
A table of contents for *Bibliotheca Sacra* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_bib-sacra_01.php

ARTICLE III.

PROFESSOR PARK'S THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM.[1]

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THE Bible having now been established as the means of the divine revelation, the doctrines peculiar to the Bible can be introduced. Of these the first examined is

THE TRINITY.

Park's treatment of this theme is determined by his historical situation. New England was not yet out of the period of the Unitarian controversy when he began his professional work, and the antithesis to Unitarianism remained throughout his entire career more distinctive of the theological condition of things than any other element. Hence Park devoted an unusual amount of space to the doctrine of the Trinity. But this did not lead him to go into such discussions as fill Augustine's treatise, or make up what Dr. Hodge would call the "protestant doctrine." The great portion of this unusual space was devoted to the central part of the Unitarian denial,—to the divinity of Christ. As to the rest, Park followed historically, and for substance of teaching, Moses Stuart, who had met many of the Unitarian denials by abandoning indefensible positions and concentrating his forces on the central elements of the truth. Stuart had abandoned the word "person" as descriptive of the three elements of the Trinity, substituting for it the less objectionable word "distinction." With this had gone a great mass of pseudo-biblical and philosophically untenable theological barnacles,

[1] Continued from Vol. lx. p. 697.

such as the "eternal generation" of the Son, and the "procession" of the Spirit. And, in general, Stuart had confined himself to the simple results of Nice and Chalcedon,—one God in three ontological and eternal distinctions, one Christ in two natures, human and divine. Park also refused to advance beyond this point, affirming our ignorance of many things. "On this doctrine," he says, "we must be careful not to know too much." "The profit of the doctrine of the Trinity is derived in some degree from the fact of its mysteriousness." He thus relieved his pupils of many difficulties which proved highly perplexing to others who had been taught to identify all the forms of this doctrine with its substance, when in the process of time, the discussions of the new era of criticism and evolution had begun. They had comparatively little to "unload."

The path of approach to the subject was determined by the inductive method of investigation, which Park had adopted, and of which many an example has already been given in the discussions of the order of his arguments. He begins the Trinity with the doctrine which historically led to it, the nature of Christ; and this he begins at the point nearest to the investigator, the humanity.

As to this, comparatively little is said. The ordinary and simple New Testament evidence of a genuine human body and soul are presented, and the conclusion of true humanity drawn without great elaboration. No special controversy existed in New England over this point. Simple facts, like Christ's ignorance of the condition of the fig-tree, and the time of the destruction of Jerusalem, are noted without further comment. They serve to help prove that Christ was truly man.

When the argument passes to the divinity of Christ, however, the combatant has evidently come forth in his full ar-

mor. The sole question is, "What is the *fact?*" and that fact is the biblical fact. Consequently the whole argument consists in a biblico-theological discussion of the New Testament; but it is conducted in the most elaborate manner, with the marshalling of innumerable texts, and under eleven general heads. Christ is God because (1) he is *called* so; (2) said to be equal with God in *condition;* (3) does the *works,* and (4) has the *attributes* of the Supreme Being; (5) receives divine *honors;* (6) has applied to him in the New Testament the *same* passages elsewhere applied to the supreme God; (7) left the *impression* on his contemporaries that he was God; (8) the Scriptures make this *impression* on the masses of men; (9) Christ's divinity commends itself to the *moral nature* of man; (10) the *concurrence* of these proofs is itself a distinct proof; (11) *no other supposition* will reconcile the Scriptures and consciousness.

As one re-reads the argument to-day, he is struck with its scrupulous accuracy in the use and interpretation of the texts. Under the first head, 1 Tim. iii. 16 is not cited, because "the external [MS.] evidence is against the reading 'God,' although the internal is for it." Nor is Acts xx. 28 adduced, because "God" is also disputed here. In treating Romans ix. 5 the argument is contextual, and the sense is relied on to show that the Christ is called "God blessed forever." The most impressive argument is drawn from Christ's works,—of creation, preservation, raising the dead, the judgment of the earth,—which cannot run off into mere verbal discussion. In fact, Park does not press verbal arguments as strongly as he might. Under head (6) those numerous cases of Old Testament quotations in the New might have been more fully cited, by which it appears that the apostles felt at perfect liberty to apply any text making assertions in respect to Jehovah (in

the Greek LXX. κύριος) directly to Christ, because he too is Lord (N. T. κύριος). It is an altogether inexplicable use if they did not view Christ as God.

