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THE
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE ECONOMY OF PAIN.

BY THE REV. HENRY HAYMAN, D. D., ALDINGHAM, ENGLAND.

A GLANCE AT PLEASURE AND PAIN IN GENERAL.

PLEASURE and Pain have, since the dawn of ethical inquiry, had a twin place in every moral system. Some have regarded them as opposite extremes, and both as, therefore, evils alike. Some have regarded them as stimulants from opposite sides to the practical principle, and therefore as both necessary alike. Others have regarded them as the one congenial, the other contrary to nature, and have therefore bidden man devote his energies to maximizing the one and minimizing the other. Aristotle, who investigates a definition of pleasure, omits giving any of pain, and apparently devotes an over-large sphere of influence to the former, regarding the latter in his tenth book, which is the seat of the question, only in a fashion supplementary to that former. As regards definition I shall follow his example, and suppose pain with its physical and moral extensions, such as helplessness, prostrate debility, wearying exhaustion, depression of spirits, agonizing anticipation, and the like, sufficiently familiar to

require for my present purpose no definition.¹ If I say, Pain is nature's signal of distress, the figure of speech used prevents this from being a definition ; but it may help my argument so to illustrate it. Let us take it as primarily so. My standpoint being pain, and for simplicity's sake, in the first instance, physical pain of the sensitive nerve, I shall refer to pleasure for only illustrative purposes ; and, firstly, in a discussion dealing only with the broader aspects of human nature, I may dismiss intellectual pleasure as that of which comparatively few are capable. The capacity for it which education confers, so far as it does confer it, is on that very account a late development, slowly matured. And not only so but, because there being no such thing as intellectual pain, it would have no direct bearing on my subject. Moral pleasures are not usually designated as such. Not that the gratifications which follow particular moral temperaments are less real than those of intellect or of sense, but in any complete scheme of pleasure they must have their place. Thus the good-natured and the malignant or cynical character have each their pleasures which follow their energies. But no such scheme of pleasure is to my present purpose, and, if it were, I should probably only confuse established nomenclature, if I assigned them their due. And now one must, for illustration and contrast, mix the subjects of the pleasure and pain of sense, and present them in juxtaposition.

¹ An interesting although brief article in the *Lancet* of August 13, 1887, pp. 333-334, which, being unsigned, may probably be editorial, says : "Pain is a sensation which more or less rapidly and acutely assails the faculty of endurance. In its commonest forms it is suffering produced by nerve excitation, the elements of the nervous apparatus being either directly or by a transmitted irritation mechanically disturbed [some examples given]. It is not, of course, always the fact that these mechanical injuries to nervous tissue take place at the point to which pain is referred ; because, being a sensation, pain is felt at some seat of sensation that is in connection with the sensory apparatus affected, although it may be remote from the point where the impression is produced. In short, pain may be a message sent from some injured part through a chain of nerve elements, as a message of word-symbols is transmitted by a telegraphic wire."

CAPACITY FOR PAIN IS DISTINCT FROM ACTUAL PAIN, WHICH HAS, HOWEVER, AN ENORMOUS EMPIRE OVER MAN.

But, first, a distinction is necessary, of capital importance, between the capacity for pain and pain itself as experienced—one sufficiently plain, one would think, but often confused. The capacity is practically unlimited and seems alike in intensity and duration very greatly to exceed in the average human organism that for pleasure. As regards the pleasures of sense, they soon satiate, cease to please, and even repel; whereas, pain endured may be protracted to an extent limited only by the exhaustion of sensibility in unconsciousness or by death. Further, pleasures over-indulged or often indulged are found to procure pains; whereas, pains have no such tendency to procure pleasures, with one exception, apparent rather than real, which I will notice further on. Pain, then, and pleasure are not so merely the reciprocal converse of each that one should drive or be driven out by the other. The more absolute empire of pain is seen in the fact that pleasures are by it, when intense, made blank, and our capacity, or at any rate our appetite for them suspended. You cannot lure a man in an acute fit of gout or neuralgia to seek sensual enjoyment. He is devoted to his suffering while it lasts. By it all, or nearly all, the energies which depend on will are neutralized or rendered difficult—nay it often sweeps away all the resolves of the will, and dictates its own terms to our moral nature. We need not here take account of, but may, in passing, notice certain exalted states of moral or mental emotion or abstraction, in which the action of the nerves seems suspended and their sensitive capacity neutralized. These are, however, pathologically interesting, outside our present purpose. The Indian gymnosophists, who excited the wonder of Alexander the Great and his comrades, and the astounding performances of certain Tunisian *Saliû* (if one may borrow a term of classic antiquity), as following their ecstatic dances, recorded by recent travellers, may be taken as persistent or occasional types of these exalted states.

SINCE PLEASURE TENDS TO DEMORALIZE, OUR CAPACITY FOR IT IS NARROWED.

The above broad facts of human and, so far as we can judge, of all sentient nature, although in different degrees, lead us to reflect that pleasure and pain, however co-related, are natural or are necessary in different degrees and are each under a different law. We may indeed conceive of a natural being so organized as to be capable of either only apart from the other, save that the notion of a being so constituted as to be capable of pain alone seems to contradict the fitness of things. Suppose, then, one so organized as to be capable of pleasure only. In such an one the preservative element which our capacity for pain confers would be wholly wanting. On this safeguard I will say somewhat further on. But pleasure, so far from acting as a safeguard, seems rather to serve as a lure; and an enlarged capacity for it, being followed, as it normally would be, by a larger indulgence, might, even if attended by an enlarged capacity for pain, and much more without this qualification, operate as a blind to precaution, even as an intoxicant. Thus nature has wisely stinted our organism on the side of pleasure. Whereas, man is capable of feeling pain acutely at every thread of the nerve-web diffused all over the body, only in a few limited organs is he capable of a pleasure at all to be compared in intensity with this. To enlarge the pleasurable capacity would demoralize, would, by the opiate so provided for reflection, drag us down to the level of the senses, and might end by stifling all the nobler energies of man. Our margin of voluptuousness is judiciously narrowed, or the moral equilibrium would be fatally disturbed. We hear of a famous Eastern king who advertised a handsome premium for the discovery of a new pleasure, but history does not record that his advertisement was ever answered.

OUR CAPACITY FOR PAIN A MAXIMUM, THAT OUR SUFFERING MAY BE A MINIMUM.

