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THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

EVOLUTION AND THE FALL OF MAN.

BY PROFESSOR D. W. SIMON, D.D.

THE chief authority on the theory of evolution, if not its originator, Mr. Herbert Spencer, defines it as follows: "An integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."¹ Among the numerous other definitions that have been proposed, that of Professor Le Conte has found considerable favor: "Continuous progressive change according to certain laws and by means of resident forces."²

Both of them, however, are open to serious criticism. That of Mr. Herbert Spencer specifies only one of the factors of the process, namely, matter; for surely motion, *per se*, is rather a state of matter for which an explanation is needed than itself a cause; besides to postulate that matter in motion should change the direction of its own motion, as it must if heterogeneity is to arise, is implicitly either to endow it with self-changeableness, or to introduce an-

¹ First Principles, p. 396. ² Religion and Science, p. 278.

other cause of change.¹ Besides, further, no mention is made of that which regulates the motion of matter. To attribute both motion and orderliness and aimfulness of motion to matter *per se* is to deny its fundamental characteristic of inertness.

Professor Le Conte's conception of evolution, on the other hand, provides us with resident forces producing, and laws regulating the changes, which constitute the progressive process; but it leaves unmentioned that which is the primary subject of the changes, namely matter.

If the ultimate constitutive factors of the cosmos—factors not further reducible—are matter, energy, and method or law, then some such formula as one of the following would more exactly represent the process of evolution, than the two just criticised: Evolution is an ever-varying integration and disintegration of matter brought about by the action of energy progressively though not uniformly differentiating itself under the regulative control of an immanent idea assuming ever greater complexity. Or, Evolution is a ceaseless differentiation and transformation of energy, giving rise to countless varied relations of matter, now of coherence, then of incoherence, under the control of an incalculably complex, informing, progressive idea.

These definitions relate to the entire process through which the cosmos, so far as it is open to observation, has passed or is passing. Before either of them can be applied to the domain with which we are at present chiefly concerned, it requires very marked differentiation and specialization.

The process of evolution, or, in other words, the process by which the world, with its hills and valleys, its fountains and streams, its lakes and seas, its flora and fauna, has been thus far evolved, is divisible into two great stages, each

¹ In point of fact, "Matter and Motion," later on developed into "Matter, Motion, and Force." See *First Principles*, § 194.

with its own specific characteristics. The first and preliminary stage is the inorganic; the second is the organic; to which Mr. Herbert Spencer adds the superorganic. The question whether or no a real gulf ever existed between the first and second and the second and third of these stages, needing to be bridged over by some sort of creative act, need not now detain us. A view of the process of evolution is quite possible,—let it be here remarked,—which shall eliminate events properly describable as creations, and yet leave room for that conscious freedom of man which is one of the essential presuppositions both of morality and religion.

The inorganic stage falls again into the three divisions; namely, the *physical*, in the narrower sense, with its subdivisions elemental, molecular, and solid; the *chemical*, with its strange anticipations of the higher forms of selection, not to speak of human choice, as well as its amazingly complicated system of law; and the domain of *crystals*, in which *form* seems first to assume sway, and a strange self-restorative power manifests itself that is suggestive of mysteries yet to be unveiled.

In this sphere, energy is found constantly differentiating itself into the various forces whose effects are investigated by physics, chemistry, and crystallography; and these forces again are found undergoing equally numerous transformations; so that, whilst all forces are forms of one energy, and all the known forms of energy can be transformed into each other,—a fact expressed in the formula “the correlation of forces”; the sum-total of energy is neither diminished nor increased,—a fact expressed in the formula “conservation of energy.”

The self-differentiations just referred to, however, rigidly conform to law—law that can, or is expected to, be exactly calculated. Hence the expression “Applied Mathematics.” Law we shall find elsewhere; but throughout this sphere

it is law of the kind that is deemed typical; rule, that is never broken, never swerved from by a single hair's-breadth; law, the apparent violations of which are found to be, if possible, more profoundly real fulfillments.

