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Christian Realism and Nuclear War

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THE DILEMMA facing Christians in relation to warfare is now more acute than it has ever been. Up to the beginning of the nuclear age the Church had to reckon with the tension between those who saw in the New Testament a clear injunction to uncompromising pacifism, either on the grounds that killing or using force or both were wrong, and those who believed, with St. Augustine,¹ that in a fallen world conflict is inevitable and that it is the duty of the Christian to resist violence and aggression, even to the extent of being willing to take other lives should the need arise. To many, pacifism appeared to be an individualistic avoidance of political responsibility, only defensible as a quasi-monastic withdrawal from the world: a vocation perhaps for a few, but not a viable political policy which Christians could urge upon the state. Whatever the horrors of war, it was possible to argue on moral grounds that in certain circumstances it was right to take up arms, the foundation for this position being the doctrine of "the just war," for centuries an integral part of Catholic moral teaching.

I. THE CONCEPT OF THE JUST WAR

The invention of modern methods of mass destruction has created an entirely new situation which faces Christians with the challenge to rethink their position on a realistic basis. While individualistic pacifism is still likely to appeal only to a few, the majority of Christians look for a viable *political policy* which they can both defend and advocate; and this seems to be completely lacking. Hence the prevailing confusion throughout the Christian world. The problem is that the whole notion of "the just war" has been rendered entirely obsolete by recent scientific inventions. This is obvious when we realize that the concept has traditionally depended on four assumptions: first, that the cause itself, the *occasio belli*, could be shown to be just; second, that hostilities would be undertaken to secure limited objectives; third, that the means employed would be consonant with those objectives and with broad ethical standards called the laws of warfare; and fourth, that it was practicable, as well as justifiable, to defend one's country against aggression. Whatever validity these assumptions may once have had, none of them can any longer be made without radical qualification.

The first, the justice of the cause, remains plausible only so long as a country which resorts to hostilities maintains that it is the victim of unprovoked aggression or else goes to the aid of another nation whose sovereignty

1. Cf. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, VII, xxx.

has been similarly violated. Quite apart from the difficulty of defining aggression in a complex international situation,² a just cause is now no longer seen as sufficient reason for engaging in armed conflict. National self-preservation is coming to be the sole criterion, as can be seen from a consideration of the inaction of the Western powers at the time of the Hungarian crisis in 1956. Where could a juster cause have been found? And yet such are the horrors of modern war that no government was willing to take the risk of being embroiled in hostilities when its own security was not directly threatened.

The argument is taken a stage further by Professor Macgregor when he declares that once a government has taken the decision to wage war, those who claim to be ruled by ethical standards are swept along by the tide. Criticizing the views of Reinhold Niebuhr, Macgregor asks: "How many Christian non-pacifists of Niebuhr's complexion would feel bound to take up arms against their own country if the Law of Love in its discriminating function should ever decide that the enemy had the juster cause?"³ Without necessarily identifying ourselves with Macgregor's uncompromising pacifism, we are forced to admit that his question shows how insecure is the position of those who still believe it is possible to justify hostilities on the basis of a righteous cause.

The second assumption is equally open to criticism. The world is far more of a unity than it once was, and what happens to one nation affects all the rest. If the major powers were to become involved in any conflict, war would necessarily be global, with the annihilation of the enemy or his unconditional surrender as the objective. Even when hostilities break out between smaller nations, no one can tell how far the conflagration will spread since the vested interests of the great powers will almost certainly be affected. The original dispute may be about some border incident or territorial infringement, but in the ensuing holocaust it is likely that this would be completely lost sight of, as in the Second World War when the integrity of Poland was the initial issue at stake. In limited areas of the world, such as South America, where the great powers are not so directly implicated as elsewhere, interrepublican conflict may still be confined to small proportions and relatively simple issues; but with growing economic interdependence amongst the nations, the regions of the earth to which the exception applies become fewer and farther between. For the vast majority of the human race the outbreak of war cannot be confidently restricted to a limited range or objective.⁴

The most far-reaching change of all is in the nature of the armaments which have now come to be at the disposal of the belligerents. Until recent

2. E.g., the question whether the British and French intervention in the Suez canal zone in 1956 was aggression or not.

3. G. H. C. Macgregor, *The Relevance of an Impossible Ideal* (London: Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1941), p. 38.