On the contrary, the capacity for pain, enormous as com-

pared with that for pleasure, operates as a salutary caution to a consciousness led by experience and attended by reflection. And if due scope be allowed to these latter, a capacity for pain might be indefinitely enlarged without any corresponding increase of actual pain ensuing. We say, in short, that, normally, although perhaps not invariably, pleasure enjoyed tends to vary directly as our capacity for it, and pain endured to vary inversely as our similar capacity. The consciousness of capacity for pain, suggesting precaution and prompting reflection, stimulates as well the intellect as the moral judgment. And where this is fully developed, any demand for actual pain to rouse its energies ceases. While it is developing, the very slightest puncture of the cuticle acts in combination with our practically indefinite capacity for pain; and its minuteness is in our consciousness, by the aid of imagination, multiplied by that capacity, until its rousing and warning power becomes enormous. Thus a minimum of pain endured suffices because of the maximum of pain possible. Were it not that we are capable of suffering so much, we should in fact suffer much more—an amiable paradox and an admirable economy, worthy of One who “does not willingly afflict.”

WHY WE CANNOT AVERT ALL PAIN.

But further, if by reflection and precaution, acting on experience, we were able to avert all pain whatever, the tendency would be to absorb an unduly large share of our energies in the study of how to avert it. This, however, is neutralized partly by the opposite inducements of pleasure, partly by there being some kinds and degrees of pain which cannot be so averted, or which to most men would not seem worth the trouble, although there are few which are not open to some degree of alleviation, especially as knowledge advances, which advance, accordingly, the presence of pain in our economy directly tends to promote.

YET PAIN, WITH SCANTY EXCEPTIONS, IS NEVER NORMAL.

And yet, with a capacity for pain diffused everywhere in

sentient being, it seems nearly, but not quite, true, that there seems no machinery, so to speak, designed to procure actual pain. In the first place, a capacity for pain which were never realized would remain inoperative, and a statement of its existence and universality would become unintelligible. An experience which should be on this side totally blank would never stimulate reflection. In whatever proportion, therefore, it may be necessary to translate capacity into actuality for this purpose, in that proportion pain may be said to be designed. But this proportion we have seen is exceedingly small. And thus in the vast majority of cases, perhaps with one or two exceptions (to be further noticed), universally, pain, however under certain conditions inevitable, seems, when suffered, to have always the air of an intrusion or a derangement, to be no proper part of humanity nor normal consequence, save in the above attenuated degree, of any known law. On the contrary, the more the laws of our nature and of its surroundings are understood and obeyed, the more we tend to reduce pain to an unappreciable minimum. And this, again, tends surely to stimulate our intelligence in the study of those laws. As regards death-throes, the pains which they indicate are sometimes severe and protracted, but, since other cases show death supervening as a painless sleep, they cannot be deemed normal. And, indeed, what are called the pains of death are really those of the mortal disease, accident, or lesion, which is the proximate cause of death, and therefore fall under the laws of pain caused by such disease, etc., short of the mortal point. And here I may notice as regards disease that the morbid internal states, mostly, if not always, attended by pain, which arise, inexplicably, perhaps, in our present state of knowledge, are really due to the infraction of some natural law by the individual, or to the results of such inherited from his ancestors.

OF CERTAIN EXCEPTIONAL FIXED PAINS IN NATURE.

The exceptions referred to above (p. 5.) as pains fixed in human nature and therefore normal, are those of parturition

and of dentition. It is possible that there may be others which my ignorance of pathology prevents my duly classing with these. The first are limited to one sex, the second to two or, possibly but rarely, three periods of life in both sexes; and the former are shared by the higher domesticated animals, to which fact I will further return. And these two fixed pains seem to me to have a curious analogy, which, however, may be superficial only. They both include the maturing of a germ which forms a part of the organism, attended by a tension of the parts, and, in the gum, a cleavage of the surface. They both include the extrusion of the germ when matured, although not in the tooth carried to a final separation, unless the dropping out of the tooth through decay attacking it in a further stage (which, however, is contingent and not normal) may be deemed such a final separation. Now, are there any fixed objects in human nature which these pains, thus analogical, may serve? The former, unquestionably, react on the mother through the moral sphere in the interests of the offspring, *i. e.*, of the entire race. They form, in short, an element in the intense tenacity of maternal affection, and seem to give it a physical basis. But farther, they have a prolonged action, still in the moral sphere, on the offspring; and thus the most vice-hardened men, although they are lost to all other feeling, are often found to cherish a strong regard for the feelings of a mother. And, indeed, a regard to maternal feelings is sometimes found to prevail where the rigor of law or custom sets aside all other regard of the same kind; and this seems, in part at least, traceable to the same physical basis, or at any rate to be inseparable from its results. And this regard to maternal feeling is probably beneficial to humanity on the whole. Nor can we exclude from the consequences of the same the stronger affection between uterine children by the half-blood, as compared with those who share paternity only. Nor indeed is the suffering of the weaker sex without its effect in cementing more closely conjugal affection, as throwing more evidently on the stronger the duty of a cherishing protection. Thus, since on

maternal, filial, and conjugal attachment the larger proportion of human attachments base themselves, the pains of parturition are a fountain of human affection widely diffused, and as such worthy of a fixed place in nature. Much less can be said on the pains of dentition. They set, indeed, a seal, as do the former, on that charter of pain of which we all are feoffees. And they may further produce a stronger sympathy between the parent, whose experience in cutting his or her own "wisdom-teeth" is recent, and the helpless infant, when the pains of the infantile stage of the former have passed out of memory. And the same fact may spread more widely, and tend to make adults generally more compassionate towards any sufferings of infancy, and thus mitigate that intolerant callousness which adults are apt to feel, especially when not parents themselves, towards a state their own experience of which lies outside memory.

PHYSICAL PAIN IN THE MORAL SPHERE NEEDED AS A DISCIPLINE
IN PROPORTION AS THE FUTURE IS OBSCURE.

