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ART. I.—COMPREHENSION AND TOLERATION.

IN considering the subject of comprehension and toleration, it may be useful at the outset to consider the matter on its own merits, without special relation to the community to which we belong. This will help us to arrive at principles which in all questions of the kind it is of supreme importance to grasp.

First, then, wherever there is comprehension there must be toleration. It is impossible to secure whatever advantages may be derived from comprehension without incurring the sacrifice, whatever it is, that toleration may demand; and toleration means bearing, and implies the act of forbearing; and, so far, the habit and virtue of forbearance. In short, this is only another instance of the truth that to take involves the correlative obligation of giving. As far, therefore, as any human society sets before itself the object of comprehension, it must acknowledge the proportionate necessity of toleration. But it is no less certain that the very idea of human society involves comprehension, for society falls to pieces when the bands of comprehension are relaxed.

It would seem, then, that the law of comprehension and the law of society are one. There can be no society where there is no comprehension. The destruction of the one principle is the destruction also of the other. If, therefore, society is an end desirable in itself, the principle of comprehension must be acknowledged as an indispensable condition, or pre-requisite of its very existence. But it is needless to argue on abstract principles that society is the law of human existence. Man as a social being is as much an organic unity as his natural body is a complete organism composed of innumerable members. There can be no question that the advantage of union is as deeply

stamped upon the nature of man in his social capacity as it is in his individual existence. If the integrity of the body is bound up in its unity, so is the general welfare of mankind involved in, and dependent upon, its recognition of the law of social unity. As man's body is a complex whole, so his constitution has designed him to be one as a family, as a race, as a Church. It is no contradiction, but rather a confirmation of the truth that this is the principle of his natural and original constitution, that the idea of the Church of Christ is but the reassertion of this principle in a more emphatic manner. "For as the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of the body being many are one body, so also is Christ." The natural body of man is exposed to the ravages of disease, to injury by accident, and to ultimate dissolution by death; and so the Church of Christ aims at counteracting the tendency there is in human society to subdivide and split up into fragments, by supplying fresh motives for comprehension, and fresh bonds of union. It is the office of Christianity, not only to reveal the true character of the Godhead, but also the true ideal character of man, and of his social constitution. And unquestionably, the ideal of the Church of Christ is to knit the whole race of man into one vast and united family, bound together by common interests and objects, and summed up in, and presided over by, one Head. But it is obvious that a vast and comprehensive unity such as this can only be realized and maintained by the exercise of individual restraints and individual forbearance. The predilections and the interests of the few must be sacrificed and give place to the interests and necessities of the many. In all matters of a moral and spiritual character this is so notorious as to need no proof. And most persons will probably admit that the existence of the Christian Church, as an ideal, is not destroyed by the various divisions into which it is split up, even though its outward unity is destroyed, and its practical harmony may be imperilled thereby. The comprehensiveness, therefore, of the ideal Christian Church is something vastly greater than anything which is ever realized, or likely to be realized, by any existing body of Christians. And the comprehensiveness of the Christian Church as a purely spiritual ideal, is a characteristic of that Church which must coexist with a condition of things falling very far short of any actual exhibition of it.

If this fact is duly recognized, we need not fear to recognize, likewise, the somewhat opposite truth that it may in conceivable circumstances be also needful to impose limitations which shall seem to operate to the restraint of this general and ideal comprehensiveness. For example, it may be highly desirable to have a National Church which shall not be able to emulate the broad comprehensiveness of the Christian Church as a whole.

Diversity is as much a principle of Nature as unity, and essential unity may oftentimes underlie apparent diversity; but Nature gives expression to the simplest ideas in a rich variety of forms. The unity of the race, in like manner, is quite compatible with the separate existence of a multitude of nations. So, too, the unity of the Church of Christ is a truth co-existent and compatible with the independence and integrity of separate Churches; and the integrity and independence of these separate Churches may even involve a certain amount of contradiction and opposition among themselves. There must, indeed, be certain limits to this freedom and independence. As the Church exists only to bear witness to Christ the Saviour, it is obvious that no Church has any right to impose terms of communion which are not also terms of salvation; but yet, as regards matters of internal government, any Church has a right to determine the conditions of her own existence. And in the case of the Church of England, this is the result of a twofold bond, representing the decision of her own free action, and that of the legal sanction confirming and establishing her decision.

