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Contemporary Views on the Doctrine of God

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I

THEOLOGY stands today at the crossroads. This had been made evident, among other things, by the way in which John A. T. Robinson's book, *Honest to God*,¹ has been widely acclaimed, not only (or even primarily) within the theological world, but by the general reading public. In this book, Robinson reacts to an outmoded spatialized concept of a God "out there," and, as an alternative, proposes what is essentially a Tillichian solution in terms of the Ground of being. Consequently, in order to consider Robinson's proposal in greater detail, and therefore to see precisely what is implied in his thesis, our purpose in this article is twofold. In the first place, we shall turn to Tillich himself, upon whose theological writings Robinson, in his reformulation of the "ancient truths," so heavily depends, for it is Tillich who speaks through the pages of Robinson's book. In the second place, our purpose will be to show that the Tillichian solution is not an adequate answer to the impasse in which modern theology finds itself; rather, there is yet another alternative to be considered. Nels Ferré, because he supports a modified supernaturalist position, and because he offers the category of personal Spirit, will be considered as the leading representative of this proposed theological position.

From the very start, the two theologians under consideration—Paul Tillich and Nels Ferré—diverge in the ultimate categories which they proffer as adequate to an understanding of the doctrine of God. Tillich's category, under which all others are subsumed, is God as Being-itself. In the adumbration of this category, Tillich speaks of God as "the infinite power of being which resists the threat of nonbeing."² From this central assertion, Tillich proceeds to elaborate his theological system. The key, therefore, to an understanding of the doctrine of God (or perhaps we might better speak, as does Tillich, of "the idea of God") is Being-itself.

Ferré, in conscious opposition to this position, asserts that the category of being, i.e., substance philosophy, is a totally inadequate concept by which to define the God of the Christian faith.³ He maintains that such a category is alien to the spirit of the Christian faith and, hence, any attempt to define

1. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963.

2. Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 64.

3. Nels F. S. Ferré, *The Christian Understanding of God* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), p. 11.

God in such a concept is not only to do injustice to the Christian understanding of God, but unnecessarily to distort the revelation which we have received of him. Within the theological enterprise, Ferré has set about the task of redefining the traditional categories (including the much discussed category of the supernatural) in the light of what he considers to be the ultimate category, i.e., God as Agape. Only thus, he feels, do the traditional categories of being, non-being, becoming, personality, and spirit become illuminated. Let us therefore proceed to a closer examination of the categories of being and non-being so that we may get a clearer picture of this area of divergence between the theologies of Tillich and Ferré.

II

In his essay on "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion,"⁴ Tillich sets forth his arguments for the use of the ontological type of philosophy of religion as over against the cosmological. In this presentation he posits what he considers to be the only valid way of approaching God. In the ontological type, man, discovering God, discovers something that is identical with himself although, to be sure, something which infinitely transcends himself, something from which he is estranged but from which he never has been nor can be separated. Man, in discovering God, discovers himself. Thereby the emphasis is placed upon the immediacy of the knowledge of God. The cosmological type of philosophy of religion, on the other hand, emphasizes the *diastasis* character which exists between God and man, and, Tillich is careful to point out, the cosmological type requires the ontological as its basis; otherwise a destructive cleavage takes place between philosophy and religion.

This philosophical essay of Tillich's is significant, for it indicates the way in which he develops his doctrine of God. Theological concepts, i.e., man's attempts not only to articulate but also to correlate the questions which arise out of his finitude and the answers which he receives in his revelatory experiences, are rooted in what Tillich calls the "mystical *a priori*";⁵ that is, an intuitive awareness of something which transcends the subject-object cleavage. Added to this "mystical *a priori*" is the criterion of the Christian message. Here we are confronted with Tillich's basic apologetic method of correlation, in which question and answer are both independent and interdependent. They are independent because the answer is neither implied in the question nor the question implied in the answer; they are interdependent because each seeks the other. This relationship is important to keep in mind as we watch the development of Tillich's doctrine of God.

