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meeting, to begin with, a Church Council, consisting of churchwardens and sidesmen, might be elected, to correspond with the Parish Council. The Ruridecanal Conference, when legally constituted, would correspond to the District Council and the Diocesan Conference to the County Council. At the head of all, and analogous, as it has always been, to Parliament, would stand the Convocation of each province, but reinforced, as it had not previously been, by a formally constituted House of Laymen. Whether the two Convocations should for all or any purposes be amalgamated into one National Synod is a question too remote for present discussion; but it is obvious that, if no such step were taken, any new ecclesiastical legislation, which the Church desired to initiate for herself, would have to run the gauntlet of six separate assemblies; namely, the Upper and Lower House of Convocation and House of Laymen of each province. The advantage of this procedure, however, in the way of preventing hasty changes, might possibly outweigh its drawbacks.

The survey of my four items of Church Reform is now completed. I would merely observe in conclusion that one of them—Finance—can be carried out by the Church herself without recourse to any extraneous aid. The others, no doubt, would require the co-operation of Parliament; but it is quite certain that if all Churchpeople were united and persistent in demanding them, this co-operation would not be long withheld.

P. V. SMITH.

ART. V.—PERSONALITY.[1]

"The abysmal depths of Personality."—TENNYSON.

"IF I am not mistaken," said Professor Sanday at the late Church Congress, "Mr. Illingworth's lectures will be found to mark the beginning of a new phase in the religious thought of our time—a phase in which philosophy will once more take its proper place in supplying a broad foundation for other branches of theological study, and at the same time quickening them with new life." The high hopes raised by such words as these will surely not be disappointed when we approach the volume of lectures itself. Since the year 1780 volume after volume of Bampton lectures has appeared in annual succession, broken only in the years 1834 and 1835, when no appointment was made on the Bampton foundation.

[1] "Personality, Human and Divine" (being the Bampton Lectures for 1894). By J. R. Illingworth, M.A. London: Macmillan.

Out of the goodly array of books thus produced, about half a dozen stand out quite conspicuously from the rest—Mansel's famous work on the "Limits of Religious Thought," Liddon's "Divinity of our Lord," Wace's "Foundations of Faith," Hatch's "Organization of the Early Christian Churches," Cheyne's "Origin of the Psalter," and last (certainly not least), Illingworth's "Personality, Human and Divine." Assuredly, since the publication in 1858 of Mansel's oft-discussed examination of the Limits of Religious Thought, there has appeared, in connection with the Bampton trust, no such valuable contribution to philosophical theology as the lectures for 1894. It is difficult to over-estimate Mr. Illingworth's admirable handling of a subject which bristles with difficulties so numerous and so manifest; of his dialectical skill, on the one hand, and of his profound apprehension of the vitally important character of the subject he so reverently deals with, on the other. Nor is the lecturer's literary art less noticeable, whether for its purity of style or ease of expression; and this, as readers will not be slow to admit, is, in itself, a by no means small recommendation. There is, perhaps, only one conspicuous blemish in the book, and that is the absence of an index.

Two great schools of thought divide thoughtful men to-day into opposite camps; the one school takes it for granted that God is unknowable, and that, if He exists, for mankind His existence is as though it were not; the other school takes it for granted that He not only does exist, but that He is knowable, and that if the human mind cannot *com*prehend Him, it may, and does, *ap*prehend Him. The disciples of the former school have, for the most part, elected to be known as Agnostics.

Now, what Illingworth sets out to demonstrate is briefly this: not merely is God knowable, but His personality is, in all respects, though infinitely transcending human personality in degree, nevertheless essentially akin thereto; accordingly, to know God we must first know man, and to know Him as a person, we must first know man as a person. Thus it is that through the instrumentality of our own finite personality we attain to some cognition, faint and dim, it may be, yet still in its measure certain, of that Infinite Personality in whose life alone our lives can find their affirmation and justification.

