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THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA

ARTICLE I.

SOME FATAL WEAKNESSES OF THE WELLHAUSEN SCHOOL.

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I.

THE present position of the Wellhausen school is too well known to need description. To all appearance it has been triumphant all along the line. Many writers habitually act on the assumption that the main conclusions, at any rate, of the inquiries it has conducted are too well established ever to be called seriously into question. Indeed, it seems to be generally supposed that nothing but religious prejudice or a total incapacity to appreciate scientific results can adequately account for the opposition which is still offered to it in some quarters.

There is, however, one very material point which has been overlooked by the theologians and philologists who believe that they are the exponents of true science. With insignificant exceptions, the whole literature of the Wellhausen school is the work of untrained men writing about subjects that can be safely handled only by experts. This statement may at first blush cause a good deal of surprise, for the critics habitually make no small display of their "training"; but a few minutes' reflection will show that the seeming paradox is perfectly true. On what do the Wellhausen school rely in the first instance?

On the evidence of the laws. But is there a single member of that school who is a trained lawyer? The answer can be only an emphatic negative. And yet it is matter of common knowledge that law is a technical and difficult subject. A reasonable man guided by those considerations which habitually actuate prudent men in the conduct of their affairs would not venture to pronounce a definite opinion on any knotty point of the law of his own age and country without legal training. Nor would he rest satisfied with the views of a theologian or a philologist or a lexicographer on such a matter. Why, then, should such views be regarded as adequate when we are dealing with the Pentateuch? It is matter of notoriety that ancient law is as a rule much more technical and difficult to understand than the legislation of modern societies; and certainly the task does not become easier when we have to deal with law that is written in a dead language. Surely, if training goes for anything, it might be thought that here, if anywhere, we had a subject that needs to be studied by persons who possess the requisite skill.

Hitherto I have spoken as if the whole of the Mosaic Law consisted of what are termed "jural laws," that is, rules intended for the guidance of courts. As everybody knows, that is not so. Early Hebrew law, like all other archaic systems, covers a much wider field than that which falls within the province of a court of justice. But it will not be contended that such subjects as sacrificial regulations are easier than jural law for the unskilled to handle, or that any of the critics are qualified sacrificial priests. Indeed, it is necessarily a far more difficult task for modern investigators to determine the construction, the bearing, and the intention of a sacrificial rule than of a jural law. However much the rules and civilizations of our modern states may have changed from the state of affairs contemplated by the legislation of the Pentateuch,

many of the conditions of the lawgiver's task remain essentially the same. The constitution of the tribunals is different; but courts of law still exist. New and refined methods of dealing with *tuum* as if it were *meum*, have been invented; but the problems presented by thieves remain. The nature and object of penalties may vary; but the need of punishment is the same. But, when we are dealing with sacrifices, we have no such assistance from our own experience. Peace-offering, burnt-offering, sin-offering, meal-offering, have no parallels in our time. Nor can we hope to reconstruct the system from the observations of our own daily life in the same way as we can do with some of the jural laws. There is a further difficulty. When we are dealing with jural laws, we can by the aid of the comparative method enjoy the assistance of the work done by a body of legal scholars on the laws of other ancient societies, and, in particular, on the Roman law. Now the science of comparative religion enjoys no such advantages, and for two reasons: 1. There is no guide to religious institutions that can be fairly likened to the assistance rendered by the Roman law to the study of legal history; 2. It is impossible to institute any comparison between the work done by the comparative lawyers and the present state of the comparative study of religious institutions. Not only is comparative law a much older and better-established science: it is pursued by men who as a body are far better fitted by virtue of their training to carry on such investigations. Nearly every scholar who studies legal history is a trained lawyer. No student of comparative religion is a sacrificial priest. Again, even in the case of the theoretical lawyers, it is frequently easy to see that they allow their theories to override their judgment. But if that be so with men who are in some measure trained to weigh evidence, what must be the case with the purely academic students who

have never received any such training, and yet write about ancient religious institutions with no equipment save such as they get from the contents of studies and libraries?

