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A table of contents for *Bibliotheca Sacra* can be found here:

[https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles\\_bib-sacra\\_01.php](https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_bib-sacra_01.php)

## ARTICLE IV.

## A LACUNA IN SCHOLARSHIP.

BY HERBERT W. MAGOUN, PH.D.,  
CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

## I.

A RECENT story, told of a great university library, is certainly suggestive. The ubiquitous need of shelf room had finally become imperative, and it was therefore decided that the books not in regular use should be transferred to the basement. One of the professors, having failed to notify the librarian what books to remove from the shelves, was presently asked to do so. With a laugh, he remarked: "Oh, that isn't necessary,— just look at the title-page and if the book is over ten years old take it away." He was a scientist.

Such books, in his opinion, were already out of date and consequently of no particular use. But, on that basis, provided he was right, how can science itself be supposed to be either accurate or stable? Is it stable, as a matter of fact? If it were, could instructions of the sort just mentioned be a possibility? If we once admit, however, that it is not stable, an inevitable conclusion presents itself, whereby it becomes necessary to assume that the boasted superiority of science, not to mention any of the claims of the scientific method, must of necessity be a myth, since anything which matures and is outgrown within the short space of a period of ten years can hardly possess superiority of any sort or kind.

And yet the scientific method appears to be fully justified in

making claims that are somewhat unusual. A reason must therefore be sought for the failure to make good. The conclusion is inevitable that there is some other element involved which vitiates results and discounts scientific accuracy. What, then, is really the trouble?

A few years ago this matter was brought to my own attention in a somewhat forcible way by a curious experience. It may be worth relating. Two winters were spent in the study of Geology, as a result of an intense interest in the question,— Was there ever a Biblical flood? The first thing noted was a general agreement that both North America and Europe were once higher than they are at present and that each of them must have been greatly depressed in the course of time by the overwhelming weight of the ice-cap. Any such depression, however, plainly pointed to a compensating elevation somewhere else; and yet no mention whatever of any such elevation could be found, although it was generally agreed that the oceanic islands had, for some unknown reason, suffered a great uplift during that very period, whose culmination was the destruction of the ice-cap.

Great volcanic activity was also postulated, on the basis of geological evidence, as a phenomenon of the same general period, but no suggestion was encountered, so far as I can now remember, that the ice-cap had any direct connection with this activity. Nor was it apparently recognized that the presence of some eight million cubic miles of ice on the land meant eight million cubic miles of water withdrawn from the sea. The resulting unstable equilibrium, the inevitable lowering of the ocean level, the consequent uncovering of great expanses now under water, the incidental connection of the continental islands with their neighboring mainlands, and the setting for a cataclysm thus provided were all ignored, as

connected phenomena, and, with a single exception, no geologist was found who had remembered that two and two make four. In this particular instance, it may be remarked that they happen to make twenty-two. It is simply a matter of arrangement.

But that was not all. The geologist mentioned had been assailed by his fellows — in another field they differed with and attacked him for fifteen years only to come around to his position in the end — and every effort had been made to discredit his results in this connection. That fact rendered the subject all the more interesting. The point at issue was the rate of erosion at Niagara during the century then closing and its bearing on the date of the melting of the ice-cap. He had figured the matter out with care; but his conclusions raised a storm of protests. The period mentioned was “too short.” Why? The reason given by his most eminent opponent was a statement to the effect that less water went over the falls in those early days than is now in evidence. This seemed most curious, and it led to further study.

By general agreement, the fresh-water lakes of that period dwarfed our present Great Lakes into ponds. Now, such a condition as that can only mean a vastly enlarged area subject to evaporation, which points directly to an intensified rainfall. Had the dissenting geologist allowed for this factor? No; he had ignored it. But, with such a rainfall, it would require a much greater shifting in the land levels than is apparently warranted by the evidence, if there was to be any possible diminution in the volume of water going over the brink of the cataract. Had he considered that contingency? Apparently not. What did it all mean?

It happened that the gorge at Niagara was somewhat familiar ground, and the next question that naturally suggested

itself was this: Has the learned professor made any allowance for variations in the width of the falls themselves? He had not! And yet it would be an utter impossibility to duplicate the present lateral extent of the falls if they were to be located a single mile down stream. Indeed, it is to be doubted whether the falls, when located there or elsewhere save at the whirlpools rapids, could have exceeded one quarter of their present extent, as any one can easily see for himself with the help of a good map of the river, such as can be found in the Century Atlas.

Now, erosion varies as the volume of water flowing over the brink. The chances are, then, that with half the present amount of water<sup>1</sup> the erosion would have to be figured at double the modern rate, and that this condition would hold most of the way up the gorge, or until the widening of the river-bed made the present extent of the cataract possible. How to dodge this conclusion does not yet appear, and it never will appear; for such an outcome is plainly unavoidable. What next?

There was, apparently, a way to test these results, after a fashion, since similar computations had been made at Minneapolis. This region was accordingly studied. It was soon found that the present gorge is much narrower than the ancient one was and that the volume of water passing through it in the early ages must have been two or three times the present amount, as a natural outcome of admitted conditions. The results obtained in this field tallied, therefore, with those secured at Niagara. It followed that the period worked out by our geologist, instead of being too short, was actually too long and, apparently, a good deal too long! Conditions dif-

<sup>1</sup> It is not safe to reckon on more than that because of the Mat-tawa River outlet discovered by Professor G. F. Wright of Oberlin, Ohio.

ferred, and, differing, altered results. Facts, not any one's *ipse dixit*, is what we are after, and here is evidently a lacuna in scholarship which needs careful attention and study.

