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A table of contents for *Bibliotheca Sacra* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_bib-sacra_01.php

ARTICLE III.

THE NICENE DOCTRINE OF THE HOMOIOUSION.

BY REV. E. R. CRAVEN, D.D., NEWARK, N.J.

THE now prevalent doctrine of the great churches of Christendom is that the substance of the persons of the Trinity is numerically one. It is also generally believed that this was the doctrine held by the Council of Nice, and that the term "homoiousion" was introduced into the creed framed by that Council for the express purpose of unmistakably setting it forth. Unquestionably, the general opinion of the modern church on both these points is enunciated in the following extract from Dr. Shedd's History of Christian Doctrine :

"§ 2. *Problem before the Nicene Council.*

"The problem to be solved by the Nicene Council was to exhibit the doctrine of the Trinity in its *completeness*; to bring into the creed *statement* the *total* data of Scripture upon the side of both unity and trinity. Heresy had arisen, partly from incomplete exegesis. Monarchianism, or Patripassianism, had seized only upon that class of texts which teach the unity of God, and neglected that other class which imply his *real*, and not modal, trinality. This led to an assertion of the consubstantiality of the Son, at the expense of his distinct personality. Origenism and Arianism, at the other extreme, following the same one-sided exegesis, had asserted the distinct personality of the Son, at the expense of his unity of essence and equal deity with the Father. It now remained for the catholic scientific mind to employ an all-comprehending exegesis of the Biblical data, and assert *both* consubstantiality and hypostatical distinction, *both* unity and trinity. In doing this the Nicene Council made use of conceptions and terms that had been employed by both those forms of error against which it was their object to guard. Sabellianism had employed the term *ὁμοούσιος* to denote the conception of consubstantiality.¹ The Monarchians were strong in their assertion that God is one *Essence* or *Being*. On the side of the Divine Unity they were scriptural and

¹ I have been unable to discover any evidence that the term *ὁμοούσιος* ever was employed by the Sabellians to set forth their doctrine.

orthodox. The Nicene Trinitarians recognized this fact, and hence adopted their term. Athanasius insisted as earnestly as ever Sabellius did that there is but one *Essence* in the Godhead; that there is but one Divine *Substance*, or *Nature*, or *Being*. Hence the Nicene Council adopted that very term, *ὁμοούσιος*, which the orthodox mind one hundred years before, in the controversy with Paul of Samosata and the Anti-trinitarianism he represented, had rejected as a distinctively heretical term.¹ The persistence with which Athanasius sought to establish the doctrine that the Son is of the *very same* substance with the Father evinces the depth and subtlety of that remarkable mind which exerted so great an influence upon the scientific construction of the Trinitarian creed of the Church. Two creeds, one by Eusebius of Nicomedia, and another by Eusebius of Caesarea, were introduced, which conceded everything except the single position that the Son is of the *very same* and *identical* substance with the Father. The position of Eusebius of Caesarea was, that the Son is of 'similar' essence (*ὁμοιούσιος*) with the Father; he is 'God of God, Light of Light, and begotten of God the Father before all worlds.' But the essence of the human soul is 'like' that of the Deity, and, consequently, there was nothing in the term *ὁμοιούσιος* that would imply that the essence of the Son differs in kind and grade from that of any finite spirit made after the likeness of Deity. The time had now come when silence on the highly metaphysical but vitally fundamental point of the *substance* of the second Person in the Trinity could not be allowed. It was now necessary to employ a technical term that *could not by any possibility* be explained or tortured into an Arian signification. The term *ὁμοούσιος* could not by any ingenuity be made to teach anything but that the essence of the Son is one and identical with that of the Father; and this placed him in the same grade of *uncreated* being with the Father, and made him *αὐτόθεος*."²

It will not be questioned that Dr. Shedd, in the foregoing passage, by his expressions *very same* and *identical*, which he himself italicizes, intended to indicate numerical oneness. This is especially manifest from the fact that shortly after (p. 387) he presents as a quotation from Athanasius (erro-

