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ARTICLE VIII.

RELIGION: ITS IMPULSES AND ITS ENDS.

BY PROFESSOR JAMES H. LEUBA, PH.D.

RELIGIOUS beliefs, rites, and ceremonials from the comparative and the genetic point of view, are now, and have been for years, common subjects of exposition and discussion. The thinking world has long been interested in religious ideas and in religious practices. Much less attention has been paid to the forces behind the religious manifestations, to the impulses they reveal, and to the ideals or the ends they tend to realize. Is this because whatever is worth knowing on these subjects is already known? In our opinion, the neglect of the dynamic side of religious life is to be explained chiefly by the fact that the attention of philosophers has been occupied for the most part during the past centuries with the *formal* elements of psychic life. Sensations, perceptions, representations, images, ideas, have been the chief objects of their concern. In religion, it is the beliefs and the doctrines, the outward performances and the ceremonials, which have attracted and kept their attention; while the efficient and the final causes of these performances, i.e., the impulses, the cravings, the desires, and the purpose or the end, have remained in the background.

That philosophic reflection should have begun upon the formal side of conscious life is quite natural. What, if not this habit of ignoring the springs of action, is to account for the opinions, now obviously untenable, of men of the learning and acumen of Max Müller and Herbert Spencer, and for the wide acceptance of their views? The former affirms that the "perception of the Infinite" is the essence

of religion; the latter finds it to consist in "the recognition of the ultimate mystery." A *perception*, a *recognition*, the essence of religion! They failed to observe, or at least to realize, the full meaning of the fact that not the perception of the Infinite or the recognition of the mystery, but *the universal and ceaseless desire to enter into relation with the one and to penetrate the other*, is what leads to the making of theologies and to religious practices.¹ But for the impulse and desire, perception and recognition would leave man absolutely unconcerned and unmoved.

A psychological study of religious life had better start, therefore, with the consideration of the instincts, the needs, the impulses, the desires; in short, with the dynamic factors of which the outward religious deeds are the manifestations.

The following pages are portions of an investigation into the impulses and the ends of religious life.² They deal exclusively with the religion of the North American Indians and with Buddhism. We have tried to keep close to the facts and, especially, to refrain from reading into them meanings derived from higher religions. Because the higher issues from the lower, or is continuous with it, it has been the custom of certain persons to insist upon discovering at least faint traces of the color and fragrance of the flower in the dingy and the ill-smelling root. When thus prepossessed, the interpretation of the religious consciousness of primitive people cannot but be fanciful. Against this tendency—seeing not what really is, but what is in our mind's eye—the student of religion is in special need of guarding himself.

¹Max Müller recognized subsequently that the mere perception was not sufficient, and completed his definition thus: "A perception of the Infinite under such manifestations as are able to influence the moral character of man."

²See also the author's papers in the *Monist*, for January and July, 1901, on the "Contents of Religious Consciousness in this Country."

We confess to some misgivings as we reflect that most of the facts we are going to recite are quite familiar. The reader may feel that ours is a case of bringing up a candle where the sun is shining. Yet we may well proceed, because, even though the facts themselves should be known, their bearings upon the psychology of religion have surely not been sufficiently appreciated. The philosophy of religion is, in this respect, in a condition similar to that in which architectural knowledge would be if, the existence of the columns of the Greek temples being known, their position in the structure was not.

THE NORTH AMERICAN INDIAN.

The religion of the North American Indian has been selected among those of the non-civilized peoples because no other has been submitted to an equally extended and minute scrutiny.¹

With the Indians, as with every other primitive people, every important event of daily life, and very many of its minor functions, are or may be associated with religious ceremonies. Birth, the attainment of manhood or womanhood, marriage, sickness, war, hunting, traveling, smoking, sowing, planting, etc., each is or may be the occasion for the manifestation of religiosity. It is only rarely that religious practices are found, as is more frequently the case with higher races, in remoter connection with, or perhaps disconnected from, the immediate concerns of practical life. But whether we consider the one or the other class, the same purpose—we shall presently inquire whether it is the only one—appears conspicuously: their religious deeds are undisguised attempts to secure benefits from a certain class of agents.