Thus we find, and I think shall find at every step of this argument, that physical pain has a tendency to react on the moral nature; and that to study pain, with or without any adequate result, in the physical sphere only, is to mutilate the problem. And thus I shall adduce, as a confirmatory instance, the correction of children by bodily pain, and the development of the ascetic idea, to which I purpose briefly returning at the end of this essay. Leaving individual cases, which may be exceptional, out of sight, it may be said that no system of education will bear the strain of wide experience which excludes that disciplinary use of artificial pain. Young human creatures are in a state of excessive sensation and defective reflection, and discipline accordingly makes use of that fact and wins nature to its side. The same is true of the childish imagination, overdeveloped, as it seems, in comparison with other faculties. But a wise teacher will similarly utilize the fact, and win nature to his side by trading at once on the power which nature has developed rather than on that which

he reserves. But as regards correction by pain, it is the natural attribute of authority and power combined, and as such is naturally understood by childhood, and lies within the scope of its feeble reasoning powers. In proportion as the future is hidden from us, the correction by physical pain, to omit for the present other grounds, seems a moral necessity. Children can have no adequate anticipation of the future, *i. e.*, adequate for the guidance of conduct, until they have amassed some experience, since by the past only is any real key to the future gained. But in proportion as that experience accrues and is turned to account, the resource of artificial pain is superseded. And indeed the above remark has a wide application to human existence. The degree to which a future state is, on natural grounds, open to question, and the unsatisfying character to some minds of the arguments adduced for it, form a measure of the disciplinary necessity of pain in the nature of man. It is probable that if the expectation of a future state rested on as strong a moral certainty as that of sunrise to-morrow, a much less amount of pain might suffice for the education of mankind. To this thought I may have occasion further to return.

PAIN ACTUAL, NOT A DESIGN IN THE SENSE IN WHICH PLEASURE IS.

But I will take another instance of a pain which probably to a superficial observer seems in the fullest sense directly natural—that of hunger. Compare this with the pleasure attending a comfortable repast. This pain, if at once obeyed by fulfilling its tendency, is only perceived by its stimulating effects on appetite. If not so obeyed, the pangs become acute and intense, and may be prolonged into the agonies of starvation. Now, it is not in the same sense a design of nature that that extreme pain, or any acute stage of it, should be reached, as it is that the pleasure of repletion should be enjoyed. A child, again, on its first feet, loses balance and falls with a shock and perhaps a bruise, but learns something from the result. It is not a design of nature that the child should so fall and suffer, in the same sense as it is that it should find re-

pose and comfort, with undefinable sensations of pleasure, in its mother's arms. Analyze it how you will, this difference is fundamental and essential. The craving which precedes the gratification of a natural appetite need never in any particular case become so acute as to be recognized as pain, much less need reach its extreme possible limit; whereas, the pleasure which follows, always tends to reach its proper maximum. Thus the pleasure attending natural functions appears to be designed in a way in which the pain attending their suspension or derangement is not. And thus the capacity for pain and the experience of pleasure are natural to a degree or in a way in which the capacity for pleasure and the experience of pain are not:—paradoxical, perhaps, but true.

PAIN PROVES, TRAINS, AND TEACHES US:—ITS USES IN THE MORAL SPHERE HINTED AT.

We spoke just now of the shock and bruise to a child in falling as that from which he learned something. Indeed, from infancy to old age, and from the infancy to the old age of our species, the shock, slight or severe, which gives him a warning, is beneficial to the individual—it teaches *him*. If so severe as to be fatal to life, it is still beneficial to the species—it teaches *them*. Thus, suffering is a condition of learning our relations with nature. It proves to ourselves, as a race, what amount of strain we can endure, what not, and by such endurance trains and teaches us. The proof-charge which tests a gun is partly analogous. It proves the individual handiwork of the founder, it teaches the founder himself. But the gun does not gain strength by resisting the strain. The experiment being in the sphere of dead matter has nothing analogous to the growth of the individual man in endurance or in knowledge by a shock of pain undergone. But as the gun-founder seeks to guarantee the weapon's safety for its owner, so the Maker and Owner of man may have designed to make His work more acceptable to Himself through pain endured, acting thus on the moral sphere through the physical. The moral being is not, we may sup-

pose, destroyed even by a shock which is fatal to natural life, and thus as no founder ever designs to burst his gun, even so we need not ascribe to the Maker of man any design of destruction. If the moral sphere transcends the physical, a moral end served may well be worth an intermediate physical end sacrificed. But I must for the present postpone this consideration of the uses of pain in the moral sphere.

PLEASURE AND PAIN COMPARED AS STIMULATING EFFORT: PAIN
THE MORE POWERFUL.

The hope of pleasure may indeed prove a stimulant to intellectual effort of a low order, but we must not confound this hope with that of material wealth, the means, of course, of commanding a supply of pleasure generally, but which has also a much wider range; and the pursuit of which is accordingly a more powerful stimulant, and to effort of a higher order. But the effort to which the hope of pleasure stimulates terminates in the pleasure obtained, and the access of pleasure is a dissuasive rather than a stimulant; whereas, both the apprehension and the access of pain, so far as the latter is not actually disabling, are stimulants alike. Farther, the efforts stimulated by these latter commonly open to us a much wider door into nature than those resulting from the hope of pleasure. And further yet, our capacity for pain being so large, while that for pleasure is so narrow, makes the efforts to which the consciousness of that former capacity stimulates more persistent in proportion, and spreads them over a wider area. From pleasure enjoyed no discipline can be extracted. In proportion as it pervades the sense, it absorbs the attentive faculty and excludes the reflective; and thus, making its subject wholly content with present conditions, shuts out the future, opens no problem, and points no question, but rather bribes all questionings to silence. Thus the discipline in that knowledge on which the well-being of the race depends, seems to depend chiefly upon pain and our capacity for it.

PAIN THE SAFEGUARD OF LIFE—ITS ECONOMY IN OUR ORGANISM.

The usefulness of pain in safeguarding the animal economy is a trite subject. The non-sensitive outer skin neutralizes the surface to actual contact, save those severe collisions which reach to jar the nerve beneath. But for this, existence with even a mere atmospheric environment would be continual torment. But the disposition of the sensitive nerves close beneath the non-sensitive cuticle is a defence more instantaneously serviceable than the shell of the tortoise or the hide of the rhinoceros. Our weakness is a better protection, on the whole, than *robur et aes triplex*. Our capacity for pain everywhere is our general safeguard against pain anywhere. Outrunning the quickness of thought, antecedent to the possibility of experience or the exercise of reflection, the sting of pain reaches the sensorium and reacts upon the flinching muscle, ringing an instant alarm to the whole system and calling a muster of all its powers to rescue the part assailed. What contrivance could be fuller of moral beauty than thus to turn the tables upon the aggressor, and compel the enemy from which nature most shrinks, to mount guard and stand sentry over the seat of life, keeping thus inviolable, from fatal lesion the sanctuary of its great organs? Moreover, special parts of the organism have their appropriate sensitiveness and a capacity of pain relative to their special function. The eye is sensitive even to the near approach of mischief, and resents a hostile demonstration, the quickness of nictitation exceeding even that of vision itself. Tendons and ligaments, ordinarily dull, are sensitive to overtension. The internal organs are sensitive only to their own morbid state, or suspension, or derangement of function. And all these *involutura* of sensitiveness have their mechanical spontaneity of action wholly independent of our will, on which, if humanity depended for the purpose, a thousand lives would be sooner lost than one is placed even in jeopardy now. But the great or small inward organs which conduct the machinery of life, when normal, have no register or acute sensations. They rest in undemonstrative content-

ment, and make no sign unless provoked as above. To have lodged such facile sensitiveness in them as underlies the whole surface would have been futile. In the same instant that the alarm of pain would have been thereby given, a mortal hurt might have reached home, and the whole economy have been frustrated.