In the second section of this article it is proposed to give point to these remarks by illustrating the inability of the critics to deal with jural and sacrificial rules and exposing some of the remarkable blunders into which their lack of training has led them. Meanwhile it may be said that the indictment against the Wellhausen school has other counts. If its members are not lawyers or sacrificial priests, it is also true that they are not historians. It is quite easy for anybody to write a book and label it "History," but it does not necessarily follow that he is competent to understand even a simple narrative. Accordingly, the third part of this article will be devoted to giving some instances of the methods employed by the critics in dealing with the biblical stories. Subsequently I shall say a very few words about the so-called "literary method" of this school, so far as that is possible in the space at my disposal. It is hoped in this way to expose some of their weaknesses with sufficient clearness to enable any unprejudiced observer to determine for himself whether or not they deserve the epithet "fatal."

II.

I first became aware of Wellhausen's central blunder while considering the slave law of Exodus xxi. 2–6. It is there provided that the Israelite who acquires a Hebrew slave by purchase is to let him go free after the expiry of six years. In case, however, the slave prefers to remain in bondage, master and slave are to go to *Elohim,* and the slave is to be taken to the door or door-post and have his ear bored through with an awl. Now this word *Elohim* has been variously translated "God" and "judges." The literary evidence for the latter

rendering will be found admirably stated in Professor A. Van Hoonacker's "Lieu du Culte" (pp. 11–17); but the Wellhausen school adopt the translation "God." This passage, they argue, belongs to a "code" that recognizes a plurality of "sanctuaries"; and the ceremony is to take place at the door of the "sanctuary." Other "codes" only recognize a single "sanctuary,"—but of that more hereafter. Perhaps I may be excused a somewhat lengthy quotation from my "Studies in Biblical Law," for this passage of Exodus serves alike to show what may be expected of the application of legal methods to the Pentateuchal legislation, and also to set a very bad mistake in the strongest possible light.

"The critics, having obtained the curious phrase 'go to God'—a phrase better suited to idolaters than to the God of the Decalogue or a law-giver who worshipped him—promptly substitute 'the sanctuary' for 'God.' But the change is fatal. It is true that we meet with a number of erections which the critics term 'sanctuaries,' but what were these sanctuaries? Not buildings, but altars—that is, structures, which, whatever their merits as places of worship, would not possess the one essential for the ceremony, a door or door-post. And what a curious transaction it is! A 'sanctuary' we have, but no priest, no congregation, no sacrifice, no ceremony, religious or other, merely this pinning of the slave's ear to the imaginary door or door-post. Is there any parallel to this in the legislation of the Pentateuch? And could this extraordinary proceeding serve any useful purpose?

"Now let us try substituting 'judges' for 'God.' Master and slave go to the judges. Where do the judges meet? Not at the notional door of a hypothetical 'sanctuary,' but at the gate (Deut. xxi. 19, xxv. 7; Josh. xx. 4; Ruth iv.; Zech. viii. 16; cf. 2 Sam. xv. 2–6; Gen. xxiii. 18), which will certainly provide the necessary door and door-post,[1] even though the adjoining wall may be of some material which would not lend itself to the ceremony. What happens? The slave publicly, in the presence of the very judges who would have to try the question of fact should any dispute hereafter arise, submits to having an indelible mark, which will always be evidence in case of any dispute, made on that part of his body where it will do least harm. If he should

[1] Cf. Judges xvi. 3.

hereafter say, 'True, I have this mark, but it was made without my consent,' the knowledge of the judges will decide the issue. If all the judges be dead, yet, as the ceremony was public, there will be the maximum probability that some witness of it will survive who can prove what he saw. The ceremony may of course also have some archæological or symbolical meaning, but it is impossible to feel any doubt as to its legal and practical aspects. It is in accordance with all we know of the ceremonies of ancient law before the introduction of the properly authenticated writing, which, in a more mature system, provides the necessary evidence. In all ancient systems of law we find the same need for evidence giving rise to the same publicity, for the question of proof has to be faced in every age. The Pentateuch knows nothing of written documents properly witnessed and authenticated by the signatures or seals of all the parties to the transaction. Writing it knows—we meet with it in the Deuteronomic law of divorce and in some of the covenant ceremonies. But in those very covenant ceremonies it is a mere adjunct to the ceremonies that we see in covenants which have no writing, and in no case is the writing authenticated as it would be in any mature system of law. The Israel of the Pentateuch has yet to pass through long ages of development before its law can embody the ideas which give rise to the Egyptian legal documents of the year 2500 B.C., the Babylonian legal tablets, the conveyance of the thirty-second chapter of Jeremiah, or the modern English deed" (pp. 26–27).