Here are some illustrations. Before going to war against

¹ See, in particular, the annual reports of the American Bureau of Ethnology—Smithsonian Institute.

the Pawnee, the pious Kansa addresses himself to the sun, thus: "I wish to kill a Pawnee! I desire to bring horses when I return. I long to pull down an enemy! I promise you a calico shirt and a robe. I will give you a blanket also, O Wakanda, if you allow me to return in safety after killing a Pawnee."¹ "Every morning of the year," says the Zuñi Indian, Pedro Pino, "when the sky is clear, at the rising of Lucero [the morning star], at the crowing of the cock, we throw corn flour to the sun. I am never without my bag of kunque; here it is. Every Zuñi has one. We offer it to the sun for good rain and good crops."² In war, before action, the Pueblo rub it upon their heart to make it big and brave. One of the prayers offered during the elaborate rain ceremonial of the Sia is as follows: after having offered food to the animals of the four cardinal points, the Shaman says, "When you eat, then you will be contented and you will pass over the straight road [into the images of themselves in the sand-painting before the altar]. We pray you to bring us, and to all peoples food, good health, and prosperity, and to our animals bring good health and to our fields large crops; and we pray you to ask the cloud people to come to water the earth."³ The Omaha Indian will, on occasions of particular moment, pray to the stream he wants to ford, thus: "You are a person and a Wakanda. I too am a person. I desire to pass through you and reach the other side." When beginning to smoke, the Indians of many tribes point the stem of their pipe alternately towards the four cardinal points, the heaven, and the earth, and say, addressing the four winds: "Thou who causeth the four winds to reach a place, help ye me!"

¹ "A Study of Siouan Cults," J. Owen Dorsey, 11th An. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1889-90, p. 376.

² "The Medicine-men of the Apache," John G. Bourke, 9th An. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1887-88, p. 508.

³ See the complicated rain-making ceremonies in "The Sia," Miss M. Coxe Stevenson, 11th An. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1889-90, p. 105.

The great Navajo ceremony called "the Mountain Chant," is celebrated for the "ostensible reason" of curing disease. The patient for the benefit of whom the lengthy ceremonies are performed pays for all expenses, and is the central figure during most of the nine days. The prayers he repeats vary but little:—

"Reared within the mountains!
 Lord of the Mountains!
 Young man!
 Chieftain!
 I have made you sacrifice.
 I have prepared a smoke for you.
 My feet restore thou for me.
 My legs restore thou for me.
 My body restore thou for me.
 My voice restore thou for me.
 Restore all for me in beauty.
 Make beautiful all that is before me.
 Make beautiful all that is behind me.
 Make beautiful my words.
 It is done in beauty,
 It is done in beauty."

The last sentence is repeated four times.

Many of the songs used during the ceremonies of the Mountain Chant are divested of religious character; they are purely poetical expressions; as, for instance, the Twelfth Song of the Thunder:—

"The voice that beautifies the land!
 The voice above,
 The voice of the thunder
 Within the dark cloud
 Again and again it sounds,
 The voice that beautifies the land.
 "The voice that beautifies the land!
 The voice below;
 The voice of the grasshopper
 Among the plants
 Again and again it sounds,
 The voice that beautifies the land."¹

¹"A Mountain Chant," Dr. W. Matthews, 5th An. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1883-84, pp. 379-467.

Many of these songs hint at, or relate, mythical beliefs regarding the sun, the moon, the earth, or other things; the names of symbolic instruments and of the figures pictured in the sand-painting recur frequently in many of them. But the proceedings, leaving out the non-religious, social, and poetical accretions, betray no other preoccupations than those arising from the "animal" desires. Every step of the dances, every accent of the songs, in so far as they have a purpose other than the gratification of the social and æsthetic feelings, is a bid for bread, or for protection from enemies, or for power, which includes among its delights both bread and protection.

That the most conspicuous and substantial parts of the religious life of the non-civilized peoples are prompted by the love of life as it manifests itself in the fear of death, in the pain of hunger, in the lust of the flesh, and the love of power,—in a word, by the very impulses which actuate secular activities,—is a statement which no one would venture to contradict. But the affirmation that *each and every* religious manifestation of the savage proceeds from the natural instincts and impulses which make the struggle for life, that there is no religious impulse *per se*, that every impulse which leads to religious activity could also, and actually does, lead to non-religious deeds, might not meet with the same unanimous approbation. Some persons have always insisted upon finding in the religion of even the most inferior men something of the loftiest, fairest contents of their own religious consciousness.¹ They have spoken with bated breath of the thirst for the Infinite, for the Absolute, for the realization of a glorious Ideal, for communion with the Divine, revealed, as in a glass darkly, even in the