I have already said that Park did not advance in any respect beyond the Chalcedon positions as to the person of Christ,—two natures, human and divine, each perfect and entire, in the unity of one person. He consented to follow his Calvinistic predecessors in the Nestorianizing distribution of ignorance to the humanity and omniscience to the divinity in respect to the same thing and at the same time. How was any "unity of person" possible under such a view? Park does not seem to have really raised this question. He illustrates what he himself says of Julius Müller, whom he always styled (while he lived) "the greatest of living theologians," that "his greatness is nowhere better seen than in this monstrous blunder." The remark was made of Müller's efforts, by means of a doctrine of "kenosis," to solve the Chalcedon paradox. Park was therefore not ignorant of this most strenuous effort of German evangelical theology to solve the difficulties of the theme; but he rejected it. It is not plain that he fully understood it, for he says, in explanation of the remark, that the theory is "absurd." "A being who is weak cannot by his weakness turn himself into omnipotence." No kenotic ever thought he could. But one must make such a criticism of the acute and indefatigable Park with caution. If *he* did not understand the kenotics, it is perfectly certain that *they* did not understand one another. Like evolution, kenotism was long in "coming to itself"; if, indeed, it has yet done so.

The chief difficulty of the doctrine of the Trinity was met when the divinity of Christ was proved, for those who have accepted this element have never found special difficulty with

the personality of the Holy Spirit. But Park gives an independent and thorough investigation to this remaining portion of the theme, that, when independently proved, it may lend corroboration, by its reflex influence, to the doctrine of the divinity of Christ. We need not follow him through this proof, which is exclusively biblical. At its close comes the summary of the whole doctrine in the form of definitions of the Trinity. The first and best of these is this: "The Father is God: the Son is God: the Holy Spirit is God. Neither is God without the others. Each has a property incommunicable to the others. There is only one God." There is no attempt at a rationale of the doctrine. Various objections are answered and misunderstandings cleared away; but the doctrine is confessedly a mystery resting on revelation, and only partially revealed. Although Park had studied Hegel under the guidance of no less a man than Kahnis, there is no trace of acceptance of Hegel's "construction," or of interest in it.

The treatment of the Trinity then closes with a couple of sections on the Sonship of Christ, and the procession of the Spirit. The term Son is applied in the New Testament to the historical Jesus Christ, and designates him as miraculously conceived and especially dear to the Father. Modern biblical theology has so generally followed this position that we need say nothing further on it here. But as this was the first distinctive point (formally) of the "New School," and was always introduced by Park as such, it is interesting to note his remarks made here on the characteristics of the school. "The New School," he says, "avoid those technical terms which will suggest a false idea, unless the terms are explained away (e.g. 'eternal generation'). They refuse to convert figurative, poetical phrases into metaphysical dog-

mas (e.g. the phrase 'This day have I begotten thee' (Ps. ii. 7) into an assertion of '*eternal generation*'). They refuse to substitute metaphysical theories for plain biblical teaching." In the first of these sentences speaks the dogmatician; in the second the preacher of the sermon on "The Theology of the Intellect and that of the Feelings"; and in the last the practical New England pastor.

DECREES.

The progress of our study is thus gradually, but only gradually, bringing us to a view of the distinctive theology of Professor Park. Most of his teaching was identical with that of all evangelical theologians. But one great distinctive position has been as yet noticed, and that only partially,—his position on the nature of virtue as applied to the character of God. I do not include the so-called "first peculiarity of the New School," on "eternal generation," because, after all, that is not characteristic or determinative of his thought, however peculiar to the New School it may have been. We are to find our next distinctive position in his treatment of the will. It might conduce to clearness if we plunged at once into this topic. But we actually encounter next, in the course of Professor Park's own development of his system, the subject of decrees; and faithfulness to him, as well as the necessity of letting him speak in his own way if we wish to gain the fullest knowledge of his innermost thought, compels us to attack decrees before the will. It was the *inductive* character of his system that prompted this order. The theory of the will is chiefly valuable as a means of explaining and defending decrees. The fact must come before the theory of the fact, and hence decrees before the will.

