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A table of contents for *Bibliotheca Sacra* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_bib-sacra_01.php

ARTICLE IV.

A NEW PLAN FOR STATE CONTROL OF THE
LIQUOR BUSINESS.

BY THE REVEREND JUSTUS NEWTON BROWN.

We are aware of the fact that liquor-drinking tends to produce poverty and corruption and crime and disease and death. At the present time the amount of liquor drunk *per capita* in the United States is said to be increasing, although for many years the friends of temperance have sought to remove the drink-evil through their various organizations, by the press and the pulpit and the Sunday school, and by the strong arm of the state. The effort put forth for this purpose by large numbers of earnest people has been beyond calculation. And yet intemperance remains, perhaps, the sorest of all evils that afflict the nation, and it is kept down to its present proportions only by the unceasing vigilance and the untiring effort of those who realize the extreme peril we are in.

In view of these facts it is an important question whether there is any better plan than has yet been tried for state control of the liquor business. It seems to me that there is one, and that it is to be found in a very simple and practical way. The experiments that have been made during the last fifty years have been sufficient to show the elements of strength and of weakness in the current methods of state control, including license and prohibition. By excluding these elements of weakness and combining these elements of strength, we should now be able to formulate a new and more effective temperance policy for the state.

Let us, accordingly, review the principal experiments that have been made in state control of the liquor business. One of these, which has been faithfully tried on a large scale, is that of license. At first it was low license, and then, when the results proved unsatisfactory, high license was substituted. License laws contain provisions restricting sales to certain places and times and persons, usually prohibiting sales to intoxicated persons, drunkards, and minors, and during a part of the night, as well as on Sundays, election days, and holidays.

This policy was adopted with the approval of many sincere friends of temperance, in the hope that such restrictions upon the sale of liquor would greatly diminish the drink-habit, and that this result would be still further accomplished through a reduction in the number of saloons. Another thing sought by this policy was to put upon those engaged in the liquor business a share of the burdens which their business puts upon society. All this seemed plausible, and many good people congratulated themselves upon having found a remedy for most of the evils of the liquor traffic.

What are the results of this experiment? Some improvement in the order prevailing upon the street; and, so far as the restrictions are enforced, less drinking than there would have been without them. But that the amount of drinking has been diminished to any considerable extent by high license cannot be ascertained by the searching investigation conducted under the direction of President Charles W. Eliot, of Harvard University, and Seth Low, sometime since mayor of New York. In this essential thing high license has proved a bitter disappointment.

Neither has it made the liquor dealers bear the burden of the increased license fees, but this burden has been borne by those least able to do so,—by the drinking men and their families. It

sounds well to talk about making the liquor traffic bear the burdens which it puts upon society, but it would be nearer the truth to say that the wife and children of the drinking man are required to pay the saloon-keeper a little more for making their husband and father a drunkard.

And the fact that the license fees paid into the public treasury seem to lighten the burdens of tax-payers constitutes a bribe for their consent to the existence and growth of a traffic that ruins men. By thus sharing in the profits of the saloon-keeper, the state becomes a partner in his business, and lends its great influence to make it respectable. At the same time the saloon-keeper, that he may recoup himself for his high license fees and use to the full the privilege he has paid for, comes out on a prominent street, rents a better building, and does what he can to make his place of business attractive. He is tempted to get children to drinking, so as to create an appetite which will induce them to become patrons of his saloon. And it is a notorious fact that the few restrictions which high license laws employ to protect society from the evils of drinking are very often disregarded.

Nor does the corrupting influence of the licensed liquor traffic stop here. The large profits induce capitalists to invest millions of dollars in developing and protecting the business. This money is used freely to corrupt legislatures and juries and courts. Already in some of our large cities the licensed liquor business decides elections and controls the policy of the government. Under the license system one of the strongest combinations of capitalists in the country has grown up, and is working constantly and systematically for the promotion of a business whose success means the corruption of the government and the ruin of the home, and whose finished product is the drunkard.