¹ Paul of Samosata was not, as many suppose, a Sabellian; nor did he, according to Athanasius, advocate the Homoousion. He presented that doctrine as the only alternative should his own be rejected. (See the extract from Athanasius on p. 733 of this article.) Hagenbach writes concerning him (History of Doctrine, Vol. i. § 88): "The doctrine of Paul of Samosata is not, as was formerly the case, to be confounded with the notions of Sabellius; it rather approached the earlier (Alogistic) opinions of Artemon and Theodotus, which, as regards the nature of Christ, were not so much pantheistic as deistic."

² Vol. i. pp. 308-311.

neously, however) the following (*italics mine*): “They [the Father and the Son] are *one numerical substance*.”

After a somewhat extended and careful examination of the genuine writings of Athanasius, who was confessedly one of the leading spirits of the Nicene Council, and subsequently the great expounder and defender of its Creed, I have arrived at a conclusion concerning the meaning that he attached to the term *ὁμοούσιος* different from the opinion that generally prevails. Notwithstanding the positive assertion of Dr. Shedd that “the term *ὁμοούσιος* could not by any ingenuity be made to teach anything but that the essence of the Son is one and identical with that of the Father,” I am constrained to differ from him.

The passage last quoted involves, apparently, two assertions — not only that the intended meaning of the term, as determined by usage or context, was to declare the numerical oneness of the Father and the Son, but also that this was its necessary force. Now etymologically the word may mean either *numerical oneness* or *specific oneness* — *homogeneity*. On this point Dr. Charles Hodge, who agrees with Dr. Shedd as to the intended meaning of the term, thus writes :

“The celebrated term *ὁμοούσιος*, so long the subject of controversy, was not free from ambiguity. It expressed plainly enough sameness of substance, but whether that sameness was specific or numerical the usage of the word left undecided.”¹

Bishop Bull, whose elaborate work entitled *Defensio Fidei Nicenae* is confessedly of highest authority, although but little read in the present day, manifestly could not have regarded that term as indicating numerical oneness, either etymologically or in the intent of the Nicene Council. He writes :

“§ 1. . . . It will be necessary to premise some observations on the true meaning and ancient use of the word *ὁμοούσιος*, of *one substance*, which was placed by the Nicene fathers in their Creed. . . . § 2. By approved Greek writers that is styled *ὁμοούσιον*, ‘*consubstantial*,’ which is of the same substance, essence, or nature with some other — a sense which the very etymology of the word carries on the face of it. Porphyry, On

¹ Systematic Theology, Vol. i. p. 454.

Abstinence from Animal Food, B. i. n. 19, says: 'Since the souls of animals are *ὁμοούσιαι*, of the same essence [eiusdem essentiae], with ours.' The anonymous author of the celebrated Opinions respecting the Soul, published with the Philocalia of Origen, quotes a passage from Aristotle, wherein he says, 'All the stars are *ὁμοούσια*, of the same essence, or nature.' In the same sense Irenaeus frequently uses this word in explaining the doctrines of the Valentinians; for instance (in B. i. c. 1), he says that those heretics taught that 'whatsoever is spiritual could not by any means have been formed by Achamoth, since it was *ὁμοούσιον*, of the same nature, with her.' Theodoret, in his dialogue *Ἀσύγχυτος*, adduces a passage from Apollinaris, where he says: 'Men are of the same substance (*ὁμοούσιαι*) with brutes, as touching their irrational body; but of another substance (*ἑτεροούσιαι*) so far as they are rational.' § 3. That this was the very sense in which the Bishops at Nice called the Son 'of one substance' with the Father will be manifest to all men who are fair minded and not of a temper thoroughly contentious, from the very terms of the Nicene Creed."¹