Whatever else Park was, he was a Calvinist. He used sometimes to say, that Calvinism was the only "respectable"

theology. This was a specimen of his playful sarcasm; but "many a truth is spoken in jest," and his sarcasm often covered his most profound convictions. He was also a High Calvinist. He was of the strain of Hopkins, in the New England theology, and Hopkins was "higher" than Princeton has ever dreamed of being. Other theologians might weakly leave something to the ungoverned freedom of man, as even Augustine seemed to leave the fall of Adam, but Hopkins, and Park after him, included the fall as fully in the decree of God as the sending of the Son or the election of an individual to salvation. And hence the subject of decrees was begun by Park with a definition: "The decrees of God are his plan so to constitute and circumstance the universe as to secure the *previous certainty of* ALL *events which actually occur.*" In fact, Park was a supralapsarian, forced to that position against his choice by his theory of the will. True, he treats supralapsarianism in a special section, and rejects it by saying of it that it is "unreasonable and arbitrary"; but he does not give any reason for this condemnation. This is the stranger because he had in his theory of virtue the means of pulverizing it as no theologian before him had been able to do. He might have said: "Supralapsarianism is the theory, that, irrespective of the fall, and without prevision of the same, God, from all eternity, for the glory of his mercy and the praise of his justice, separated men into two classes, and foreordained the one unto eternal life and the other unto eternal death. This theory is *impossible;* for (1) it regards men, antecedent to all sin, either as mere mathematical units, or as merely sentient beings, their moral nature and questions of desert being disregarded. (2) As mere mathematical units they can be the object of no moral judgment, and so neither condemned nor acquitted. (3) As merely sentient, they must

become the objects of the divine *benevolence,* by which God *must choose to do them good, and good only,* and hence none of them can be reprobated. (4) Hence in neither case can there be the separation described." But Park does not say this. Why? The answer, I believe, is to be found in his determinism, which made substantial supralapsarianism necessary to him, however unwelcome. *This discord between the nature of virtue and the theory of the will is the great defect of Park's system, and would have been fatal to it had there not been a corresponding inconsistency in the theory of the will itself.* We are, accordingly, approaching rapidly to the deepest secret of Park's theology. It is his *crux.*

But we must first pause over the subject of decrees. Park derives his doctrine fundamentally from the sovereignty, or supreme causality, of God. His whole theology follows the Calvinistic tendency to exalt God. It is wise, best, desirable, and really accepted by all men (when in their right minds) that God should govern all things. Methodists and Calvinists really agree. If the latter say that God *intends* to do a thing, the former say he does it *intentionally!* And it is a fundamental idea that decrees are no greater, and no other thing in religion than in ordinary affairs. God "foreordains *whatsoever* comes to pass actually."

The development of the subject is therefore primarily apologetic. The word "decree" is a bad word. "Plan" would be much better. It pertains primarily to what *God himself* will do, and only secondarily to what his *creatures* are to do, as the *certain,* but *not* necessary, consequence of his action. The connection here is made under the Edwardean theory of the will, to which we are soon to pass. God acts, and he knows exactly how men will act, and thus by decreeing his own action, he plans, decrees, secures, but does not force or compel

the action of man. No sooner does Park thus make a definition than he laments its terms; "predestination," "election," "reprobation," are all "unfortunate."

For the sake of illustrating both his doctrine and some of the elements of his method, I subjoin here, as I have hitherto refrained from doing, Park's treatment of one point of the subject of decrees. What follows are merely *heads:* the illuminating and enforcing discussion of the heads, their "development" in no ordinary sense of that word, we must dispense with. It was always extempore, and is gone into the great abyss of time, except as preserved in the memories of hearers. But something of the real Park will here be seen by all readers, and more will be recalled to some who were once hearers.

"2. The doctrine of Reprobation is not inconsistent with benevolence.

"*a.* It is for the best that God should not prevent sin, and he does not. It is best that he should leave some men to themselves, and he does leave some to themselves. The greater part he elects, the few he permits to perish. We have a right to make the supposition that the proportion of those saved to those lost, in this and other worlds, is as one grain of sand to the myriad grains of the seashore.

"*b.* It is not unjust for God to leave the reprobate to themselves, for they deserve nothing.

"*c.* He does leave men to themselves; therefore it is right for him to *decree* to leave them to themselves.

"*d.* God does place and constitute some men so that they will sin. Then it is right for him to do so.

"*e.* All the arguments which prove that it is benevolent for God to permit sin, prove also that it is benevolent and just to decree to permit sin.

"*f.* All the arguments which prove that it is best for God on the whole to permit sin, prove that it is for the best that he *decree* to permit sin.

