
A table of contents for *The Churchman* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_churchman_os.php

brethren" all who oppose the monstrous doctrines which were believed by the public and by the Church itself to have been buried with their author, the fated Archbishop. The confusions which followed this attempt to revive all the worst evils of the former century are too well known to need the pursuit of them in this rapid sketch.

We have now briefly traced the evils which the political preaching of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has inflicted upon our Church, how much it has contributed to increase and perpetuate our "manifold divisions," how justly it has brought us under the charge of will-worship and idolatry, and into the sin of "having men's persons in admiration because of advantage" (Jude v. 16). For these "great swelling words" were not uttered without the motive, however latent, of proving a higher degree of orthodoxy, a more unquestionable loyalty, a greater horror of crime, a more profound affection for the person of royalty, and, in a word, proving that the preacher "was not as other men are." And though the provocations to this guilt have been removed by the wise severance of religion from politics and the disuse of polemical services, the danger still remains. The pulpit is still too panegyrical in its character, too onesided in its appreciation of the great events that are passing on around us, and too partial in their application. We may well, therefore, take a solemn lesson from this brief review of the influence of the pulpit for evil during our past history, and fix more and more upon our minds the great rule of the Apostolic preaching, "We preach Christ crucified"—a sufferer with whose life no human life can ever be compared without dishonouring it, a Teacher whose lesson was ever one of love and mutual forbearance, and who proved in His Divine life and expiatory death that the truth of God can never be reached but through love unfeigned; that, in the words of St. Augustine, "Non vincit nisi veritas; victoria veritatis est charitas" (Sermon 358).

ROBERT C. JENKINS.

ART. II.—THE DEFENCE OF CHITRAL.

> Not once or twice in our fair island story
> Has the path of duty been the way to glory.
>
> TENNYSON.

THE defence of Chitral is a very brilliant episode in the recent history of India. We have heard that it has been compared with the memorable defence of Lucknow; but it

seems to us much more closely to resemble the historic siege of Arcot nearly one hundred and fifty years ago, when Clive first won his spurs as the ablest strategist and soldier of that time in Southern India, and when Indian sepoy and European soldier first learned to combat shoulder to shoulder. There are some striking points of resemblance between these two events. They both lasted about the same length of time. In both the odds against the besieged were enormous; in both the devotion of the sepoys to their officers and to their duty was conspicuous; in both the unselfishness and the self-denial of the sepoys were pre-eminent; in both the enemy made one great final effort and was repulsed, and in a brief space of time after it dispersed. One well-known instance of the unselfishness of the sepoys at Arcot may here be given. They were half starving, but they came to their young leader and requested leave to give all the remaining rice to their European comrades, the water in which it was boiled being, they said, enough for them. Well might Macaulay write: "The devotion of the little band to its chief surpassed anything that is related of the Tenth Legion of Cæsar or of the Old Guard of Napoleon." The heroism at Chitral may be set beside the devotion exhibited at Arcot.

Chitral is a small town in a valley sloping down from the Hindu Kush about seventy miles from the eastern frontier of Afghanistan. It is a hundred and eighty-six miles due north of Peshawar, the great north-western frontier garrison of British India, and in comparatively close proximity to the Pamirs, which have of late become the bone of contention between Russia and England. It has not come prominently into notice until within the last five years, and, in fact, it has, owing to recent events, only within the last few months been an object of anxiety and attention to our Indian statesmen. The fort is a rude but strong fastness, built in the fashion common in that neighbourhood, possessing the advantages and the weakness of similar constructions. The walls are made of rough stones wedged into a wooden framework. They are strong, but liable to destruction by fire on account of the quantity of wood which they contain. The fort is quadrangular, the angles being defended by tall loopholed castellets. It is situated about forty yards from the left bank of the river which runs through the valley, and there is a fifth tower on the north, intended to protect the access to the river. The walls are about twenty-five feet high, and the towers double that height. There are several gardens adjoining the fort on the east and south, and these were of considerable service to the enemy and a source of peculiar peril to the besieged. Nestling amidst the luxuriant foliage of plane-trees, near to

the mountains which there close in upon the valley, the fort is commanded by these heights, and is within range of the enemy posted on them. The principal difficulty during the siege was to obtain protection from the incessant fire poured into the interior from the adjacent mountains, as well as from the gardens. Chitral is of great strategical importance, not so much on account of its own intrinsic strength as because it commands the roads issuing from certain comparatively easy passes over the giant guardian mountains on the north.