Now this picture of the critics genially pinning the ear of the slave to the non-existent door or door-post of an altar which they have first called a sanctuary, really supplies the clue to the worst mistakes that have been made. It is the word "sanctuary," and the mental confusion engendered by it, that have enabled these writers to put forward their wonderful reconstruction of the history of Israel. It would take too long to work the matter out to its full extent here, and we must therefore be content with taking some of the broad features of the mistake; but reference may be made to an article in the *Churchman* for December, 1905, entitled "The Jewish Attitude towards the Higher Criticism." I there exposed, in some detail, the mistakes underlying the current views of "sanctu-

aries." Taking a standard modern book, the Oxford "Hexateuch,"[1] I showed how the writers had, by means of the ambiguous word "sanctuary," confounded three things that were entirely distinct; viz. (1) lawful altars of earth or unhewn stones erected to the God of Israel in circumstances contemplated by the Law; (2) heathen high places prohibited by Deuteronomy xii.; (3) "the house of the LORD." I also challenged the writers of the Oxford "Hexateuch," in the clearest language I could command, to put forward any defense they had. No answer has reached me at the date of writing (Nov., 1906). As the article was quite short and as I took the precaution of sending a copy to each of the numerous writers who were concerned in the production of the Oxford "Hexateuch," only one inference can be drawn. It will therefore be sufficient here briefly to recapitulate some of the most salient points.

The Wellhausen school say that in Exodus there is a code that recognizes a plurality of sanctuaries, and that, at the time of its promulgation, all slaughter of domestic animals was sacrificial. Then, in the reign of Josiah, Deuteronomy restricted sacrifices to the Temple, and for the first time made non-sacrificial slaughter possible.

Now, *first,* this view rests on the confusion as to the effect of Exodus that has been induced by the use of the word "sanctuary." Exodus xx. 24–26 legalizes a plurality of *altars,* not *houses,* for certain specified purposes. What those altars were like can be seen quite easily from such a passage as 1 Samuel xvi. 32–35, where, in intentional compliance with the requirements of the law, Saul set up a stone as an altar. That stone was not a house, and it is impossible to turn either that

[1] The Hexateuch. Edited by J. Estlin Carpenter and G. Harford-Battersby. 2 Vols. 1900.

or any other altar into a house by simply calling it a "sanctuary." But Exodus itself recognizes a *house* of the LORD. "The first of the first-fruits of thy ground shalt thou bring to the house of the LORD thy God" (Ex. xxiii. 19–xxxiv. 26). It is therefore not correct to say that Exodus legalizes a plurality of sanctuaries. It recognizes a plurality of *altars* which might be used for certain purposes, and side by side with these it recognizes a single *house* of the LORD, to which alone first-fruits could be brought.

Secondly, the view that non-sacrificial slaughter was not in use before the time of Josiah is demonstrably wrong. In Genesis we find instances where the slaughter cannot fairly be said to have been a sacrifice *performed at an altar.* Thus in Genesis xviii. 7 Abraham fetched a calf and gave it to his servant to dress, and in Genesis xxvii. 9–14 Jacob fetched two kids for his mother. In neither of these cases is there any hint of an altar or a sacrifice, yet both passages are found in narrative that the critics regard as early and pre-Deuteronomic. Again, in such a passage as 1 Samuel xxviii. 24, we find a *woman* killing an animal. This shows that after the time of Moses non-sacrificial slaughter was in use as early as the days of Saul.[1] That part of the theory therefore falls to the ground.