This, then, is the outcome of the license policy. The one lesson above all others which this experiment teaches is, that the only way to solve the liquor problem is to take the financial profit out of the liquor business. As long as this business is profitable, men will engage in it and do what they can to build it up.

A very different experiment in license is the Norwegian Company System, which was thus described by Professor Francis G. Peabody in the *Forum* for January, 1899:—

“The Company system does not apply to the whole of Norway. On the contrary, the country as a whole is under a prohibitory law, procured by local option. . . . In the country districts generally the native population is, to an almost unparalleled degree, removed from the solicitations of the drink-traffic. . . . The town, having voted that licenses shall be granted for the next five years, makes over the monopoly of such sales to a stock company, organized by public-spirited citizens for the purpose not of increasing, but of restricting, the business. The interest on capital invested in such company is limited to 5 per cent; and all accounts are subject to the supervision of the municipal authorities. All further profits are devoted to objects of public usefulness,—not, however, to charities or institutions which would be otherwise maintained by the town, but to voluntary methods of relief and social advantages, especially such as seem to counteract the drink-habit. . . . Precisely how one of these companies operates may be indicated by a single illustration. Bergen is a city of 54,000 inhabitants. . . . There are nine saloons and four wholesale depots. The company has a capital of \$20,000 in four hundred shares held by two hundred and thirty-seven stockholders. Among these are many of the leading citizens. . . . It deals with the distilled-liquor business only; and it makes no attempt to provide in its saloons any element of sociability or agreeableness. . . . There are no tables or chairs or encouragements for idlers, but simply counters provided with the small glasses of the company, measured, like an apothecary's, for the exact dose. A customer enters, drinks his thimbleful, as if of medicine, and at once withdraws. Instead of solicitation there is the barest permission. . . . On the walls are various deterrent notices like the following: ‘No credit’; ‘No loafing’; ‘No disorderly conduct’; ‘No sale to an intoxicated person.’ The regulations set forth that it is the duty of the superintendent not to encourage, but to check, excessive drinking. No liquor can be sold to minors. The saloons are open from 8 to 12 in the morning and from 1.30 to 7

in the afternoon. . . . That is to say, the sale stops just when an American bar begins its best business; and the prohibition which could not be obtained outright is obtained for every evening and every non-working day."

Still, the liquor business in Norway is "enormously lucrative." In 1897 the net profit of the Bergen Company was about \$50,000, out of which about \$30,000 was distributed among charitable organizations of the town. The great financial success of the companies has led to a change in the law, which now requires most of their profits to be paid over to the government.

Before this system was adopted, it is said that the drink-habit in Norway "threatened the very fibre of the people," but after its adoption the amount of distilled spirits consumed *per capita* was reduced more than one-half in fourteen years, and, under the general policy of prohibition in the country and the company license system in the larger towns, Norway has become, with respect to the use of distilled spirits, "the most temperate of European countries."

Although the Norwegian system would be a vast improvement on the American license system, there is no probability that it will ever prevail here. Our democratic principles forbid our granting to any company a monopoly of the liquor business. A few years ago the United States tried the experiment of educating the Indian children in private schools, but even this policy was so unpopular that it was soon abandoned. In this country, whatever the state chooses to do in regard to the liquor business, when it gets tired of a general license system, it will do directly, through its own agents, just as it builds the Panama Canal.

But while we shall not import the Norwegian system, we may learn important lessons from this experiment. One of these is the advantage of a policy of state control which shall

include such variety in method that it shall be adapted to people of different ideas, habits, and environment, especially to those living in the country and to those living in the larger cities. Another lesson is the benefit of placing certain restrictions upon the sale of liquor, even though these fall far short of absolute prohibition. A third lesson, no less important, is the feasibility of an attempt to eliminate the element of financial gain from the sale of liquor.

