that the wealth becomes less by הַל (Targ., but not the Syr.), or that it is less than הַל (Umbreit), but הֵקֶם-מַהָל is one idea: wealth proceeding from הַל; but הַל, properly a breath (Theod. ἀπὸ ἀτμοῦ or ἀτμίδος), then appearance without reality (Aquila, ἀπὸ ματαιότητος), covers itself here by that which we call swindle, *i.e.* by morally unrestrained fraudulent and deceitful speculation in contrast to solid and real gain. The translations: ἐπισπουδαζομένη μετὰ ἀνομίας (LXX.), ὑπερσπουδαζομένη (Symmachus, *Quinta*¹),

¹ [A fragment of an anonymous translation, so called from the place it holds in Origen's *Hexapla*.]

festinata (Jerome), do not necessarily suppose the phrase מְהֵרָה = מְהֵרָה, xx. 21 *Keri*, for wealth which comes מְהֵרָה is obtained in a windy (unsubstantial) manner and as if by storm, of which the proverb holds good: “*so gewonnen so zerronnen*” (= quickly come, quickly go). מְהֵרָה needs neither to be changed into that un-hebraic מְהֵרָה (Hitzig) nor into the cognate מְהֵרָה (Ewald), but yet inferior to מְהֵרָה in the content of its idea. The contrast of one who by fraud and deception quickly arrives at wealth is one who brings it together in his hand, ἐπὶ χειρός (*Venet.*), i.e. always as often as he can bear it in his hand and bring it forth (Ewald, Bertheau, Elster, and Lagarde), or according to the measure of the hand, κατὰ χεῖρα (which means “according to external ability”), so that על, which is applied to the formation of adverbs, e.g. Ps. xxxi. 24 (Hitzig),—by both explanations על-ל has the meaning of “gradually,”—is used as in the post-bib. Hebr. על יד על יד = מעט מעט, e.g. *Schabbath* 156a (*vid.* Aruch under על) (distinguish from ביד = with thought, intentionally, *Berachoth* 52b). There is scarcely a word having more significations than יד. Connected with על, it means at one time side or place, at another mediation or direction; that which is characteristic here is the omission of the pronoun (על-יד, על-יד). The LXX. translates יד על יד with the unrestrained freedom which it allows to itself by μετ’ εὐσεβείας, and has following πλεθυνθήσεται another line, δίκαιος οἰκτεῖρει καὶ κυχρᾷ (from Ps. xxxvii. 26).

The figures of paradise in vers. 12 and 14 require us to take along with them the intermediate verse (13).

Ver. 12 Deferred waiting maketh the heart sick,
And a tree of life is a wish accomplished.

Singularly the LXX. *Κρείσσων ἐναρχόμενος βοηθῶν καρδίᾳ*, followed by the Syr. (which the Targ. transcribes¹): Better is he who begins to help than he who remains in hesitating expectation, by which תחלת is doubled, and is derived once from תחיל, to wait, and the second time from תחיל, to begin. If the LXX., with its imitators, deteriorates to such a degree proverbs so clear, beautiful, and inviolable, what may one expect from it in the case of those not easily understood! מְשַׁח signifies also, Isa. xviii. 2, to be widely extended (cf. Arab. *meshak*), here in the sense of time, as מְשַׁח, to prolong, Isa. xiii. 22, and post-bib. הַמְשַׁח, the course of time.

¹ That the Targum of the Proverbs is a Jewish elaboration of the Peshito text, *vid.* Nöldeke in *Merx' Archiv*, Bd. ii. pp. 246-49.

Regarding *תְּהִלָּתוֹ*, *vid.* at x. 28, where as xi. 27 *תִּקְוָתוֹ*, here *תִּצְאוֹ*, as also Ps. lxxviii. 29 of the object of the wish, and with *בּוֹא* in the sense of being fulfilled (cf. Josh. xxi. 43), as there with *הִבִּיא* in the sense of accomplishing or performing. Extended waiting makes the heart sick, causes heart-woe (*מַחֲלָה*, *part. fem. Hiph.* of *חָלָה*, to be slack, feeble, sick; R. *חָל*, to loosen, to make loose); on the contrary, a wish that has been fulfilled is a tree of life (cf. p. 32), of a quickening and strengthening influence, like that tree of paradise which was destined to renew and extend the life of man.

Ver. 13 Whoever despiseth the word is in bonds to it,
And he that feareth the commandment is rewarded.

The word is thought of as ordering, and thus in the sense of the commandment, *e.g.* 1 Sam. xvii. 19, Dan. ix. 23, 25. That which is here said is always true where the will of a man has subordinated itself to the authoritative will of a superior, but principally the proverb has in view the word of God, the *מִצְוָה* *κατ' ἐξ.* as the expression of the divine will, which (vi. 3) appears as the secondary, with the *תּוֹרָה*, the general record of the divine will. Regarding *בּוֹא* of contemptuous, spiteful opposition, *vid.* at vi. 30, cf. xi. 12. Joël (*vid.* p. 136, *note*) records the prevailing tradition, for he translates: "Whoever despises advice rushes into destruction; whoever holds the commandment in honour is perfect." But that *יִשְׁלָם* is to be understood neither of perfection nor of peace (LXX. and Jerome), but means *compensabitur* (here not in the sense of punishment, but of reward), we know from xi. 31. The translation also of *יִהְיֶה לוֹ* by "he rushes into destruction" (LXX. *καταφθαρήσεται*, which the Syr.-Hexap. repeats; Luther, "he destroys himself;" the *Venet.* *οὐ γένηται οἱ, periet sibi*) fails, for one does not see what should have determined the poet to choose just this word, and, instead of the ambiguous *dat. ethicus*, not rather to say *יִהְיֶה נֶפֶשׁוֹ*. So also this *יִהְיֶה לוֹ* is not with Gesenius to be connected with *חָבַל* = Arab. *khabl*, *corrumpere*, but with *חָבַל* = Arab. *habl*, *ligare*, *obligare*. Whoever places himself contemptuously against a word which binds him to obedience will nevertheless not be free from that word, but is under pledge until he redeem the pledge by the performance of the obedience refused, or till that higher will enforce payment of the debt withheld by visiting with punishment. Jerome came near the right interpretation: *ipse se in futurum obligat*; Abulwalid refers to Ex. xxii. 25; and Parchon, Rashi, and others paraphrase: *מִיִּשְׁבּוֹ יִתְמַשְׁבּוֹ עָלָיו*,

he is confiscated as by mortgage. Schultens has, with the correct reference of the לֹ not to the contemner, but to the word, well established and illustrated this explanation: he is pledged by the word, Arab. *marhwan* (*rahyn*), viz. *pigneratus pænæ* (Livius, xxix. 36). Ewald translates correctly: he is pledged to it; and Hitzig gives the right explanation: "A תְּבִלָּה [a pledge, cf. xx. 16] is handed over to the offended law with the תְּבִלָּה [the bad conduct] by the despiser himself, which lapses when he has exhausted the forbearance, so that the punishment is inflicted." The LXX. has another proverb following ver. 13 regarding *υἱὸς δόλιος* and *οικέτης σοφός*; the Syr. has adopted it; Jerome has here the proverb of the *animæ dolosæ* (*vid.* at ver. 9).

Ver. 14 The doctrine of the wise man is a fountain of life,
To escape the snares of death.

An *integral* distich, *vid.* p. 8 of the Introduction. Essentially like 14a, x. 11 says, "a fountain of life is the mouth of the righteous." The figure of the fountain of life with the teleological לִכְסוֹר (the ל of the end and consequence of the action) is repeated xiv. 27. The common non-biblical figure of the *laquei mortis* leads also to the idea of death as יָקוּשׁ [a fowler], Ps. xci. 3. If it is not here a mere formula for the dangers of death (Hitzig), then the proverb is designed to state that the life which springs from the doctrine of the wise man as from a fountain of health, for the disciple who will receive it, communicates to him knowledge and strength, to know where the snares of destruction lie, and to hasten with vigorous steps away when they threaten to entangle him.

Four proverbs follow, whose connection appears to have been occasioned by the sound of their words (ברע . . . ברעת. בל . . . שבל. רישע . . . רישע).

Ver. 15 Fine prudence produceth favour;
But the way of the malicious is uncultivated.

Regarding שִׁבְלָה טוֹב (thus to be punctuated, without *Makkeph* with *Munach*, after Codd. and old editions), *vid.* p. 84; for the most part it corresponds with that which in a deep ethical sense we call fine culture. Regarding יָחַן, *vid.* at x. 10: it is not used here, as there, impersonally, but has a personal subject: he brings forth, causes. Fine culture, which shows men how to take the right side and in all circumstances to strike the right key, exercises a kindly heart-winning influence, not merely, as would be expressed by יִסְעָא, to the benefit of its possessor, but, as is expressed by

יָתֵן, such as removes generally a partition wall and brings men closer to one another. The אֵיתָן [*perennis*], touching it both for the eye and the ear, forms the contrast to יָתֵן חֵן. This word, an elative formation from יָתֵן = יָתַן, denotes that which stretches itself far, and that with reference to time: that which remains the same during the course of time. "That which does not change in time, continuing the same, according to its nature, strong, firm, and thus יָתֵן becomes the designation of the enduring and the solid, whose quality remains always the same." Thus Orelli, *Die hebr. Synonyme der Zeit u. Ewigkeit*, 1871. But that in the passage before us it denotes the way of the בְּנֵי־אָדָם as "endlessly going forward," the explanation of Orelli, after Böttcher (*Collectanea*, p. 135), is withdrawn by the latter in the new *Aehrenlese* (where he reads רֵיב אֵיתָן, "constant strife"). And נָחַל אֵיתָן (Deut. xxi. 4) does not mean "a brook, the existence of which is not dependent on the weather and the season of the year," at least not in accordance with the traditional meaning which is given *Sota* ix. 5 (cf. the Gemara), but a stony valley; for the Mishna says: אֵיתָן בְּמִשְׁמְעוֹ קִישָׁה, i.e. אֵיתָן is here, according to its verbal meaning, equivalent to קִישָׁה (hard). We are of the opinion that here, in the midst of the discussion of the law of the עֹלָה עֲרוּפָה (the ritual for the atonement of a murder perpetrated by an unknown hand), the same meaning of the אֵיתָן is certified which is to be adopted in the passage before us. Maimuni¹ (in *Sota* and *Hilchoth Rozeach* ix. 2) indeed, with the Mishna and Gemara, thinks the meaning of a "strong rushing wady" to be compatible; but קִישָׁה is a word which more naturally denotes the property of the ground than of a river, and the description, Deut. xxi. 4: in a נָחַל אֵיתָן, in which there is no tillage and sowing, demands for נָחַל here the idea of the valley, and not primarily that of the valley-brook. According to this tradition, the Targum places a תַּקִּיפָא in the Peshito translation of 15b, and the Venet. translates, after Kimchi, ὁδὸς δὲ ἀνταρτῶν (of ἀνταρτῆς from ἀνταίρειν) ἰσχυρά. The fundamental idea of remaining like itself, continuing, passes over into the idea of the firm, the hard, so that יָתֵן is a word that interchanges with סָלַע, Num. xxiv. 21, and serves as a figurative designation of the rocky mountains, Jer. xlix. 19, and the rocky framework of the earth, Mic. vi. 2. Thus the meaning of hardness (περῶδες, Matt. xiii. 5) connects itself with

¹ [= R. Moses b. Maimon = Rambam, so called by the Jews from the initial letters of his name = Maimonides, d. 1204.]

the word, and at the same time, according to Deut. xxi. 4, of the uncultivable and the uncultivated. The way of the בְּנִיִּים, the treacherous (*vid.* p. 84), *i.e.* the manner in which they transact with men, is stiff, as hard as stone, and repulsive; they follow selfish views, never placing themselves in sympathy with the condition of their neighbour; they are without the tenderness which is connected with fine culture; they remain destitute of feeling in things which, as we say, would soften a stone. It is unnecessary to give a catalogue of the different meanings of this אֵרֶן, such as *vorago* (Jerome), a standing bog (Umbreit), an ever trodden way (Bertheau), etc.; Schultens offers, as frequently, the relatively best: *at via perfidorum pertinacissime tensum*; but אֵרֶן does not mean to strain, but to extend. The LXX. has between 15a and 15b the interpolation: τὸ δὲ γυνῶναι νόμον διαβολᾶς ἐστὶν ἀγαθὴς.

Ver. 16 Every prudent man acteth with understanding;
But a fool spreadeth abroad folly.

Ilitzig reads, with the Syr. (but not the Targ.) and Jerome, בָּל (*omnia agit*), but contrary to the Hebr. syntax. The בָּל is not feeble and useless, but means that he always acts בְּרָעַת, *mit Bedacht* [with judgment] (*opp.* בְּבָלִי רָעָה, *inconsulto*, Deut. iv. 42, xix. 4), while on the contrary the fool displays folly. xii. 23 and xv. 2 serve to explain both members of the verse. *Bedächtigkeit* [judgment] is just knowledge directed to a definite practical end, a clear thought concentrated on a definite point. יִקְרָא, he calls out, and בִּיטֵּי, he sputters out, are parallels to יִפְרֹשׂ. Fleischer: פָּרֵשׂ, *expandit* (*opp.* Arab. *tawy*, *intra animum cohibuit*), as a cloth or paper folded or rolled together, cf. Schiller's¹—

“He spreads out brightly and splendidly
The enveloped life.”

There lies in the word something derisive: as the merchant unrolls and spreads out his wares in order to commend them, so the fool does with his foolery, which he had enveloped, *i.e.* had the greatest interest to keep concealed within himself—he is puffed up there-with.

Ver. 17 A godless messenger falls into trouble;
But a faithful messenger is a cordial.

The traditional text, which the translations also give (except Jerome, *nuntius impii*, and leaving out of view the LXX., which

¹ [“*Er breitet es heiter und glänzend aus,
Das zusammengewickelte Leben.*”]

makes of ver. 17 a history of a foolhardy king and a wise messenger), has not מְלִאָּה, but מְלִאָּה; the Masora places the word along with הַמְלִאָּךְ, Gen. xlviii. 16. And יַל is likewise testified to by all translators; they all read it as *Kal*, as the traditional text punctuates it; Luther alone departs from this and translates the *Hiph.*: “a godless messenger bringeth misfortune.” Indeed, this conj. יַל presses itself forward; and even though one read יַל, the sense intended by virtue of the parallelism could be no other than that a godless messenger, because no blessing rests on his godlessness, stumbles into disaster, and draws him who gave the commission along with him. The connection מְלִאָּךְ רִשָּׁע is like אֲדָם רִשָּׁע, xi. 7 (cf. the fem. of this adj., Ezek. iii. 18). Instead of בָּרָעָה is בָּרָעָה, xvii. 20, xxviii. 14, parallels (cf. also xi. 5) which the punctuators may have had in view in giving the preference to *Kal*. With מְלִאָּךְ, from מְלִאָּה, R. לך, to make to go = to send, is interchanged צִיר, from צַר, to turn, whence to journey (cf. Arab. *sar*, to become, to be, as the vulg. “to be to Dresden = to journey” is used). The connection צִיר אֲמִינִים (cf. the more simple צִיר נֶאֱמָן, xxv. 13) is like xiv. 15, עֵר אֲמוּנִים; the *pluralet*. means faithfulness in the full extent of the idea. Regarding מְרַפָּא, the means of healing, here of strength, refreshment, *vid.* iv. 22, xii. 18.

Ver. 18 Poverty and shame (to him) who rejecteth correction;

But he who regardeth reproof is honoured.

We are neither to supply אִישׁ before וְקָלָן (or more correctly, *abstr. pro concr.*, as רַבִּיָּה, xii. 27), nor ל before פּוֹרַע, as Gesenius (*Lehrgeb.* § 227a) does; nor has the *part.* פּוֹרַע the value of a hypothetical clause like xviii. 13, Job xli. 18, although it may certainly be changed into such without destroying the meaning (Ewald, Hitzig); but “poverty and shame is he who is without correction,” is equivalent to, poverty and shame is the conclusion or lot of him who is without correction; it is left to the hearer to find out the reference of the predicate to the subject in the sense of the quality, the consequence, or the lot (cf. *e.g.* x. 17, xiii. 1, xiv. 35).¹ Regarding פּוֹרַע, *vid.* p. 73. The Latin expression corresponding is: *qui detrectat disciplinam*. He who rejects the admonition and correction of his parents, his pastor, or his friend, and refuses every counsel to duty as a burdensome moralizing, such an one must at last gather wisdom by means of injury if he is at

¹ *Vid.* regarding the strong demand which the Hebr. style makes on bearer and reader, my *Gesch. der jüdischen Poesie* (1863), p. 189.

all wise : he grows poorer in consequence of missing the right rule of life, and has in addition thereto to be subject to disgrace through his own fault. On the contrary, to him who has the disgrace to deserve reproof, but who willingly receives it, and gives it effect, the disgrace becomes an honour, for not to reject reproof shows self-knowledge, humility, and good-will ; and these properties in the judgment of others bring men to honour, and have the effect of raising them in their position in life and in their calling.

Two pairs of proverbs regarding fools and wise men, ranged together by catchwords.

Ver. 19 Quickened desire is sweet to the soul,

And it is an abomination to fools to avoid evil.

A synthetic distich (*vid.* p. 8), the first line of which, viewed by itself, is only a feeblér expression of that which is said in 12*b*, for תַּחֲתָהּ נִהְיָה is essentially of the same meaning as תַּחֲתָהּ בָּאָה, not the desire that has just arisen and is not yet appeased (Umbreit, Hitzig, Zückler), which when expressed by a *part.* of the same verb would be הִנָּה (= אֲשֶׁר הִיָּתָה), but the desire that is appeased (Jerome, Luther, also *Venet.* ἐφθεσις γενομένη, *i.e.* after Kimchi: in the fulfilling of past desire ; on the contrary, the Syr., Targ. render the phrase נִהְיָה of becoming desire). The *Niph.* נִהְיָה denotes not the passing into a state of being, but the being carried out into historical reality, *e.g.* Ezek. xxi. 12, xxxix. 8, where it is connected with בָּאָה ; it is always the expression of the completed fact to which there is a looking back, *e.g.* Judg. xx. 3 ; and this sense of the *Niph.* stands so fast, that it even means to be done, finished (brought to an end), to be out, to be done with anything, *e.g.* Dan. ii. 1.¹ The sentence, that fulfilled desire does good to the soul, appears commonplace (Hitzig) ; but it is comprehensive enough on the ground of Heb. xi. to cheer even a dying person, and conceals the ethically significant truth that the blessedness of vision is measured by the degree of the longing of faith. But the application of the clause in its

¹ We have said, p. 215, that a *Niph.* in which the peculiar causative meaning of the *Hiph.* would be rendered passively is without example ; we must here with נִהְיָה add, that the *Niph.* of intransitive verbs denotes the entrance into the condition expressed by the *Kal*, and may certainly be regarded, according to our way of thinking, as passive of the *Hiphil* (Gesen. § 51, 2). But the old language shows no הִנָּה to which נִהְיָה (Arab. *ainhaway*, in Mutenebbi) stood as passive ; in the Arab. also the seventh form, rightly regarded, is always formed from the first, *vid.* Fleischer's *Beiträge*, u.s.w., in the *Sitzungs-Bericht. d. Sächs. Gesellschaft d. Wiss.* 1863, p. 172 f.

pairing with 19*b* acquires another aspect. On this account, because the desire of the soul is pleasant in its fulfilment, fools abhor the renouncing of evil, for their desire is directed to that which is morally worthless and blameworthy, and the endeavour, which they closely and constantly adhere to, is to reach the attainment of this desire. This subordinate proposition of the conclusion is unexpressed. The pairing of the two lines of the proverb may have been occasioned by the resemblance in sound of תועבת and תאצה. טור is *n. actionis*, like xvi. 17, cf. 6. Besides, it is to be observed that the proverb speaks of fools and not of the godless. Folly is that which causes that men do not break free from evil, for it is the deceit of sinful lust which binds them fast thereto.

Ver. 20 Whoever goes with wise men, becomes wise;

And whoever has intercourse with fools, becomes base.

Regarding the significance of this proverb in the history of the religion and worship of Israel, *vid.* p. 39. We have translated 20*a* after the *Keri*; the translation according to the *Chethib* is: "go with wise men and become wise" (cf. viii. 33), not הלך, for the connection of the (meant imperatively) *infin. absol.* with an imper. (meant conclusively) is not tenable; but הלך is an imper. form established by הלכתי, Jer. li. 50 (cf. הלך = לבת, Num. xxii. 14), and appears to have been used with such shades of conception as here of intercourse and companionship for לך. Regarding ירד, *vid.* at xi. 15; there it meant *malo afficietur*, here it means *malus (pejor) fiet*. The *Venet.* (contrary to Kimchi, who explains by *frangetur*) rightly has *κακωθήσεται*. There is here a play upon words; רעה means to tend (a flock), also in general to be considerate about anything (xv. 14, Isa. xlv. 20), to take care of anything with the accusative of the person (xxviii. 7, xxix. 3), to hold intercourse with any one: he who by preference seeks the society of fools, himself becomes such (Jerome, *similis efficietur*), or rather, as ירד expresses, he comes always morally lower down. "A wicked companion leads his associate into hell."

Ver. 21 Evil pursueth sinners,

And the righteous is repaid with good.

תורה of the punishment which follows after sinners at their heels, cf. Nah. i. 8. Greek art gives wings to Nemesis in this sense. To translate 21*b*, with Löwenstein, "The pious, the good rewards them," is untenable, for טוב, the good (*e.g.* xi. 27), never appears personified, only טוב, goodness, Ps. xxiii. 6, according to

which the LXX. τοὺς δὲ δίκαιους καταλήψεται (יִשָּׁ) ἀγαθά. Still less is טוב meant personally, as the Venet. τὰ δὲ δίκαια ἀποδώσει χρηστός, which probably means: righteous conduct will a good one, viz. God, reward. טוב is an attribute of God, but never the name of God. So the verb יִשָּׁ, after the manner of verbs of educating and leading (נָסַל, עָנַן, עָבַד), is connected with a double accusative. The Syr., Targum, and Jerome translate passively, and so also do we; for while we must think of God in the *retribuet*, yet the proverb does not name Him any more than at xii. 14, cf. x. 24; it is designedly constructed, placing Him in the background, with vague generality: the righteous will one, will they, reward with good—this expression, with the most general personal subject, almost coincides with one altogether passive.

Ver. 22 The good man leaveth behind him for his children's children,
And the wealth of the sinner is laid up for the just.

As a commencing word, טוב signifies in the *Mishle* for the most part *bonum* (*præ*); but here, as at xii. 2, cf. xxii. 9, xiv. 4, it signifies *bonus*. As the expression that God is טוב (Ps. xxv. 8, etc.) of the O. T. is equivalent to the N. T. that He is ἀγάπη, so that man who in his relation to others is determined by unselfish love is טוב for the good man [*der Gültige*], i.e. the man who is willing to communicate all good is truly good, because the essence of צְדָקָה, righteousness of life, is love. Such an one suffers no loss by his liberality, but, according to the law, xi. 25, by which a dispenser of blessings is at the same time also a recipient of blessings, he has only gain, so that he makes his children's children to inherit, i.e. leaves behind him an inheritance extending even to his grandchildren (*vid.* regarding הִנְחִיל, p. 182; here trans. as containing its object in itself, as at Deut. xxxii. 8: to make to inherit, to place in possession of an inheritance). The sinner, on the contrary (חֹסֶד sing. to חֹסֶד, ἀμαρτωλοί), loses his wealth, it is already destined to pass over to the righteous who is worthy of it, and makes use (cf. Job xxvii. 17) of that which he possesses in accordance with the will and appointment of God—a revelation of justice appertaining to time, the exceptions to which the old limited doctrine of requital takes no notice of. כֹּחַ, strength, then like our "*Vermögen*" (cf. *opes*, *facultates*), that by means of which one is placed in circumstances to accomplish much (Fl.); cf. regarding the fundamental idea *contorquere*, *compingere*, p. 226, also regarding עָצַם, properly *condensare*, then *condere*, p. 61.

Connected with ver. 22 there now follow two proverbs regarding sustenance, with one intervening regarding education.

Ver. 23 The poor man's fresh land gives food in abundance,
And many are destroyed by iniquity.

The Targ. and Theodotion (μέγας) translate רַב, but the Masora has רַב־ with short *Kametz*, as xx. 6, Eccles. i. 8 (cf. Kimchi under רַב). The rendering: *multitudo cibi est ager pauperum*, makes the produce the property of the field (= *frugum fertilis*). יֵרִי is the new field (*novale* or *novalis*, viz. *ager*), from יָרָה, to make arable, fruitful; properly to raise up, viz. by grubbing and freeing of stones (סִבָּל). But why, asks Ilitzig, just the new field? As if no answer could be given to this question, he changes יֵרִי into יָרִיב, and finds in 23a the description of a *rentier*, "a great man who consumes the income of his capital." But how much more intelligible is the new field of the poor man than these capitals (רְאשִׁים) with their *per cents* (יָרִיב)! A new field represents to us severe labour, and as belonging to a poor man, a moderate field, of which it is here said, that notwithstanding its freshly broken up fallow, it yet yields a rich produce, viz. by virtue of the divine blessing, for the proverb supposes the *ora et labora*. Regarding רְאשִׁים = רָשִׁים, vid. at x. 4. Jerome's translation, *patrum* (properly, heads), follows a false Jewish tradition. In the antithesis, 23b, one is tempted to interpret עֲשֵׂי in the sense of viii. 21 [substance, wealth], as Schultens, *opulentia ipsa raditur quum non est moderamen*, and Eichel: that which is essentially good, badly managed, goes to ruin. But עֲשֵׂי and עֲשֵׂי at the beginning of a proverb, or of a line of a proverb, in every case means *est qui*. That a wealthy person is meant, the contrast shows. נִקְפָּה, which denotes anything taken away or gathered up, has the same meaning here as at 1 Sam. xxvii. 1: *est qui* (Fl. *quod*, but the parallel does not demand this) *abripitur*, i.e. *quasi turbine auferatur et perdatur*; the word reminds us of סוּפָה, whirlwind, but in itself it means only something smooth and altogether carried off. The בִּי is here as at Gen. xix. 15; elsewhere בִּלְאֵי מִשְׁפָּט means with injustice (properly, not-right), xvi. 8, Jer. xxii. 13, Ezek. xxii. 29; here it is not the בִּי of the means, but of the mediate cause. While the (industrious and God-fearing) poor man is richly nourished from the piece of ground which he cultivates, many a one who has incomparably more than he comes by his unrighteousness down to a state of beggary, or even lower: he is not only in poverty, but along with this his honour, his freedom, and the very life of his person perish.

Ver. 24 He that spareth his rod hateth his son,
And he who loveth him visits him early with correction.

The pædagogic rule of God, iii. 12, avails also for men, xxiii. 13 f., xxix. 15. The rod represents here the means of punishment, the *patria potestas*. He who spareth or avoideth this, and who does this even from love, has yet no true right love for his son; he who loveth him correcteth him early. With ἐπιμελῶς παιδεύει of the LXX. (cf. Sir. xxx. 1, ἐνδεδεχῆσαι μάστιγας) the thought is in general indicated, but the expression is not explained. Many erroneously regard the suffix of שָׁחַר as referring to the object immediately following (de Dieu, Ewald, Bertheau, Zöckler); Hitzig, on the contrary, rightly remarks, that in this case we should expect the words to be, after v. 22 (cf. Ex. ii. 6), אֶת־הַבֶּחֶר. He himself, without any necessity, takes שָׁחַר in the sense of the Arab. *skhar*, *compescere*. Hofmann (*Schriftbew.* ii. 2. 402) is right in saying that "שָׁחַר is connected with a double accusative as elsewhere קָרַם occurs; and the meaning is, that one ought much more to anticipate correction than restrain it where it is necessary." שָׁחַר means to go out early to anything (*vid.* p. 73), according to which a Greek rendering is ὀρθρίζει (*Venet.* ὀρθριεῖ) αὐτῷ παιδεύειν: *maturat ei castigationem = mature eum castigat* (Fl.). שָׁחַר does not denote the early morning of the day (as Rashi, לְבֹקֶרִים), but the morning of life (as Euchel, בְּשַׁחַר יָמֵי). "The earlier the fruit, the better the training." A father who truly wishes well to his son keeps him betimes under strict discipline, to give him while he is yet capable of being influenced the right direction, and to allow no errors to root themselves in him; but he who is indulgent toward his child when he ought to be strict, acts as if he really wished his ruin.

Ver. 25 The righteous has to eat to the satisfying of his soul;
But the body of the godless must suffer want.

Jerome translates תַּחֲסַר freely by *insaturabilis* (he has want = has never enough), but in that case we would have expected תַּחֲסִיר; also in 25a עֲרִיכָה would have been used. We have thus before us no commendation of temperance and moderation in contrast to gluttony, but a statement regarding the diversity of fortune of the righteous and the godless—another way of clothing the idea of x. 3. שָׂכַר is a segolate form, thus an infin. formation, formally different from the similar שָׂכַר, iii. 10. Regarding בֶּטֶן, *vid. Psychol.* p. 265 f.; it is a nobler word than "*Bauch*" [belly], for it denotes not the external arch, but, like κοιλία (R. בֶּטֶן, *concavus*), the inner

body, here like xviii. 20, as that which receives the nourishment and changes it in *succum et sanguinem*. That God richly nourishes the righteous, and on the contrary brings the godless to want and misery, is indeed a rule with many exceptions, but understood in the light of the N. T., it has deep inward everlasting truth.

Chap. xiv. The division of chapters here corresponds to a new commencement made in ver. 1. This proverb reminds us of the allegorical conclusion of the Introduction, and appears, since it is older, to have suggested it (*vid.* p. 34). The three proverbs 1-3 form a beautiful *trifolium*: wise management, God-fearing conduct, and wise silence, with their threefold contraries.

Ver. 1 The wisdom of the woman buildeth her house,
And folly teareth it down with its own hands.