Thirdly, Deuteronomy itself recognizes a plurality of lawful altars. "Thou shalt not plant thee an Asherah, any kind of tree beside the *altar* of the LORD thy God, *which thou shalt make thee*" (Deut. xvi. 21). By the admissions of prominent critics themselves, this can be referred only to lay altars, such as those contemplated by Exodus. The fact is that Deuteronomy xii. is aimed at heathen high places, and contains not a single word directed against lawful altars of the LORD. By wresting one or two verses from their context and regard-

[1] Cf., also, Gen. xliii. 16; 1 Sam. xxvii.; 1 Kings xix. 2.

ing them without reference to their setting or to the other material available, it is possible to represent this chapter as exacting complete centralization of all sacrifice; but that is not the true intent of the law. Take a very simple test. There was a form of covenant entered into by means (*inter alia*) of an altar and sacrifices.[1] It was used by Jacob and Laban, and again by Moses at Sinai. In the present text of Deuteronomy, instructions are given for the Deuteronomic covenant to be entered into by this method. It must, therefore, have been in the purview of any Deuteronomic legislator who desired to abolish lay or local sacrifice. Yet the Pentateuch may be searched in vain for a single word which can be regarded as prohibiting such a covenant or the erection of the altar and the offering of sacrifices which were necessary for its celebration.[2]

But, if the main Wellhausen theory breaks down under examination, it must not be thought that the current views on other supposed discrepancies in the Mosaic legislation are any sounder. Here again we must content ourselves with giving outlines, leaving those who are interested in the details to follow them up by the help of the references.

In ancient societies slavery might arise in any one of several ways. Thus it might result from wrong-doing of some particular kind, capture in war, sale by parents, or servile birth. Illustrations of all these may be found in the Bible, as in other ancient literatures. But there was one cause to which we must give more particular attention. Bad harvests, operations of war, or other causes might reduce peasants and others to such financial straits as to render it necessary for them to raise

[1] Studies in Biblical Law, pp. 65 ff.

[2] As to the whole of this subject, reference may also be made to a series of articles by the present writer, entitled "Notes on Hebrew Religion," which will appear in the Churchman for 1907.

money on the security of their own persons. Everybody will remember the case of the Egyptians in the days of Joseph and the events that led up to the Solonian *seisachtheia*. Now, in many ancient societies, insolvency frequently resulted in slavery; but in at least two it would seem that in the eye of the law the debtor remained a free man, though his creditors could —and did—enjoy the benefit of the quasi-servile labor he rendered. The more famous of those two cases is the case of Rome. In the early days of the republic there existed a class of debtors who were in fact the slaves of their creditors, though they were *de jure* free citizens, and could in case of war be made to perform the duties of citizens. The other case concerns us more nearly. In ancient Israel it was provided that, if a free man sold himself through insolvency, he was not to be treated as a slave, and in the year of jubilee he was to go free. A scrutiny of the provisions of Leviticus xxv. in the light of the ordinary canons of legal interpretation makes it clear beyond all possibility of doubt that free insolvent Israelites—and free insolvent Israelites alone—are within the scope of the enactment. Yet the legal ignorance of biblical commentators has led them to imagine that they had here a slave law which conflicted with the provisions of Exodus and Deuteronomy. From a legal point of view this is quite untenable. Leviticus deals with the purchase of the quasi-servile labor of insolvent *freemen*, Exodus with the purchase of Hebrew *slaves*, however that slavery may have originated. It will therefore be seen that the supposed antinomy between the two passages has no existence in fact. They are different laws, designed to meet entirely different circumstances, and the difficulties that have been felt, simply arose from the lack of the necessary expert assistance.[1]

[1] For detailed proof of the above, see Studies in Biblical Law, pp. 5–11.