That man is aware of his potential participation in the infinite is to be seen in the state of being ultimately concerned. God, for Tillich, is that which concerns man ultimately. God is the answer to the question implied

4. Paul Tillich, *Theology of Culture*, ed. Robert C. Kimball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959).

5. *Systematic Theology*, I, p. 9

in man's very finitude,⁶ and, whatever it may be, that which is of ultimate concern for man is his god. The question which Tillich asks is: What is the *content* of this ultimate concern? "*Our ultimate concern is that which determines our being or not-being.*"⁷ Being is the ultimate question of man; that which answers man's question is God as Being-itself, in the sense of the power of being or the power to conquer non-being which ever threatens man.

Tillich consistently and emphatically denies that God as Being is something, a being higher than other beings, a being magnified infinitely into a Being. He rejects this view on two grounds. In the first place, such a concept would lead to a positing of another world above or beyond this world, a supranatural world. Such a view for Tillich is nothing more than primitive or pagan superstition and ignorance. In the second place, God cannot be considered a Being because he is the ground of, and power for, everything that has being. God is not a Being; he is Being-itself. For this reason, Tillich will not refer to God or to man's ultimate concern as *the* ultimate, *the* unconditioned, *the* universal, *the* infinite, but as ultimate, unconditional, total, and infinite. This does not imply the elimination of objects; quite to the contrary, for objects act as mediums through which the Ground of being is made manifest. Anything can become a medium to the Ground of being in so far as it points beyond itself. We shall see how important this relationship between objects and the Ground of being is in Tillich's understanding of the holy.

Before proceeding to a direct comparison of Tillich's doctrine of God with that of Ferré, we should consider the former's use of symbol because of the central place it holds in his theology as a whole.

Firstly, therefore, whatever man knows about a finite object, because that object participates in God as its ground, man knows about God. Secondly, however, because God is wholly other (or, in Tillich's words, ecstatically transcendent) the finite cannot be applied to God.⁸ The unity of these consequences in our knowledge of God is that which Tillich means when he speaks of the symbolic knowledge of God. The symbol, in other words, participates in that to which it points, but the symbol is not to be equated with the reality.

Is there any point at which our language is non-symbolic? This is a moot point for Tillich. After vacillating somewhat on this question, Tillich comes to the conclusion that, on the one hand, there is a non-symbolic element in our image of God, namely, that he is Being-itself; and that, on the other hand, there is a symbolic element present, namely, that he is the highest being in which everything that exists in the most perfect way.⁹ Thus we have a symbol for that which is not symbolic, i.e., Being-itself. This relation-

6. *Ibid.*, p. 211.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

8. Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 9.

9. *Theology of Culture*, p. 61.

ship of symbol and reality is significant, especially in regard to the question with which we must deal: do we have any real knowledge of the Ground of being?

Ferré, as we indicated at the beginning of this article, considers the philosophical category of Being inadequate to comprehend the Christian understanding of God. The ultimate category which he puts forth is that of love, or Agape. His purpose, consequently, is to show the adequacy of the Agape category and to indicate the way in which it illumines the traditional categories.

One of the traditional categories with which he deals in his exposition is Love as being, in which he defines love as "the form of being which acts out of complete concern not only for all, in all dimensions of life, and the conditions which sustain, promote and enhance life, but also for ever new life and new conditions of life."¹⁰ Furthermore, love is by nature creative of good and seeks to share of itself. Love is the supreme purpose which remains self-sustaining while being other-concerned. Love as ultimate both is and is not; that is to say, it is self-existing and self-directing energy but, at the same time, it requires an object. Non-being therefore is defined not in Tillich's terms as that which continually threatens being, or as the loss of being, but, in positive terms, as the condition for, and the occasion of, love as being.¹¹ Thus while not making non-being a form of being, Ferré organically connects it with love within the categories of reality and explanation. For Tillich, although Being-itself does not contain non-being within itself (as differentiated from finite existence which contains a mixture of being and non-being), Being nevertheless continually conquers the realm of non-being. Being and non-being are placed over against each other, while for Ferré non-being is the pre-condition for being as love, or for being as becoming, and indicates an unlimited capacity for creativity. In the latter's theology, there is no sense of an ultimate struggle between two opposing realms; rather, non-being allows love to express its nature.

Within the realm of finitude, Tillich insists upon positing a dialectical participation of non-being within being. The ontological character of non-being is proved, he claims, in the existential knowledge that man can make negative judgments. He further insists that unless there is a dialectical participation of non-being in being there can be no world. Tillich, in the same light, discovers no adequate way of dealing with the problem of evil outside of positing a dialectical negativity in God himself. By positing this dialectical negativity Tillich places meaning and the abyss as the two ultimate factors in his theological system.