That Athanasius not only did not regard the term as necessarily indicating numerical oneness, but that he used it as appropriately designating homogeneity — specific oneness — I hold to be demonstrable, and shall endeavor to demonstrate. It is in place here to say distinctly that the ensuing discussion has relation solely to the historical question of the meaning of *ὁμοούσιον* in the intent of the Council of Nice as witnessed by Athanasius. It is also proper, though scarce necessary, to remark that the *Creed Quicunque*, or, as it is generally styled, the Athanasian Creed, was not composed by the great patriarch of Alexandria. It will not be controverted, in this article, that that symbol teaches the numerical oneness of the divine substance. It did not appear, however, until after the death of its reputed author. It is generally conceded that no traces of its existence can be found antecedent to the Council of Chalcedon. Dr. Schaff writes concerning it:

¹ Def. Fid. Nicen., Bk. ii. chap. 1. §§ 1-3 (Oxford transl.), p. 55 sq. It is an interesting fact that Waterland, the great defender in the early part of the last century of the Divinity of our Lord, did not regard the unity indicated by the term, in reference to the Father and the Son, as either specific or numerical. He wrote (First Defense, Query, xxv. 6): "As to the question whether it [the consubstantiality] shall be called *specific* or *numerical*, I am in no pain about it. Neither of the names exactly suits it, nor perhaps any other we can think on."

“ Its origin is involved in obscurity. . . . Since the middle of the seventeenth century the Athanasian authorship has been abandoned by learned Catholics as well as Protestants. The evidence against it is conclusive. The Symbol is nowhere found in the genuine writings of Athanasius or his contemporaries and eulogists. The general Synods of Constantinople (381), Ephesus (431), and Chalcedon (451) make no allusion to it whatever. . . . The pseudo-Athanasian Creed originated in the Latin Church from the school of St. Augustine, probably in Gaul or North Africa. It borrows a number of passages from Augustine and other Latin fathers. It appears first in its full form toward the close of the eighth or the beginning of the ninth century.”¹

The doctrine of Athanasius on the subject at issue seems to have been threefold, viz.

First, that the substance of the Son is begotten from the substance (*ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*) of the Father, as is the substance of a human son from that of a human father, and is consequently *ὁμοούσιον* (i.e. specifically one in substance) with the Father.

Second, that the begetting of the Divine Son implies no division of the Father's substance as in the begetting of a human son; or, in other words, that the perfect substance of the Son is begotten from the perfect, undivided, and indivisible substance of the Father.

Third, that the begetting is from eternity, and is ever continued.

The effort will be made to establish, by quotations from the writings of Athanasius, the validity of the first and second of these positions. Only incidental reference will be made to the third, as its truth is controverted by none. It will appear, it is believed, in the course of the discussion, that the idea that Athanasius held the doctrine of the *numerical* oneness of the divine substance is largely defended by a partial presentation of his declarations on the second point, which are but supplementary, without bringing into view his far more numerous and manifestly leading utterances on the first point.

It is in place here to remark that in the quotations about to be presented the Oxford translation of the works of Athanasius will be strictly followed. Original terms and

¹ History of Creeds, Vol. i. p. 35 sq.

alternative translations, when deemed necessary, will be introduced within brackets. The Greek edition used for comparison is that of Migne in the *Patrologia*. Italics will in all cases be those of the Oxford translators, save where the contrary is indicated. Where pages are referred to, the reference will be to those of the Oxford translation.

Before proceeding to the quotation of passages in proof of the positions taken, it will be proper to guard the reader against two possible sources of misapprehension. The first of these is the singularity to English ears of the terms employed by Athanasius to set forth the genuine sonship of the second person of the Trinity, such as *οὐ ἕξωθεν, γνήσιος, ἴδιος, ιδιότης*. These words, in the Oxford translation, are generally rendered *not external, genuine, proper, possession*, and to the casual reader seem to indicate something peculiar in the relation of the Divine Son to the Father. Examination, however, shows that Athanasius uses all of them to indicate the relation of human sons to their parents. Thus he writes :

“For, granting the [human] parent had not a son before his begetting, still, after having him, he had him not as external or as foreign [*οὐκ ἕξωθεν οὐδὲ ἀλλότριον*], but as from himself and proper [*ἴδιον*] to his substance and his unvarying image,” etc.