¹ Whether or not these loftiest contents of the religious consciousness are not also dependent upon the natural instincts and impulses which make the struggle for life—at a higher level, of course,—is a point we must leave aside for the present.

most rudimentary religions. The very thought of any one of the members of the human race being so low as not to possess in some degree those lofty characteristics in which they take so much pride, makes them uncomfortable. They resent a suggestion to that effect as an indirect reflection upon themselves. But the facts they adduce do not countenance their view, unless their own interpretation of them be accepted,—an interpretation which proceeds from the unconscious self-glorifying motive we have just alluded to. It is so easy to misinterpret. We are assured, for instance, that the mourning custom of the Winnebago of cutting open their flesh and drawing blood is not a sympathetic expression of deep sorrow, as it has been supposed, but only to “let it out,” just as one would take an emetic for an overloaded stomach.¹

We know of no Indian religious practice to which a higher motive could be ascribed than the one already mentioned. Rites of pure adoration, not accompanied by request for physical help and protection, or by offerings intended as compensation for expected returns, are not to be found among the North American Indians.

It is probably in some of the most elaborate religious “dances” that the gross egoistic utilitarianism is least obtrusive; this not because the purer spirit of worship, familiar to the Christian—adoration, the communion of spirits,—is part of them, but only because the means used to carry out the religious purpose have gradually become associated in them with other functions having non-religious ends, as the pursuit of æsthetic and social pleasures.² The “Mountain Chant,” for instance, is a festival in which the initial purpose (the curing of disease) has been in many parts sup-

¹ 10th An. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1888-89.

² See, for instance, the last night's entertainment described at length by Dr. Washington Matthews, 5th An. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1883-84, pp. 431 *et seq.*

plemented, and even supplanted, by performances having no connection with the disease. An admixture of similar æsthetic and social pleasures is found in all religions, even in the highest. The various festivals which have come to be connected with Christian celebrations, and much of the music in the Christian churches, are of the same character. In the same way the satisfaction of hunger is made the occasion for the social pleasures of the table; fast day is turned into a time for merriment; even death and its attendant mournful ceremonial is made the occasion, or the excuse, for letting loose some of the inferior cravings. These extra-religious motives which have found a place in religious ceremonies, must not be allowed to bring confusion in the study of religion. Considered as a whole, the "dances" have a known purpose—the one to which the name "religion" is applicable and is actually applied. That purpose is always of the kind already described: the Indian wants to propitiate the spirits before going on the war path, or before starting on a hunt; he wants to cure disease, to secure rain, etc. A Dakota Indian gave the following reason for the celebration of the Sun Dance: "During any winter when the people suffer from famine or epidemic, or when they wish to kill any enemy, or they desire horses or an abundance of fruits and vegetables during the coming season, different Indians pray mentally to the sun, and each one says, 'Well, I will pray to Wakantanka early in the summer.' Throughout the winter all those men who have made such vows take frequent baths in sweat lodges." When the spring has come these men take the necessary steps to bring the dance to pass.¹

Whatever sacrificial rites are found among the North American Indians bear plainly inscribed on their face a gross utilitarian intention. Thank-offerings are of rare oc-

¹ "A Study of Siouan Cults," J. Owen Dorsey, 11th An. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1889-90, p. 451.

currence among them, and, when met with, the attendant circumstances make it impossible to see in them anything loftier than the natural joyful expression of satiated hunger and of exultant power associated with the hope of continued favor.

The manifestations of religious life with which we have so far been concerned show the Indian endeavoring to reach his end through a particular class of agents conceived of by him as conscious beings. There are, however, among the performances usually included under the term "religion," certain activities which separate themselves clearly from the former, in that, although they have the same purpose and are animated by the same desires, they are not called forth by belief in conscious beings. *They differ in regard to the means, or rather the conception of the means, used to secure the particular benefits.* Consider, for instance, the so-called "animal dances." The Nutkas, before going to the hunt, perform the "seal dance." They wade some distance into the sea, and then come out of it crawling on the sand on their elbows and belly, imitating as they creep the motion and the cry of the seal. Advancing in this fashion, they enter their huts, and the performance ends with a wild dance. Their actions, symbolic of the coming into their huts of the seals, is supposed by the Indians to be in some way efficacious in bringing about the realization of the scene they have enacted. A similar belief in, and expectation from, a non-anthropomorphic agent, is shown in the use made of the "Groaning Stick" by the Navajo and the Apache. It is a flat rectangular piece of wood tied to a string, also called "Bull Roarer." Of this little instrument Bourke says, "The medicine-men twirled it rapidly, and with a uniform motion, about the head and from front to rear, and succeeded in faithfully imitating the sound of a gust of rain-laden wind. As explained to me by one of the medicine-men, by making this sound