The recent history of the Chitral State is rather intricate owing to the relationships of its successive rulers, and a minute description of them would be unnecessarily wearisome. In 1885 a diplomatic mission was sent thither by Lord Dufferin under Sir William, then Colonel, Lockhart, and a close alliance was entered into between the Mehtar, or ruler of Chitral, and the Indian Government. The Mehtar at that time was Aman-ul-Mulk, a strong and sturdy governor, who had got the whole State into his firm grasp, and knew how to retain it by the rough and ready means too well known in that primitive part of the world. So long as he reigned there was neither division nor anarchy in the country. He died suddenly in September, 1892. There then ensued a thoroughly Oriental scramble for the throne. In such contests the weakest invariably goes to the wall, and the strongest gains the day. Might is always right. The absent have not a shadow of a chance. Old Aman-ul-Mulk left four legitimate sons, two by one mother and two by another. The first two were by name Nizam-ul-Mulk and Afzul-ul-Mulk. The latter was in Chitral at the time of their father's death. He accordingly promptly seized the throne, and marched against his brother Nizam, who precipitately fled. There seemed every probability of his remaining in peaceable possession; but though he had apparently got rid of his brothers, he had forgotten a likely claimant in the person of an uncle, a brother of his father's, named Sher Afzul, who had been driven by Aman-ul-Mulk into Afghanistan, and who, seeing a favourable opportunity for asserting himself, suddenly appeared before the fort. It was a bold stroke, but one of those daring feats which prove successful owing to its very rapidity and daring. In the conflict that ensued Afzul-ul-Mulk was killed by a stray shot, as he was hurrying to the defence of the walls. This settled the matter. His time-serving citizens at once perceived that the new-comer, who had appeared so promptly and rapidly, was the right man for them, and forthwith enlisted themselves on his side. He was profuse in promises. He assured the people that under him a golden reign would commence, and they were quite content to be his humble slaves—until

another claimant should turn up. Very soon another did turn up. This was the old Mehtar's eldest son, Nizam-ul-Mulk, and on his appearance Sher Afzul rapidly fled back again to Afghanistan.

Right seemed now to have come to the right, as the Eastern proverb says. Nizam-ul-Mulk had been a good deal in the company of English officers, and he requested that a representative of the British Government might be sent to Chitral. Accordingly Mr. Robertson was commissioned to proceed thither, and he arrived there in January, 1893. The consequence was that Nizam-ul-Mulk was fully recognised by the Indian Government as ruler; and a political officer was appointed, who, after remaining at Chitral for a few months, withdrew to Mastuj, a town about sixty miles north-east of Chitral, though from time to time he visited that place. Tranquillity and good government prevailed for the space of two full years, but on New Year's Day of the present year the whole country was once more thrown into confusion. One of the sovereign's half-brothers, named Amir-ul-Mulk, instigated some of his partisans to shoot his brother while out hawking, the latter being passionately fond of sport. This was the reason of the recent hostilities. Amir-ul-Mulk was evidently acting under the inspiration of his father-in-law, Umra Khan, the chief of Jandol, a small territory to the south of Chitral. This man, whose name is now so familiar to us all, was a born soldier. He at once grasped the situation, despatched forces across the lofty passes that separate Jandol from Chitral, took the fort of Drosh, and hastened to invest Chitral. That fort had meanwhile been in great peril owing to the political agent, Lieutenant Gurdon, having with him but a slender escort. He was, however, reinforced by Mr. Robertson, the British agent at Gilgit, which is some two hundred miles east of Chitral, with some Sikhs and one hundred and fifty men of an Imperial regiment belonging to the Maharajah of Kashmir. Umra Khan found a ready ally in Sher Afzul, the brother of the old Mehtar, who, it will be remembered, had been for a short season on the throne, and who, scenting war and plunder, had emerged from his hiding-place in Afghanistan. The inhabitants of Chitral were enthusiastic admirers of Sher Afzul, whose former promises of unlimited enjoyment they appreciated. A few remained within the fort, but they were a source of embarrassment to the garrison, and had to be carefully guarded. Nothing daunted by the number and ability of their assailants, Mr. Robertson and his brave little garrison calmly made preparations for defence. A small detachment, under Captain Ross, which had been despatched for their relief, was almost annihilated, and the

defenders of Chitral were in sore straits. They were not, however, to be left to their own resources; and we will turn aside for a few minutes to consider the efforts which the Government of India was making for their relief, though we intend to concentrate our attention chiefly on their own achievements.