"Remark. All these objections to the doctrine of decrees lose their force when we consider that ***men are free, notwithstanding the decrees.***" [Here, as indicated by the notes, Professor Park introduced Lyman Beecher's famous comparison. Election is as if a man should go to a prison, open all the doors and loose every chain, and then call to the prisoners to come out! They will not. Then he rushes in, seizes as many as he can and drags them out. These are the "elect." Those whom he is obliged to leave, all of whom have been set free, and invited to come out, and every one of whom *could,* but *does not, come,* are the "reprobates."]

THE WILL.

We have thus come, by the regular constructive method of Park's system, to that point which may be properly called, as above remarked, its *crux*. If the question of the will can be properly solved, consistency may be brought into the doctrine not merely of the decrees, but of the other saving activities of God. But failure here will involve partial or more complete failure at many another point of the system.

It was both Professor Park's happy and his unhappy lot to follow in the development of a school which had been largely founded by a famous work upon the will by its great leader, Jonathan Edwards. That work made the connection between motives, such as the apple which in a given act I may choose and appropriate, and the agent, a *causative* one. The difference between moral and physical causation lay, in Edwards' phrase, "rather in the terms connected than in the nature of the connection." Hence his theory is one of philosophical necessity or determinism; and he expressly limits our "free-

dom" to our ability to *do* (externally) what we *choose* (internally). To be sure, just what he meant may be subject of much question, and of various interpretation, and may never be known by the ordinary mind, for he was (probably) a Berkeleian idealist, and even the connection of cause and effect in the physical world was ultimately simply a connection of ideas in one's mind! But, at all events, that subjective, idealistic connection of ideas is a certain, infallible, inevitable, unalterable, necessary connection—words meaning here the same thing,—and *such* is the connection of motives and choices in the Edwardean system. The will always is as the greatest apparent good.

Park so admired and reverenced Edwards that he believed himself at every point in this theory a follower of the master. Why he so thought is one of the mysteries of the subject. He was himself a greater mind than Edwards. Not one important position, not one important argument sustaining his positions, did Edwards himself originate, but took them all bodily from Locke, his own great philosophical teacher, in whose "Essay" they may be read to-day. Park must have known this! Edwards' work was preëminent only for its acuteness, elaboration, comprehensiveness, and mercilessness in the pursuit of what he deemed error. Park's admiration of these qualities, and of the service which Edwards rendered by the perfect timeliness of his writings in saving evangelical theology in America, was so great that it blinded him, apparently, to every other aspect of the matter. This was the easier, because Edwards' phraseology on this most slippery of all metaphysical themes is capable of two quite divergent interpretations, of which the most favorable to Edwards, and the most useful for apologetics, had been already given by Jonathan Edwards the Younger. Park seized this inter-

pretation and declared it the true interpretation, and thus concealed from himself his greatest divergence from Edwards. His further divergences could then the more easily remain hid from his own eyes.

These divergences pertained to three points:—

1. Edwards followed the old division of the mind into the understanding and affections, and subsumed the will under the latter head. He hence confounded the affections and the will, and made a hundred times the fallacy of gliding from "inclination" considered as a desire to inclination as a volition without being conscious of it, which, of course, was the fallacy of "ambiguous term." Park, on the contrary, followed the threefold division into intellect, sensibility, and will, and was always consistent in the distinction.

2. Park denied the *causal* connection between motives and choices. Hence he interpreted the maxim, which he himself preserved, "The will always *is* as the greatest apparent good," as embodying the *usage,* not the necessitated action, of the will. It *might* at any moment choose the least apparent good; but it never *does,* and it never *will.* This was the younger Edwards' interpretation of his father.

3. Park gave a new meaning, and above all a new force, to the idea of natural ability to choose, which he would have made a real freedom but for the shackles laid upon him by that maxim, which he thought he had evacuated of its mischief, but which, like a tamed cobra, possessed both the power and the will to poison the theory, if not the practical application, of any theology cherishing it.

These divergences were of the utmost importance for subsequent thinkers, but it was chiefly because of their extension and enlargement on account of practical considerations. We now concern ourselves with the theoretical position in which

they left Park's theology. In a word, this was that of supra-lapsarian determinism.

Park maintains that the will always *is* as the greatest apparent good. Take any human being, from Adam down, and he comes into a world of goods, already fixed independently of his volitional action. His own balance of desires and tendencies, (subjective natural motives, in Park's terminology,) previous to his first choice, is also fixed independently of himself. Now he chooses,—puts forth his *first* choice. It *is* as the greatest apparent good. What that good presented to him is, is independent of himself. What there is about it, or about him, that renders it apparently good is independent of him. The "greatest apparent good" is absolutely *objective* to him considered as a free, choosing, being; and his will *is* as that good. The same is true of every subsequent choice, for if the will, the previous choice, is at any moment operative in determining what he *desires* and thus modifies the "appearance," it was itself not *his,* but was *as* the (previously) apparent good. Hence two things follow:—

1. Such a connection between motives and will is *causative;* and hence Park has not avoided the abyss of Edwards' necessity,—nor that of Spencer or even Spinoza.