The record of the conception and growth of the idea of God forms one of the most profoundly interesting chapters in the history of the race. And however firmly convinced we may be that this idea of God is, in some form or other, a primary element, nay, necessary factor, in the constitution of human thought, we need not refuse to admit that the unfolding of this germ-idea, the making explicit what was previously im-

plicit, has been a genuine growth, needing the lapse of many centuries for its completion.

In the early beginnings of his earthly life, it is not unnatural to suppose that man's thoughts would turn in an outward direction to that visible world which made itself so palpable to his senses, to which he seemed bound by ties of the closest and subtlest intimacy, and which affected him with longings so strange and unaccountable. He had become conscious of the world; beyond such consciousness he had not advanced, but that consciousness was the first great step in the evolution of the human mind. Ages later, perhaps, and only by painful steps and slow, he learnt to recognise that between himself and the world lies a gulf of difference; Nature gradually drew further and further from him, and (so to speak) forced him to confront her and gaze upon her. Nature and man are no longer one in the way they have been hitherto. Vast indeed is the stride which man has now made; he has learned to distinguish himself, as a conscious subject, from the non-self, as object. Man has at length become a self-conscious being.

There is, indeed, a third stage in this unfolding of man's mental life, and that third stage is the idea of God. Only by constant reflection upon his inner self and the outer world was it borne in upon the human consciousness that an eternal dualism of subject and object could not *ultimately* satisfy the demands of thought. Behind and beyond and beneath the subject and the object there must surely be a something, in the unity of which the manifold differences both of subject and object are merged, and from which they spring. We are occupying no debateable ground here; our position so far is, to all intents and purposes, identical with that held by even the most rigidly orthodox Agnostics. No one has more clearly seen this than Mr. Herbert Spencer, who, though often unjustly spoken of as a materialist, has strenuously maintained that the eternal energy which lies behind matter and spirit is in truth the greatest of all realities. There can be no doubt that it is so; the conviction of this is, in some shape or another, a primary datum of human consciousness. It is only when the Agnostic assumes that this eternal energy is not merely inscrutable only, but totally and for ever impenetrable to the spirit of man, that we differ. The human mind will not tolerate being put off with a persistent "nescimus" upon a matter so vital as this. Either the energizing power which the universe everywhere manifests is a purely materialistic force, or it is not. If the former alternative be the true one, how comes it that a materialistic view of the universe always fails in the end to give any satisfaction to the yearnings of man's mind and heart? Because, I reply, man is a spiritual

being, and he seeks a spiritual cause for phenomena; he is, by the very conditions of his being, forced to admit that the universe is essentially spiritual, that reason does declare itself in the ordered realm of nature, and that, whatever difficulties this conviction may bring in its train, they are immeasurably surpassed by the difficulties which any other view of the question entails. Only in the light of this spiritual cause of the universe can the shifting currents of material things become linked in harmonious movement, and disclose their meaning and character.

So strong does this tendency towards unity (if I may so call it) appear to be in all the higher developments of human thought, that a refusal to admit its claims has resulted in the strangest aberrations of the human intellect. Certain scientists have, in their search for causality, postulated for individual atoms a consciousness, which, however, in no way brings us nearer to a solution of the problem involved.[1] An infinite series of consciousnesses would require some single consciousness, if it is to mean anything for us; for to assume an infinite series of conscious atoms merely multiplies *ad infinitum* the original difficulties presented by the concept of consciousness itself.

We have thus far seen that the presence of phenomena in space and time not only justifies, but demands, in order that these phenomena may themselves have coherence and meaning, that we recognise an infinite and eternal Presence, of which the visible world is but a mode—a living and actual embodiment appealing to man's senses and understanding. But this timeless and spaceless Energy can have no adequate signification for us, unless its reality, presupposed in all that we see, appeals to the whole conscious life and being of man in the sum of his activities. Man's instinct for worship is a thing concerning which there can be no shadow of doubt; it is an evident historic fact. But man is totally unable to worship any mere philosophic abstraction which appeals to his understanding alone. Man is a spiritual being; and the highest function of his existence, the highest term in his mental and spiritual condition, is personality, the unity of which is a verity not to be shaken. Personality is the consummated harmony of man's whole being; the perfect focus in which the scattered rays of his many-coloured life are finally blent in the pure light of self-consciousness and oneness of being, shining with steady brilliancy upon the world of outward experience. Personality, says Illingworth, is the canon of reality.