Comprehension and toleration, therefore, with reference to the Church of England, must be further conditioned by the limits provided by the formularies of the Church, and by the laws of the nation as affecting them. No one, for instance, can claim the privilege of comprehension within the limits of the Church, who openly or in secret dissents from, or disagrees with, what he believes to be the mind and teaching of the Church. We say designedly, what he believes to be the mind and teaching of the Church. Because in certain cases there must be this latitude. For instance, the formularies of the Church were framed, for the most part, three centuries ago; since that time, and especially during the present century, a variety of questions have been hotly debated, which had not arisen at that time, and could not possibly arise, and, therefore, could not be contemplated by the existing formularies of the Church. It is plain, for instance, that the meaning and force of such terms as regeneration, inspiration, revelation, and the like, are questions of this character. It is conceivable, therefore, that a man holding by the letter of the Church's formularies, may consider himself committed to a very different belief as to the meaning of the term regenerate from one who looks at the matter more in the light of actual facts, and considers that the language of the Church cannot but be reconcileable therewith; while yet the particular question at issue between these two persons may be one which lies more or less apart from, because not originally contemplated by, the language of the formularies. The belief, therefore, of the person claiming the privilege of comprehension within the Church, as to what the teaching of the Church actually is, must be allowed,

at all events, to some extent to determine the justice of the claim, unless on any other ground it can be shown that it is already determined. In such a matter as regeneration, for instance, everything turns upon what is meant by the term; and as this is nowhere defined, except by the vernacular equivalent of new birth, a very wide door is assuredly left open for men of different opinions to go in and out abreast. But, with regard to the other sacrament, the case is somewhat different. It was around the Lord's Supper that the fight raged fiercest at the time when our existing formularies were framed. It was impossible, therefore, that their language and intention could be ambiguous. They were cast with the express intention of repudiating Romish doctrine; and this statement applies, not merely to the Articles, but likewise to the Communion Office, which, according to the opinion of those who advocate extreme teaching on the Eucharist, has suffered more than any other at the hands of the Reformers. Clearly, therefore, to attempt to make the existing Office the vehicle for doctrine which is indistinguishable from, and, in fact, boasts of being virtually identical with, the doctrine of the Church of Rome is, and can only be, an act of unfair dealing with the declared intention of the Body prescribing the limits of comprehension which can only be characterized as traitorous thereto. One can sympathize with the desire to make others see eye to eye with oneself in all abstract and practical matters, and with the general unwillingness to break with friends and associates of long standing for the sake of minor differences; but if there is a difference which is substantial and real, it is of no use ignoring the fact, and it is far better to face it manfully, and to take the consequences, than to go on endeavouring to persuade others as well as ourselves, that the Church says one thing, when the very rationale, no less than the history of her existence and position, goes to establish the fact that she says another. Now in the case of the Baptismal Service it is not so. Every thoughtful man must admit that the difference between a person, whether an infant or not, baptized or unbaptized, is as great as possible; so much so, that we may, without impropriety, measure it, if we will, by the difference between the regenerate and the unregenerate state. But if we go on to define regeneration as the act by which the believer becomes consciously one with Christ as the Saviour, then it needs no argument to show that this is a change which cannot take place in any infant baptism; and common sense itself would revolt against the dictum of any man, or of any body of men, who should even seem to maintain that it did. If, to go further, we affirm that our Lord required this conscious union with Himself as the condition and the test of life, as truly as He did require baptism of every member of His Church, we can-

not be far wrong in any interpretation of the Baptismal Offices but that which regards conscious union with Christ as of less importance than external baptism, and even affirms that regeneration and baptism are simply convertible terms. Moreover, as the religion of Christ is nothing, if it is not a moral and a spiritual force ordained to move and influence the whole world, we may be sure that no theory of that religion can be a true one which confines and limits its operation to the continual repetition and multiplication of certain external acts. Nor can that Church be a true exponent of the quick and powerful Word of God, which leads men to suppose that the effect of that Word is exhausted when compliance has been made with its necessary appointments of outward and visible acts and symbols, without regard to the moral and spiritual response of the heart and conscience, as distinct, even, from the mere regulation of the conduct.