they compelled the wind and the rain to come to the aid of the crops."¹

It is the same association of like with like, or of a thing with its opposite, which makes the Indian believe that a decoction of yellow root will cure biliousness; that a decoction of a tough root will strengthen the warrior's muscles; that a decoction of burr, in virtue of its sticking quality, will improve memory's retentiveness. Among the Cherokees, snake-poisoning is cured by rubbing the bitten limb in a direction opposite to that in which the snake coils itself. The Zuñis say that the arrow-head was originally made by the lightning, as also the forked tongue of the snake, and that therefore the snake is a nearer relative of the lightning than of man.

We are not called upon in this article to account for the ascription of causal relations between like, as also between opposite, qualities; and, inasmuch as we deal with the motives and ends, and not with the channels, of religious action, it is immaterial to our immediate purpose whether or not the two kinds of activities just differentiated have each a right to the name "religion," since the motives and the ends are the same in both. We note only that *in the first a conscious being is the supposed agent of the religious end, while in the second the end is to be achieved through non-anthropomorphic agents.*² It is evident that the indicated distinction in the nature of the available agents will induce different emotional attitudes and different mental contents: the feelings and the ideas of the Indian praying to Wakanda

¹"The Medicine-men of the Apache," John G. Bourke, 9th An. Rep. Bur. Eth., 1887-88, pp. 476-477.

²The word "superstition" might advantageously be reserved for the beliefs characteristic of the second class. It would then have a clear, well-defined meaning. We intend to take up in another article the genesis and evolution of the dualism in the concepts of force and of causal relation which is the ground of the differentiation of human activities into religious and non-religious.

will not be the same as when he makes use of magical means, even though it be in order to secure the same end.

In this connection, we must take notice of the fact, well known though rarely fully appreciated, that the medicine-man is both the physician and the priest, as far as that term may be used with reference to the non-civilized peoples; i. e., he has charge of the body and of the soul. The point of value to us in this fact is, that in primitive civilization these two functions, which later on became separated from each other, are not distinguished from each other, *although several classes of means are used to reach the common ends. It is therefore the community of ends and of fundamental instincts and impulses which is the bond between the physician and the priest.* It is only when the distinctions existing between body and soul, and between the separate *classes of means* available for the cure of the body and for the salvation of the soul, have become clearer, that the physician parts company with the priest.

Among the Indians three classes of means can already be distinguished: (1) superhuman agents (religion); (2) the power of like upon like and similar supposed forces (magic, superstition); (3) the power of certain agents called later on "physical" and natural, such as the use of certain medicinal plants, of massage, etc. These three classes of means are often used together in the same ceremony: religion, magic, and medicine (science) are made to contribute together to the end in view. The procedure by which the Indian tries to induce, or to compel, the conscious agent to come and take his temporary residence in the *altar* erected for his abode belongs frequently to the second class of means. The sand-painting symbolism, which plays such a considerable rôle in the life of several Indian tribes, is also often of that character. The Shaman will, for instance, spread on the floor a band of maize flour of a particular shape, leading up to the image of the God in

order that it may serve as a compelling or inducing thread for the "Spirit," from whom, when once his presence has been secured, some particular favor is expected.

In *résumé*, the impulses which actuate the North American Indian in his religious activity are not "religious," if by that is meant *a particular kind of impulse not to be met with in the other walks of life.* In that sense there are no "religious" impulses, no more are there "religious" ends. What prompts the primitive man to religious actions are the general, universal instincts and impulses proper to all animate beings: self-preservation and self-increase, together with the preservation and increase of others as far as they have become part of himself. If the primitive man whirls his "Groaning Stick" to get rain for his parched fields, he is also moved by the same desire "secularly" to water them; if he performs the "seal dance," he also, and for the same purpose, gets his hunting instruments in effective condition; if he calls in the medicine-man to secure the assistance of superhuman powers, he also, acting from the same motive, makes use of "natural" means for the recovery of his patient; if he offers corn flour to the sun that it may cause his crops to ripen abundantly, he also plants and tills the ground. His general psychic attitude and the contents of his mind are surely different as he does the one or the other, but the impulses, the motives, and the ends to be reached are common to the whole range of his life's activities.