What, then, is it like? That it is there, no one can deny, unless he is ignorant of the facts. Is it conscious or unconscious perverting of the evidence, or is it something else that eludes exact analysis because it is complex and a natural human limitation? Is it intentional or unintentional?

Intellectual honesty is said to be the rarest thing in the world, and the teaching is sometimes enforced by the story of a great geologist, who, after traveling some thousands of miles to see certain rocks, turned back when only a hundred miles or so from his goal and went sadly homeward. He had met another scholar just returning, who had assured him that those particular rocks were the best possible evidence of the igneous theory of rock-formation, and, being himself the leading exponent of the aqueous theory, he plainly could not afford to see them! It was therefore a case of "Home, sweet home," and the nostalgia won the contest.

In some instances, without doubt, an element of that kind is present, but it cannot be possible that frailties of such a sort as this constitute the real foundation, on which have been based the fluctuations and overturnings that have already occurred in science and that will surely continue to occur for many generations. Pet hypotheses, like spontaneous generation, will refuse to die; but the Louis Pasteurs of the future will meet and confute them in due time. Such things must be allowed for; and yet there cannot fail to be some other element, some human limitation or some human infelicity that vitiates the work of men of science and so compels each generation to go over the ground and try once more to compass the truth brought to light, to a greater or less ex-

tent, by the labors of its predecessors. The world's work is not done, and it will not be done in this generation or the next.

But, lest it should be thought that science is to be the object of an attack in these pages, let it be said at once that science does not stand alone in this matter or anything like it, whether the domain be that of intellectual honesty or its opposite. A single experience will suffice to make this clear. While working for my Doctor's degree at the Johns Hopkins University, it chanced one day that a question came up concerning a controversial article in a German periodical. The professor to whom I referred it promptly forbade me to read such compositions. The reason given fairly made me gasp. "Those men are not seeking for the truth: they are supporting a theory. If a man happens to belong to their school, it is their business to defend him right or wrong. If he does not, it is their business to tear his work to pieces, no matter whether he has told the truth or not."

I did not understand — then. As he was born over there, however, and had spent years over there, including a recent visit to the leading universities, I felt certain that he was depicting the exact situation, and the lack of varnish did not render the portrayal any less vivid. He therefore did me an inestimable kindness in thus opening my eyes to certain facts. Scholars have stopped talking about getting exact results. What they do talk about is getting some theory accepted. That is the present end and aim of many men of that class. It is not a commendable one. To understand it, however, is to see the true inwardness of various things.

Think for a moment of the possibilities involved. Suppose that a few men hold exalted positions which enable them to pose as "responsible scholars," as accredited instructors of

youth, and as authoritative teachers of the public; then add to this a sort of gentleman's agreement or, what is just as good, a mutual understanding among themselves, whereby they persistently support one another and quote from one another's books with approval, while just as persistently ignoring all other writers on their subjects and even going so far as to suggest to their pupils that it is a waste of time to read them; then remember that, when they are forced to notice some persistent or prominent conservative, they have at hand the ready retort, "Yes: but he is way behind the times; for his theology is hopelessly antiquated,"—they always forget to add "and unquestionably Biblical";—then call to mind the fact that promotion, standing, salary, reputation, and even the very bread and butter of their pupils depend in large measure upon the zeal with which they accept and propagate the ideas that have been taught them; and, finally, ask yourself whether any political machine was ever devised that was more efficient for promoting special privilege or more deadening to intellectual and spiritual independence?

But these men do not stop there. They have the wisdom of the serpent. They leave no trail behind them. They accomplish their undertakings largely through the power of suggestion. They do take pains, however, to influence prominent publishers or even get possession of strong publishing houses. That is necessary to keep fences in repair. They realize that there is something in a printed page which inevitably carries with it more or less weight, regardless of its intrinsic value, and they know how to make the most of the fact. Moreover, they waste little time on men of mature minds. The best results are obtained with the young, for they are much more susceptible and have a much greater regard for anything in print.



My old college Professor of Greek once called Liddell and Scott in question before the class, and every face expressed the shock that had been produced by his lack of reverence for what we all regarded as the ultimate repository of linguistic wisdom. It is impossible to think of it now without a smile at my own innocence. Work in some of the old grammarians has led me to discover so many infelicities, not to say deficiencies, in the eighth edition of the lexicon — we used the seventh — that my objections to the professor's strictures seem decidedly crude.

For example, when Aristoxenus uses the word *topos* in connection with music, as he often does in his treatise on that subject, the thing that he refers to is musical pitch, or place in the scale. The scale itself is known as a *genos*. The novice, however, will look in vain for any such suggestion in the lexicon, unless he happens to find the latter word under *enarmonios* or *diatonos*, in which connection he will also be informed that the Enharmonic scale was simpler than the Chromatic and even than the Diatonic.