Ferré, on the other hand, sees evil as the necessary medium and method for learning. Evil thus is not seen to be something which is outside or beyond God's direct control. It is rather to be viewed within the total pedagogical process in which man responsibly learns to accept and share God's love.

10. *The Christian Understanding of God*, pp. 15f.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

Two of the three issues which Ferré discusses in his consideration of Tillich's theology in *Searchlights on Contemporary Theology* necessarily must receive our attention in this article. They are the issues of (1) a personal God and (2) supernaturalism.

III

The question of a personal God is of crucial significance in a comparative study of Tillich and Ferré, for there is a wide divergence between their theologies at this point. Tillich, on the one hand, strongly opposes the term *person* as applied to God because *person* implies individuation and is to be seen only under the conditions of existential estrangement. God (or Being-itself) transcends the distinctions between essence and existence. With regard to the Ground of being, one should speak of the transpersonal category,¹² a category which for Tillich affirms the significance of the personal without in any way limiting God. While man can experience the holy in and through any object (as long as that object negates itself and becomes transparent to the Ground of being), the holy cannot be less than the receiver is. The holy thus cannot be a-personal, for man cannot be ultimately concerned about anything which is less than he is. But we cannot stop at the personal level in our assertion of God, for God infinitely transcends this category known by us. The more adequate category for Tillich consequently is the transpersonal, as that which includes not only the personal but also the impersonal.

On the other hand, while appreciating the strength inherent in such a position, Ferré (who holds the position that God is personal Spirit) raises some crucial questions as to the implications in Tillich's stand.¹³ One such question is this: Would not the world of ultimate reality and our world of experience be more adequately correlated if the personal were seen to be in charge of the impersonal? And does not the fullest explanation of our existence as a whole demand not some undifferentiated unity, but the light and power of the selective, revelatory personal Event of the Christian faith?

In the light of his analysis, Ferré develops his doctrine of God in terms of personal Spirit, a category which does not involve the limitation of localization. For Tillich, the Ultimate would be limited or conditioned by the presence of relations, and such is beyond the realm of possibility. The Ultimate is the Unconditional (*das Unbedingte*) and therefore cannot enter into relationship with that which is conditioned. God as Being-itself is the ground of every relation; in his life all relations are present beyond the distinctions between potentiality and actuality, but these are relations within the divine life and not relations between God and finite life. God is unable to enter into relations with the finite because he cannot be conditioned by

12. Paul Tillich, *Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955), pp. 21-8.

13. Nels F. S. Ferré, *Searchlights on Contemporary Theology* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), pp. 123f.

the actualization of finite freedom. God therefore can only symbolically be spoken of as being in relation with the finite. Having accepted Tillich's presuppositions, i.e., God as Being-itself, one must admit that his conclusions are valid; but if God is personal Spirit the presence of relations naturally follows from the creative, outgoing nature of love. Ferré, while not accepting the limitations which Tillich places on the category of the personal, is not forced to move into the Transpersonal realm in which the personal is absorbed into an undifferentiated Ground of being (although, certainly, Tillich insists that the transpersonal is more positive than that).

Ferré insists on the personal category, not in the anthropomorphic sense in which Tillich feels one must view it, but in terms of purposes which are selective. Over against Tillich's undifferentiated unity—where God is the Ground of being and meaning as we know it—Ferré answers with the God of Love who must be personal, for "he is the most high and the most real, and love is most high and most real only in personal beings and relations."¹⁴ So, whereas for Tillich the Absolute can be said to be related to the world in a symbolic sense, Ferré strongly advocates not only the ability of the Absolute to relate himself to the world in a positive way but in fact the reality of the relationship which the Absolute, through his initiative, has established. The question as to *how* this relationship has been established may be considered symbolic but not the question of the relationship itself.¹⁵ In this way, Ferré's category of the personal allows for a more positive approach than does Tillich's category of the transpersonal. Despite the correlation which we shall see that Tillich makes between the subjective and objective polarities within the ontological structure, man ends with no real knowledge of the infinite. Ferré, however, insists that no matter how minute our knowledge may be in proportion to the totality of the richness of God as Agape, nevertheless we can "picture" at least reliable indications that can be filled out and corrected by growth in understanding.¹⁶ He sums up the relationship between God and the created world very succinctly: "The infinite Love by his very nature produces the finite and perfects it as well, not by its becoming infinite but by God's own pedagogical accommodation in love to the finite and by his final achieving for and in the finite its perfect relationship to him and within its own nature."¹⁷