[1] Häckel is a notorious offender in this respect. Compare what he says in his recent brochure, "Monism."

This being the case, we cannot predicate, as a quality of the Infinite being, of whose life the world is but (so to speak) the material symbol, anything less than personality; for personality is the highest and completest idea which we are able to form. It is also the *terminus a quo* of all human thought; for, as Illingworth so justly observes, the externality of things is only conceivable when referred to personality, apart from which these things have no real existence.

It is at this stage in the problem that I have found Illingworth's lectures of the deepest and most permanent value. His first lecture deals with the development of personality from the human side, and he shows, in a masterly manner, that the final conception of personality is due to Christianity; whence it naturally follows that the Christian conception of personality really introduces a lasting element of the highest import into human life. Personality, according to the standpoint of the purest Christian philosophy, is that unity in which men's attributes and functions meet; hence the power of this philosophy to unify, in a wholly unique degree, the divergent faculties, thoughts, and emotions of man into a consistent whole. One corollary of the deepest significance follows upon this—man cannot transcend his personality; he cannot get outside himself.

At this important juncture the objection of the thoroughgoing Agnostic makes itself heard. He will assert that the concept of a personal God which we have reached is but the projection of ourselves upon an infinite background, and, therefore, in the end, a creation of our own desires. He does but echo the utterance of the ancient Greek thinker, Xenophanes, who argues thus:

> ἀλλ' εἴτοι χεῖράς γ' εἶχον βόες ἠὲ κέλητες
> καὶ γράψαι χείρεσσι καὶ ἔργα τελεῖν ἅπερ ἄνδρες,
> ἵπποι μέν θ' ἵπποισι, βόες δέ τε βουσὶν ὁμοίας,
> καὶ κε θεῶν ἰδέας ἔγραφον καὶ σώματ' ἐποίουν
> τοιαῦθ' οἷόν περ καὐτοὶ δέμας εἶχον ὁμοῖον.[1]

The half-truth contained in these verses constitutes, in reality, one of the most malignant of falsehoods; it is so plausible to conclude that man must needs regard God as "a bigger kind of me," yet so replete with mixed truth and error. Man can only think of God, it is true, from his platform of finality; can only conceive His infinite being—if that being is to mean anything more to him than a fever-shaken effort of the imagination, nebulous and vague—under limitations of sense; dream of His timeless and spaceless existence under the

[1] Fr. 6 *apud* Clem. Strom., v., p. 714, "The lions, if they could have pictured a god, would have pictured him in fashion as a lion, the oxen like an ox, and so forth."

conditions both of space and time. We cannot fling our arms around God; but we can humbly touch the border of His garment. In brief, our idea of God is an apprehension, never a comprehension.

The fact of man's religiousness is undoubted; and the testimony of all history is to show that belief in God or gods has never been absent from the race. Now, belief in God was, as Illingworth says, achieved through man's belief in himself; he naturally argued from his known personality to God's personality. In the course of centuries the original concept advanced, though whether or not this advance was merely the regaining of fuller knowledge held previously is another matter. The contributions of Indian philosophers (to name no others) in the evolution of religion were not inconsiderable, though, owing to the extreme vagueness and dreamy mysticism of the setting of their thoughts, their influence on philosophy has been wholly indirect. The Indian view of things is a universal Pantheism—of imagination, however, not of thought. Hence, in India, adequate concepts of personality were unattainable. Even in Greek philosophy the idea of a personal God is misty; but Plato and Aristotle undoubtedly cleared it of many accretions, or at least showed how the problem was to be attacked. Plato's method was largely emotional, while Aristotle's was grounded on a basis of pure intellection. Certainly the Semitic view was, in all its higher manifestations, clearly personal; this is proved by the very idea of a *righteous* God. The Hellenic and Semitic concepts, passed through the clarifying medium of Alexandrian speculation, elevated the personality of God into the position of certainty.