Over against this must be placed the testimony of Aristides Quintilianus to the effect that any one can sing a Diatonic tetrachord, that the educated can sing a Chromatic one, — they had a variety of these instead of our single specimen, — and that the most eminent attain to the Enharmonic tetrachord, a statement which, to say the least, somewhat discredits the idea of simplicity in that connection. We use only semi-tones as fractional ones, but they had thirds of a tone, three-eighths of a tone, and quarter-tones in their system, and the last, which defy modern ears as a rule, were employed in the Enharmonic scale. The tetrachord was itself a scale, although it contained but four notes or tones (C to F), in which the intervals varied, showing eight different combinations. Two

quarter-tones and a double-tone, arranged in that order, made up the Enharmonic scale, and its effect must have been weird. The "Soft Chromatic Tetrachord" contained two of the triple divisions of a tone now talked of by modern musicians, the other third being added to the remaining tone and a half to make a single interval. The educated could sing it.

But there are other infelicities. *Leimma* is explained as a *diesis*, the technical name for a fractional fragmentary-tone; but Aristides, in the very passage that is cited by way of exemplification, defines it in such a way as to exclude the possibility of its being anything but an eighth-rest. Furthermore, *prosthesis*, which is so defined in the same connection that it must refer to a quarter-rest, is ignored entirely. Again, *sēmeion*, which is used by Aristoxenus in referring to the Greek symbol for the pitch of a note,—it was made up of two whole or partial letters,—is cited as meaning "unit of time" or "note" in the very same passage, which is used as an illustration.

In this instance pitch, not duration, was what he had reference to; but the same word is used to indicate duration, its real meaning being, not "unit of time" but "time-beat," although no one has yet appreciated the fact to all appearance. It is a "sign" or "symbol" of something (New Testament, "miracle"), and it is used of gestures made in pantomime. In music, therefore, it is plainly a time-beat. Finally, *lichano-eidēs topos* is defined as "the place in the lyre where the fore-finger was used," although its actual signification is "a pitch suitable for a second string." That there is some sort of a lacuna in this connection needs no argument.

The time-beat suggests another curious fact. For approximately sixty years the world has been approving of the metrical schemes of J. H. Heinrich Schmidt, and it is only within

recent times that they have been seriously questioned, although there are said to be German scholars who have never accepted his system. The schemes themselves are mostly in three-eight time. My own solution of the problem was first really essayed in the spring of 1895, but, since that date, with ever increasing intensity, my leisure has been given to an attempt to settle the question definitely and finally. It is now possible to tell just what Schmidt did, how he made his mistake, what his false premise was, and why it vitiated all of his subsequent work. At the beginning, his conclusions were accepted with delight, because they seemed to show an "equality of the bars," a "fraternity of the feet," and a "freedom from tradition."

As a matter of fact, they did not do so, and no one has ever followed any such schemes with accuracy. The movement indicated is that of a swift waltz, while the time really used has been either two-four or four-four with a free admission of pauses within lines, a thing sternly prohibited by Schmidt's theory. He knew that their admission would be fatal to his schemes. It has been, and the schemes actually followed have been those of Hephæstion, which he rejected. Readers have instinctively put in the rhythmical elements necessarily omitted in metrical schemes, and they have then imagined that they were using those devised by Schmidt. It was simply another case of a lacuna in scholarship. In the nature of things, rhythm must have been hoary with age when meter was born; for rhythm began with the very first effort of man to speak or move in balanced measures, while meter is of necessity a development due to later artificial restrictions placed upon free rhythm.

Rhythm is natural. All savages possess it in a high degree. They know nothing of meter. Meter clips the wings of

rhythm and seeks to dominate the thing that gave it birth. When it goes too far, a reaction follows and we have "Rag-time" in music and the rhythmical prose of Robert Frost in verse. The Greeks very properly made meter subordinate to rhythm and even said of it, "The father of meter is rhythm," which is not far from the truth. The Hebrew of the Old Testament preserves the earliest form of rhythm devoid of metrical limitations, the Vedas show the first encroachments of meter, the so-called logædics of Latin and Greek exhibit an advanced stage of metrical domination, and some modern English "jingles" represent the process "gone to seed."

Accuracy in time relations has always been a thing unknown among metricians, although it has taken years of study and experiment, with a mechanical means of testing results, to discover the fact; and, for that reason, their undue anxiety to make such poets as Homer conform to their narrow limitations is highly entertaining. Indeed, the solicitude displayed by metricians both ancient and modern concerning some of his lines which are beautifully rhythmical even if they are not strictly metrical is really touching to behold. When the metricians are through with them, there is little left but a ruin. Here also a lacuna in scholarship must be faced, and it is a large one.

Incidentally, it may be remarked that metrical considerations, when made operative in the case of certain syllables technically known as "ordinaries,"—the name "common" is unquestionably wrong, since the syllables themselves, as Hephæstion plainly intimates, had a value lying approximately half way between the regular 2's and 1's, the numbers used by the Greeks to indicate longs and shorts,—may even result in making the same combination of letters within a word both long and short in the same verse, as happens, for instance, in

the case of the penult of *isos*. Such a syllable is not "either long or short" but neither long nor short. Its real value is approximately that of a dotted eighth-note, and as such it is used. The poet's ear balances it correctly. The metrician distorts it to suit his fancy. No double quantities, then, are needed, if we get rid of our lacuna.

In the twenty years that have now been given to these investigations, many a discovery has been made that has upset all previous ideas on the subject and caused no end of astonishment. Nothing has been accepted, however, until it has been proved beyond a peradventure, and the testimony of the grammarians has been tested mechanically wherever there was the slightest ground for any sort of a question as to accuracy of results. As a rule they have been right. When they have been shown to be wrong, the problem has been such that the unaided human ear could not be trusted to solve it alone. It should be said, however, that in some cases their explanations of rhythmical phenomena have been fully as absurd as any that can be found in the works of modern metricians. It is clear that anomalies of that sort are doomed, and the publication of my book on the subject, which already contains over three hundred thousand words, although it is not yet complete, will not delay the process.

