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THE PROBLEM OF MONISM

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"Monism! A Monistic View of the World!" That these words are in our time the watchword for a great number of people is not necessary to be amply proved. Everybody knows that even a league has been formed which takes these words as a motto and manifests considerable activity. These facts would in themselves be a sufficient occasion for us to occupy ourselves with the question of Monism; however, another reason may be added. The exponents of Monism dogmatically assert that only their own view of the world satisfies the logical demand of the human mind. For thinking man feels in himself the inevitable impulse to advance to a uniform conception of the world. Thus everyone who thinks on the reason of Monism has his share in the endeavor of mankind to be perfectly satisfied in spirit. How could we avoid such various impulses to form an opinion on Monism? Therefore, I beg to offer in the following lines some contribution to an investigation of Monism.

This is rendered more difficult by the fact that nowadays three kinds of Monism strive for the applause of our contemporaries. We have, therefore, nothing less to do than examine these three Monistic points of view each by itself.

I

The first or chief Monistic position is what may be called Psycho-Monism. This has been defended especially by Dr. Max Verworn (Professor of Physiology at Bonn). He did so in his essay, "Naturwissenschaft und Weltanschauung." His chief proposition is, "There is in reality no contrast between the physical world and psyche, for

the whole physical world forms only the contents of human psyche." This kind of Monism, therefore, considers the imaginations of the soul as the only uniform realm of all realities or, rather, of all phenomena.

In considering this first kind of Monism our attention must be turned to the fact that a natural philosopher is so much addicted to Kant's theory of cognition as to represent the states of the soul as the only world of reality. This fact alone is of great historical interest. For in the last centuries it was a significant fact known to the attentive student of intellectual movements that the theory of cognition following Kant's philosophy, according to which all of man's knowledge consists only of his own conceptions, made but little conquest among natural philosophers. Thus, for instance, the celebrated physicist, Helmholtz, declared, "In the beginning of my career I was a more convinced adherent of Kant's philosophy than I am now."[1] On the contrary, in the *Psycho-Monism* of Verworn a medical man stands quite on the basis of the theory of cognition following Kant. Now it is of importance to form a just opinion of this Psycho-Monism.

To attain this end, I shall not render the proposition so easy as only to raise the question, "Is the corpse which lies before the medical student on a table, and whose members he dissects, with any probability only a creation of human psyche?" On the other hand, I think that I need do no more for the critical examination of Psycho-Monism than to develop the following propositions:

Kant's doctrine of the relation of human cognition to the external world assumes that man is altogether restricted to the circle of the operations of his own soul. This theory denies that man can approach by his perceptions an objective external world. It denies that man can recognize "the thing in itself." The whole world, according to this doctrine, is built up for man only by the perceptions of his own senses.

This theory of cognition of Kant, however, shows, *first*, such a weak point as might well be called a mortiferous wound, or the tendon of Achilles of this theory. That is

[1]See Helmholtz, Preface of first volume of his "Vorträge," etc.

to say that, although according to Kant human spirit must be deprived of all perception of "the thing in itself," Kant himself could not avoid asserting something of "the thing in itself." He was obliged to give the declaration of its working on our sensational nerves. He was forced to do this or else our sensations would have no cause. So he must attribute to man the faculty to recognize "the thing in itself," at least as a cause. This first objection to the perfect accuracy of Kant's theory of cognition removes from it its ultimate foundation. This objection throws down the corner-stone of the whole building.

But, *secondly*, this theory shows at the very top and starting point a dangerous weakness. For not even the single certain sensations of man are without dependence on the external world. For in seeing a red ball lying beside a green one we rightly conclude from the difference of this color sensation that there must be an objective difference between the two perceived things. Here it is quite indifferent that physiology teaches that colors are produced only during the process of our sensation. For physics proves at once that if a man with normal eyes sees a green object, we may conclude that there are rays possessing a certain number of vibrations. From the change in the appearance, thus, a variety of *things* existing without us must be argued. The differences of the appearances must be *parallel* to the differences of things. The human eye can certainly not be the cause of seeing a red or a green ball. For in perceiving at the same time the two differently colored balls, the eye remains essentially the same instrument. Human perception is, therefore, in causal connection with an external world so that it *causes* an *effect* in the eye.