4. Contrast this situation with the attitude prevalent, for instance, in the eighteenth century, when wars of limited liability were favoured. Cf. Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity and History* (London: Bell, 1949), p. 138.

years arguments could be adduced with some degree of plausibility for the morality of using some types of weapons in contrast to others. Many will recall the controversy that raged over dum-dum bullets and poison gas in the War of 1914–1918, though even then the distinctions seemed somewhat academic to those who were engaged in the desperate business of trying to secure victory at all costs. When the world conflict was resumed in 1939, much was heard at the outset about the conventions of warfare and the ethics of precision-bombing as opposed to wanton attacks upon the civilian population by the *Luftwaffe*; but before long the allies were using every weapon at their disposal for the destruction of the enemy in his homeland, a policy which reached its climax in the obliteration bombing of German cities and the fateful raids with atomic explosives on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

That was the point of no return. It is instructive to look back on the attempts of Christian moralists, retreating from one position after another, to bring ethical principles to bear on the increasingly indiscriminate bombardment of the enemy.⁵ In the end the death knell was sounded for all such rationalization by the unleashing of the atomic bomb. That event faced the Church with perhaps the most urgent moral crisis of its history—a crisis the gravity of which has only been enhanced and underlined by the developments of more recent years. The stockpiling of nuclear weapons and the devising of ever more terrible and efficient means of mass destruction have rendered completely obsolete the belief that a major war could now be waged which depended on *any* distinction between the morality of one way of prosecuting it and another.⁶

The fourth assumption—that defence against aggression is practicable—is only just beginning to be questioned. The questioning stems from an awareness of the revolution that has been caused by the development of nuclear weapons. As long as conventional arms were employed on both sides, a nation could hope to defend itself more or less successfully; and this remained true until the end of the Second World War. But the invention of missiles with atomic warheads has altered the whole picture completely. It is now possible for a limited number of these deadly weapons to wipe out a whole population, and there is no known means of preventing their being delivered. The elaborate warning systems that are being constructed will give only a few minutes' notice of an impending attack, simply sufficient, if all goes well, to launch a counter-offensive; they will not prevent the destruction of the target area. Of what use is the retaliatory blow to those who are dead and whose homeland is in ruins? The truth is that the word "defence" has become obsolete in the context of atomic warfare.

5. E.g., Dr. J. H. Oldham's contributions to the *Christian News-Letter*, published in Great Britain during the Second World War.

6. The report of a commission of the Church of England entitled *The Church and the Atom* (London: The Press and Publications Board of the Church Assembly, 1948) is an example of a wholly unrealistic attempt to draw such a distinction, contradicted by a conclusion that in any case atomic weapons may have to be used for defensive purposes.

We can talk meaningfully about the nuclear deterrent or its possibilities for retaliation; but it is sheer delusion to speak of defence expenditure or defence strategy in this connection. The manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear bombs or warheads for long-range missiles has nothing to do with *defence*; these weapons are solely a deterrent, and could only be used in vindictive retaliation. The respectable and comforting word is preserved, partly to lull the general public into a false sense of security, and partly because no one—neither the politician nor the military expert nor the man in the street—wants to face the unpalatable facts.

We are confronted with a totally new situation—one which renders the traditional argument between pacifist and non-pacifist completely out of date. It is no longer a question of the ethics of using force or taking human life in defence of our own particular civilization (here we might well be on debatable ground if this were still a realistic appraisal of the situation). The question is rather whether the use of the methods of mass destruction is justified on any rational grounds whatsoever. It is puerile, in the light of what we now know, to advance analogies of the policeman and the burglar, or to ask whether a Christian is in duty bound to kill a homicidal maniac who attacks his wife and family. The point is whether we are justified in committing mass suicide and destroying the human race for any reason at all. What is going to be defended in any conceivable global war?

II. THE DEFENCE OF FREEDOM

When the justifiability of atomic warfare on any grounds is raised, the usual reply is that there are certain values enshrined in what is called "the Western way of life" which are of such fundamental importance that it is better to make any sacrifice than to live in a world from which they have been banished. Democracy and freedom are frequently claimed to be such absolutes, the loss of which would be tantamount to total degradation and extinction. Is this a position which Christians can accept? Surely not, unless it can be shown that democracy and freedom enshrine fundamental Christian principles, and that these principles can be defended by engaging in atomic warfare.