“Let it be repeated, then, that a work is external to the nature, but a Son [son] is the proper offspring of the substance; it follows that a work need not have been always, for the workman frames it when he will; but an offspring is not subject to will, but is proper to the substance [*τῆς οὐσίας ιδιότης*]. And a man may be, and may be called, maker, though the works are not as yet; but father he cannot be called, nor can he be, unless a son exist.”

“Thus [human] fathers often call the sons born of them servants, yet without denying the genuineness [*τὸ γνήσιον*] of their nature. . . . Solomon [was] . . . a son natural and genuine [*γνήσιον*].”

“A man by counsel builds a house, but by nature he begets a son; and what is in building at will began to come into being, and is external [*ἕξωθεν*] to the maker; but the son is proper [*ἴδιον*] offspring of the father's substance, and is not external [*οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξωθεν*] to him.”¹

¹ Discourse 1. § 26, p. 218; § 29, pp. 222 sq. Discourse 11. §§ 3, 4, p. 285. Discourse 111. § 62, p. 489. See also Nicen. Def. § 10, p. 16; § 13, p. 21. Discourse 1. § 29, p. 222.

The second possible source of misapprehension against which it is important to guard the reader is the apparent force of such terms as ἀμέριστος, ἀδιαίρετος, ἀχώριστος, ἄσχιστος. These words are frequently translated, without discrimination, *inseparable*, *indivisible*, and, together with their corresponding adverbs, are of frequent occurrence. 'Αμέριστος, so far as I have been able to discover, is used only to set forth the indivisible nature of the Father's substance, as in the following:

“He [God] is not composed of parts, but being impassible and simple, he is impassibly and indivisibly [ἀμέριστος] Father of the Son. . . . Why speculate they about passions and parts in the instance of the immaterial and indivisible [ἀμέριστος] God, that under pretence of reverence they may deny the true and natural generation of the Son?”¹

The other terms seem sometimes to be used in the same way as ἀμέριστος. More generally, however, they are employed in reference to the relation of the Father to the Son; and they indicate that, as the Father eternally begets and the Son is eternally begotten, the existence of the one always and everywhere involves that of the other — in eternity and immensity they are inseparable, indivisible. Instances of this use will be found throughout the quotations. In all cases the original term will be bracketed.

As to the first mentioned point of the doctrine of Athanasius, — viz. that the substance of the Son is begotten from the substance (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας), and is consequently ὁμοούσιος (i.e. *specifically* one in substance) with the Father, — the classical passages are to be found in the Epistle De Synodis. Before quoting them, however, it will be proper to make a few prefatory remarks.

The opponents of the Nicene Creed, antecedent to the framing of the second Sirmian Creed in 357, though separated into a great number of parties holding different shades of opinion, might be regarded as having been divided into two great classes, viz. 1. the *Homoiousians*, who affirmed that the Father and Son were *like in substance*; and 2. the *Hetero-*

¹ Discourse I. § 28, p. 220 sq.

ousians, who affirmed that they were *unlike in substance*. The Homoiousians were divided into two schools, which may be styled respectively the Lower and the Higher. To appreciate the vital difference between these parties, it should be remembered that the original Nicene Creed contained not merely the declaration that the Son is *one in substance* (*ὁμοούσιος*) with the Father, but the further declaration that he is “*of [from] the substance (ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας) of the Father,*” and also an anathema of those who should say that “the Son of God is of [from] other subsistence or substance (*ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως ἢ οὐσίας*).” The Council of Constantinople, which set forth in an amended form what is now styled the Nicene Creed, omitted the clause declarative of the *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*, and also the anathema. The Higher Homoiousians confessed the *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*, — that the Son is *from the substance*, — and rejected only the *ὁμοούσιον* — that he is *the same in substance*; the Lower Homoiousians, in common with the Hetero-ousians, denied both the declarations. In accepting the second Sirmian Creed, which denied, as unwarranted by Scripture, the propriety of attributing substance to God, and also rejected the terms “one in substance” and “like in substance,” some of the Lower Homoiousians, if not all, retired from their old position, and formed a third great class.