Were it חֲכָמֹת נָשִׁים, after, Judg. v. 29, cf. Isa. xix. 11, then the meaning would be: the wise among women, each of them buildeth her house. But why then not just אִשָּׁה חֲכָמָה, as 2 Sam. xiv. 2, cf. Ex. xxxv. 25? The Syr., Targum, and Jerome write *sapiens mulier*. And if the whole class must be spoken of, why again immediately the individualizing in בְּנִיתָהּ? The LXX. obliterated that by its *ἐκκοδόμησαν*. And does not אִשָּׁה [folly] in the contrasted proverb (1b) lead us to conclude on a similar abstract in 1a? The translators conceal this, for they translate אִשָּׁה personally. Thus also the *Venet.* and Luther; אִשָּׁה is, says Kimchi, an adj. like צוּרָה, *cæca*. But the linguistic usage does not point אִשָּׁה with אִשָּׁה to any אִשָּׁה. It is true that a fem. of אִשָּׁה does not occur; there is, however, also no place in which אִשָּׁה may certainly present itself as such. Thus also חֲכָמֹת must be an abstr.; we have shown at i. 20 how חֲכָמֹת, as neut. plur., might have an abstr. meaning. But since it is not to be perceived why the poet should express himself so singularly, the punctuation חֲכָמֹת is to be understood as proceeding from a false supposition, and is to be read חֲכָמָה, as at ix. 1 (especially since this passage rests on the one before us). Fleischer says: "to build the house is figuratively equivalent to, to regulate well the affairs of a house, and to keep them in a good condition; the contrary, to tear down the house, is the same contrast as the Arab. 'amârat âlbyt and kharab albyt. Thus e.g. in Burekhardt's *Sprüche*. 217, harrt sabrt bythâ 'amârat, a good woman (*ein braves Weib*) has patience (with her husband), and thereby she builds up her house (at the same time an example of the use of the preterite in like general sentences for individual-

izing); also No. 430 of the same work: 'amārat ālbyť wla kharābť, it is becoming to build the house, not to destroy it; cf. in the *Thousand and One Nights*, where a woman who had compelled her husband to separate from her says: āna ālty 'amalt hadhā barahy wākhrnt byty bnfsy. Burckhardt there makes the remark: 'amārat ālbyť denotes the family placed in good circumstances—father, mother, and children all living together happily and peacefully." This conditional relation of the wife to the house expresses itself in her being named as house-wife (cf. *Haushere* [= honour of a house] used by Luther, Ps. lxxviii. 13), to which the Talmudic רְבִיתִי (= *uxor mea*) answers; the wife is noted for this, and hence is called עֵיקַר הַבַּיִת, the root and foundation of the house; *vid.* Buxtorf's *Lex.* col. 301. In truth, the oneness of the house is more dependent on the mother than on the father. A wise mother can, if her husband be dead or neglectful of his duty, always keep the house together; but if the house-wife has neither understanding nor good-will for her calling, then the best will of the house-father cannot hinder the dissolution of the house, prudence and patience only conceal and mitigate the process of dissolution—folly, viz. of the house-wife, always becomes more and more, according to the degree in which this is a caricature of her calling, the ruin of the house.

Ver. 2 He walketh in his uprightness who feareth Jahve,
And perverse in his ways is he that despiseth Him.

That which syntactically lies nearest is also that which is intended; the ideas standing in the first place are the predicates. Wherein it shows itself, and whereby it is recognised, that a man fears God, or stands in a relation to Him of indifference instead of one of fear and reverence, shall be declared: the former walketh in his uprightness, *i.e.* so far as the consciousness of duty which animates him prescribes; the latter in his conduct follows no higher rule than his own lust, which drives him sometimes hither and sometimes thither. הוֹלֵךְ בְּיִשְׁרָאֵל (cf. יִשְׁרָאֵל הוֹלֵךְ, Mic. ii. 7) is of kindred meaning with הוֹלֵךְ בְּחַסְדּוֹ, xxviii. 6 (הוֹלֵךְ בְּחַסִּים, x. 9), and הוֹלֵךְ בְּנֶחֱמוֹ, Isa. lvii. 2. The connection of בְּרַחֲמֵי follows the scheme of 2 Kings xviii. 37, and not 2 Sam. xv. 32, Ewald, § 288c. If the second word, which particularizes the idea of the first, has the reflexive suff. as here, then the accusative connection, or, as ii. 15, the prepositional, is more usual than the genitive. Regarding לֵב, *flectere, inclinare* (a word common to the author of i.-ix.), *vid.* at ii. 15. With

בִּזְיוֹנוֹ, cf. 1 Sam. ii. 30; the suffix without doubt refers to God, for בִּזְיוֹנוֹ is the word that stands in parallel contrast to יְהוָה.

Ver. 3 In the mouth of the fool is a switch of pride;
But the lips of the wise preserve them.

The noun הָטֵר (Aram. חֲטִירָא, Arab. *khitr*), which besides here occurs only at Isa. xi. 1, meaning properly a brandishing (from הָטֵר = Arab. *khatr*, to brandish, to move up and down or hither and thither, whence *alkhūtār*, the brandisher, poet. the spear), concretely, the young elastic twig, the switch, i.e. the slender flexible shoot. Luther translates, "fools speak tyrannically," which is the briefer rendering of his earlier translation, "in the mouth of the fool is the sceptre of pride;" but although the Targum uses חֲטִירָא of the king's sceptre and also of the prince's staff, yet here for this the usual Hebr. שִׁבְט were to be expected. In view of Isa. xi. 1, the nearest idea is, that pride which has its roots in the heart of the fool, grows up to his mouth. But yet it is not thus explained why the representation of this proceeding from within stops with הָטֵר (cf. xi. 30). The *βαστηρία ὑβρεως* (LXX., and similarly the other Greek versions) is either meant as the rod of correction of his own pride (as e.g. Abulwalid, and, among the moderns, Bertheau and Zöckler) or as chastisement for others (Syr., Targum: the staff of reviling). Hitzig is in favour of the former idea, and thinks himself warranted in translating: a rod for his back; but while גִּבָּה is found for גִּבְעָה, we do not (cf. under Job xli. 7: a pride are the, etc.) find גִּבָּה for גִּבָּה, the body, or גִּבָּה, the back. But in general it is to be assumed, that if the poet had meant הָטֵר as the means of correction, he would have written גִּבְעָתוֹ. Rightly Fleischer: "The tongue is often compared to a staff, a sword, etc., in so far as their effects are ascribed to it; we have here the figure which in Rev. i. 16 passes over into plastic reality." Self-exaltation (R. גָּא, to strive to be above) to the delusion of greatness is characteristic of the fool, the אֵיל [godless], not the קִסִּל [stupid, dull]—Hitzig altogether confounds these two conceptions. With such self-exaltation, in which the mind, morally if not pathologically diseased, says, like Nineveh and Babylon in the prophets, I am alone, and there is no one with me, there is always united the scourge of pride and of disgrace; and the meaning of 3b may now be that the lips of the wise protect those who are exposed to this injury (Ewald), or that they protect the wise themselves against such assaults (thus most interpreters).

But this reference of the *eos* to others lies much more remote than at xii. 6; and that the protection of the wise against injury inflicted on them by words is due to their own lips is unsatisfactory, as in this case, instead of *Bewahrung* [*custodia*], we would rather expect *Vertheidigung* [*defensio*], *Dämpfung* [damping, extinguishing], *Niederduckung* [stooping down, accommodating oneself to circumstances]. But also it cannot be meant that the lips of the wise preserve them from the pride of fools, for the thought that the mouth preserves the wise from the sins of the mouth is without meaning and truth (cf. the contrary, xiii. 3). Therefore Arama interprets the verb as jussive: the lips = words of the wise mayest thou keep, *i.e.* take to heart. And the *Venet.* translates: *χείλη δὲ σοφῶν φυλάξεις αὐτά*, which perhaps means: the lips of the wise mayest thou consider, and that not as a prayer, which is foreign to the gnome, but as an address to the hearer, which *e.g.* xx. 19 shows to be admissible. But although in a certain degree of similar contents, yet 3a and 3b clash. Therefore it appears to us more probable that the subject of 3b is the חכמה contained in חכמים; in vi. 22 wisdom is also the subject to חִשְׁמַר עָלֶיךָ without its being named. Thus: while hurtful pride grows up to the throat of the fool, that, viz. wisdom, keeps the lips of the wise, so that no word of self-reflection, especially none that can wound a neighbour, escapes from them. The form חִשְׁמַרְתָּ is much more peculiar than חִשְׁמַרְתָּ, Ex. xviii. 26, and חִשְׁמַרְתָּ, Ruth ii. 8, for the latter are obscured forms of חִשְׁמַרְתָּ and חִשְׁמַרְתָּ, while on the contrary the former arises from חִשְׁמַרְתָּ.¹ If, according to the usual interpretation, we make חִשְׁמַרְתָּ the subject, then the construction follows the rule, Gesen. § 146, 2. The LXX. transfers it into Greek: *χείλη δὲ σοφῶν φυλάσσει αὐτούς*. The probable conjecture, that חִשְׁמַרְתָּ is an error in transcription for חִשְׁמַרְתָּ אִתָּם (this is found also in Luzzatto's *Gramm.* § 776; and Hitzig adduces as other examples of such transpositions of the ו Jer. ii. 25, xvii. 23, Job xxvi. 12, and Josh ii. 4, חִשְׁמַרְתָּ for חִשְׁמַרְתָּ), we do not acknowledge, because it makes the lips the subject with an exclusiveness the justification of which is doubtful to us. ! !

¹ *Vid.* regarding these forms with *š* instead of the simple *Sheva*, Kimchi, *Michlol* 20ab. He also remarks that these three forms with *š* are all *Alibra*; this is the case also in a remarkable manner with חִשְׁמַרְתָּ, *vid.* *Michlol* 21b; *Licjath Chen* ii. 9; and particularly Heidenheim, in his edition of the Pentateuch entitled *Me'or Enajim*, under Ex. xviii. 26.

Ver. 4. The switch and the preserving, ver. 3, may have given occasion to the collector, amid the store of proverbs before him, now to present the agricultural figure:

Without oxen the crib is empty;

But rich increase is by the strength of the plough-ox.

This is a commendation of the breeding of cattle, but standing here certainly not merely as useful knowledge, but as an admonition to the treatment in a careful, gentle manner, and with thankful recompense of the ox (xii. 10), which God has subjected to man to help him in his labour, and more generally, in so far as one seeks to gain an object, to the considerate adoption of the right means for gaining it. אֲלָפִים (from אָלַף, to cling to) are the cattle giving themselves willingly to the service of men (poet. equivalent to בְּקָרִים). שׁוֹר (חֹר, Arab. *thwr*), Ved. *sthūras*, is the Aryan-Semitic name of the plough-ox. The noun אֹכֶלֶת (= אָכַל like אָסַף, אָמַן) denotes the fodder-trough, from אָכַל, to feed, and thus perhaps as to its root-meaning related to φάτνη (πάτνη), and may thus also designate the receptacle for grain where the corn for the provender or feeding of the cattle is preserved—מִאֹכֶלֶת, Jer. i. 26, at least has this wider signification of the granary; but there exists no reason to depart here from the nearest signification of the word: if a husbandman is not thoughtful about the care and support of the cattle by which he is assisted in his labour, then the crib is empty—he has nothing to heap up; he needs not only fodder, but has also nothing. בָּר (in pause בַּר), clean (synon. בָּרִי, cf. at xi. 26), corresponds with our *baar* [bare] = *bloss* [nudus]. Its derivation is obscure. The בָּ, 4b, is that of the mediating cause: by the strength of the plough-ox there is a fulness of grain gathered into the barn (תְּבוּאוֹת, from בָּוֵא, to gather in, anything gathered in). רֶבֶר is the inverted בָּר. Striking if also accidental is the frequency of the א and ב in ver. 4. This is continued in ver. 5, where the collector gives two proverbs, the first of which commences with a word beginning with א, and the second with one beginning with ב:

Ver. 5 A faithful witness does not speak untruth;

But a lying witness breathes out falsehoods.

The right vocalization and sequence of the accents is בְּקִישׁ לֵן חֲכָמָה (ק with *Tsere* and the servile *Mahpach*, חֲכָמָה with *Munach*, because the following *Athnach*-word has not two syllables before the tone). As in 5a עַד אֲמִנִּים, so in 5b עַד שֹׁקֵר is the subject. Different is the relation of subject and predicate in the second line of the

parallel proverbs, ver. 25, xix. 5. With 5a cf. צִיר אֲמָנִים, xiii. 17; and regarding יִצֵּי (one who breathes out), *vid.* at vi. 19, xii. 17.

Ver. 6 In vain the scorner seeketh wisdom;

But to the man of understanding knowledge is easy.

The general sentence is concrete, composed in the common historical form. Regarding יִצֵּי, *necquidquam*, *vid.* at xiii. 4. The participle לֵקֵל is here neut. for יִקְלֶה, something which makes itself easy or light. The frivolous man, to whom truth is not a matter of conscience, and who recognises no authority, not even the Supreme, never reaches to truth notwithstanding all his searching, it remains veiled to him and far remote; but to the man of understanding, who knows that the fear of God and not estrangement from God leads to truth, knowledge is an easy matter—he enters on the right way to this end, he brings the right receptivity, brings to bear on it the clear eye, and there is fulfilled to him the saying, “To him that hath it is given.”

Three proverbs regarding fools:

Ver. 7 Go from the presence of a foolish man,

And surely thou hast not known lips of knowledge;

i.e. surely hast not brought into experience that he possesses lips which express experimental knowledge, or: surely thou must confess on reflection that no prudent word has come forth from his mouth. If 7b were intended to assign a motive, then the expression would be יָבֹל-תֵּרַע or כִּי בֹל-תֵּרַע (Isa. xlv. 9), according to which Aquila and Theodotion translate, καὶ οὐ μὴ γινῶσκ. נָנִי is the sphere of vision, and מִנְּנִי denotes either away from the sphere of vision, as *e.g.* Isa. i. 16, or, inasmuch as מֵן is used as in מֵתַחַת, מֵעַל, and the like: at a certain distance from the sphere of vision, but so that one keeps the object in sight, Gen. xxi. 16. לִּי נָנִי denotes, as the inverted expression Deut. xxviii. 66 shows, over against any one, so that he has the object visibly before him, and מִנְּנִי לִּי, Judg. xx. 34, from the neighbourhood of a place where one has it in view. So also here: go away from the *vis-à-vis* (*vis* = *visûs*) of the foolish man, if thou hast to do with such an one; whence, 7b, follows what he who has gone away must on looking back say to himself. בֹּל (with the pret. as *e.g.* Isa. xxxiii. 23) expresses a negative with emphasis. Nolde and others, also Fleischer, interpret 7b relatively: *et in quo non cognoveris labia scientiæ*. If יָבֹל-תֵּרַע were the expression used, then it would be explained after ix. 13, for the idea of the foolish man is extended: and of such an one as absolutely

knows not how to speak anything prudent. But in *וּבִלְיָרָעָה* the relative clause intended must be indicated by the added *בִּנְיָ*: and of such an one in whom . . . Besides, in this case *נָלֵךְ* (*vid.* Ps. xxxv. 15) would have been nearer than *וּבִלְיָ*. The LXX. has modified this proverb, and yet has brought out nothing that is correct; not only the Syr., but also Hitzig follows it, when he translates, "The foolish man hath everything before him, but lips of knowledge are a receptacle of knowledge" (*וּבִלְיָ רָעָה*). It racks one's brains to find out the meaning of the first part here, and, as Böttcher rightly says, who can be satisfied with the "lips of knowledge" as the "receptacle of knowledge"?

Ver. 8 The wisdom of the prudent is to observe his way,
And the folly of fools is deceit.

The nearest idea is that of self-deceit, according to which the LXX., Syr., and Jerome render the word error ("*Irrsal*"). But *מִרְקָה* is nowhere else used of self-deception, and moreover is not the suitable word for such an idea, since the conception of the *dolus malus* is constantly associated with it. Thus the contrast will be this: the wisdom of the prudent shows itself in this, that he considers his conduct (*וְהִנֵּן* as vii. 7, cf. Ps. v. 2), *i.e.* regulates it carefully, examining and considering (xiii. 16) it according to right and duty; and that on the contrary the folly of fools shows itself in this, that they aim at the malevolent deception of their neighbour, and try all kinds of secret ways for the gaining of this end. The former is wisdom, because from the good only good comes; the latter is folly or madness, because deception, however long it may sneak in darkness, yet at last comes to light, and recoils in its destructive effects upon him from whom it proceeds.

Ver. 9 The sacrificial offering of fools mocketh;
But between upright men there is good understanding.

We may not give to the *Hiiph.* *וְהִנֵּן* any meaning which it nowhere has, as, to excuse (Kimchi), or to come to an agreement by mediation (Schultens). So we may not make *אֲוִילִים* the subject (Targ., Symmachus, Jerome, Luther, "fools make sport with sin"), for one is persuaded that *אֲוִילִים* is equivalent to *אֲוִילֵי מַן הָאֲוִילִים* (Immanuel, Meiri, and others), which would be more admissible if we had *מִלֵּין* (*vid.* iii. 35), or if *יֵלֵין* did not immediately follow (*vid.* xxviii. 1). Aquila and Theodotion rightly interpret the relation of the component parts of the sentence: *ἄφρονες χλευάζει πλεημύλεια*; and this translation of *אֲוִילִים* also is correct if we take *πλεημύλεια* in

the sense of a *θυσία περὶ πλημμελείας* (Sir. vii. 31), in which the Judæo-Hellenic actually uses it (*vid.* Schleusner's *Lex.*). The idea of sacrificial offering is that of expiation: it is a penitential work, it falls under the prevailing point of view of an ecclesiastical punishment, a *satisfactio* in a church-disciplinary sense; the forgiveness of sins is conditioned by this, (1) that the sinner either abundantly makes good by restitution the injury inflicted on another, or in some other way bears temporal punishment for it, and (2) that he willingly presents the sacrifices of rams or of sheep, the value of which the priest has to determine in its relation to the offence (by a tax-scale from 2 shekels upwards). The *Torâ* gives accurately the offences which are thus to be atoned for. Here, with reference to 9*b*, there particularly comes into view the offence against property (Lev. v. 20 ff.) and against female honour (Lev. xix. 20–22). Fools fall from one offence into another, which they have to atone for by the presentation of sacrificial offerings; the sacrificial offering mocketh them (לִיזִן with *accus.-object*, as xix. 28, Ps. cxix. 51), for it equally derides them on account of the self-inflicted loss, and on account of the efforts with which they must make good the effects of their frivolity and madness; while on the contrary, among men of upright character, רֶצֶן, a relation of mutual favour, prevails, which does not permit that the one give to the other an indemnity, and apply the *Asham*-[עֲשָׂה = trespass-offering] *Torâ*. Symmachus rightly: καὶ ἀνάμεσον εὐθέων εὐδοκία. But the LXX. confuses this proverb also. Hitzig, with the Syr., follows it and translates:

The tents of the foolish are in punishment overthrown [*verfällt*];

The house of the upright is well-pleasing [*wolgefällt*].

Is not this extravagant [*ungereimt* = not rhymed] in spite of the rhyme? These אהלי [tents] extracted from אוילים, and this בית [house] formed out of בֵּין, are nothing but an aimless and tasteless flourish.

Four proverbs of joy and sorrow in the present and the future:

Ver. 10 The heart knoweth the trouble of its soul,

And no stranger can intermeddle with its joy.

The accentuation לֵב יִרְעֵה seems to point out יִרְעֵה as an adjective (Löwenstein: a feeling heart), after 1 Kings iii. 9, or genit. (of a feeling heart); but Cod. 1294 and the Jemen Cod., and others, as well as the editions of Jablonsky and Michaelis, have לֵב with *Rebia*, so that this is by itself to be taken as the subject (cf. the accentuation xv. 5*a* and under at 16*a*). פֶּתַח has the ר with *Dagesh*,

and consequently the short *Kametz* (*Michlol* 63*b*), like שָׁרָה iii. 8, cf. בִּרְתָּה, Judg. vi. 28, and on the contrary בִּרְתָּה, Ezek. xvi. 4; it is the fem. of *mōr* = *mor*, from מָרַר, *adstringere, amarum esse*. Regarding לֵב, in contradistinction to נֶפֶשׁ, *vid. Psychol.* p. 251. "All that is meant by the Hellenic and Hellenistic νοῦς, λόγος, συνείδησις, θυμός, is comprehended in καρδιά, and all by which the בִּישָׁר and נֶפֶשׁ are affected comes in לֵב into the light of consciousness."

The first half of the proverb is clear: the heart, and only it, *i.e.* the man in the centre of his individuality, knows what brings bitterness to his soul, *i.e.* what troubles him in the sphere of his natural life and of the nearest life-circle surrounding him. It thus treats of life experiences which are of too complex a nature to be capable of being fully represented to others, and, as we are wont to say, of so delicate a nature that we shrink from uncovering them and making them known to others, and which on this account must be kept shut up in our own hearts, because no man is so near to us, or has so fully gained our confidence, that we have the desire and the courage to pour out our hearts to him from their very depths. Yet the saying, "Every one knows where the shoe pinches him" (1 Kings viii. 38), stands nearer to this proverb; here this expression receives a psychological, yet a sharper and a deeper expression, for the knowledge of that which grieves the soul is attributed to the heart, in which, as the innermost of the soul-corporeal life, it reflects itself and becomes the matter-of-fact of the reflex consciousness in which it must shut itself up, but also for the most part without external expression. If we now interpret לֹא יִתְעַרֵּב as prohibitive, then this would stand (with this exception, that in this case לֹא instead of לֵב is to be expected) in opposition, certainly not intended, to the exhortation, Rom. xii. 15, "Rejoice with them that do rejoice," and to the saying, "Distributed joy is doubled joy, distributed sorrow is half sorrow;" and an admonition to leave man alone with his joy, instead of urging him to distribute it, does not run parallel with 10*a*. Therefore we interpret the fut. as *potentialis*. As there is a soul-sorrow of the man whose experience is merely a matter of the heart, so there is also a soul-joy with which no other (*vid.* regarding יָרַח, p. 135, and cf. here particularly Job xix. 27) intermeddles (בְּהִתְעַרְבֵי like Ps. cvi. 35), in which no other can intermeddle, because his experience, as *e.g.* of blessed spiritual affection or of benevolent feeling, is purely of a personal nature, and admits of no participation (cf. on ἔκφυγε, Matt. xiii. 44), and

thus of no communication to others. Elster well observes: "By this thought, that the innermost feelings of a man are never fully imparted to another man, never perfectly cover themselves with the feelings of another, yea, cannot at all be fully understood by another, the worth and the significance of each separate human personality is made conspicuous, not one of which is the example of a species, but each has its own peculiarity, which no one of countless individuals possesses. At the same time the proverb has the significance, that it shows the impossibility of a perfect fellowship among men, because one never wholly understands another. Thereby it is indicated that no human fellowship can give true salvation, but only the fellowship with God, whose love and wisdom are capable of shining through the most secret sanctuary of human personality." Thus also Düchsel (but he interprets *106* admonitorily): "Each man is a little world in himself, which God only fully sees through and understands. His sorrow appertaining to his innermost life, and his joy, another is never able fully to transfer to himself. Yea, the most sorrowful of all experiences, the most inward of all joys, we possess altogether alone, without any to participate with us."

Ver. 11 The house of the wicked is overthrown;
But the tent of the upright flourishes.

In the cogn. proverb, xii. 7, line 2 begins with *בֵּית*, but here the apparently firmly-founded house is assigned to the godless, and on the contrary the tent, easily destroyed, and not set up under the delusion of lasting for ever, is assigned to the righteous. While the former is swept away without leaving a trace behind (Isa. xiv. 23), the latter has blossoms and shoots (*הַפְּרִי*) as inwardly transitive, like Job xiv. 9, Ps. xcii. 14); the household of such remains not only preserved in the same state, but in a prosperous, happy manner it goes forward and upward.

Ver. 12 There is a way that seemeth right to one,
But the end thereof are the ways of death.

This is literally repeated in xvi. 25. The rightness is present only as a phantom, for it arises wholly from a terrible self-deception; the man judges falsely and goes astray when, without regard to God and His word, he follows only his own opinions. It is the way of estrangement from God, of fleshly security; the way of vice, in which the blinded thinks to spend his life, to set himself to fulfil his purposes; but the end thereof (*אַחֲרֵיהֶם*) with *neut.*

fem.: the end of this intention, that in which it issues) are the ways of death. He who thus deceives himself regarding his course of life, sees himself at last arrived at a point from which every way which now further remains to him leads only down to death. The self-delusion of one ends in death by the sentence of the judge, that of another in self-murder; of one in loathsome disease, of another in a slow decay under the agony of conscience, or in sorrow over a henceforth dishonoured and distracted life.

Ver. 13 Even in the midst of laughter the heart experiences sadness;
And to it, joy, the end is sorrow.

Every human heart carries the feeling of disquiet and of separation from its true home, and of the nothingness, the transitoriness of all that is earthly; and in addition to this, there is many a secret sorrow in every one which grows out of his own corporeal and spiritual life, and from his relation to other men; and this sorrow, which is from infancy onward the lot of the human heart, and which more and more deepens and diversifies itself in the course of life, makes itself perceptible even in the midst of laughter, in spite of the mirth and merriment, without being able to be suppressed or expelled from the soul, returning always the more intensely, the more violently we may have for a time kept it under and sunk it in unconsciousness. Euchel cites here the words of the poet, according to which 13a is literally true:

"No, man is not made for joy;
Why weep his eyes when in heart he laughs?"¹

From the fact that sorrow is the fundamental condition of humanity, and forms the background of laughter, it follows, 13b, that in general it is not good for man to give himself up to joy, viz. sensual (worldly), for to it, joy, the end (the issue) is sorrow. That is true also of the final end, which according to that saying, *μακάριοι οἱ κλαίοντες νῦν ὅτι γελάσετε*, changes laughter into weeping, and weeping into laughter. The correction אֶתְחַיֶּה הַשִּׁמְחָה (Hitzig) presses upon the *Mishle* style an article in such cases rejected, and removes a form of expression of the Hebr. *syntaxis ornata*, which here, as at Isa. xvii. 6, is easily obviated, but which is warranted by a multitude of other examples, *vid.* at xiii. 4 (also v. 22), and cf. Philippi's *Status Const.* p. 14 f., who regards the second word, as here שִׂמְחָה, after the Arab., as accus. But in cases like שִׂמְחָה

¹ "Nein, der Mensch ist zur Freude nicht gemacht,
Darum weint sein Aug' wenn er herzlich lacht."

שָׁקַר, although not in cases such as Ezra ii. 62, the accus. rendering is tenable, and the Arab. does not at all demand it.¹ In the old Hebr. this *solutio* of the *st. constr.* belongs to the elegances of the language; it is the precursor of the vulgar post-bibl. אֲחִירֵיהֶם שֶׁל־שִׁמְחָה. That the Hebr. may also retain a gen. where more or fewer parts of a sentence intervene between it and its governing word, is shown by such examples as Isa. xlviii. 9, xlix. 7, lxi. 7.²

There follows a series of proverbs which treat of the wicked and the good, and of the relation between the foolish and the wise :

Ver. 14 He that is of a perverse heart is satisfied with his own ways ;
And a good man from himself.

We first determine the subject conception. כֹּסֵף לֵב (one turning aside τῆς καρδίας or τὴν καρδίαν) is one whose heart is perverted, כֹּסֵף, turned away, viz. from God, Ps. xliv. 19. The Book of Proverbs contains besides of this verb only the name of dross (*recedanea*) derived from it; כֹּסֵף, separated, drawn away, is such a half passive as כֹּסֵר, Isa. xlix. 21, שֹׁרֵר, Mic. ii. 8, etc. (Olsh. § 245a). Regarding אִישׁ טוֹב, *vid.* at xii. 2, cf. xiii. 22: a man is so called whose manner of thought and of action has as its impulse and motive self-sacrificing love. When it is said of the former that he is satisfied with his own ways, viz. those which with heart turned away from God he enters upon, the meaning is not that they give him peace or bring satisfaction to him (Löwenstein), but we see from i. 31, xviii. 20, that this is meant recompensatively: he gets, enjoys the reward of his wandering in estrangement from God. It is now without doubt seen that 14b expresses that wherein the benevolent man finds his reward. We will there-

¹ Regarding the supplying (*ibdāl*) of a foregoing genitive or accus. pronoun of the third person by a definite or indefinite following, in the same case as the substantive, Samachschari speaks in the *Mufasssal*, p. 94 ss., where, as examples, are found: *raeituhu Zeidan*, I have seen him, the Zeid; *marartu bihi Zeidin*, I have gone over with him, the Zeid; *saraftu wugūlahā awwalihā*, in the flight I smote the heads of the same, their front rank. *Vid.* regarding this anticipation of the definite idea by an indefinite, with explanations of it, Fleischer's *Maḥḥarī*, *Additions et Corrections*, p. xl. col. 2, and Dieterici's *Mutanabbi*, p. 341, l. 13.

² These examples moreover do not exceed that which is possible in the Arab., *vid.* regarding this omission of the *mudâf*, where this is supplied from the preceding before a genitive, Samachschari's *Mufasssal*, p. 34, l. 8-13. Perhaps אֲחִירֵיהֶם, Obad. ver. 7, of thy bread = the (men) of thy bread, is an example of the same thing.

fore not explain (after iv. 15, cf. Num. xvi. 26, 2 Sam. xix. 10) : the good man turns himself away from him, or the good man stands over him (as Jerome, *Venet.*, after Eccles. v. 7) ;—this rendering gives no contrast, or at least a halting one. The מַעְלִי must be parallel with that of מִדְּרָכָי . From the LXX., ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν διανοημάτων αὐτοῦ, the Syr. rightly : from the fruit (religiousness) of his soul ; the Targ. : from his fruit. Buxtorf, against Cappellus, has already perceived that here no other phrase but the explanation of מַעְלִי by *ex eo quod penes se est* lies at the foundation. We could, after vii. 14, also explain : from that which he perceives as his obligation (duty) ; yet that other explanation lies proportionally nearer, but yet not so that we refer the suffix to the blackslider of 14a : in it (his fate) the good man is satisfied, for this contrast also halts, the thought is not in the spirit of the Book of Proverbs (for xxix. 16b does not justify it) ; and in how totally different a connection of thought מַעְלִי is used in the Book of Proverbs, is shown by xxiv. 17b ; but generally the Scripture does not use שָׂבַע of such satisfaction, it has, as in 14a, also in 14b, the recompensative sense, according to the fundamental principle, $\delta \epsilon \lambda \nu \sigma \pi \epsilon \iota \rho \eta \alpha \nu \theta \rho \omega \pi \omicron \varsigma \tau \omicron \upsilon \tau \omicron \kappa \alpha \iota \theta \epsilon \rho \iota \sigma \tau \epsilon \iota$ (Gal. vi. 7). The suffix refers back to the subject, as we say : יָגֵשׁ עָלַי , רָחֵם עָלַי (*Psychol.* p. 152). But considerations of an opposite kind also suggest themselves. Everywhere else מַעַל refers not to that which a man has within himself, but that which he carries without ; and also that מַעְלִי can be used in the sense of כִּשְׁמַעְלִי , no evidence can be adduced : it must be admitted to be possible, since the writer of the Chronicles (2 Chron. i. 4) ventures to use בְּהִכִּין . Is מַעְלִי thus used substantively : by his leaves (Aben Ezra and others) ? If one compares xi. 28 with Ps. i. 3, this explanation is not absurd ; but why then did not the poet rather use מִפְּרִי ? We come finally to the result, that מַעְלִי , although it admits a connected interpretation, is an error of transcription. But the correction is not יַמְעְלִי (Elster) nor יַמְעַלְלִי (Cappellus), for עָלִים and עֲלָלִים , deeds, are words which do not exist ; nor is it יַמְפַּעְלִי (Bertheau) nor יַמְנַמְלִי (Ewald), but יַמְפַּעְלִי (which Cappellus regarded, but erroneously, as the LXX. phrase) ; for (1) throughout almost the whole O. T., from Judg. ii. 19 to Zech. i. 18, דְּרָכִים and מַעַלִּים are interchangeable words, and indeed almost an inseparable pair, cf. particularly Jer. xvii. 10 ; and (2) when Isaiah (iii. 10) says, $\text{אִמְרוּ צָדִיק כִּי־טוֹב בִּי־פְרִי מַעַלְלֵיהֶם יֹאכֵלוּ}$, this almost sounds like a prophetical paraphrase of the second line

of the proverb, which besides by this emendation gains a more rhythmical sound and a more suitable compass.¹

Ver. 15 The simple believeth every word ;

But the prudent takes heed to his step.