But, *thirdly*, has Professor Verworn himself been able to sustain Psycho-Monism logically? He says, indeed: "The stone is heavy. That is a sensation. The stone is cold. That is another sensation, etc." But it would have been more correct for him to say: The heaviness of the stone is a sensation *for us*. For our having a sensation of the heaviness of the stone does not prove that the heavy stone exists only in our sensations. Professor Verworn

speaks also of the rays of light and the length of the waves (l. c., p. 21) and calls them conditions of the sensation of "blue." But, according to his theory, he assumes that *every* thing is only a sensation of the soul! Are the "conditions," perhaps, also stored up in the soul as its contents? No; his manner of expressing himself betrays that he himself has not been able to sustain his theory of cognition.

Therefore, he has not succeeded in upholding Psycho-Monism. Even its most sagacious defender has not been able to remove either the casual connection of our perceptions with an external world or the parallelism between our sensations and the things without us. Consequently he cannot contradict the fact that *besides* the contents of the soul, and independent of them, there is an external world of realities. Therefore, the "contents of the soul" are *not* the only realm of reality, as Psycho-Monism asserts.

II

In another camp of the "German League for Monism" they fight for *materialistic* Monism. Everyone knows that in this camp the zoologist, Ernest Haeckel (of the University of Jena), was the leader; for he published the well-known book, "Die Welträtzel" (1899). With a frankness worthy of commendation he calls his opinion a renaissance of Spinoza's philosophical system, and claims to have founded "Substance-Monism" in following this philosopher. Has he succeeded?

The verdict on the explanation of the world which Haeckel gives may, in my opinion, be expressed in the two following propositions: First, he tries to deny spirit where it is really existent and manifest in the world; and, secondly, he tries to introduce spirit, that is to say, he chooses to suppose its presence where it cannot be proved to exist in the sphere of reality. I shall proceed to investigate these two propositions each in its turn.

(a) One glimpse into the realms of plants and of animals discloses the fact that every organism is ruled by an *inherent law* with regard to form, quantity, means of provision, duration of life, etc. To whom does it not occur

that out of the seed of the fir-tree there grows up a slender stem with a top straight as a rush, whereas the seed of a lime-tree produces a tree with a cupola-shaped crown? How remarkable is also the generally established relative size of plants and of animals. Besides, it is really striking that certain plants thrive only in a certain kind of soil. Does a fly become ten or a horse fifty years old? These examples may suffice to illustrate that phase of the *inherent law* which exercises a mystical rule on all kinds of organisms! Such *inherent laws* of nature manifest themselves also in many other phenomena. For carbonic acid, so pernicious to the organism of men and animals, serves plants in their growth; and, just the contrary, plants exhale oxygen, which forms an elixir of life to animals and men. But what is still more astonishing is that there is not only a distinction of sexes, but that also a constant proportion between the number of the representatives of the sexes is evident among human beings, one hundred and six male births corresponding on an average to one hundred female births. Whoever, furthermore, considers the construction of an eye cannot fail to see that nature shows constructions resembling the works of human *intelligence*, or we must rather say that, for instance, a bridge with its arches is far surpassed by the construction of the system of the world. The only rational conclusion is, therefore, that those inherent laws which rule each type of plants and the last mentioned cases of constructions in the world, must be referred to the agency of a designing spirit.