The point upon which we are desirous of placing emphasis here will become evident, if we consider that, even though religion, as existing among the Indians, should include impulses and ends exclusively its own, it could, nevertheless, not be denied, that, without them—with only the lowest of the universal human impulses and needs—the Indian would still be led to the performance of all the activities we have mentioned in the course of this article,

provided his conceptual powers remained the same. Since these activities are by common consent called "religious," the existence of religion is therefore independent of the supposed specific religious impulses and ends.

If we insist upon a matter which to many will appear self-evident, it is because of the mischievous influence of the tree-in-the-germ hypothesis to which we have alluded at the beginning; it is also, and chiefly, because it appears to us of primary importance for the student of religion to keep fast in mind the fact that its fundamental spring, at least in so far as the non-civilized races are concerned, is the love of life, *at any and every level, however low, of development, in the same sense as it is the spring of every other manifestation of life*, and that therefore nothing has a less mysterious and a more natural *efficient cause* than religion. Whatever sacredness attaches to it belongs to the "will to live"; it is not religion's particular property.

PRIMITIVE BUDDHISM: ITS MOTIVE AND END.

Buddhism, unlike more primitive religions, is the creation of one man, of the Buddha Gautama, in the same sense as Christianity is the work of Jesus. This fact simplifies considerably our task, inasmuch as we shall find in the experiences which launched the Founder upon his career, and in the doctrines he enunciated, a double revelation of the motive and purpose of original Buddhism.

With the manifold departures from Gautama's teachings, and with the metaphysical and poetical accretions with which the disciples overspread the Master's revelation, we are not concerned here.

It would be a sufficient reward of much labor to be allowed to penetrate into the inner life of the young man in whom the new religion was germinating. His disgusts and his yearnings, his disappointments and his hopes, his sorrows and his loves, would make a precious con-

tribution to the psychology of religion. Unfortunately, history offers only meager information on these points. Yet the little we know of that early period, taken together with his subsequent activity, and particularly his teaching, is quite sufficient to put his motives beyond question. At the age of about twenty-nine, Siddharta, the son of an Indian prince, abandoned his father's palace and his own family, to search for the peace of Nirvāna. He thought first of finding it in a life of isolation and rigid penance. There is complete unanimity as to the cause of this unusual and irregular conduct: Siddharta had tasted of all the gilded joys of this world, and found them all loathsome, delusive, or insufficient.

As we might rightly conjecture from the rapid growth of Buddhism, the moral nausea of this Indian prince was not at the time an isolated fact. The views of human life entertained by the more serious Indians at the rise of Buddhism were extremely gloomy. Kern writes: "What strikes us most is the emphatically pronounced dread of the miseries of life, of old age and death; a dread intensified by the belief in perpetual rebirth, and consequently of repeated misery. All sects—barring the Sadducees of the epoch—agree in the persuasion that life is a burden, and unmixed evil. All accordingly strive to get liberated from worldly existence, from rebirth, from Samsāra."¹ When the famous Brahman, Kassapa of Uruvelā, had left all to join the new Teacher, and the astonished people asked him:—

"What hast thou seen, O thou of Uruvelā,
That thou, for penances so far renowned,
Forsakest thus thy sacrificial fire?
I ask thee, Kassapa, the meaning of this thing:
How comes it that thine altar lies deserted?"

¹ H. Kern, "Manual of Indian Buddhism," in the *Grundriss der Indoarischen Philologie und Altertumskunde*, edited by G. Buhler, III Band, 8 Heft, p. 11.

he answers:—

“’Tis of such things as sights, and sounds, and tastes,
Of women, and of lusts, the ritual speaks.
When these I saw to be the dregs of life,
I felt no charm in offerings small or great.”¹

But if a religion issued from this pessimism, it is because it was not all-embracing; room was left for an optimism just as absolute within its range and just as tenacious as was the pessimism. The conviction that life is not worth living, deadening as it is when filling the heart entire, becomes a seed of religion, an occasion of irresistible activity, when associated with the conviction that there is a way of escape leading to the peace that “passeth understanding,” a way not beyond the power of man to discover and to follow. This is precisely what was true of the seriously minded Indians of the time, and of Siddharta in particular. Kern writes of the general state of religion in India at the advent of Gautama, “All [sects] are convinced that there are means to escape rebirth, that there is a path of salvation, a path consisting in conquering innate ignorance and in obtaining the highest truth.”