Here, too, there is evolution,—real evolution,—though it is marked by a simplicity and calculable regularity that are absent from the second and higher stage.

Evolution at the stage of life is defined by Hæckel as “the doctrine that all organisms (viz., all species of animals, all species of plants, which have ever existed or still exist on the earth) are derived from one single, or from a few simple original forms, and that they have developed themselves from these in the natural course of a gradual change.”¹ In other words, it is the doctrine that all the manifold forms of life, human no less than animal, animal no less than vegetable, have gradually arisen, the less simple from the more and most simple, the most complex from the less and least complex, though not necessarily or probably in a straight line.

The factors of the process have been the following:—

1. *Matter*, with the necessity characterizing it, as inert, of persistence in any relation which it may hold,—a necessity or tendency which, in the organic sphere, is perhaps the ultimate ground of what is known as the law of heredity;—for what is heredity after all, at the bottom, but the persistence of a germ in being and behaving as its generator before it was and behaved?²

2. *Energy*, with the self-differentiating and self-varying power which, though recognized by biologists under the form of the law of variability, has not yet been treated with adequate insight into its real significance. This again is the same factor as the one we found operating in the fore-organic sphere, but lifted to a higher potency; and though

¹ History of Creation, Vol. i. p. 4.

² Compare Grant Allen's article in Fortnightly Review, July, 1895.

not exempt from or raised above rule, it is a rule not restricted to mathematically calculable lines.

3. *Environment*, consisting primarily of the inorganic sphere and then of the organic, every part of which latter may alternately be related to every other part, now as environment, then as environment.

So much, then, for the process of evolution and the factors by which it is constituted.

I. Let us now consider some of the general characteristics of the several steps in the biological process prior to the appearance of the living creature which calls itself man; in other words, some of the general characteristics of the various species which in the larger sense constituted man's ancestry, from the protozoön at the very beginning to—let us say—the anthropoid ape, which, according to some, may have been “the hole whence we were dug.”

1. Species differ from each other, not in being less or more normally constituted, but in being less or more complex. The advancement or progress in the organic scale which is pointed out by biologists, rests, as Darwin says, referring to a great German authority, “on the amount of differentiation and specialization of the several parts of a being, when arrived at maturity.”¹ In other words, the difference between the earlier and the later, or between what we call the lowest and the highest organisms, is in the main a matter of the number of parts and organs and functions, that is, of greater or less simplicity or complexity; not of the healthiness of the parts and organs in themselves or their suitability in relation to each other. An amœba is, in its kind, as well constituted as a whale or an elephant; and it discharges its functions and performs its activities in a no less healthy and orderly manner than the larger and more complex animal.

2. One species is intrinsically as well adapted to its own

¹ *Descent of Man*, p. 164.

environment as another; though each succeeding species has needed, has been fitted for, has been provided with, and has adapted itself to, a wider and more varied environment. The amoeba, though it lives in the same physical surroundings as a fish, actually utilizes a much more restricted part thereof for the upkeep of its life and the discharge of its functions. It does so because it needs less and is fitted to less; but it is *not less fitted*, in its way; it does not *less perfectly* relate itself, in its way; and it does not *less efficiently* supply its own specific needs. The fish needs more and finds more, so to speak, ready to hand; but it neither assimilates more of what it needs, nor does it find what is better suited to it, than does the amoeba. This is equally true of the other and higher species. The system to which they all belong supplies each with its own appropriate environment, varying according to the constitution of each; but in no case, so far as one can see, is the adaptation between the living beings and their respective environments more real, more complete, more full, than in another. Differentiation and specialization in the organism find corresponding differentiation and specialization in the environment; but that there is greater fitness or adaptation between the two cannot be maintained.