Time relations, elision in Greek and Latin, quantity, the relation of meter to rhythm, the nature of feet, why they differ from bars, why compound feet are a necessity, what sort of time mixtures are rhythmical, and various other things have all been studied in minute detail and then explained with simple directness and lucidity. It has been a heartbreaking task; but it has been worth all that it has cost, since common-sense has been shown to be reliable even in this field. Now, let us turn to something else.

The thing that comes to mind is a curious linguistic problem that cannot be stated without a certain amount of explanation as a preliminary requirement. It has to do with the language of the Armenians. By common consent, the Armenian people, in race characteristics, habitat, and mental peculiarities, are better fitted than any other human beings to be the descendants of the lost ten tribes. What has always been regarded as an insurmountable obstacle to such a view, however, is the fact that their language is an Aryan tongue, not a Semitic one.

But is that really an insurmountable obstacle? Think a moment. When Cæsar conquered Gaul, what happened? Latin became the official language and Old French was born. When the Angles and the Saxons and the Normans followed one another to Britain, what was the result? Old English was born. Celtic and Welsh and other forms of speech largely disappeared, and a new tongue was established in their places. A new linguistic era was begun in the British isles, very much as a new linguistic era had been begun on the continent.

Now, how about the ten tribes? What do we know? Israel was carried away captive about the year 720 B.C. and placed *in the cities of the Medes*. We learn that from 2 Kings xvii. 6, and it is decidedly significant. The Medes were Aryans. In 538 B.C., the Babylonian Empire came to an end and the Persian Empire took its place. The Persians were Aryans, and their language was akin to that of the Medes if it was not identical with it. Both were closely related to Sanskrit. What was going to happen to those captive Israelites? Would their rulers take pains to learn their language or would they force them to learn their own?

What has happened to the modern Jews? Do they speak Hebrew? Did they speak it when they returned from Baby-

lonia? How did the use of Aramaic begin among them? Do you know? Are you aware that a strong effort is now on foot to make Hebrew a spoken language fit for the expression of modern thoughts? Men are working hard to that end, and one man has given his life to the preparation of a dictionary; but the great mass of the people speak Yiddish, and they write Yiddish also and print their newspapers in it. What, then, is Yiddish? It is a genderless German dialect written in Hebrew characters. It is accordingly not Semitic but Aryan. Have they therefore ceased to be Semites? What bearing has that on the question? <sup>1</sup>

The Armenian tongue is peculiar and difficult. Whitney makes it a member of the Persian or Iranian branch of the Indo-European group of languages and agrees, essentially, with Delbrück, who places it between the Indo-Iranian and Greek branches, however, on the ground that it had an independent development of its own. Its literature did not begin until the fifth century, when the Armenians were Christianized; but it had already adopted the Greek alphabet as a result of the Hellenizing policy of Alexander the Great. The people who speak it have Semitic characteristics. Where, then, did it come from, and who are the people who use it?

Settled for centuries among an Aryan people, forgetful of their religion and literature, with every inducement in the way of material prosperity urging them to acquire and speak Iranian, with no motive left for retaining even an elementary knowledge of Hebrew, with the ready adoption of another tongue as a race characteristic, and with the same tenacity of

<sup>1</sup> A curious parallel is found in Salonica; for the Jewish population, exiled from Spain in the days of the Inquisition, still speak a mongrel Spanish which is written in Hebrew characters. It is called Judæo-Espagnol (*Atlantic Monthly*, Oct., 1916, pp. 563 f.). Is either tongue an "insurmountable obstacle" to being a Jew?

purpose in acquisition that has always been a typical Israelitish trait,—it is not conspicuous for its absence in the modern Armenians,—what would be likely to happen to the men of the northern kingdom who were thus scattered among the Aryan Medes and Persians? How long would they persist in retaining a Semitic form of speech? Could they escape the adoption of an Aryan one? And, in the latter event, would the Aryan tongue of their adoption remain pure or would it tend to take on peculiarities of its own as soon as the people were freed from the domination of their Aryan masters or came into contact with new conquerors of a related race? What are the probabilities?

Now, let us look a little deeper. When the Israelites were led away into captivity, it is clear that they had already lapsed into idolatry, that they were in rebellion against Jehovah, and that they were furious with his prophets because of their denunciations. Of these things there can be no doubt. What, then, was to be expected of them after they had been scattered among an Aryan people who worshiped the sun, the phantasmagoria of the howling tempest, the enveloping firmament (Ahura Mazda), the distant lightning bolt, and similar natural phenomena? What motives would be likely to appeal to them?

The people of the land are prosperous, and the captives consider prosperity the great desideratum. The same people soon appear in the guise of conquerors, and the captives have world ambitions of their own. The conquerors are also their masters, and they are not servants of Jehovah. They do worship, however, a god of the heavens (Ahura Mazda), and they recognize a devil (Angra Mainyu or the Druj). They also have an abundance of superstitions of various kinds, such as have already appealed to the captive apostates. Will their



religion repel or attract the latter, under the conditions that clearly obtain among them?