How does Haeckel reconcile these facts? He leaves those inherent laws of nature just mentioned quite unexplained; and with regard to such constructions as we admire, for instance, in the human eye, he chooses to take shelter behind the formula that these constructions of nature are founded on "functional self-formation."[2] But this is altogether an untenable position. For instance, he must demonstrate that the parts of the eye could already perform the act of seeing *before* they possessed their

[2]In "Die Lebenswunder" (1904), p. 365: "Funktionelle selbstgestaltung."

present quality and composition. Or, for instance, the reproductive organs of various plants *could not yet perform their services* when they had not yet reached that length to send the pollen of the stamina to the stigma. Consequently, they could not shape themselves by their function. And how are to be derived from Haeckel's "functional self-formation" the tusks of the male elephant or the mane of the male lion or the elegant tail of the peacock? The last mentioned form, furthermore, cannot be explained from the striving after its possession, even if this cause may be considered possible at all. For, certainly, also the pea-hens might have entertained the wish of possessing such an ornament. Acording to all this, it is undeniable that in the universe the action of a mysterious *intelligence* is manifest; nor has Haeckel succeeded in excluding from the universe this intelligence with its subject, that is, the spirit.

(b) On the other hand, it is evident by many statements of Professor Haeckel that he boasts in vain with his Monistic League to have constructed a Monistic view of the world. For he renders uniformity in the elements of the world plausible only in the following way. Whereas he denies world intelligence where it exists in real analogies, *he puts animation in realms* where, according to the opinion of so many other scholars, there can be no animation.

He speaks, we know, of a cell-soul and employs the word "Cellular-Psychology," so impressive to the unlearned multitude. He asserts, moreover, that the coral-stock, an inorganic formation, is, in his opinion, composed of "persons," as he announces in spaced letters in his book, "Die Lebenswunder" (p. 168). Thus he makes a part of the mineral kingdom consist of beings possessing self-consciousness and self-determination. This would be tolerable if he had said so only as a poet, if the coralstock was only to be personified. But this is not the case. He asserts it to be philosophical truth. But in the face of such facts, Kant is probably right in saying: "I should at once descend from the back of my horse and treat it as a rational being if I could gain the conviction that it

was possessed of the idea of self." Consequently, neither did Haeckel succeed in removing the barriers which exist in the universe between the kingdoms of the unconscious and the conscious (that is, the spiritual), which, in fact, certainly exist.

So "Substance-Monism" shows two mortal weaknesses. First, it wrongly denies that in the universe intellect has worked as a moving principle, whereas the universe shows appearances which, *according to the analogy of reality*, can owe their existence only to the intelligence of a spirit highly surpassing all human understanding. Secondly, even at a risk of a contradiction of his materialistic point of departure, Haeckel chooses to ascribe a soul or spirit even to the constitutive elements of the world, in which exact investigation cannot prove the least trace of a soul. But it is impossible to make the universe a unity, either by that operation of depriving the universe of intellectuality, or by this manipulation by means of a liberal distribution of intellect.

III

Perhaps, then, the wish, quite justified in itself, for a uniform view of the world has been realized in the *third* and most modern kind of Monism. This third kind has been described by Dr. Med. Franze in his essay on "Monismus des Geistes" (1907).

He says in the introduction that he considers it "a duty to call public attention to the fact that to apply really logical thinking to the most modern and best attainments of physics brings to light the direct metaphysical opposite of a materialistic view of the world, that is to say, the explanation of all things being and occurring from their *spiritual* contents alone; and that is the Monism of Spirit." But in what sense may this expression be meant? We get an idea of this sense by noting the import of these words. In them the author indicates that physics is, nowadays, more and more being ruled by *Dynamic-Monism* by which all events are to be explained as purely energetic. This kind of Monism is, in his opinion, involved in the dynamic theory of electrons. If this theory be put in the centers of argumentation, it may supposedly

easily be shown that "Spiritual-Monism" is that view of the world which must be called with the greatest probability the right one.