Exceptions, of course, exist to this general rule. Individuals are to be found in every species which are not suited to their environment, or for which there is not a fitting environment.¹ As a rule, however, far as environments may be from unchangeableness, they are fitted to

¹ To speak, however, as Romanes does, "Scientific Evidence of Organic Evolution," of "species" attaining to a condition of proper adjustment or complete and proper adaptation to their environment, is misleading, owing to its ambiguity. Every living being is, normally, adapted to its environment from the very first. Were it not so, its growth and development would be hindered. As it grows and develops, its relation to its environment changes; but it does not therefore become more fitting, i. e. intrinsically, though it may become more full and rich.

provide what is necessary to the development and increase of the living beings related to them. The whole system to which living creatures belong, comprises, as has been already stated, as many differing environments as there are differing species, or, one might almost say, as many as there are differing individuals of differing species; and, barring exceptions, there is always correspondence between them; the vast majority of individuals that attain maturity are capable of readily adapting or adjusting themselves to their own particular section of the general environment, and find an answering environment awaiting them.

3. Each species, accordingly, is not only *fitted* to live out its own particular life as normally and happily as another, but, barring interferences from without, actually does so. The life of a fish, for example, is, of its kind, as normal as that of a bird; that of a bird as that of a horse. Within each species exceptions occur; individuals are to be found which cannot, and do not, discharge their functions, put forth their activities, grow and develop as they should; but what has been advanced holds good of species as wholes—it is one of their characteristics.

Evolutionists speak indeed of a “survival of the fittest,” meaning that, in the competition for food and for mates, denoted by the phrases natural and sexual selection, and in face of other favorable or unfavorable conditions,—astronomical, geological, geographical, vegetal, zoölogical, and so forth,—the best fitted survive, and by surviving show that they possessed qualities which made them *fitter* to survive than the rest. But this common assertion is open to two serious objections:—

(1) It is by no means a universal fact that the intrinsically weaker and less swift, those with the less keen senses, and so forth, perish, either in the struggle for food, or in the competition for mates, still less in the frequent encounters with unfavorable surroundings, such as fire and flood, earth-

quake or volcano, lightning or avalanche, or any of the numberless other agencies by which animals are maimed or weakened or killed. Good reasons can in very many cases be assigned for just the opposite result.¹

(2) When certain members of a species perish in the struggle to exist, or fail to propagate themselves, it need not be because they are intrinsically less fit to live out their own life and propagate themselves than are the others. Looked at by and for themselves, they are just as fit to live, just as capable of propagating, as those by which they are superseded.

What is really meant, is, that, having regard to the evolution of animal life, to its progress,—that is, to the rise of new and ever higher species, by increased differentiation and specialization of the several parts of living beings,—those which survive are, as a rule, the fittest to survive. Indeed, apart from their survival, new species would not be evolved. The reason for the changes in which such new and higher species take their rise is of course a totally different question. This, however, is survival of the fittest in a *teleological* respect, not in respect of intrinsic adaptedness to live and flourish.

With rare exceptions the members of species that have perished, left to themselves, would have lived out their life as normally as those which survived. At any rate, of the members that arrived at maturity, barring accidents, those which perished would have enjoyed their life as much as those which survived.

4. No species has ever existed, so far as is now known, within which there have been serious differences in point of normality of constitution, fitness to live and living fitly, between the earlier and later members; or indeed between any one class of members, and another. For practical purposes, species may be treated as fixed and homogeneous,

¹ See C. C. Coe, *Nature versus Natural Selection*, pp. 66, 69, 71.

though the point under consultation would not be affected, were there absolutely no distinguishable species; and, this being the case, it may be safely affirmed that the earliest members have never been stunted, deformed, weak, unhealthy, backward, misrelated to their environment, and so on, as contrasted with members existing tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of years later. There may possibly have been development in one and the other direction, though it is open to doubt whether, where nature is the sole educator, much change for the better is ever evoked, either in beast or man; but traces of progress warranting us in applying to the earlier stages terms analogous to "low," "savage," and the like have never yet been pointed out.

If there have been exceptions, they have undoubtedly been of the kind denoted by expressions like *lusus naturæ*.

So much, then, for the general characteristics of the species that have arisen through evolution prior to the appearance of man.