ON THE LIFE-JOY AS ANTECEDENT TO PLEASURE OR PAIN.

And this passiveness of organs until aroused leads one on to notice that human existence, even on its sensuous side, is not made up of pleasures and pains only, to be balanced one against another. Antecedently to any such balance, animal life, including human, is normally a state of placid enjoyment, like the general warmth of tone in a picture, underlying all lights and shadows alike. Given average health with bodily functions corresponding, and there results a deposit of complacency of which we are imperfectly conscious until it is interrupted. Thus, to sleep and wake, take exercise and repose, to draw breath and take in ordinary objects of sight or sound by eye or ear, (wholly apart from the special interest of the objects as such,) are all elements in this calm *plenum* of enjoyment. In all these the lower animals have their share, and there can be no doubt, that, apart from the excitements of appetite, they enjoy existence, and stamp it with an unanimous verdict of approval, which is rather the more than the less weighty from its being rather sentient than reflective. This is the primary result of harmonized surroundings—a kindly soil, as it were, in which all secondary sensations take root, whether pleasurable or painful; or a general current of life-joy, “without o’erflowing full,” in which they float either as pleasures with the stream, or as pains, thwarting and chafing, or even suspending and clogging it. It is not an exalted, much less a rapturous state; but its low level of copiousness pervades the greatest number of hours out of the twenty-four, covering with its ample margin even our sleeping moments, and when it fades from consciousness, as slumber becomes profound, is perhaps negatively existent still.

MORAL REFLECTIONS ON THE LIFE-JOY.

This life-joy, so broad a proof of goodness at work in nature, is mostly skipped in ethical discussion, as if thrown into the shade by the stronger glare of pleasures or of pains. But I cannot afford to omit it here. It shows nature in the physico-sensuous sphere as aiming rather at quantity than at quality, and spreading a protoplasm of equable contentment as a pre-condition of formulated energies. It is that nearly apathetic minimum of individuality—the objective mingling, but not colliding, with the subjective—the back-ground of effort, the whole horizon of quietism, which would be left surviving, even if Stoic or Buddhist should succeed in effacing all the salient excitements and all the special emotions of the soul. It is this—consistent with all theories of life save those which pessimism has leavened—of which Schopenhauer lost sight when he called the world “a penal settlement.” It seems to enfold conscious existence in a general sympathy to which all respond, as the luminiferous ether, interfused between orb and orb, binds all in one communion of the light of life.

ON AN EXCEPTIONAL PLEASURE THROUGH RELIEF FROM INTENSE PAIN.

And this leads to the development of a remark offered above (p. 3), that pains do not tend to produce pleasures as these to procure pains. But here one questionable exception is noteworthy. The cessation of pain, intense and prolonged, becomes intensely pleasurable. Why is this? The force of contrast is, I suppose, the popular and ready answer. But if this were all, why should not the cessation of extreme pleasure bring about a result of intense pain, which it is notoriously incapable of doing? I take the truer answer to be, that the life-joy, which has been interrupted by the pain-fit, asserts itself with a cumulative power. The dammed up stream rises until its force-flood pervades every fibre of the whole being. But whether this be the true account or no, the phenomenon is real, and yet, so far from its being a set-

off in the balance against pain on the side of pleasure, is rather a weight in the scale of pain itself. Action and reaction being presumed here, as in mechanics, equal and opposite, how powerful must be the action of pain, in order by reaction from its pressure to bring ecstasy out of a state but one remove from apathy! This special result of pain, therefore, instead of abating its rigor, serves rather to enhance it. Compared with the tendency of pleasure to penalize us by dying out into pain, it is found to have nothing in common with that tendency, and for this reason I called the exception stated above one rather apparent than real.

A SUMMARY OF CERTAIN RESULTS OF THE ARGUMENT.

The pleasure and pain of sense only have here been taken into view, *i. e.*, those which terminate in a sensation. Limited thus, we find pleasure fugitive and treacherous, and our capacity for it wisely narrowed. We find in pain far more of constancy and of a tendency to permanency. As regards the consequences of each to the higher or supra-sensual nature, we find pleasure negative or mischievous, but pain fruitful in far-reaching usefulness. Pleasure is the silly nurse who fondles and spoils the child. Pain is the severe custodian and harsh master, yet in whose keeping we are safe and from whose teaching we feel that we learn. The life-joy is the gentle mother, whose presence makes the home and who keeps it for her children.

THE PLEASURE WHICH FOLLOWS THE EXERCISE OF POWER.

Pleasure enlarged would only be safe for beings much nearer perfection than we are; while the need of pain in our economy attests our imperfection and corruption. Pleasure, however, as limited by sense, is directly dangerous or noxious to the individual alone who enjoys or pursues it. But there is another kind of pleasure so dangerous to mankind at large, and so full of mischievous reaction on the enjoyer, that it demands notice. I mean that which follows the consciousness and the exercise of power. And, probably because it is

thus doubly mischievous, only a very few can in the nature of things attain to the greater heights of such power. And, again, one may notice a proof of human imperfection and corruption in the fact of power, and the pleasure annexed to its exercise, being so full of detriment alike physical and moral. For power being in itself neutral, and implying a freedom from restraints to which others are subjected, we see in fact that its neutrality is on the whole far more likely to be warped and wrested to an abuse, and that such freedom from restraints is a privilege with which hardly any one who has enjoyed it is fit to be trusted. And if these facts do not show an innate bias in human nature to the bad side, I know not what can. But some may think I am digressing too far from pain, my proper subject, in these remarks. I will proceed to show their relevancy.