Let us see how this point of view is to be further established. Continuing his argument, Dr. Franze appeals at first to the well-known Berlin physiologist, Dubois-Reymond, and emphasizes how justly the latter in his celebrated speech on "Die Grenzen des Naturerkennens," asserted that it is impossible to derive spiritual occurrences from material conditions. This is nowadays, in his opinion, plainly considered as a fact. But recently scholars have shown that the formerly supposed atoms may be divided again into still smaller particles as they divide themselves again by self-irradiation of radio-active substances (uranium, thorium, and radium). These smallest particles now found are according to him *not* really *material* particles. Electrons are by a number of physicists rather justly considered as "only specially limited energy or elementary limited quantity of electricity." A similar assertion has besides been made by the renowned chemist, W. Ostwald (Leipzig); for this latter authority established, in a highly interesting speech, the assertion, "Matter (materia) is nothing but a specially arranged group of different energies, and all that we assert of it, we assert of this energy."

Even now, at this point, I must interrupt Dr. Franze's reasoning with an objection. For I beg to refute the identification of matter (materia)and energy. For if what we assert of the energy of some matter we assert also at the same time of matter itself no identity of matter and energy results from this at all. Apart from energy, matter exists still, from which energy emanates. There is no doubt that every force must have something by which it is supported. This is also confirmed by actual experiment. For the kind of our perception is *different* with regard to energy and with regard to matter. We certainly feel the warmth which, for instance, is sent forth by a stove; but in reacting upon warmth we are not as much hurt by running against it as in beating against a stove, which produces perhaps a blue mark on the arm. So I

can only judge that energy takes its origin in matter which supports it, or clings to substances, however small they may be, as is the case with electricity.

But the chief point is the following assertion of Dr. Franze. He says (p. 5), "All psychological phenomena must be in an analogous relation to matter as to energy. Now, I have shown the possibility of reducing matter altogether to energy. Analogously, all matter, even inorganic matter, must be *animated* in the same measure as it is affected by energy." He intends to give the proof of it in the following words: "Since, as Dubois-Reymond has proved, psychical qualities cannot be derived from mechanical conditions, another principle than mere mechanics must first of all be introduced, at any rate, in order to explain *organic* nature completely. Now we have, further, taken Monism for granted. Hence it follows that the same principle that is required in organic matter in order to explain psychical processes must exist already in *inorganic* matter; for if this were not the case we should have a kind of dualism which we have rejected *a priori*" (p. 5f). By these reasons—thus he concludes—Spiritual Monism, as a view of the world, is derived from the dynamism of physics.

Judging the value of this kind of Monism, one must be strongly tempted to repeat the words of Horatius: "Parturiunt montes, exit ridiculus mus." At any rate, the criticism of this "Monism of Spirit" may be given in the following few words:

What is the last argument to which Dr. Franze resorts? Only this, that he assumes "Monism as given." *That* is the reason why, according to his doctrine, even the inorganic constituents of nature must be *animated. That* is the reason why he asserts the "animation of every part of matter." *That* is the reason why he concludes that energy may be reduced to a psychical quality (p. 6). This professed argumentation is the best example of equivocation that has occurred of late, and the best feature of it is that Dr. Franze several times positively emphasizes openly this manner of his procedure. In this respect he

may be considered as a model. The rest of his whole fabric collapses of itself.

For, *first*, he argues wrongly, as has been proved already above, that he can deny the supporter of a power besides the power itself; and, *secondly*, he tries to put energy on an equality with mental power. Motion, however, is not equal to thinking. For where else but in the head of man would motion be equal to thinking? As thinking takes place only here, there must exist here a *special* condition for this process, and that is supplied by the soul, the supporter of our consciousness, not dependent upon nor affected by change of matter and the subject of our thinking. This soul in man is the spirit in the true sense of the word; and as it (the soul) alone practices thinking and is the supporter of a real intelligence, it forms the analogon to a world-spirit which is the subject of thinking, whose efficacy in the world cannot be denied after the above intimated observations of empirical science.

Now, there stand the three forms under which Monism has presented itself of late, as the true uniform view of the world, before our intellectual eye. In each form the foundations have been proved unsound, and the materials of the building not trustworthy.

But must we for this reason renounce a *uniform view of the world?* By no means! For uniformity is *not* sameness, and harmony is *not* identity. The truly harmonious view of the world and of history has long been found: the universe in which traces of intellect cannot be denied has been projected by an absolute Spirit, and is being developed to a sublime end by its first Mover in the course of time.