II. Let us now pass on to the consideration of evolution in its special bearing on man. For the purpose of our argument, we will assume that the species of living being which calls itself "man" is a real outcome of the process termed "evolution"; further, that, as the first bird or birds may have descended from some sort of reptile or reptiles, so the first man or men descended from some "ancestral form common to him and the anthropoid apes,"¹—in a word, that the founder or founders of the human race, as they may be termed, had non-human animals for their parents. We will still further assume that this species is the highest, as it is believed to be the latest, outcome of the process; in fact, its very blossom and flower.

Now what does the process of evolution at its previous stages, what do its previous products, warrant us in expect-

¹ Words of Alfred Wallace.

ing with regard to the new species? Will it not, at all events, be marked by the same general characteristics as the species which constitute its ancestry?

1. To begin with, its first members will surely be as normally *constituted* as were the first members of each of the preceding species; and with exceptions, most of which may be eliminated by the causes operative at the earlier stages of evolution, all the later members may be expected to be equally perfect. By way of illustration, let us take birds; though any other species would serve the purpose equally well. Birds as we know them—birds that are now called birds—though possibly descended from reptiles, are thoroughly birds: their constitution, organs, functions, all go to make them birds: there is nothing in them that can be said to contradict what one may term the bird-idea:—the reptile does not cleave to them, hampering them in the discharge of their bird-activities, checking the development of their bird-potentialities. So with man. The first men will be as truly men as birds are truly birds. The animal which was their immediate parent will not cleave to them as an element to hamper, hinder, drag down, or keep down. It will be as illegitimate to say of them, "The strain of antecedent beasts remains in their blood,"¹ animalism cleaves to them, as it would have been to say of birds, The strain of antecedent reptilism remains in their blood:—in the sense, namely, previously explained. In one word, if the process of evolution is to continue in the main the course it pursued in the past, man would stand forth, normally constituted in *his kind*, even as other animals stood forth normally constituted in *their kind*—not more, not less; still further, not only the earliest members of the species, but also their descendants—allowing of course for exceptions.

If any creatures of any kind intervened between man and

¹ The New Faith and the Old Faith, p. 137.

his simian or other mammalian ancestors, which, though no longer mere animals, were not yet men, they do not concern us, whether they have disappeared, or still somewhere survive. Being more or less mere animals, they necessarily had or have the constitution and potentialities of animals; but not those of man. Yet even they, unless evolution deviated from its course, must have been in *their kind*, normally constituted—not of course like the animals before them, because they were new; nor again like the animal man after them, because he too was new.

Putting the matter in a nutshell, man will be man; just as completely as any animal before him was the animal it was.

2. Still further, the new species will find itself in the midst of an *environment*, between which and itself there is all the correspondence necessary for the promotion of normal growth and development; and there will accordingly result a life as normal, in its kind, as any previously evolved species has lived in its kind.

A few words on each of the points herewith briefly formulated must suffice.

Beginning with man's environment: What would the most enlightened intelligence of the present day consider to be its constitutive factors? the factors necessary to a normal and full human development? The reply would be given: first of all, the natural world, as related both to body and mind; secondly, the human world, to evoke, guide, and train the powers of body and mind, to meet the needs of the affections, and to enable men to be not only full individuals, like the animals below them, but to constitute societies, nations, humanity; thirdly, the invisible sphere, with its unseen realities and personalities; and, finally, God, the Great Father, with his all-illuminating light, all-quickening grace, and all-satisfying love. It is this environment that makes the best modern man what he is. Fish

do not need their environing water—be it brook, river, lake, or sea and ocean, birds their environing atmosphere, more absolutely, if they are not to be stunted and shriveled, than man needs the environment, just broadly sketched, if he is to grow and develop in accordance with his potentialities. It goes, of course, without saying, that this environment never could have been, and never can be, to him at any one stage all that it is capable of being. It will expand to him as he grows up to it. But the whole must act on him from the outset proportionately to his susceptibility, or his capabilities will never be unfolded and satisfied.