We do not translate, "every thing," for "word" and faith are correlates, Ps. cvi. 24, and פְּתִי is the non-self-dependent who lets himself be easily persuaded by the talk of another (*vid.* p. 56) : he believes every word without proving it, whether it is well-meant, whether it is true, whether it is salutary and useful, so that he is thus, without having any firm principle, and without any judgment of his own, driven about hither and thither ; the prudent, on the other hand, considers and marks his step, that he may not take a false step or go astray, he proves his way (8a), he takes no step without thought and consideration (רָץ or רָצִין with ל, to consider or reflect upon anything, Ps. lxxiii. 17, cf. xxxiii. 15)—he makes sure steps with his feet (Heb. xii. 13), without permitting himself to waver and sway by every wind of doctrine (Eph. iv. 14).

Ver. 16 The wise feareth and departeth from evil ;

But the fool loseth his wits and is regardless.

Our editions have יָרָא with *Munach*, as if הָרָם were a substantive with its adjective ; but Cod. 1294 has הָרָם with *Rebia*, and thus it must be : חָכָם is the subject, and what follows is its complex predicate. Most interpreters translate 16b : the fool is over-confident (Zöckler), or the fool rushes on (Hitzig), as also Luther : but a fool rushes wildly through, *i.e.* in a daring, presumptuous manner. But הִתְעַפֵּר denotes everywhere nothing else than to fall into extreme anger, to become heated beyond measure, xxvi. 17 (cf. xx. 2), Deut. iii. 26, etc. Thus 16a and 16b are fully contrasted. What is said of the wise will be judged after Job i. 1, cf. Ps. xxxiv. 15, xxxvii. 27 : the wise man has fear, viz. fear of God, or rather, since הֵאֱלֹהִים is not directly to be supplied, that careful, thoughtful, self-mistrusting reserve which flows from the reverential awe of God ; the fool, on the contrary, can neither rule nor bridle his affections, and without any just occasion falls into passionate excitement. But on the other side he is self-confident, regardless, secure ; while the wise man avoids the evil, *i.e.* carefully goes out of its way, and in N. T. phraseology "works out his own salvation with fear and trembling."

¹ As here an ל too few is written, so at Isa. xxxii. 1 (וְלִשְׁרִים) and Ps. lxxiv. 14 (לְעִיִּים) one too many.

Ver. 17. This verse, as if explanatory of מחער, connects itself with this interpretation of the contrasts, corresponding to the general *usus loquendi*, and particularly to the *Mishle* style.

One who is quick to anger worketh folly,
And a man of intrigues is hated.

Ewald finds here no right contrast. He understands אִישׁ מְזִמָּה in a good sense, and accordingly corrects the text, substituting for אִישׁ, אִישׁ־טוֹב (אִישׁ־טוֹב), for he translates: but the man of consideration bears (properly smooths, viz. his soul). On the other hand it is also to be remarked, that אִישׁ מְזִמָּה, when it occurs, is not to be understood necessarily in a good sense, since מְזִמָּה is used just like מְזִמָּה, at one time in a good and at another in a bad sense, and that we willingly miss the "most complete sense" thus arising, since the proverb, as it stands in the Masoretic text, is good Hebrew, and needs only to be rightly understood to let nothing be missed in completeness. The contrast, as Ewald seeks here to represent it (also Hitzig, who proposes אִישׁ־טוֹב: the man of consideration remains quiet; Syr. *ramys*, circumspect), we have in ver. 29, where the μακρόθυμος stands over against the ὀξύθυμος (אִישׁ or אִישׁ־טוֹב of the breathing of anger through the nose, cf. Theocritus, i. 18: καὶ οἱ αἰὲ δριμύεια χολὰ ποτὲ ῥινὶ κάθηται). Here the contrast is different: to the man who is quick to anger, who suddenly gives expression to his anger and displeasure, stands opposed the man of intrigues, who contrives secret vengeance against those with whom he is angry. Such a deceitful man, who contrives evil with calculating forethought and executes it in cold blood (cf. Ps. xxxvii. 7), is hated; while on the contrary the noisy lets himself rush forward to inconsiderate, mad actions, but is not hated on that account; but if in his folly he injures or disgraces himself, or is derided, or if he even does injury to the body and the life of another, and afterwards with terror sees the evil done in its true light, then he is an object of compassion. Theodotion rightly: (ἀνὴρ δὲ) διαβουλιῶν μισηθήσεται, and Jerome: *vir versutus odiosus est* (not the Venet. ἀνὴρ βδελυγμῶν, for this signification has only אִישׁ־טוֹב, and that in the sing.); on the contrary, the LXX., Syr., Targum, and Symmachus incorrectly understand אִישׁ מְזִמָּה in *bonam partem*.

Ver. 18 The simple have obtained folly as an inheritance;
But the prudent put on knowledge as a crown.

As a parallel word to אִישׁ־טוֹב, אִישׁ־טוֹב (after the Masora defective), also in the sense of Arab. *ākthar*, *multiplicare*, *abundare* (from Arab.

kathura, to be much, perhaps¹ properly comprehensive, encompassing), would be appropriate, but it is a word properly Arabic. On the other hand, inappropriate is the meaning of the Heb.-Aram. כָּתַר, to wait (properly waiting to surround, to go round any one, cf. *manere aliquem* or *aliquod*), according to which Aquila, ἀναμενοῦσιν, and Jerome, *expectabunt*. Also כָּתַר, to encompass in the sense of to embrace (LXX. κρατήσουσιν), does not suffice, since in the relation to נָחַל one expects an idea surpassing this. Certainly there is a heightening of the idea in this, that the *Hiph.* in contradistinction to נָחַל would denote an object of desire spontaneously sought for. But far stronger and more pointed is the heightening of the idea when we take יָכַתַר as the denom. of כָּתַר (Gr. κίταρις, κίδαρις, Babyl. כדר, *cadur*, cf. כָּרַר, a rounding, *sphæra*). Thus Theodotion, στεφθήσονται. The *Venet.* better actively, ἐστέψαντο (after Kimchi: ישימו הרעת ככתר על ראשם), the Targ., Jerome, Luther (but not the Syr., which translates נָחַל by “to inherit,” but יָכַתַר by μεριουσται, which the LXX. has for נָחַל). The bibl. language has also (Ps. cxlii. 8) הכתיר in the denom. signification of to place a crown, and that on oneself; the non-bibl. has מכתיר (like the bibl. מַכְעִיִר) in the sense of distributor of crowns,² and is fond of the metaphor כתר הרעת, crown of knowledge. With those not self-dependent (*vid.* regarding the plur. form of פָּתִי, p. 56), who are swayed by the first influence, the issue is, without their willing it, that they become habitual fools: folly is their possession, *i.e.* their property. The prudent, on the contrary, as ver. 15 designates them, have thoughtfully to ponder their step to gain knowledge as a crown (cf. הָעֵשִׂיר, to gain riches, הַפְּרִיחַ, 11b, to gain flowers, Gesen. § 53, 2). Knowledge is to them not merely an inheritance, but a possession won, and as such remains with them a high and as it were a kingly ornament.

Ver. 19 The wicked must bow before the good,

And the godless stand at the doors of the righteous.

The good, viz. that which is truly good, which has love as its principle, always at last holds the supremacy. The good men who manifest love to men which flows from love to God, come finally forward, so that the wicked, who for a long time played the part of lords,

¹ According to rule the Hebr. כ becomes in Arab. ك, as in Aram. כ; but *kthar* might be from *ktar*, an old verb rarely found, which *derivata* with the idea of encircling (wall) and of rounding (bunch) point to.

² *Vid.* *Wissenschaft, Kunst, Judenthum* (1838), p. 240.

bow themselves willingly or unwillingly before them, and often enough it comes about that godless men fall down from their prosperity and their places of honour so low, that they post themselves at the entrance of the stately dwelling of the righteous (xiii. 22), waiting for his going out and in, or seeking an occasion of presenting to him a supplication, or also as expecting gifts to be bestowed (Ps. xxxvii. 25). The poor man Lazarus *πρὸς τὸν πυχλῶνα* of the rich man, Luke xvi. 20, shows, indeed, that this is not always the case on this side of the grave. *לָצֵק* has, according to the Masora (cf. Kimchi's *Wörterbuch* under *לָצֵק*), the ultima accented; the accentuation of the form *לָצֵק* wavers between the *ult.* and the *penult.* Olsh. p. 482 f., cf. Gcsen. 68, *Ann.* 10. The substantival clause 19b is easily changed into a verbal clause: they come (Syr.), appear, stand (incorrectly the Targ.: they are judged in the gates of the righteous).

Three proverbs on the hatred of men :

Ver. 20 The poor is hated even by his neighbour ;

But of those who love the rich there are many.

This is the old history daily repeating itself. Among all people is the saying and the complaint :

*Donec eris felix multos numerabis amicos,
Tempora si fuerint nubilia solus eris.*¹

The Book of Proverbs also speaks of this lamentable phenomenon. It is a part of the dark side of human nature, and one should take notice of it, so that when it goes well with him, he may not regard his many friends as all genuine, and when he becomes poor, he may not be surprised by the dissolution of earlier friendship, but may value so much the higher exceptions to the rule. The connection of the passive with *לָצֵק* of the subject (cf. xiii. 13), as in the Greek with the dative, is pure Semitic; sometimes it stands with *לָצֵק*, but in the sense of *ἀπρό*, Cant. iii. 10, before the influence of the West led to its being used in the sense of *ὑπρό* (Ges. § 143, 2); *לָצֵק*, is hated (Cod. 1294 : *לָצֵק*), connects with the hatred which is directed against the poor also the indifference which makes him without sympathy, for one feels himself troubled by him and ashamed.

Ver. 21 Whoever despiseth his neighbour committeth sin ;

But whoever hath compassion on the suffering—blessings on him !

One should regard every human being, especially such as God has

¹ Ovid, *Trist.* i. 8.

placed near to him, as a being having the same origin, as created in the image of God, and of the same lofty destination, and should consider himself as under obligation to love him. He who despiseth his neighbour (write כָּדֹ with *Metheg*, and *vid.* regarding the constr. with dat. object. vi. 30, cf. xi. 12, xiii. 13) sins in this respect, that he raises himself proudly and unwarrantably above him; that the honour and love he shows to him he measures not by the rule of duty and of necessity, but according to that which is pleasing to himself; and in that he refuses to him that which according to the ordinance of God he owes him. In ver. 21b the *Chethib* עֲנִיִּים and the *Keri* עֲנִיִּים (*vid.* at Ps. ix. 13) interchange in an inexplicable way; עָנִי is the bowed down (cf. Arab. *ma'nūwū*, particularly of the prisoner, from 'ana, fut. *ya'nūw*, to bow, bend), עָנִי (Arab. 'anin, with the art. *āl'niy*, from the intrans. 'aniya, to be bowed down) the patient bearer who in the school of suffering has learned humility and meekness. One does not see why the *Keri* here exchanges that passive idea for this ethical one, especially since, in proving himself to be כְּחֹנֵן (compassionate) (for which elsewhere the *part.* *Kal* חֹנֵן, xiv. 31, xix. 17, xxviii. 8), one must be determined only by the needy condition of his neighbour, and not by his (the neighbour's) moral worthiness, the want of which ought to make him twofold more an object of our compassion. All the old translators, from the LXX. to the *Venet.* and Luther, on this account adopt the *Chethib*.

Ver. 22. The proverb terminating (ver. 21) with אֲפֹרְרֵי (cf. xvi. 20) is now followed by one not less singularly formed, commencing with הֲלֹא (cf. viii. 1).

Will they not go astray who devise evil,
And are not mercy and truth to those who devise good?

The *part.* חָרָשׁ signifies both the plougher and the artisan; but on this account to read with Hitzig both times חָרָשִׁי, *i.e.* *machinatores*, is nothing less than advisable, since there is connected with this metaphorical חָרָשׁ, as we have shown at iii. 29, not only the idea of fabricating, but also that of ploughing. Just so little is there any reason for changing with Hitzig, against all old translators, יִתְעִי into יִרְעִי: will it not go ill with them . . .; the fut. יתעו (cf. Isa. lxiii. 17) is not to be touched; the perf. חָתוּ (*e.g.* Ps. lviii. 4) would denote that those who contrive evil are in the way of error, the fut. on the contrary that they will fall into error (cf. xii. 26 with Job xii. 24). But if יתעו is the expression of the result which shall

certainly come to such, then 22b stands as a contrast adapted thereto: and are not, on the contrary, mercy and truth those who contrive that which is good, *i.e.* (for that which befalls them, as xiii. 18a, cf. xiv. 35b, is made their attribute) are they not an object of mercy and truth, *viz.* on the part of God and of men, for the effort which proceeds from love and is directed to the showing forth of good is rewarded by this, that God and men are merciful to such and maintain truth to them, stand in truth to them; for חָסֶד וְאֱמֶת is to be understood here, as at iii. 3, neither of God nor of men exclusively, but of both together: the wicked who contrive evil lose themselves on the way to destruction, but grace and truth are the lot of those who aim at what is good, guarded and guided by which, they reach by a blessed way a glorious end.

There now follows a considerable series of proverbs (vers. 23–31) which, with a single exception (ver. 24), have all this in common, that one or two key-words in them begin with מ.

Ver. 23 In all labour there is gain,
But idle talk leadeth only to loss.

Here the key-words are מְהֵרָה and מְחִסּוֹר (parallel xxi. 5, cf. with xi. 24), which begin with מ. עֵצֶב is labour, and that earnest and unwearied, as at x. 22. If one toils on honestly, then there always results from it something which stands forth above the endeavour as its result and product, *vid.* at Job xxx. 11, where it is shown how יָהִר, from the primary meaning to be stretched out long, acquires the meaning of that which hangs over, shoots over, copiousness, and gain. By the word of the lips, on the contrary, *i.e.* purposeless and inoperative talk (דְּבַר שִׁפְתַּיִם as Isa. xxxvi. 5, cf. Job xi. 2), nothing is gained, but on the contrary there is only loss, for by it one only robs both himself and others of time, and wastes strength, which might have been turned to better purpose, to say nothing of the injury that is thereby done to his soul; perhaps also he morally injures, or at least discomposes and wearies others.

Ver. 24 It is a crown to the wise when they are rich;
But the folly of fools remains folly.

From xii. 4, 31, xvii. 6, we see that עֲטֶרֶת חֲכָמִים is the predicate. Thus it is the riches of the wise of which it is said that they are a crown or an ornament to them. More than this is said, if with Hitzig we read, after the LXX., עֲרָמָם, their prudence, instead of עֲשָׂרָם. For then the meaning would be, that the wise need no

other crown than that which they have in their prudence. But yet far more appropriately "riches" are called the crown of a wise man when they come to his wisdom; for it is truly thus that riches, when they are possessed along with wisdom, contribute not a little to heighten its influence and power, and not merely because they adorn in their appearance like a crown, or, as we say, surround as with a golden frame, but because they afford a variety of means and occasions for self-manifestation which are denied to the poor. By this interpretation of 24a, 24b comes out also into the light, without our requiring to correct the first אֵלֶּה, or to render it in an unusual sense. The LXX. and Syr. translate the first אֵלֶּה by διατριβή (by a circumlocution), the Targ. by gloria, fame—we know not how they reach this. Schultens in his *Com.* renders: *crassa opulentia elumbium crassities*, but in his *Animadversiones* he combines the first אֵלֶּה with the Arab. *awwale*, precedence, which Gesen. approves of. But although the meaning to be thick (properly *coalescere*) appertains to the verbal stem אָל as well as the meaning to be before (Arab. *ál*, *áwila*, *wál*), yet the Hebr. אֵלֶּה always and everywhere means only folly,¹ from the fundamental idea *crassities* (thickness). Hitzig's אֵלֶּה (which denotes the consequence with which the fool invests himself) we do not accept, because this word is Hitzig's own invention. Rather לֵילִי is to be expected: the crown with which fools adorn themselves is folly. But the sentence: the folly of fools is (and remains) folly (Symmachus, Jerome, *Venet.*, Luther), needs the emendation as little as xvi. 22b, for, interpreted in connection with 24a, it denotes that while wisdom is adorned and raised up by riches, folly on the other hand remains, even when connected with riches, always the same, without being either thereby veiled or removed,—on the contrary, the fool, when he is rich, exhibits his follies always more and more. C. B. Michaelis compares Lucian's *simia est simia etiamsi aurea gestet insignia*.

Vcr. 25 A witness of truth delivereth souls;

But he who breathes out lies is nothing but deception.

When men, in consequence of false suspicions or of false accusations, fall into danger of their lives (רֵי יִנְשָׁרוֹת is the designation in the later language of the law of a criminal process), then a tongue

¹ Ewald's derivation of אֵלֶּה from אָוֶן = אָוֶן, null, vain, is not much better than Heidenheim's from אָוֶן: one who says "perhaps" = a sceptic, *vid.* p. 59, *note*.

which, pressed by conscientiousness and not deterred by cowardice, will utter the truth, saves them. But a false tongue, which as such (*vid.* 5*b*) is a יִפְתָּ כּוֹבִים (after the Masora at this place יִפְתָּ defective), *i.e.* is one who breathes out lies (*vid.* regarding יִפְתָּ at vi. 19), is mere deception (LXX., without reading מְרַמֶּה [as Hitzig does]: δόλιος). In xii. 17 מְרַמֶּה is to be interpreted as the object. accus. of יָנִי carried forward, but here to carry forward מְרַמֶּה (Arama, Löwenstein) is impracticable—for to deliver deceit = the deceiver is not expressed in the Hebr.—מרמה is, as possibly also xii. 16 (LXX. δόλιος), without אִישׁ or יָר being supplied, the pred. of the substantival clause: such an one is deception (in bad Latin, *dolositas*), for he who utters forth lies against better knowledge must have a malevolent, deceitful purpose.

Ver. 26 In the fear of Jahve lies a strong ground of confidence,

And the children of such an one have a refuge.

The so-called *essentia* stands here, as at Ps. lxxviii. 5, lv. 19, Isa. xxvi. 4, before the subject idea; the clause: in the fear of God exists, *i.e.* it is and proves itself, as a strong ground of confidence, does not mean that the fear of God is something in which one can rely (Hitzig), but that it has (xxii. 19, Jer. xvii. 7, and here) an inheritance which is enduring, unwavering, and not disappointing in God, who is the object of fear; for it is not faith, nor anything else subjective, which is the rock that bears us, but this Rock is the object which faith lays hold of (cf. Isa. xxviii. 16). Is now the יִלְבְּנִי to be referred, with Ewald and Zöckler, to ה' ? It is possible, as we have discussed at Gen. vi. 1 f.; but in view of parallels such as xx. 7, it is not probable. He who fears God entails in the Abrahamic way (Gen. xviii. 19) the fear of God on his children, and in this precious paternal inheritance they have a מְחֻסָּה (not מְחֻסָּה, and therefore to be written with Masoretic exactness מְחֻסָּה), a fortress or place of protection, a refuge in every time of need (cf. Ps. lxxi. 5-7). Accordingly, יִלְבְּנִי refers back to the ה' יִרָא, to be understood from בִּירְאָת ה' (LXX., Luther, and all the Jewish interpreters), which we find not so doubtful as to regard on this account the explanation after Ps. lxxiii. 15, cf. Deut. xiv. 1, as necessary, although we grant that such an introduction of the N. T. generalization and deepening of the idea of sonship is to be expected from the Chokma.

Ver. 27 The fear of Jahve is a fountain of life,
To escape the snares of death.

There springs up a life which makes him who carries in himself (cf. John iv. 14, *ἐν αὐτῷ*) this welling life, penetrating and strong of will to escape the snares (write after the Masora כִּפְקִשׁ *defective*) which death lays, and which bring to an end in death—a repetition of xiii. 4 with changed subject.

Ver. 28 In the multitude of the people lies the king's honour;

And when the population diminishes, it is the downfall of his glory.

The honour or the ornament (*vid.* regarding הָרַר, *tumere, ampliari*, the root-word of הָרַר and הִרְרָה at Isa. lxiii. 1) of a king consists in this, that he rules over a great people, and that they increase and prosper; on the other hand, it is the ruin of princely greatness when the people decline in number and in wealth. Regarding כִּהְרָה, *vid.* at x. 14. כִּהְרָה signifies prepositionally "without" (properly, by non-existence), *e.g.* xxvi. 20, or adverbially "groundless" (properly, for nothing), Isa. lii. 4; here it is to be understood after its contrast בְּרֵב: in the non-existence, but which is here equivalent to in the ruin (cf. כִּהְרָה, the form of which in conjunction is כִּהְרָה, Gen. xlvii. 15), lies the misfortune, decay, ruin of the principedom. The LXX. ἐν δὲ ἐκλείψει λαοῦ συντριβή δυνάστου. Certainly הָרַר (from הָרַר, Arab. *razuna*, to be powerful) is to be interpreted personally, whether it be after the form בְּנִיר with a fixed, or after the form יִקְרֵה with a changeable *Kametz*; but it may also be an abstract like סֶלָם (= Arab. *selām*), and this we prefer, because in the personal signification הָרַר, viii. 15, xxxi. 4, is used. We have not here to think of הָרַר (from הָרַר), consumption (the *Venet.* against Kimchi, *πενίας*); the choice of the word also is not determined by an intended amphibology (Hitzig), for this would be meaningless.

Ver. 29 He that is slow to anger is rich in understanding;

But he that is easily excited carries off folly.

אִישׁ אֲרָא (constr. of אֲרָא) is he who puts off anger long, viz. the outbreak of anger, אֲרָא, xix. 11, *i.e.* lets it not come in, but shuts it out long (*μακρόθυμος* = *βραδὺς εἰς ὀργήν*, Jas. i. 19); and אֲרָא, he who in his spirit and temper, viz. as regards anger (for אֲרָא denotes also the breathing out and snorting, Isa. xxv. 4, xxxiii. 11), is short, *i.e.* (since shortness of time is meant) is rash and suddenly (cf. quick to anger, *præceps in iram*, 17a) breaks out with it, not ὀλιγόθυμος (but here ἐξυθύμος), as the LXX. translate 17a. The former, who knows how to control his affections, shows himself

herein as "great in understanding" (cf. 2 Sam. xxiii. 20), or as a "man of great understanding" (Lat. *multus prudentiâ*); the contrary is he who suffers himself to be impelled by his affections into hasty, inconsiderate action, which is here expressed more actively by מְרִים אֵילָנָה. Does this mean that he bears folly to the view (Luther, Umbreit, Bertheau, Elster, and others)? But for that idea the *Mishle* style has other expressions, xii. 23, xiii. 16, xv. 2, cf. xiv. 17. Or does it mean that he makes folly high, i.e. shows himself highly foolish (LXX., Syr., Targum, Fleischer, and others)? But that would be expressed rather by הִנְדִּיל or הִרְבָּה. Or is it he heightens folly (Löwenstein, Hitzig)? But the remark that the angry ebullition is itself a gradual heightening of the foolish nature of such an one is not suitable, for the choleric man, who lets the evenness of his disposition be interrupted by a breaking forth of anger, is by no means also in himself a fool. Rashi is right when he says, מַפְרִישָׁה לַחֲלָק, i.e. (to which also Fleischer gives the preference) *aufert pro portione sua stultitiam*. The only appropriate parallel according to which it is to be explained, is iii. 35. But not as Ewald: he lifts up folly, which lies as it were before his feet on his life's path; but: he takes off folly, in the sense of Lev. vi. 8, i.e. he carries off folly, receives a portion of folly; for as to others, so also to himself, when he returns to calm blood, that which he did in his rage must appear as folly and madness.

Vcr. 30 A quiet heart is the life of the body,

But covetousness is rottenness in the bones.

Heart, soul, flesh, is the O. T. trichotomy, Ps. lxxxiv. 3, xvi. 9; the heart is the innermost region of the life, where all the rays of the bodily and the soul-life concentrate, and whence they again unfold themselves. The state of the heart, i.e. of the central, spiritual, soul-inwardness of the man, exerts therefore on all sides a constraining influence on the bodily life, in the relation to the heart the surrounding life. Regarding לֵב מְרִפָּה, *vid.* at xii. 18, p. 262. Thus is styled the quiet heart, which in its symmetrical harmony is like a calm and clear water-mirror, neither interrupted by the affections, nor broken through or secretly stirred by passion. By the close connection in which the corporal life of man stands to the moral-religious determination of his intellectual and mediately his soul-life—this threefold life is as that of one personality, essentially one—the body has in such quiet of spirit the best means

of preserving the life which furthers the well-being, and co-operates to the calming of all its disquietude; on the contrary, passion, whether it rage or move itself in stillness, is like the disease in the bones (xii. 4), which works onward till it breaks asunder the framework of the body, and with it the life of the body. The plur. בְּשָׂרִים occurs only here; Böttcher, § 695, says that it denotes the whole body; but בְּשָׂר also does not denote the half, בְּשָׂרִים is the surrogate of an *abstr.*: the body, *i.e.* the bodily life in the totality of its functions, and in the entire manifoldness of its relations. Ewald translates bodies, but בָּשָׂר signifies not the body, but its material, the animated matter; rather cf. the Arab. *âbshâr*, "corporeal, human nature," but which (leaving out of view that this plur. belongs to a later period of the language) has the parallelism against it. Regarding קִנְיָה (jealousy, zeal, envy, anger) Schul-tens is right: *affectus inflammans æstuque indignationis fervidus*, from קָנָה, Arab. *kanâ*, to be high red.

Ver. 31 He who oppresseth the poor reproacheth his Maker;

And whosoever is merciful to the poor, it is an honour to him.

Line first is repeated in xvii. 5a somewhat varied, and the relation of the idea in 31b is as xix. 17a, according to which וְיִמְכְּרוּ is the predicate and חֵן אֲבִיּוֹן the subject (Symmachus, Targ., Jerome, Venet., Luther), not the reverse (Syr.); חֵן is thus not the 3 per. *Po.* (LXX.), but the *part. Kal* (for which 21b has the *part. Po.* מְחִינִן). The predicates חָרָה עֵינָיו (*vid.* regarding the perf. Gesen. § 126, 3) and וּמַכְבֵּדוּ follow one another after the scheme of the *Chiasmus*. עֵינָיו has *Munach* on the first syllable, on which the tone is thrown back, and on the second the העמרה sign (*vid. Torath Emeth*, p. 21), as *e.g.* פִּזְוֵר, xvii. 14, and אָהֵב, xvii. 19. The showing of forbearance and kindness to the poor arising from a common relation to one Creator, and from respect towards a personality bearing the image of God, is a conception quite in the spirit of the Chokma, which, as in the Jahve religion it becomes the universal religion, so in the national law it becomes the human (*vid.* p. 41). Thus also Job xxxi. 15, cf. iii. 9 of the Epistle of James, which in many respects has its roots in the Book of Proverbs. Matt. xxv. 40 is a New Testament side-piece to 31b.

Ver. 32. This verse also contains a key-word beginning with ט, but pairs acrostically with the proverb following:

When misfortune befalls him, the godless is overthrown;
But the righteous remains hopeful in his death.

When the subject is רָעָה connected with רָשָׁע (the godless), then it may be understood of evil thought and action (Eccles. vii. 15) as well as of the experience of evil (*e.g.* xiii. 21). The LXX. (and also the Syr., Targ., Jerome, and *Venet.*) prefers the former, but for the sake of producing an exact parallelism changes בְּמוֹתָו [in his death] into בְּתוֹשָׁתוֹ [in his uprightness], reversing also the relation of the subject and the predicate: ὁ δὲ πεποιθὼς τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ὀσιότητι (the Syr.: in this, that he has no sin; Targ.: when he dies) δίκαιος. But no Scripture word commends in so contradictory a manner self-righteousness, for the verb חָסָה never denotes self-confidence, and with the exception of two passages (Judg. ix. 15, Isa. xxx. 2), where it is connected with בָּצַל, is everywhere the exclusive (*vid.* Ps. cxviii. 8 f.) designation of confidence resting itself in God, even without the בָּה, as here and at Ps. xvii. 7. The parallelism leads us to translate בָּרַעָהוּ, not on account of his wickedness, but with Luther, in conformity with בְּמוֹתוֹ, in his misfortune, *i.e.* if it befall him. Thus Jeremiah (xxiii. 12) says of the sins of his people: בְּאֲפָלָה יִרְחֻוּ, in the deep darkness they are driven on (*Niph.* of רָחַח = רָחַח), and xxiv. 16 contains an exactly parallel thought: the godless stumble בָּרַעָהוּ, into calamity. Ewald incorrectly: in his calamity the wicked is overthrown—for what purpose then the pronoun? The verb רָחַח frequently means, without any addition, “to stumble over heaps,” *e.g.* Ps. xxxv. 5, xxxvi. 13. The godless in his calamity is overthrown, or he fears in the evils which befall him the intimations of the final ruin; on the contrary, the righteous in his death, even in the midst of extremity, is comforted, *viz.* in God in whom he confides. Thus understood, Hitzig thinks that the proverb is not suitable for a time in which, as yet, men had not faith in immortality and in the resurrection. Yet though there was no such revelation then, still the pious in death put their confidence in Jahve, the God of life and of salvation—for in Jahve¹ there was for ancient Israel the beginning, middle, and end of the work of salvation—and believing that they were going home to Him, committing their spirit into His hands (Ps. xxxi. 6), they fell asleep, though without any explicit knowledge, yet not without the hope of eternal life. Job also knew that (xxvii. 8 ff.) between the death of those estranged from God and of those who feared God there was not only an external, but a deep essential distinction; and now

¹ *Vid.* my *Bibl.-prophet. Theol.* (1845), p. 268, cf. *Bibl. Psychologie* (1861), p. 410, and *Psalmen* (1867), p. 52 f., and elsewhere.

the Chokma opens up a glimpse into the eternity heavenwards, xv. 24, and has formed, xii. 28, the expressive and distinctive word *אֶל־מָוֶת*, for immortality, which breaks like a ray from the morning sun through the night of the *Sheol*.