It is to be seen that, in Ferré's theology, God is personal as Spirit. Whereas the category of personal is to be seen in terms of purpose and encounter, the category of Spirit is to be seen in terms of omnipresence and interpenetration. God as Spirit is the form of God; God as Agape is the content. Spirit interpenetrates and gives freedom. God is personal and as such we encounter him, but as Spirit he interpenetrates without robbing us of our freedom. Thus, the most inclusive definition of God is Spirit.

14. *The Christian Understanding of God*, p. 30.

15. Nels F. S. Ferré, *Reason in Religion* (New York: Thomas Nelson, 1963), pp. 85-89, in which he develops various ways in which God is said to be related to the world

16. *Ibid.*, p. 85

17. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

Spirit is not limited to locality, for it is everywhere, without being everything. It is at this point that Ferré sees the truth of the transpersonal position. God is not everywhere present as personal, but, although he is present in different ways, the reality is the same. It is spirit that gives ultimate cohesiveness to being, uniting being and non-being. While, for Tillich, existence cannot be predicated of being, Ferré maintains that it is only in becoming that being truly becomes what it is. Starting, therefore, with Being necessarily precludes the possibility of God fully participating in the realm of human history in such a way that there is something more than a manifestation of power and meaning. Ferré here finds Tillich's doctrine of God to be restrictive.

Spirit is an important concept for Tillich, but it is viewed in quite a different light from that of Ferré. Spirit, for the former, is connected with the polarity which exists between subjectivity and objectivity. The basic ontological structure, he asserts, cannot be derived. It must be accepted as revelation.

Tillich's ontological analysis deals with the ontological elements which constitute the basic self and the structure of being. By the affinity of its reason to the reasonable structure of the world the self is related to the world; by finite freedom it transcends itself and the world and therefore is separated from the world. This structure includes polarities between individualization and participation, dynamics and form, freedom and destiny.¹⁸ In existence these polarities struggle against each other. In the divine life these polarities are without tension. Spirit then is "the unity of the ontological elements and the *telos* of life."¹⁹ God is spirit. This for Tillich is the most embracing, direct, and unrestricted symbol for the divine life, a symbol which, because it includes within it all the ontological elements, does not need to be balanced with another symbol. The spirit as the unity of power and meaning is, in one sense, the whole of the divine life.

Here we see most clearly how Tillich has made abyss and meaning the two ultimate factors in his system. This is important to keep in mind, for it determines his approach to many other theological problems, such as evil and freedom.

IV

One of the most crucial issues in contemporary theology, and of decisive importance for the man seeking for a faith in the modern day, is the issue of supernaturalism (or what Tillich terms supranaturalism). If supernaturalism is to be equated with the acceptance of a three-decker universe, both theologians reject its validity for the Christian faith. Tillich, at least in part, bases his rejection of the supernatural upon such an equation. Is the equation necessary?

Ferré likens Tillich's position (which the latter calls ecstatic naturalism) to the Kantian transcendentalism, as over against the ultimate reality of a

18. *Systematic Theology*, I, pp. 168-86. 19. *Ibid.*, p. 249

transcendent realm.²⁰ Working with the world which we know, Tillich finds certain principles of validity which are available for our appropriation.

The use of symbols is significant at this point. Tillich, in his doctrine of God, is careful to stay clear both of an objectivist position that equates knowledge with reality and also of a subjectivist position in which there is no objective counterpart in reality to the symbols employed.²¹ Tillich writes as follows:

Man symbolizes that which is his ultimate concern in terms taken from his own being. From the subjective side of the polarities he takes—or more exactly, receives—the material with which he symbolizes the divine life. He sees the divine life as personal, dynamic, and free. He cannot see it in any other way, for God is man's ultimate concern, and therefore he stands in analogy to that which man himself is. But the religious mind—theologically speaking, man in the correlation of revelation—always realizes implicitly, if not explicitly, that the other side of the polarities also is completely present in the side he uses as symbolic material.²²

It is true as Tillich says that the only way by which man can speak of God is through symbols, and these symbols arise out of the experience of man himself. However, at the same time, it must be noted that the objective counterpart is just as truly a reality as the subjective side.