If, however, we take another point, which is likely to assume yet greater importance and prominence, day by day—namely, inspiration—we shall find that this is a matter on which the existing utterances of the Church are exceedingly vague and insufficient, and for the manifest reason that the burning questions of the present day had not arisen. The ultimate appeal to Scripture was substantially admitted on all hands. Now we have come face to face with the question whether, strictly speaking, in the original sense of the words, there is any Holy Scripture at all. It is conceivable, therefore, that very great latitude of opinion might be technically reconcileable with the formal declarations of the Church upon this subject; and yet it is equally plain that the very existence of the Church is involved in the existence of a real Holy Scripture. For if there is no veritable Word of God, then there is nothing for the faith of the Church to rest upon; and if there is no foundation for faith, then the very existence of the Church is purely imaginary. The limits of comprehension then, are surely strained to the utmost when those who do their best to disparage the Word of God in all their treatment of it, are content to do so under the shelter of that Church which fought the battle of the Reformation and won it upon the basis of the ultimate and supreme authority of the Word of God. And if the limits of comprehension are strained to the utmost, the duty and exercise of toleration are needlessly and unduly strained on the part of those who, feeling the dangerous tendency of such principles, are nevertheless compelled to bear with them. There may be principles fatal to the existence of the Church, against which the Church itself has raised no protest, not having anticipated them as possible.

The great practical difficulty, however, with which we have to deal in the present day, is the condition and observance of

the rubric. The truth is not sufficiently apprehended that the rubric in the Prayer Book is in a most inadequate and incomplete condition, and that consistency in the observance of it is simply and absolutely impossible. If the "Low" Churchman has too often treated it with indifference and contumely, the "High" Churchman has no cause to boast of his compliance with its terms; for what High Churchman obeys the rubric which inferentially enjoins him to require that notice be given by those who intend to present themselves at the Lord's Table? and who thinks of reading the whole of either of the two exhortations appointed for the purpose every time he gives notice of the administration of the Sacrament?[1] In how many choirs is the rubric immediately following the Apostles' Creed observed or contravened, which enjoins that the suffrages following the Creed be pronounced by the minister with a loud voice? What High Churchman would be content to allow the alternative position of the Lord's Table prescribed by the rubric, which directs that it shall stand in the body of the church, or in the chancel? These are merely casual instances; and other cases might be mentioned in which the most punctilious stickler for the observance of the rubric might feel himself somewhat puzzled to shew his reverence for it, or his obedience to it, seeing that it is notorious that in certain cases the directions of the rubric are ambiguous to the last degree. Who, for instance, is to decide how the priest is to stand after reciting the Commandments? or what is the relation of the order to "kneel

[1] I might here specify the cases so tellingly recounted by the Dean of Chichester, in his letter to Canon Gregory, who asks, "How does it come to pass that many of the (ritualistic) practices are clear violations of the rubric? How, for instance, does it come to pass that some insist on *kneeling* during the prayer of consecration, though the rubric orders them to *stand?* Why, again, do others introduce the Agnus Dei into the Communion Service, although they solemnly pledged themselves at their ordination to use the form prescribed in the Book of Common Prayer, and *none other*, alike in public prayer and in the administration of the sacraments? Further, why do these sticklers for rubrical exactness overlook the plain command to begin the service for the Holy Communion standing at the *north side* of the table (the north side, or end thereof, as Archbishop Laud in the Scottish book explains it)? Why do some of them omit the Ten Commandments; some, the exhortation expressly ordered to be said at the time of the celebration of the Communion, the communicants being conveniently placed for the receiving of the Holy Sacrament; some, the latter part of the prescribed formula at communicating? Why are they not careful, at least, to break the bread before the people? and Why are they not scrupulous to deliver the communion in both kinds *into the hands* of as many as communicate? Above all, in face of the emphatic order that there shall be no celebration of the Lord's Supper unless there be a convenient number to communicate with the priest, why, I ask, in defiance of this plain order, do some of these sticklers for rubrical exactness communicate *alone?*"—*Guardian*, May 25, 1881.