PAIN THE TRIBUTE TO POWER.

The greater part of human history, as the old commonplace has it, is written in blood, and the pains which shock and revolt us most as we study it are those which men inflict upon one another. They stand out as wanton and gratuitous additions to the needful pains which, while they afflict, yet have a preservative and disciplinal efficacy. And, indeed, one of the most sorrowful effects of the dominion of pain over man is the extent to which it tends to place man at the mercy of his fellow. And to have others at their mercy and make them feel that they are so, has been the object pursued in all the ambitious wars which have desolated humanity and in all the tyrannies which make history horrible. When A is at B's mercy and feels that he is so, B can, by inflicting or threatening pain, make A do practically whatever he pleases. And thus, although the greater heights of power are scaled by few, yet a slave-system in which men are treated nearly as domestic beasts, perhaps better, perhaps worse, has secured, within an area large or small according to wealth, rank, and station, an absolute ascendancy to an entire people by right of conquest over another or many other races enslaved. But apart

from pain inflicted as a means of enforcing useful service to the superior, pain endured is a direct tribute to power and a manifest proof of it. For the intense reality of pain enables the possessor of power to realize it most readily and easily by inflicting pain; and not only so, but it tends directly to increase the power which it proves, by the wholesale intimidation which it causes. On the other hand, the fugitive and comparatively precarious nature, as we have seen, of the pleasures of sense, and much more, perhaps, their expensiveness when diffused on a large scale, hinders the efficacy of their diffusion as a proof of power; while to gratify a few provokes the envy and discontent of the many, and thus tends not to extend power but to curb it. Thus the gratification of a few by a tyrant always needs to be balanced by the intimidation of the many; and as no man, or hardly any, can be such a monster, even when perverted by absolute power, as to enjoy *alone*, the object and resource of tyrants in the popular sense has been to pamper their own creatures and to terrorize by pain over the rest. As examples of the horrible barbarities to which absolute power has led even men eminently gifted, we may take Tiberius, Ivan "the Terrible," of Russia, several of the popes, and Louis XI. of France. These and similar characters have various elements. In some, brutal passions, in some, reason misled by sophistry, but in all such, the pleasure attending the consciousness and the exercise of power has exerted a wide influence. Pain is, in short, the readiest and most widely current coin in which the tribute to power can be paid; but, save for the debasement and corruption of human nature, power would not require nor accept it.

HOW PAIN DOES ITS DIDACTIC WORK IN US.

Given perfectly suitable surroundings from without, or, short of this, given all laws of nature, physical and moral, known and observed by man, and pain, save in the fixed and normal instances named, would either vanish or shrink to an

insignificant minimum. But, being as we are, experience seems to establish that only by the discipline of pain can man effectively for his own protection learn the laws of nature. Thus, for instance, he learns to distinguish poisonous or noxious from wholesome fruits, etc., and venomous snake-bites lead to the study of antidotes. He also learns very early that the forces which those laws govern are not all uniformly constant in the energies which they put forth, that many, indeed, vary through all degrees possible up to the maximum. This leads him to risk and to hope—the two elements which form the spirit of adventure. He constantly presses upon the margin of superiority which he has already secured over nature by learning her secrets; and presumes that the chances (by which name we call the laws of whose combinations and incidences we are ignorant), will be in his favor. By thus staking man's own acquired skill and hardihood against those forces, often with the moral certainty of a large measure of pain as the condition, enormous advantages have been secured to the species, often with deplorable and fatal results to the individual. The records of mining, navigation, aeronautics, and bell-diving are full of illustrations of this. But the condition of possible pain is everywhere present, and in a great number of instances is realized with more or less severity. And although, especially within recent memory, enormous advances have been made, yet this condition seems to abide in its full force, and with every additional advance made, a wider margin of possible accident, loss, wreck, and havoc seems to open. In proportion as we tax the resources of nature we multiply the points of collision with her forces, and sometimes, as in coal-pits, set those forces free to act against us. All this means increased pain. Man's ascendancy over nature confirms the empire of pain over man.

THE AMOUNT OF PAIN FOR THIS PURPOSE IS PROBABLY A MINIMUM.

It is perhaps the condition of progress that this should be so. If the margin of man's average attentiveness and industry could be largely increased, a large measure of it might be

devoted to devising security and cultivating precaution. But that margin being what it is, the tendency is to spend it so largely upon adventure that precaution is neglected, and men prefer rather to take the risk than the trouble of ensuring against it. Nor as yet is any sign visible of a change of tendencies in human nature on this behalf, although such a change is not impossible; and while the tendencies continue, they extend the incidence of pain. Thus it appears that pain is not only the chief stimulus to learn, but also the condition of learning. Nor need this last fact be deemed superfluous, for without it we should certainly never lay the lessons to heart. Indeed, as it is, by the greater number of mankind they are imperfectly mastered; and when we pass to the moral sphere we may certainly say that a great number of mankind live in defiance of moral laws, although their breach is constantly avenged by the direst and most obvious physical consequences. Nor is this defiance of known laws without example even in the physical sphere. The world then being in these respects as we know it, the extinction of pain would mean the outbreak of lawlessness; and the amount of existing pain is probably a minimum for all the purposes which it serves.

THE QUESTION REGARDING THE SURPLUS OF PAIN.

We have seen so far that those purposes are chiefly two: (1) preservative and (2) didactic, and that these two, although distinct in idea, yet overlap in fact, and that the one is seldom realized without some measure of the other being promoted. But I will assume that when both these uses have been served there remains a surplus of human pain; and the questions force themselves upon us, Why, when both these demands have been satisfied, does pain remain often to lay a life-long burden on the sufferer? Why is relief so slow, precarious, and remote? Why is that burden often heaviest where no such uses are presumable or where they are plainly impossible? Why is the load of agony so often laid on the undeserving, on the bettermost and more lovable specimens of humanity? Why is it protracted in cases where the moral

result seems to be mere fretful chafing and vindictive impatience? and Why, when relief comes in the form of death, is the problem broken off rather than solved,—the knot cut, but not untied? Why, in a word, should the formula of “a happy release” be so widely applicable? But notice that through all these queries it is the assumed “surplus of pain” which raises them.

WHAT IF THROUGH LIMITED FACULTIES WE CANNOT ANSWER THEM?