An American system for state control of the liquor business which bears some resemblance to that just described is the Dispensary System of South Carolina. The law, which went into operation in 1893, provided for the sale of liquor through dispensaries, forbidding all other sales except those made by manufacturers to the state itself. The business thus monopolized by the state was to be carried on for a profit to be divided equally between the county and the municipality in which the dispensary should be located. The appointment of dispensers of liquor was vested in a state board, but their salaries were made to depend upon the amount of business done, leaving them under temptation to increase their sales for private gain.

Under this law dispensaries have been established in some rural districts where prohibition formerly prevailed, but in the cities it has reduced the number of places where liquor can be bought. A few years ago no city except Charleston and Columbia had more than one dispensary. Of the operation of this system the committee appointed by President Eliot and Ex-mayor Low reported:—

“ It is quite within the truth to say that no substitute for a license system has been so thoroughly enforced in this country as the dispensary act of South Carolina. . . . Its mandates are generally heeded, but from necessity rather than from choice. A strong force of constabulary, which may be augmented at will by the governor, is everywhere at work ferreting out violations of the law, watching railroad stations, steamboat landings, express offices, and other ave-

nues of commerce. Having large powers, they make the importation of contraband liquor a most difficult operation, no matter under what guise it may be shipped. . . . In every municipality, with the exception of Charleston, the law is well enforced. . . . In the cities and towns formerly under license the dispensary law has promoted sobriety in a truly wonderful degree. . . . The bar-room, where liquor is retailed by the glass, has been banished from South Carolina. . . . The business of liquor selling at the dispensaries is flourishing. . . . The liquor interest (the 'Blind Tigers' excepted) is demoralized and has disbanded."

South Carolina has thus demonstrated the fact that a state can rid itself of liquor saloons by taking the traffic wholly into its own hands.

The next experiment to be mentioned is that to which, from time to time, the friends of temperance have looked with more hope than to any other. Prohibition has been tried in Maine for fifty years, and for a shorter period in many other states. Yet most of the states having prohibitory laws have found them so difficult to enforce that they have finally repealed them. In Iowa, an agricultural state, with no large cities, and with a public sentiment opposed to intemperance, after ten years' trial the prohibitory law was practically set aside. It was not repealed, but what is called the "mulct law" was enacted, which provides that, upon the written consent of the majority of voters in a given district, the penalties of the prohibitory law may be suspended, and the sale of liquor may be subject to a tax only. One of the weak points in the Iowa law was the permission to sell liquor which was granted to pharmacists. It appeared that the drug-stores were harder to regulate than saloons. And there were counties in which the law was boldly disregarded. Still it "wiped out nearly a hundred and fifty breweries, closed a large distillery, and drove out of business nearly or quite two thousand saloons."

In Kansas the operation of the prohibitory law has been so

beneficial, on the whole, that it has been retained in spite of all the efforts made to secure its repeal. In most of the state it is enforced fairly well, but in four or five cities it is flagrantly disregarded. Like the Iowa law, its loophole is the drug-store. It provides for granting permits to druggists to sell liquor for medicinal purposes, and the temptation to sell it as a beverage under this pretext is so strong that not a few drug-stores are practically saloons. I speak from personal observation, when I say that efforts to secure the conviction of those who violate the Kansas law are so expensive, and so likely to fail, that it is difficult to persuade temperance people to engage in them.

The prohibitory law of Maine provides for town agencies for the sale of "pure, unadulterated, intoxicating liquors, for medicinal, mechanical, and manufacturing purposes," but there are not more than twenty of these agencies in the state. The intoxicating liquor sold for these purposes almost everywhere is purchased in other states, or sold contrary to law. Yet in most of the state the prohibitory law is so far enforced that temperance people are unwilling to have it repealed.