In spite of all that is said by politicians, journalists, and popular propagandists, it is far from clear that for most people these words are much more than emotionally charged slogans with little positive content. It would be generally conceded that democracy derives whatever degree of sanctity it has as a political system from the nature of freedom; but the word "freedom" is ambiguous in the extreme, and unless some precise meaning is given to it, a meaning which can be shown to have positive value, we shall simply be found to be making a noise about nothing. Here lies the peril of propaganda speeches which rest upon no clearly thought-out ideas—a point wittily illustrated by Canon J. O. Hannay, better known as the novelist George A. Birmingham. Commenting on the four freedoms which

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill offered to the world as the basis of a new international order at their historic meeting in 1941, Hannay suggests that all four of them are enjoyed by a bear in his cage at the zoo! He has freedom from want; he gets as much as he needs to eat. He has freedom from fear; no one is going to attack him. He has freedom of speech; he can growl to his heart's content. He has freedom of conscience because he is presented with no moral choice anyway! The facetious nature of the comment may conceal the important truth underlying it: a bear is only free in so far as he is a real bear, roaming in his own native mountains, living his natural life. By the same token man cannot really be called free unless he is living the life proper to a man; and most ideas of freedom do not begin to take this positive factor into account. Liberty is not to be equated with the absence of constraint, with the right to do just what we please. That is license and the corruption of manhood.

It is somewhat alarming to set the concepts of security and freedom as ordinarily understood in the Western world alongside St. Augustine's description of the *civitas Romana*, at a time when it was protected from the assaults of its enemies and its citizens were free to follow their own pursuits.

The worshippers and devotees of those gods of yours, [he writes] the men who gaily ape their vices and depravities, are not in the least disturbed to see their country wallow in a dismal swamp of immorality. "As long as it endures," they say, "as long as it prospers amid plenty and can boast of victory and enjoy the securities of peace, what do morals matter to us? What concerns us more is that everyone should become richer and richer so as to be able to bear the costs of his daily excesses, and to lord it over his economically weaker fellows."⁷

By the standards of many of our contemporaries Rome was both free and secure; but it was corrupt, a state *sine iustitia*. As Peter Drucker says,

Freedom is not so much a right as a duty. Real freedom is not freedom from something; that would be license. . . . To be "free" to choose between ice cream and plum pudding for dessert is not freedom, since no responsibility attaches to the decision.⁸

Freedom, if it is to have value, must be the opportunity to live a certain kind of life and build a certain kind of society which are manifestly worth emulating. And it is at this point that the Afro-Asian nations are inclined to be most sceptical. In the light of their own experience, freedom is associated with imperialism, colonialism, economic exploitation, and race discrimination—with prosperity for the few at the expense of the many. If freedom means the perpetuation and extension of what appears to them to be an unjust order of society, then they want none of it.

The issue is clearly put by Nicolas Berdyaev in describing the disillusionment of a young visitor to France from the Soviet Union: he found no real freedom there because it seemed impossible to change things, to make a new way of life. "The so-called freedom there was of the kind that leaves

7. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, II, xx.

8. Peter Drucker, *The Future of Industrial Man* (New York: Day, 1942), pp. 149, 156.

everything unchanged; every day was like its predecessor; you might turn out a government every week but that altered nothing; and so the young man who came from Russia was bored in France."⁹ Such criticism needs to be taken seriously by the Western nations. Many of those who are reasonably affluent and benefit from the comforts of a technological age may be content with the *status quo*; they may be anxious to defend their "freedom" to enjoy life in their own way, undisturbed by the claims of others; but the vast majority of the world's population does not possess this "freedom" and is not content with the *status quo* at all. That is why the Soviet Union's championship of the underprivileged is rapidly capturing the Asian and African continents. Cynical and unscrupulous as their statesmen may be, with a record of imperialism that darkens the pages of modern history, the Soviets yet appear to many as the champions of all the oppressed peoples. Whether we like it or not, despite our programs of economic aid, the Western nations are regarded in Asia and Africa as primarily concerned with the preservation of their own privileges, whereas the Soviet Union, for all its faults, does seem to offer some hope of alleviating the lot of the depressed masses of humanity.