The doctrine of the Trinity, as it emerged from the schools of Alexandrian philosophy, though admittedly incomprehensible in its totality, is a valuable aid in rendering explicit our notions of the Infinite. Personality in man seems to split itself up into three distinct yet vitally related elements: (1) Self-consciousness, or reason; (2) self-determination, or will; (3) self-realization, or love. Hence, arguing by analogy from the human and finite to the divine and infinite personality, we may expect to find a triple element in Deity itself. This is precisely what, according to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity,[1] actually exists. God moves out of Himself and makes Himself object to Himself in the Eternal Son, and recoils upon Himself in the Eternal Spirit, thereby effecting a perfect and complete process in the unfolding of the Absolute. It is in the light of this infinite and eternal progression that we find a reconciliation between matter and spirit, between God and the world.

[1] Contrast this with the Trinity of Indian philosophy.

In one of the many thoughtful notes appended by Illingworth to his book, we are reminded (see p. 244) that this Christian doctrine of the Trinity, with all the possibilities of Divine self-determination which it involves, is "a further assistance towards the conception of a personality which is at once infinite and yet definite." To the various suggestive references given there, in which this idea is drawn out, we might add one from Lotze,[1] who remarks: "Perfect personality is in God alone; to all finite minds there is allotted but a pale copy thereof. The finiteness of the finite is not a producing condition of that personality, but a limit and a hindrance of its development." One may justly, perhaps, observe in this place that, apart from Christianity, there *is* no really adequate concept of personality; for the Unitarian's conception of it as "an undifferentiated unity" is not, properly, thinkable. If it be objected that the Christian conception of the Divine personality is an argument based on analogy, and consequently valueless as proof, I submit that in such a matter the fact that it *is* so based is one of the strongest reasons for accepting it as a true estimate. Analogy is not logical proof, and from the nature of the case cannot so be, but an analogy of the kind we are using is the highest sort of proof. God's existence and selfhood cannot be treated like a formula of logic or a problem in algebra; and even logic itself, we do well to remember, is human, after all.

One turns with a curiosity, natural enough under the circumstances, to the pages in which Illingworth deals with "the proofs" themselves—the famous triad which has caused such infinite dissensions in the philosophic camp. How to better his statement of these three proofs—cosmological, teleological, ontological—would be difficult indeed. Due weight is allowed for each of these "proofs of the existence of God," and the nowadays much-abused ontological argument has the justice done to it which it deserves. Notwithstanding all the dirt thrown at it by recent writers, I firmly believe it to constitute, in the main, the strongest strand in that rope of proof whereby we hope to draw down God to us in the sphere of intellectual belief. The very thought of God is that which cannot *not-be*. Our idea of Him, inadequate as it always will be, cannot be an empty dream; it must have some objective reality somewhere to correspond with it. The arguments, cosmological and teleological, are only valid on the assumption that thought is valid. Now, "to think" means "to know," and is a universal desire of the human mind; such a desire, of course, implying

[1] "Microcosmus," vol. ii., p. 688 (E. T.). Cf. an essay by Professor Knight on "Personality and the Infinite" in his "Studies in Philosophy and Literature."

that there is something that is and can be known, *i.e.*, intelligible. "The universe we find to consist of intelligible relations; these can only exist through thought, and as they are certainly independent of all individual human thinkers, they must exist through a universal thought." Now, thought implies a thinker; therefore universal thought implies a universal thinker. Again, as personality is the highest sort of thinking we can conceive,[1] universal mind cannot be less than personal. And this initial conviction is the beginning of the self-revelation of universal mind to us. Such, in effect, is Illingworth's statement of the ontological proof. Nothing could be more satisfying in its ultimate effects on the conscience, thought, and life of a sincere seeker after truth.[2]