What is a causative connection between phenomena? I see a spark applied to powder and then I see an explosion. This is the uniform fact. The explosion always *is* as the application of the spark. I apply heat to ice and it melts. Whenever I see invariable connection of antecedents and certain consequents, I say, the former are the *cause* of the latter. Professor Park elsewhere reasons in this way. He is thoroughly opposed to John Stuart Mill's theory of causation. He says that *whenever* we see the invariability which Mill affirms, we go farther than Mill, and declare that there is *power* there; and

we thus arrive for the first time at the true idea of causation. Apply the same reasoning to his own maxim; and whenever we perceive that the "will *always is* as the greatest apparent good," we say, The good is the *cause* of the action of the will; *and we cannot say anything else while we have the powers of human reasoning left.*

Park, of course, perceived that this objection would be made to him (in fact, like many another student, I made it myself), and his answer was ready. This uniformity is uniformity of *usage*. The will can choose the greatest apparent good freely, as freely as it could a lesser apparent good. And it always *does* freely choose the greatest apparent good. That it always does it freely, however so many times, is evident from consciousness; for consciousness declares of every choice that it is free.

We may rejoin that we are not conscious that every choice is free, for many are not; as, for example, my choice this morning to brush my hair with my brush. But of free choices, —for man does make such, and of these only, is our discussion here,—consciousness not only declares that the choice is free, but it often declares also that the choice is *not* one of "the greatest apparent good." It is an abuse of language as well as of morals to declare that the drunkard choosing the cup believes or feels it in any sense "good"! So that consciousness, if it is for freedom, as it is, is against the uniformity of the Edwardean maxim!

It is the more strange that Park did not see this because, if the will always is as the greatest apparent good, then, on his theory of virtue, *there can never be any sin.* Sin is the choice of the lower instead of the higher or greater good. If a man chooses the greatest apparent good, that is, the thing which on the whole seems best to him, that act is a vir-

tuous act. And as every act is such a choice, according to Edwards, every act is virtuous. This argument can be met only by saying that the "greatest apparent good" is that which appeals more to the man, affords the greatest total present gratification, is the easiest to choose, has the most desire for itself. But if it is these, it is *truly* the greatest good, *unless* the man knows all the time that to choose it he must forsake duty for it, and that the desire it will gratify is an *evil* desire which he ought *never* to harbor. But then it is neither good nor apparently good! It is bad, and nothing but bad.

In fact, the term "greatest apparent good" is another example of the "ambiguous middle" in Edwards' reasoning of which "inclination" is the first and principal. Now it means the preponderating object of the sensibility, and now that of the conscience or of the whole harmonious man. No one can tell when it oscillates from one to the other; and hence *any* argument *may* be vitiated by it, and *most are*.

2. This theory is essentially supralapsarianism. The decrees of God are eternal. They surround the first, equally with every, act of the will. There is never a moment of freedom, of action not predetermined. Augustine made man free in his fall; Edwards and Park made him no more free there than anywhere else. In view of this, all questions of the *order* of the decrees are trivial. Was the decree to make man sin prior or subsequent to the decree to damn him? Who cares? The main fact is that *all* of every man's action and of all men's is decreed,—his fall, his sin, as well as his punishment for sin. God's decree embraces everything. It was not that God *foresaw* man's sin, and then decreed to punish him. He did not *foresee*, he decreed man's sin. There is not one atom of freedom, one moment of personal responsibility, deliberation,

individual and uncaused action on the part of man anywhere. All is necessitated.