Ver. 33 Wisdom rests in the heart of the man of understanding ;
But in the heart of fools it maketh itself known.

Most interpreters know not what to make of the second line here. The LXX. (and after it the Syr.), and as it appears, also Aquila and Theodotion, insert *οὐ* ; the Targ. improves the Peshito, for it inserts *אֵלֶּה* (so that xii. 23, xiii. 16, and xv. 2 are related). And Abulwalid explains : in the heart of fools it is lost ; Euchel : it reels about ; but these are imaginary interpretations resting on a misunderstanding of the passages, in which *יָדַע* means to come to feel, and *הוֹרִיעַ* to give to feel (to punish, correct). Kimchi rightly adheres to the one ascertained meaning of the words, according to which the *Venet.* μέσον δὲ ἀφρόνων γνωσθήσεται. So also the translation of Jerome : *et indoctos quosque (quoque) erudiet*, is formed, for he understands the "and is manifest among fools" (Luther) not merely, as C. B. Michaelis, after the saying : *opposita juxta se posita magis elucescunt*, but of a becoming manifest, which is salutary to these. Certainly *בְּקֶרֶב* can mean among = in the circle of, xv. 31 ; but if, as here and e.g. Jer. xxxi. 31, *בְּקֶרֶב* is interchanged with *בֵּלֶב*, and if *הַכֶּמֶה בְּקֶרֶב* is the subject spoken of, as 1 Kings iii. 28, then *בְּקֶרֶב* does not mean among (in the midst of), but in the heart of the fool. According to this, the Talmud rightly, by comparison with the current proverb (*Mezîa* 85b) : *אֶחָדֵיהֶם בִּלְגִינָא קִישׁ קִישׁ קָרִיא*, a stater in a flaggon cries *Kish, Kish*, i.e. makes much clatter. In the heart of the understanding wisdom rests, i.e. remains silent and still, for the understanding feels himself personally happy in its possession, endeavours always the more to deepen it, and lets it operate within ; on the contrary, wisdom in the heart of the fools makes itself manifest : they are not able to keep to themselves the wisdom which they imagine they possess, or the portion of wisdom which is in reality theirs ; but they think, as it is said in Persius : *Scire tuum nihil est nisi scire hoc te sciat alter*. They discredit and waste their little portion of wisdom (instead of thinking on its increase) by obtrusive ostentatious babbling.

Two proverbs follow regarding the state and its ruler :

Ver. 34 Righteousness exalteth a nation,
And sin is a disgrace to the people.

The Hebr. language is richer in synonyms of "the people" than the German. **עַם** (formed like the non-bibl. **מַי**, water, and **נַי**, corporeality, from **נָתַת**, to extend itself from within outward; cf. ix. 3, **נָתַת**, x. 13, **נָתַת**) is, according to the *usus loq.*, like *natio* the people, as a mass swollen up from a common origin, and **עַם**, 28a (from **עָמַם**, to bind), the people as a confederation held together by a common law; **עַם** (from **עָמַם**, to unite, bind together) is the mass (multitude) of the people, and is interchanged sometimes with **נַי**, Gen. xxv. 23, and sometimes with **עַם**, ver. 28. In this proverb, **עַמִּים** stands indeed intentionally in the plur., but not **נַי**, with the plur. of which **נַיִם**, the idea of the non-Israelitish nations, too easily connects itself. The proverb means all nations without distinction, even Israel (cf. under Isa. i. 4) not excluded. History everywhere confirms the principle, that not the numerical, nor the warlike, nor the political, nor yet the intellectual and the so-called civilized greatness, is the true greatness of a nation, and determines the condition of its future as one of progress; but this is its true greatness, that in its private, public, and international life, **צִדְקָה**, i.e. conduct directed by the will of God, according to the norm of moral rectitude, rules and prevails. Righteousness, good manners, and piety are the things which secure to a nation a place of honour, while, on the contrary, **חַטָּאת**, sin, viz. prevailing, and more favoured and fostered than contended against in the consciousness of the moral problem of the state, is a disgrace to the people, i.e. it lowers them before God, and also before men who do not judge superficially or perversely, and also actually brings them down. **רוּם**, to raise up, is to be understood after Isa. i. 2, cf. xxiii. 4, and is to be punctuated **רוּמָה**, with *Munach* of the penult., and the **העמדה**-sign with the *Tsere* of the last syllable. Ben-Naphtali punctuates thus: **רוּמָה**. In 34b all the artifices of interpretation (from Nachmani to Schultens) are to be rejected, which interpret **חָסֵד** as the *Venet.* (*ἔλεος δὲ λαῶν ἀμαρτία*) in its predominant Hebrew signification. It has here, as at Lev. xx. 17 (but not Job vi. 14), the signification of the Syr. *chesdho*, *opprobrium*; the Targ. **חַסְדָּא**, or more frequently **חַסְדָּא**, as among Jewish interpreters, is recognised by Chanan'el and Rashbam. That this **חָסֵד** is not foreign to the *Mishle* style, is seen from the fact that **חָסֵד**, xxv. 10, is used in the sense of the Syr. *chasadh*. The synonym. Syr. *chasam*, *invidere*, *obtrectare*, shows that these verbal stems are formed from the R. **חָס**, *stringere*, to strike. Already it is in some

measure perceived how חָסַר, Syr. *chasadh*, Arab. *hasada*, may acquire the meaning of violent love, and by the mediation of the jealousy which is connected with violent love, the signification of grudging, and thus of reproach and of envy; yet this is more manifest if one thinks of the root-signification *stringere*, in the meaning of loving, as referred to the subject, in the meanings of disgrace and envy, as from the subject directed to others. Ewald (§ 51c) compares חָסַל and חָסַר, Ethiop. *chasra*, in the sense of *carpere*, and on the other side חָסַר in the sense of "to join;" but חָסַר does not mean to join (*vid.* Ps. ii. 12), and instead of *carpere*, the idea more closely connected with the root is that of *stringere*, cf. *stringere folia ex arboribus* (Cæsar), and *stringere* (to diminish, to squander, strip) *rem ingluvie* (Horace, Sat. i. 2. 8). The LXX. has here read חָסַר (xxviii. 22), diminution, decay, instead of חָסַר (shame); the *quid pro quo* is not bad, the Syr. accepts it, and the *miseros facit* of Jerome, and Luther's *verderben* (destruction) corresponds with this phrase better than with the common traditional reading which Symmachus rightly renders by *ὀνειδος*.

Ver. 35 The king's favour is towards a prudent servant,
And his wrath visits the base.

Regarding the contrasts חָסַר and חָסַר, *vid.* at x. 5; cf. xii. 4. The substantival clause 35a may mean: the king's favour has (possesses) . . ., as well as: it is imparted to, an intelligent servant; the arrangement of the words is more favourable to the latter rendering. In 35b the gender of the verb is determined by attraction after the pred., as is the case also at Gen. xxxi. 8, Job xv. 31, Ewald, § 317c. And "his wrath" is equivalent to is the object of it, cf. 22b, xiii. 18, and in general, p. 282. The syntactical character of the clause does not permit the supplying of ל from 35a. Luther's translation proceeds only apparently from this erroneous supposition.

Chap. xv. 1-6. We take these verses together as forming a group which begins with a proverb regarding the good and evil which flows from the tongue, and closes with a proverb regarding the treasure in which blessing is found, and that in which no blessing is found.

Ver. 1 A soft answer turneth away wrath,
And a bitter word stirreth up anger.

In the second line, the common word for anger (חָסַר, from the breathing with the nostrils, xiv. 17) is purposely placed, but in

the first, that which denotes anger in the highest degree (הַמָּה from הָמָה, cogn. חָמָם, Arab. *hamiya*, to glow, like שָׁנָה from שָׁן): a mild, gentle word turns away the heat of anger (*excoandescantiam*), puts it back, cf. xxv. 15. The *Dagesh* in דָּב follows the rule of the קִיחַ, i.e. of the close connection of a word terminating with the accented הָ, הַ, הֵ with the following word (*Michlol* 63b). The same is the meaning of the Latin proverb:

Frangitur ira gravis

Quando est responsio suavis.

The דָּבֵר עֲצָב produces the contrary effect. This expression does not mean an angry word (Ewald), for עֲצָב is not to be compared with the Arab. *ghadab*, anger (Umbreit), but with Arab. *'adb*, cutting, wounding, paining (Hitzig), so that דָּבֵר עֲצָבִים is meant in the sense of Ps. lxxviii. 40: a word which causes pain (LXX. λυπηρός, Theod. πονικός), not after the meaning, a word provoking to anger (Gesenius), but certainly after its effect, for a wounding word "makes anger arise." As one says of anger שָׁב, "it turns itself" (e.g. Isa. ix. 11), so, on the other hand, עָלָה, "it rises up," Eccles. x. 4. The LXX. has a third line, ὀργὴ ἀπόλλυσι καὶ φρονίμους, which the Syr. forms into a distich by the repetition of xiv. 32b, the untenableness of which is at once seen.

Ver. 2. The πραΰτης σοφίας (Jas. iii. 13) commended in ver. 1 is here continued:

The tongue of the wise showeth great knowledge,

And the mouth of fools poureth forth folly.

As הִיטִיב נָנָה, Isa. xxiii. 16, means to strike the harp well, and לָחַט הִיטִיב, xxx. 29, to go along merrily, so רָעַט הִיטִיב, to know in a masterly manner, and here, where the subject is the tongue, which has only an instrumental reference to knowledge: to bring to light great knowledge (cf. 7a). In 2b the LXX. translate στόμα δὲ ἀφρόνων ἀναγγέλλει κακά. From this Hitzig concludes that they read רָעַט as 28b, and prefers this phrase; but they also translated in xiii. 16, xiv. 28, xxvi. 11, אֵלֶּה by κακίαν, for they interpreted the unintelligible word by combination with עָלָה, and in xii. 23 by ἀπαῖς, for they thought they had before them אֵלֶּה (from אָלָה).

Ver. 3 The eyes of Jahve are in every place,

Observing the evil and the good.

The connection of the dual עֵינַיִם with the plur. of the adjective, which does not admit of a dual, is like vi. 17, cf. 18. But the first line is a sentence by itself, to which the second line gives a

closer determination, as showing how the eyes of God are everywhere (cf. 2 Chron. xvi. 9, after Zech. iv. 10) abroad over the whole earth, viz. beholding with penetrating look the evil and the good (חֵץ, to hold to, to observe, cf. ἐπιβλέποντες, Sir. xxiii. 19), i.e. examining men whether they are good or evil, and keeping them closely before His eyes, so that nothing escapes him. This universal inspection, this omniscience of God, has an alarming but also a comforting side. The proverb seeks first to warn, therefore it speaks first of the evil.

Ver. 4 Gentleness of the tongue is a tree of life ;

But falseness in it is a wounding to the spirit.

Regarding מַרְפֵּס, *vid.* at xii. 18, and regarding מַלְלָה, at xi. 3; this latter word we derive with Fleischer from מַלֵּל, to subvert, overthrow, but not in the sense of "violence, *asperitas*, in as far as violent speech is like a stormy sea," but of perversity, *perversitas* (*Venet.* λαξότης), as the contrast to truthfulness, rectitude, kindness. Gentleness characterizes the tongue when all that it says to a neighbour, whether it be instruction or correction, or warning or consolation, it says in a manner without rudeness, violence, or obtrusiveness, by which it finds the easiest and surest acceptance, because he feels the goodwill, the hearty sympathy, the humility of him who is conscious of his own imperfection. Such gentleness is a tree of life, whose fruits preserve life, heal the sick, and raise up the bowed down. Accordingly, שֹׁכֵר פִּי, is to be understood of the effect which goes forth from perversity or falseness of the tongue upon others. Fleischer translates: *asperitas autem in ea animum vulnerat*, and remarks, "שֹׁכֵר פִּי, *abstr. pro concreto*. The verb שֹׁכֵר, and the *n. verbale* שֹׁכָר derived from it, may, in order to render the meaning tropical, govern the prep. בְּ, as the Arab. *kaser baklby*, he has broken my heart (opp. Arab. *jabar baklaby*), cf. בפניי, xxi. 29, *vid. De Glossis Ihabichtianis*, p. 18; yet it also occurs with the accus., Ps. lxix. 21, and the corresponding gen. שֹׁכֵר רֵיחַ, Isa. lxi. 14." In any case, the breaking (deep wounding) is not meant in regard to his own spirit, but to that of the neighbour. Rightly Luther: but a lying (tongue) makes heart-sorrow (elsewhere, a false one troubles the cheerful); Eichel: a false tongue is soul-wounding; and the translation of the year 1844: falsehood is a breach into the heart. Only for curiosity's sake are two other interpretations of 4a and 4b mentioned: the means of safety to the tongue is the tree of life, i.e. the Tóra (*Erachin* 15b); and: per-

versity suffers destruction by a breath of wind, after the proverb, כל נפש בו נדות רוח קימעא שוברתו, a breath of wind breaks a man who is puffed up¹ (which Meiri presents for choice, *vid.* also Rashi, who understands רוח of the storm of judgment). The LXX. translates, in 4b, a different text: ὁ δὲ συντηρῶν αὐτὴν πλησθήσεται πνεύματος; but the יִשְׁבֵּעַ רוּחַ here supposed cannot mean "to be full of spirit," but rather "to eat full of wind." Otherwise the Syr. and Targ.: and he who eateth of his own fruit is satisfied (Heb. וְאִכְלָה מִפְּרִי יִשְׁבֵּעַ),—an attempt to give to the phrase יִשְׁבֵּעַ a thought correct in point of language, but one against which we do not give up the Masoretic text.

Ver. 5 A fool despiseth his father's correction;
But he that regardeth reproof is prudent.

We may with equal correctness translate: he acts prudently (after 1 Sam. xxiii. 22); and, he is prudent (after xix. 25). We prefer, with Jerome, *Venet.*, and Luther, the latter, against the LXX., Syr., and Targ., because, without a doubt, the יָעִיר is so thought of at xix. 25: the contrast is more favourable to the former. It is true that he who regardeth reproof is not only prudent, but also that he is prudent by means of observing it. With line first cf. i. 7 and i. 30, and with line second, xii. 1. Luther translates: the fool calumniates . . .; but of the meanings of abuse (properly *pungere*) and scorn, the second is perhaps here to be preferred.

Ver. 6 The house of the righteous is a great treasure-chamber;
But through the gain of the wicked comes trouble.

The contrast shows that חֵסֶן does not here mean force or might (LXX., Syr., Targ., Jerome, and *Venet.*), which generally this derivative of the verb חָסַן never means, but store, fulness of possession, prosperity (Luther: in the house of the righteous are goods enough), in this sense (cf. xxvii. 24) placing itself, not with the Arab. *hasuna*, to be firm, fastened (Aram. חֲסִין, حَسَن), but with Arab. *khazan*, to deposit, to lay up in granaries, whence our "*Magazin*." חֵסֶן may indeed, like חֵיל, have the meaning of riches, and חֵסֶן does actually mean, in the Jewish-Aram., to possess, and the *Aphel* אֲחָסֵן, to take into possession (*κπατεῖν*); but the constant use of the noun חֵסֶן in the sense of store, with the kindred idea of laying up, *e.g.* Jer. xx. 5, and of the *Niph.* נִחְסַן, which means, Isa. xxiii. 18, with נִאֲצֵר, "to be magazined," gives countenance to the

¹ *Vid.* Duke's *Rabbinische Blumenlese*, p. 176, where the rendering is somewhat different.

idea that חֶסֶן goes back to the primary conception, *recondere*, and is to be distinguished from חֶסֶן , חֶסֶן , and other derivatives after the fundamental conception. We may not interpret בֵּית , with Fleischer, Bertheau, and Zöckler, as accus.: in the house (cf. בֵּית , viii. 2), nor prepositionally as *chez* = *casa*; but: "the house of the righteous is a great store," equivalent to, the place of such. On the contrary, destruction comes by the gain of the wicked. It is impossible that בֵּית can have the house as the subject (Löwenstein), for בֵּית is everywhere *mas.* Therefore Abulwalid, followed by Kimchi and the *Venet.* (*ὁλεθρος*), interprets נֶעְכַּר as subst., after the form of the Mishnic נִבְרָכָה , a pool, cf. נִבְרָצָה , peremptorily decided, decreed; and if we do not extinguish the ב of וּבְהִכּוֹנֵת (the LXX. according to the second translation of this doubly-translated distich, Syr., and Targ.), there remains then nothing further than to regard נֶעְכַּר either as subst. neut. overturned = overthrow (cf. such part. nouns as מִוֶּעֱקָה , מִוֶּסְדָּה , but particularly נִסְכָּה , 2 Chron. x. 15), or as impers. neut. pass: it is overthrown = there is an overthrow, like נִשְׁעָרָה , Ps. l. 3: it is stormed = a storm rages. The gain of the wicked has overthrow as its consequence, for the greed of gain, which does not shrink from unrighteous, deceitful gain, destroys his house, עֵקֶר בֵּיתוֹ , ver. 27 (*vid.* regarding עֵבֶר , xi. 29). Far from enriching the house, such gain is the cause of nothing but ruin. The LXX., in its first version of this distich, reads, in 6a , בְּרִבּוֹת צָדִיק (*ἐν πλεοναζούσῃ δικαιοσύνῃ*), and in 6b , $\text{וּבְהִכּוֹנֵת הַשֵּׁעַ נֶעְכַּר}$ (and together with the fruit the godless is rooted out, *ὁλόρριζοι ἐκ γῆς ἀπολούνται*); for, as Lagarde has observed, it confounds עֵבֶר with עָקַר (to root, *privativ*: to root up).

Vers. 7-17. A second series which begins with a proverb of the power of human speech, and closes with proverbs of the advantages and disadvantages of wealth.

Ver. 7 The lips of the wise spread knowledge;

But the direction is wanting to the heart of fools.

It is impossible that לִאֲרֹן can be a second object. accus. dependent on יָרִי (*dispergunt*, not יָצִיר , xx. 28; *φυλάσσουνσι*, as Symmachus translates): but the heart of fools is unrighteous (error or falsehood) (Hitzig after Isa. xvi. 6); for then why were the lips of the wise and the heart of the fools mentioned? לִאֲרֹן also does not mean *οὐχ οὕτως* (an old Greek anonymous translation, Jerome, Targ., *Venet.*, Luther): the heart of the fool is quite different from the heart of the wise man, which spreads abroad knowledge

(Zöckler), for it is not heart and heart, but lip and heart, that are placed opposite to each other. Better the LXX. οὐκ ἀσφαλῆς, and yet better the Syr. *lo kînîn* (not right, sure). We have seen, at xi. 19, that כָּן as a participial adj. means standing = being, continuing, or also standing erect = right, i.e. rightly directed, or having the right direction; כָּן-צִדְקָה means there conducting oneself rightly, and thus genuine rectitude. What, after 7a, is more appropriate than to say of the heart of the fool, that it wants the receptivity for knowledge which the lips of the wise scatter abroad? The heart of the fool is not right, it has not the right direction, is crooked and perverse, has no mind for wisdom; and that which proceeds from the wise, therefore, finds with him neither estimation nor acceptance.

Ver. 8 The sacrifice of the godless is an abhorrence to Jahve;

But the prayer of the upright is His delight.

Although the same is true of the prayer of the godless that is here said of their sacrifice, and of the sacrifice of the righteous that is here said of their prayer (*vid.* xxviii. 9, and cf. Ps. iv. 6 with Ps. xxvii. 6), yet it is not by accident that here (line first = xxi. 27) the sacrifice is ascribed to the godless and the prayer to the upright. The sacrifice, as a material and legally-required performance, is much more related to dead works than prayer freely completing itself in the word, the most direct expression of the personality, which, although not commanded by the law, because natural to men, as such is yet the soul of all sacrifices; and the Chokma, like the Psalms and Prophets, in view of the ceremonial service which had become formal and dead in the *opus operatum*, is to such a degree penetrated by the knowledge of the incongruity of the offering up of animals and of plants, with the object in view, that a proverb like "the sacrifice of the righteous is pleasing to God" never anywhere occurs; and if it did occur without being expressly and unavoidably referred to the legal sacrifice, it would have to be understood rather after Ps. li. 18 f. than Ps. li. 20 f., rather after 1 Sam. xv. 22 than after Ps. lxvi. 13-15. זָבַח, which, when it is distinguished from עֹלָה, means (cf. vii. 14) the sacrifice only in part coming to the altar, for the most part applied to a sacrificial feast, is here the common name for the bloody, and, *per synecdochen*, generally the legally-appointed sacrifice, consisting in external offering. The לִרְצוֹן, Lev. i. 3, used in the *Tôra* of sacrifices, is here, as at Ps. xix. 15, transferred to prayer. The

fundamental idea of the proverb is, that sacrifices well-pleasing to God, prayers acceptable to God (that are heard, xv. 29), depend on the relations in which the heart and life of the man stand to God.

Ver. 9. Another proverb with the key-word תועבת (to'ebah):

An abomination to Jahve is the way of the godless ;
But He loveth him who searcheth after righteousness.

The manner and rule of life is called the way. דרך is the heightening of דרך, xxi. 21, and can be used independently in *bonam*, as well as in *malam partem* (xi. 19, cf. xiii. 21). Regarding the form דארה, vid. Fleischer in *Deutsch. Morgenl. Zeitsch.* xv. 382.

Ver. 10 Sharp correction is for him who forsaketh the way ;
Whoever hateth instruction shall die.

The way, thus absolute, is the God-pleasing right way (ii. 13), the forsaking of which is visited with the punishment of death, because it is that which leadeth unto life (x. 17). And that which comes upon them who leave it is called דעסר, *castigatio dura*, as much as to say that whoever does not welcome instruction, whoever rejects it, must at last receive it against his will in the form of peremptory punishment. The sharp correction (cf. Isa. xxviii. 28, 196) is just the death under which he falls who accepts of no instruction (v. 23), temporal death, but that as a token of wrath which it is not for the righteous (xiv. 32).

Ver. 11 The underworld [Sheol] and the abyss are before Jahve ;
But how much more the hearts of the children of men !

A syllogism, a *minori ad majus*, with דארה (LXX. πῶς οὐχὶ καὶ, *Venet.* μᾶλλον οὖν), like xii. 32.¹ דארה has a meaning analogous to that of τάρταρος (cf. ταρταροῦν, 2 Pet. ii. 4, to throw down into the τάρταρος), which denotes the lowest region of Hades (שואל תחתית or ש' תחתית), and also in general, Hades. If אברון and מון are connected, Job xxxvii. 22, and if אברון is the parallel word to קבר, Ps. lxxxviii. 12, or also to שואל, as in the passage similar to this proverb, Job xxvi. 6 (cf. xxxviii. 17): "Sheol is naked before

¹ In Rabbin. this concluding form is called קל וחומר (light and heavy over against one another), and דין (judgment, viz. from premisses, thus conclusion), κατ' ἐξ. Instead of the biblical דארה, the latter form of the language has בל-שכן (all speaks for it that it is so), על-אחת כמה וכמה (so much the more), אינו דין, or also קל וחומר (a *minori ad majus* = *quanto magis*); vid. the Hebr. *Römerbrief*, p. 14.

Him, and Abaddon has no covering;" since אַבְדֹן is the general name of the underworld, including the grave, i.e. the inner place of the earth which receives the body of the dead, as the kingdom of the dead, lying deeper, does the soul. But where, as here and at xxvii. 10, שָׂאֹל and אַבְדֹן stand together, they are related to each other, as ᾗδης and ταρταρος or ἄβυσσος, Rev. ix. 11: אַבְדֹן is the lowest hell, the place of deepest descent, of uttermost destruction. The conclusion which is drawn in the proverb proceeds from the supposition that in the region of creation there is nothing more separated, and by a wide distance, from God, than the depth, and especially the undermost depth, of the realm of the dead. If now God has this region in its whole compass wide open before Him, if it is visible and thoroughly cognisable by Him (יָיִן, *acc. adv.*: in conspectu, from יָיִן, *eminere, conspicuum esse*),—for He is also present in the underworld, Ps. cxxxix. 8,—then much more will the hearts of the children of men be open, the inward thoughts of men living and acting on the earth being known already from their expressions. Man sees through man, and also himself, never perfectly; but the Lord can try the heart and prove the reins, Jer. xvii. 10. What that means this proverb gives us to understand, for it places over against the hearts of men nothing less than the depths of the underworld in eternity.

Ver. 12 The scorner liketh not that one reprove him,
To wise men he will not go.

The *inf. absol.*, abruptly denoting the action, may take the place of the object, as here (cf. Job ix. 18, Isa. xlii. 24), as well as of the subject (xxv. 27, Job vi. 25). Thus הוֹכִיחַ is (ix. 7) construed with the dat. obj. Regarding the probable conclusion which presents itself from passages such as xv. 12 and xiii. 20, as to the study of wisdom in Israel, *vid.* p. 39. Instead of לֵא, we read, xiii. 20 (cf. xxii. 24), לֵא; for לֵא means to have intercourse with one, to go a journey with one (Mal. ii. 6, cf. Gen. v. 24, but not 2 Sam. xv. 22, where we are to translate with Keil), according to which the LXX. has here μετὰ δὲ σοφῶν οὐχ ὁμιλήσει. The mocker of religion and of virtue shuns the circle of the wise, for he loves not to have his treatment of that which is holy reprov'd, nor to be convicted of his sin against truth; he prefers the society where his frivolity finds approbation and a response.

Ver. 13 A joyful heart maketh the countenance cheerful;
But in sorrow of the heart the spirit is broken.

The expression of the countenance, as well as the spiritual *habitus* of a man, is conditioned by the state of the heart. A joyful heart maketh the countenance טוב, which means friendly, but here happy-looking = cheerful (for טוב is the most general designation of that which makes an impression which is pleasant to the senses or to the mind); on the contrary, with sorrow of heart (עֲצֻבָה, constr. of עֲצָבָה, x. 10, as חֲמָאָה = חֲמָאָה, from חֲמָאָה) there is connected a stricken, broken, downcast heart; the spiritual functions of the man are paralyzed; self-confidence, without which energetic action is impossible, is shattered; he appears discouraged, whereby רִיח is thought of as the power of self-consciousness and of self-determination, but לֵב, as our "*Gemüt*" [*animus*], as the oneness of thinking and willing, and thus as the seat of determination, which decides the intellectual-corporeal life-expression of the man, or without being able to be wholly restrained, communicates itself to them. The יָ of יַעֲצֻבָה is, as xv. 16 f., xvi. 8, xvii. 1, meant in the force of being together or along with, so that רִיח נִכְאָה do not need to be taken separate from each other as subject and predicate: the sense of the noun-clause is in the כ, as *e.g.* also vii. 23 (it is about his life, *i.e.* it concerns his life). Elsewhere the crushed spirit, like the broken heart, is equivalent to the heart despairing in itself and prepared for grace. The heart with a more clouded mien may be well, for sorrow has in it a healing power (Eccles. vii. 3). But here the matter is the general psychological truth, that the corporeal and spiritual life of man has its regulator in the heart, and that the condition of the heart leaves its stamp on the appearance and on the activity of the man. The translation of the רִיח נִכְאָה by "oppressed breath" (Umbreit, Hitzig) is impossible; the breath cannot be spoken of as broken.

Ver. 14 The heart of the understanding seeketh after knowledge,
And the mouth of fools practiseth folly.

Luther interprets רָעָה as metaphor. for to govern, but with such ethical conceptions it is metaphor. for to be urgently circumspect about anything (*vid.* xiii. 20), like Arab. *ra'y* and *r'áyt*, intentional, careful, concern about anything. No right translation can be made of the *Chethib* פִּי, which Schultens, Hitzig, Ewald, and Zückler prefer; the predicate can go before the פִּי, after the Semitic rule in the fem. of the sing., 2 Sam. x. 9, cf. Job xvi. 16,

Chethib, but cannot follow in the masc. of the sing.; besides, the operations of his look and aspect are ascribed to his face, but not spiritual functions as here, much more to the mouth, *i.e.* to the spirit speaking through it. The heart is within a man, and the mouth without; and while the former gives and takes, the latter is always only giving out. In xviii. 15, where a synonymous distich is formed from the antithetic distich, the ear, as hearing, is mentioned along with the heart as appropriating. נָבִין is not an adj., but is gen., like צֶרֶק, 28a (opp. וּפִי). חָכֵם, xvi. 23. The φιλοσοφία of the understanding is placed over against the μωρολογία of the fools. The LXX. translates καρδία ὀρθὴ ζητεῖ αἴσθησιν (cf. xiv. 10, καρδία ἀνδρὸς αἰσθητικῆς); it uses this word after the Hellenistic *usus loq.* for נָעֻם, of experimental knowledge.

Ver. 15 All the days of the afflicted are evil;

But he who is of a joyful heart hath a perpetual feast.