3. On the other hand, it is obviously to be expected that he will relate himself normally to his environment.

The several species of living creatures before him do this,—each to its own proper part of the great system to which all belong. So far as they do not, whatsoever may be the reason, so far does it not avail for them. The greater the differentiation of parts, the more complex the organization of a species, the more numerous its potentialities, the richer and more complex the process of adjustment, and the greater the risk of failure in adaptation and consequent miscarriage in the struggle of existence.

Not otherwise is it with man. And as self-adjustment to their proper environment was the rule among the members of his ancestral species, he too may be expected to adjust himself at every stage to the whole of his manifold environment as required by his varied potentialities; not indeed completely, for that will be a matter of growth, but certainly not to the complete neglect—whether from ignorance or any other cause—still less to the misuse, of any important factor.

Accordingly the life of the human species from the very beginning ought to be as normal in its kind as that of any one of the preceding species in its kind. Individual members and groups of members may prove exceptions to the

rule; but, taking the species as a whole, its life will be full, varied, rich, pleasant, proportionately to its constitution and potentialities, on the one side, and to the environment answering thereto, on the other. Nor will there ever be within the species any great class of members, any race, between which and the rest differences will prevail such as to warrant the application of contrasted terms like "low" or "backward" and "advanced"; "savage" and "civilized"; "debased" and "noble"; and so forth. Whatever differences may arise, they will remain within the limits compatible with normal growth and development.

Even if it should need to be granted that competition for food, for mates, and for the satisfaction of other needs peculiar to itself, was the lot of the human species no less than of those which preceded it; and that its members were, equally with the rest, exposed to injury and destruction from their inorganic, vegetable, and animal environment; there is nothing in the process of evolution as it went on during the assumed hundreds of thousands of years before the appearance of man, to suggest, much less to warrant, the assumption, that, as regards the general characteristics previously described, he would form an exception.

III. Yet what do we find? Let the answer be given in the words of one whom all evolutionists regard as a very high authority on this subject: "I know of no study which is so unutterably saddening as that of the evolution of humanity, as it is set forth in the annals of history. Out of the darkness of prehistoric ages, man emerges with the marks of his lowly origin strong upon him. He is a brute, only more intelligent than other brutes; a blind prey to impulses, which as often as not lead him to destruction; a victim to endless illusions which make his mental existence a terror and a burthen and fill his physical life with barren toil and battle. He attains a certain degree of comfort and develops a more or less workable theory of life in

such favorable situations as the plains of Mesopotamia or of Egypt, and then for thousands and thousands of years, struggles with varying fortunes, attended by infinite wickedness, bloodshed, and misery, to maintain himself at this point against the greed and the ambition of his fellow-men."¹

Or, as another writer says, "Looking back through the glasses of modern science we behold him [man] at first outwardly a brute, feebly holding his own against many fierce competitors. 'He has no wants above those of the beast; he lives in holes and dens in the rock; he is a brute, even more feeble in body than many of the animals with which he struggles for a brute's portion. Tens of thousands of years pass over him, and his progress is slow and painful to a degree. The dim light which inwardly illumines him has grown brighter; the rude weapons which aid his natural helplessness are better shaped; the cunning with which he circumvents his prey, and which helps him against his enemies, is of a higher order. But he continues to leave little impress on nature or his surroundings; he is still in wants and instincts merely as his fellow denizens of the wilderness."

"After a comparatively short interval, a marvelous transformation has taken place—a transformation without any parallel in the previous history of life. This brute-like creature, which for long ages lurked in the woods and amongst the rocks, scarcely to all appearances of so much account as the higher carnivora with which he competed for a scanty subsistence, has obtained mastery over the whole earth. He (or at all events certain tribes and races) has organized himself into great societies. The brutes are no longer his companions and competitors. The earth

¹ Huxley, "Agnosticism," in *Nineteenth Century*, February, 1889; cf. A. I. Balfour, *Essays and Addresses*, p. 307; Kidd, *Social Evolution*, p. 101.