The successive steps of Gautama in the search for the path of salvation need not be detailed here. His departure from home, his seclusion, his penances and fasting, and, finally, the attainment of the Buddhahood, have of late become almost as well known to the reading public as the passion of Christ. Unfortunately history provides only stingily for the understanding of the final condition of Gautama. What his inner state was after the Enlightenment, how he differed from the young man who a few years before had abandoned his home, what had taken place within him at the crucial moment, are questions which can be answered only in the light of better-known transformations of a similar charac-

¹ The first *Khandhaka*, chap. xxii. §5, quoted by Rhys Davids in his “*Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion*,” *Hibbert Lectures for 1881*, p. 159.

ter; as, for instance, certain experiences of the Christian mystics and the renovation called "Conversion." But this matters little to us, inasmuch as the limited purpose of this article may be completed by an examination into the meaning of the word Nirvāna. It will make clear the end proposed to the members of the Brotherhood.

Nirvāna is the word used to denote the state after which the Buddhist yearns; it is the goal of his religious activity. The complete connotation of "Nirvāna" is open to discussion, but it is now generally granted that its meaning is not purely negative, as some formerly held, it does not mean simply annihilation, suppression of life. We shall presently have something to add on this point. For the present, a quotation from the Buddhist Birth Stories will bring out its positive side: "When the fire of lust is gone out, then peace is gained; when the fire of hatred and delusion are gone out, then peace is gained; when the troubles of mind, arising from pride, credulity, and all the other sins, have ceased, then peace is gained! Sweet is the lesson the singer makes me hear, for the Nirvāna of Peace is that which I have been trying to find out. This very day I will break away from household cares! I will renounce the world! I will follow only after the Nirvāna itself."¹

Whatever may have been the exact conception entertained by the Buddhists concerning the end of their religious efforts, this at least can be affirmed without hesitation: Arahatsip, the *Immediate* Nirvāna, is a *bliss* to be enjoyed on this earth, free from the disappointments of the senses and of the fear of death itself; the *Absolute* Nirvāna, the ultimate end, which can only be reached after death, is a state void for all eternity of all the suffering to which flesh and mind are prone. Logically the Absolute Nirvāna implies a cessation of consciousness; the doctrine of the Skand-

¹See Rhys Davids' *Hibbert Lectures* for 1881, pp. 160 and 161; also p. 159.

has and that of Karma, both admitted by Gautama, lead unquestionably to annihilation of personality.¹ But the Master never expressed himself definitely concerning the fate of consciousness and of the Ego in the Absolute Nirvāna. He is reported to have said that it is one of the questions which must be set aside as useless. So much as this is admitted by Burnouf, Oldenberg, Barth, Kern, La Vallée Poussin, and other authorities, and may therefore be considered as established.

Practically Nirvāna means for the believer deliverance from suffering,—salvation, final and forever. We may well feel certain that few were those who worried themselves with an attempt at a clear representation of the condition of the salvation-enjoying individual. It was enough for life's purpose to define it as the highest happiness. Does the modern Christian entertain a more distinct idea of his future state? We meet here a truth which, however often perceived, is always escaping anew from the philosopher's mind: it is not perception, understanding, knowledge, which man wants, but that subjective state of feeling he calls happiness, satisfaction; give him that—whatever it may be—or convince him that he will get it a little later on, and he will be content to walk on blindfolded.

The importance placed by Gautama and the Buddhistic sacred literature upon knowledge is not in the least in contradiction with the preceding statement. If the disciple must learn, if he must know the real nature of man and the conditions of his existence, it is only in order to escape from the "fetter of delusion," and be prepared to follow the path of salvation. Knowledge is the *revealer* of the Path of Salvation; it is a *means*, not an end in itself.

How thoroughly pragmatic Buddhism is, cannot fail to be noticed. One cannot approach the religion of Gau-

¹ Kern, *l. c.*, pp. 46-54; Louis de La Vallée Poussin, *Buddhism, Études et Matériaux*, pp. 43-46, 83-84.

tama from the point of view of traditional Christianity without being struck with two characteristics,—the absence of every theological element, and a deeply grounded aversion to pure speculation. Barth says, “Buddha does not deny the existence of certain beings called Indra, Agni, Varuna; but he thinks that he owes nothing to them, and that his business does not lie with them. . . . He does not busy himself with the origin of things; he takes them just as they are, or as they appear to him to be; and the problem to which he incessantly returns in his conversations is not that of being itself but that of existence. Still more than in the Vedanta of the Upanishads, his doctrine is confined to the doctrine of salvation.”¹ The exclusively and directly utilitarian purpose of primitive Buddhism is evident and uncontested: the way leading to the cessation of suffering was the quest upon which Siddharta set out, and it is the announcement of this way (the eightfold path to salvation), together with whatever knowledge might be useful to lead men to it (the four Satyas, or Axioms, stating the facts with which man must be concerned; and the twelve Nidānas, or Causes of the evil of the world), which makes the burden of Gautama’s preaching and the substance of Buddhism.