But, if finality is to be looked for, I do not imagine for a moment that any one of the three proofs, *taken singly*, constitutes a strand powerful enough to bear the strain to which it will be subjected. Taken, however, together, and still further reinforced by the moral argument, derived (1) from the freedom of the will, (2) from our own sense of moral obligation, it forms a four-fold cord that cannot be broken. Or, to change the metaphor, the four proofs, running into one at diverse points in their course, have force enough, thus linked, to carry before them every obstacle, just as separate streams are feeble when alone, but, united, move as one majestic river which sweeps with its onward current each hindrance in its way, ere it joins the great sea. Whatever be our view from time to time of the precise methods of intuition, we need to keep constantly before us this sovereign fact, that knowledge is not a mere intellectual process. To know God aright we must first love Him, or, as Plotinus somewhat differently expresses it, "He must become godlike who desires to see God." The prevailing spirit of our age is the "intellectualism" of the scientific mind. "Its ambition," says Professor James Seth, "is to *understand*, and to understand *Nature*." But the understanding is only a part of man, and not the greatest part, either; nor is Nature, in the term's common acceptance, all that veritably is. Nature is but the reverse of Spirit; taken by itself and for itself, it is only an abstraction—the half of reality, and no true existence. The phenomenal remains, and will ever remain, an impenetrable

[1] "The denial of personality is the denial of knowledge. Without a metaphysical ego there could be neither memory nor sensation. Its very negation is tantamount to its affirmation; for, without this principle of permanence, the concepts employed in its denial could not possibly have been formed."—DR. MOMERIE.

[2] For a thorough examination of the "proofs," see Professor Knight's "Theism" (published in 1893), an earnest, and even noble book.

mystery, unless the noumenal key be applied to unlock its hidden chambers and disclose its riches. Man, truly, is not all intellect, nor must intellect be allowed to thrive (as it too often does) at the expense of the rest of his nature. And, therefore, in the highest resort, the existence of God becomes a certainty to us—not so much by reasoning, as by actual experience. In other words, the supreme vision of God is granted to us through the instrumentality of our moral nature, inasmuch as morality is the condition of spiritual insight.

Other points of profound interest both to theologian and philosopher might be touched upon in connection with Illingworth's lectures; my purpose, however, will have been amply achieved if what has been said thus far induces the reader to study the book for himself. No book of this decade is more truly worth our earnest and careful consideration. The following extract from Professor Seth's recent work[1] may fitly close the foregoing comments:

"Instead of surrendering the idea of Personality, we must cherish it as the only key to the moral and religious life. It is the hard-won result of long experience and deep reflection. The depth and spirituality of the conception of God have grown with the growth of the idea of human personality. As man has learned to know himself, he has advanced in the knowledge of God."

EDWARD HENRY BLAKENEY.

ART. VI.—ENGLAND'S DEBT TO THE WORK OF THE CITY COMPANIES.

THE last farewell of our Blessed Lord to His beloved disciples was taken at a festal meal. And the duty of feasting[2] and rejoicing at fit seasons is one which will only be repudiated by the morose, the dyspeptic, the fantastic, the scornful, the pessimistic, the fanatical, and the inhuman. However frugal and austere a man's habits may be in the ordinary hours of his

[1] "A Study of Ethical Principles," by James Seth (1894).

[2] Feasting has no necessary connection with excessive eating. It appears to include the following elements, or some of them:

1. Hospitality.
2. Good company.
3. Choice music.
4. Lights and flowers.
5. The artistic element in food and drink, however simple.
6. The artistic element in plate, glass and china, or more careful preparation than usual.
7. Temperance.
8. Conversation.
9. Short appeals to good feeling on public institutions and objects.
10. Thanksgiving.
11. Charity.
12. Absence of care.