I am not sure that an adequate answer at all points can be given. I will point out what the facts suggest, and then show what considerations must govern us in seeking a more comprehensive solution. But in all such inquiries we should remember the possibility of human ignorance being insuperable through a defect of human faculty. We might as well clamor for a sixth sense or a fourth dimension of space, as for knowledge for which there is in us no subjective receptacle. And this seems certain to be the case wherever the conditions of the future shine dimly through those of our present being, and hardly less certainly so wherever moral and physical conditions interweave themselves in one context.

AN ANSWER AS REGARDS THE PERSISTENCY OF PAIN IN CERTAIN CASES.

I spoke just now of what the facts suggest. Let us take, therefore, actual cases, those, for instance, of crippling accident or clinic disease. In these the pains which were a sign of mischievous lesion or morbid ailment often continue. Nor is this unreasonable, for while derangement continues, the prolongation of pain is an abiding witness to it, as it were a danger-signal kept constantly hoisted. And there is, further, the undoubted fact that the presence of pain tends most powerfully to conciliate sympathy with the sufferer, and to stimulate every utmost resource of watchful skill and loving care. It is certain that no scientific conviction that life was in danger would probably fling the same halo of

moral interest round the sufferer, induce the same self-devotion to sustain the often laborious and repulsive offices necessary, draw forth the same tenderness of invigilation for the patient, or force upon him the same degree of self-watchfulness and compliance, as are secured by the constant presence or apprehension of pain.

TAKING THE HUMAN RACE IN ITS FULL TOTALITY, THERE IS NO APPARENT SURPLUS OF PAIN.

I hinted not far back that the existence of such a surplus of pain as I am discussing is an assumption, and I believe some are prepared to dispute it. Thus I find it urged² that "pain never comes where it can serve no good purpose" [where the context shows that by "good," physically useful is intended]. "Pain is eminently merciful, if I may so put it." Of course physiological science enlarges our power of interpreting pain, and many pains that were merely enigmas without an answer fifty years ago have received their solution since, and are now indispensable signs to guide our therapeutics; and so on backward to the very infancy of medical skill; at which period the area of uninterpreted, and therefore practically, as regards the patients who then suffered and died, *gratuitous* pain, would have been at its maximum. Fifty years hence a similar advance may be scored and the area of practically gratuitous pain be yet further reduced; and so onwards, until, as we may plainly conceive, and so may contemplate as practicable, the reduction of such gratuitous

² The quotation is from a paper in the *Lancet* of August 13, 1887, p. 305 sq. on "The Life-saving Value of Pain and Disease, by Cameron Gillics, M. B." In it he goes on to urge, "Say that a man is smashed in a railway accident. If his injuries are such that he cannot recover, he suffers no pain at all. He dies of shock, as the surgeons say. But that, I submit in all humility, is a wrong view of the case, a wrong interpretation of the natural facts. The man dies because vital parts of the organism have been destroyed in the collision, and this condition of shock, this insensibility to useless pain, is the most merciful provision that can be conceived." Still I suppose there are hundreds of clinics in our hospitals, hopeless of cure, yet suffering each more or less of pain.

pain to an insignificant minimum. There remain, however, the fixed and normal pains of humanity before referred to. Let us suppose it so. Yet still, for the sufferer of pain uninterpreted and therefore unrelieved in every age and, indeed, for all who witness his sufferings, the pain so endured is as completely in this sense gratuitous as if no remedy were ever possible. We cannot anticipate the knowledge of the next age, and "while the grass grows the horse starves." Yet it seems as certain as experience can make it, that the pains of the present are a condition of the science of the future; that, at whatever point they stop, the clock of human progress will stop or slacken with them; that pains can therefore only cease when all the knowledge to which they stimulate is attained; and thus that the unrelieved pains, in fact, of not only countless individuals, but of ages, are not gratuitous as regards *the race*. Thus pain is the interest paid on ignorance; only as the principal diminishes can the interest diminish, and only with its extinction be absolutely extinguished. Thus pain tends to bind, in a bond of mysterious sympathy, not only the sufferer and his contemporary witnesses, but extends a solidarity throughout all ages of our race, viewed as acquirers of knowledge, from the dawn of experiment to the last complement of total science. This tends to vertebrate entire humanity, in a spinal column as it were, with a marrow of sensitiveness running throughout the whole.

BUT TAKING EACH AGE SEPARATELY, THAT SURPLUS IS PROBABLY NOT OTIOSE.

And this seems a considerable result to have established; but, if I mistake not, the bond of sympathy is even more pervasive in the moral sphere than in the physical and intellectual. This, however, will be shown later. It remains to notice that there is in every age a surplus of pain beyond what that age can make use of either as a preservative or a didactic stimulant, passed on to the next. Does it follow that that surplus is wholly otiose as regards its own genera-

tion? It cannot surely be taken to have no uses beyond these two. Its economy may include something else, and have other active functions in the present besides being the condition of the knowledge of the future. And as human ignorance is the limit of its present usefulness in the physical sphere; so human ignorance may have even wider relations with the further sphere of activity which we suppose. Meanwhile the surplus of pain is such in reference to the age in which it is felt. Of this I seek to show the moral uses. Those who reject those uses must remember that as regards collective humanity there seems to be no surplus at all.

ANALOGY IS MUCH IN FAVOR OF OUR IGNORANCE BEING THE TRUE
ACCOUNT OF THE DIFFICULTY.

But, further, we have seen reasons for supposing that there is an economy of pain in the physical and intellectual sphere, and that the amount of pain available for preservative and didactic purposes is probably a minimum. This would lead us to suppose that, in respect of the assumed "surplus" unavailable for those purposes, there is a similar economy, rather than a superfluous infliction; and that, if we fail to detect it, the reason is more likely to lie in our feebleness of faculty either to appreciate the end served, or to see how the means serve the end, than in a wanton disbursement of pain without an adequate object. And this probability is enhanced, if the end in view is one which is not and cannot be fully realized in our present state of being. For we should notice that we *are* able with great fulness to realize, in those former purposes, the preservative and the didactic, both the end itself and how the means serve it. They lie so fully within the reach of our present faculties and the scope of our immediate and conscious needs, that we can be in no doubt about them. Therefore, when we arrive at this doubt about the use of the "surplus" of pain, it becomes highly probable that some end which at present is imperfectly developed, and some relation which is not fully within our grasp, lie at the root of our uncertainty. But making allowance for this, it may still be

possible to show in which direction the balance of argument inclines.