Professor Park, of course, elaborately denies these positions, and, as we are about to show, escapes them,—but not consistently. We are now holding him strictly to his theories as they must be interpreted, if he consistently maintains the Edwardean theory of the will, as he says he does. He says, God does not *positively* decree the sin of Adam or of any other man. But he "circumstances and places" man so that he "will certainly sin," and Adam as much as any son of his. Now that is, in plain words, *surrounding him with motives* leading to sin,—and motives are *causes* producing sinful action. The distinctions utterly evaporate as soon as the maxim, "always *is* as the greatest apparent good," is remembered. That is *causation.*

The charm of such a view of the will's action, by which this grim and inhuman theory retained its hold upon the minds of Edwards and Park, is to be found in its relation to the concept of God. God was viewed by them both as unchangeable in all his perfections, in his wisdom, knowledge, blessedness, etc. His government was perfect also. Now, if there had been any true grief in God, his eternal blessedness would have been impaired; if any ignorance, even the slightest, of the future free acts of man, his infinite knowledge would have disappeared; if any failure to control any, even the least act of man, even so little an act as putting the finger *at random* on any square of a checkerboard (which example Edwards elaborately discussed), then there would be no divine government left whatever! The perfection of the logician, of the systematician,—a geometrical perfection,—was thus demanded in respect to life, even the life of God; and these great men continued to demand it in entire obliviousness of the fact

that they were now discussing not the Living God, but an intellectual abstraction, as cold as an iceberg, and as unreal as the Olympian Zeus. A colossal blunder certainly, but one of which "only colossal minds could be guilty."

The third peculiarity by which Park departed from Edwards undid, however, most of the harm of these supralapsarian positions. He gave a new meaning to "natural ability." This he defined as real ability, the ability to choose freely either right or wrong. "Moral ability" is not properly ability at all, since it is mere willingness. But natural ability is true, spontaneous, primal, causality. A man has natural ability to repent, always, everywhere, without the influence of the Holy Spirit, without church or Bible; but he *never* will so repent. He hasn't "moral ability"; that is, he *won't*. But he *can*.

Now, Park himself may have been perfectly consistent here with his Edwardean positions. He may have maintained that "natural ability," while complete, was *never* exercised, even in so small a matter as lifting the finger to brush away a fly, without "moral ability" conjoined, that is, without a balance of motives for such an action. His emphasis on certain positions, however, and the elaborateness with which he defined and removed objections when discussing the subject of decrees, would imply not. The toil would have been so futile unless the pupil, and the master, got for the time out from under the burden of Edwards' "certainty"! His pupils made an adjustment, even if Park did not, and the impression and total outcome of the system for them at this point was something as follows:—

1. The will of man is free. He can, at any moment, choose right or wrong. This is the emphasis which Park constantly threw upon "natural ability." His statements were as ex-

treme as the most ardent devotee of free will could desire. "Man can perfectly obey the law of God, because he can love God supremely and his neighbor as himself, and can maintain such a love, and exemplify it in every individual choice." "He can do right just as easily as he can do wrong." "He can break every decree of God relating to his own conduct." "He can repent at any moment without any aid from the Holy Spirit." Such were forms of expression Park constantly used. And out of them, his pupils drew the doctrine that the will has a true, unchanged, primal causality, by which man truly originates action, and is himself the one, and the only, cause of his own action.

2. Motives, however, have a real influence on man; that is, a real tendency to move the will in this direction or that.

3. God's moral government is exercised through motives, influencing human wills. The action of a man can be determined, within reasonable limits, by his fellow-creatures, as they plan to bring such or such other motives to bear upon him. God can in a far greater sense control men's action by the same method, because he has far greater knowledge of all the conditions, internal and external, which affect the operation of those motives.

4. The scope of this government thus includes the volitions of men, and extends far beyond the reach of finite comprehension. Has it any limits? Only such, whatever they may be, as God himself has given.

5. God set in motion a universe resulting in some degree of sin. Of course, he *purposed* to permit that sin. The explanation of that permission Park has already given. Sin entered by the free act of man; and that man was as able not to commit the sin he did commit, as he was to commit it. But God foresaw that man *would* sin; and he prepared for it.

6. The condition of things now is such that, left to themselves, men will sin. This is not a necessity, but it is a fact.

7. God interferes with the course of sin as largely as he can consistently, and calls some men unto salvation. This is *election.* It is not absolute in the sense that it renders faith necessary, for any elected man *can* persist in sin and be lost; and he can be saved only by exerting this same power of freedom in the way of repentance, faith, and reformation. Are any elect thus lost ? Park would say, No! His pupils would say, Possibly some are.

8. Those whom God must, to be consistent with the best interests of all, leave without such influence as will *actually* bring them to repentance, he so leaves. This is "praeterition," passing over, not "reprobation." But there is no absolute, or complete praeterition. Men have grace enough to be saved, every one. And they have "natural power," true freedom, to repent and be saved without *any* grace.