Now this challenge is going to be met only by a constructive valuation of human beings, by an unshakeable resolve to accord to all men, irrespective of their race, colour, or creed, the maximum freedom for the proper expression of their individuality. And how can this be reconciled with the waging of atomic warfare involving the mass destruction of whole populations? This is to turn "freedom" into a shibboleth without positive moral content, and to offer what Professor Herbert Butterfield has called "vast human sacrifices to abstract nouns."¹⁰ It is to destroy democracy and freedom in the supposed defence of these principles, annihilating morals in the name of morals.

For the Christian this line of action is nothing less than the complete evacuation of the ground on which he stands. It is not just a question of modifying his principles to meet the exigencies of circumstances or adapting them to the relativities of the human predicament; *it is their total abandonment*. For what possible meaning can be given to the high valuation of the individual, if he may be exterminated without any regard to his individuality at all? The use of force as such is not at issue here, or even the morality of taking human life. Coercion is a necessary element in restraining evil and in holding society together. But if force is to be used, it must be justifiable in the light of the ends it is designed to achieve; and for the Christian these ends must include the ultimate welfare of the enemy.¹¹ If, therefore, as Tillich says, "It is not compulsion which is unjust, but a compulsion which destroys the object of compulsion instead of working towards its ful-

9. Nicolas Berdyaev, *The Origin of Russian Communism* (London: Bles, 1937), p. 183.

10. Butterfield, *Christianity and History*, p. 130.

11. Cf. Herbert Butterfield, *Christianity, Diplomacy and War* (London: Epworth, 1953), p. 43.

filament,"¹² what defence is left for employing weapons of indiscriminate mass extermination?

Some would go further, and, returning to the pacifist position, argue that the principle enunciated precludes all forms of military operation without regard to any particular kind of armament; the hydrogen bomb is simply the extension of the explosive charge in a primitive rifle. This contention depends on the debatable thesis that the taking of life itself destroys a person's power of being and is a fundamental violation of the structure of the universe. That may be so, though it does not seem to be self-evident. Nevertheless, the line is crossed somewhere, and when the power of being in another has been manifestly violated by the complete overriding of individual claims through the policy of mass extermination, we are on entirely different ground; the principles of the universe are at stake, and with them our fidelity to the gospel. If, then, the essential thing to respect and conserve in another person is his power of being, we are surely driven to admit that modern methods of waging warfare must be outlawed not only in principle but also in practice, whatever the cost of doing so. My submission is that this is the point where the Christian is summoned to take an uncompromising stand.

III. BREAKING THE POLITICAL DEADLOCK

The immediate reaction to such a conclusion is that it takes no account of political realities. While it may be the calling of individual Christians to bear witness to the gospel by refusing to subscribe to policies that stand condemned in the light of spiritual values, this refusal (it will be said) could be no more than a gesture, unlikely to affect political decisions as such. No responsible government, we shall be told, could take any unilateral step which would weaken its own preparedness to meet armed aggression. Of course, everybody desires that the nations should disarm and the stocks of nuclear weapons should be destroyed; but until there is general agreement to do so under a satisfactory system of inspection and control we have to live with the cold war and maintain the existing arms race.

The trouble with this line of action, which appeals to most people as the only sensible and realistic procedure, is that it is not realistic enough. While we may hope for an easement of international tension through top-level conferences, the experience of the last forty years does not justify us in placing too much confidence in their outcome. At the time of writing it appears unlikely that either the United States or the Soviet Union will agree to scrap all nuclear weapons, and so we are left with the probability of an indefinite continuance of a world divided into armed camps with an almost inevitable holocaust somewhere along the road—a holocaust which would engulf practically the whole of the earth's population. To

12. Paul Tillich, *Love, Power and Justice* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 67.

acquiesce in such a suicidal policy can hardly be described as political realism.

Is there any alternative? Those who are convinced that the use of the weapons of mass destruction is never justifiable under any circumstances have to look for a fresh and viable approach to the problem of international conflict. Since politics is the realm of the possible within a given situation, the course of action open to people in different countries will vary. For example, Americans and Canadians do not face exactly the same predicament. As things stand, the former are committed to the preservation of what may be called the balance of terror, whereas Canadians, Europeans, Afro-Asians, and South Americans may be open to an alternative which could break the deadlock. I suggest that this alternative may be found in the idea of a third force, committed to the renunciation of nuclear weapons and tied to neither of the major nuclear powers. In other words, instead of trying to get into the nuclear club, as France has done, the rational policy is to try to keep out of it. That policy would mean a return to conventional armaments on the part of the NATO allies, carrying with it the implicit declaration that the price of purchasing anything with atomic weapons is too high. The objections to such a policy are obvious. There would immediately be an outcry in many quarters, particularly in the United States, that the Western alliance was falling to pieces, and that Europe and the Middle East were being left wide open to Soviet conquest. What hope would there be for relatively weak and conventionally armed forces to resist the invader from the East? It would be like shooting at tanks with bows and arrows. NATO strategy depends on nuclear weapons, and, without them, the cause of the West is lost.