A statement of Kern is very interesting in this connection. After having named the four axioms of Gautama,—suffering, cause, suppression, the path,—he says, “It is not difficult to see that these four Satyas are nothing else but the four Cardinal articles of Indian Medical Science applied to the spiritual healing of mankind, exactly as in the Yoga doctrine.”

That Buddha refused to enter upon metaphysical discussions concerning the soul, and that he held it irrelevant to his purpose and needless to reason upon the origin, nature, and existence of spiritual beings, is now a fact recognized

¹ Barth, *The Religions of India* (tr. by the Rev. J. Wood), pp. 109–110.

by every authority. We transcribe a part of an interesting passage bearing upon this point, taken from the Suttas, as translated from the Pali by Rhys Davids.

"It is by his consideration of those things which ought not to be considered [the gods and future existence], and by his non-consideration of those things which ought to be considered, that wrong leanings of the mind arise within him [the disciple]."

"Unwisely doth he consider thus: 'Have I existed during the ages that are past, or have I not? What was I during the ages that are past? How was I during the ages that are past? Having been what, what did I become in the ages that are past? Shall I exist during the ages of the future, or shall I not? What shall I be during the ages of the future? How shall I be during the ages of the future?' . . . Or he debates within himself as to the present: 'Do I after all exist, or am I not? How am I?'"

"In him thus unwisely considering, there springs up one or other of the six absurd notions [all of which are about the soul]. This, brethren, is called the walking in delusion, the jungle, the wilderness, the puppet-show, the writhing, the fetter of delusion!"¹

On one other peculiar and pregnant fact we must dwell an instant. If original Buddhism is a non-speculative religion, if it has no theology, it is because its salvation is to be secured by the individual efforts of each person. As he expects no help from the celestial powers, they forthwith fall outside his field of attention. Let the Brahman discourse upon the origin, the nature, and the attributes of the gods, bow to them in adoration, offer them sacrifices in the hope of securing their merciful assistance; the disciple of Buddha is *to gain salvation for himself by himself* without any reference to God or gods. In one of his last conversations with Ānanda, his beloved disciple, the Buddha said, speaking of the future of the Brotherhood and of the desire just expressed by Ānanda that he would leave instructions touching the Order, "The Tathāgata [Gautama] thinks not that it is he who should lead the brotherhood. . . . Why then should he leave instructions in any matter

¹ Hibbert Lectures, p. 88. For another similar passage see *Buddhism in Translations*, H. C. Warren, pp. 117-128.

concerning the order?" He then adverts to his approaching passing away, and continues:—

"Therefore, O Ānanda, be ye lamps unto yourselves. Be ye a refuge to yourselves. Betake yourselves to no external refuge. Hold fast to the truth as a lamp. Hold fast as a refuge to the truth. Look not for refuge to any one besides yourselves."

"And whosoever, Ānanda, either now or after I am dead, shall be a lamp unto themselves, and a refuge unto themselves, . . . and holding fast to the truth as their lamp . . . shall look not for refuge to any one besides themselves, it is they, Ānanda, among the Blikkhus (the members of my Society) who shall reach the very topmost height [Nirvāna Arahatsip]—but they must be willing to learn."¹

It follows evidently from this proud individualism with regard to the means of salvation, that there is no room for worship, for adoration, in *original* Buddhism. The Founder is merely the revealer of the Truth; he is the Enlightener; and thus, but only thus, is he the Saviour. That is, the orthodox belief authorizes only a *commemoration* of the saints and of the symbols of their mission. Nevertheless, we find in practice among Buddhists two methods by which the assistance of the gods is sought,—the Tantric method and Adoration.² That it should be so will not be a surprise to any one who has observed how irresistible and independent of reason is the health-seeking instinct.