produces at his will; all its resources are his. The secrets of the universe have been plunbed, and with the knowledge obtained he has turned the world into a vast workshop where all the powers of nature work submissively in bondage to supply his wants."¹

Evolutionists further assure us that the lowest races of men existing at the present moment fairly represent, if not the very earliest men,—for *they* may have been still lower down in the scale,—at all events men as they must have been tens of thousands of years ago. In other words, what human beings like the Aborigines of Australia or the Bushmen of Africa are to-day, prowling about and living very like the animals which they hunt and with which they compete for food; sheltering themselves in dens, holes, wurlies; their social relations not much higher than those of the prairie dog or wild horse; with the scantiest language; with little or no properly intellectual life; with ideas of right and wrong, truth and error, that can scarcely be indentified as such; and with totemism, fetichism, or animism, or something else of the kind, for a religion:—in short, what these are now, such or even lower were primeval men; such too they continued to be for tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of years.

IV. Supposing the position thus taken up by what is commonly considered to be the best, the highest, the most authoritative science of the present day, to be sound and true, it scarcely needs saying that the *life* of the human species, whatever may be thought in the abstract of its constitution and its environment, has not hitherto been, and is not now, marked by the general characteristics of the species of living beings which preceded it on the earth; that on the contrary, for some reason or other, the human animal deviates,—that too, as seems to eminent and competent

¹ Kidd, *Social Evolution*, pp. 31, 32.

judges, very much for the worse,—from the animals which constituted its ancestry.

If one could imagine a philosophical or scientific observer arising among the slugs, or lizards, or herrings, or sparrows, or apes, or indeed any other animal species of the present day, would he have the slightest ground for using, with regard to his ancestry of thousands or tens of thousands of years ago, the terrible language which human observers use regarding their ancestry? Would he not, on the contrary, have a right to maintain that, apart from *lusus naturæ*, abortions, monstrosities, and other individuals which are defective or diseased from birth or through accident or interference, all the members of his species had been normally constituted, fittingly related to a fitting environment, and had lived a normal life; still more, that between those of the present moment and the earliest no appreciable or material difference of any kind can be discovered; that certainly no such contrast exists as only too plainly prevails between *some modern* and *all* primeval men; yea, even between *all civilized* men and all the *modern* representatives of primeval man?

If this is not a break in the process of evolution, what is a break? Why should the flower of the process be in some respects the least perfect of its productions? Why has not man lived from the very first a life as normal for him as the life lived by the races which preceded him, was normal for them; or that lived by *contemporaneous* species of living creatures is normal for them? *Had the great Demiurge grown weary, or exhausted his skill? Or were the materials on which he worked, no longer as plastic as of yore?* Or what can be the reason why hundreds of centuries should elapse ere man began to *live like a man*? Ere he began to live as normally in his kind as the brutes in their kind? Ere he stood forth, conformably to his essential nature, as the lord of the world, and the image and

son of the Eternal Father? He is characterized as a "brute,"—"ugly animalism" is predicated of him. Why? Verily, man would have been a noble and happy creature, had he discharged his functions, grown and developed, realized his potentialities, and held the relations to his environment which befitted *him*, as fittingly and well as the worms on which he trod, the fish which he caught, and the wild animals which he hunted, for his daily nourishment. The brutes, in fact, are *not brutes* in the reproachful sense in which the word is applied to man. In that sense of the term man is the only "brute" which the process of evolution has brought forth; and one would almost be justified in twisting Burns' well-known lines about Nature into,

Her prentice hand she tried on man,
And then she made the *beasties*, O!

His whole existence, as compared with that of the living creatures alongside of him—even the simplest—has been bungled; so much so, in fact, that even now, those who have to some extent fought their way out of savagery, only too often look almost with envy on the manner in which the lower animals realize the idea of their being. It is true, of course, that these latter are not men; but for what they are, they cannot be said to be at war with the law of their own nature, to live other lives than they are capable of living. To use language about them such as men use about their fellow-men—assuming them to be *fellow-men*—would be to give way to hysterical sentiment. There is nothing either in their constitution or mode of existence, intrinsically considered, that deserves reproach or contempt or even pity—unless it be the fact that so many of them have to live on each other. But what is man? At the best, a bundle of unrealized ideals; too often so little developed in mind as not even to have ideals. Mostly he drags on an existence either of more or less conscious wretched-

ness; or, what is sadder still, of insensibility to, or heedlessness of, nearly everything that appertains to his proper humanity.