CIVILIZATION INCREASES THE CAPACITY FOR PAIN AND ACTUAL PAIN.

Before attempting the more complex question of the moral aspect of pain, it is worth noticing how the general question is affected by civilization; which seems to me to involve an increase both in man's capacity for pain, and in the amount of pain at any given moment in the world, I mean in proportion to the numbers of mankind. For as civilization tends to a numerical increase of mankind, of course the greater that number the greater amount of pain, unless some agency were at work to reduce it. Ancient civilization as well as, to a great extent, barbarism rested wholly upon a slave-system, and secured the culture or the leisure of the free classes by shifting the burdens of existence upon those in a servile condition. This, however, is passed away, or so nearly that it may be disregarded. But one feature of it has not and does not tend to pass away. Civilization, ancient or modern, always expands its resources unduly upon the mental and material sides of man's nature as compared with the moral; witness the Baconian philosophy with its material results. Of course moral progress is made, but not commensurate. The extinction of slavery in Europe is a case in point, but its long tenacity, its slowness to succumb to acknowledged principles, and the extent to which it has vitiated those Latin races who caught from the Roman empire its views most powerfully, show how slow, even in this leading example, moral progress has been. If we ask why no proportionate moral development attends our material progress, the answer must be sought in the corruption of mankind. The connection between that moral inertness of civilization and the tendency of the latter to develop pain, is probably organic; *i. e.* as the headache of the drunken and the *delirium tremens* of the drunkard are connected with his moral inertness to resist the dram or break from the habit.

CIVILIZATION IS ALWAYS DEFECTIVE ON THE MORAL SIDE.

The late Mr. Buckle laid it down very broadly that the influence of intellectual laws has been much greater than that of moral laws in advancing civilization, and that, in respect of the opposite evils, "their diminution has been effected not by the moral feelings nor by moral teachings, but solely by the activity of the human intellect and by the inventions and discoveries which have attended it."³ To whatever extent this view is correct, it confirms what I say. So far as "the activity of the human intellect" *plus* its "inventions and discoveries" have been predominant factors in civilization, to the overbalance of the influence of "moral feelings and teachings," to that extent our civilization is one-sided, being not so much immoral as non-moral. You cannot "gather grapes of thorns." And thus far civilizations, ancient and modern, stand on similar grounds and labor under the same defect. And this fact alleged by the eminent authority just quoted, so far as it is a fact, is the surest index of that corruption of mankind which in the same chapter, a few pages earlier,⁴ he stoutly denies. For since by the corruption of

³ History of Civilization in England, vol. i. chap. iv. p. 224, ed. 1868.

⁴ "Whatever theologians may choose to assert, it is certain that mankind at large has far more virtue than vice, and that in every country good actions are more frequent than bad ones. Indeed, if this were otherwise, the preponderance of evil would long since have destroyed the human race, and not even have left a single man to lament the degeneracy of his species" (*Ibid.*, p. 221). And to this decay unquestionably the old Roman empire was tending when it received Christianity into its bosom, and underwent a re-infusion of vigorous and young races, undrugged by its own lethargy of effete civilization, on whom the Christian energy might work. What would have been the result to mankind, if one of these factors had not been provided to meet the other—if the hope of the world's rejuvenescence had been met solely by that effeteness of corruption—is the most curious and awful of the hypothetical problems which history presents. But, indeed, short of the taint which engenders social decay, there may be an abundance and even an excess of vice. Much vice which corrodes the individual character is not destructive of the social bond, or of individual life. Besides which, in all the examples to which the writer's view extends, the solvent action of vice upon society is kept in check by the persistent moral forces of Christianity, which he studi-

mankind we understand that of their morals, the impotency above ascribed to moral forces is only what we might expect from such a corruption, and but for that corruption would be unaccountable, but, assuming it, is naturally explained. On this I shall have something further to adduce, but I wish first to show how civilization acts upon pain.

CIVILIZATION INCREASES CAPACITY FOR PAIN BY ACCENTUATING SENSITIVENESS.

I have suggested that civilization increases man's capacity for pain. It does so by accentuating sensitiveness in the physical, and emotion in the moral, sphere of his nature. With the former only I am now directly concerned. The vast increase in nervous⁵ diseases of recent years seems to prove this accentuation of sensitiveness. How it operates, this is a complicated pathological problem which I cannot profess to touch with the needle of scientific analysis, and can handle only in the crude way of general remark. It seems to me that mental and animal stimulus, coming more frequently, rings a series of changes where monotony prevailed before. The nerves are constantly called upon for greater exertion, the living telegraphy within us becomes a mass of

ously ignores, or recognizes only to depreciate. But apart from this, it is obvious that he treats the first two of the principal clauses above cited as equivalent to or implying one another, which they are far from being. That "in every country good actions are more frequent than bad ones" can be true only by reckoning as good those which moralists have generally agreed to call indifferent. But that "mankind at large has far more virtue than vice," unless a very low and base standard of virtue be taken, is probably false.

⁵ If one seeks a proof of the accentuation of moral emotion in recent life, take those of our novels which try to get as near contemporary life as they can. The fiction of to-day, so far as it is a special reflex of the age, and not common to all, is so mainly in the greater play of emotion in its characters, and the elaborate self-introspection by which that play of emotion is explored. It differs in this respect from the novels of adventure and externality—the large family of which *Gil Blas* is the type and often the parent—which marked an earlier period. And the same is probably the cause of the increased recent popularity of Shelley among poets.

ever excited conductors, and by this pervading excitement extra sensitiveness is developed. The nerves are somewhat like harp-strings, unequal to the strain which rapid variations of atmospheric condition impose. Only, being contextual parts of a living organism, they do not, like dead wires stretched upon a dead frame, snap and break, but become morbidly affected and extend their morbidity to the organism around them.

CIVILIZATION INCREASES ACTUAL PAIN BY SAVING SICKLY LIFE.

But civilization enlarges the current *quantum* of actual pain, and perhaps, therefore, ultimately the capacity for pain, by rescuing lives of feeble vitality and sickly constitution, which in a backward stage of human progress would have dropped in infancy. It prolongs such lives to middle age or more, so that they reproduce after their kind. Thus every degree of valetudinarianism may totter on through a struggle of variable length, attended by pains which show death nibbling at his prey, and thus the pain-tax of collective life is heavier in proportion. Indeed, it is owing to its dominantly materialistic side, and to its power in increasing the capacity for pain, as well as actual pain, that civilization has developed modern pessimism, and given it a foothold in human experience which it would not otherwise have found.