MUSIC IN THE EVOLUTION OF CIVILIZATION

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IT it claimed that music is the fourth necessity of life, and that the American people are rapidly approaching a full realization of this. This is a musical age. Such statements are undoubtedly true, although much of the music performed today in this country is very poor stuff, and many who attend concerts and musical entertainments do so simply to be up-to-date. During the most musical periods of time there are to be found many unmusical people, who are unable to take pleasure in musical art, because their ears are inaccessible to, and their imagination not fitted for, this kind of impression. For these people, however, the field of musical art need not be a marked off, and barred up territory; they may turn its riches to good account, if not directly for aesthetic gratification, then at least indirectly for theoretic education. Music may be considered not only as an art in itself, in relation to its own peculiar ideal and material, but also as an important factor in the evolution of civilization.

By way of introduction, before we take up the subject proper, let us refer to a name, which is of little or no importance in the field of musical composition, but is great in the field of literature of music, a name which ought to be mentioned in connection with that of Lessing, but is usually passed by with inequitable silence by the historians. Leading investigators of the 18th century have nothing to say about the dashing and original writings of Johann Mattheson, that strange fellow, precisian, charlatan, and great reformer, by his own time overestimated and despised, and by posterity forgotten. Yet Mattheson advanced theories long before the time of Winckelmann and Lessing, which have been incorrectly ascribed to the latter men. During the first half of the 18th century, at a time when the sturdy French classicalism ruled the world and the most absurd conceptions of the nature and object of music prevailed everywhere, Johann

Mattheson dared to talk about the political significance of music, urged a deeper study of the history of music, and referred those who desired to compose noble melodies to a serious study of the plastic art of classical antiquity. Lessing warned against the intermixture of foreign art-styles in painting, sculpture, etc., and Mattheson did the same thing with respect to music, and that much earlier and just as vigorously, if not as scientifically. Mattheson battled boldly against those sophistic musicians who endeavored to transfer the objects of poetry and painting over into music, who sought to interpret the content of Ovid's Metaphors in instrumental symphonies, who endeavored to picture Saul's madness by absurd harmonies and false melodic progressions, etc. Mattheson was influenced by the delusions of his age, but in his writings there are to be found a great many true and noble ideas, which have been of great value to later scientific research in the field of music. We call attention to the following ideas of Mattheson, which may serve as examples of his good thinking. He called pantomime a dumb music, and drew the same parallel between music and architecture which in the writings of Goethe and Schlegel was admired as something new and striking. He also declared that the motto of music ought to be "Discordia Concors" (unity in discord). He enlarged the musical vocabulary of his mother tongue to a very marked extent. We are indebted to Mattheson for a great many technical terms in music, which have passed over to us from the German language.

We do not disregard, nor do we depreciate the value of that conquest in behalf of the philosophy of art which Lessing carried out with far better weapons than Mattheson. The latter does not deserve the same place as the former, but he certainly deserves mention and recognition. In what has been said above, we have only wished to point out how instructive the study of the history of the literature about music may be, and at the same time to show that this study has been neglected by the representatives of the annals of human culture. We shall now

proceed to our subejct—Music in the Evolution of Civilization.

The importance of music in the evolution of civilization is, of course, dependent upon music's own character and object. If it be claimed that music's object is to interpret artistically the inner activities of the soul, in their whole range from pleasure to pain, with all the intervening lights and shades, in their isolation as well as in their mutual harmony and conflict, in their form of quiescent perception as well as of action-begging impulses —then music's place and interest to the historian is absolutely fixed by this its inner character or quality. Emotion is a most indivisible thing, the most individualistic in man, that in which a human being is himself and nobody else. But there are individuals on a large scale, so to speak, there are individuals which we call nations, peoples, races, etc., and these consist, respectively, of many human beings, who feel pretty well in the same way, but unlike all other similar groups. However, it must be observed that they all, since they are all human beings, must feel in some general way, or must possess in all their emotional life some certain unity, which admits some general conception and estimation of things. And what is true of the various peoples, is true also, in a certain sense, of the various periods of time.

