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SOME FACTORS IN EARLY HEBREW HISTORY[1]

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I

THE religious interest attaching to the fortunes of Abraham and his descendants up to the time of the schism inevitably overshadows the political aspects of the history, even in circles that accept the historical nature of the early records. Comparatively little thought is devoted to a consideration of the forces that were at play in the creation and molding of the nation. Yet it is not difficult to show that this neglect is unwarrantable. So far from meriting less attention than the secular history of other nations, the causes that influenced the making of the Jews are deserving of study on two grounds. They possess the fascination and value of historical factors in the same measure as those that have helped to form other secular history. In addition they claim our consideration because of their effect on the religion. Life, however many-sided, is always a unity, and no single facet of it is ever isolated in a water-tight compartment shut off from all others. The study of any great branch of a people's activity cannot be wholly disjoined from the background afforded by the other phases of the national life, least of all where the most vital manifestations of that activity are evoked by extraordinary crises in its political experiences. How inseparable politics and religion are in the case we have to consider is most easily shown by an illustration. Cut out all that depends on the sojourn in Egypt, the Exodus, the wanderings, and the monarchy and achievements of

[1] Owing to space limitations, many Biblical passages that would otherwise have been quoted have merely been cited. It is hoped that the reader will make allowances for the difficulties of production at the present time and look up the references where necessary.

David and his successors, and what would remain of the religion of Israel? The connection is so close that any real divorce of the religious history from the national is unthinkable; and in the long run we shall understand the religion the better if we attempt for once to study the development primarily from the secular point of view, regarding the religion as only one of the factors in the growth of the nation.

One of the first things that must strike any attentive observer of the patriarchal history is the tendency to separate. In other words, there is a centrifugal force or centrifugal forces at work. Abraham separates from his brothers; then Lot and Abraham, Isaac and Ishmael, Jacob and Esau, fall apart, and there are incipient divisions between Jacob's sons; while in Gen xxv 6 we read how Abraham sent away the sons of the concubines. Sometimes one reason is assigned, sometimes another; but, underlying and emphasizing all the actual occasions for separation, one great force is operative. It is the natural tendency to centrifugalism which is inherent in the psychology of the race. How far it was checked at a later stage we shall have to consider hereafter; but, for the moment, we have to emphasize the existence of this tendency, and then note the secondary causes which assisted its development or perhaps in some cases only gave expression to it.

Undoubtedly the first of these causes is the idealism of the race. From first to last this is to be seen operating — fostering and emphasizing the centrifugal tendency for the most part, though sometimes acting as a unifying force. This idealism manifests itself particularly in two forms, but these are closely intertwined — the relationship towards God and the desire for political and territorial greatness. The command to Abraham to leave his kindred and his country permits no doubt as to this: "I will make of thee a great nation, and I will bless thee and make thy name great: and be thou a blessing" (Gen xii 2); "Unto thy seed will I give this land" (ver. 7). These ideas

recur again and again, but for the moment one only of their consequences is of special interest to us — the natural tendency to aloofness and separation that they would foster in the early days of the race.

Next to the centrifugal tendencies of the idealism we may mention two other internal causes, that might have proved less effective in a people of somewhat different psychology — the recurring jealousies and the effects of differences of temperament. The hostility of Sarah and Hagar (Gen xvi, xxi 9 ff.), with the consequent friction between Ishmael and Sarah (xxi 9–14), the natural incompatibility of Jacob and Esau, the jealousy of Joseph's brothers, were all contributory to the dominance of centrifugalism. Had there been any adequate binding force to counteract them during this period, the result might have been different; but in the earlier parts of the Genesis narrative nothing of the kind can be traced.

The natural expansion of the patriarchal *familiæ* — to borrow the appropriate term from Roman law — inevitably drove the wedge home. The patriarchs were individuals, but their households consisted not merely of wives and children, but also of slaves. The conception that they were tribes or clans lacks foundation; but the sources make it abundantly clear that they were the heads of very large familiæ. The narrative of the separation of Abraham and Lot throws light on the disruptive force of expansion with the friction it brought in its train (Gen xiii 5–7). The two reasons given for the parting — the inability of the land to bear them both, and the strife between their herdsmen — are in reality one, for it was the expansion that rendered the strife a serious factor, even if it did not originally cause it.

Thus the first great tendency that we find at work dominating the history of the period is centrifugalism, fostered and increased by various minor forces operating for a long time without any visible check. Nor should we fail to note that the semi-nomad stage of civilization to which the patriarchs belong, with its lack of a permanent territory,

provided conditions that were singularly favorable to the free play of the disruptive forces.

If the idealism of the race contributed to the strength of centrifugalism, it also operated to shape its fortunes in other ways. The special relationship to God, the tendency towards what may be called separateness (i.e. the ideal of becoming a separated people), the strong consciousness of being links in the great living chain of generations that inherited the covenants, are all evident in the narratives of Genesis. Taken together with the fact that the patriarchs were strangers and sojourners in the land, and with the practice on an extensive scale of endogamy, these traits had the effect of making a stock of which, in the future, it might be truly said, "Lo, it is a people that dwell alone" (Nu xxiii 9). Most of the factors are too obvious to call for further notice.

Centrifugalism and separateness are thus the two dominating tendencies of the period; and in regard to both we find internal factors, rooted in psychology, called into play and reënforced by the pressure of external influences. If, for example, the tendency to separateness leads naturally to endogamy, we find this strengthened by such causes as the friction between Rebekah and her Hittite daughters-in-law (Gen xxvii 46 ff.), the religious barrier between Israel and Shechem (Gen xxxiv), and the position of foreigners occupied by the patriarchs in Palestine.

But history is molded not merely by general tendencies, and even in this period we see two other vital factors at work — the personality of one great man, Abraham, and the distinctive quality of his religion. Both of these are better considered later, when the materials for comparison and contrast throw into relief the essential aspects. For the moment it is sufficient to point to the fact that, without the personality and religion of Abraham, there would have been no Moses or David, no Israel or Judah.

When the Israelites descended into Egypt the two great tendencies were still at work. True, endogamy is no longer the absolute rule, as we see from Gen xxxviii and xli 45;

and the mixed multitude of Exodus shows that unions with Egyptians became common. On the other hand, the refusal of Egyptians to eat with Hebrews (Gen xliii 32), and the religious and racial differences, contributed to the strengthening of the feeling of separateness; and this probably received a powerful impulse, at the time of the expulsion of the Hyksos, from the wave of anti-foreign feeling represented by Ahmose.