They deserted Jehovah and turned to the worship of local heathen gods in Palestine, as we know from the words of the prophets; and they did so in the hope that it would bring them worldly success. Would they lose the tendency entirely in the presence of the thing that they covet? Hardly. But if they lost their religion, their language would go with it. Their Jewish brethren in Babylonia retained their religion; and yet they lost their language for the most part, and on their return to Palestine the common people could not understand the Scriptures. Paraphrases thus became necessary, and the Targums were the ultimate result. Henceforth the people used Aramaic instead of Hebrew, although the short space of seventy years was all that separated them from their former use of the latter tongue, a thing which they never regained. The learned could still use it and did to some extent, at least in writing; but the rank and file had lost the power to do so and lost it for good.

Certain elements in the problem need no argument. It is clear that the ten tribes lost their religion. Otherwise, they had not been lost themselves. It is equally clear that they lost their language; for they never could have disappeared from history, if they had retained it. The natural inference is that they turned to the Iranian dialect, writing it for a time, possibly, in the Hebrew character, as the Jew now does his metamorphosed German, but ultimately adopting the more convenient Greek alphabet and forgetting all about the Semitic one. A few centuries would then suffice to obliterate it.

The next step would lead inevitably to a modification of the adopted Iranian tongue,—the modern Jew has plainly modified his adopted German,—and later, when the Greek culture

became prevalent, that would, in turn, have an effect more or less marked upon the language. All this is sufficiently clear. It follows that the Armenians have just such a tongue as the ten tribes ought to have developed under the circumstances, because of the pressure exerted by their environment. What, then, does it all mean? Simply this. The linguistic argument, instead of being an insuperable obstacle to the theory of an Hebraic origin for this people, is distinctly in its favor. A lacuna in scholarship has obscured the truth, and the reasoning has been exactly opposite to what it should have been. It is often so in matters of controversy.

This last fact suggests another curious phenomenon. In matters of dispute, people often beat the air instead of reaching any common ground. They are like the two men who wrangled for an hour and a half over the meaning of the word "faith." Finally, one was compelled to leave in order to catch a train. In parting he remarked: "Get such and such a tract and read it,—it expresses my ideas exactly." The other fairly gasped with astonishment; but he finally managed to reply, "Why — I wrote that tract myself." They had not defined their terms.

A difference of viewpoint will produce the same result. It may even lead to an inability to understand what is meant by the statements of an opponent and therefore to a futile argumentation, which, while supposedly destroying completely his position, does not even touch it! Instances of that sort can be found in the issues of this Quarterly within recent years. A case in point occurs to me in the instructive and illuminating article by Hugh Pope, O.P., which was published in April, 1914. The premise with which he started made it impossible for him to grasp the real meaning of the statements which he sought to answer, and his supposed refutation therefore fell

to the ground. He had the form of the words but not their content.

Incidentally, it may be remarked that the word *petros* in Greek always refers to a stone that is detached and movable. It may be a pebble, and it may be a boulder; but it is invariably a stone that can be shifted out of its place. The word *petra*, on the other hand, has reference with unchanging regularity to a fixed and immovable portion of the earth's crust. It may be a ledge or a crag or the roof of a cave; but it is always the thing that we call "the living rock." To assume that the two can be identical is therefore out of the question. The Church was not founded upon Peter but upon the everlasting truth that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God. We are Christians, not Peterites. Here we have another lacuna.

It suggests yet another of a curious sort, which has to do with an error in the English New Testament, primarily, but is common to all the versions, so far as I am aware. Of those in English, the King James Version is the least objectionable in this instance; but even that is plainly wrong. For some reason, ancient and modern translators have overlooked the fact that *nomizō* cannot possibly refer to a supposition. There is nothing hypothetical about it.<sup>1</sup> The nearest approach that

<sup>1</sup>The verb is a denominative from *nomos*. It must therefore mean 'to make use of a *nomos*.' But a *nomos* is a 'custom' or 'law,' and making use of a custom or a law is not supposing in any true sense of that word. It may mean 'to be in the habit of thinking,' 'to believe'; but that is not supposing, unless our usage is allowed to be extremely loose. Belief is a positive thing. Supposition is not. Supposition implies uncertainty, and it is never a fit word to employ in this connection. Omitting the passage under discussion, we have in the New Testament:—'when the first came, they believed that they were going to get more' (Matt. xx. 10); 'But they, believing him to be in the company, went a day's journey' (Luke ii. 44); 'For he [Moses] believed that his brethren

can be had, may be expressed by the words, "they were in the habit of thinking that." Such a translation would express the truth without doubt, but it would not be an accurate rendering of Luke iii. 23 even then. An accurate rendering, in fact, appears to make no sense.