The objective reality of which Tillich speaks is the ground and power of being and meaning—not what most Christians would find to be a very adequate concept of the God of revelation. Certainly Ferré finds this concept inadequate—good so far as it goes in its concept of God as Being-itself, namely, to resist non-being, and to make for harmony of being, but lacking in adequacy to explain experience meaningfully or to account for the new within the cosmic process. Consequently, Ferré speaks in terms of “the moreness and otherness beyond ordinary experience.” For Ferré, the highest arrival of meaningfulness best indicates the nature of cosmic process precisely by its being more and other than the process as a whole.²³ The new in experience witnesses to its source beyond previous process. It must be noted here that Tillich, in his rejection of the supernaturalist position, does not fall into the naturalist position, the latter of which, Tillich states, attempts to derive the answers rather than merely the questions from human existence. But, at the same time, Tillich's position is still far removed from the intent of the supernaturalist position which Ferré advocates.

Beginning, as he does, with Being-itself, Tillich is unable to accept any Incarnation as such (claiming that such an idea taken literally is purely nonsensical). This presupposition leads him to claim that there is no transcendent realm. He is willing only to say that Being-itself constitutes an unconditional demand for being and harmony of being.²⁴

20. *Searchlights on Contemporary Theology*, p. 126.

21. See Ferré's appraisal of Tillich's theology, *ibid.*, pp. 124–8.

22. *Systematic Theology*, I, p. 243.

23. Ferré, *Reason in Religion*, p. 79.

24. *Systematic Theology*, I, p. 190.

Ferré admits that the term "supernatural" is a limiting term,²⁵ although that which is implied in the concept is not itself inadequate, namely, the God who is beyond the cosmic process and who has initiative, purpose, and relations with the world. In the first place, the term suffers from the fact that it defines God in relation to the natural, as though, he says, the natural were more certain, or at least of primary reference. In the second place, the term suffers from being a spatial term. Even the word "dimensional" which, he suggests, might be more adequate is limited to the spatial category. The term he proposes as alternative to "inward" or "upward" is "spiritward,"²⁶ a word which is more helpful because it is less bound to the spatial category. In any case, we simply cannot escape in our language from these categories of space and time. We must rather break through the limitations which they impose and see the reality to which they point. God cannot be contained or explained by this world but he nevertheless acts directly and personally in it, guiding it to its consummation.

v

Before we conclude this article we should briefly consider the concept of the holy, because of the decisive role it plays in the theologies of both men.

Tillich places strong emphasis on the category of the holy. He states: "A doctrine of God which does not include the category of holiness is not only unholy but also untrue."²⁷ The divine is the holy. The holy, he goes on to say, is the *quality* of that which concerns man ultimately. Therefore, holiness is the most adequate basis we have for understanding the divine. Because the holy appears wherever the divine is manifest, any object can become transparent to the divine, and can thereby become holy. When a segment of reality is used as a symbol for the divine, this realm is elevated into the realm of the holy. The holy becomes demonic only when these objects establish *themselves* as holy.

Tillich rejects not only the purely moral interpretation of holiness, but also the distinction which is sometimes made between the clean and the unclean, holiness being identified with the clean. In such a correlation, holiness loses its depth, mystery, and numinous character; but where this dimension of depth is actualized, holiness appears. Tillich is thus in full accord with Otto's description of holiness in terms of *tremendum* and *fascinatum*, the former referring to that which is the abyss of man's being, and the latter referring to that which is his ground of being.

Ferré, moving from the central conviction that God is love, defines holiness fundamentally as "the intrinsic purity of His love whereby it rejects all else as an unworthy basis for fellowship *for the sake of those whom it wants to save.*"²⁸ God has created man for fellowship. A necessary correlate of

25. *Reason in Religion*, p. 94.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 178.

27. *Systematic Theology*, I, p. 215.