down at the Lord's table," before the prayer of humble access, to the one immediately following, which directs the priest to "stand before the table?" It is simply impossible to maintain the inviolability of the rubric in the face of discrepancies such as these, or to affirm that it is in any degree a sufficient guide for those who are sincerely desirous to obey it.[1] But then, surely such considerations as these can only serve to demonstrate the extreme inconsistency and absurdity of those who would concentrate all their reverence and devotion for these standing orders of the Church upon one unfortunate rubric, confessedly the most uncertain and ambiguous of all, if it be not literally, by implication, inconsistent, and at variance with all the rest of the Prayer Book put together. We mean, of course, the Ornaments Rubric. For when we find this celebrated rubric, saying as plainly as it does, that "Such ornaments of the Church, and of the Ministers thereof, at all times of their Ministration, shall be retained, and be in use, as were in this Church of England, by the Authority of Parliament, in the Second Year of the Reign of King Edward the Sixth," it surely is not possible that there can be any doubt as to what it does really say. First, ascertain what ornaments of the Church, and of the ministers thereof, were in use in 1548-9, and then note that all such shall be retained and be in use still. There does not seem to be room for the faintest shadow of a doubt on this point. But then, note also, that such ornaments shall not only be retained and be in use, but, *unless* the rubric is a dead letter, which is assuredly a very considerable certainty, they will have been retained and have been continuously in use in virtue of this very order itself.

This rubric, then, whatever else it says or does not say, most unquestionably does not say that such ornaments having become obsolete shall be restored, nor does it even permit them to be restored. It is, therefore, a most unwarrantable and gratuitous piece of rubricolatry to fasten upon this obscure and obsolete rubric, and to insist on being allowed to treat it as other rubrics in many cases are not treated. Is it not obvious that there is such a thing as dying of old age, and that as the formularies of the Church have most undoubtedly not anticipated the questions and difficulties of the present day, so certain of its rubrics have outlived the circumstances that occasioned them, and are from the nature of existing circumstances superannuated? And may not this Ornaments Rubric be one of them? And is it not a matter of fact that practically it

[1] The like uncertainty, at least in matters of ritual, was also shown by the Dean of Durham, in his excellent Paper at the Newcastle Congress, though we may decline to accept all the conclusions or positions of that Paper.

has been for centuries a dead letter, and therefore, unless *per se* it can be shown to be of vital moment to the existence and well-being of the Church, it cannot be worth restoring. Surely, therefore, the northern Upper House of Convocation have shown a very wise and meritorious unanimity in voting that this mysterious and unaccountable rubric should be superseded by one that shall be intelligible and capable of being rationally obeyed. Whatever may have been the history of the Ornaments Rubric in the past, assuredly its history in the last thirty years is fraught with lessons of solemn warning and interest to the Church. One can remember the time when the hidden virtues of this wondrous rubric had not even dawned upon the minds of the enlightened. Its supreme importance and its marvellous capacity for being made a rallying point, is a discovery of times long within one's own memory, but it is a discovery that teaches a very solemn lesson to every thoughtful and earnest mind. And there are words older even than the Ornaments Rubric, and of authority not less, that seem to be singularly appropriate to the whole aspect of the matter and the zeal that it excites:—"Ye pay tithe of mint and anise and cummin, and have omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith: these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone." The consistent observance of the rubric of the Prayer Book may, in its proper place, be a matter of no little importance; but that it can under any circumstances be a matter of the highest importance, or that it can be of even equal importance, when compared with many other matters closely connected with the Prayer Book itself, and the ostensible purpose of its very existence, is a simple impossibility and absurdity. The Ornaments Rubric, however, is by no means without its bearing upon the subject-matter of comprehension and toleration. As long as that rubric stands where it does, I do not see how we can escape from the difficulties and dilemmas in which it may land us. There will, there must be, those who will avail themselves of the licence and privilege it offers. There will always be those who will insist upon interpreting all the offices and declarations of the Church by the standard it suggests. Nor do I see that they are not fairly comprehended within the Church's legal boundaries, or that we are not in duty bound to tolerate them. But if others are bound to tolerate them, the obligation is surely reciprocal, and they are bound to tolerate those who select, it may be, for the standard by which to gauge the Church's teaching, some other formulary, article, or statement of less ambiguity and more definiteness than the Ornaments Rubric.