The last example I shall take from the legislation is designed to illustrate rather different principles. Not the least of the troubles that await biblical investigators is the use of technical terms. The obscurity that has beset some of these is the main cause of the inability of biblical students to understand the law as to firstlings. Shortly stated, the main effect of the various provisions is to enact that every male firstling shall be holy,—a technical term meaning that it is to be withdrawn from ordinary use, and sacrificed,—and that these "holy" firstlings are to be brought to the religious center. Then a due (called a "heave-offering," the amount of which lay in the discretion of the sacrificant, but which appears generally to have consisted of one or more of the animals) was to be paid to the priest, while the owner and his family consumed the rest at a feast. Now it happens that this has to be collected from various passages in different books of the Pentateuch. Deuteronomy—the book intended for public reading to the people—contains the command to bring the firstlings to the religious center and hold the feast. In a passage of Numbers which deals with dues, the rule as to paying a heave-offering is laid down, while a third passage dealing with the internal priestly arrangements makes provision for the disposition of the heave-offering when received. Owing chiefly to failure to understand the principles of arrangement and the technical terms employed, the commentators have thought that there was an antinomy between Deuteronomy and Numbers, while they have failed to bring the passage which really supplies the key to the whole problem (Num. v. 9–10) into relation with the other laws that treat of the subject.[1]

[1] For detailed proof of what has been said about firstlings, see the Churchman for July, 1906, pp. 426–430 and September, 1906, pp. 554, 555. Other mistakes of the critics in the handling of the laws are exposed in Studies in Biblical Law, the various articles in

III.

Turning now to the historical work of the critics, it is impossible to speak well of their treatment of even the simplest narratives. For instance, in book after book, statements will be found that one of the supposititious sources (J) places the Israelites in Goshen, where they are apart from the Egyptians, while the other two (E and P) picture them as dwelling in the midst of the Egyptians. In support of the latter statement we are referred to passages which represent the Israelites as borrowing jewels from their neighbors, or which speak of God's commanding them to smear blood on their door-posts, so that he might pass over their houses. But these writers would appear to have neglected to take the precaution of reading their Goshen narrative carefully. Had they done so, they would have discovered that the supposititious J also represents the Israelites as being in close contact with the Egyptians; for in Exodus viii. 26 Moses says to Pharaoh, "Shall we sacrifice the abomination of the Egyptians before their eyes, and will they not stone us?" Clearly if the Israelites in Goshen were near enough to the Egyptians to be aptly described as being "before their eyes" and in danger of stoning, they were near enough to borrow jewels when occasion arose. The critics seem wholly unable to realize that the residence of the Israelites in Goshen does not necessarily exclude the presence of Egyptians in that district.

Next we may take an example from a narrative that has puzzled biblical students for centuries, but is susceptible of very easy explanation. I state the difficulty in Bishop Colenso's words. After showing (from Gen. xlvi. 8, 12, 26, 27; Ex. i. 1, 5; and Deut. x. 22) that the Bible states that Hezron and

the Churchman to which reference has already been made, and also an article in the number for May, 1906, pp. 286–295.

Hamul went down with Jacob to Egypt, he proceeds thus:—

"Now Judah was forty-two[1] years old, according to the story, when he went down with Jacob into Egypt. But, if we turn to Gen. xxxviii., we shall find that, in the course of these forty-two years of Judah's life, the following events are recorded to have happened

"(i) Judah grows up, marries a wife,—'at that time' (ver. 1), that is, after Joseph's being sold into Egypt, when he was 'seventeen years old' (Gen. xxxvii. 2) and when Judah, consequently, was, at least, twenty years old,—and has, separately, three sons by her.

"(ii) The oldest of these three sons grows up, is married, and dies.

"The second grows to maturity (suppose in another year), marries his brother's widow, and dies.

"The third grows to maturity (suppose in another year still), but declines to take his brother's widow to wife.

"She then deceives Judah himself, conceives by him, and in due time bears him twins, Pharez and Zarah.

"(iii) One of these twins also grows to maturity, and has two sons, Hezron and Hamul, born to him, before Jacob goes down into Egypt.