Regarding עָנִי (the afflicted), *vid.* 21b. They are so called on whom a misfortune, or several of them, press externally or internally. If such an one is surrounded by ever so many blessings, yet is his life day by day a sad one, because with each new day the feeling of his woe which oppresses him renews itself; whoever, on the contrary, is of joyful heart (gen. connection as xi. 13, xii. 8), such an one (his life) is always a feast, a banquet (not מִשְׁתֶּה, as it may be also pointed, but מִשְׁתֵּה, and תָּסִיד thus *adv.*, for it is never adj.; the post-bib. usage is עֲלֹת תָּסִיד for תָּסִיד). Hitzig (and also Zückler) renders 15b: And (the days) of one who is of a joyful heart are . . . Others supply לוֹ (cf. xxvii. 7b), but our rendering does not need that. We have here again an example of that attribution (Arab. *isnād*) in which that which is attributed (*musnad*) is a condition (*hal*) of a logical subject (the *musnad ilāhi*), and thus he who speaks has this, not in itself, but in the sense of the condition; the inwardly cheerful is feasts evermore, *i.e.* the condition of such an one is like a continual festival. The true and real happiness of a man is thus defined, not by external things, but by the state of the heart, in which, in spite of the apparently prosperous condition, a secret sorrow may gnaw, and which, in spite of an externally sorrowful state, may be at peace, and be joyfully confident in God.

Ver. 16 Better is little with the fear of Jahve,

Than great store and trouble therewith.

The כ in both cases the LXX. rightly renders by μετά. How

מְהוּמָה (elsewhere of wild, confused disorder, extreme discord) is meant of store and treasure, Ps. xxxix. 7 shows: it is restless, covetous care and trouble, as the contrast of the quietness and contentment proceeding from the fear of God, the noisy, wild, stormy running and hunting about of the slave of mammon. Theodotion translates the word here, as Aquila and Symmachus elsewhere, by words which correspond (*φαγέδαινα* = *φάγαινα* or *ἀχορτασία*) with the Syr. *ܐܚܥܝܢܐ*, greed or insatiability.

Ver. 17 Better a dish of cabbage, and love with it,
Than a fatted ox together with hatred.

With *בּו* is here interchanged *שָׁם*, which, used both of things and of persons, means to be there along with something. Both have the *Dag. forte conj.*, cf. to the contrary, Deut. xxx. 20, Mic. i. 11, Deut. xi. 22; the punctuation varies, if the first of the two words is a *n. actionis* ending in *ה־תָּ*. The dish (portion) is called *אַרְרָה*, which the LXX. and other Greek versions render by *ξενισμός*, entertainment, and thus understand it of that which is set before a guest, perhaps rightly so, for the Arab. *arrakh* (to date, to determine), to which it is compared by Gesenius and Dietrich, is equivalent to *warrāh*, a denom. of the name of the moon. Love and hatred are, according to circumstances, the disposition of the host, or of the participant, the spirit of the family:

*Cum dat oluscula mensa minuscula pace quietū,
Ne pete grandia lautaque prandia lite repleta.*

Two proverbs of two different classes of men, each second line of which terminates with a catchword having a similar sound (*וּרְחָם*, *וּרְחָם*).

Ver. 18 A passionate man stirreth up strife,
And one who is slow to anger allayeth contention.

xxviii. 25a and xxix. 22a are variations of the first line of this proverb. The *Pih.* *גָּרַר* occurs only these three times in the phrase *גָּרַר מִדָּם*, R. *גר*, to grind, thus to strike, to irritate, cogn. to (but of a different root from) the verb *עוֹרֵר*, to excite, x. 12, and *הִרְחֵר*, to set on fire, xxvi. 21, cf. *שָׂרָה*, vi. 14. Regarding *הָמָה*, *vid.* xv. 1; we call such a man a "hot-head;" but the biblical conception nowhere (except in the Book of Daniel) places the head in connection with spiritual-psychical events (*Psychologie*, p. 254). Regarding *אָרַם*, *vid.* xiv. 29; the LXX. (which contains a translation of this proverb, and after it of a variation) translates *μακρόθυμος δὲ καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν καταπράννει*, i.e. (as the Syr. render it) he suppresses

the strife in its origin, so that it does not break out. But both are true: that he who is slow to anger, who does not thus easily permit himself to become angry, allayeth the strife which one enters into with him, or into which he is drawn, and that he prevents the strife, for he places over against provoking, injurious conduct, patient gentleness (סָפֵּחַ, Eccles. x. 4).

Ver. 19 The way of the slothful is as hedged with thorns;
But the path of the righteous is paved.

Hitzig misses the contrast between עָצֵל (slothful) and יָשָׁר (upright), and instead of the slothful reads עָרִץ, the tyrannical. But is then the slothful יָשָׁר? The contrast is indeed not that of contradiction, but the slothful is one who does not act uprightly, a man who fails to fulfil the duty of labour common to man, and of his own special calling. The way of such an one is כְּמִשְׁכַּת הָרֶקֶק, like a fencing with thorns (from הָרֶקֶק, R. חר, to be pointed, sharp, distinguished from Arab. *hadk*, to surround, and in the meaning to fix with the look, denom. of *khadaqt*, the apple of the eye), so that he goes not forwards, and sees hindrances and difficulties everywhere, which frighten him back, excusing his shunning his work, his remissness of will, and his doing nothing; on the contrary, the path of those who wait truly and honestly on their calling, and prosecute their aim, is raised up like a skilfully made street, so that unhindered and quickly they go forward (כְּלִילָה, R. סל, *aggerare*, cf. Jer. xviii. 15 with Isa. xlix. 11, and iv. 8, כְּלִילָה, which was still in use in the common language of Palestine in the second cent., *Rosch haschana*, 26b).

This collection of Solomonic proverbs began, x. 1, with a proverb having reference to the observance of the fourth commandment,¹ and a second chief section, xiii. 1, began in the same way. Here a proverb of the same kind designates the beginning of a third chief section. That the editor was aware of this is shown by the homogeneity of the proverbs, xv. 19, xii. 28, which form the conclusion of the first and second sections. We place together first in this new section, vers. 20–23, in which (with the exception of ver. 25) the יִשְׂמַח [maketh glad] of the first (x. 1) is continued.

Ver. 20 A wise son maketh a glad father,
And a fool of a man despiseth his mother.

¹ [The *fifth* commandment of the Westminster Shorter Catechism is named as the *fourth* in Luther's catechism.]

Line first = x. 1. The gen. connection of כְּסִיל אָדָם (here and at xxi. 20) is not superlative [the most foolish of men], but like פָּרָא אָדָם, Gen. xvi. 12; the latter: a man of the wild ass kind; the former: a man of the fool kind, who is the exemplar of such a sort among men. Piety acting in willing subordination is wisdom, and the contrary exceeding folly.

Ver. 21 Folly is joy to him that is devoid of understanding;
But a man of understanding goeth straight forward.

Regarding חֶסְרִיךְ, *vid.* at vi. 32 (cf. *libib*, which in the Samaritan means "dearly beloved," in Syr. "courageous," in Arab. and Aethiop. *cordatus*); אִישׁ חֲבוּנָה, x. 23, and יָשָׁר, with the accus. of the way, here of the going, iii. 6 (but not xi. 5, where the going itself is not the subject). In consequence of the contrast, the meaning of 21a is different from that of x. 23, according to which sin is to the fool as the sport of a child. Here אֲנִיָּלָה is folly and buffoonery, drawing aside in every kind of way from the direct path of that which is good, and especially from the path of one's duty. This gives joy to the fool; he is thereby drawn away from the earnest and faithful performance of the duties of his calling, and thus wastes time and strength; while, on the contrary, a man of understanding, who perceives and rejects the vanity and unworthiness of such trifling and such nonsense, keeps the straight direction of his going, *i.e.* without being drawn aside or kept back, goes straight forward, *i.e.* true to duty, prosecutes the end of his calling. לָכֵן is accus., like xxx. 29, Mic. vi. 8.

Ver. 22 A breaking of plans where no counsel is;
But where many counsellors are they come to pass.

On the other side it is also true according to the proverbs, "*so viel Köpfe so viel Sinne*" [*quot homines, tot sententiæ*], and "*viel Rath ist Unrath*" [*ne quid nimis*], and the like. But it cannot become a rule of morals not to accept of counsel that we may not go astray; on the contrary, it is and remains a rule of morals: not stubbornly to follow one's own heart (head), and not obstinately to carry out one's own will, and not in the darkness of wisdom to regard one's own plans as unimproveable, and not needing to be examined; but to listen to the counsel of intelligent and honest friends, and, especially where weighty matters are in hand, not affecting one's own person, but the common good, not to listen merely to one counsellor, but to many. Not merely the organism of the modern state, but also of old the Mosaic arrangement of

the Israelitish community, with its representative organization, its courts and councils, rested on the acknowledged justice and importance of the saying uttered in xi. 14, and here generalized. **הִפֵּר**, *infin. abs. Hiph.* of **פָּרַר**, to break, with the accus. following, stands here, like **הִפּוֹף**, xii. 7, instead of the finite: the thoughts come to a fracture (failure), *irrita fiunt consilia*. **סוֹד** (= **סֹדֶר**, cf. **נוֹסֵר**, Ps. ii. 2) means properly the being brought close together for the purpose of secret communication and counsel (cf. Arab. *sāwada*, to press close together = to walk with one privately). The LXX.: their plans are unexecuted, *οἱ μὴ τιμῶντες συνέδρια*, literally Symmachus, *διασκεδάζονται λογισμοὶ μὴ ὄντος συμβουλίου*. **תִּקְוָה** has, after Jer. iv. 14, li. 29, **מִתְקַבֵּחַ** as subject. The LXX. (besides perverting **כָּרַב** [by a multitude] into **בָּלָב** [*ἐν καρδίαις*]), the Syr., and Targ. introduce **עֲצָה** (xix. 21) as subject.

Ver. 23 A man has joy by the right answer of his mouth;

And a word in its season, how fair is it!

If we translate **תִּקְוָה** only by "answer," then 23a sounds as a praise of self-complaisance; but it is used of true correspondence (xxix. 19), of fit reply (Job xxxii. 3, 5), of appropriate answer (cf. 28a, xvi. 1). It has happened to one in his reply to hit the nail on its head, and he has joy from that (**שָׂמַח בְּשִׁמְתָּהּ** after **בְּ**, e.g. xxiii. 24), and with right; for the reply does not always succeed. A reply like this, which, according to circumstances, stops the mouth or bringeth a kiss (xxiv. 26), is a fortunate throw, is a gift from above. The synonymous parallel line measures that which is appropriate, not to that which is to be answered, but from a general point of view as to its seasonableness; **עֵת** (= **עֵרַת** from **עָרַר**) is here "the ethically right, becoming time, determined by the laws of wisdom (moral)" (*vid.* Orelli, *Synonyma der Zeit u. Ewigkeit*, p. 48), cf. **עַל-אֶפְסָיו** (translated by Luther "in its time"), xxv. 11. With **מִתְקַבֵּחַ**, cf. xvi. 16; both ideas lie in it: that such a word is in itself well-conditioned and successful, and also that it is welcome, agreeable, and of beneficial influence.

Four proverbs of fundamentally different doctrines:

Ver. 24 The man of understanding goeth upwards on a way of life,

To depart from hell beneath.

The way of life is one, v. 6, Ps. xvi. 11 (where, notwithstanding the want of the article, the idea is logically determined), although in itself forming a plurality of **אֲרָמוֹת**, ii. 19. "A way of life," in the translation, is equivalent to a way which is a way of life.

הַמַּלְאָכִים, upwards (as Eccles. iii. 21, where, in the doubtful question whether the spirit of a man at his death goes upwards, there yet lies the knowledge of the alternative), belongs, as the parallel מַלְאָכִים מְשֻׁבָּחִים shows, to מְשֻׁבָּחִים as virtual adj.: a way of life which leads upwards. And the הַ of מַלְאָכִים is that of possession, but not as of quiet possession (such belongs to him), but as personal activity, as in הַ הַיָּרֵךְ, he has a journey = he makes a journey, finds himself on a journey, 1 Kings xviii. 27; for הַמַּלְאָכִים is not merely, as מַלְאָכִים, xiii. 14, xiv. 27, the expression of the end and consequence, but of the subjective object, *i.e.* the intention, and thus supposes an activity corresponding to this intention. The O. T. reveals heaven, *i.e.* the state of the revelation of God in glory, yet not as the abode of saved men; the way of the dying leads, according to the O. T. representation, downwards into She'ol; but the translations of Enoch and Elijah are facts which, establishing the possibility of an exception, break through the dark monotony of that representation, and, as among the Greeks the mysteries encouraged *ἡδυστέρως ἐλπίδας*, so in Israel the Chokma appears pointing the possessor of wisdom upwards, and begins to shed light on the darkness of She'ol by the new great thoughts of a life of immortality, thus of a *ζωὴ αἰώνιος* (xii. 28) (*Psychologie*, p. 407 ff.), now for the first time becoming prominent, but only as a foreboding and an enigma. The idea of the She'ol opens the way for a change: the gathering place of all the living on this side begins to be the place of punishment for the godless (vii. 27, ix. 18); the way leading upwards, *εἰς τὴν ζωὴν*, and that leading downwards, *εἰς τὴν ἀπώλειαν* (Matt. vii. 13 f.), come into direct contrast.

Ver. 25 The house of the proud Jahve rooteth out,
And He establisheth the landmark of the widow.

The power unnamed in מַלְאָכִים, ii. 22 (cf. xiv. 11a), is here named מַלְאָכִים מְשֻׁבָּחִים (thus to be pointed with *Mercha* and *Pasek* following). מְשֻׁבָּחִים is the abbreviated fut. form which the elevated style, *e.g.* Deut. xxxii. 8, uses also as indic.,—a syntactical circumstance which renders Hitzig's correction מְשֻׁבָּחִים superfluous. It is the border of the land-possession of the widows, removed by the מַלְאָכִים (LXX. *ὕβριστῶν*), that is here meant. The possession of land in Israel was secured by severe punishment inflicted on him who removed the "landmark" (Deut. xix. 14, xxvii. 17), and the Chokma (xxii. 28; Job xxiv. 2) as well as the prophets (*e.g.* Hos. v. 10)

inculcate the inviolability of the borders of the possession, as the guardian of which Jahve here Himself appears.

Ver. 26 An abomination to Jahve are evil thoughts;
But gracious words are to Him pure.

Not personally (Luther: the plans of the wicked) but neutrally is רָע here meant as at ii. 14, and in אִשְׁתֵּי רָע, vi. 24 (cf. Pers. *merdi niku*, man of good = good man), *vid.* Friedr. Philipp's *Status Constr.* p. 121. Thoughts which are of a bad kind and of a bad tendency, particularly (what the parallel member brings near) of a bad disposition and design against others, are an abomination to God; but, on the contrary, pure, viz. in His eyes, which cannot look upon iniquity (IIab. i. 13), are the אֲמַר־נָעִם, words of compassion and of friendship toward men, which are (after 26a) the expression of such thoughts, thus sincere, benevolent words, the influence of which on the soul and body of him to whom they refer is described, xvi. 24. The Syr., Targ., Symmachus, Theodotion, and the *Venet.* recognise in וְטָהוּרִים the pred., while, on the contrary, the LXX., Jerome, and Luther (who finally decided for the translation, "but the pure speak comfortably") regard it as subject. But that would be an attribution which exceeds the measure of possibility, and for which אֲמַר־נָעִם or רָבִרִי must be used; also the parallelism requires that טָהוּרִים correspond with חֲתֻכַּת ה'. Hence also the reference of וְטָהוּרִים to the judgment of God, which is determined after the motive of pure untainted law; that which proceeds from such, that and that only, is pure, pure in His sight, and thus also pure in itself.

Ver. 27 Whoever does service to [*servit*] avarice troubleth his own house;
But he that hateth gifts shall live.

Regarding בָּצַע בָּצַע, *vid.* at i. 19, and regarding עֲכָר בֵּיתוֹ, xi. 29, where it is subject, but here object.; xxviii. 16b is a variation of 27b. מִתְּנוּת are here gifts in the sense of Eccles. vii. 7, which pervert judgment, and cause respect of persons. The LXX. from this point mingles together a series of proverbs with those of the following chapter.

Two proverbs regarding the righteous and the wicked:

Ver. 28 The heart of the righteous considereth how to answer right,
And the mouth of the godless poureth forth evil.

Instead of לְעֵינָיו, the LXX. (Syr. and Targ.) imagines אֲטָנוֹת, *πίστεις*; Jerome translates, but falsely, *obedientiam* (from עָנָה, to bend oneself); Meiri thinks on לְעֵנָה, wormwood, for the heart of

the righteous revolves in itself the misery and the vanity of this present life; Hitzig corrects this verse as he does the three preceding: the heart of the righteous thinks on עֲנִיּוֹת, a plur. of verb עָנָה, which, except in this correction, does not exist. The proverb, as it stands, is, in fineness of expression and sharpness of the contrast, raised above such manglings. Instead of the righteous, the wise might be named, and instead of the godless, fools (cf. 2*b*); but the poet places the proverb here under the point of view of duty to neighbours. It is the characteristic of the righteous that he does not give the reins to his tongue; but as Luther has translated: the heart of the righteous considers [*tichet* from *dictare*, frequently to speak, here carefully to think over] what is to be answered, or rather, since מִה-לְעֲנֹת is not used, he thinks thereupon to answer rightly, for that the word עָנָה is used in this pregnant sense is seen from 23*a*. The godless, on the contrary, are just as rash with their mouth as the righteous are of a thoughtful heart: their mouth sputters forth (*effutit*) evil, for they do not first lay to heart the question what may be right and just in the case that has arisen.

Ver. 29 Jahve is far from the godless;

But the prayer of the righteous He heareth.

Line second is a variation of 8*b*. God is far from the godless, viz. as Polychronius remarks, *non spatii intercapedine, sed sententiae diversitate*; more correctly: as to His gracious presence—הִלָּץ מֵהֶם, He has withdrawn Himself from them, Hos. x. 6, so that if they pray, their prayer reaches not to Him. The prayer of the righteous, on the contrary, He hears, He is graciously near to them, they have access to Him, He listens to their petitions; and if they are not always fulfilled according to their word, yet they are not without an answer (Ps. cxlv. 18).

Two proverbs regarding the eye and the ear:

Ver. 30 The light of the eye rejoiceth the heart,

And a good message maketh the bones fat.

Hitzig corrects also here: מֵרָאָה עֵינַיִם, that which is seen with the eyes, viz. after long desire; and certainly מֵרָאָה עֵינַיִם can mean not only that which the eyes see (Isa. xi. 3), but also this, that the eyes do see. But is it true what Hitzig says in justification of his correction, that מֵאֹר *never* means light, or ray, or brightness, but lamp (φωστήρ)? It is true, indeed, that מֵאֹר עֵינַיִם cannot mean a cheerful sight (Luther) in an objective sense (LXX. θεωρῶν

ὁφθαλμὸς καλός), as a verdant garden or a stream flowing through a landscape (Rashi), for that would be מְרֻחָה מַאֲר עֵינַיִם, and "brightness which the eyes see" (Bertheau); the genitive connection certainly does not mean: the מאור is not the light from without presenting itself to the eyes, but, like אור עֵינַיִם (Ps. xxxviii. 11) and similar expressions, the light of the eye itself [bright or joyous eyes]. But מאור does not mean alone the body of light, but also the illumination, Ex. xxxv. 14 and elsewhere, not only that which (δ, τι) gives light, but also this, that (ὅτι) light arises and is present, so that we might translate it here as at Ps. xc. 8, either the brightness, or that which gives light. But the clear brightness of one's own eye cannot be meant, for then that were as much as to say that it is the effect, not that it is the cause, of a happy heart, but the brightness of the eyes of others that meet us. That this gladdens the heart of him who has a sight of it is evident, without any interchanging relation of the joy-beaming countenance, for it is indeed heart-gladdening to a man, to whom selfishness has not made the χαίρειν μετὰ χαίρόντων impossible, to see a countenance right joyful in truth. But in connection with xvi. 15, it lies nearer to think on a love-beaming countenance, a countenance on which joyful love to us mirrors itself, and which reflects itself in our heart, communicating this sense of gladness. The ancient Jewish interpreters understand מאור עֵינַיִם of the enlightening of the eye of the mind, according to which Eichel translates: "clear intelligence;" but Rashi has remarked that that is not the explanation of the words, but the Midrash. That, in line second of this synonymous distich, שְׂמוּעָה טוֹבָה does not mean *alloquium humanum* (Fl.), nor a good report which one hears of himself, but a good message, is confirmed by xxv. 25; שְׂמוּעָה as neut. *part. pass.* may mean that which is heard, but the comparison of שְׂמוּעָה, stamps it as an abstract formation like נִדְלָה, נִאֲלָה, (נִדְלָה), according to which the LXX. translates it by ἀκοή (in this passage by φήμη). Regarding רִשָּׁן, richly to satisfy, or to refresh, a favourite expression in the *Mishle*, *vid.* at xi. 25, xiii. 4.

Ver. 31 An ear which heareth the doctrine of life
Keeps itself in the circle of the wise.

As, vi. 33, תּוֹכַחַת מוֹסֵר means instructions aiming at discipline, so here תּוֹכַחַת חַיִּים means instructions which have life as their end, *i.e.* as showing how one may attain unto true life; Hitzig's חֲכָם, for חַיִּים, is a fancy. Is now the meaning this, that the ear

which willingly hears and receives such doctrine of life will come to dwell among the wise, *i.e.* that such an one (for וְיָסֵב is *synecdoche partis pro persona*, as Job xxix. 11) will have his residence among wise men, as being one of them, *inter eos sedem firmam habebit iisque annumerabitur* (Fl.)? By such a rendering, one is surprised at the harshness of the synecdoche, as well as at the circumstantiality of the expression (cf. xiii. 20, וְיָסֵב). On the contrary, this corresponds with the thought that one who willingly permits to be said to him what he must do and suffer in order that he may be a partaker of life, on this account remains most gladly in the circle of the wise, and there has his appropriate place. The "passing the night" (לַיְלָה , cogn. לַיְלָה , Syr. Targ. בַּיּוֹם , Arab. *bât*) is also frequently elsewhere the designation of prolonged stay, *e.g.* Isa. i. 21. בְּקִרְבִּי is here different in signification from that it had in xiv. 23, where it meant "in the heart." In the LXX. this proverb is wanting. The other Greek translations have $\text{oûs ákoûon élēgchous zôês én mésw sofôn aúlischēsetai}$. Similarly the Syr., Targ., Jerome, Venet., and Luther, admitting both renderings, but, since they render in the fut., bringing nearer the idea of prediction (Midrash : $\text{וְיָסֵב בְּיִשְׁבֵּי חַכְמִים}$) than of description of character.

Two proverbs with the catchword מִיֶּסֶד :

Ver. 32 He that refuseth correction lightly values his soul ;

But he that heareth reproof getteth understanding.

Regarding מִיֶּסֶד , בְּיֶסֶד , *vid.* xiii. 18, cf. i. 25, and מִיֶּסֶד , viii. 36. מִיֶּסֶד contains more than the later expression עַצְמוֹ , self; it is equivalent to $\text{חֵבֶי$ (Job ix. 21), for the נֶפֶשׁ is the bond of union between the intellectual and the corporeal life. The despising of the soul is then the neglecting, endangering, exposing of the life; in a word, it is suicide (10b). xix. 8a is a variation derived from this distich: "He who gains understanding loves his soul," according to which the LXX. translate here ἀγαπᾷ ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ . לֵב the Midrash explains by $\text{חֵבֶי שְׁנוּנוֹת בָּלָב}$; but the correct view is, that לֵב is not thought of as a formal power, but as operative and carried into effect in conformity with its destination.

Ver. 33 The fear of Jahve is a discipline to wisdom,

And before honour is humility.

We may regard יִרְאַת ה' (the fear of Jahve) also as pred. here. The fear of Jahve is an educational maxim, and the end of education of the Chokma; but the phrase may also be the subject, and by such a rendering Luther's parallelism lies nearer: "The fear

of the Lord is discipline to wisdom ; " the fear of God, viz. continually exercised and tried, is the right school of wisdom, and humility is the right way to honour. Similar is the connection מִסֵּר הַיָּסָד, discipline binds understanding to itself as its consequence, i. 3. Line second repeats itself, xviii. 12, " Pride comes before the fall." Luther's " And ere one comes to honour, he must previously suffer," renders עָנִי rather than עֲנִיָּה. But the Syr. reverses the idea : the honour of the humble goeth before him, as also one of the anonymous Greek versions : *προπορεύεται δὲ ταπεινοῖς δόξα*. But the *δόξα* comes, as the above proverb expresses it, afterwards. The way to the height lies through the depth, the depth of humility under the hand of God, and, as עָנָה expresses, of self-humiliation.

Four proverbs of God, the disposer of all things :

Chap. xvi. 1 Man's are the counsels of the heart ;

But the answer of the tongue cometh from Jahve.

Gesen., Ewald, and Bertheau incorrectly understand 1b of hearing, i.e. of a favourable response to what the tongue wishes ; 1a speaks not of wishes, and the gen. after מַעֲנֶה (answer) is, as at xv. 23, Mic iii. 7, and also here, by virtue of the parallelism, the *gen. subjecti*. xv. 23 leads to the right sense, according to which a good answer is joy to him to whom it refers : it does not always happen to one to find the fitting and effective expression for that which he has in his mind ; it is, as this cog. proverb expresses it, a gift from above (*δοθήσεται*, Matt. x. 19). But now, since מַעֲנֶה neither means answering, nor yet in general an expression (Euchel) or report (Löwenstein), and the meaning of the word at 4a is not here in question, one has to think of him whom the proverb has in view as one who has to give a reason, to give information, or generally—since עָנָה, like *ἀμείβεσθαι*, is not confined to the interchange of words—to solve a problem, and that such an one as requires reflection. The scheme (project, premeditation) which he in his heart contrives, is here described as מַעְרָכִילָב, from עָרַךְ, to arrange, to place together, metaphorically of the reflection, i.e. the consideration analyzing and putting a matter in order. These reflections, seeking at one time in one direction, and at another in another, the solution of the question, the unfolding of the problem, are the business of men ; but the answer which finally the tongue gives, and which here, in conformity with the pregnant sense of מַעֲנֶה (*vid.* at xv. 23, 28), will be regarded as right, appropriate, effective, thus generally the satisfying reply to the demand placed before him, is from God. It

is a matter of experience which the preacher, the public speaker, the author, and every man to whom his calling or circumstances present a weighty, difficult theme, can attest. As the thoughts pursue one another in the mind, attempts are made, and again abandoned; the state of the heart is somewhat like that of chaos before the creation. But when, finally, the right thought and the right utterance for it are found, that which is found appears to us, not as if self-discovered, but as a gift; we regard it with the feeling that a higher power has influenced our thoughts and imaginings; the confession by us, *ἡ ἱκανότης ἡμῶν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ* (2 Cor. iii. 5), in so far as we believe in a living God, is inevitable.

Ver. 2 Every way of a man is pure in his own eyes;
But a weigher of the spirits is Jahve.

Variations of this verse are xxi. 2, where *יָשָׁר* for *יָי* (according to the root-meaning: pricking in the eyes, *i.e.* shining clear, then: without spot, pure, *vid.* Fleischer in Levy's *Chald. Wörterbuch*, i. 424), *לְבוֹשׁ* for *רוּחוֹת*, and *כָּל-דָּרָךְ* for *כָּל-דְּרָכַי*, whereupon here without synallage (for *כָּל* means the totality), the singular of the pred. follows, as Isa. lxiv. 10, Ezek. xxxi. 15. For the rest, cf. with 2a, xiv. 12, where, instead of the subj. *בְּעֵינַי*, is used *לִפְנַי*, and with 2b, xxiv. 12, where God is described by *חָזַן לְבוֹשׁ*. The verb *חָזַן* is a secondary formation from *חָזַן* (*vid.* Hupfeld on Ps. v. 7), like *חָזַן* from Arab. *tyakn* (to be fast, sure), the former through the medium of the reflex. *הִתְחַזַּקְתִּי*, the latter of the reflex. Arab. *aitkñ*; *חָזַן* means to regulate (from *regula*, a rule), to measure off, to weigh, here not to bring into a condition right according to rule (Theodotion, *ἐδράζων*, *stabiliens*, Syr. Targ. *מְחַזְקֵן*, Venet. *καταρτίζει*; Luther, "but the Lord maketh the heart sure"), but to measure or weigh, and therefore to estimate rightly, to know accurately (Jerome, *spirituum ponderator est Dominus*). The judgment of a man regarding the cause of life, which it is good for him to enter upon, lies exposed to great and subtle self-deception; but God has the measure and weight, *i.e.* the means of proving, so as to value the spirits according to their true moral worth; his investigation goes to the root (cf. *κριτικός*, Heb. iv. 12), his judgment rests on the knowledge of the true state of the matter, and excludes all deception, so that thus a man can escape the danger of delusion by no other means than by placing his way, *i.e.* his external and internal life, in the light of the word of God, and desiring for himself the all-penetrating test of the Searcher of hearts (Ps.

cxxxix. 23 f.), and the self-knowledge corresponding to the result of this test.

Ver. 3 Roll on Jahve thy works,
So thy thoughts shall prosper.

The proverbs vers. 1-3 are wanting in the LXX.; their absence is compensated for by three others, but only externally, not according to their worth. Instead of לָא, the Syr., Targ., and Jerome read לָא, *revela*, with which the לָא, Ps. xxxvii. 5, cf. lv. 23, interchanging with לָא (here and at Ps. xxii. 9), does not agree; rightly Theodotion, κύλισον ἐπὶ κύριον, and Luther, "commend to the Lord thy works." The works are here, not those that are executed, Ex. xxiii. 16, but those to be executed, as Ps. xc. 17, where כִּינֶה, here the active to כִּינֶה, which at iv. 26 as jussive meant to be placed right, here with ו of the consequence in the *apodosis imperativi*: to be brought about, and to have continuance, or briefly: to stand (cf. xii. 3) as the contrast of disappointment or ruin. We should roll on God all matters which, as obligations, burden us, and on account of their weight and difficulty cause us great anxiety, for nothing is too heavy or too hard for Him who can overcome all difficulties and dissolve all perplexities; then will our thoughts, viz. those about the future of our duty and our life-course, be happy, nothing will remain entangled and be a failure, but will be accomplished, and the end and aim be realized.

Ver. 4 Jahve hath made everything for its contemplated end;
And also the wicked for the day of evil.