The real truth of the matter, which underlies all this zeal for liberty according to the letter of a practically obsolete rubric,

is that men's hearts are set upon a type and idea of worship which is grasped the more tenaciously in proportion to the slight encouragement to be found for it anywhere else. If we give up the Ornaments Rubric, we fasten what is well-nigh the only door left open for the restoration, in their completeness, of "Catholic" ideas, and the return to "Catholic" principles and "Catholic" unity. And therefore, before we can deal successfully with the Ornaments Rubric, we must grapple with those principles which underlie the zeal for it. What, then, is meant by such "Catholic" principles? Is it not, more simply, assimilation or approximation to the Church of Rome? Is it not virtually Romish teaching *minus* the supremacy of the Pope, and, perhaps, the dogma of infallibility? There is, unquestionably a spirit abroad which may justly be characterized as one of infatuation for what is Romish because it is Romish. This is not said in a spirit of partisanship—God forbid—but as our deliberate conviction, after endeavouring to estimate the matter in a calm and philosophical spirit. There is no question that the Church of England as it is is not sufficiently Romish, or, as they prefer to say, Roman, for many professed members of it. Hence, they will on no account part with the Ornaments Rubric, or would be loth to do so, because it supplies them with the last plank which spans the gulf between modern and ante-Reformation practice.

What, then, is the fascinating idea which thus allures so many eager souls? What is the element of attractiveness in "catholicity?" It cannot be unity, because there can be no actual union with Rome as she is, without the supremacy and infallibility. It is, therefore, after all, only an ideal unity; a unity existing in the imagination, but not realized in fact, or capable of being realized in fact; a unity longed after but not obtained, or, indeed, obtainable. Nor is the love of this ideal to be explained by the mere love of antiquity; because, if we go back far enough, we lose every trace of it; as, for example, in the Acts of the Apostles, where, strange to say, the only vestige of "catholicity," and that merely an etymological one, is to be found in the injunctions of the Chief Priests and Sadducees to the Apostles, that they should not speak *at all* (καθόλου), nor teach in the name of Jesus.[1] It seems, then, that the fascination of "catholicity" consists in an ideal love for the framework and *personnel*, the order and authority of an ideal Church. And this is essentially and exclusively an ideal which exercises the greater charm because it is contradicted by the stern realities of fact. Multitudes feel that the actual experience of Rome will not satisfy this ideal. But so deeply do we sympathize with the aspirations after this ideal, that we can entirely appreciate that apparent approximation to

[1] Acts iv. 18.