Our authorities present us with a complete blank for the period between the death of Joseph and the accession of Ramses II., except, perhaps, for one notice.[1] We read in 1 Ch vii 21 ff. of certain sons of Ephraim "whom the men of Gath that were born in the land slew, because they came down to take away their cattle." This looks as if Ephraimites had made an unsuccessful raid on Gath during the Egyptian period; and when the small extent of the cities of that day is remembered, and the insignificance of the forces employed in their defense,[2] there is nothing improbable in the notice. The information about Sheerah is too scanty to permit any considerable inferences to be drawn; but, taking the two items together, we may hold that in the Chronicler's view the Ephraimites did not simply remain rooted in Goshen for 400 years.

[1] This is, however, of doubtful interpretation and value.

[2] See BS, Jan. 1917, pp. 107–110. Professor M. Löhr, who has read this in typescript, kindly draws my attention to the fact that the expression "came down," which is here used of the Ephraimites, is inept for persons coming from Egypt. He urges, therefore, that they are probably regarded as occupying Mt. Ephraim, so that the notice refers to some period subsequent to the Conquest. The point appears to be well taken, but I scarcely think it decisive. The Chronicler seems to have considered that the episode occurred in the lifetime of Ephraim. We do not know with certainty where Gath was situated, and we cannot be sure that its position together with the particular route taken by the Ephraimites, or possibly even some special linguistic usage current when this notice received its present form, did not justify the employment of the term. Or again the Chronicler may have used an infelicitous expression in summarizing the information before him. Hence it may be that if we knew more, the linguistic difficulty would disappear.

The Egyptian period first introduces us to the full operation of that great force which throughout the national history has shared with the religious motive and the influence of separatism the task of combating centrifugalism, viz. foreign pressure. In the patriarchal age there had been signs of it in the friction with Abimelech's servants (Gen xxi 25, xxvi 25 ff.), but the men of Shechem had been prepared to fuse themselves into a single people with the Israelites; and, with the freedom of intermarriage observable during the Egyptian period, the absorption of Israel into other peoples was not inconceivable. The anti-foreign feeling roused by the Hyksos domination, which led to the expulsion of that people, has already been noticed: nor must it be forgotten that from the first the Israelites had been quartered in a special district (Goshen), where, as we know from Papyrus Anastasi VI., foreign nomads and their herds were sometimes sustained in the domain of Pharaoh. When Pithom and Raamses were built as store-cities, Egyptian garrisons and populations would be introduced into the district. But by that time the policy of oppression inaugurated by Ramses II. was already counteracting centrifugalism in the strongest possible way. On the whole, then, the forces at work during this period inevitably tended to strengthen the separateness of the people and to prevent its assimilation or disruption. At this point it is desirable to glance at the organization that had developed. We read of elders, who of course would be purely tribal, and "officers of the children of Israel which Pharaoh's taskmasters had set over them" (Ex v 14), but there is no sign whatever of any national authority. And in the Mosaic age we find the tribal sentiment dominant. At Sinai twelve pillars, according to the twelve tribes of Israel (Ex xxiv 4), are erected. The spies, judges, and officers are appointed by tribes (Nu xiii, Dt xvi 18), the land law is purely tribal, and the feeling is so strong that, in the case of heiresses, intermarriage with men of another tribe is prohibited (Nu xxxvi). Here we find the sentiment asserting itself in a way that shows how far the tribe was

from being merged in the nation. For our present purpose we are concerned to emphasize the connection between tribalism and centrifugalism. Where the tribal feeling overshadows the national, the soil is prepared for disintegration and civil war, and the principle of centrifugalism finds full scope. On the other hand, external pressure might be — and at certain periods actually was — strong enough to counterbalance the tribal centrifugalism.

Thus, by the end of the Egyptian period, all the main influences that were to mold the history of the people throughout the ages had come into play. Centrifugalism and separatism, the special religious position and external pressure, — those are the four great forces that stand out in the web of the national history, mingling though they do at all times with other factors, personal, climatic, economic, intellectual, and so forth.

The oppression inevitably led to a revival of national and religious feeling among the Hebrews. We see its first recorded manifestation in the narrative of Moses' intervention in the dispute between a Hebrew and an Egyptian. The people who had not been too faithful to the God of Abraham (Ezk xxiii 3, 8, etc.) naturally began to remember Him in their distress. Then came the death of Ramses, the revelation on the Mount, and the return of Moses. In the succeeding plagues the strife of the peoples is merged in the battle of the gods. The great deliverance and the events leading up to it constituted a manifestation of the divine power which sank deep into the national consciousness, and has never ceased to operate by way of tightening the grip of the religion on the people. It was the deliverance from Egypt that, more than any part of the formative period, decided the future history of the Israelites.

We have, then, a loose aggregation of tribes, bound together by a common descent, a common danger, a common history, a common relationship to their God, and the preeminent leadership of one man. For the moment centrifugalism was outmatched by the perilous situation in which they all stood. Behind them was the Egyptian *corvée,* in

front the Amalekites. We cannot now identify with certainty the site of the first battle, but it is absolutely clear from Ex xvii 8 ff. that the united forces of Israel had some difficulty in defeating the enemy. Had they been divided into two or more federations of tribes, the separate bodies would have suffered overwhelming defeat. Secession was not a practical possibility in the Mosaic age, for it must have meant destruction to all the separate parts.

In approaching the work of the desert period it is well to glance at some of the conditions under which it had to be accomplished. Our information here is uncommonly full, for it must be remembered that every law introduces us to some problem of life or thought and the solution propounded for it; and that much the same holds good, though in a lesser degree, of the narratives and of many of the observations in the speeches. But, for our present purpose, many of these may be laid aside as being devoid of political significance. The precise steps taken to provide meat and drink for the people on various occasions do not touch the present inquiry, nor does the law of gleaning or of pledge. With the religion, too, we are concerned on this occasion only in so far as it has important political bearings.

Attention has already been drawn to the intensity of tribal feeling during this epoch. The Israelites in Egypt had, in fact, been a company of separate tribes without any common organs of government. While this forms the background of much of the organization and work of Moses, the difficulty it threw in the way of the erection of a strong central power must not be overlooked. "Ye take too much upon you, seeing all the congregation are holy, every one of them, and the Lord is among them: wherefore then lift ye up yourselves above the assembly of the Lord?" (Nu xvi 3). Nor, as we shall see, was it ever possible successfully to overcome this feeling. Another less important force that greatly influenced the course of the legislation may be noticed in passing — I refer to the blood feud and the sentiment of vengeance. Inasmuch as this

is common to all early peoples and was of relatively small political importance, we need not linger over it. The legal rules adopted reckoned with the difficulties it presented, and were ultimately successful in eliminating the danger to society which was inherent in this institution.