As a statement of the general results of prohibitory legislation, the conclusions reached by President Eliot and Ex-mayor Low, after the careful investigation which they directed for "the committee of fifty," are instructive. They say:—

"Prohibitory legislation has failed to exclude intoxicants completely, even from districts where public sentiment has been favorable. In districts where public sentiment has been adverse or strongly divided, the traffic in alcoholic beverages has been sometimes repressed or harassed, but never exterminated or rendered unprofitable. . . . The liquor traffic, being very profitable, has been able, when attacked by prohibitory legislation, to pay fines, bribes, hush-money, and assessments for political purposes to large amounts. This money has tended to corrupt the lower courts, the police administration, political organizations, and even the electorate itself. . . . Again, the

sight of justices, constables, and informers enforcing a prohibitory law far enough to get from it the fines and fees which profit them, but not far enough to extinguish the traffic and so cut off the source of their profits, is demoralizing to society at large."

Whether we agree with all the findings of this sub-committee or not, it is clear that prohibitory laws are weakened in some states by the fact that certain private parties, as pharmacists, are permitted to sell liquor for lawful purposes. And in all states where prohibitory laws are in vogue, they have two other weak points.

1. In some parts of the state,—usually in the larger cities,—for lack of a local public sentiment supporting prohibition, it is exceedingly difficult, almost impossible, to enforce the law. For this reason there are districts in every such state where prohibition does not prohibit.

2. The other weak point in current prohibitory legislation is its unequal treatment of the seller and the purchaser of liquor. One cannot sell unless another buys. If the sale of liquor is wrong, the purchase of liquor is wrong; for these are simply two parts of the same transaction. In every violation of the prohibitory law there are two partners, the seller and the purchaser. Why should the law put upon one of these partners the sole responsibility for an act in which both have a share? This is not fair. Men are not treated so when they are involved in other misdemeanors and crimes. The accomplice and the abettor are condemned. So are the accessory before the fact and the accessory after the fact. One guilty of the subornation of perjury is condemned along with the perjurer. The same is true of bribery. The one who gives or offers a bribe is condemned, as well as the one who receives it. But let a man be guilty of the same sort of an act in purchasing liquor, let him do all he can to induce another to sell

in violation of the law, and his responsibility for the unlawful sale is ignored, while the man who sells to him may be sent to jail. Should we be surprised to find it difficult to secure the conviction of liquor-sellers under a law that is so manifestly unequal? If the responsibility of the purchaser of liquor is thus ignored by the law in order that his testimony against the seller may be obtained more easily, this is a sacrifice of justice for the exigencies of administration, but surely it is not statesmanship.

Again, one of the reasons brought forward in support of prohibitory legislation is its educational value. It is maintained that, by forbidding the sale of liquor, the state at least helps people to form a correct judgment in regard to the character of the liquor traffic. This would be true if prohibitory legislation represented fairly the guilt of both of the parties responsible for the traffic. But what shall be said of the educational value of legislation which always overlooks the responsibility of one of the parties, and which always, to this extent, misrepresents the facts?

Yet, in spite of its weak points and its inconsistency, this legislation has no little strength. Its strength comes from its evident purpose to avoid all complicity with drunkard-making, and from the fact that it proposes heroic treatment for a deadly evil. To many it seems to be the only thoroughgoing method yet suggested for dealing with the liquor problem. In the presence of difficulty and defeat they cling to prohibition as a forlorn hope.

Only one more experiment remains to be mentioned. It is local option. This is only another name for prohibition by districts smaller than states,—prohibition by counties, cities, or towns. This form of prohibition has spread rapidly, especially at the South, until it prevails in large portions of some states

where state-wide prohibition would not be acceptable. There are always districts favorable to prohibition when the state as a whole is opposed to it, and in many such districts the saloon has been voted out under local option laws. Not only is it thus easier to secure this form of prohibition, but wherever it is secured it is likely to be sustained by the local public sentiment. Those who vote "No license" can generally be relied on to use their influence toward keeping out the saloon. Thus the strength of local option is in its home-rule principle which makes this form of prohibition easier both to adopt and to maintain than a state-wide prohibitory law.

But the weakness of local option is not far to seek. When people have banished the saloon from their midst, they have no legal means of protection from the saloons in the neighboring town or city. For this reason, local option in many places has more effect in determining where liquor shall be bought than in determining how much liquor shall be drunk. Because of the ineffectiveness of local option in the vicinity of licensed saloons, and because of the other disadvantages which it suffers through its restriction to small areas, it cannot be regarded as a solution of the liquor problem. Local option, while it is so far superior to the American license system that there is no comparison between them, seems to be merely a station on the road to something better than itself.