9. God never lets the world get out of his control. No "permissive decree," no "praeterition," ever implies that he stands by as a silent and helpless spectator, and sees the world going evil ways which he cannot hinder. He so guides and controls, even in the darkest times, as to bring all out eventually to his own glory. This is his perfection, but it is a living and not a mere geometrical perfection.

Park thus never accepted for himself fully an idea which is essential to his defense of the benevolence of God in the permission of sin,—the idea of the divine self-limitation. He admitted it in respect to the permission of sin, for he taught that God, having made man as he did and given him the faculty of free-will, *could* not then consistently do so and so. He never explicitly recognized the fact that God limits himself even when he creates matter; for he cannot thereafter

proceed in the universe, matter having its fixed qualities, forces, and laws, exactly as he otherwise could. He expressly rejected, as we have seen, the suggestion of Julius Müller and other kenotics, that the divine Logos limited itself in the incarnation. He really wanted a self-limitation which should be at the same time no limitation; which should explain the permission of sin, and yet not infringe the absoluteness of God's control, foreknowledge, and eternal decree, which with differences was to cover everything alike. He erred here in maintaining a doctrine of the Absolute,—the truly Unconditioned,—which is impossible when once sin, incarnation, atonement, and forgiveness are introduced. He should have listened here to Kahnis with whom he once studied, and to the great Thomasius.

Thus a new thought, new for Calvinism, was struggling in Park's mind, as yet not quite able to come to the birth. It was the idea of freedom. Not of a "gracious freedom," such as Arminians had taught, but a new natural, constitutional, and inalienable attribute of man. On the side of the theory of decrees and the will, it did not find consistent expression; but in the doctrine of sin, it did. It begat a new bearing towards these doctrines, and towards all the doctrines of theology, for it introduced into them, for the first time with completeness and power, the ethical conception. The mind of man is an ethical agent, possessed of freedom and influenced by motives. And all the great processes of redemption—the atonement as well as regeneration, conversion, and sanctification—are to be explained by this conception of his nature. We shall see how thoroughly controlled Park is by this idea as we proceed; and it needs no elaborate exhibition to show every theologian how great a modification in past theories, this fact must produce. It was nothing less than an ethical revolution in the

theological system which New England theology in Park's hands now effected.

SIN.

Park had already laid down the position that all moral agency consists in choosing. Nothing which goes before the choice is part of man's moral agency, and nothing that comes after it. Hence when he came to define sin, he put it tersely as "the voluntary transgression of known law." He proves his proposition from the testimony of conscience and the common opinions of men, and from a long review of the biblical use of the various words for sin.

This view would at once meet with opposition from those who maintain that men are sinners by nature previously to any act on their own part. Many of their objections are met by a more delicate analysis than they had been wont to apply. That "profound" objection that "men generally feel that sin lies deeper than action," is admitted; but it is shown in reply that the chosen definition of sin does not mean that it is only the outward transgression. It is *chiefly* the ethical process, the act of *choosing*. When sin is said by Park briefly to be an act, he always means, an act of the will, a volition. The objection, again, that "sin consists in something permanent, but actions are not permanent," is answered by showing that the sinner is "permanently choosing." Going still deeper, the reply uncovers the nature of character by showing that, even if moral action be interrupted, it always is sinful when resumed, for the sinner "sins whenever he can"; and even the citadel of his opponents is invaded by the further reply, that, "if a man's *nature* is such that he will sin whenever he can, then he may be called a sinner, even though he do not sometimes act it out."

Another definition of sin as "a preference of the less and lower above the greater and higher good"; and of virtue as

"a preference of the greater and higher above the less and lower good"; and still another, "a preference of the world, or of self and the world, above God"; bring Park to the question whether sin may be defined as consisting in selfishness, which he answers in the negative.

Such are Park's definitions of sin. As he defines virtue as consisting in love,—love to God supremely and to our neighbor as ourself, or more abstractly, love to being according to its worth; so he sometimes defines sin as any choice not consisting in such love or intended to carry it into execution. And it is in this sense particularly that the force of his doctrine of "depravity" appears. He makes this *universal* (all men sin) and *total* (none of the moral acts of the individual sinner are virtuous prior to regeneration). In a word, only the regenerate exercise Christian love. Stated thus, the principle seems axiomatic.