More important for our purpose is the question of the treatment accorded to foreigners. It is clear that the policy here was largely dictated by the religion. Moses himself had married a Midianite girl. He sought to induce his wife's kinsman to join the Israelites. According to the LXX text of Nu x 31, he even promised that "thou shalt be an elder amongst us." He expressly permitted certain unions with Midianite women (Nu xxxi 18), and foreign captives generally (Dt xxi 10 ff.), provided that they did not belong to the nations excepted on strictly religious grounds (Dt vii 1 ff.). Edomites and Egyptians could be admitted to the congregation of the Lord in the third generation (xxiii 8 ff.). The exclusion of Ammonites and Moabites (xxiii 4 ff.) is actuated by the hostility of their attitude towards the wandering Israelites. These provisions, and the policy adopted generally in the legislation, show us that there was no objection to foreigners as such. Except where there was danger to the religion, intermarriage was freely permitted; and the ancient equivalent of full naturalization was allowed to the third generation of certain peoples and to the first generation of the friendly Kenites. The policy is favorable to assimilation *by* Israel where there is no historical antipathy or religious peril. This, of course, throws into bolder relief the attitude adopted where there was danger of religious assimilation *of* Israel. And here stress should be laid on the important fact that the people were to invade a country which was much too large for their immediate requirements, and occupied by a number of hostile and relatively powerful peoples that followed religious and other usages that menaced the national ideal of morality and holiness. The legislation constantly emphasizes these points. The overwhelming numbers, and religious dangers, form the theme of Ex

xxiii 28–33. The peril to the purity of Israel's faith is driven home in most emphatic language in xxxiv 12 ff. The menace to morality and holiness is the burden of Lev xviii 3–5 (cp. 24 ff.).

One other matter must not be overlooked. The original intention was that after leaving Sinai, the Israelites should invade Canaan from the south in the second or third year of the Exodus.[1] It was only the failure of the people's morale after the report of the spies, and the subsequent crushing defeat, that led to the long period of wandering in the wilderness; and in estimating the statesmanship and intentions of Moses this must never be forgotten.

This lack of morale is seen more than once. The fugitive Israelites left Egypt with a broken spirit (Ex xiii 17, xiv 11–14). There is, therefore, nothing surprising in the failure of courage that was displayed after the return of the spies. And this was a danger that Moses feared long subsequently, when the long desert wanderings had in fact restored the tone of the people's sentiment. It was this that alarmed him when the trans-Jordanic settlement was mooted (Nu xxxii 7–10, 14 f.). The moral effects of the long oppression left their imprint on the spirit of the people for many years, and it was only as the result of the wanderings that this difficulty was overcome.

It is in the light of these conditions that the work of the desert age should be studied; and in that study three of the four great factors — the relationship to God in its political implications, centrifugalism, and separatism — should be borne in mind. The fourth, foreign pressure, during this period takes the form of compelling the sojourn in the desert; but there is naturally no direct contact such as we find in other ages.

At the first glance, it is obvious that the period of the wanderings automatically contributed something towards the strength of national unity which was independent of any policy or design. The mere fact that the tribes acted

[1] See BS, July, 1916, and Oct. 1919.

together for forty years under a single outstanding leader, and underwent common trials, necessarily endowed them with the consolidating force of a vital historical experience and the memory of the common possession of a great statesman and patriot.

The relationship to God on its political side tended to counteract centrifugalism and to weld the tribes into a single unit. The fundamental offer of the Sinaitic covenant makes this clear: "Ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me from among all peoples . . . and ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests and a holy nation" (Ex xix 5 f.). "A holy nation," be it observed, — not, in the language of Genesis, a company of peoples. Twelve pillars are erected, "according to the twelve tribes of Israel" (Ex xxiv 4), for the ratification of that covenant; but thenceforth, and throughout the legislation, the view is taken that the unit is the single people of Israel, not the twelve tribes. The covenants made Israel a nation just as truly as they placed it in a special relationship to God, and this aspect of their operation should be emphasized. "The Lord hath avouched thee this day to be a peculiar people unto himself" (Dt xxvi 18). The public sacrifices of Nu xxviii f. are on a national, not a tribal, basis. They are offered on behalf of a single Israel, not of the twelve tribes. The conception of a company of peoples is entirely foreign to the policy of the Law towards the Israelites. In all its parts the legislation proceeds on the view that the people is the unit, though for certain administrative purposes the tribal organization is utilized and even expanded. The solitary exception to this rule well illustrates the conflict between the national policy of Moses and the centrifugal tendency. When he provides that daughters may inherit land in certain cases, tribalism scents a danger. A deputation waits on the lawgiver and secures the concession that heiresses may only marry within their own tribe to avoid the alienation from it of any portion of the property of its lot (Nu xxxvi). The narrative and resulting laws clearly illuminate the true state of popular feeling, the extreme strength

and narrowness of the tribal sentiment and the lack of national vision. But they also serve to throw into relief the dominant tendency of the religious relationship and Mosaic policy to combat centrifugalism.

The policy of religious separatism which is so prominent a feature of the thought and enactments of the age, by giving all Israelites a marked differentia from all non-Israelites, and also by its moral effects, tended in the same direction. It, too, is strongly stressed in the very words we have already quoted from the fundamental offer to show the policy of unification. "A peculiar treasure from among all peoples," "a kingdom of priests," "a holy nation," — each phrase in turn adds something to the emphasis of the separation of this people from all others. Historical experience and separatism are shown to us blended together in the words of Moses in Ex xxxiii 16. This inevitably resulted in the creation of a power of resistance to assimilative tendencies. "And ye shall be holy unto me: for I the Lord am holy, and have separated you from the peoples, that ye should be mine" (Lev xx 26). That is the keynote of much of the legislation the special provisions of which do not touch our present subject. Their joint effect, however, would be partly external and partly internal. Externally they would make a barrier between Israelites and non-Israelites and a bond of union among all Israelites. Internally they would inspire the people with a feeling of self-respect and moral worth. Both alike tended to maintain their unity and exclusiveness.