There are two principal routes from British India to Chitral. One is through Kashmir and Gilgit, where the number of troops had been increased, but it is long, very mountainous, and very difficult. The other is from Peshawar, which is geographically situated in Afghanistan, though it is politically in the province of the Punjab. It is much shorter than the other, but lies across several stiff passes, two of which are more than ten thousand feet in height, and are crowned with snow. This route also lies through a country inhabited by tribes who are the inveterate frontier enemies of the British Government. A compact army of 14,000 men of all arms was assembled at Peshawar under the command of Sir Robert Low, and warning was given to Umra Khan that, unless he raised the siege of Chitral within a given time, he would be attacked. A proclamation was issued to the various tribes, stating that if they remained peaceful they would not be molested, but plainly informing them that the object of the Indian Government was to put an end to the present state of affairs, and to prevent any future lawless aggression on the territory of Chitral. As no satisfactory reply was received, the force marched from Peshawar on April 1. At the same time, Colonel Kelly was endeavouring to advance from Gilgit by the more difficult route with a small detachment of 600 men, consisting of the 32nd Pioneers, some Kashmir troops, and local levies. It does not appear that the garrison of Chitral were aware of these efforts being made for their relief, and it is to their doings that we now return.

On March 2 the usurping Mehtar, Amir-ul-Mulk, resigned, and Mr. Robertson, having good reason to believe that he was intriguing with Umra Khan, placed him under arrest, and put his younger brother, Shuja-ul-Mulk, in temporary occupation as Mehtar, subject to the future decision of the Government of India. Next day Sher Afzul, Umra Khan's ally, arrived with his forces in the neighbourhood of Chitral, and it was resolved that an attack upon him should immediately be made. The main object was to ascertain the strength and disposition of the enemy. Captain Colin Campbell, of the Central India Horse, was in command. The chief attack was made under him on a village where Sher Afzul was posted, while a smaller body of men was sent under Captain Baird to scour the mountain-side on the right, and to endeavour to out-

flank the enemy. Both were greatly outnumbered. In the attack on the village Captain Campbell was wounded on the knee, and General Baj Singh and Major Bhikam Singh of the Kashmir forces were killed. The enemy was well armed, and swarmed around them. The retreat was conducted in a calm and soldierly fashion. At first great apprehension was felt regarding the fate of Captain Baird, for his party was completely cut off from the main body; but, though he was severely wounded, he was rescued by the courageous heroism of Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch, who carried him on his back, defending him against tremendous odds. Under cover of darkness he sometimes supported and sometimes carried him along a circuitous route some three miles long. Once he had to leave him for a few moments, and clear a way with the few men with him at the point of the bayonet, but eventually brought him safely into the fort. Unhappily his courage was unsuccessful so far as Captain Baird's life was concerned, for the latter died from his severe wounds the next morning. Calm, collected, and resigned, his last words to Mr. Robertson were, "Good-bye, sir. I hope your plan will succeed."

The enemy closed in on the next day, March 4, and the siege began. Before describing the salient points of the siege, which lasted just forty-six days, let us think for a few moments of the actors on the scene on either side. Within the fort were 543 men, of whom 370 were combatants. The Chitralis were a source of weakness and danger, for they had, as already stated, to be watched and guarded. There were 90 Sikhs sepoys and 300 of the Kashmir Imperial troops, besides servants and followers. There were six British officers—Mr. Robertson, the British Agent at Gilgit, whose coolness and promptitude and resource can scarcely be praised too highly; Captain Townshend, of the Central India Horse, who was in military command of the garrison; Captain Campbell, who had been incapacitated by the severe wound he had received in the action of March 3; Lieutenant Gurdon, the Political Agent at Chitral; Lieutenant Harley, in command of the Sikhs; and the brave Surgeon-Captain Whitchurch, an instance of whose gallantry has just been related. All seem to have acted together splendidly, and to have been fertile in devices and resource. On the other side, the besiegers were under the command of Abdul Majid Khan, a general of Umra Khan's, who kept admirable discipline, and who seems thoroughly to have known his business, and to have been completely versed in the art of conducting attacks against the forts that stud that country. Umra Khan was noted for his aptitude in taking such forts, and the troops under his general were equally proficient in this mode of warfare. They were splendid marks-