The question to which attention has been called is not, whether the world in general, and the living part of it in particular, has become what it is by a process of evolution; nor whether variability and heredity, aided by natural and sexual selection and the multiform influences of inorganic cosmic forces, have been factors in the process, nor whether the life of the human species—social, political, intellectual, æsthetical, moral, religious—has been subject to the law of development or of evolution! No, let it be repeated, this is not the question. All this may be taken for granted.

The real question is, why the products of the process, that is, the innumerable forms of animal life evolved prior to man were marked by characteristics which are not only lacking to the latest and highest product of the same process, but have actually been supplanted by others, warranting descriptions of the kind previously quoted.

Either the process itself must surely have undergone a marked change at the moment of reaching its culminating stage; or a disturbing element must then have been introduced into the life of the world, infinitely more disastrous in its consequences to the newly evolved species than the competition for food and mates, or the untoward action of physical forces, ever were to the long series of species that arose during the hundreds of thousands of years which are supposed to have preceded the appearance of man.

On the problem with which we are thus face to face, light is thrown by the account given in the book of Genesis of the entrance of sin into the world, and of the effect which it had on man, considered both in himself and in his relation to his environment. But the narrative must be interpreted by the aid of the general conception of the world, of God, and of the relation between the two, which

lies behind the Scriptures, and to which, with more or less distinctness, they constantly point, though it never finds in them a formal statement or exposition, not under the misleading guidance of recognized or unrecognized patristic or theological or critical or merely philological authorities, least of all under that of the polytheistic cosmogonies of the heathen religions. The conception of the primitive state of man, of the relation between him and the world and of that between him and God, which was once avowedly held by well-nigh the whole Christian church, and which still unconsciously more or less colors and dominates the minds both of the friends and foes of biblical truth, left human history as difficult a problem as it is left by the current theory of evolution.

What that narrative teaches is substantially as follows: Man came into existence healthily constituted both as to body and mind, though the latter, as in the case of children born nowadays, was a mere bundle of potentialities. He was placed in a physical environment which comprised everything necessary to the healthy growth, development, and activity of his body, considered both in itself and as the organ of mind. The divine factor of his environment made himself known to, and behaved towards, him in a manner conformable to the childlike stage of his mental life, for the purpose of so evoking his intelligence and affection, and awaking his moral and religious nature, that he should be able to enter on the free and conscious development for which he was destined. Among the intelligences which constituted his—as they also constitute our—invisible environment, was one who sought to counteract the divine purpose, and therefore took measures to sow distrust of God in the mind of the newly created being, with a view to preventing his normal development and effecting his final ruin. The immediate result was alienation from God, divine resentment, restriction of the outflow

and inflow of the gracious energy which was necessary for the invigoration of man's higher nature. The further consequences of this failure of man freely to maintain the relation to God for which he was created and in which he found himself by nature, are seen in the physical and intellectual degradation, the wickedness, irreligion, and superstition, and the unutterable miseries which have marked the history of man from the beginning down to the present moment.

It was the incoming of sin that created the problem to which attention has been called. The law of evolution remained. But when the self-controlled force which bears the name man, "corrupted its way on the earth," in other words, entered on a course of conduct opposed to the order of the world, the process of evolution necessarily brought forth the fruits of brutality, ignorance, non-morality and immorality, godlessness and idolatry, physical and mental misery.

Until science and philosophy recognize this terrible fact, they will be condemned to go on, as heretofore, piling hypothesis on hypothesis, in the vain hope of reducing the history of the human race to something like order and rationality. The key to the strange and dark contrast between man and his animal ancestry, is to be found alone in the fact of the Fall.