We have already glanced at the conditions that necessitated the stressing of a policy of separateness if Israel were to maintain itself and its religion in Canaan — the presence of a number of more powerful peoples and the nature of their worship and conceptions of morality. Indeed, the passages already cited from Leviticus are found in association with legislation directed to the erection and maintenance of distinctive standards of individual and national holiness. At this point the reasoned commands of Dt vii 1–7 may be quoted as giving a forcible summary

alike of the policy of separation and the reasons for its necessity:—

"When the Lord thy God shall bring thee into the land whither thou goest to possess it, and shall cast out many nations before thee, the Hittite, and the Girgashite, and the Amorite, and the Canaanite, and the Perizzite, and the Hivite, and the Jebusite, seven nations greater and mightier than thou; and when the Lord thy God shall deliver them up before thee, and thou shalt smite them; then thou shalt utterly destroy them; thou shalt make no covenant with them, nor shew mercy unto them: neither shalt thou make marriages with them; thy daughter thou shalt not give unto his son, nor his daughter shalt thou take unto thy son. For he will turn away thy son from following me, that they may serve other gods: so will the anger of the Lord be kindled against you, and he will destroy thee quickly. But thus shall ye deal with them; ye shall break down their altars, and dash in pieces their pillars, and hew down their Asherim, and burn their graven images with fire. For thou art an holy people unto the Lord thy God: the Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be a peculiar people unto himself, above all peoples that are upon the face of the earth. The Lord did not set his love upon you, nor choose you, because ye were more in number than any people; for ye were the fewest of all peoples."

The possession of a common system of law acts as a unifying force; and hence we must assign indirect political importance to the legislative and judicial work of Moses in the civil and criminal fields. Some of his enactments, however, had a more direct political bearing. The most striking of these is undoubtedly the law of pilgrimage. On its religious side the central sanctuary was intended to have a far-reaching effect in guarding the people from apostasy and idolatrous practices (Dt xii): on its political it had consequences which necessitated its destruction when the final schism came. The best way of ascertaining the political value of the Mosaic ordinances is by giving careful consideration to the steps that were taken to undo their effect when Israel was permanently rent into two. Jeroboam was unquestionably the ablest Hebrew statesman of his generation. He had raised himself from nothing to

the throne of the larger portion of the Hebrew tribes; and, while he was undeniably favored by circumstances, it is perfectly plain that he possessed great ability. He was in a position to know what were the effects of the various institutions; and it was indispensable for him to take measures to counteract those that made for national unity. Consequently special importance attaches to his selection of the points for attack and to the nature of the blows he directed against them:—

"And Jeroboam said in his heart, Now shall the kingdom return to the house of David: if this people go up to offer sacrifices in the house of the Lord at Jerusalem, then shall the heart of this people turn again unto their lord, even unto Rehoboam king of Judah; and they shall kill me, and return to Rehoboam king of Judah. Whereupon the king took counsel, and made two calves of gold; and he said unto them, It is too much for you to go up to Jerusalem; behold thy gods, O Israel, which brought thee up out of the land of Egypt. And he set the one in Beth-el, and the other put he in Dan. And this thing became a sin; for the people went to worship before the one, even unto Dan. And he made houses of high places, and made priests from among all the people, which were not of the sons of Levi. And Jeroboam ordained a feast in the eighth month, on the fifteenth day of the month, like unto the feast that is in Judah, and he went up unto the altar; so did he in Beth-el, sacrificing unto the calves that he had made: and he placed in Beth-el the priests of the high places which he had made. And he went up unto the altar which he had made in Beth-el on the fifteenth day in the eighth month, even in the month which he had devised of his own heart: and he ordained a feast for the children of Israel, and went up unto the altar, to burn incense" (1 K xii 26–33).

The whole passage has been quoted because it shows so clearly how Mosaic legislation that was primarily religious in character operated against centrifugalism in the political field.

Let us just consider the reasons for his changes. He did not seek to abolish the institutions he attacked altogether. That would have been impossible, for he could not change the whole mentality of his age. On the con-

trary, he found it necessary to substitute other institutions outwardly almost identical, though in reality subtly unlike. And so with profound insight into the psychology of his people he opposed a form of syncretism to the purer Mosaic faith. The Baal of Israel was likened to the baals of the surrounding peoples by the introduction of the bull of Hadad, the baal *par excellence*. It was because the historical and unique Ark, with its clustering associations, worked for national unity that the bull was introduced as a counter-attraction into the imageless worship of the Baal of Israel. It was because the law of pilgrimage tended towards national unity that Jeroboam took steps to prevent the periodical visits to Jerusalem. It was because the Levitical priesthood was a powerful force in the same direction, that he created a fresh priesthood with none but northern associations, owing its position not to history or the choice of God, but simply and solely to the favor of a king to whom it was consequently devoted (cp. Am vii 10 ff.) and dependent on the continued separation of the two kingdoms for its priestly status. Again, it was because common religious observances made for unity that he ordained a feast for the children of Israel in the month which he had devised.[1] But even this does not exhaust the lessons to be learnt. Both systems, that of Moses and that of Jeroboam, were submitted in the course of history to the most exacting tests that can be conceived. And the results were supremely unlike. While abuses crept into both and were cleared away, the prophet's system has enabled his people to emerge ultimately faithful and triumphant from the appalling trials of two exiles, while the king's had no such power. Wherein lies the reason for this difference? Not in superior numbers or wealth, for Judah was the smaller and poorer of the two kingdoms. Not in a difference of blood, for the stock was the same in all essentials. Not in the pilgrimages, or the priesthood, or the date of a festival; for, in the exile, the pilgrimages were impossible,

[1] Probably a later harvest in the north made this a popular measure.

the priesthood did not function, and nothing could turn on whether a festival (if celebrated at all) was kept in the seventh or eighth month. The reason lies elsewhere. Fundamentally the imageless worship was a religion that differed most vitally from the heathen cults: the bull worship, on the other hand, was a compromise with heathenism. Again, the Levitical priesthood, whatever its backslidings, could return to the Law, to which, in the last resort, it owed its existence; but the priesthood of Israel was, by its nature, compelled, in all circumstances, to reject the book which proved its illegitimacy. The Jews could, and ultimately did, find in it a source of life; but this was not open to those who followed Jeroboam. The Israelite monarchy was based on the despiritualization of the idea of God and the rejection of the Torah: the Judæan, on the other hand, however faithless its occupants may frequently have been to spiritual religion, rested on nothing that was incompatible with it, and always had the possibility of returning to the Torah. To establish his throne Jeroboam perforce took a line that ultimately destroyed both religion and people. And so we learn yet another historical lesson. We see that the great spiritual command of the Decalogue possesses direct political power of an extraordinary kind, and we recall the fact that the religion of Abraham had been marked by this distinctive quality. There can be no more striking evidence of the statesmanship of the Mosaic provisions, and the state-building and nation-preserving power of the religion, than the measures taken by the arch opponent of national unity to undo them, and the remarkable difference in the outcome of the two systems when submitted to the final tremendous test.