Such is a brief review of the principal experiments in state control made in a prolonged and bitter and disappointing struggle with intemperance. But these experiments are worth all they have cost, because of the light they throw upon the path to success. And the friends of temperance will take a long step in this path, when they adopt a policy that shall combine the elements of strength and exclude the elements of weakness

that we have discovered in the current methods of dealing with the liquor problem.

In order that this discussion may lead to definite conclusions and practical results, I will venture to outline *a new plan for state control* which, it seems to me, would meet these conditions. This outline will be stated in three propositions.

FIRST PROPOSITION. *That the state should abolish all liquor saloons within its borders, and prohibit all manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquor by private parties, including druggists, making just compensation to any persons who may be injured by this change in its policy; and should prohibit the purchase of intoxicating liquor from private parties.*

A liquor saloon is a place where intoxicating liquor is sold and may be drunk, and where people may treat one another to drinks. In spite of all that may be claimed for this institution as "the poor man's club," every such resort is a curse to the community and should be abolished by law. It is well said, that "the only solution of the saloon problem is no saloon." Undoubtedly there should be substitutes for the saloon, but not saloons. And the only way to get rid of the saloon is to stop the sale of liquor by private parties, including druggists. The surest way to accomplish this is to prohibit also the manufacture of liquor by private parties. Experience shows that the manufacture of liquor can be controlled by law more easily than its sale, and this prohibition is needed in order that the state may have a free hand in dealing with the whole problem.

The state can better afford to compensate those who may be injured by this radical change in its policy than to have them continue in their present business. Those entitled to compensation would be chiefly such as were compelled to suffer loss on the plant which had been used for the lawful manu-

facture of liquor. But, with sufficient time to prepare for the change of policy, and with the possibility of selling out to the state, probably the instances requiring compensation would not be many. In any case there could be no reasonable objection to "just compensation" to those who were really "injured" by the change in the state's policy. But the promise of such compensation would lessen their opposition to the new law.

SECOND PROPOSITION. *That, in the interest of temperance, the state should take the whole liquor business into its own hands; and that it should manufacture pure liquor, and sell it—so far as, in its judgment, liquor ought to be manufactured and sold—substantially at cost, through carefully selected agents who should have no financial interest in their sales, and who should be under bonds to keep the law.*

This does not mean that the state, having closed all private saloons, should itself go into the saloon business; but that such liquor as ought to be sold by any one should be sold, not by private parties, but by the state, at its own agency, where no drinking should be allowed, and where nothing should be said or done to induce people to buy. In fact, all the regulations and restrictions under which liquor should be offered for sale, as to time and place of sale, kind and quantity to be sold, purchasers to whom sales may be made, under what conditions and for what purposes,—all of these things should be decided by the state and that, too, in the interest of temperance. I am not discussing the question what liquor should be sold, or recommending that any liquor at all shall be sold, but simply maintaining that, if any liquor ought to be sold, this should be done by the state rather than by private parties.

Naturally, under this general plan of state control, some states would open the doors of their liquor agencies wider than others. So the question arises whether a state like New York,

for example, adopting the plan here recommended, would have the right to sell liquor as a beverage, even if this would promote temperance by preventing the more extensive sale of it by private parties. Before answering this question, let us understand what is meant by selling liquor "as a beverage." It is not, certainly, that the liquor is sold to some one who declares his intention to use it in this way. But it means simply that one who sells the liquor has reason to expect that it will be drunk as a beverage. This is often true of the agents who sell liquor under the Maine law. Yet the state of Maine has a right to provide a liquor-selling agency, not because the purchasers declare their intention to use the liquor for medicinal, mechanical, or manufacturing purposes, but simply because in this way the state seeks to diminish the amount of liquor drunk. Just so the state of New York, if by doing so it could promote temperance, would have a right to establish agencies in which liquor should be sold and no questions asked. In this matter, so long as the state puts no temptation in any man's way, it has a right to pursue such policy as will best promote temperance. It is not here maintained that it would be wise for any state to sell liquor and ask no questions, or that this could ever be done in the interest of temperance. These are matters which the state has a right to decide for itself.