But so universal and so deep a fact as sin must have an adequate reason. Its cause, properly speaking, is the will of the sinner himself acting efficiently in producing it. But wills are led to choices by motives. Hence the question rises as to the motives leading to universal and total depravity or its *occasion*. Park specifies two occasions,—the proximate and the remote. Of the former he says: "Total depravity may be referred to a disordered state of man's constitution, existing previously to man's voluntary moral acts and occasioning their uniform sinfulness." He further defines this "disordered state" as consisting in a disproportion in his sensibilities and moral powers. Since universal sin is a fact of man's active life, the cause must be found in his nature, and this cause is his disorder. He is not fitted, in the actual world into which he comes, to lead a perfectly holy life. This disorder of nature being antecedent to every moral act, and oper-

ative from the beginning, it is necessary to conclude that man begins to sin as early as he begins any moral action. Thus he never passes through a period of holiness before beginning to sin. But Park carefully avoids various unwarranted extremes into which theologians had sometimes fallen; such as, that infants begin to sin as soon as they are born.

We are thus brought to the doctrine commonly called "original sin." So far as it taught the corruption of human nature, Park thoroughly accepted it. But when corruption was denominated, in the language of Westminster, as "truly and properly sin," he recurred to his definition of sin as consisting in wrong choice, and denied the name sin to that which has come upon man without his own voluntary action. The central point and chief interest of original sin lay, however, in its connection with Adam. Park is thus brought, as well as by the course of his own argument, to the connection of Adam's sin (the fall) and our general depravity. He answered the question as to the *proximate* occasion of total depravity by saying it was the corruption of man's nature; he now asks the occasion of that corruption, or the *remote* occasion of depravity, and answers it by the fall of man in Eden.

The fall is thus defined: "That sin of Adam by which it was rendered certain that all the moral agents descended from him should be totally depraved, and necessary that all the members of the race (Christ only excepted) should suffer appropriate evil." The proof of such a connection between Adam's sin and ours is purely biblical, and does not differ from that employed by all other Calvinistic theologians.

What, now, is the link that connects Adam's sin and the disorder of nature in all his descendants? Edwards had made it all a "divine constitution," as he was most naturally led to do by his idealistic philosophy, which makes all connec-

tion of things a connection of ideas, and teaches that all ideas arise in us immediately by the operation of deity. It is remarkable that Park adopted the same view, so far as he adopted any. The relation was established by God. Why? We do not know. How? Here he is equally silent. A suggestion at one point that heredity *may* have had something to do with it, is the only hint pertinent to this question. Of one thing, however, Park is certain,—that it was *not* by identification with Adam in his sin ("sinning *in* Adam"), nor by imputation of Adam's sin to us. We are better off to-day under the larger view of heredity given us by evolutionary studies. We now know how necessary it is, in accordance with the very principles which have brought the physical and even the mental nature of man to its present condition, that, when sin has once occurred, every descendant of the sinner should be profoundly affected by it; and how increasing sinning should enlarge the affected area of the soul, how individual sins should become first habitual, then automatic, and then hereditary; so that there should be finally racial tendencies to evil rendering, by the balance of the nature thereby created ("corruption"), actual sins by all the individuals of the race certain.

Park thus set his pupils and successors free from a mass of false reasoning as to imputation and kindred matters. He transferred the matter of sin from the external, the forum, and from the influence of legal methods and analogies, to the inward, ethical nature of the soul. For this service we cannot be too grateful. That he did not furnish us with a philosophy of the universality of sin is the fault of his whole psychology of the will. He depended, when he had once got universal corruption, on the maxim that "the will always *is* as the greatest apparent good." We shall have to depend on the multiplicity and complexity of temptations. But in his

affirmation of total depravity, he followed both Scripture and daily observation.

The defects of his positions in these portions of the system are nowhere better brought out than in his treatment of the salvation of infants dying in infancy. He should have said, in consistency with his fundamental principle that sin consists in the "*voluntary* transgression of *known* law," that infants dying before the age of moral consciousness and responsibility *have not sinned* and *do not need saving* in the sense in which we speak of saving sinners. Hence their salvation is as certain as that of *angels* who have never sinned. But he only ventures to say that infants *may* sin from the first moment of their birth, and *probably* do sin at an early period. They need regeneration because of their participation in universal human corruption; and they are saved by the atonement. "The whole impression of reason and of the Bible is that infants begin to sin very early. We have an instinctive *hope* that infants are saved. *We cannot perhaps prove it.* The true remark would be: I have an instinctive hope that they will be saved. Yet I cannot prove it, and am willing to leave them in the hands of God."

Yes! so must we all be! But, "shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" And can souls that have not sinned be lost? Certainly Professor Park might have said more at this point! His result falls far below the truth.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]