Everywhere else מַעֲנֶה means answer (*Venet.* πρὸς ἀπόκρισιν αὐτοῦ), which is not suitable here, especially with the absoluteness of the מַל; the Syr. and Targ. translate, *obedientibus ei*, which the words do not warrant; but also *propter semet ipsum* (Jerome, Theodotion, Luther) give to 4b no right parallelism, and, besides, would demand לְמַעַנִי or לְמַעֲנִי. The punctuation לְמַעֲנֵה, which is an anomaly (cf. בְּנִבְרָתָהּ, Isa. xxiv. 2, and בְּעֶרְיִי, Ezra x. 14), shows (Ewald) that here we have, not the prepositional לְמַעַן, but לְ with the subst. מַעֲנֵה, which in derivation and meaning is one with the form מַעַן abbreviated from it (cf. מַעַל, מַעַר), similar in meaning to the Arab. *ma'anyu*, aim, intention, object, and end, and mind, from *'atay*, to place opposite to oneself a matter, to make it the object of effort. Hitzig prefers לְמַעֲנֵה, but why not rather לְמַעֲנֵה, for the proverb is not intended to express that all that God has made serve a purpose (by which one is reminded of the arguments for the existence of

God from final causes, which are often prosecuted too far), but that all is made by God for its purpose, *i.e.* a purpose premeditated by Him, that the world of things and of events stands under the law of a plan, which has in God its ground and its end, and that also the wickedness of free agents is comprehended in this plan, and made subordinate to it. God has not indeed made the wicked as such, but He has made the being which is capable of wickedness, and which has decided for it, *viz.* in view of the "day of adversity" (Eccles. vii. 14), which God will cause to come upon him, thus making His holiness manifest in the merited punishment, and thus also making wickedness the means of manifesting His glory. It is the same thought which is expressed in Ex. ix. 16 with reference to Pharaoh. A *prædestinatio ad malum*, and that in the supralapsarian sense, cannot be here taught, for this horrible dogma (*horribile quidem decretum, fateor*, says Calvin himself) makes God the author of evil, and a ruler according to His sovereign caprice, and thus destroys all pure conceptions of God. What Paul, Rom. ix., with reference to Ex. ix. 16, wishes to say is this, that it was not Pharaoh's conduct that determined the will of God, but that the will of God is always the *antecedens*: nothing happens to God through the obstinacy and rebellion of man which determines Him to an action not already embraced in the eternal plan, but also such an one must against his will be subservient to the display of God's glory. The apostle adds ver. 22, and shows that he recognised the factor of human self-determination, but also as one comprehended in God's plan. The free actions of men create no situation by which God would be surprised and compelled to something which was not originally intended by Himself. That is what the above proverb says: the wicked also has his place in God's order of the world. Whoever frustrates the designs of grace must serve God in this, ἐνδελξασθαι τὴν ὀργὴν καὶ γνωρίσαι τὸ δυνατόν αὐτοῦ (Rom. ix. 22).

Here follow three proverbs of divine punishment, *expiatio* [Versöhnung] and *reconciliatio* [Versöhnung].

Ver. 5 An abomination to Jahve is every one who is haughty ;

The hand for it [assuredly] he remains not unpunished.

Proverbs thus commencing we already had at xv. 9, 26. מַגִּבִּי is a metaplastic connecting form of מָגִב; on the contrary, מָגִב, 1 Sam. xvi. 7, Ps. ciii. 11, means being high, as מָגִב, height; the form underlying מַגִּבִּי is not מָגִב (as Gesen. and Olshausen write it), but מָגִב. In 5b, xi. 21a is repeated. The translators are per-

plexed in their rendering of לֹא יָדָהּ . Fleischer: *ab ætate in ætatem non* (i.e. *nullo unquam tempore futuro*) *impunis erit*.

Ver. 6 By love and truth is iniquity expiated,

And through the fear of Jahve one escapes from evil—

literally, there comes (as the effect of it) the escaping of evil (סָר , *n. actionis*, as xiii. 19), or rather, since the evil here comes into view as to its consequences (xiv. 27, xv. 24), this, that one escapes evil. By אֱמֶת וְחֶסֶד are here meant, not the $\chi\acute{\alpha}\rho\iota\varsigma$ καὶ ἀλήθεια of God (Berthieu), but, like xx. 28, Isa. xxxix. 8, love and faithfulness in the relation of men to one another. The ב is both times that of the mediating cause. Or is it said neither by what means one may attain the expiation of his sins, nor how he may attain to the escaping from evil, but much rather wherein the true reverence for Jahve, and wherein the right expiation of sin, consist? Thus von Hofmann, *Schriftbew.* i. 595. But the ב of בְּחֶסֶד is not different from that of בְּאֱמֶת , Isa. xxvii. 9. It is true that the article of justification is falsified if good works enter as *causa meritoria* into the act of justification, but we of the evangelical school teach that the *fides quâ justificat* is indeed inoperative, but not the *fides quæ justificat*, and we cannot expect of the O. T. that it should everywhere distinguish with Pauline precision what even James will not or cannot distinguish. As the law of sacrifice designates the victim united with the blood in the most definite manner, but sometimes also the whole transaction in the offering of sacrifice even to the priestly feast as serving לִפְנֵי , Lev. x. 17, so it also happens in the general region of ethics: the objective ground of reconciliation is the decree of God, to which the blood in the typical offering points, and man is a partaker of this reconciliation, when he accepts, in penitence and in faith, the offered mercy of God; but this acceptance would be a self-deception, if it meant that the blotting out of the guilt of sin could be obtained in the way of imputation without the immediate following thereupon of a blotting of it out in the way of sanctification; and therefore the Scriptures also ascribe to good works a share in the expiation of sin in a wider sense—namely, as the proofs of thankful (Luke vii. 47) and compassionate love (*vid.* at x. 2), as this proverb of love and truth, herein according with the words of the prophets, as Hos. vi. 6, Mic. vi. 6–8. He who is conscious of this, that he is a sinner, deeply guilty before God, who cannot stand before Him if He did not deal with him in mercy instead of justice, according to the pur-

pose of His grace, cannot trust to this mercy if he is not zealous, in his relations to his fellow-men, to practise love and truth; and in view of the fifth petition of the Lord's Prayer, and of the parable of the unmerciful steward rightly understood, it may be said that the love which covers the sins, x. 12, of a neighbour, has, in regard to our own sins, a covering or atoning influence, for "blessed are the merciful, for they shall obtain mercy." That "love and truth" are meant of virtues practised from religious motives, 6b shows; for, according to this line, by the fear of Jahve one escapes evil. The fear of Jahve is subjection to the God of revelation, and a falling in with the revealed plan of salvation.

Ver. 7 If Jahve has pleasure in the ways of a man,
He reconciles even his enemies to him—

properly (for וַיִּשְׁׁלַח is here the causative of the transitive, Josh. x. 1): He brings it about that they conclude peace with him. If God has pleasure in the ways of a man, i.e. in the designs which he prosecutes, and in the means which he employs, he shows, by the great consequences which flow from his endeavours, that, even as his enemies also acknowledge, God is with him (e.g. Gen. xxvi. 27 f.), so that they, vanquished in heart (e.g. 2 Sam. xix. 9 f.), abandon their hostile position, and become his friends. For if it is manifest that God makes Himself known, bestowing blessings on a man, there lies in this a power of conviction which disarms his most bitter opponents, excepting only those who have in selfishness hardened themselves.

Five proverbs of the king, together with three of righteousness in action and conduct:

Ver. 8 Better is a little with righteousness,
Than rich revenues with unrighteousness.

The cogn. proverb xv. 16 commences similarly. Of רֵב רַבְּבוּת, multitude or greatness of income, *vid.* xiv. 4: "unrighteous wealth profits not." The possessor of it is not truly happy, for sin cleaves to it, which troubles the heart (conscience), and because the enjoyment which it affords is troubled by the curses of those who are injured, and by the sighs of the oppressed. Above all other gains rises *ἡ εὐσέβεια μετ' αὐταρκείας* (1 Tim. vi. 6).

Ver. 9 The heart of man deviseth his way;
But Jahve directeth his steps.

Similar to this is the German proverb: "*Der Mensch denkt, Gott lenkt*" [=our "man proposes, God disposes"], and the Arabic

el-'abd (עֶבֶד = man) *judebbir wallah jukaddir*; Latin, *homo proponit, Deus disponit*; for, as Hitzig rightly remarks, 9b means, not that God maketh his steps firm (*Venet.*, Luther, Umbreit, Bertheau, Elster), but that He gives direction to him (Jerome, *dirigere*). Man deliberates here and there (חֲשַׁבָה, intens. of חָשַׁב, to calculate, reflect) how he will begin and carry on this or that; but his short-sightedness leaves much out of view which God sees; his calculation does not comprehend many contingencies which God disposes of and man cannot foresee. The result and issue are thus of God, and the best is, that in all his deliberations one should give himself up without self-confidence and arrogance to the guidance of God, that one should do his duty and leave the rest, with humility and confidence, to God.

Ver. 10 Oracular decision (belongeth) to the lips of the king;

In the judgment his mouth should not err.

The first line is a noun clause; מִפִּי, as subject, thus needs a distinctive accent, and that is here, after the rule of the sequence of accents, and manuscript authority (*vid. Torah Emeth*, p. 49), not *Mehuppach legarme*, as in our printed copies, but *Dechi* (מִפִּי). Jerome's translation: *Divinatio in labiis regis, in judicio non errabit os ejus*, and yet more Luther's: "his mouth fails not in judgment," makes it appear as if the proverb meant that the king, in his official duties, was infallible; and Hitzig (Zöckler agreeing), indeed, finds here expressed the infallibility of the theocratic king, and that as an actual testimony to be believed, not only as a mere political fiction, like the phrase, "the king can do no wrong." But while this political fiction is not strange even to the Israelitish law, according to which the king could not be brought before the judgment, that testimony is only a pure imagination. For as little as the N. T. teaches that the Pope, as the legitimate *vicarius* of Christ, is infallible, *cum ex cathedra docet*, so little does the O. T. that the theocratic king, who indeed was the legitimate *vicarius Dei*, was infallible *in judicio ferendo*. Yet Ewald maintains that the proverb teaches that the word of the king, when on the seat of justice, is an infallible oracle; but it dates from the first bright period of the strong uncorrupted kingdom in Israel. One may not forget, says Dächsel also, with von Gerlach, that these proverbs belong to the time of Solomon, before it had given to the throne sons of David who did evil before the Lord. Then it would fare ill for the truth of the proverb—the course of history would

falsify it. But in fact this was never maintained in Israel. Of the idolizing flattering language in which, at the present day, rulers in the East are addressed, not a trace is found in the O. T. The kings were restrained by objective law and the recognised rights of the people. David showed, not merely to those who were about him, but also to the people at large, so many human weaknesses, that he certainly appeared by no means infallible; and Solomon distinguished himself, it is true, by rare kingly wisdom, but when he surrounded himself with the glory of an oriental potentate, and when Rehoboam began to assume the tone of a despot, there arose an unhallowed breach between the theocratic kingdom and the greatest portion of the people. The proverb, as Hitzig translates and expounds it: "a divine utterance rests on the lips of the king; in giving judgment his mouth deceives not," is both historically and dogmatically impossible. The choice of the word קָסָם (from קָסַם, R. קָס טָק, to make fast, to take an oath, to confirm by an oath, *incantare*, *vid.* at Isa. iii. 2), which does not mean prediction (Luther), but speaking the truth, shows that 10a expresses, not what falls from the lips of the king in itself, but according to the judgment of the people: the people are wont to regard the utterances of the king as oracular, as they shouted in the circus at Cæsarea of King Agrippa, designating his words as *θεοῦ φωνή καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπων* (Acts xii. 22). Hence 10b supplies an earnest warning to the king, viz. that his mouth should not offend against righteousness, nor withhold it. לֹא יִמְעַל is meant as warning (Umbreit, Bertheau), like לֹא תִבָּזֵל, xxii. 24, and ב in יִמְעַל is here, as always, that of the object; at least this is more probable than that מַעַל stands without object, which is possible, and that ב designates the situation.

Ver. 11 The scale and balances of a right kind are Jahve's;
His work are the weights of the bag.

Regarding מִשְׁכָּל, *statera*, a level or steelyard (from שָׁלַם, to make even), *vid.* iv. 26; מִאֲזִינִים (from אָזַן, to weigh), *libra*, is another form of the balance: the shop-balance furnished with two scales. אֲזִינִים are here the stones that serve for weights, and כֶּסֶף, which at i. 14 properly means the money-bag, money-purse (cf. vii. 20), is here, as at Mic. vi. 11, the bag in which the merchant carries the weights. The genit. מִשְׁכָּלֵי כֶּסֶף belongs also to מִשְׁכָּל, which, in our edition, is pointed with the disjunctive *Mehuppach legarme*, is rightly accented in Cod. 1294 (*vid. Torah Emeth*, p. 50) with the con-

junctive *Mehuppach*. מִשְׁכַּחַט, as 11b shows, is not like מִקְרָה, the word with the principal tone; 11a says that the balance thus, or thus constructed, which weighs accurately and justly, is Jahve's, or His arrangement, and the object of His inspection, and 11b, that all the weight-stones of the bag, and generally the means of weighing and measuring, rest upon divine ordinance, that in the transaction and conduct of men honesty and certainty might rule. This is the declared will of God, the lawgiver; for among the few direct determinations of His law with reference to trade this stands prominent, that just weights and just measures shall be used, Lev. xix. 36, Deut. xxv. 13-16. The expression of the poet here frames itself after this law; yet ה' is not exclusively the God of positive revelation, but, as agriculture in Isa. xxviii. 29, cf. Sirach vii. 15, so here the invention of normative and normal means of commercial intercourse is referred to the direction and institution of God.

Ver. 12 It is an abomination to kings to commit wickedness,
For by righteousness the throne is established.

As 10b uttered a warning to the king, grounded on the fact of 10a, so 12a indirectly contains a warning, which is confirmed by the fact 12b. It is a fact that the throne is established by righteousness (יִצְחָן as expressive of a rule, like הִיכָן, Isa. xvi. 5, as expressive of an event); on this account it is an abomination to kings immediately or mediately to commit wickedness, i.e. to place themselves in despotic self-will above the law. Such wicked conduct shall be, and ought to be, an abhorrence to them, because they know that they thereby endanger the stability of their throne. This is generally the case, but especially was it so in Israel, where the royal power was never absolutistic; where the king as well as the people were placed under God's law; where the existence of the community was based on the understood equality of right; and the word of the people, as well as the word of the prophets, was free. Another condition of the stability of the throne is, after xxv. 5, the removal of godless men from nearness to the king. Rehoboam lost the greater part of his kingdom by this, that he listened to the counsel of the young men who were hated by the people.

Ver. 13. History is full of such warning examples, and therefore this proverb continues to hold up the mirror to princes.

Well-pleasing to kings are righteous lips,
And whoever speaketh uprightly is loved.

Rightly the LXX. ἀγαπᾷ, individ. plur., instead of the plur. of *genus*, מְלָכִים; on the contrary, Jerome and Luther give to the sing. the most general subject (one lives), in which case it must be distinctly said, that that preference of the king for the people who speak out the truth, and just what they think, is shared in by every one. צֶדֶק, as the property of the יֵשׁוּעַ, accords with the Arab. *sidk*, truth as the property of the *lasán* (the tongue or speech). יֵשׁוּעַ, from יָשַׁר, means *recta*, as נְיִימִים, *principalia*, viii. 6, and רֵיקִים, *inania*, xii. 11. יֵשׁוּעַ, Dan. xi. 10, neut. So neut. יֵשׁוּעַ, Ps. cxi. 8; but is rather, with Hitzig and Riehm, to be read יָשַׁר. What the proverb says cannot be meant of all kings, for even the house of David had murderers of prophets, like Manasseh and Joiakim; but in general it is nevertheless true that noble candour, united with true loyalty and pure love to the king and the people, is with kings more highly prized than mean flattery, seeking only its own advantage, and that, though this (flattery) may for a time prevail, yet, at last, fidelity to duty, and respect for truth, gain the victory.

Ver. 14 The wrath of the king is like messengers of death;
But a wise man appeaseth him.

The clause: the wrath of the king is many messengers of death, can be regarded as the attribution of the effect, but it falls under the point of view of likeness, instead of comparison: if the king is angry, it is as if a troop of messengers or angels of death went forth to visit with death him against whom the anger is kindled; the plur. serves for the strengthening of the figure: not one messenger of death, but at the same time several, the wrinkled brow, the flaming eye, the threatening voice of the king sends forth (Fleischer). But if he against whom the wrath of the king has thus broken forth is a wise man, or one near the king who knows that ὁργὴ ἀνδρὸς δικαιοσύνην Θεοῦ οὐ κατεργάζεται (Jas. i. 20), he will seek to discover the means (and not without success) to cover or to propitiate, i.e. to mitigate and appease, the king's anger. The Scripture never uses כִּפֶּה, so that God is the object (*expiare Deum*), because, as is shown in the *Comm. zum Hebräerbrief*, that were to say, contrary to the *decorum divinum*, that God's holiness or wrath is covered, or its energy bound, by the offering up of sacrifices or of things in which there is no inherent virtue of atonement, and which are made the means of reconciliation only by the accommodative arrangement of God. On the contrary,

כָּפַר is used here and at Gen. xxxii. 21 of covering = reconciling (propitiating) the wrath of a man.

Ver. 15 In the light on the king's countenance there is life,
And his favour is as a cloud of the latter rains.

Hitzig regards אֹר as the *inf.* (cf. iv. 18), but one says substantively אֹר פָּנָי, Job xxix. 24, etc., and in a similar sense מְאֹר עֵינַיִם, xv. 30; light is the condition of life, and the exhilaration of life, wherefore אֹר הַחַיִּים, Ps. lvi. 14, Job xxxiii. 30, is equivalent to a fresh, joyous life; in the light of the king's countenance is life, means that life goes forth from the cheerful approbation of the king, which shows itself in his face, viz. in the showing of favour, which cheers the heart and beautifies the life. To speak of liberality as a shower is so common to the Semitic, that it has in Arab. the general name of *nadnā*, rain. 15b conforms itself to this. מְלִקֹּשׁ (cf. Job xxix. 23) is the latter rain, which, falling about the spring equinox, brings to maturity the barley-harvest; on the contrary, מְזֻרָה (יֹרֶה) is the early rain, which comes at the time of ploughing and sowing; the former is thus the harvest rain, and the latter the spring rain. Like a cloud which discharges the rain that mollifies the earth and refreshes the growing corn, is the king's favour. The noun עַץ, thus in the *st. constr.*, retains its *Kametz*. *Michlol* 191b. This proverb is the contrast to ver. 14. xx. 2 has also the anger of the king as its theme. In xix. 12 the figures of the darkness and the light stand together as parts of one proverb. The proverbs relating to the king are now at an end. Ver. 10 contains a direct warning for the king; ver. 12 an indirect warning, as a conclusion arising from 12b (cf. xx. 28, where יָצַר is not to be translated *tueantur*; the proverb has, however, the value of a *nota bene*). Ver. 13 in like manner presents an indirect warning, less to the king than to those who have intercourse with him (cf. xxv. 5), and vers. 14 and 15 show what power of good and evil, of wrath and of blessing, is given to a king, whence so much the greater responsibility arises to him, but, at the same time also, the duty of all to repress the lust to evil that may be in him, and to awaken and foster in him the desire for good.

Five proverbs regarding wisdom, righteousness, humility, and trust in God, forming, as it were, a succession of steps, for humility is the virtue of virtues, and trust in God the condition of all salvation. Three of these proverbs have the word טוֹב common.

Ver. 16 To gain wisdom, how much better is it than gold;
And to attain understanding to be preferred to silver.

Commendation of the striving after wisdom (understanding) with which all wisdom begins, for one gains an intellectual possession not by inheritance, but by acquisition, iv. 7. A similar "parallel-comparative clause" (Fl.), with the interchange of טוב and נִבְחַר, is xxii. 1, but yet more so is xxi. 3, where נִבְחַר, as here, is neut. pred. (not, as at viii. 10 and elsewhere, adj.), and עֵצָה, such an anomalous form of the *inf. constr.* as here קָנָה, Gesen. § 75, Anm. 2; in both instances it could also be regarded as the *inf. absol.* (cf. xxv. 27) (*Lehrgebäude*, § 109, Anm. 2); yet the language uses, as in the case before us, the form קָנָה only with the force of an *abl.* of the gerund, as עֵצָה occurs Gen. xxxi. 38; the *inf.* of verbs ל"ה as *nom.* (as here), *genit.* (Gen. i. 20), and *accus.* (Ps. ci. 3), is always either קָנָה or קָנָה. The meaning is not that to gain wisdom is more valuable than gold, but that the gaining of wisdom exceeds the gaining of gold and silver, the common *comparatio decurtata* (cf. Job xxviii. 18). Regarding חֲרִיר, *vid.* at iii. 14.

Ver. 17 The path of the righteous is the avoiding of evil,
And he preserveth his soul who giveth heed to his way.

The meaning of כִּסְלָה, occurring only here in the Proverbs, is to be learned from xv. 19. The attribution denotes that wherein the way they take consists, or by which it is formed; it is one, a straight and an open way, *i.e.* unimpeded, leading them on, because they avoid the evil which entices them aside to the right and the left. Whoever then gives heed to his way, preserveth his soul (שָׁמַר, נִפְשׁוֹ, as xiii. 3, on the contrary xxv. 5, subj.), that it suffer not injury and fall under death, for כּוֹר מְמוּקָשׁ מוֹת and כּוֹר מָרָע, xiv. 27, are essentially the same. Instead of this distich, the LXX. has three distichs; the thoughts presented in the four superfluous lines are all already expressed in the one distich. Ewald and Hitzig find in this addition of the LXX. a component part of the original text.

Ver. 18 Pride goeth before destruction,
And haughtiness cometh before a fall.

The contrast is לפני כְּבוֹד עוֹנָה, xv. 33, according to which the "haughtiness comes before a fall" in xviii. 22 is expanded into the antithetic distich. שִׁבְרָה means the fracture of the limbs, destruction of the person. A Latin proverb says, "*Magna cadunt, inflata*

crepant, tumefacta premuntur."¹ Here being dashed in pieces and overthrown correspond. שָׁבַר means neither bursting (Hitzig) nor shipwreck (Ewald). בְּשִׁלּוֹן (like בִּפְחוֹן, וּבְרוֹן, etc.), from בָּשַׁל or נִבְשַׁל, to totter, and hence, as a consequence, to come to ruin, is a ἀπαξ. λεγ. This proverb, which stands in the very centre of the Book of Proverbs, is followed by another in praise of humility.

Ver. 19 Better in humility to dwell among sufferers,
Than to divide spoil among the proud.

The form שָׁפַל is here not *adj.* as xxix. 23 (from שָׁפַל, like חָסַר, vi. 32, from חָסַר), but *inf.* (like Eccles. xii. 14, and חָסַר, defectio, x. 21). There existed here also no proper reason for changing עֲנִיִּים (*Chethib*) into עָנִיִּים; Hitzig is right in saying that עֵי may also be taken in the sense of עַי [the idea "sufferer" is that which mediates], and that here the inward fact of humility and the outward of dividing spoil, stand opposed to one another. It is better to live lowly, *i.e.* with a mind devoid of earthly pride (*Demut* [humility] comes from *dēo* with the deep *e*, *diu*, servant), among men who have experience of the vanity of earthly joys, than, intoxicated with pride, to enjoy oneself amid worldly wealth and greatness (cf. Isa. ix. 2).

Ver. 20 He that giveth heed to the word will find prosperity;
And he that trusteth in Jahve, blessed is he!

The "word" here is the word *kar' éξ*, the divine word, for טִשְׁבִּיר is the contrast of לִדְבַר, כִּי, xiii. 13a, cf. Neh. viii. 13. טוֹב is meant, as in xvii. 20, cf. xiii. 21, Ps. xxiii. 6; to give heed to God's word is the way to true prosperity. But at last all depends on this, that one stand in personal fellowship with God by means of faith, which here, as at xxviii. 25, xxix. 25, is designated after its specific mark as *fiducia*. The *Mashal* conclusion אֲשֶׁר־יִי occurs, besides here, only at xiv. 21, xxix. 18.

Four proverbs of wisdom with eloquence:

Ver. 21 The wise in heart is called prudent,
And grace of the lips increaseth learning.

Elsewhere (i. 5, ix. 9) הוֹסִיף לִמָּד means more than to gain learning, *i.e.* erudition in the ethico-practical sense, for sweetness of the lips (*dulcedo orationis* of Cicero) is, as to learning, without significance, but of so much the greater value for teaching; for grace of

¹ An expression of similar meaning is אחרי דרגא תביר = after *Darga* (to rise up) comes *tebtir* (breaking = destruction); cf. Zunz, in Geiger's *Zeitschrift*, vi. 315 ff.

expression, and of exposition, particularly if it be not merely rhetorical, but, according to the saying *pectus disertus facit*, coming out of the heart, is full of mind, it imparts force to the instruction, and makes it acceptable. Whoever is wise of heart, i.e. of mind or spirit (לֵב = the N. T. *νοῦς* or *πνεῦμα*), is called, and is truly, גָּבִי [learned, intelligent] (Fleischer compares to this the expression frequent in Isaiah, "to be named" = to be and appear to be, the Arab. *du'ay lah*); but there is a gift which highly increases the worth of this understanding or intelligence, for it makes it fruitful of good to others, and that is grace of the lips. On the lips (x. 13) of the intelligent wisdom is found; but the form also, and the whole manner and way in which he gives expression to this wisdom, is pleasing, proceeding from a deep and tender feeling for the suitable and the beneficial, and thus he produces effects so much the more surely, and beneficently, and richly.

Ver. 22 A fountain of life is understanding to its possessor ;
But the correction of fools is folly.

Oetinger, Bertheau, and others erroneously understand מוֹסֵר of the education which fools bestow upon others; when fools is the subject spoken of, מוֹסֵר is always the education which is bestowed on them, vii. 22, i. 7; cf. v. 23, xv. 5. Also מוֹסֵר does not here mean education, *disciplina*, in the moral sense (Symmachus, *ἐννοια*; Jerome, *doctrina*): that which fools gain from education, from training, is folly, for מוֹסֵר is the contrast to מִקְוֵה חַיִּים, and has thus the meaning of correction or chastisement, xv. 10, Jer. xxx. 14. And that the fruits of understanding (xii. 8, cf. יִכְלֵל טוֹב, fine culture, xiii. 15) represented by מִקְוֵה חַיִּים (*vid.* x. 11) will accrue to the intelligent themselves, is shown not only by the contrast, but also by the expression: *Scaturigo vitæ est intellectus præditorum eo*, of those (= to those) who are endowed therewith (the LXX. well, τοῖς κεκτημένοις). The man of understanding has in this intellectual possession a fountain of strength, a source of guidance, and a counsel which make his life secure, deepen, and adorn it; while, on the contrary, folly punishes itself by folly (cf. to the form, xiv. 24), for the fool, when he does not come to himself (Ps. cvii. 17-22), recklessly destroys his own prosperity.

Ver. 23 The heart of the wise maketh his mouth wise,
And learning mounteth up to his lips.

Regarding הִשְׁקִיל as causative: to put into the possession of intelligence, *vid.* at Gen. iii. 6. Wisdom in the heart produceth intelli-

gent discourse, and, as the parallel member expresses it, learning mounteth up to the lips, *i.e.* the learning which the man taketh into his lips (xxii. 18; cf. Ps. xvi. 4) to communicate it to others, for the contents of the learning, and the ability to communicate it, are measured by the wisdom of the heart of him who possesses it. One can also interpret הוסיף as *extens. increasing*: the heart of the wise increaseth, *i.e.* spreads abroad learning, but then בִּשְׂפָתָיו (Ps. cxix. 13) would have been more suitable; עַל-שִׁפְתָיו calls up the idea of learning as hovering on the lips, and thus brings so much nearer, for הוסיף, the meaning of the exaltation of its worth and impression.

Ver. 24 A honeycomb are pleasant words,
Sweet to the soul, and healing to the bones.

Honeycomb, *i.e.* honey flowing from the דָּבַר, the comb or cell (*favus*), is otherwise designated, Ps. xix. 11. מִחֹק, with מִרְפָּא (*vid.* p. 132), is *neut.* אִמְרֵי-לֵב are, according to xv. 26, words which love suggests, and which breathe love. Such words are sweet to the soul of the hearer, and bring strength and healing to his bones (xv. 30); for מִרְפָּא is not only that which restores soundness, but also that which preserves and advances it (cf. *θεραπεία*, Rev. xxii. 2).

A group of six proverbs follows, four of which begin with אִישׁ, and five relate to the utterances of the mouth.

Ver. 25 There is a way which appears as right to a man;
But the end thereof are the ways of death.

This verse = xiv. 12.

Ver. 26 The hunger of the labourer laboreth for him,
For he is urged on by his mouth.

The Syr. translates: the soul of him who inflicts woe itself suffers it, and from his mouth destruction comes to him; the Targ. brings this translation nearer the original text (בִּזְיוֹן, humiliation, instead of אֲכִירָה, destruction); Luther translates thus also, violently abbreviating, however. But עָמַל (from עָמַל, Arab. *'amila*, to exert oneself, *laborare*) means, like *laboriosus*, labouring as well as enduring difficulty, but not, as *πονών τινα*, causing difficulty, or (Euchel) occupied with difficulty. And labour and the mouth stand together, denoting that man labours that the mouth may have somewhat to eat (cf. 2 Thess. iii. 10; נָפֵט, however, gains in this connection the meaning of *ψυχῇ ὀρεκτικῇ*, and that of desire after nourishment, *vid.* at vi. 30, x. 3). אִכְלָה also joins itself to this circle

of ideas, for it means to urge (Jerome, *compulit*), properly (related to כָּבַח, *incurvare*, כָּבַח כָּבַח, to constrain, necessitate), to bow down by means of a burden. The Aramæo-Arab. signification, to saddle (Schultens: *clitellas imposuit ei os suum*), is a secondary denom. (*vid.* at Job xxxiii. 7). The *Venet.* well renders it after Kimchi: ἐπεὶ κύπτει ἐπ' αὐτὸν τὸ στόμα αὐτοῦ. Thus: the need of nourishment on the part of the labourer works for him (*dat. commodi* like Isa. xl. 20), *i.e.* helps him to labour, for (not: if, ἐάν, as Rashi and others) it presses upon him; his mouth, which will have something to eat, urges him. It is God who has in this way connected together working and eating. The curse *in sudore vultus tui comedes panem* conceals a blessing. The proverb has in view this reverse side of the blessing in the arrangement of God.

Ver. 27 A worthless man diggeth evil;

And on his lips is, as it were, scorching fire.