When such a plan of state control as that under consideration is proposed to the citizens of a state, if there are those to whom it seems wrong, they ought to oppose it by their influence and their vote. But when they have voted, if they find themselves in the minority, it may become their duty, as good citizens, to support the government in maintaining the very policy whose adoption it was their duty to oppose. For it is now their duty to let the majority rule. If the majority ought to rule, they ought to have a fair chance to do so.

All that has been said of the right of the state to sell liquor applies with equal force to the manufacture of liquor.

As to the manner in which liquor might be sold according to the proposed plan for state control, something further should be said. For obvious reasons the agents intrusted with the responsibility of selling in the name of the state should be "carefully selected" and put "under bonds to keep the law." They should "have no financial interest in their sales," that they might not be tempted to sell more than they ought. By selling too much they would both injure the purchasers and misrepresent the state.

How about the suggestion that the liquor should be sold "substantially at cost"? This "cost" may be regarded as including the whole expense of administering the law under which the sale should be made, and perhaps there should be added to this such other expenses of the government as are directly caused by the drink-habit. For selling "substantially at cost" there are two reasons.

1. One is, that in its sale of liquor the state might act, and might be known to act, purely for the public good. On the one hand, the state itself would need to be delivered from the temptation to sell liquor for the profit there is in the business. On the other hand, it ought to cast its whole influence as strongly as possible for temperance,—a thing which it could not do if it should sell liquor at a profit, for in that case it might be suspected of acting from a lower motive.

2. The other reason for selling "substantially at cost" is that, by thus reducing its price, the state could more effectively suppress unlawful selling. The large profit which comes from selling liquor at a high price is what tempts men to sell unlawfully. By reducing the price the state would remove this great temptation. And it could so discourage the purchase of

liquor in other ways that this lowering of the price would not lead to a corresponding increase of sales. Some would undoubtedly abuse their privilege and purchase liquor at the state agency for the same purpose for which they now purchase it at a saloon. But the knowledge of the fact that they could get it anywhere and by any means at a low price would tend to take the profit out of the illicit liquor business. With this accomplished, the liquor interest as a financial power would gradually disappear.

THIRD PROPOSITION. That the state should provide, by a general law, such minimum of regulation, restriction, and prohibition of its own sales of liquor as, in its judgment, may wisely be applied in all places within its borders; and should authorize counties, towns, cities, and wards of cities to add thereto any further regulation, restriction, and prohibition which they might deem wise.

What is here proposed is not a particular law either forbidding the sale of liquor by the state, or permitting its sale, or restricting and regulating its sale, but a plan whereby the state as a whole and the local community would both have a share in deciding these matters. This plan would secure the advantages of both state-wide prohibition and local option without the disadvantages of either. It would give the state as a whole less law and more enforcement of law than current prohibitory enactments. It would give all the prohibition that could be enforced throughout the commonwealth. At the same time it would give to every county, town, city, and ward the privilege of having just as much more of regulation, restriction, and prohibition than the rest of the state as its citizens might want. In every place it would thus be possible to enlarge the state law and to tighten its grip. The government would not be conducted on two contradictory policies, as is the case

in Iowa under the prohibitory and the "mulct" laws. But the state and the local governments would be moving in the same direction, with the privilege granted to each community of going as much farther than the state as it should choose. This combination of a general law with the home-rule principle would be equally adapted to places where the temperance sentiment is weak and to places where it is strong.