28. Nels F. S. Ferré, *The Christian Faith* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942), p. 169. Cf. *The Christian Understanding of God*, pp. 114-118; Nels F. S. Ferré, *Christ and the Christian* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), pp. 168-70.

fellowship is genuine freedom which allows man to choose or to reject God's purpose for him, despite the fact that it is only in the acceptance of it that man's full freedom is found. Because of the purity of his love, God rejects as inadequate any basis for fellowship that falls short of Agape. In terms of function, holiness is love's negative work in relation to sin, working in man's life to bring him to the realization of his need. Holiness is thus God's left hand, separating unrighteous man from him who is holy love, while God's right hand is extended to man, that in him man might find his fulfilment. This causes a functional tension in God between his holiness and his love, a tension which can be released only by the Atonement. God longs for reconciliation between himself and man, an act which he alone can initiate and, with man's response, fulfil.

VI

In this study we have been confronted by two very diverse approaches to the doctrine of God. The view advocated by Tillich derives from what he calls the "ontic shock," or the existential realization of non-being, and is based upon the assertion that God therefore is the Ground of being, the power for being, or Being-itself. If we begin our appraisal of Tillich from the faith-stance of the Christian, many problems are raised with regard to his doctrine of God, some of which have been discussed in this article. As an analysis of experience, however, Tillich's theological system is of inestimable value, offering hope for, and a real meaning to, the whole of our historic existence.

Tillich's emphasis upon the abysmal nature of God points to the threatening, judging character of God. It is there ever to remind us that he is God and not man. Although unable rationally to grasp it, or adequately to articulate it, man has at times the existential experience of what Tillich calls the abyss character of God. Such an experience prevents too careless a handling of the Holy. The abyss is, however, not an ontological category, as Tillich would make it. Rather it is the reality of God's holiness over against man's unrighteousness. Thus, contrary to Tillich's conviction, the abyss character of God should not be allowed to become the dominant category of God's nature, for it is the Christian affirmation (and here I must stand with Ferré over against Tillich) that God has revealed his full nature to be one of Love, even though that which we know of him is in actuality a very minute segment of his reality.

Tillich constantly reminds us that as human beings we must of necessity use human language and concepts which are bound to the categories of time and space. These concepts are very inadequate to express that which is beyond spatial limitations. Therefore, we must ever be reminded that the concepts we use to express our experience of reality are inadequate, and that we must never limit God to these concepts. Nevertheless, at the same time, we are firmly convinced that concepts can at least point to, and participate in, reality.

The issues are before the Christian Church today, perhaps in clearer terms than ever before, and we within the Church are being forced to find new ways in which to interpret and to express to the world the faith which we hold. This is not simply a matter of semantics, of the *word* to be used in reference to the ultimate—whether it be God as the Ground of being or as personal Spirit; it is rather the *content* of that word. To provide that content, Bishop Robinson has indicated the need for a radical recasting of traditional categories.²⁹ In that direction he has supported Tillich's rejection of naturalism, pantheism, and supranaturalism. Naturalism is rejected "because the Christian's faith cannot rest in the capacities of man."³⁰ Pantheism is rejected because it gives no place to freedom or to moral evil.³¹ Supranaturalism is rejected because it clings to an outmoded mythological "superworld."³² The solution to the dilemma in which modern theology finds itself, Robinson believes, is to be found in Tillich's position of the God "beyond naturalism and supranaturalism," of God as the ground and power of being and meaning. Thus, Tillich's God is the real *within* whatever has reality.

In this article, I have questioned the adequacy of the Tillichian solution which Robinson proposes, seriously doubting its ability to deal in a most meaningful way with man's ultimate quest for authentic existence. I have proposed, as a more positive approach, the alternative of God as personal Spirit. Although, to be sure, there are positions other than the two which I have sought to illumine in this article, nevertheless, the alternatives which the Church has before it are basically those which have been discussed here.

What categories best illumine the Church's faith? In answering this question, Tillich and Ferré have grappled with the question (among others) of a personal God and the question of the supernatural. And the issue is presented to us: Which category—that of Being, that of Love, or perhaps still another—most adequately enables us to account for the world which we experience and yet, at the same time, provides us with a definable content to evaluate, order, and direct the rest of our experience? As an ultimate category, it seems to me, that of personal Spirit rather than that of Being is more adequate to throw light on, and inform, our life as a whole and the various problems with which we, in our day-to-day experience, must deal.

29. *Honest to God*, p. 7.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 128.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 130.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 132.