If it is the law of pilgrimage that first impresses the mind with the political effects of the central sanctuary, we must be careful to remember that that is not the only way in which the religious capital operated in favor of the national unity. During the lifetime of Moses there had been a supreme court for the trial of cases of exceptional

difficulty which were reserved for it by the ordinary judges (Ex xviii). At first this consisted of Moses alone. Later we find the high priest and others associated with him (Nu xxvii, etc.). Now it was enacted that this institution should be continued at the religious capital (Dt xvii 8 ff.). This gave to the whole nation the benefits of a directing head in the legal sphere, and insured the rule of a single system of law throughout the country. Furthermore, the possession of this capital provided an organizing center and brain for the great institution through which the teachings of the Mosaic religion radiated throughout the length and breadth of the land — the Levitical priesthood. And this leads to a consideration of the political effects of this — the remaining object of Jeroboam's attack.

In surveying the conditions of the work of Moses we observed the great power of tribalism. The lawgiver might strive to make a single nation, but at the outset he was confronted with a number of tribes of common origin and customs without a single national organ; and the case of the daughters of Zelophehad shows us quite clearly that at the end of his life he still had to reckon with separate entities that were averse to all fusion. In such circumstances there was naturally no common administrative service of any kind. Moses alone, as the leader in the historical emergency, was the common organ of all the tribes. Even he had to maintain his authority against a rude challenge (Nu xvi): "Behold, while I am yet alive with you this day, ye have been rebellious against the Lord; and how much more after my death" (Dt xxxi 27). That is only one of many similar utterances; and if the rebellion of which complaint is made was against the Lord, we must yet remember that it was directed against the national leadership which was exercised in His name. To the last it would appear that ordinary judicial and administrative appointments were purely tribal. It would seem that this had to be so, on account of the strength of the tribal feeling. For the purposes of a battle or a campaign, a single

leader would necessarily be accepted (Joshua in Ex xvii 8 ff.; cp. Nu xxxi), but it seems very doubtful whether the sentiment of unity was yet sufficiently strong for the formation of an intertribal executive service of any sort. In those conditions Moses succeeded in forming a permanent national institution, charged with important religious and other functions, by the device of dedicating a whole tribe to the priestly service and depriving it of equality of tribal right in secular power and possessions. Thus the other tribes, which might have resented the giving of any kind of religious privilege or authority to members of a rival secular tribe, were induced to submit to the authority of a hereditary priesthood, charged with the performance of a wide range of duties.

Such seem to have been the principal political tendencies of the work of Moses. One great omission is most striking. There is no permanent central executive authority. I use the word "executive" deliberately; for, on the religious and judicial sides, the priesthood and the arrangement for a supreme court cover the ground. And it must be remembered that a supreme court in fact creates new law, when necessary, to deal with any case that comes before it. A portion, therefore, of the functions of a legislature was embraced in this Mosaic provision; for, in any matter that could form the subject of judicial decision, the supreme court would in effect make new laws, as Moses had done in, e. g., the case of Shelomith's son (Lev xxiv 10 ff.). And some portion of the legislative field was covered, though not continuously, in the provisions as to the activity of future prophets (Dt xviii 15 ff.). None of these, however, gave the permanent central executive, which alone can insure the safety of a nation from external dangers. Deuteronomy xx 9 shows this clearly in the military sphere. Only when battle was about to be joined were commanders to be appointed. The danger of being without a permanent central executive was understood and foreseen, and a law was enacted providing regula-

tions in the event of its future creation (Dt xvii 14 ff.).[1] In the near future the Israelites were to experience the dangers to which their lack of an adequate government exposed them.

The reason for the omission appears to have been the intense tribalism. We have seen several manifestations of it, even to the extent of imperilling the position of Moses himself. This conclusion is reënforced by the lessons of the period of history which we are yet to survey. These show that the tribes were not yet ready to submit to any permanent supreme authority. They could sometimes obey an outstanding personality in an emergency, and victory would give him prestige and authority for the remainder of his life, but these could not be transmitted to a son. Nor were the personal factors favorable to the creation of the necessary dynasty. The circumstances of the people when Moses was about to leave the stage, imperatively called for the vesting of the supreme executive authority in their best general. It was the Ephraimite Joshua, and not a son of the lawgiver, who possessed this qualification. Indeed, the sons of Moses either died young or else were nonentities. We hear nothing of their lives and actions, and it seems clear that the personal factor rendered a Mosaic dynasty impossible. Had the lawgiver had a son of commanding military talent to succeed him, the political problem might have been susceptible of a different solution.

When we turn to the post-Mosaic history we find striking confirmation of these views.[2] The Book of Joshua

[1] Dealing with a king, according to the Hebrew, but with rulers, according to the LXX (see PS, pp. 157 ff., and cp. the Edomite dukes in Gen xxxvi 15 ff., Ex xv 15).

[2] A word must be said as to the historical conditions that made possible the part played by Israel in and after the age of Joshua. At the time of the Israelite invasion, and throughout the rest of the period covered by this study, Babylonia was in no condition to wage an aggressive campaign in Palestine. The Kassite dynasty was still on the throne, but seems to have been involved in a struggle of varying success with Assyria, and to have come to an end in 1185 B.C. as the result of an Elamite invasion (L. W. King,

shows us the uncertainty as to the position that even the disciple of Moses himself would occupy in the endeavor to lead. The promise of obedience to him by the trans-Jordanic tribes in the form in which we have it (Josh i 16–18) contains the qualification "only the Lord thy God be with thee as he was with Moses"; and a later notice shows that it was only after success that his authority was established (iv 14). The danger of centrifugalism is eu-

History of Babylon [1915], pp. 244 f.). Their early successors had their hands full in dealing with the same two foes; and, though Nebuchadnezzar I. (*circa* 1140 B.C.) won victories, and did much to reëstablish the position of his country, he does not seem to have penetrated to the neighborhood of Palestine. "It is true," writes Dr. King (*op. cit.*, p. 255), "that Nebuchadnezzar claimed among his titles that of 'conqueror of Amurru,' but it is doubtful whether we should regard this term as implying more than a raid into the region of the middle Euphrates." Some years later (*circa* 1110) Tiglath-Pileser I. inflicted a heavy defeat on Babylonia, and thereafter the country seems to have been overrun by sami-nomad tribes from beyond the Euphrates. "This was probably the first of many raids, and we may see evidence of the unsettled condition of the country in the ephemeral Babylonian dynasties, which followed one another in quick succession" (*op. cit.*, p. 257). Tiglath-Pileser himself reached the Mediterranean north of Palestine, but was almost immediately recalled to the east by a Babylonian attack (H. R. Hall, Ancient History of the Near East [4th ed., 1919], pp. 388, 395, 398).