These two facts—the conviction that life as we have it is not worth living, and the proclamation of the self-sufficiency of the individual to save himself from the misery of life—are the most important traits of primitive Buddhism. The second of them marks the point of greatest difference between the religion of Gantama and that of Jesus. In no other point is Buddhism, considered from the practical point of view, so inferior to Christianity as in its failure to provide a set of beliefs which could suggestively convey to the believer a power outside³ himself. Original

¹ Rhys Davids, Hibbert Lectures, pp. 182, 183.

² See, for description of these methods, La Vallée Poussin, pp. 107, 108.

³ The word "outside" must not be understood here in a spatial sense.

Buddhism makes no use of the power of "personality," or, rather, does not officially recognize and make use of it. The individual's only recourse is the suggestive power of his own ideas and feelings, while in Christianity the life-rescuing power emanates, auto-suggestively of course, from persons other and greater than himself,—from God the Father, from Christ the Son, from Mary the Mother, and from the Saints. The Enlightened One had hardly closed his eyes when his followers brought forth the personal and external means of help which had been denied them, thus finding their departed Prophet guilty of having pointed out a path of salvation to them unpracticable.

Let us, in conclusion, compare, from the point of view of this article, the religion of the North American Indians with that of Buddha. In both the motive to religious activity is rooted in the instinct for self-preservation and increase; Salvation is the end of both. Of Buddhism also can be said what was affirmed a little while ago of the religion of the non-civilized peoples: *the fundamental spring of religion is the love of life, at any and every level of development, in the same sense as it is the spring of every other manifestation of life.* Therefore there are no exclusively religious impulses, and religion derives the right it may have to sacredness from whatever sacredness belongs to the Primordial Instinct. Within this fundamental general agreement there are between them important points of difference indicating the much higher intellectual and affective development of the Hindoo. The following are the most important points by which Buddhism differentiates itself from the religion of the North American Indian:—

1. What is desired is not so much a positive good (the satisfaction of certain needs), as a negative one (the cessa-

The power is, of course, developed within the individual and not transmitted from one being, or from one place, to another.

tion of evil). The Buddhist desires—let us not stop at the apparent contradiction in terms—“the cessation, giving-up, relinquishment, forsaking, and non-adoption of desire.” Is it not *desire* which endeavors to destroy desire? The Buddhist is dominated by the consciousness of the painfulness of life, the Indian by an aggressive desire to enjoy its goods; the one prays that he may be spared, the other that he may triumphantly assert himself. In the one, life declares its unwillingness to suffer; in the other, it affirms its will to enjoy. The one bears a close analogy to the graspingness of vigorous youth; the other, to the relinquishment of age. We need not add that neither one of these attitudes is exclusive of the other: Nirvāna is, practically, both cessation of desire, and eternal blessedness.

2. The several, particular, ends of daily life have become generalized: beyond the satisfaction or the destruction of the isolated, momentary desires,—food, triumph over an enemy, water for his fields, etc.,—the Buddhist aims at a final state in which all the separate ends of life will find their realizations.

It might be advanced, as an objection to this second point of difference, that the North American Indian also believes in a final state of happiness; he hopes to pass from this life to the “Happy Hunting Grounds” beyond the far-away river. This also is the result of a unification of the separate ends of life, but this physical paradise is little more than an occasional dream. It does not direct his conduct; it is not the ever-present goal of his religious efforts.

3. The undesirable circumstances to be gotten rid of include not only the “physical” pains and discomfort against which the Indian struggles, but also, in addition, “moral” suffering.

The consciousness in Buddhism of moral suffering is, for the student of the evolution of human desires, the most important point of difference between the two peoples

we are comparing. The young Prince is painfully affected not only by disease, old age, death, and the other physical miseries. They are not alone responsible for his dread of life. There is at the bottom of his pessimism a "moral" evil: conflicting desires, antagonistic motives, which, dividing him against himself, rob him of all peace and make him yearn for rest and deliverance. It is, even though not so clearly realized and divested of the feeling of guilt, the evil of which Paul complains, "For the good which I would that I do not, but the evil which I would not, that I practice. . . . O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?" It is the dark conflict of newly born functions not yet harmoniously incorporated in the enriched organism. At the birth of Buddhism, this unrest, brought about by the appearance of new and higher desires, is only vaguely apprehended; hence the impatient, radical, condemnation of desire as an instrument of misery.

With these brief remarks upon weighty matters this article must be brought to a close, and further developments left for subsequent publication.