Powerfully and directly to assert those inner soul movements and revolutions, those sentiments and passions, which have been the cause of, and which have been reacted against, by the outer, political and social revolutions in history, and to visualize in warm and deep colors for sympathetic thought the individual characteristics of the different peoples and periods of time, *this* is the significance of music as a factor in the evolution of civilization. An inconvenience arises here. Emotional life can never be fully exhausted in any kind of apprehension, not even the apprehension of music. Mysterious in itself, it is indefinite in its expression. Tunes that were originally set to secular poems have been used for church hymns, and vice versa. But if musical works are regarded as a whole, in their mass, origin, details, and co-

herence, with other spiritual and sensuous phenomena in the process and progress of civilization, then the element of inconvenience, above referred to, will largely disappear; and the products of music become an invaluable means for a living conception of the innermost soul of the various peoples and periods of time. No one can deny that Italian music possesses a decidedly different character from French music. The merry sensuousness of the Italians, the dramatic liveliness of the French, the brooding emotionality of the Germans, all these things have found expression in music, just as faithfully, and even more irresistibly convincing, than in poetry and painting. Even within the same nation the climatic and provincial differences may be distinctly reflected in the movable waters of the sea of musical notes; compare, for example, Bach and Haydn, or Schumann and Schubert, and the difference between the northern and the southern German character can be clearly seen.

Music as a well developed art is the youngest in the family of the fine arts, and its real history is not as old as that of Christianity. Classical antiquity was too objective and too plastic to be able to support a richer development of the art of subjective emotion. Emotion in classical antiquity was fettered; Christianity liberated emotion and opened the sluices of the soul. That music did not attain any greater development even during the Middle Ages, was due partly to the obstructive conservatism of the Church, which took music into its work, and partly to the difficulties in the investigation of the mysteries of harmony and counterpoint. However, the study of the music of these two periods of time may be instructive for a correct conception of them. Music's comparatively subordinate significance in Greek art is the strongest indirect evidence that can be given for the preponderatingly plastic talents of the Greeks. On the other hand, the *"cantus firmus"* which was chained to the altar of St. Peter's church at Rome, to prevail for centuries as the standard for the musical part of public worship, is a most eloquent symbol of the great and firm authority of the Roman church.

In Hucbald's atrocious "organum" (parallel intervals of fourths and fifths), of the tenth century, Harmony took its first tottering steps; in the so-called "*discantus*" (singing apart), of the eleventh century, Counterpoint tried its weak wings. Not until the fifteenth century, in the Netherland school of musical composition, did Harmony and Counterpoint attain artistic form. The Netherlanders —as epochmaking in music as in painting—show very clearly in their audacious and sagacious melodies the spirit of the times which gave birth to Gothic art and Scholasticism. We can see in their original melodies the new demand of freedom for the individual, favoured by the rise of the spirit of exploration, advancement in civic matters, and better business; on the other hand, this independence in their music was as yet restricted by the stiff and strictly "canonical" form which it assumed and which unquestionably had a touch of subtlety and hair-splitting—this may well be called scholasticism.

There is much important and very interesting ethnographical material in folk-music, because nowhere has the human race so frankly and so faithfully expressed its joys and sorrows, its love-yearnings and its love of life, as in its songs.

The Reformation brought Christianity, which had degenerated into empty superficialities, back to its original purity. The great step from the legalism of Catholicism over into the inner world of the spirit was taken through the Reformation, and the religious consciousness gained immensely in depth. The popes (excluding Julius II and Leo X) took energetic steps to protect the church against the powerful movements of Protestantism. A regeneration of Catholicism followed. These great movements ushered in the world-historic birthday of musical art, as a higher and greater art. These great movements brought music into social life more fully, and liberated the art from scholasticism. Music became the leading art and the voice of the new spirit, and that to such an extent that in later centuries music gained the most important place in the artistic or aesthetic consciousness. Music, while enjoying very widespread sympathy, stirred

up that which slumbered deeply in the human soul; and brought out those qualities which are common to all.