The Hittites and Egypt were in no better case. In the year 8 of Ramses III. a confederation of northern peoples attacked the Egyptian Empire in Syria. "The Syrian dominions of the Hittites must have been lost and the Hittite power in Syria completely broken" (J. H. Breasted, History of Egypt [2d ed., 1909], p. 479). The Pharaoh was successful in routing them by both land and sea. He perhaps waged another northern campaign some three years later, but our information as to this is very meager. "It was the last hostile passage between the Pharaoh and the Hittites; both empires were swiftly declining to their fall, and in the annals of Egypt we never again hear of the Hittites in Syria" (*op. cit.*, p. 488). Thereafter the field was clear, so far as the great powers were concerned, for the native states, the Philistines and Israel, but we cannot suppose that these campaigns had left the small powers of Canaan unweakened. Doubtless they formed part of the historical preparation for Israel's history.

riously illuminated by the narrative of the trans-Jordanic altar (Josh xxii 9 ff.). The cis-Jordanic tribes feared apostasy and that their brethren were rebelling against them (ver. 19). The trans-Jordanic leaders, on the other hand, dreaded a severance of connection by the rest of Israel (ver. 24 ff.).

The settlement in Canaan reënforced the power of centrifugalism in two ways. It interposed distances and geographical barriers between the various parts of Israel, and it formed human divisions between them of the unconquered portions of the native tribes. It is only necessary to glance at a good map of the country to appreciate the first factor.[1] Joshua xxii 24 ff. shows the fear of its effect felt by the trans-Jordanic tribes; and in reading the history it is difficult not to feel that it is often determined by the geographical conditions. It was, perhaps, not always easy for the southern tribes to lend efficient help in the north. Probably it was mainly for this reason that we hear nothing of assistance by Judah to the northern tribes in the period of the earlier Judges. And, further, we find constant reminders of the fact that most of the fortified cities were not subjugated (see Josh xvi 10; xvii 12 f.; Jgs i; iii 2 f.; xix 11 f.), and that the native tribes continued to dwell in the land (e. g. Jgs iii 5 f.; 1 K ix 20 f.). The interposition of a line of hostile fortresses must have reenforced the divisions created by geography.

In this connection we may pause to note the gradual silent change which took place in the conditions during the period of the Judges and early kings through a well-known cause — the excess of the death rate over the birth

[1] For a detailed description, see Sir G. A. Smith's Historical Geography of the Holy Land (7th thousand, 1897), pp. 45–59. "Palestine," he concludes, "formed as it is, is emphatically a land of tribes" (p. 59). In point of fact, we find that in pre-Israelite times these conditions were mirrored in history. Genesis, Joshua, and the Amarna tablets alike show a number of petty authorities, not integrated into a single empire or close federation. This was one of the conditions of the success of the invading Israelites. It will also have tended to foster centrifugalism among themselves.

rate in eastern towns. The effect of this is that they are continually undergoing replenishment from country blood. The Israelites met with but little success against the fortified cities at the time of the conquest, but they occupied much of the hill country. As has so frequently happened in history, the hardy and virile mountaineers necessarily waxed stronger, while the townsmen grew both absolutely and relatively weaker. Israel lived on the tablelands of life: the Canaanites dwelt in the valley of the shadow of death.

In this period we meet with nationalism and centrifugalism, the latter partly counterbalanced by foreign pressure; and we see the religion acting in the direction of national unity. Let us look a little more closely at these factors.

Centrifugalism is so strong that we often find a city or district neglecting its duty to the general cause. "Curse ye Meroz. . . . Curse ye bitterly the inhabitants thereof; because they came not to the help of the Lord" (Jgs v 23). In the days of Gideon, Succoth and Penuel are conspicuous examples, though they may have been cowed by the hostile menace. Jabesh-gilead is wanting in another emergency (Jgs xxi 18ff.). Worse still, we meet with several instances of civil war. Ephraim is more intent on the maintenance of its own sense of self-importance than on the saving of Israel (viii 1–3), and at a later period it actually involves itself in hostilities and disaster (xii 1–6). The narrative of Jgs xix–xxi shows Benjamin fighting all Israel in a thoroughly bad cause. This centrifugalism is only partially checked by the countervailing influences; for it was at times of national emergency that Ephraim adopted its disloyal attitude. On the other hand, foreign domination regularly leads to a temporary coalition of various tribes for joint deliverance; and we invariably find that it is in the name of the God of Israel that the Judge performs his work. Here, then, we see these two great unifying forces at work. In the present form of the narrative, expression is given to the national sentiment in the lament of Jgs xxi 3 (cp. ver. 17), that one tribe should be

lacking in Israel, and in the summons to all Israel of xix 29 f. As yet, however, there is little effort to establish a permanent national or intertribal executive. With the sole exception of Gideon and his house, we find no instance of any tendency in this direction. A judge was followed when the stress of events rendered this course necessary; and, as a rule, he retained sufficient prestige, as the result of his victories, to exercise some moral authority for the rest of his life. In one case, where necessity had compelled recourse to a man of no standing, who alone possessed the requisite ability, we find him bargaining for the headship as a condition of lending his services (Jgs xi 9). The exception, therefore, is worthy of some notice. Gideon's success aroused so much feeling that the offer of a hereditary monarchy was made to him, but refused (viii 22 f.). That the refusal did not altogether put an end to the idea appears from the story of Abimelech, who actually made himself king in a small district. His failure to maintain himself, coupled with Gideon's refusal, shows that opinion was not yet ripe for any such step as the institution of a monarchy. It was only more thorough disaster and more numerous dangers than had yet been faced that would suffice to render this acceptable.

It is noticeable that Jgs x 7 speaks of dangers from two quarters simultaneously: "He sold them into the hand of the Philistines and into the hand of the children of Ammon." Jephthah's success dispelled the danger from Ammon for some time. The Philistine menace, however, remained.