So runs the argument. But there are several things to be said in reply. The cause is lost anyway if these weapons are used. What would be left of Britain, West Germany, or even Canada in that event? The appalling destruction which would inevitably follow baffles the imagination. Voices are being raised, even amongst the military experts, against the policy of tying defence strategy to the nuclear deterrent. Let us suppose that the worst was to happen, and that the Soviets, knowing that they had overwhelming military advantage, were to extend Communist rule to many more parts of the world. What then? At least they would find themselves confronted by hostile populations with the possibility of guerilla and underground activities prepared for by previously trained conventional units, the latter being designed in the first instance to deal with internal security and border disputes, and to serve as a task force in troubled areas at the time of the Suez crisis. More important, the aggressor would find himself faced with moral resistance, the resistance of those who had refused to use his weapons; and in the end his power would be seen to be brittle in the extreme. To quote a modern political theorist,

"No totalitarian state has yet been able to destroy all liberties—to close, for example, and to keep closed the doors of all the churches, to banish all untoward thoughts, to stifle the laughter and the ridicule and at times (as Hungary

in 1956 made clear) even the violence that fragmentarily erupts against those who pose as secular gods."¹³

Whatever the deprivations and sufferings—and for the majority they would probably be much less severe than those that would accompany and follow atomic war—there would at least be a chance of standing for eternal principles; and the issue would be in the hands of God.

No man has any right to say this kind of thing lightly without weighing the consequences for those whom he loves best. He does not commit himself alone; he has a measure of responsibility for others who are influenced by his conclusions or implicated in his decisions. Perhaps the most testing way of putting the dilemma is to ask whether we would prefer to see our own children subject to the tyranny of a Communist regime or involved in an atomic war to prevent it. The writer, deeply conscious of the grim character of the option, would choose the former, not just on the negative ground that it is the lesser of two evils, but because, whatever the pressures, moral principles could still be the foundation of life. Our children would still have the truth of God for which to contend, whereas with the other alternative, in addition to enduring the dreadful sufferings of atomic warfare, they would belong to a community which had renounced its moral heritage, even in the cause of self-defence. Everything worth living and dying for would thereby have been surrendered.

In fact, what I have described as the worst consequences that would follow from the adoption of a neutralist attitude in regard to nuclear weapons are extremely unlikely to happen. To suppose otherwise is to misunderstand Soviet policy altogether. The mistaken idea is abroad that the Communist leaders in the Kremlin are waiting and manœuvring for the opportunity to extend their rule throughout the world by military conquest, and that they are only prevented from doing so by the West's being armed to the teeth. Certainly, their aim is to bring the whole world under Communist government, but this is to be achieved through economic expansion and political subversion. They believe that the military threat originates in capitalist countries, and they see evidence for this view especially in the American bases in Europe and the Middle East. Astounding as it may seem to peace-loving citizens of the United States and other Western nations, the Soviets mean what they say when they talk about the danger of American aggression. Did not Lenin forecast that the time would come when capitalism, because of its inner contradictions, would be forced to launch an attack on the Communist stronghold? And that, coupled with the experience of the Nazi invasion, is why the Russians are so afraid of a rearmed Germany.

If the West is to combat the spread of Communism, it must understand both the ideology and the strategy of its opponents. Once the Soviets believed that they were delivered from the threat of a foreign attack—and the nuclear disarming of the NATO allies together with agreement on an

13. David Spitz, *Democracy and the Challenge of Power* (New York: Columbia, 1958), p. 167.

area of military disengagement in Central Europe would go far to achieve this—it is very doubtful indeed whether they would think it worth while to embark on ambitious military conquests. It might be possible for their armies to overrun Europe and the Middle East, but they would surely think twice about extending their occupational commitments in the light of their experience in the satellite countries. The events in Poland and Hungary were a humiliation that the Soviets are not likely to forget. The men in the Kremlin would almost certainly pursue another path, one that they are bound to believe would lead to ultimate success. Schooled as they are in Marxist dogma to a degree we are often prone to ignore, the cornerstone of their thinking is the inevitability of the internal collapse of the capitalist world through its economic contradictions. Therefore, for them the struggle is primarily an economic one to be fought with the weapons of internal subversion. It is here, not on the military front, that the real battle is engaged. It is here that, contrary to Soviet expectations, the West can win, but only if we are prepared to out-think them in terms of ideology, and base our policies on sound moral foundations.