The expression, *hōs enomizeto*, is an idiom meaning, "as would understand" (Acts vii. 25); 'having stoned Paul, drew him out of the city, believing him to be dead' (Acts xiv. 19); 'would have killed himself, believing that the prisoners had escaped' (Acts xvi. 27); 'whom they believed that Paul had brought into the temple' (Acts xxi. 29); 'I believe therefore this to be good, on account of the present necessity, — that it is good for a man that it should be so' (1 Cor. vii. 26); and 'believing that godliness is a way of gain' (1 Tim. vi. 5). "Believe" is not only better, in all of these passages, than "suppose," but it is more in keeping with oriental modes of thought. Occidentals suppose; orientals assume or assert, and they are decidedly positive about it. See "The Oriental Manner of Speech" by Abraham M. Rihbany, *Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1916, pp. 510 f., 516. In fact, so true is this that it is extremely doubtful whether the word "suppose" ought ever to be used in rendering a Biblical passage. Fortunately, it is found but once in the Old Testament, and the actual meaning there is, 'Let not my lord say' (2 Sam. xiii. 32). Conditions in the New Testament are similar; for 'deem' or 'consider' (*hēgeomai*) would come nearer to the Greek in Phil. ii. 25, 'reckon' (*logizomai*) would convey the real meaning in 2 Cor. xi. 5 and 1 Pet. v. 12, 'opine' or 'be of the opinion that' (*oiomai*) would give the true sense in John xxi. 25 and Phil. i. 16, 'assume,' 'postulate,' or 'take for granted' (*hupolambanō*), would be better than "suppose" in Luke vii. 43 and Acts ii. 15, and 'conjecture' or 'suspect' (*huponoeō*) would give a closer rendering in Acts xxv. 18. In the passages having *dokōō*, 'think' is the proper word to use, as in 'Think ye that I am come to give peace' (Luke xii. 51). The others are:—Mark vi. 49; Luke xiii. 2, xxiv. 37; John xx. 15; Acts xxvii. 13; and Heb. x. 29. The whole matter hinges on a difference of viewpoint, based on a difference of temperament. The translators have allowed themselves to be thoroughly Anglo-Saxon in their mental attitude from start to finish, and they have not realized that these things must be studied from the inside and that they should seek to be Jewish, as far as possible, in the matter of *Sprachgefühl*.

the custom was." But to be the son of Joseph, as the custom was, is an evident impossibility; and the translators therefore did the best they were able under the circumstances. It will be impossible to do any better, unless we go deeper. To do so, we must go back a little. With a few exceptions, Zerubbabel appears, throughout the Bible, as Zerubbabel the son of Shealtiel or Salathiel. The most important of the exceptions is found in 1 Chron. iii. 17-19, where it appears, from his genealogy, that he was not the son of Shealtiel but of Pedaiah! It seems that Shealtiel was the second son of Jeconiah; but he was evidently his heir and therefore in the royal line. Malchiram came next and then Pedaiah, and he appears to have been the first to have had male issue, a son named Zerubbabel, who thus became the heir of Shealtiel and the next in the royal line. He was therefore, in reality, the nephew of Shealtiel.

Now, "son of" is a translation of the Hebrew prefix *Bar-*, which is found in such names as Barabbas, Barjesus, Barnabas, Barsabas, Bartholomew, Bartimæus, etc., to which may be added Barjona. In the old Greek texts, this last name is written as two words, in Matthew xvi. 17; but it appears in its correct form in the Westcott and Hort edition. It is one word, and it means John-son. Yes: John-son. That is it exactly, and that is the best way to write it. An alternative form might be used, Son-of-John, but, in either case, it is a proper name, which does not necessarily indicate descent, although it does imply relationship of some kind.

Zerubbabel, then, was really Zerubbabel Pedaiah-son; but he became by adoption Zerubbabel Shealtiel-son. From this there is no possible escape, unless we falsify the records; and that would not be an escape but a subterfuge. It follows that "son of Joseph" is wrong. It should be Joseph-son. The

situation then becomes clear. According to Luke, Jesus was recorded as the custom was, as being a Joseph-son Heli-son, etc., to the end of the chapter, following his accepted descent, his ordinary name being Jesus Joseph-son. In this instance, unfortunately, the Westcott and Hort text is not as good as the old one was; for it shifts the words out of their natural order and makes them correspond to the Greek and English translations, both of which appear to miss the Hebrew idiom. The latter corresponds to the old Scandinavian one, which is now fast disappearing from use. It does survive, however, in some country districts.

Luke takes it for granted that his readers will understand that he is quoting from the records, and he therefore says merely, "Being, as the custom was, a Joseph-son," etc. The Greek idiom that was mentioned above is thus preserved, no violence is done to the meaning of the verb, and the Hebrew idiom is correctly interpreted. But that is not all; for other puzzling matters now have a simple solution. Ten times in the New Testament Jesus is called a "son of David." He was not a son of David, but he was a David-son, and that is what it should be in each instance. The difficulty involved in the use of the expression disappears instantly, when the content of the words is known.

The same reasoning applies elsewhere. It often happens in the Scriptures that a generation or two is omitted in the reckoning, and the discovery of the fact has caused considerable uneasiness. For this there was not the slightest occasion. It amounts to no more, in effect, than the omission of a man's middle name does in English. When the content of the words is considered, the translation automatically becomes "descendant of" rather than "son of," and that difficulty disappears. The whole trouble lies in a difference of idiom, and the Greek

seems to have the same limitations as the English. It does not, in fact, since it was understood by users of that language essentially as the Hebrew idiom was.

It should be noted, incidentally, that this method of interpretation has still another advantage; for it removes all possibility of contradiction in comparing the accounts of the birth of Jesus with subsequent incidents, in which he appears to be called the son of Joseph. He was not so called. He received his legal name, Jesus Joseph-son, and that was all there was to it. Now, think a minute. Joseph married Mary under somewhat distressing circumstances, as such matters go, and, in doing so, he assumed the paternity of the child. That was all he could do, and he naturally had to give him his own name, Joseph-son.

From this there was no possible escape; but the transaction did not involve a particle of evidence, except the mere appearance of the thing, concerning the underlying facts. Joseph's original intention, however, to put her away privately does involve a definite and tangible bit of evidence as to the truth, and it shows clearly that he was not the father of the babe. If he had been, he would have shown himself a most contemptible cad in going so far as even to entertain such an idea, and no honorable man can possibly deny the allegation in view of Mary's character.