In dealing with the period of the Philistine wars we must remember that our accounts are fragmentary, and not necessarily chronological. The historical books do not tell us that Shiloh was destroyed, yet we know from other sources (Jer vii 12 ff., xxvi 6) that this actually happened. We meet with a Philistine garrison [1] in the land (1 S x 5,

[1] If "garrison" is the correct translation. In any case it is clear, from the context, that we have to do with some manifestation of Philistine authority.

xiii 3, etc.), but we do not know how it came to be there. This is in direct contradiction of the statements of 1 S vii 13 f., which must therefore be regarded with suspicion. Again, we have different narratives combined together in a manner that is not always easy to follow. For these reasons it is impossible to trace the history of the struggle between the two races in detail, but it is not difficult to see how the main forces operated.

The opening chapters of 1 S give us a glimpse of the working of the Mosaic law of pilgrimage. We find periodical visits paid to Shiloh, where was the house of the Lord with the Ark attended by the priests (1 S i 3, 21; ii 14, 19). Unfortunately they appear to have been false to their high office, and the conduct of Eli's sons tended to neutralize the beneficial effects of the institution. Nevertheless, its influence during the age of the Judges, though of a kind that would not naturally appear in historical narratives, is shown, by the very complaints made here, to have been continuous and important.

From the Philistine wars certain salient features stand out. Israel was worsted as never before, the Ark itself going into captivity. That supreme disaster, followed probably by the destruction of Shiloh, must have produced a far more powerful effect on national opinion than any that preceded it. Then Samuel arose, and showed himself a greater spiritual and ethical force than any earlier judge. He succeeded in winning some success against the Philistines, and so far accustomed a district to some form of central government that he went on circuit and judged Israel in four places (1 S vii 16 f.). But in spite of this we find the Israelites under the Philistine heel in his old age (1 S xiii 19 ff.). And, as we have seen, there appears to have been a Philistine garrison in the land. There can be no doubt whatever that for some time considerable portions of Israelite territory were under some form of Philistine rule. There is no ground for thinking that this people interfered with the local autonomy of their Hebrew vassals in most respects, but they clearly adopted all the

measures that they thought necessary to preserve their military supremacy. The fact of vassalage emerges not only from the passages already cited, but also from several others (Jgs x 7, xv 11, 1 S iv 9, xiii 19). David held Ziklag as a vassal of Achish (1 S xxvii 6). We read of a garrison of Philistines at Bethlehem (2 S xxiii 14). It is not, however, clear how far the Philistine suzerainty extended. There is no reason to suppose that they ever gained a footing in trans-Jordania; and we do not know what parts of cis-Jordania they ruled, and how far their dominion varied at different times. If we are to place Samson before the defeat of Eli's sons, as seems probable, Judah or some portions of its territory would seem to have been subject to the Philistines at a time when Shiloh appears to have enjoyed independence; and the territorial limits of their rule probably varied with the vicissitudes of the struggle. On top of the Philistine oppression came the danger from Nahash and the Ammonites. The case against the monarchy is succinctly put in 1 S xii 11 f. Why should the invasion of Nahash call for a kingdom any more than earlier oppressions?

It is easy to see the answer. Having regard to the dominant position of the Philistines, the only chance of salvation lay in concentrating the whole of the national forces under one unquestioned permanent national leader. It was impossible to place Samuel in this position, because he was too old. Nor is there any evidence that he possessed organizing capacity or generalship. His sons lacked the character and ability. There was no room for another judge by the side of Samuel. The prophet's character and authority would have made that impossible, even if the national emergency had not required that the supreme power should be concentrated in one hand. Had there been no Samuel, it is possible that the appointment of a judge would have tided over the immediate emergency; but, after the prolonged trouble with the Philistines, it may be doubted if this would have been sufficient. The days were past when emergency organization was adequate to main-

tain the position of Israel. If the immediate dangers were due to the Philistines and the Ammonites, it must be remembered that they did not stand alone. The people were surrounded by enemies (1 S xiv 47 f.), and nothing less than the permanent organization of the whole nation could give any hope of salvation. There was much reason in the plea "that we also may be like all the nations; and that our king may judge us, and go out before us, and fight our battles" (1 S viii 20).

Nothing could more clearly show the necessity and superiority of the monarchical organization than the fact that, from the time of its first adoption right away to the exile, no responsible person ever suggested a reversion to the earlier conditions. More than once questions arose as to whether there should be one kingdom or two, and disputes as to who should be the person to occupy the throne were frequent. But, so far as we know, an abandonment of the monarchical form of government was never contemplated.

The national peril had given the forces of unification a signal victory over centrifugalism. It was not long before the latter began to take its vengeance. It is, however, impossible to be sure of the details. For the period of Saul's lifetime we have duplicate accounts of many matters, and these cannot always be reconciled in all respects. The natural process of deterioration to which every MS text is subject and the editorial methods employed have tended to obscure the course of events further. Nor can we be certain that our informants always had exact knowledge. For instance, there are two accounts of the origin of the saying, "Is Saul also among the prophets?" (1 S x 10 ff, xix 18–24). They may be treated as good evidence of the existence of such a saying, and of conduct on the part of Saul that justified it; but it is clearly impossible to say at what point in his career he was under the influence of the prophetic spirit. Great care must consequently be used in testing the narratives; and, where they appear to be open to question as they stand, we must not be afraid of confessing our ignorance.

A conspicuous example of this is afforded by the story of the breach between Samuel and Saul. The narrative of 1 S xiii 8–14, in its present state and position, cannot be accepted. It is so discreditable to Samuel as to be incredible. There was a great national emergency. The new king, at the head of a mere handful of badly equipped troops, had to face an overwhelming Philistine army, containing powerful chariot and cavalry forces as well as infantry. Samuel had made an appointment, but failed to keep it, and Saul's men began to desert. It was unquestionably the duty of the king, who owed the creation of his office to the necessity of utilizing the whole concentrated power of the people to secure independence, to take the necessary steps to check this movement. Accordingly he offered the appropriate sacrifices in pursuance of the law of Ex xx 24–26. Subsequently Samuel, who had been at fault, appeared, and quarreled with him for his action in the matter. And Samuel, be it remembered, was the very person whose administration had failed so completely as to make the erection of the kingdom essential. There is a suggestion in the text that Saul had been told to await Samuel's coming, and was therefore to blame; but, in the circumstances *as stated in our present account*, this contention cannot be upheld. Saul was made a king with the rights and duties of his office, and no instructions given by a prophet who failed to keep his appointment could discharge him from the obligation of taking the steps he saw to be required by the national interest. The Philistine menace would not await Samuel's convenience. Had a disaster occurred through any failure of Saul's to act, it would have been no answer to say that he, the king, had neglected to take the appropriate measures because he had awaited the overdue prophet, who, for all that was known to the contrary, might have been prevented from coming at all. But what could be said in extenuation of the conduct of a man who, in such an emergency, could find nothing better to do than to quarrel with the king whom he had anointed in the name of God only a few days

previously? Neither his patriotism nor his inspiration would be of a nature to command respect. It is therefore not strange that in 1 S xi 14 f. we have an account of the ceremony at Gilgal which represents it as having passed off quite smoothly.