Athanasius directed the first part of his Epistle De Synodis against all classes of opponents except the Higher Homoiousians — against all classes that rejected both *from the substance* (*ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*) and *one in substance* (*ὁμοούσιος*). He then proceeds as follows :

“Those who deny the Council altogether are sufficiently exposed by these brief remarks; those, however, who accept everything else that was defined at Nicaea, and quarrel only about the One in substance [*τὸ ὁμοούσιον*] must not be received as enemies; nor do we here attack them as Ario-maniacs, nor as opponents of the fathers, but we discuss the matter with them as brothers with brothers, who mean what we mean, and dispute only about the word. For, confessing that the Son is from the substance [*ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*] of the Father, and not from other subsistence [*ἐξ ἑτέρας ὑποστάσεως*], and that He is not creature nor work, but His genuine and

natural offspring, and that He is eternally with the Father as being His Word and Wisdom, they are not far from accepting even the phrase 'One in substance,' of whom is Basil of Ancyra, in what he has written concerning the faith. For only to say [to say *only*] 'like according to substance' is very far from signifying 'of [from] the substance,' by which, rather, as they say themselves, the genuineness of the Son to the Father is signified. Thus tin is only like to silver, a wolf to a dog, and gilt brass to the true metal; but tin is not from silver, nor could a wolf be accounted the offspring of a dog. But since they say that He is 'of [from] the substance,' and 'Like in substance [ὁμοιούσιον],'¹ what do they signify by these but 'One in substance [τὸ ὁμοούσιον]?' For, while to say only 'Like in substance' does not necessarily convey 'of [from] the substance,' on the contrary, to say 'One in substance' is to signify the meaning of both terms 'Like in substance' and 'of [from] the substance.' And accordingly they themselves, in controversy with those who say that the Word is a creature, instead of allowing him to be genuine Son, have taken their proofs against them from human illustrations of son and father, with this exception, that God is not as man, nor the generation of the Son as offspring of man, but as one which may be ascribed to God, and it becomes us to think. Thus they have called the Father the Fount of Wisdom and Life, and the Son the Radiance [ἀπαύγασμα]² of the Eternal Light, and the Offspring from the Fountain, as he says '*I am the Life,*' and '*I Wisdom dwell with Prudence.*' But the Radiance from the Light, and Offspring from Fountain, and Son from Father, — how can these be so suitably expressed as by 'One in Substance'?"²

It must be manifest to every intelligent reader that the foregoing passage could not have been written by one who regarded ὁμοούσιος as indicating *numerical oneness*. 'Ὁμοούσιος and ὁμοιούσιος each is ambiguous; — the former may mean either *numerical oneness* or *homogeneity*; the latter, either *homogeneity* or *mere similarity*; — each has a meaning common to both, in which they coincide, namely, *homogeneity*. It was only as the Homoousian and the Homoiousonian contemplated, each, his term in its coincident sense, as meaning homogeneity, that they could clasp hands as brethren; had either used his own term in its variant sense

¹ It is quite as much a problem to determine what, according to the idea of Athanasius, was the relation of ἀπαύγασμα to φῶς, as it is to determine the relation of the Son to the Father. That he understood by it a luminous substance radiated from a luminous substance will appear from the following quotations and the special discussion on p. 754 sqq.

² De Synodis, § 41. p. 138 sqq.

he must have regarded the other as a heretic; had Athanasius believed that *ὁμοούσιος* meant *numerical oneness* he never could have welcomed to brotherhood the Homoiousian, Basil of Ancyra. So far as can be gathered from this passage Athanasius objected to the term *ὁμοούσιος* not because it necessarily set forth a heresy, but because it did not necessarily and unmistakably set forth the truth. Possibly at the time of the Council of Nicaea, and certainly at a later period of life, he objected to it for another reason, as will appear.