Moreover, as the child was born after the marriage, let it be repeated that Joseph had no loophole whereby he could escape the custom of his people which required that the boy should be called a Joseph-son. There was no other name to give him. As the ancient proverb has it, "It is a foule byrd that fyleth his owne nest"; and Joseph would have done exactly that if he had sought to avoid the legal practice. Why

men fail to see the bearing of such facts upon the premises as a whole has long been a puzzle to various thinkers; but they do so fail and never seem to realize what is involved. That, however, will come up for discussion later.

As a matter of fact, the failure is on a par with other things that men do. Disregarding the plain evidence that Luke, during Paul's detention in Judea, was in Jerusalem or Cæsarea or both, alternately, for about two years and a half, with every opportunity at hand and plenty of leisure for the task, they place his Gospel some twenty years later, because, forsooth, he includes in his report of the events following the triumphal entry into Jerusalem some words about its future destruction that are not found in the other Gospels in that particular connection, although they are practically duplicated elsewhere in all three (Matt. xxiv. 2, 15-31; Mark xiii. 2, 14-27; Luke xxi. 6, 20-24).

Each of the single verses cited (2, 2, and 6) refers to the complete demolition of the temple, not one stone being left upon another, while the other passage (Luke xix. 44) has reference to the city as a whole; but each account implies the other more or less distinctly, since the temple would not be likely to suffer destruction apart from the city itself. Moreover, since the details of the account rather than its general features have led the critics to select a late date, there is nothing to do but hold them to the facts concerning those details. Now, Titus spared the west wall of the Upper City and Herod's three towers at the northwest corner, and they remained standing until Hadrian had suppressed the uprising under Barcochebas, after which they were demolished. The complete destruction of the city, therefore, which was called for by the prophecy, was not consummated until the year 135 A.D., a date entirely too late to fit into their theory that the



event had already taken place when Luke mentioned it in the first passage.

Here, then, is another lacuna — due to guessing. It involves a method that ignores important details for mere trifles which seem to favor a preconceived theory and then hastens on to assert that the theoretical time, at which they have arrived by guessing, was probably the actual time when the transaction took place. The writers want it late, and so they put it late; but that is not a commendable method of procedure. The three verses that stand by themselves (2, 2, and 6) are simply ignored in making up a verdict; but those three verses cannot be excluded, by any possibility, from the discussion, and they effectually dispose of the notion that Luke's Gospel was enough later than the others to have been written after the fall of Jerusalem.

The foundation for such a conclusion thus appears to be entirely too flimsy for a rational mind to accept; for to take that horn of the dilemma is to invite the implication that Matthew and Mark were also written later than 70 A.D., *since* nothing else remains to be done in the premises, unless interpolations amounting to downright fraud are postulated to account for the facts. When cornered, that is the very expedient to which such writers resort. Evidence is of no consequence, tradition is scoffed at, textual criticism does not count, and conservative opinion is worthless; but their own subjective conclusions are all-sufficient and must be accepted as final by any and all who do not wish to be thought behind the times! Unfortunately, some of us still "hail from Missouri and must be shown."

But there is more involved in this matter. Paul's Epistles have necessarily been given an early date, because he could not have written them after he was dead. That fact was too

patent to be dodged. But the very conditions which gave rise to his Epistles furnished the basis for a crying need of authoritative lives of Jesus or, in other words, for Gospels that could be used in the churches as the final statement concerning his works and his teachings. Such a demand would not long go unsupplied, if any one could be found to meet it; and it is therefore certain that the Synoptic Gospels are all early, since a demand for such writings was already beginning to be imperative by the time Paul began his second missionary journey, or soon after the year 50 A.D. Even John can hardly have been written later than 68 A.D.; for it is a fairly safe inference that its author would have made some reference to or betrayed some knowledge of the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus, if that event had already taken place at the time of writing.

Now, it is well agreed that John was the youngest of the apostles. But even if he was four or five years younger than Christ himself, he would still be close to seventy years of age at the date mentioned, since he would have been born, in all probability, in the first year of our era. He may have been a little older, or about seventy, and, in any event, he had had all of thirty-eight years in which to digest the teachings of his Master. That is certainly as long a period as there is any need of postulating. Moreover, his Gospel received—it had to have it—the endorsement of the Apostolic Church, which was in exile at Pella after the year 69 A.D.; and, as the center of religious influence was evidently transferred to Ephesus soon after that date, there would seem to be no escape from the conclusion that the endorsement of the Apostolic Church must have been placed upon John's Gospel before the fall of Jerusalem.

With its departure from that city, the Apostolic Church

certainly lost its prestige and probably also its authority. Communication with the outside world was no longer easy, and decisions concerning matters of general interest to the Church at large were no longer referred to it. This element and others like it are usually ignored in studying such questions; but it is not safe to omit even the infinitesimals, in our computation, until the final result has been reached, since the equation is rendered worthless by every procedure of that sort.

As to Revelation, it may be said that it belongs where it was originally placed by tradition; namely, at the end of the first century. The linguistic argument that has been advanced to controvert this position is wholly vicious and untenable. Men do not improve their style and diction between the ages of seventy and ninety-five, as any one must surely know who has studied the matter in the concrete; and it is a rare thing for them to retain their powers in full after they have reached the age of seventy years. If John, then, wrote his Gospel, as he certainly must have done, while he was still at the height of his mental efficiency and in command of his best powers of expression, the chances are that he could not have been over seventy years of age when he did it. That should be clear from our present knowledge of men.