That civilization produces many precious compensations for this, but still chiefly on the material and intellectual side, I am not now directly concerned, but it is right to notice it; also that, while it accentuates sensitiveness, it stimulates reflection; and its effect on the emotional side has been already noticed. In all these ways it multiplies and diversifies, alike in their processes and in their results, the energies of which man is capable. But while it thus augments the value of human life on the whole, it makes the strain on that life's powers proportionately greater and more varied; while, probably through a consciousness of that enhanced value, sufferers cling to life more tenaciously, and are sustained in

that tenacity by the more developed sympathies of others around them.

OTHER DRAWBACKS OF CIVILIZATION. PAIN ITS NEMESIS.

Owing to the defect in its moral element the advantages of civilization imperfectly penetrate each of the national masses in which mankind are packed, while the pains which it imposes are much more equably diffused. But as regards those advantages, it is rather the acquisition than the enjoyment of them which imparts pleasure. When they have taken their place as normal elements of existence, they pass away into the general life-joy, before mentioned, and are solved in it without perceptibly adding to its maximum, but if suddenly withdrawn from it are felt as a privation; while the prospect of new acquisitions of the like kind sets desire on the stretch to obtain them. Thus the luxuries of one age take their place as necessaries in a later one. But the supply of these depends on a highly complex social fabric, which, owing to the interaction of its many delicate and ramified combinations, is specially liable to unforeseen derangements. Our life is overlaid and interwoven with a web of many skeins, and a strain, a hitch, or a tangle, at any one of a thousand points of interlacing, spreads discomfort which is felt as disaster. Not only do enjoyments suspended leave a sense of craving behind, and make a vacuum of what was a plenum, but they extend into the moral sphere, and by discontent, irritability, and envy intensify the physical or sensuous loss. Of the drawback found in the moral element's defect, take, as an instance, the modern commercial system, resting, as it does necessarily, upon credit. The many pitfalls in which it abounds arise from nothing so much as that the factor of dishonesty remains so far undiminished in human nature, and, with every extension of commerce and therefore of credit, produces disasters more enormous. The same defect makes rivals and antagonists of those who should be partners and helpers, and by keenness of competition between nations, between organizations of industry, and between individuals, intensifies the

action of civilization in the strain which it puts upon human endurance. The same defect causes the mental advantages of civilization to dwindle down in the bulk of mankind into mere astuteness to outwit others in procuring material advantages. Through this defect we are caught in our advantageous surroundings like flies in treacle, and because material advantage so far engrosses our progress in fact, it has come to engross it even in idea. We can by degrees conquer the adverse elements in nature around us, those in ourselves we cannot overcome, and these are before all moral. And thus the pains for which civilization is responsible are the proper nemesis of its non-moral tendency, while the residuum of that pain which, with more or less success, it is ever attacking, blends with those former to reinforce that nemesis. Then both these unite to take advantage of the larger capacity for pain which civilization bestows, and thus keep alive a standing witness to that civilization's defects. Pain then appears as the condition and the consequence of that progress which is natural to man, and conversely the evidence goes to show that the human races least endowed with a capacity for pain, contain fewer rudiments of civilization and decline most rapidly by contact with it. But before further pursuing this at present, let us take a glance at animals.

DOMESTICATION IN ANIMALS PARALLEL TO CIVILIZATION IN MAN.

And here one may turn aside for a moment to notice the lower animals, known to us chiefly through domestication, which seems to produce on them effects analogous to civilization on humanity; but, further, as placing them in a state less natural to them than that in which civilization places us, affects them probably with a larger morbid tendency and a consequently larger pain-tax, wholly distinct from that which our service and often reckless usage force upon them. They fall, as it were, within the penumbra of humanity; and in particular the pains of parturition would seem to be increased, although lack of opportunity to observe them when non-domesticated calls for a cautious reserve in all such state-

ments. These pains of parturition may probably impress the consciousness of the dam in the interests of the offspring. Thus they pass partly under a quasi-moral law and are thereby raised in the scale of being, pain conditioning progress. And similar preservative and didactic uses of pain are traceable in their economy, and probably, when non-domesticated, nearly or quite exhaust it. When domesticated, the interpretation of their pains forms a leading element in the economy of their use. It is noteworthy that there seems no suicidal instinct among them.⁶ A stronger wild creature of their own species turns executioner upon the wounded or disabled wild animal—an instinct adapted to diminish pain.

As we have no perfect key to their consciousness, all remarks on the pains of animals are necessarily imperfect, and the subject seems worthy of more attentive research than it has yet received. I thus content myself with a guarded reference to it, chiefly lest critics should think it has been forgotten. The time may come when we may illustrate, through larger knowledge, human pain from animal pain. At present we illustrate, and that partially, animal pain from human, and to all humane persons the dominion of pain over the animal world meanwhile must remain a profound and mysterious source of pity. Probably, comparing their domestic condition with their wild, the entire amount of pain actually endured by animals in the latter is, in proportion to their numbers, inconsiderable as compared with that caused by human cruelty or thoughtlessness in the former. Especially when we add to this the severity with which we tax their toil to save our own.

SINGULAR CONTRAST BETWEEN THESE TWO ON THE MORAL SIDE.

But in the domestication of animals there is this curious contrast with the civilization of man, that the moral element

⁶ I believe in the case of domesticated bees this is denied. When past work, they are said to flee the hive and retire into the wilderness voluntarily to perish, thus ridding the society of the incumbrance of their support. Whether the same is true of wild bees there seems no evidence to show.

there is more proportionately developed than in ourselves. We noticed the one-sidedness of human civilization in this respect. Now the domestication of animals depends at least as largely on the cultivation of their affections, including, of course, their fears, as it does upon that of their faculties. Nay, it would rather seem that the keenness of some of their faculties is rather abated by domestication, whereas that of their affections, especially in the case of dog, horse, and elephant, and many birds, is intensified sometimes on a prodigious scale. Dogs in particular, under human tutelage, show a tenacious constancy of affection not only for their owner but for one another, or even for other animals, which, if we had not experience of it, would seem impossible. This, however, is no proper part of my subject, and only appears as a *pendant* to the above remarks on the results of civilization in man. How wonderful a confirmation incidentally this seems of man's moral corruption, that that which forms the master-key to his empire over the brutes should, in his own case, be left comparatively uncared for in his own progress!