Regarding אִישׁ בִּלְעֵל, *vid.* vi. 12, and regarding כָּרַח, to dig round, or to bore out, *vid.* at Gen. xlix. 5, l. 5; here the figure, "to dig for others a pit," xxvi. 27, Ps. vii. 16, etc.: to dig evil is equivalent to, to seek to prepare such for others. צָרַח Kimchi rightly explains as a form similar to קָשַׁח; as a subst. it means, Lev. xiii. 23, the mark of fire (the healed mark of a carbuncle), here as an adj. of a fire, although not flaming (אֵשׁ לִהְבֶּה, Isa. iv. 5, etc); yet so much the hotter, and scorching everything that comes near to it (from צָרַח, to be scorched, cogn. שָׂרַח, to which also שָׂרַף is perhaps related as a stronger power, like *comburare* to *adurare*). The meaning is clear: a worthless man, *i.e.* a man whose disposition and conduct are the direct contrast of usefulness and piety, uses words which, like an iron glowing hot, scorches and burns; his tongue is φλογιζομένη ὑπὸ τῆς γέεννης (Jas. iii. 6).

Ver. 28 A man of falsehood scattereth strife,

And a backbiter separateth confidential friends.

Regarding תְּהַבֵּחַ (מַרְבֵּחַ) אִישׁ, *vid.* ii. 12, and שֶׁלַח מַרְבֵּחַ, vi. 14; the thought of 28b is found at vi. 19. נִרְנָן (with ך minuscule, which occurs thrice with the terminal Nun) is a *Niphal* formation from נִרְנַן, to murmur (cf. מְרִיר, from מִיר), and denotes the whisperer, viz. the backbiter, ψιθυρος, Sir. v. 14, ψιθυριστής, *susurro*; the Arab. *nyrj* is abbreviated from it, a verbal stem of נִרְנַן (cf. Aram. *noŕgo*, an axe, Arab. *naurag*, a threshing-sledge = מוֹרֵג) cannot be proved. Aquila is right in translating by τουθρυστής, and Theodotion by γόγγυσος, from נִרְנַן, *Niphal*. נִרְנָן, γογγύζειν. Regarding

אֱלִיף, confidential friend, *vid.* p. 82; the sing., as xviii. 9, is used in view of the mutual relationship, and מִפְּרִיר proceeds on the separation of the one, and, at the same time, of the other from it. Luther, in translating by "a slanderer makes princes disagree," is in error, for אֱלִיף, *φύλαρχος*, is not a generic word for prince.

Ver. 29 A man of violence enticeth his neighbour,
And leadeth him in a way which is not good.

Cf. Gen. iv. 8. The subject is not moral enticement, but enticement to some place or situation which facilitates to the violent man the carrying out of his violent purpose (misdemeanour, robbery, extortion, murder). חֲקִי (here with אֱלִיף at iii. 31) is the injustice of club-law, the conduct of him who puts his superior power in godless rudeness in the place of God, Hab. i. 11, cf. Job xii. 6. "A way not good" (cf. Ps. xxxvi. 5) is the contradictory contrast of the good way: one altogether evil and destructive.

Ver. 30 He who shutteth his eyes to devise falsehood;
He who biteth his lips bringeth evil to pass.

A physiognomical *Caveto*. The ἀπ. λεγ. פִּיץ is connected with פִּיץ, Isa. xxxiii. 15 (Arab. transp. *ghamd*), *comprimere*, formed from it. Regarding פִּיץ of lips or eyes, *vid.* p. 144; the biting of the lips is the action of the deccitful, and denotes scorn, malice, knavery. The perf. denotes that he who is seen doing this has some evil as good as accomplished, for he is inwardly ready for it; Hitzig suitably compares 1 Sam. xx. 7, 33. Our editions (also Löwenstein) have בִּלֵּה, but the Masora (*vid. Mas. finalis*, p. 1) numbers the word among those which terminate in נ, and always writes בִּלֵּה.

We now take together a series of proverbs, xvi. 31–xvii. 5, beginning with עֲטָרָה.

Ver. 31 A bright diadem is a hoary head,
In the way of righteousness it is found—

namely, this bright diadem, this beautiful crown (iv. 8), which silver hair is to him who has it as the result of his advanced age (xx. 29), for "thou shalt rise up before the hoary head," Lev. xix. 32; and the contrast of an early death is to die in a good old age, Gen. xv. 15, etc., but a long life is on one side a self-consequence, and on another the promised reward of a course of conduct regulated by God's will, God's law, and by the rule of love to God and love to one's neighbour. From the N. T. standpoint that is also so far true, as in all the world there is no better established means of prolonging life than the avoidance of evil; but the clause corre-

sponding to the O. T. standpoint, that evil punishes itself by a premature death, and that good is rewarded by long life, has indeed many exceptions arising from the facts of experience against it, for we see even the godless in their life of sin attaining to an advanced old age, and in view of the veiled future it appears only as a one-sided truth, so that the words, Wisd. iv. 9, "discretion is to man the right grey hairs, and an unstained life is the right old age," which is mediated by life experiences, such as Isa. lvii. 1 f., stand opposed to the above proverb as its reversed side. That old Solomonic proverb is, however, true, for it is not subverted; and, in contrast to self-destroying vice and wickedness; calling forth the judgment of God, it is and remains true, that whoever would reach an honoured old age, attains to it in the way of a righteous life and conduct.

Ver. 32 Better one slow to anger than a hero in war;

And whoever is master of his spirit, than he who taketh a city.

Regarding אִישׁ אֶרֶץ, *vid.* xiv. 29, where קִצְרֵיחַ was the parallel of the contrast. The comparison is true as regards persons, with reference to the performances expressed, and (since warlike courage and moral self-control may be united in one person) they are properly those in which the טוב determines the moral estimate. In *Pirke Aboth* iv. 1, the question, "Who is the hero?" is answered by, "he who overcomes his desire," with reference to this proverb, for that which is here said of the ruling over the passion of anger is true of all affections and passions.

"Yet he who reigns within himself, and rules

Passions, desires, and fears, is more a king;

Which every wise and virtuous man attains."¹

On the other side, the comparison is suggested:

Break your head, not so sore;

Break your will—that is more.²

Ver. 33 One casts the lot into the lap;

But all its decision cometh from Jahve.

The *Tóra* knows only in one instance an ordeal (a judgment of God) as a right means of proof, Num. v. 12–31. The lot is nowhere ordained by it, but its use is supported by a custom running parallel with the Mosaic law; it was used not only in private life,

¹ Milton's *Paradise Regained*, ii. 466–8.

² "Zerbrich den Kopf dir nicht so sehr;

Zerbrich den Willen—das ist mehr."—MATTH. CLAUDIUS.

but also in manifold ways within the domain of public justice, as well as for the detection of the guilty, Josh. vii. 14 f., 1 Sam. xiv. 40-42. So that the proverb xviii. 18 says the same thing of the lot that is said in the Epistle to the Hebrews, vi. 16, of the oath. The above proverb also explains the lot for an ordeal, for it is God who directs and orders it that it fall out thus and not otherwise. A particular sanction of the use of the lot does not lie in this, but it is only said, that where the lot is cast, all the decision that results from it is determined by God. That is in all cases true; but whether the challenging of the divine decision in such a way be right in this or that case is a question, and in no case would one, on the contrary, venture to make the person of the transgressor discoverable by lot, and let it decide regarding human life. But antiquity judged this matter differently, as *e.g.* the Book of Jonah (chap. i.) shows; it was a practice, animated by faith, in God's government of the world, which, if it did not observe the boundary between faith and superstition, yet stood high above the unbelief of the "Enlightenment." Like the Greek *κόλπος*, קֶחַל (from קָח, Arab. *ḥak*, *khak*, to encompass, to stretch out) means, as it is commonly taken, *gremium* as well as *sinus*, but the latter meaning is the more sure; and thus also here it is not the lap as the middle of the body, so that one ought to think on him who casts the lot as seated, but also not the lap of the garment, but, like vi. 27, cf. Isa. xl. 11, the swelling, loose, external part of the clothing covering the bosom (the breast), where the lot covered by it is thrown by means of shaking and changing, and whence it is drawn out. The construction of the passive הִטַּל (from טָל = Arab. *tall*, to throw along) with the object. accus. follows the old scheme, Gen. iv. 18, and has its reason in this, that the Semitic passive, formed by the change of vowels, has not wholly given up the governing force of the active. מִשְׁפָּט signifies here decision as by the Urim and Thummim, Num. xxvii. 21, but which was no lot-apparatus.

xvii. 1. A comparative proverb with מִבֵּית, pairing with xvi. 32:

Better a dry piece of bread, and quietness therewith,
Than a house full of slain beasts with unquietness.

Similar to this in form and contents are xv. 16 f. and xvi. 8. פֶּתַח חֲרִיבָה is a piece of bread (פֶּתַח, fem., as xxiii. 8) without savoury drink (Theodotion, *καθ' ἑαυτόν*, *i.e.* nothing with it), cf. Lev. vii. 10, a meat-offering without the pouring out of oil. זִבְחֵי are not sacrificial gifts (Ilitzig), but, as always, slain animals, *i.e.* either

offerings or banquets of slain beasts; it is the old name of the *שלמים* (cf. Ex. xviii. 12, xxiv. 5; Prov. vii. 14), part of which only were offered on the altar, and part presented as a banquet; and *נָחַל* (in contradist. to *מָנַח*, ix. 2, Gen. xliii. 16) denotes generally any kind of consecrated festival in connection with the worship of God, 1 Sam. xx. 29; cf. Gen. xxxi. 54. "Festivals of hatred" are festivals with hatred. *מָלַח* is part. with object-accus.; in general *מָלַח* forms a constructive, *מָלַח* occurs only once (Jer. vi. 11), and *מָלַח* not at all. We have already, vii. 14, remarked on the degenerating of the *shelamûm* feasts; from this proverb it is to be concluded that the merriment and the excitement bordering on intoxication (cf. with Hitzig, 1 Sam. i. 13 and 3), such as frequently at the *Kirmsen* merry-makings (*vid.* p. 164), brought quarrels and strife, so that the poor who ate his dry bread in quiet peace could look on all this noise and tumult without envy.

Ver. 2 A prudent servant shall rule over the degenerate son ;

And he divides the inheritance among the brethren.

Regarding the contrasts of *מִשְׁכִּיל* and *מְבִישׁ*, *vid.* at x. 5, xiv. 35. The printed editions present *בֶּן־מְבִישׁ* in genit. connection: a son of the scandalous class, which is admissible (*vid.* p. 79 and p. 330); but Cod. 1294 and Cod. *Jaman*,¹ Erf. No. 2, 3, write *בֶּן מְבִישׁ* (with *Tsere* and *Munach*), and that is perhaps right, after x. 5, xvii. 25. The futures have here also a fut. signification: they say to what it will come. Grotius remarks, with reference to this: *manumissus tutor filiis relinquetur*; *חֹלֵק* *tutorio officio*. But if he is a conscientious, unselfish tutor, he will not enrich himself by property which belongs to another; and thus, though not without provision, he is yet without an inheritance. And yet the supplanting of the degenerate is brought about by this, that he loses his inheritance, and the intelligent servant steps into his place. Has one then to suppose that the master of the house makes his servant a co-heir with his own children, and at the same time names him as his executor? That were a bad anachronism. The idea of the *διαθήκη* was, at the time when this proverb was coined, one unknown—Israelitish antiquity knows only the intestate right of inheritance, regulated by lineal and gradual succession. Then, if one thinks of the degenerate son, that he is disowned by the father, but that the intelligent servant is not rewarded during the life of his master for his true

¹ The Cod. brought by Sappir from Jemen (*vid.* p. 295), of which there is an account in the preface to the edition of *Isaiah* by Baer and me.

services, and that, after the death of the master, to such a degree he possesses the esteem and confidence of the family, that he it is who divides the inheritance among the brethren, *i.e.* occupies the place amongst them of distributor of the inheritance, not: takes a portion of the inheritance, for חֵלֶק has not the double meaning of the Lat. *participare*; it means to divide, and may, with אֵ, mean "to give a part of anything" (Job xxxix. 17); but, with the accus., nothing else than to distribute, *e.g.* Josh. xviii. 2, where it is to be translated: "whose inheritance had not yet been distributed (not yet given to them)." Jerome, *hereditatem dividet*; and thus all translators, from the LXX. to Luther.

Ver. 3 The fining-pot for silver, and the furnace for gold;
And a trier of hearts is Jahve.

An emblematical proverb (*vid.* p. 9), which means that Jahve is for the heart what the smelting-pot (from צִרָף, to change, particularly to melt, to refine) is for silver, and what the smelting furnace (כּוּר, from כּוּר, R. כּר, to round, Ex. xxii. 20) is for gold, that Jahve is for the heart, viz. a trier (בַּחֵן, to grind, to try by grinding, here as at Ps. vii. 10) of their nature and their contents, for which, of the proof of metals, is elsewhere (xvi. 2, xxi. 2, xxiv. 12) used the word (cf. בַּחֵן, the essay-master, Jer. vi. 7) חֵזֶן, weigher, or חוֹרֵט, searcher (1 Chron. xxviii. 9). Wherever the subject spoken of is God, the searcher of hearts, the plur. לְבָבוֹת, once לְבָבוֹת, is used; the form לְבָבִים occurs only in the *status conjunctus* with the suffix. In xxvii. 21 there follow the two figures, with which there is formed a *priamel* (*vid.* p. 13), as at xxvi. 3, another *tertium comparationis*.

Ver. 4 A profligate person giveth heed to perverse lips;
Falsehood listeneth to a destructive tongue.

The meaning, at all events, is, that whoever gives ear with delight to words which are morally reprobate, and aimed at the destruction of neighbours, thereby characterizes himself as a profligate. Though מִרַע is probably not pred. but subj., yet so that what follows does not describe the מִרַע (the profligate hearkens . . .), but stamps him who does this as a מִרַע (a profligate, or, as we say: only a profligate . . .). מִרַע, for מִרַע, is warranted by Isa. ix. 16, where מִרַע (not מִרַע, according to which the *Venet.* here translates ἀπὸ κακῶς) is testified to not only by correct codd. and editions, but also by the Masora (cf. *Michlol* 116b). הַקָּשִׁיב (from קָשַׁב, R. קָשׁ, to stiffen, or, as we say, to prick, viz. the ear) is generally united with לְ

or אָל, but, as here and at xxix. 12, Jer. vi. 19, also with על. אָל, wickedness, is the absolute contrast of a pious and philanthropic mind; הָיָה, from הָיָה, not in the sense of eagerness, as x. 3, xi. 6, but of yawning depth, abyss, catastrophe (*vid.* at Ps. v. 10), is equivalent to entire destruction—the two genitives denote the property of the lips and the tongue (*labium nequam, lingua pernicioso*), on the side of that which it instrumentally aims at (*cf.* Ps. xxxvi. 4, lii. 4): practising mischief, destructive plans. שָׁקֵר beginning the second line is generally regarded as the subj. parallel with מַרְע, as Luther, after Jerome, “A wicked man gives heed to wicked mouths, and a false man listens willingly to scandalous tongues.” It is possible that שָׁקֵר denotes incarnate falsehood, as רָמִיָּה xii. 27, incarnate slothfulness, *cf.* מְרִמָּה xiv. 25, and perhaps also xii. 17; זָדָק, Ps. lviii. 2, תּוֹשָׁעָה, Mic. vi. 9; יָצָר קִטְוֶה Isa. xxvi. 13, etc., where, without supplying אִישׁ (אֲנִשִּׁי), the property stands instead of the person possessing that property. The clause, that falsehood listeneth to a deceitful tongue, means that he who listens to it characterizes himself thereby, according to the proverb, *simile simili gaudet*, as a liar. But only as a liar? The punctuation before us, which represents מַרְע by *Dechi* as subj., or also pred., takes שָׁקֵר מוֹזֵן as obj. with מוֹן as its governing word, and why should not that be the view intended? The representation of the obj. is an inversion less bold than Isa. xxii. 2, viii. 22, and that על here should not be so closely connected with the verb of hearing, as 4a lies near by this, that הִקְשִׁיב על is elsewhere found, but not הִזְמִין על. Jewish interpreters, taking שָׁקֵר as obj., try some other meaning of מוֹן than *auscultans*; but neither מוֹן, to approach, nor מוֹן, to arm (*Venet.* ψευδός ὁπλιζέει), gives a meaning suitable to this place. מוֹן is equivalent to מִזְמִין. As מִזְמִין, Job xxxii. 11, is contracted into מִזִּין, so must מִזְמִין, if the character of the part. shall be preserved, become מוֹזֵן, mediated by מִזְמִין.

Vcr. 5 He that mocketh the poor reproacheth his Maker;

He that rejoiceth over calamity remains not unpunished.

Line first is a variation of xiv. 31a. God is, according to xxii. 2, the creator of the poor as well as of the rich. The poor, as a man, and as poor, is the work of God, the creator and governor of all things; thus, he who mocketh the poor, mocketh Him who called him into existence, and appointed him his lowly place. But in general, compassion and pity, and not joy (שִׂמְחָה), commonly

with ζ , of the person, *e.g.* Obad. ver. 12, the usual formula for *ἐπιχαιρεκακία*), is appropriate in the presence of misfortune (רָע , from רָא , to be heavily burdened), for such joy, even if he on whom the misfortune fell were our enemy, is a *peccatum mortale*, Job xxxi. 29 f. There is indeed a hallowed joy at the actual revelation in history of the divine righteousness; but this would not be a hallowed joy if it were not united with deep sorrow over those who, accessible to no warning, have despised grace, and, by adding sin to sin, have provoked God's anger.

Ver. 6. With this verse this series of proverbs closes as it began :

A diadem of the old are children's children,
And the glory of children are their parents.

Children are a blessing from God (Ps. cxxvii., cxxviii.); thus, a family circle consisting of children and grandchildren (including great-grandchildren) is as a crown of glory surrounding the grey-haired patriarch; and again, children have glory and honour in their parents, for to have a man of an honoured name, or of a blessed memory, as a father, is the most effective commendation, and has for the son, even though he is unlike his father, always important and beneficial consequences. In 6b a fact of experience is expressed, from which has proceeded the rank of inherited nobility recognised among men—one may abnegate his social rights, but yet he himself is and remains a part of the moral order of the world. The LXX. has a distich after ver. 4 [the Vatican text places it after ver. 6]: "The whole world of wealth belongs to the faithful, but to the unfaithful not even an obolus." Lagarde supposes that $\delta\lambda\omicron\varsigma \acute{o} \kappa\acute{o}\sigma\mu\omicron\varsigma \tau\acute{\omega}\nu \chi\rho\eta\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega\nu$ is a translation of $\text{יְהִי עֲשֵׂת יְהִי}$, instead of $\text{יְהִי עֲשֵׂת יְהִי}$, 7a. But this ingenious conjecture does not amount to the regarding of this distich as a variation of ver. 7.

The proverbs following, 7–10, appear to be united acrostically by the succession of the letters ψ (ψ , ψ) and η .

Ver. 7 It does not become a fool to speak loftily,
How much less do lying lips a noble!

As at Isa. xxxii. 5 f., נָבִל and נָדִיב are placed opposite to one another; the latter is the nobly magnanimous man, the former the man who thinks foolishly and acts profligately, whom it does not become to use lofty words, who thereby makes the impression of his vulgarity so much the more repulsive (cf. Job ii. 10). שִׁפְתֵי יְהִי (not יְהִי , for the word belongs to those which retain their *Pathach*

or *Segol*, in *pausa*) is neither elevated (soaring) (Ewald) nor diffuse (Jo. Ernst Jungius in Oetinger: *lingua dicax ac sermonem ultra quam decorum verbis extendere solita*), rather imperative (Bertheau), better presumptuous (Hitzig) words, properly words of superfluity, *i.e.* of superabundant self-consciousness and high pretension (cf. the transitive bearing of the Arab. *waṭr* with ὑβρίζειν, from ὑπέρ, Aryan *upar*, *Job*, p. 363). Rightly Meiri, שֹׁפֵט נָאֻה וְשֹׁרֶרָה. It produces a disagreeable impression, when a man of vulgar mind and of rude conduct, instead of keeping himself in retirement, makes himself of importance, and weighty in a shameless, impudent manner (cf. Ps. xii. 9, where זָלָתָה, *vilitas*, in a moral sense); but yet more repulsive is the contrast, when a man in whom one is justified in expecting nobility of mind, in accordance with his life-position and calling, degrades himself by uttering deceitful words. Regarding the אָהָרָה, concluding *a minori ad majus*, we have already spoken at xi. 31, xv. 11. R. Ismael, in *Bereschith Rabba*, at xlv. 8, reckons ten such conclusions *a minori ad majus* in the Scriptures, but there are just as many *quanto magis*. The right accentuation (*e.g.* in Cod. 1294) is here אָהָרָה בִּי־לָנֶרֶב, transformed from אָהָרָה בִּי־לָנֶרֶב, according to *Accentuationssystem*, xviii. 2.

Ver. 8 The gift of bribery appears a jewel to its receiver ;
Whitherso'er he turneth himself he acteth prudently.

How 8b is to be understood is shown by 1 Sam. xiv. 47, cf. Josh. i. 7; the *quoque se vertit, prudenter rem agit*, has accordingly in both sentences the person meant by בָּעָלִי as subject, not the gift (Hitzig), of which הַשָּׁבִיל, "it maketh prosperous," is not said, for הַשָּׁבִיל means, used only of persons, prudent, and therefore successful, fortunate conduct. Such is said of him who has to give (Luther): he presses through with it whithersoever he turns. But the making of בָּעָלִי the subj. does not accord with this: this means [gift] to one who has to give, appears to open doors and hearts, not merely as a golden key, it is truly such to him. Thus בָּעָלִי, as at iii. 27, will be meant of him to whom the present is brought, or to whom a claim thereto is given. But שָׁחַד means here not the gift of seasonable liberality (Zöckler), but, as always, the gift of bribery, *i.e.* a gift by which one seeks to purchase for himself (xvii. 23) preference on the part of a judge, or to mitigate the displeasure of a high lord (xxi. 14); here (for one does not let it depend merely on the faithfulness of another to his duty) it is

that by which one seeks to secure an advantage to himself. The proverb expresses a fact of experience. The gift of bribery, to which, as to a well-known approved means, *הַשְׁחָר* refers, appears to him who receives and accepts it (Targ.) as a stone of pleasantness, a charming, precious stone, a jewel (*Juwel* from *joie* = *gaudium*); it determines and impels him to apply all his understanding, in order that he may reach the goal for which it shall be his reward. What he at first regarded as difficult, yea, impossible, that he now prudently carries out, and brings to a successful conclusion, wherever he turns himself, overcoming the seemingly insurmountable hindrances; for the enticement of the gift lifts him, as with a charm, above himself, for covetousness is a characteristic feature of human nature—*pecuniæ obediunt omnia* (Eccles. x. 19, Vulg.).

Ver. 9 He covereth transgressions who seeketh after love,

And he who always brings back a matter separateth friends.

The pred. stands first in the simple clause with the order of the words not inverted. That *מַכְסֵּה פֶשַׁע* is also to be interpreted here as pred. (cf. 19a) is shown by x. 12, according to which love covereth all transgressions. We write *מַכְסֵּה פֶשַׁע* with *Dag. forte conjunctivum* of פ (as of ב in Ezek. xviii. 6), and *Gaja* with the *Sheva*, according to the *Meth.-Setzung*, § 37; the punctuation *פֶּשַׁע מַכְסֵּה* also occurs. What the expression "to seek love" here means, is to be judged, with Hitzig, after Zeph. ii. 3, 1 Cor. xiv. 1. It is in no case equivalent to seek to gain the love of another, rather to seek to preserve the love of men towards one another, but it is to be understood not after 9b, but after x. 12: he seeks to prove love who does not strike on the great bell when his neighbour has sinned however grievously against him, does not in a scandal-loving manner make much ado about it, and takes care not thereby to widen the breach between men who stand near to one another, but endeavours by a reconciling, soothing, rectifying influence, to mitigate the evil, instead of making it worse. He, on the contrary, who repeats the matter (*הַזֶּה* with ז of the obj., to come back with something, as xxvi. 11), i.e. turns always back again to the unpleasant occurrence (Theodotion, *δευτερῶν ἐν λόγῳ*; Symmachus, *δευτερῶν λόγον*, as Sir. vii. 14, xix. 7), divides friends (*vid.* xvi. 28), for he purposely fosters the strife, the disharmony, ill-will, and estrangement which the offence produced; while the noble man, who has love for his motive and his aim, by prudent silence contributes to bring the offence and the division which it occasioned into forgetfulness.

Ver. 10 One reproof maketh more impression on a wise man
Than if one reckoned a hundred to the fool

One of the few proverbs which begin with a future, *vid.* xii. 26, p. 265. It expresses what influence there is in one reproof with a wise man (מִבֵּיִן, viii. 9); נִצָּרָה is the reproof expressed by the post-bibl. נִיּוֹפָה, as the lowest grade of disciplinary punishment, *admonitio*, connected with warning. The verbal form חָחַח is the reading of the LXX. and Syr. (συντρίβει ἀπειλῇ καρδίαν φρονίμου) for they read חָחַח נִצָּרָה לֵב מִבֵּיִן, derived from חָחַח, and thus חָחַח (from *Hiph.* חָחַח); thus Luther: reproof alarms more the intelligent, but חָחַח with ב of the obj. is not Hebr.; on the contrary, the reading of the LXX. is in accordance with the usage of the language, and, besides, is suitable. It is, however, first to be seen whether the traditional text stands in need of this correction. As *fut. Niph.* חָחַח, apart from the ult. accent. to be expected, gives no meaning. Also if one derives it from חָחַח, to snatch away, to take away, it gives no appropriate thought; besides, חָחַח is construed with the object. accus., and the *fut. Apoc.*, in itself strange here, must be pointed either חָחַח or חָחַח (after חָחַח) (Böttcher, *Lehrb.* ii. p. 413). Thus חָחַח, as at Job xxi. 13, Jer. xxi. 13, will be *fut. Kal* of חָחַח = חָחַח, Ps. xxxviii. 3 (Theodotion, Targ., Kimchi). With this derivation, also, חָחַח is to be expected; the reference in the *Handwörterbuch* to Gesen. *Lehrgebäude*, § 51, 1, Anm. 1, where, in an extremely inadequate way, the retrogression of the tone (נִכְסֵי אֲחֵרִי) is spoken of, is altogether inappropriate to this place; and Böttcher's explanation of the ult. tone from an intended expressiveness is ungrammatical; but why should not חָחַח, from חָחַח, with its first syllable originating from contraction, and thus having the tone, be *Milel* as well as *Milra*, especially here, where it stands at the head of the sentence? With ב connected with it, חָחַח means: to descend into anything, to penetrate; Hitzig appropriately compares *altius in pectus descendit* of Sallust, *Jug.* 11. Jerome rightly, according to the sense: *plus proficit*, and the *Venet.* ἀνεί (read ὀνεί) ἀπειλῇ τῷ συνίοντι. In 10b מִבֵּיִן (cf. Deut. xxv. 3; 2 Cor. xi. 24) is to be supplied to מִבֵּיִן, not מִבֵּיִן (an hundred times, which may be denoted correctly by מִבֵּיִן as well as מִבֵּיִן, Eccles. viii. 12). With the wise (says a Talmudic proverb) a sign does as much as with the fool a stick does. Zehner, in his *Adagia sacra* (1601), cites Curtius (vii. 4): *Nobilis equus umbra quoque virgæ regitur, ignavus ne calcari quidem concitari potest.*

Five proverbs of dangerous men against whom one has to be on his guard:

Ver. 11 The rebellious seeketh only after evil,
And a cruel messenger is sent out against him.

It is a question what is subj. and what obj. in 11a. It lies nearest to look on מְרִי as subj., and this word (from מָרָה, *stringere*, to make oneself exacting against any, to oppose, *avertir*) is appropriate thereto; it occurs also at Ezek. ii. 7 as *abstr. pro concreto*. That it is truly subj. appears from this, that בָּקֵשׁ רָע, to seek after evil (cf. xxix. 10; 1 Kings xx. 7, etc.), is a connection of idea much more natural than בָּקֵשׁ מְרִי [to seek after rebellion]. Thus אֵף will be logically connected with רָע, and the reading מְרִי אֵף will be preferred to the reading אֵף-מְרִי; אֵף (corresponding to the Arab. *ainnana*) belongs to those particles which are placed before the clause, without referring to the immediately following part of the sentence, for they are much more regarded as affecting the whole sentence (*vid.* xiii. 10): the rebellious strives after nothing but only evil. Thus, as neut. obj. רָע is rendered by the Syr., Targ., Venet., and Luther; on the contrary, the older Greek translators and Jerome regard רָע as the personal subject. If now, in reference to rebellion, the discourse is of a מְלָאךְ אֲכֹזֵרִי, we are not, with Hitzig, to think of the demon of wild passions unfettered in the person of the rebellious, for that is a style of thought and of expression that is modern, not biblical; but the old unpoetic yet simply true remark remains: *Loquendi formula inde petita quod regis aut summi magistratus minister rebelli supplicium nunciat infligitque*. מְלָאךְ is *n. officii*, not *naturæ*. Man as a messenger, and the spiritual being as messenger, are both called מְלָאךְ. Therefore one may not understand מְלָאךְ אֲכֹזֵרִי, with the LXX., Jerome, and Luther, directly and exclusively of an angel of punishment. If one thinks of Jahve as the Person against whom the rebellion is made, then the idea of a heavenly messenger lies near, according to Ps. xxxv. 5 f., lxxviii. 49; but the proverb is so meant, that it is not the less true if an earthly king sends out against a rebellious multitude a messenger with an unlimited commission, or an officer against a single man dangerous to the state, with strict directions to arrest him at all hazards. אֲכֹזֵרִי we had already at xii. 10; the root קָשׁ means, to be dry, hard, without feeling. The fut. does not denote what may be done (Bertleau, Zöckler), which is contrary to the parallelism, the order of the words, and the style of

the proverb, but what is done. And the relation of the clause is not, as Ewald interprets it, "scarcely does the sedition seek out evil when an inexorable messenger is sent." Although this explanation is held by Ewald as "unimprovable," yet it is incorrect, because לֹא in this sense demands, *e.g.* Gen. xxvii. 3, the perf. (strengthened by the *infin. intensivus*). The relation of the clause is, also, not such as Büttcher has interpreted it: a wicked man tries only scorn though a stern messenger is sent against him, but not because such a messenger is called אֲבוּרִי , against whom this "trying of scorn" helps nothing, so that it is not worth being spoken of; besides, לֹא or $\text{לֹא־יִשְׁכַּח$ would have been used if this relation had been intended. We have in 11a and 11b, as also *e.g.* at xxvi. 24, xxviii. 1, two clauses standing in internal reciprocal relation, but syntactically simply co-ordinated; the force lies in this, that a messenger who recognises no mitigating circumstances, and offers no pardon, is sent out against such an one.