Another distinct advantage of this plan would be its educating influence, for, under it, each community would have its own liquor problem to solve. The fact that, within certain limits, it could apply its own remedy, would raise the question in each community how far it should go beyond the state law in its effort to save itself from the drink-evil. To answer this question intelligently would require that the people should inform themselves in regard to the consequences of the liquor traffic in their midst. Different experiments in dealing with it would be tried in different places. In some places restrictions and deterrents like those employed under the company system at Bergen, Norway, might be adopted. And different experiments might be tried at different times in the same place. The results of all these experiments would be compared. Temperance workers would discuss them, and whenever they appealed to the people to save their own community from the drink-evil, they would appeal to those having the legal remedy, as well as the moral, in their own hands. All of these things would promote a better understanding of the liquor problem, and would tend to improvement in methods of dealing with the drink-evil.

This Plan for State Control of the Liquor Business appears to me to possess the following advantages:—

1. It is adapted to states and communities in every condition and belief and practice.

2. It would tend to educate the people of every community in temperance.
3. It would provide laws that can be enforced everywhere.
4. It would take the financial profit out of the liquor business.
5. It would abolish the liquor saloon.

Before dismissing the subject, let us inquire whether there is reason to expect that any such policy as this will ever be adopted. I think it is evident that some such policy would be the natural result of a comparison of the experiments in temperance legislation that have been tried during the last fifty years. That such a comparison will be made and thoroughly discussed in the near future there is no question for the following reasons:—

1. These experiments were made because each of them in its turn was regarded by a goodly number of temperance people as a solution of the liquor problem. And so long as the supporters of each of the several methods of action entertained this view, it was not strange that they declined to coöperate with those who supported some other method. The temperance army came to be divided into competing or hostile camps. Thus it remained until each method had a fair trial, and none of them accomplished what its friends expected.

2. At the present time, however, there is a new spirit of coöperation among good people in temperance work, as in other efforts for the uplifting of men. The same people who disregard old party affiliations, that they may coöperate in electing honest men to office, and favor the federation of the churches for Christian work, will be glad to coöperate for the

promotion of temperance. And their number is increasing. Indeed, the latest temperance organization, the Anti-Saloon League, is founded on this principle. Its influence is already bringing leading temperance men and women into coöperation. In addressing one of its conventions the eminent Prohibition leader and editor, Mr. John G. Woolley, said:—

“For the first nine years of its existence I considered the Anti-Saloon League a compromise and a mistake. . . . Meanwhile some of you were holding similar misjudgments of the Prohibition party. You said it was harsh, narrow and unpractical. Both of us were right. Both of us were wrong. . . . I saw that the great reform must fall unless the unformed but friendly sentiment and the full-fledged logic of the movement could be gripped by organization and made to work together for the mighty end in view. For two years the keynote of my paper has been coöperation. . . . And I have come to this convention on purpose to take off my hat to the Anti-Saloon League as the most sane, safe and successful application of the prohibition doctrine the world has ever known. . . . We are not enemies, but friends. We are not rivals, but cogs in the same wheel.”

Another competent witness to this growing spirit of coöperation is Mr. William E. Johnson, of Chicago, who has published an article on “The Era of Good Feeling in Temperance Work,” in which he says:—

“The temperance reform is getting down to ‘team work,’ and ‘team work’ does not consist in chewing the ears of the other horse. ‘Team work’ naturally breeds fellowship as well as efficiency. The net result has been the creation of an era of good feeling in the reform, such as it has not known in its history.”

Coöperation among those temperance people who have been in hostile camps is certainly coming.

3. But when this coöperation comes, there will come with it a candid and careful comparison of the several experiments in temperance legislation, and as a result the best features from the various systems will be retained in a new combination.

Toward such a consummation it seems to me that we are surely and steadily moving. When we reach it the great cause of temperance will have such an opportunity as it never had before. Meantime an understanding of the movement we are in will prepare us for leadership. If we keep our eyes on this goal of temperance legislation, we shall lead with wisdom and hope and courage. Others will follow. A great many of the plain people will follow. They have lost confidence in current methods of dealing with the drink-evil, but they will rally to the support of a new policy that appeals to their common sense as sane, practical, and thoroughgoing.