There is another story of the breach in 1 S xv. According to this, Samuel commanded Saul to extirpate Amalek, in accordance with Dt xxv 17–19. The king and the people — note the conjunction (1 S xv 9) — spared Agag and the most valuable part of the booty. That the people had some voice in the matter is extremely probable; for we may recall their insistence on the creation of the kingdom, and their action in overruling Saul when he wished to put Jonathan to death in accordance with his vow (1 S xiv 45). At the same time such action by the people, in defiance of the Law and the divine message given by Samuel, could alone justify the punishment. For it must be remembered that, if the issue proved fatal to Saul at Mount Gilboa, the defeat, the subsequent civil war, and Philistine oppression, and the evils of the disputed succession were borne by the whole nation. It would, therefore, be difficult to defend Samuel's action unless the people had offended jointly with Saul. No doubt the king, by taking a strong line in support of the Law, could have overruled the people. For this reason he was most to blame. But it would be unjust to Samuel to ignore the guilt of the people in the matter.

If this account is historical, Saul failed here through weakness. On other grounds, however, it is plain that his was an unhappy choice. He was not conspicuous for ability in handling men or for organizing power. Our information does not suggest that he was either a diplomat or a statesman. On the other hand, he appears to have suffered from a mental disorder that completely unfitted him for a position of responsibility. The mere fact that he was visited by prophetic ecstasy must be regarded as a serious disqualification; for this argues a temperament directly opposed to that required by a ruler. Moreover, the other notices of the evil spirit that afflicted him (1 S

xvi 14 ff., xviii 10, xix 9) suggest that his sanity was not always above question, and his conduct towards David and the priests (1 S xxii) shows a nature of violent passions entirely unbridled by self-control. If he lost his life in a final disaster in fighting against the enemy whose oppression had led to the creation of his office, it must be remembered that he had been the architect of his own misfortunes. Anointed king in order to save Israel by uniting all the national forces, he offended the most earnest adherents of the Law, outlawed his ablest general, who was also a popular hero, persecuted the priests, and alienated one of the most powerful tribes. It was a disaster for the cause of national unity that such a man should have been chosen as the first king.

In studying history from the point of view of the play of forces, it is only too easy to overlook or underestimate the importance of the personal equation. In the story of the making of Judah we meet with three great men who were supremely adequate to their respective tasks, and whose personalities undoubtedly molded history — Abraham, Moses, and David. We see that the whole course of the story of mankind would have been different if any one of these three men had lacked the peculiar qualities that distinguished him. But if the force of great personalities has been a mighty factor in determining the fortunes of the race, it is almost equally true that the inadequacy of others has proved scarcely less important. The most signal instance of this that can be rigorously proved, *on our information,* in the period covered by this study, will come before us in the cases of Solomon and Rehoboam; but we have already seen reason to suspect that the absence of a natural heir to Moses of sufficient caliber may have been a contributory cause of the failure to create a satisfactory national organization in the first instance; and in any study of the less fortunate effects of the personal equation on history Saul's unsuitability for the kingly office must hold a high place. At the lowest, it led to prolonged suf-

ferings and disasters for his people: at the highest it was one of the factors that led to the great disruption.

It was unfortunate that the first leader of the age came from the tribe of Judah. Samuel had been an Ephraimite. He had wisely not anointed a fellow tribesman as king. The suggestion of vesting the supreme power permanently in a member of that strong and haughty tribe might easily have driven Judah into secession. This danger was averted for the time by the choice of a king from the small and weak buffer tribe of Benjamin. There was a reasonable prospect that both the leading tribes could be induced to acquiesce in a solution which did not hand the power over to a strong rival; and, in fact, we hear of no trouble with Ephraim. The danger to Judah from the Philistines might well have led that tribe to remain loyal for a period that would have sufficed to consolidate the monarchy, and with it the national unity, had David been less eminent, and Saul better fitted for his rôle. The friendship of Jonathan and David might have secured for the nation the best services of the latter under the former's reign, and the history of Israel might have been brighter alike for the nation, the religion, and the world. Here, however, the personal equation proved decisive. Saul and David being what they respectively were, the course that events took was inevitable.

The old internecine tribal jealousy was reënforced by the king's blunders and misfortunes, and by the ability and success of the handsome young chieftain. "Saul hath slain his thousands and David his ten thousands" (1 S xviii 7–9). The king realized that David's life was a fatal obstacle to the establishment of his dynasty (xx 30 f.); and at last there arose a state of affairs that was not far remote from civil war (xxii). David, throughout, behaved with admirable restraint in his dealings with the king, and unquestionably this constitutes one of the finest traits in his character. All our information points rather to his having been forced into the position he occupied during the last period of Saul's reign than to his having been disloyal to his sovereign.

The disaster at Mount Gilboa led to a division of the monarchy. Now that the Benjaminite had failed to protect it against the Philistines, Judah anointed the leader of the sole remaining organized fighting force in cis-Jordania. It was only in trans-Jordania that Saul's son could be raised to the throne. He was taken to Mahanaim and there made king (2 S ii 8 f.). There were thus two kingdoms, and a state of civil war existed between them. On the one side was a national hero supported by a powerful and devoted tribe, aided by a general who for unscrupulous capacity far excelled anybody who could be brought against him, and enjoying the support of many of his opponent's ostensible subjects (cp. 2 S iii 17); on the other, a nonentity who was heir to a disaster, and had no hold over his own disaffected servants except such as the mere claim of legitimacy, and dislike of the supremacy of Judah, could give. Of these only one could offer the slightest hope of national deliverance from the Philistines. After seven and a half years of the calamitous conditions produced by this situation, the only possible solution was adopted, and David became king of all Israel. Yet there are signs in the later narrative that the wound inflicted on the national unity, while scarred over, was never completely healed.