"The above being certainly incredible, we are obliged to conclude that one of the two accounts must be untrue. Yet the statement, that Hezron and Hamul were born in the land of Canaan, is vouched so positively by the many passages above quoted, which sum up the 'seventy souls,' that, to give up this point, is to give up an essential part of the whole story. But then this point cannot be maintained, however essential to the narrative, without supposing that the other series of events had taken place beforehand, which we have seen to be incredible."[1]

In this passage Colenso can be shown to have made two mistakes. *First,* he is wrong in thinking that Judah can only

[1] Colenso here adds the following important footnote:—

"Joseph was thirty years old, when he stood 'before Pharaoh' as governor of the land of Egypt (Gen. xli. 46); and from that time nine years elapsed (seven of plenty and two of famine) before Jacob came down to Egypt. At that time, therefore, Joseph was thirty-nine years old. But Judah was about three years older than Joseph; for Judah was born in the fourth year of Jacob's double marriage (Gen. xxix. 35) and Joseph in the seventh (Gen. xxx. 24–26; xxxi. 41). Hence Judah was forty-two years old when Jacob went down to Egypt.

[1] Pentateuch (2d Ed.), part i. pp. 18, 19.

have been three years older than Joseph; *secondly*, he puts on the words "at that time" a meaning which the Hebrew does not necessarily bear. I proceed to prove these two points in detail.

The biblical narrative makes it clear that at least thirteen years—not six or seven—elapsed between the date of Jacob's marriage with Leah and his departure from Aram-Naharaim. To make this point stand out, it will be best to trace Leah's fortunes in the first instance. She married Jacob at the end of the first seven years of his service (Gen. xxix. 20–23). She then bore seven children at different times before the departure from Laban, which (Gen. xxxi. 41) took place six years after the marriage with Rachel.

It is not possible to compress these events into six years, even if Genesis xxx. 9, which demands some considerable extension of time, be ignored. This is confirmed by yet another circumstance. The two younger sons and the daughter were not born until *after* the episode of the mandrakes narrated in Genesis xxx. 14–16. But a comparison of the dates will show that if the births of all the children were to be squeezed into six years, Reuben could have been little more than two years old when he got the mandrakes, and that is certainly not probable. The truth is that commentators have been misled by the narrator's method of telling his story.

It is always possible to group events either chronologically or on some other principle. In this instance a true literary instinct has led the historian to finish the history of Jacob's marriages before he began to speak of his children. The marriage with Leah was a disappointment to the ardent lover, and accordingly we are told how he served another seven years, and then received Rachel as a wife (Gen. xxix. 27–28). Then the story proceeds to speak of the birth of the children, but the

narrator does not fail to point out how Providence compensated Leah for her husband's want of affection (ver. 31). In grouping the events in this way, it is clear that he intends to point a moral, not to offer a scheme of chronology. When the chapter is carefully examined, it is plain that the first four sons were born in the early years of Leah's married life, while she was the sole wife,—not, as Colenso says, in the years of the *double* marriage,—and that the marriage with Rachel and the birth of the other children fell between the termination of the fourteenth year of Jacob's service with Laban and the time of his flight. These facts have been obscured by the order of the narrative and the narrator's tendency to moralize, but they entirely harmonize with all we know.

The second mistake relates to the phrase rendered "at that time" in Genesis xxxviii. 1. Judah having married "at that time," it has been assumed that we must look back to see the last episode mentioned, and infer that the marriage took place *after* that episode. But the usage of the phrase in other portions of the Pentateuch conclusively shows that this argument will not hold water. Thus in Deuteronomy x. 8 ff. Moses tells how "at that time" God separated the tribe of Levi. Now, whatever view be taken of the preceding verses,—and there is considerable ground for thinking that verses 6 and 7 were not part of the original text,—it is difficult to read the phrase as meaning "then next," for the narrative resumes (verse 10), "And I stayed in the Mount . . . forty days," etc. Clearly the sequence is here not strictly chronological. The mention of the Tables and the Ark in verse 5 reminds Moses that some time about the same period a tribe was set aside to perform the ministry of the Ark, and he uses the phrase rather as indicating a period than as giving a precise date. A second instance may be found in Deut. i. 9, where the desire to make

the phrase bear too rigid a meaning has led some critics to infer that the story of the appointment of the judges is out of place in the present text of Exodus. It is therefore evident that chronological inferences drawn by critics from the occurrence of the phrase in Genesis xxxviii. will not bear investigation, and it follows that there is no impossibility in the biblical narrative when properly understood. One other point should be made. In Genesis xli. 32, we are told that Pharaoh's dream was to be fulfilled "shortly." This need not necessarily mean *immediately;* and it may therefore be that some slight interval elapsed between the time when Joseph stood before Pharaoh and the beginning of the seven plenteous years. [1]

IV.