the realization of it which is offered by the Church of Rome. There we have a vast and well-nigh universal historic organization of unbroken continuity. And this in itself is a great charm. But the question arises, is it the real thing, or does it lead us away on a false issue, to something which is, after all, only a substitute for the real thing? We are convinced that it does. Professing to give us the true realization of the Communion of Saints, it gives us, instead, only the concrete embodiment of the Holy Catholic Church. Now in the Creed, the article of the Holy Catholic Church stands between two others, these, namely, of the Holy Ghost, and the Communion of Saints; unless, therefore, the Holy Catholic Church leads directly from the one and to the other, unless it is a connecting link between both, it fails in its office, and belies its position. In short, the Holy Catholic Church is not an end in itself, but a means to an end. It is nothing to belong to the body to which Hooker, Bull, and Andrewes, Bede and Anselm, Augustine and Ambrose belonged, unless we are animated by their spirit, and are partakers of their faith; it is nothing to be united to them unless we are also personally united to Him, to whom they were presumably united. And this is the mistake which men make. They think that union may be mystical or corporate, whereas it must be spiritual if it is to be real; and, therefore, union with the Church, whether of the first century or of the nineteenth; whether with that Church to which Phœbe carried the Epistle to the Romans, or with that which now rules from the Vatican, is nothing without personal union with Jesus. It is not catholicity which can satisfy the true ideal, but Jesus Christ: He, and He only, in whose name the disciples were commanded (catholically) not to speak or teach. Unity is a blessed thing, and union a most desirable end. But let us not mistake the means to it, or be deceived by any fictitious substitute for it. "Behold how good and joyful a thing it is for brethren to dwell together in unity." That is comprehension. But the one bond of comprehension is lacking, if that is lacking which binds us all to Jesus Christ:—"That they all may be one; as Thou, Father, art in Me, and I in Thee, that they all may be one in Us." That is the true centre of unity, the one bond of union. We should all strive after that, and be satisfied with nothing short of that, whether it be a Church, a liturgy, or a rubric. But setting that object clearly before us, and aiming only at that, and seeking to be comprehended in that unity, whether as individuals or as Church, we may well exercise toleration—that is, forbearance—towards all of whom we can hope the same; but for others, though, indeed, we may well tolerate them, yet let us not cease to wage deliberate and determined war against their principles, inasmuch as he who substitutes any centre for the true centre

is not a friend, but a foe, to the only bond which can comprehend and bind us all together; is not a foe, but a friend, to discord and the essential spirit of intolerance.

STANLEY LEATHES.

ART. II.—PROFESSOR RAWLINSON'S EGYPT.

History of Ancient Egypt. By GEORGE RAWLINSON, M.A., Camden Professor of Ancient History in the University of Oxford. Two volumes. London: Longmans & Co. 1881.

PROFESSOR RAWLINSON tells us that his present work was "conceived and commenced in the year 1876, and designed to supply what seemed a crying need of English literature—viz., an account of Ancient Egypt, combining its antiquities with its history, addressed partly to the eye, and presenting to the reader, within a reasonable compass, the chief points of Egyptian life—manners, customs, art, science, literature, religion—together with a tolerably full statement of the general course of historical events, whereof Egypt was the scene, from the foundation of the monarchy to the loss of independence"—*i.e.*, from Menes, the proto-monarch of Egypt—the "Mizraim" of Scripture, as George Syncellus[1] calls him—to the Persian Conquest, B.C. 527. After alluding to the enormous stores of antiquarian and historical material accumulated during the present century, since the discovery of the famous Rosetta Stone by M. Boussard, in 1799—the key which has unlocked all the archaic treasures of Egypt—the Professor enumerates some of these treasures in chronological order. Thus, he mentions Denon's "Description de l'Egypte," Rosellini's "Monumenti dell' Egitto," Lepsius's "Denkmäler aus Ægypten und Aethiopien" and his "Königsbuch der Alten Ägypter," Mariette's "Monuments divers recueillis en Egypte et en Nubie," De Rouge's "Recherches sur les Monuments," Chabas's "Mélanges Egyptologiques," Col. Howard Vyse's great work on "The Pyramids," Sir Gardner Wilkinson's five volumes on "The Entire Subject of Egyptian Customs and Manners," the "Revue Archéologique," the "Transactions of the Society of Biblical Archæology," together with "the finished histories of Egypt by Bunsen, Kenrick, Lenormant, Birch, and Brugsch, without whose works his (Rawlinson's) could certainly not have been written." As all of these are either possessed by, or known to, the present writer, we are

[1] "Mizraim, who is Menes."—SYNCELLUS, *Canon of the Kings of Egypt.*