men, and never fired a shot aimlessly, as the garrison soon discovered to their cost. They were armed with rifles, and had plenty of ammunition, which was increased when the relieving-party under Lieutenants Fowler and Edwardes had been captured. Sher Afzul was among them, and with him levies who had come over the border from Afghanistan—Pathans who were attracted by the thought of a religious war against the Kafirs or infidels. These all tried every device to intimidate the English officers, and to allure the sepoys from their allegiance. They set before them diligently all the adverse news that they could collect. They let them know of every event that told against them, such as the capture of Lieutenant Fowler's party, but sedulously kept from them all news of Sir Robert Low's and Colonel Kelly's advances. The method in which Abdul Majid Khan conducted the attack was most careful and scientific. The chief assaults were made on the Water Tower, which protected the garrison's access to the river, and persistent endeavours were made to set the wood-work on fire. Much inconvenience was experienced from the enemy occupying a garden, which was so close to the fort that it almost formed a portion of it, for the enclosing wall ran out from the fort itself. There was a summer-house in this garden, which was a constant source of annoyance to the garrison. It was only fifty yards from one of the flanking castellets called the Gun Tower. General Abdul Majid Khan permitted no aimless, undisciplined rushes, and each advance was made by carefully-constructed *sangars*, or stone breast-works, which gave shelter and protection to each advancing party, and these were made in regular parallels. Early in the siege a desperate effort was made to set fire to the Water Tower, and such efforts were renewed at frequent intervals.

The garrison were fully on the alert. Their first business was to make a protected way to the river, and to concentrate their main attention on keeping it protected and free of access. The three military officers divided the day into watches as on board ship, and took watch and watch about. Constant care against fire had to be taken, and every device used to obtain protection from the accurate aim of the enemy. They had to be very careful regarding their ammunition, and their food supply had to be jealously husbanded. They were at once put on half rations, and, after a time, their medicines and surgical appliances failed. The most persistent attack was made on April 7, at five o'clock in the morning. A desperate effort was made against the Water Tower and the water-way, and also against the tower on the opposite side of the fort. The enemy brought great bundles of firewood, which they placed against this tower and set fire to them. This was not put out

for some hours, and with great difficulty; and, in helping to extinguish it, Mr. Robertson was wounded in the shoulder. He was, however, able to bear up; and, by the time the siege was raised, he could report that he was quite well again, and fit for any duty.

The most alarming attempt, however, was made by mining. Suspiciously loud tomtoming and other noises were made about the middle of April, and attentive listening during the intervals revealed the fact of persistent tapping which indicated mining operations, and which the noises were intended to drown. This mine was being dug from the summer-house in the garden, which was only forty yards from the south-east tower, and it had already reached to within ten feet of the walls. It was consequently determined to make a vigorous effort to dislodge the enemy from the summer-house and to destroy the mine. This sortie was completely successful. Lieutenant Harley commanded it, and he had under him forty Sikhs and sixty men of the Kashmir Regiment. Every man was told exactly what was to be done. The summer-house was taken, and the occupants of it driven out, and although a hot fire was kept up on the party from behind a breastwork beyond and from the garden walls, the head of the mine was captured, some five-and-thirty of the men who came creeping out of it were bayoneted, and the mine itself was blown up with the very powder which had been placed there for use against the fort.