It is not possible to do more here than to offer one or two general observations on the so-called literary method; but two criticisms should be made in addition to the well-known objections that have frequently been stated by other writers. Nobody who has had a literary training, and who comes to this subject with an impartial mind, can avoid seeing that the long lists of words are too frequently the result of purely mechanical labor executed by men who have no true understanding of the considerations that guide an author's choice of language. What shall be said of an invitation to infer diversity of authorship from such facts as that "Hear, O Israel," and other phrases that are peculiarly suitable in an orator's mouth, abound in the speeches of Deuteronomy, while they are rarely, if ever, found in narrative or legal passages? Or again, what are we to make of reasoning based on the fact

[1] For some other examples of the historical work of the critics, reference may be made to pp. 355–359 of the Churchman for June, 1906, and Studies in Biblical Law, pp. 35–39. Considerations of space forbid my adding further instances here.

that numbers of technical sacrificial terms are found in passages intended primarily for the guidance of priests, while they are conspicuous by their absence in a work intended for public reading? These are two examples of the clearest kind. Need it be added that we may search the literature of the higher criticism in vain for indications of such qualifications as an adequate sense of the superiority of different sounds and rhythms in different styles of composition?

The second criticism has been partly (but not wholly) anticipated by the first. Literary feeling is a *sine qua non* of successful literary criticism, and the critics are entirely devoid of it. A strong instance of this meets us at the threshold of the Bible. For the sublime opening of the book of Genesis, an opening that by its simple majesty has during the last three thousand years appealed to every reader who was capable of appreciating literature, most critics substitute "These are the generations of the heavens and the earth." And why? Because numerous other sections of the book begin with the phrase "These are the generations of."

Such is their sense of literary fitness!

Sufficient illustrations have now been given of the weaknesses indicated in the first section. But we are in a position to go further, and add some additional criticisms of the Wellhausen school and its arguments. Two of the pleas most frequently put forward are seen to be baseless. We have been told times out of number that the main conclusions are supported by a consensus of qualified scholars. How strange this statement sounds in view of what we now know! Will any consensus of modern writers make the altars of Exodus and Samuel first develop doors and door-posts, and then gradually merge into "houses of the LORD"? And if not, what value are we to put

on the consensus of a body of men who have confused altars with houses? Take a parallel. Let us suppose that in some other branch of research the investigators were to insist on calling spades "excavatory implements," and finally became so confused, as the result of using their own terminology, that they mistook "pick-axes" for "spades,"—what would be thought of them?

A second important plea also breaks down. It was said that the Wellhausen theory was supported by the converging results of many different lines of inquiry. Law, history, style, all offered their independent testimonies. That statement falls to the ground once for all. Cumulative evidence there is, but it is not evidence of the Wellausen theory; for the authenticity of the Mosaic legislation can be made the subject of scientific proof.[1]

In conclusion, we may make one other remark, which it would take too long to develop adequately. The examination we have made shows more than the weakness of some arguments or the necessity for expert workers. It points to some fatal defects in the methods of the critics. We have seen how they have first called an altar a sanctuary, and then confused it with a house. But often they go a good deal further; as, for instance, by boldly stating that the door of the "sanctuary" was the center of the administration of justice. In such cases we can say definitely that superior caution and accuracy, as well as superior knowledge, training, and insight, are essential, if biblical studies are to do anything but retrogress.

[1] In addition to the older arguments, which are generally known, see pp. 286–295 of the Churchman for May, 1906, and the references there collected.