Moreover, for more than twenty years, beginning probably soon after the year 62 A.D. or possibly in that year, he dwelt at Ephesus as a missionary among the people, and his vocabulary and style were certainly not improved by daily contact with the corrupt Ionic Greek that was spoken in that city. This alone is sufficient, even apart from the character of the subject matter, to account for the inferiority of the Greek in the Apoealypse, as compared with that in the Gospel, and the advanced age of the apostle only serves to confirm the diagnosis. It is largely a question of physical capabilities, as op-

posed to the subjective opinions of men who have not waited to go to the bottom of the matter, so far as such a thing is now among the possibilities.

In this connection, a word should be said of John xxi. 24, which is often taken to imply an editor's hand in the preparation of the Gospel. The statement, "we know that his witness is true," is thus referred to the men who are supposed to have prepared and issued the document. No such inference is necessary or even called for by the probabilities. A difference of mentality or mode of thought, such as is known to be characteristic of modern Syrians or of Russian Jews, is all that is needed to account for the words. The Anglo-Saxon and German races are strongly self-conscious. Syrians and Jews, however, are almost wholly lacking in that particular, unless long contact with free Europeans or Americans has developed the trait independently.

It is extremely hard for scholars to grasp that fact; but grasp it they must, if they are ever to get at the truth in many of these matters. There is a simple naïveté and a child-like directness of approach in the mental processes of these people that is often diametrically opposed to those of the men who undertake to edit or comment on their works. For that reason, the latter cannot realize how natural it would be for such an author as John to make the first part of the statement in xxi. 24 and then go on to make the rest of it. Such a process, however, would not be in the least inconsistent from his point of view. He would not be sufficiently self-conscious to differentiate himself from his brethren even when he said, "This is the disciple which beareth witness of these things, and wrote these things"; and the addition of the final clause, "and we know that his witness is true," would therefore be entirely in keeping with his modes of thought. His conscious-

ness was a community consciousness rather than an individual consciousness, and it behooves us to realize the fact.

This peculiarity accounts for various things in both the Old and New Testaments, and it explains, in part, the audacious performances of Marcion in connection with Luke and the Epistles of Paul. His sense of individual responsibility was crude and feeble, and a similar condition was common to the men of his age. They were, in this respect, but little different from the people of Mexico in our own day. If they kept the Gospel writings pure, as they evidently did, it was largely the result of a community sense of responsibility, which was fairly well developed. Slight verbal changes would thus excite no comment and no opposition; but anything more than that would arouse the entire Church and result in an upheaval of greater or less intensity.

This should be clear enough from the facts of early Church History. We do not know all that happened, but we do know some things; and they are significant, if we only have eyes to see and ears to hear. The trouble with us consists, in large measure, of a lamentable readiness to be satisfied with a superficial view of things. It often causes us to judge by appearances, instead of never being satisfied until we have obtained all that the records have preserved and all that they imply, so far as that is possible.

But even these things are not enough. Men accept a theory with undue haste and then proceed to apply it to the facts,—without much regard for the facts themselves even when they have them in their entirety, so far as that sort of thing can now be determined,—after which they push things to their logical conclusion, on the basis of the theory, and, by doing so, get results that are patently false and woefully misleading. “Figures won’t lie, but statistics will.” Exactly. Men make

them lie. And they do the same thing with facts. It is not always intentional or even conscious, and they are often innocent enough in their conclusions; but they pervert the truth nevertheless and then complain if they are brought to book by others who have gone more deeply into the subject than they have, even going so far as to assert that people should listen to "responsible scholars" rather than to men who venture to disagree with them.

There is something about this claim that is simply delicious. The men who make it are anything but "responsible" in their method of dealing with such things, to say nothing of their views; for they have deliberately adopted a line of action that will further their worldly prosperity and their own ambitions, whether they are fully aware of the fact or not, and they are apt to be blind leaders of the blind. They imagine, however, that they can compass by sheer force of intellect what no man could possibly be sure of without divine guidance and that too of a pronounced character. Moreover, the words, "Except ye . . . become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Mark xviii. 3), contain a saying of the Master with which they have no acquaintance and no sympathy. But then, they have outgrown his authority and are satisfied that they are much wiser than he could have been. And yet, by patronizing some of his words and works, they still claim to be his followers.

There is evidently some sort of a lacuna here, and it may furnish food for thought in a subsequent paper. Conceit was, indeed, a pagan virtue — it is one of the attainments praised in the Vedic literature as an acquirement brought home by a boy after a course of study with a **guru** — and it still is; but it has not been so regarded among Christians, since humility was exalted by Jesus in his teachings and really enjoined upon

his followers. It does not seem to be observed, in any monumental fashion, by those who exalt themselves above him in matters of Biblical learning and of theological doctrine.

That men are doing that sort of thing to-day is too patent for words. It is possible that they are not aware of the fact; but, if they are not, it is time that some of us woke them up to their responsibilities and their — I came near saying sins! What shall we call them? Sins are no longer in fashion, men are immature angels, and Jesus himself is but a man, so they assert, no different from themselves, save in certain particulars, which must have been wholly fortuitous — if the rest of the program is to stand. But my allotted space is already fully occupied, and these matters must be left for future consideration.