This was the last effort of a determined enemy. On the night of the 18th they fled, and the brave little garrison were relieved from the incessant attacks whereby they had been harassed, except during short truces, for the past six weeks. It was reported that Colonel Kelly's force, after his wonderful march from Gilgit, had reached a place two marches distant, and on April 20 it arrived at Chitral. It is not within our purpose to narrate the account of his march over snow-clad mountain passes, through carefully fortified valleys, and against an active enemy, nor of the slower but not less admirable advance of Sir Robert Low's army. These had both dispirited the enemy and caused his retreat, now that the mining project had been defeated. Sher Afzul and Umra Khan were both in full flight. No wonder that, after a siege which had lasted forty-six days, and during which some of the finest qualities of man had been exhibited, the English officers are reported to have looked "worn and set," bearing even on their faces marks of the intense strain they had undergone. The testimony which they bear to the discipline, the devotion, and the fortitude of the sepoys, and especially of the Sikhs, is clear and unstinted. The Muhammadans of the garrison were true

to their salt even amidst persuasions and inducements to join their co-religionists, which were more trying and difficult to bear than the strain and stress of the siege. Since writing the greater part of the above from the telegraphic accounts contained in various papers, we have had the pleasure of reading the animated and vivid narrative of the siege written on the spot by the Special Correspondent of the *Times*, which enables us to supply here and there local colour and life.

The great problem which now remains for the Government of India to solve is the future policy regarding Chitral. It is generally supposed that this will eventually be solved by the retention of the fort, and by the construction of a road to it from Peshawar. This question has the warmest advocates on either side. The evidence regarding it is very equally divided. The military witnesses, headed by the undoubted authority of Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, are mostly in favour of retention; civilians, among whom are numbered Sir James Lyall and Sir Lepel Griffin, but supported by military men like Sir Neville Chamberlain, generally advocate its abandonment. All have an eye to the ultimate designs and movements of Russia. Our own feeling is that Russia has no idea whatever of invading India at any time and in any way. Her sole object is the possession of Constantinople; and any trouble that she may occasion on the frontier of India is solely intended to distract the attention of Europe, and especially of England, from that object. The constant scare regarding Russian designs on India, which has troubled England like an evil nightmare during the last sixty years, strikes us as not very worthy or dignified. We have lately been reading again the history of the first Afghan War, and very sad reading it is. It would have been well for India if the counsels of Sir Alexander Burnes and others like him had never been allowed to disturb the equanimity either of the English Cabinet or of the Indian Government. The position of affairs has enormously altered since those days. Russia and England have drawn closer. Russia now possesses as well-ordered and peaceable cantonments on the north of the Hindu Kush and the Himalayas as England has on the south. The latter should be watchful and vigilant, but never nervous, and should be careful not to fall again into the same condition of alarm as in the earlier days to which we have alluded. The stiff mountain ranges and a friendly Amir of Afghanistan are the two strongest outward bulwarks of India; righteousness and justice are the best securities within. If Chitral should be retained, it will be an enormous drain on our Indian resources. The territory intervening between it and the Punjab would have to be kept in force by strong European and Indian troops. The fort of

Chitral would have to be rebuilt on better principles, and in a position where it would not be commanded from the neighbouring heights; and an overpowering force would be required to keep in check the hill-tribes, who are noted for their passionate love of freedom and for their dread of annexation. Even if annexation is not enforced, it would be most difficult to keep our hold on a country so far from our Indian border and so liable to local disturbances. The evidence seems to us in favour of retiring from the neighbourhood of Chitral, while a vigilant watch is kept on all that may be going on there; but we sympathize heartily with the Government of India in the very difficult problem which is now before it, and feel sure that it will be guided to do what is just and right.

HENRY MORRIS.

ART. III.—THE SAMARITAN PENTATEUCH.[1]

IV.

THE eighth and last class of variants in Gesenius' classification contains alterations made, as he considers, in favour of Samaritan theology. This, which is really a very small class of various readings, appears to be popularly looked on as if it were almost the whole.

The probability that manuscripts in the possession of the Samaritans, and still more copies of such manuscripts, might be so altered has been pointed out already, and has evidently nothing to do with the origin and age of the Codex itself, and not much to do with the value of the multitudinous variants which have no possible bearing on the differences between the Samaritans and the Jews. And, on the other hand, it must not be forgotten that, if the Samaritans during the period in which the Codex was in their hands may have made, which is certainly possible, a few alterations favourable to their own opinions or practices, we have not only reason to suspect, but ground for believing, that the Masorites during the hundreds of years, from about the sixth century of our era to the tenth, in which they were completing their very minute revision, made very considerable alterations in the Jewish Codex in opposition to Christianity.

This opinion has very sufficient grounds. The fact has already been referred to, as borne witness to by Abul-Pharagi, with reference to the chronology; implied by Jerome's asser-

[1] I., II., III.: April, 1894; July, 1894; March, 1895.