Ver. 12 Meet a bear robbed of one of her whelps,

Only not a fool in his folly.

The name of the bear, as that of the cow, Job xxi. 10, Ps. cxliv. 14, preserves its masculine form, even when used in reference to sexual relationship (Ewald, § 174b); the *ursa catulis orbata* is proverbially a raging beast. How the abstract expression of the action פָּגַעַת [to meet], here as *e.g.* Ps. xvii. 5, with the subj. following, must sound as finite (*occurrat*, may always meet), follows from $\text{וְיִפְגַּעַת = וְיִפְגַּעַת}$ (*non autem occurrat*). פָּגַעַת has on the last syllable *Mehuppach*, and *Zin-norith* on the preceding open syllable (according to the rule, *Accent-system*, vi. § 5d).¹ בְּאַגְלֹתוֹ , in the state of his folly, *i.e.* when he is in a paroxysm of his anger, corresponds with the conditional noun-adjective זֶעֶבֶל , for folly morbidly heightened is madness (cf. Hos. xi. 7; *Psychol.* p. 291 f.).

Ver. 13 He that returneth evil for good,

From his house evil shall not depart.

If ingratitude appertains to the sinful manifestations of ignoble selfishness, how much more sinful still is black ingratitude, which recompenses evil for good! (מִשְׁכִּיב , as 1 Sam. xxv. 21, syn. נִמְל , to requite, iii. 30, xxxi. 12; שָׁלַם , to reimburse, xx. 22). Instead of חָמַיִשׁ , the *Keri* reads חָמַיִשׁ ; but that this verb, with a middle vowel, may be "ע" as well as "ו"ע, Ps. lv. 2 shows.

¹ In the *Torath Emeth*, p. 18, the word is irregularly represented as *Milel*—a closed syllable with *Cholem* can suffer no retrogression of the tone.

Ver. 14 As one letteth out water is the beginning of a strife;
But cease thou from such strife ere it comes to showing teeth.

The meaning of this verb פָּטַר is certain: it means to break forth; and transitively, like Arab. *fatr*, to bring forth from a cleft, to make to break forth, to let go free (Theodotion, ἀπολύων; Jerome, *dimittit*; Venet. ἀφαιείς). The LXX., since it translates by ἐξουσίαν δίδωσι, thinks on the juristic signification, which occurs in the Chronicles: to make free, or to declare so; but here פֹּטֵר מַיִם (vid. regarding the *Metheg* at xiv. 31, p. 311) is, as Luther translates, one who tears away the dam from the waters. And ראשית מֵרֶוֶן is not accus. dependent on פֹּטֵר, to be supplied (Hitzig: he unfetters water who the beginning of strife, viz. unfetters); but the part is used as at x. 17: one who unfetters the water is the beginning of strife, i.e. he is thus related to it as when one . . . This is an addition to the free use of the part. in the language of the Mishna, where one would expect the *infin.*, e.g. בִּזְרֹעַ (= בִּזְרָעַ), if one sows, בְּמִזְרֹר (= בְּזִרְוֹן), of wantonness. It is thus unnecessary, with Ewald, to interpret פֹּטֵר as neut., which lets water go = a water-outbreak; פֹּטֵר is meant personally; it represents one who breaks through a water-dam, withdraws the restraint of the water, opens a sluice, and then emblematically the proverb says: thus conditioned is the beginning of a strife. Then follows the warning to let go such strife (הֵרִיב, with the article used in the more elevated style, not without emphasis), to break from it, to separate it from oneself ere it reach a dangerous height. This is expressed by לִפְנֵי הִתְהַלֵּךְ, a verb occurring only here and at xviii. 1, xx. 3, always in the *Hithpa.* The Targum (misunderstood by Gesenius after Buxtorf; vid. to the contrary, Levy, under the word נִיר II.) translates it at xviii. 1, xx. 3, as the Syr., by “to mock,” also Aquila, who has at xx. 3, ἐξυβρισθήσεται, and the LXX. at xviii. 1, ἐπονείδιστος ἔσται, and Jerome, who has this in all the three passages, render the *Hithpa.* in this sense, passively. In this passage before us, the Targ., as Hitzig gives it, translates, “before it heats itself,” but that is an error occasioned by Buxtorf; vid. on the contrary, Levy, under the word קָרָא (κύριος); this translation, however, has a representative in Haja Gaon, who appeals for גָּלַע, to glow, to *Nidda* viii. 2.¹ Elsewhere the LXX., at xx. 3, συμπλέκεται (where Jerome, with the amalgamation of the two significations, *miscentur contumeliis*); Kimchi and others gloss it by התערב, and, according to this, the Venet. translates, πρὸ τοῦ

¹ Vid. Simon Nascher's *Der Gaon Haja u. seine geist. Thätig.* p. 15.

συνχυθῆναι (τῇν ἔριν); Luther, "before thou art mingled therein." But all these explanations of the word: *insultare*, *excandescere*, and *commisceri*, are etymologically inadmissible. Bertheau's and Zöckler's "roll itself forth" is connected at least with a meaning rightly belonging to the R. גל. But the Arab. shows, that not the meaning *volvere*, but that of *retegere* is to be adopted. Aruch¹ for *Nidda* viii. 2 refers to the Arab., where a wound is designated as כְּבֹלֶה לְהִנָּלֵעַ וּלְהוֹצִיא דָם, i.e. as breaking up, as it were, when the crust of that which is nearly healed is broken off (Maimuni glosses the word by לְהִתְקַלֵּב, were uncrusted), and blood again comes forth. The meaning *retegere* requires here, however, another distinction. The explanation mentioned there by Aruch: before the strife becomes public to thee, i.e. approaches thee, is not sufficient. The verbal stem נלע is the stronger power of נלה, and means laying bare; but here, not as there, in the Mishna of a wound covered with a crust. The Arab. *jal'* means to quarrel with another, properly to show him the teeth, the *Poël* or the tendency-stem from *jāl'a*, to have the mouth standing open, so that one shows his teeth; and the Syr. *glas*, with its offshoots and derivatives, has also this meaning of *ringi*, opening the mouth to show, i.e. to make bare the teeth. Schultens has established this explanation of the words, and Gesenius further establishes it in the *Thesaurus*, according to which Fleischer also remarks, "נלע, of showing the teeth, the exposing of the teeth by the wide opening of the mouth, as happens in bitter quarrels." But הָרִיב does not agree with this. Hitzig's translation, "before the strife shows its teeth," is as modern as in ver. 11 is the passion of the unfettered demon, and Fleischer's *prius vero quam exacerbetur rixa* renders the *Hithpa.* in a sense unnecessarily generalized for xviii. 1 and xx. 3. The accentuation, which separates להתנלע from הָרִיב by *Rebia Muqrash*, is correct. One may translate, as Schultens, *antequam dentes stringantur*, or, since the *Hithpa.* has sometimes a reciprocal signification, e.g. Gen. xlii. 1, Ps. xli. 8: ere one reciprocally shows his teeth. Hitzig unjustly takes exception to the inversion הָרִיב נִטָּשׁ. Why should not the object precede, as at Hos. xii. 15, the נִטָּשׁ, placed with emphasis at the end? The same inversion for a like reason occurs at Eccles. v. 6.

¹ [Vid. p. 109, note.]

Ver. 15 He that acquitteth the guilty and condemneth the righteous—
An abomination to Jahve are they both.

The proverb is against the partisan judge who is open to bribery, like xxiv. 24, cf. Isa. v. 23, where, with reference to such, the announcement of punishment is emphatically made. וְרָצָעַ and וְצִדִּיק, in a forensic sense, are equivalent to *sons (reus)* and *insons*. בֵּן (cf. the Arab. *jmy'na*, altogether, but particularly the Pers. *ham* and the Turkish *dkhy* standing wholly thus in the numeral) is here, as at Gen. xxvii. 45, equivalent to וְהָיָה, Jer. xvi. 12 (in its unions = united). Whoever pronounces sentence of justification on the guilty, appears as if he must be judged more mildly than he who condemns the guiltless, but both the one and the other alike are an abhorrence to God.

We take vers. 16-21 together. This group begins with a proverb of the heartless, and ends with one of the perverse-hearted; and between these there are not wanting noticeable points of contact between the proverbs that follow one another.

Ver. 16 Why the ready money in the hand of the fool;
To get wisdom when he has yet no heart?

The question is made pointed by וְהָיָה, thus not: why the ready money when . . . ? Is it to obtain wisdom?—the whole is but one question, the reason of which is founded in וְלִבּוֹ (thus to be accented with *Mugrash* going before).¹ The fool, perhaps, even makes some endeavours, for he goes to the school of the wise, to follow out their admonitions, קִנְיָה חִכְמָה (iv. 5, etc.), and it costs him something (iv. 7), but all to no purpose, for he has no heart. By this it is not meant that knowledge, for which he pays his *honorarium*, remains, it may be, in his head, but goes not to his heart, and thus becomes an unfruitful theory; but the heart is equivalent to the understanding (*vid.* p. 174), in the sense in which the heart appears as the previous condition to the attainment of wisdom (xviii. 15), and as something to be gained before all (xv. 32), viz. understanding, as the fitting intellectual and practical *habitus* to the reception, the

¹ If we write וְלִבּוֹ with *Makkeph*, then we have to accentuate חִכְמָה with *Tarcha Munach*, because the *Silluk* word in this writing has not two syllables before the tone. This sequence of accents is found in the Codd. Ven. 1521, 1615, Basel 1619, while most editions have וְלִבּוֹ חִכְמָה, which is false. But according to MSS. we have וְלִבּוֹ without *Makkeph*, and that is right according to the *Makkeph* rules of the metrical *Accentuationssystem*; *vid. Torah Emeth*, p. 40.

appropriation, and realization of wisdom, the ability rightly to comprehend the fulness of the communicated knowledge, and to adopt it as an independent possession, that which the Greek called *νοῦς*, as in that "golden proverb" of Democrates: πολλοὶ πολυμαθείες νοῦν οὐκ ἔχουσι, or as in Luke xxiv. 25, where it is said that the Lord opened τὸν νοῦν of His disciples to understand the Scriptures. In the LXX. a distich follows ver. 16, which is made up of 19*b* and 20*b*, and contains a varied translation of these two lines.

Ver. 17 At all times the right friend shows himself loving;

And as a brother is he born for adversity.

Brother is more than friend, he stands to one nearer than a friend does, Ps. xxxv. 14; but the relation of a friend may deepen itself into a spiritual, moral brotherhood, xviii. 24, and there is no name of friend that sounds dearer than אָח, 2 Sam. i. 26. 17*a* and 17*b* are, according to this, related to each other climactically. The friend meant in 17*a* is a true friend. Of no other is it said that he loves אֶת-לֵוִי, i.e. makes his love manifest; and also the article in הָרֵץ not only here gives to the word more body, but stamps it as an ideal-word: the friend who corresponds to the idea of such an one.¹ The *inf.* of the *Hiiph.*, in the sense "to associate" (Ewald), cannot therefore be אָחַד, because אָחַד is not derived from אָח, but from אָחַד. Thus there exists no contrast between 17*a* and 17*b*, so that the love of a friend is thought of, in contradistinction to that of a brother, as without permanency (Fl.); but 17*b* means that the true friend shows himself in the time of need, and that thus the friendship becomes closer, like that between brothers. The statements do not refer to two kinds of friends; this is seen from the circumstance that אָח has not the article, as הָרֵץ has. It is not the subj. but pred., as אָח, Job xi. 12: sooner is a wild ass born or born again as a man. The meaning of הָיָה there, as at Ps. lxxxvii. 5 f., borders on the notion of *regenerari*; here the idea is not essentially much less, for by the saying that the friend is born in the time of need, as a brother, is meant that he then for the first time shows himself as a friend, he receives the right status or baptism of such an one, and is, as it were, born into personal brotherly relationship to the sorely-trying friend. The translation *comprobatur* (Jerome) and *erfunden* [is found out] (Luther) obliterates the peculiar and

¹ The Arab. grammarians say that the article in this case stands, *ḥaṣṣrāh al-jnās āl-jnās*, as an exhaustive expression of all essential properties of the genus, i.e. to express the full ideal realization of the idea in that which is named.

thus intentional expression, for נולד is not at all a metaphor used for passing into the light—the two passages in Proverbs and in Job have not their parallel. לָצָרָה is not equivalent to בְּצָרָה (cf. Ps. ix. 10, x. 1), for the interchange of the prep. in 17*a* and 17*b* would then be without any apparent reason. But Hitzig's translation also: as a brother he is born of adversity, is impossible, for לְ after נולד and בְּ always designates that for which the birth is an advantage, not that from which it proceeds. Thus לְ will be that of the purpose: for the purpose of the need,—not indeed to suffer (Job v. 7) on account of it, but to bear it in sympathy, and to help to bear it. Rightly Fleischer: *frater autem ad ærumnam (sc. levandam et removendam) nascitur*. The LXX. gives this sense to the לְ: ἀδελφοὶ δὲ ἐν ἀνάγκαις χρήσιμοι ἔστωσαν, τοῦτο γὰρ χάριν γεννῶνται.

Ver. 18 A man void of understanding is he who striketh hands,
Who becometh surety with his neighbour.

Cf. vi. 1–5, where the warning against suretyship is given at large, and the reasons for it are adduced. It is incorrect to translate (Gesen., Hitzig, and others) לִפְנֵי רֵעִי, with the LXX., Jerome, the Syr., Targ., and Luther, “for his neighbour;” to become surety for any one is לְ עֵרֵב, vi. 1, or, with the object. accus., xi. 15, another suitable prep. is בְּעֵר; but לִפְנֵי never means *pro* (ὕπέρ), for at 1 Sam. i. 16 it means “to the person,” and 2 Sam. iii. 31, “before Abner’s corpse (bier).” רֵעִי is thus here the person with whom the suretyship is entered into; he can be called the עֵר of him who gives bail, so much the more as the reception of the bail supposes that both are well known to each other. Here also Fleischer rightly translates: *apud alterum (sc. creditorem pro debitore)*.

Ver. 19 He loveth sin who loveth strife;
He who maketh high his doors seeketh destruction.

A synthetic distich (*vid.* p. 10). Böttcher finds the reason of the pairing of these two lines in the relationship between a mouth and a door (cf. Mic. vii. 5, פִּתְחֵי בַיִת). Hitzig goes further, and supposes that 19*b* figuratively expresses what boastfulness brings upon itself. Against Geier, Schultens, and others, who understand פִּתְחוֹ directly of the mouth, he rightly remarks that הַנְּבִיחַ פֶּה is not heard of, and that הַנְּגִיל פֶּה would be used instead. But the two lines harmonize, without this interchangeable reference of *os* and *ostium*. *Zanksucht* [quarrelsomeness] and *Prunksucht* [ostentation] are related as the symptoms of selfishness. But both bear

their sentence in themselves. He who has pleasure in quarrelling has pleasure in evil, for he commits himself to the way of great sinning, and draws others along with him; and he who cannot have the door of his house high enough and splendid enough, prepares thereby for himself, against his will, the destruction of his house. An old Hebrew proverb says, בל העוסק בבנין יחככן, *œdificandi nimis studiosus ad mendicitatem redigitur*. Both parts of this verse refer to one and the same individual, for the *insanum œdificandi studium* goes only too often hand in hand with unjust and heartless litigation.

Ver. 20 He that is of a false heart findeth no good;
And he that goeth astray with his tongue falleth into evil.

Regarding עֲקֵשׁ-לֵב, *vid.* xi. 20. In the parallel member, נִהַפֵּךְ בְּלִשׁוֹנוֹ is he who twists or winds (*vid.* at ii. 12) with his tongue, going about concealing and falsifying the truth. The phrase וְנִהַפֵּךְ (the connecting form before a word with a prep.) is syntactically possible, but the Masora designates the word, in contradistinction to וְנִהַפֵּךְ, pointed with *Pathach*, Lev. xiii. 16, with לִית as *unicum*, thus requires וְנִהַפֵּךְ, as is also found in Codd. The contrast of דָּעָה is here טוֹב, also neut., as xiii. 21, cf. xvi. 20, and כֵּן, xiii. 17.

The first three parts of the old Solomonic Book of Proverbs ((1) x. 1–xii. 28; (2) xiii. 1–xv. 19; (3) xv. 20–xvii. 20) are now followed by the fourth part. We recognise it as striking the same keynote as x. 1. In xvii. 21 it resounds once more, here commencing a part; there, x. 1, beginning the second group of proverbs. The first closes, as it begins, with a proverb of the fool.

Ver. 21 He that begetteth a fool, it is to his sorrow;
And the father of a fool hath no joy.

It is admissible to supply יָלְדוֹ, developing itself from יָלַד, before לוֹ לְחִינָה (*vid.* regarding this passive formation, at x. 1, cf. xiv. 13), as at Isa. lxvi. 3, מִיֵּלֶדָה (Fl.: *in mærorem sibi genuit h. e. ideo videtur genuisse ut sibi mærorem crearet*); but not less admissible is it to interpret לוֹ לְחִינָה as a noun-clause corresponding to the וְלֹא-יִשְׂמַח (thus to be written with *Makkeph*): it brings grief to him. According as one understands this as an expectation, or as a consequence, יָלַד, as at xxiii. 24, is rendered either *qui gignit* or *qui genuit*. With נִבֵּל, seldom occurring in the Book of Proverbs (only here and at ver. 7), בָּכִיל, occurring not unfrequently, is interchanged. Schultens rightly defines the latter etymologically:

marcidus h. e. qui ad virtutem, pietatem, vigorem omnem vitæ spiritualis medullitus emarcuit; and the former: *elumbis et mollitie segnitieve fractus*, the intellectually heavy and sluggish (cf. Arab. *kasal*, laziness; *kaslân*, the lazy).¹

Ver. 22 A joyful heart bringeth good recovery;
And a broken spirit drieth the bones.

The heart is the centre of the individual life, and the condition and the tone of the heart communicates itself to this life, even to its outermost circumference; the spirit is the power of self-consciousness which, according as it is lifted up or broken, also lifts up or breaks down the condition of the body (*Psychol.* p. 199), *vid.* the similar contrasted phrases לֵב שִׂמְחָה and רֵיחַ נְבִיאָה, xv. 13. The ἀπ. λεγ. נָהָה (here and there in Codd. incorrectly written נִיָּהָה) has nothing to do with the Arab. *jihat*, which does not mean sight, but direction, and is formed from *wjah* (whence *wajah*, sight), like עֵדָה, congregation, from ועָד (עָדָה). The Syr., Targ. (perhaps also Symmachus: ἀγαθύνει ἡλικίαν; Jerome: *etatem floridam facit*; Luther: makes the life *lüstig* [cheerful]) translate it by body; but for this נָהָה (נִיָּהָה) is used, and that is a word of an entirely different root from נִיָּהָה. To what verb this refers is shown by Hos. v. 13: וְלֹא-יִנְהָה מָכֶם מָוֹר, and healed not for you her ulcerous wound. מָוֹר is the compress, i.e. the bandage closing up the ulcer, then also the ulcer-wound itself; and נָהָה is the contrary of עָלָה, e.g. Jer. viii. 22; it means the removing of the bandage and the healing of the wound. This is confirmed by the Syr. *gho*, which in like manner is construed with *min*, and means to be delivered from something (*vid.* Bernstein's *Lex. Syr.* to Kirsch's *Chrestomathie*). The Aethiop. quadriliteral *gâhgêh*, to hinder, to cause to cease, corresponds to the causative Syr. *agahiṣh*. Accordingly נָהָה means to be in the condition of abatement, mitigation, healing; and נָהָה (as synonym of בָּקָה, Neh. iii. 19, with which Parchon combines it), *levamen, levatio*, in the sense of bodily healing (LXX. εὐεκτηίν ποιεῖ; Venet., after Kimchi, ἀγαθύνει

¹ Nöldeke's assertion (*Art. Orion* in Schenkel's *Bibel-Lexicon*) that the Arab. *kasal* corresponds to the Hebr. כָּשַׁל proceeds from the twofold supposition, that the meaning to be lazy underlies the meaning to totter (*vid.* also Dietrich in Gesenius' *Heb. Wörterbuch*), and that the Hebr. כ must correspond with the Arab. كس. The former supposition is untenable, the latter is far removed (cf. e.g. כָּסַף and *kursi*, כָּסַר and *sifr*, מָסַךְ and *miskîn*). The verb כָּשַׁל, Aram. כָּשַׁל, is unknown in the Arab.

θεραπεύειν); and *הִיטִיב גָּהָר* (cf. xv. 2) denotes, to bring good improvement, to advance powerfully the recovery. Schultens compares the Arab. *jahy, nitescere, disserenari*, as Menahem has done *גָּהָר*, but this word is one of the few words which are explained exclusively from the Syriac (and Æthiop.). *גָּהָר* (here and at xxv. 15) is the word interchanging with *עָצָם*, xv. 30, xvi. 24.

Ver. 23 Bribery from the bosom the godless-receiveth,
To pervert the ways of justice.

Regarding *שֹׁחַד*, *vid.* xvii. 8. The idea of this word, as well as the clause containing the purpose, demand for the *שֹׁחַד* a high judicial or administrative post. The bosom, *חֶקֶת* (*חֶקֶת*), is, as xvi. 23, that of the clothing. From the bosom, *מִחֶקֶת*, where it was kept concealed, the gift is brought forth, and is given into the bosom, *בְּחֶקֶת*, xxi. 14, of him whose favour is to be obtained—an event taking place under four eyes, which purposely withdraws itself from the observation of any third person. Since this is done to give to the course of justice a direction contrary to rectitude, the giver of the bribe has not right on his side; and, under the circumstances, the favourable decision which he purchases may be at once the unrighteous sentence of a *צִדִּיק*, accusing him, or accused by him, xviii. 5.

Ver. 24 The understanding has his attention toward wisdom;
But the eyes of a fool are on the end of the earth.

Many interpreters explain, as Eichel:

“The understanding finds wisdom everywhere;
The eyes of the fool seek it at the end of the world.”

Ewald refers to Deut. xxx. 11–14 as an unfolding of the same thought. But although it may be said of the fool (*vid.* on the contrary, xv. 14) that he seeks wisdom, only not at the right place, as at xiv. 6, of the mocker that he seeks wisdom but in vain, yet here the order of the words, as well as the expression, lead us to another thought: before the eyes of the understanding (*אֵת־פָּנָיו*, as Gen. xxxiii. 18, 1 Sam. ii. 11, and frequently in the phrase *נִרְאָה נִרְאָה*, e.g. 1 Sam. i. 22) wisdom lies as his aim, his object, the end after which he strives; on the contrary, the eyes of the fool, without keeping that one necessary thing in view, wander in *alia omnia*, and roam about what is far off, without having any fixed object. The fool is everywhere with his thoughts, except where he ought to be. Leaving out of view that which lies nearest, he loses himself in *aliena*. The understanding has an ever present

theme in wisdom, which arrests his attention, and on which he concentrates himself; but the fool flutters about fantastically from one thing to another, and that which is to him precisely of least importance interests him the most.

The series of proverbs, ver. 25-xviii. 2, begins and closes in the same way as the preceding, and only ver. 26 stands by itself without apparent connection.

Ver. 25. This verse begins connecting itself with ver. 21:

A grief to his father is a foolish son,
And a bitter woe for her that bare him.

The *אפ. λεγ.* מָרַר is formed from מָרַר (to be bitter, properly harsh), as מָרַם from מָרַם. The Syr. and Targ. change the subst. into participles; some codd. also have מָרַר (after the forms מָרַח, מָרַב, מָרַר, מָרַע), but as may be expected in 25a, מָרַעִים. The dat. obj. instead of the accus. may be possible; the verse immediately following furnishes a sufficient example of this.

Ver. 26 Also to inflict punishment on the righteous is not good;

This, that one overthrows the noble on account of his rectitude.

Does the נָם [also] refer to a connection from which the proverb is separated? or is it tacitly supposed that there are many kinds of worthless men in the world, and that one from among them is brought forward? or is it meant, that to lay upon the righteous a pecuniary punishment is also not good? None of all these. The proverb must have a meaning complete in itself; and if pecuniary punishment and corporeal punishment were regarded as opposed to one another, 26b would then have begun with אִם כִּי (*quanto magis percutere ingenuos*). Here it is with נָם as at xx. 11, and as with אִם at 11a, and לָךְ at xiii. 10: according to the sense, it belongs not to the word next following, but to לְצַדִּיק; and עֲנִיֹּשׁ (whence *inf.* עֲנִיֹּשׁ, as xxi. 11, with the *ā* in ע, cf. also אָבֵר, xi. 10, for אָבֵר) means here not specially to inflict a pecuniary fine, but generally to punish, for, as in *mulctare*, the meaning is generalized, elsewhere with the accus., Deut. xxii. 19, here to give to any one to undergo punishment. The ruler is the servant of God, who has to preserve rectitude, εἰς ὁρμηγῆν τῷ κακὸν πρῶσσουντι (Rom. xiii. 14). It is not good when he makes his power to punish to be felt by the innocent as well as by the guilty.

In 26b, instead of הַיָּשׁוּם, the proverb is continued with הַיָּשׁוּם; לֹא-טוֹב, which is to be supplied, takes the *inf.* alone when it precedes, and the *inf.* with לְ when it follows, xviii. 5, xxviii. 21,

xxi. 9 (but cf. xxi. 19). הַכּוֹחַ is the usual word for punishment by scourging, Deut. xxv. 1-3, cf. 2 Cor. xi. 24, N. T. *μαστιγοῦν*, *δέρειν*, Rabb. מַכּוֹחַ, strokes, or מַלְקוֹת from מַלָּךְ, *vapulare*, to receive stripes. נְרִיבִים are here those noble in disposition. The idea of נְרִיב fluctuates between *generosus* in an outward and in a moral sense, wherefore עַל-יִצָּר, or rather עַל-יִצָּר, is added; for the old editions, correct mss., and e.g. also Soncin. 1488, present עַל (vid. Norzi). Hitzig incorrectly explains this, "against what is due" (יִצָּר, as xi. 24); also Ps. xciv. 20, עַל-יִצָּר does not mean *κατὰ προστάγματος* (Symmachus), but *ἐπὶ προστάγματι* (LXX. and Theod.), on the ground of right = *prætextu juris* (Vatabl.). Thus עַל-יִצָּר means here neither against nor beyond what is due, but: on the ground of honourable conduct, making this (of course mistakenly) a lawful title to punishment; Aquila, *ἐπὶ εὐθύτητι*, cf. Matt. v. 10, *ἔνεκεν δικαιοσύνης*. Besides, for עַל after הַכּוֹחַ, the causal signification lies nearest Num. xxii. 32, cf. Isa. i. 5 (עַל-מַחַ, on account of anything). If the power of punishment is abused to the punishing of the righteous, yea, even to the corporeal chastisement of the noble, and their straight, i.e. conscientious, firm, open conduct, is made a crime against them, that is not good—it is perversion of the idea of justice, and an iniquity which challenges the penal rectitude of the Most High (Eccles. v. 7 [8]).

Ver. 27 He that keepeth his words to himself bath knowledge,
And the cool of temper is a man of understanding.

The first line here is a variation of x. 19b. The phrase יָדַע דָּעָה (here and at Dan. i. 4) means to possess knowledge (*novisse*); more frequently it is יָדַע בִּינָה, e.g. iv. 1, where יָדַע has the inchoative sense of *noscere*. In 27b the *Kerî* is יִקְרִירוֹחַ. Jerome translates it *pretiosi spiritus*, the *Venet.* *τίμιος τὸ πνεῦμα*. Rashi glosses יָקָר here, as at 1 Sam. iii. 1, by מַכּוֹחַ (thus to be read after codd.), *retentus spiritu*; most interpreters remark that the spirit here comes into view as expressing itself in words. It is scarcely correct to say that יִקְרִירוֹחַ could designate one who is sparing in his words, but יִקְרִירוֹחַ is, according to the fundamental conception of the verb יָקָר, *gravis spiritu* (Schultens), of a dignified, composed spirit; it is a quiet seriousness proceeding from high conscientiousness, and maintaining itself in self-control, which is designated by this word. But the *Chethib* יִקְרִירוֹחַ presents almost the same description of character. קָר from קָרַר (of the same root as יָקָר) means to be firm, unmoveable, *καρτερόν εἶναι*, hence to be congealed,

frozen, cold (cf. *frigus* with *rigere*, *rigor*), figuratively to be cold-blooded, passionless, quiet, composed (Fl.); cf. post-bibl. קָרָה רִיחַ (Arab. *kurrat 'ain*), cooling = refreshing, ἀνάψυξις (Acts iii. 20).¹ Whether we read קָר or קָר, in any case we are not to translate *rarus spiritu*, which, apart from the impossibility of the expression, makes 27b almost a tautological repetition of the thought of 27a. The first line recommends bridling of the tongue, in contrast to inconsiderate and untimely talk; the second line recommends coldness, i.e. equanimity of spirit, in contrast to passionate heat.

Ver. 28 continues the same theme, the value of silence:

Even a fool, when he keeps silence, is counted wise;
When he shutteth his mouth, discreet.

The subj. as well as the pred. of the first line avail for the second. טָטַח, *obturare*, *occludere*, usually of closing the ear, is here transferred to the mouth. The *Hiph.* הִתְקַרֵּית means *mutum agere* (cf. Arab. *klrs*, *mutum esse*), from הִקְרִית, which, like κωφός, passes from the meaning *surdus* to that of *mutus* (Fl.). The words of Job xiii. 5, and also those of Alexander: *si tacuisses sapiens mansisses*, are applicable to fools. An Arab. proverb says, "silence is the covering of the stupid." In the epigrammatical hexameter,

πᾶς τις ἀπαίδευτος φρονιμώτατός ἐστι σιωπῶν,

the word σιωπῶν has the very same syntactical position as these two participles.²

¹ "He has made my eye glowing" (*askhn*, cf. שִׁחִין) is in Arab. equivalent to "he has deeply troubled me." The eye of the benevolent is *bārid*, and in the Semitic manner of expression, with deep psychological significance, it is said that the tears of sorrow are hot, but those of joy cold.

² Cf. C. Schulze's *Die bibl. Sprichwörter* (1860), p. 60 f.

END OF VOL. I.