We must, of course, be careful about transferring personal standards of conduct to the behaviour of nations in any naive way. Governments in their representative capacity almost inevitably act on a lower plane than that which is attainable by the individual. All the same, in seeking to be realistic, we are not bound to submit to the law of the jungle, and the possibility of genuine moral leadership on the international scene in a challenge waiting to be accepted.

Signs are not lacking that such a lead could be forthcoming. Pressure is being applied on the British government to renounce the nuclear deterrent, if need be unilaterally, and assume a real position of leadership in world affairs. Unfortunately, the United Kingdom has for so long adopted the role of junior partner in the American alliance that it is very difficult for her to extricate herself from this position. As for France, it was an act of sheer folly to explode an atomic bomb in the Sahara just after General de Gaulle had asserted his authority in Algeria and given promise of a more enlightened approach to the establishment of peace and justice in North Africa. At one stroke the moral advantage was lost, and France condemned herself to become a pale shadow of the United States. Perhaps the brightest hope lies with Canada, whose voice has come to be increasingly respected in the councils of the nations, and which possesses the inestimable advantage at the present time of having no nuclear weapons of her own. Moreover, a pattern of independent policy was set by Lester B. Pearson, when Minister for External Affairs, which was climaxed in the decisive influence he exercised at the time of the Suez crisis; and Howard Green has on the whole maintained this line under the Progressive Conservative government. Certainly, the Afro-Asian nations have more confidence in Canada than in any other country in the West. Here is an opportunity that should not be lost.

In the meantime it is the Christian responsibility to support whatever

proximate solutions to international disputes seem to be viable. Every step towards controlled disarmament or disengagement in areas where tension is high should be encouraged. There is no excuse for abdicating and refusing to become involved simply because the ideal, even the right, course of action from the Christian point of view is precluded through blindness or prejudice or the inherent difficulty of reaching agreement. Politics is the arena of what William Temple once called "balanced decisions and practical adjustments."¹⁴ While the biblical revelation must provide the perspective and afford the guiding rule, it is the art of diplomacy that will achieve the results. Experience does not lead us to expect too much. Niebuhr is surely right when he maintains that the concern of collective man for some centuries to come "is not the creation of an ideal society in which there will be uncoerced and perfect peace and justice, but a society in which there will be enough justice, and in which coercion will be sufficiently non-violent to prevent his common enterprise from issuing into complete disaster."¹⁵ Even for so modest a voyage a polar star is needed; and that is what the Christian revelation affords.

But what if we fail? What if the long and arduous climb of man from the beginnings of primitive society to the achievements of the modern age should issue in a terrible orgy of destruction? What then? For the secularist that would be the end—sheer irretrievable disaster. Not so for the Christian. Like the apostle Paul in the midst of the storm, when all hope had been lost, he can still say, "Sirs, . . . I believe God" (Acts 27:21-25). Nothing is beyond the reach of God's redemptive power.

The assurance that the universe is ultimately in the hands of God was graphically illustrated in a sermon preached by Bishop Eivind Berggrav, the Primate of Norway, just after the end of the Second World War. Speaking from the pulpit of St. Margaret's, Westminster, he described the way in which the Bible had come alive to his fellow-countrymen under Nazi occupation when they thought they had lost everything on which they and their forefathers had depended. Then the bishop added: "The other day I was being shown the bombed sites of your great city by one of your leading politicians. Suddenly he turned to me and said, 'Isn't it terrible to think that one bomb could now destroy all the rest?' To which I replied, 'But if that were to happen, my friend, you and I know that the City of God remaineth.'"

In vain the surge's angry shock,
 In vain the drifting sands;
 Unharm'd upon the eternal Rock
 The eternal City stands.

Therein lies the final hope for this uncertain world.

14. William Temple, *Citizen and Churchman* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1941), p. 67.

15. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York: Scribner, 1936), p. 22.