Protestantism expressed itself very powerfully through a new kind of song, and the regenerated Catholicism found expression in Palestrina's new Masses. In both directions emotion threw off its loosened fetters. In both directions there is to be seen the most fervent and unaffected devotion. And yet how different! It is the devotion of the Protestant and of the Catholic, it is the Teutonic and the Romanic conception of Christianity. On one hand, an unshakable resignation on the part of the subject under the universality of papacy, on the other hand, a free and healthy democracy; on one hand, a boundless peace, an undisturbed seraphic blessedness, on the other hand, a fearless and glorious struggle for salvation, an *"ecclesia militans"* (very clearly seen in the wonderful church music of J. S. Bach, the great master musician and the musical climax of Lutheranism); on one hand, the solemn old Gregorian music, on the other hand a richer harmonic crisis and a good singable hymn-tune. But on both sides, the Catholic and the Protestant, there was great sowing going on, which resulted in a most glorious bloom in the field of musical art.

Palestrina (1526-1594) is the outstanding musical figure of the Roman church. From Palestrina's great Masses to Rossini's Stabat Mater (1830) and Verdi's Requiem (1874) there is a long step which signifies a process of gradual detaching of the subject from the authority of the church, under the influence of a secular art-form which became very popular, although it originated in an exclusively aristocratic circle, namely the Opera.

The Italian opera is a child of the Renaissance. It was supposed to be a restoration of the ancient Athenian drama. This, however, was an illusion. But the new art-form was a matter of great importance, because it brought music out from the dusk of the church and into the world, so that music henceforth could take part in all the joys and sorrows of the people. It liberated music from the domination of the old church modes (the Gregorian music system), and brought about a symmetrical

and well rounded construction of tunes and melodies. The invention of the opera is really a very significant thing in the field of musical art—it was a big thing for music. However, the aesthetic authority of the opera has been much disputed, and the worth and value of the Italian opera, at least during the 17th and 18th centuries, was very low. The Italian opera could not disclaim its kinship with the pseudo-classical pastoral play; and finally degenerated to the most deplorable aberrations, and the most discreditable dependence upon outer, adventitious, and technical attributes. But the Italian opera offers a very instructive field of study to the student of history, and presents splendid illustrations of the corruption of the time and the luxury of the court. Fabulous sums were lavished upon operatic equipment. The people were wild in their enthusiasm over operatic performances. Faustina Bordoni, a famous singer of the 18th century, was called a kitchen-maid of Venus, void of all womanliness. Most admired of all were the male sopranos and contraltos (*evirati*), who retained their boys' voices in consequence of a brutal operation, which was everywhere contrary to law, but encouraged by the theatre and even tolerated in the church. It would be very difficult to find a graver and plainer evidence of the unnaturalness of that time.

German and Italian music are opposites, dependent upon the more abstract nature of the German and the more sensuous nature of the Italian, opposites which are calculated to perfect each other. In Italy the principle of *melody* is foremost, while Germany is the home of *harmony*, polyphony, and advanced counterpoint. France is also represented by its own principle, which seems to occupy a place midway between German and Italian music. French music leans sometimes towards the Italian and sometimes towards the German musical tendencies; but peculiar to French music, in consequence of the French union of sensuous vivacity and abstract wisdom, is the predominance of the element of *rhythm*. The three essential factors of music are: Rhythm (France), Melody (Italy), and Harmony (Germany).

We approach now a time which offers even more in-

terest than the preceding, partly because emotion and individuality appear and develop more freely, and, in consequence of this, the musical notes of Euterpes become richer and fuller; and partly because we can now point to great individual examples of various musical types. The first great musical figure to be considered is Johann Sebastian Bach (1685-1750).

A careful study of J. S. Bach and others, and also of the Oratorio, is reserved for a subsequent article.