The next passage that will be cited is a quotation from Dionysius of Alexandria. This quotation is twice made by Athanasius, once in Nicen. Def. § 25, and again in the Epistle De Synodis. In both cases it was introduced for the purpose of showing that Dionysius had held the doctrine of the *Homoousion*. Of course he could not have used the passage unless he had agreed with Dionysius in the meaning that he evidently placed upon the term.

“ And I have written in another letter a refutation of the false charge which they bring against me, that I deny that Christ is one in substance [*ὁμοούσιον*] with God. For though I say that I have not found or read this term anywhere in holy Scripture, yet my remarks which follow, and which they have not noticed, are not inconsistent with that belief. For I instanced a human production, which is evidently homogeneous [*ὁμογενής*], and I observed that undeniably fathers differed from their children only in not being the same individuals; otherwise there could be neither parents nor children. And my letter, as I said before, owing to present circumstances, I am unable to produce, or I would have sent you the very words I used, or rather a copy of it all; which if I have an opportunity, I will do still. But I am sure from recollection, that I adduced many parallels of things kindred with each other, for instance, that a plant grown from seed or from root, was other than that from which it sprang and yet altogether one in nature [*ὁμοφύεῖς*] with it; and that a stream flowing from a fountain changed its appearance and its name, for that neither the fountain was called stream, nor the stream fountain, but both existed, and that the fountain was as it were father, but the stream was what was generated from the fountain.”¹

The next important passage manifestly contemplates two substances, one having been generated from the other, as

¹ De Synodis, § 44, p. 142 sq.

ὁμοούσιαι, and also, like the preceding, regards human parents and children as *ὁμοούσιοι*.

“However, let us fairly inquire why it is that some, as is said, decline the ‘One in substance,’ whether it does not rather show that the Son is one in substance with the Father. They say then, as you have written, that it is not right to say that the Son is one in substance with the Father, because he who speaks of one in substance speaks of three, one substance pre-existing, and that those who are generated from it are one in substance; and they add, ‘If then the Son be one in substance with the Father, then a substance must be previously supposed, from which they have been generated; and that the one is not Father and the other Son, but they are brothers together.’ As to all this, though it be a Greek interpretation, and what Greeks say have no claim upon us, still let us see whether these things which are called one in substance and are collateral, as derived from one substance presupposed, are one in substance with each other, or with the substance from which they are generated. For if only with each other, then are they other in substance when referred to that substance which generated them; for other in substance [*ἑτεροούσιον*] is opposed to one in substance [*ὁμοούσιον*]; but if each be one in substance with the substance which generated them, it is thereby confessed that what is generated from anything is one in substance with that which generated it; and there is no need of seeking for three substances, but merely to seek whether it be true that this is from that. For should it happen that there were not two brothers, but that only one had come of that [former] substance, he that was generated would not be called alien in substance merely because there was no other from that substance than he; but though alone, he must be one in substance with him that begat him. For what shall we say about Jephthae’s daughter; because she was only-begotten, and *he had not*, says Scripture, *other child*; and again, concerning the widow’s son, whom the Lord raised from the dead, because he too had no brother, but was only-begotten, was on that account neither of these one in substance with the parent? Surely they were, for they were children, and this is a property of children with reference to their parents. And in like manner also, when the fathers said that the Son of God was from his substance reasonably they have spoken of him as one in substance. For the like property has the radiance compared with the light.”¹

The last of these specially important passages is the following, which lies in the last two sections of the *De Synodis*. I remarked in reference to the first of these passages that, so far as could be gathered from it, Athanasius objected to the

¹ *De Synodis*, § 51, p. 151 sqq.

term *ὁμοιούσιος*, not because it necessarily set forth a heresy, but because it did not unmistakably set forth the truth. From the passage about to be quoted, however, it appears that he also objected to it on metaphysical considerations — because he regarded it as inappropriate to set forth the relation between *substances*; such relation being, in his judgment, properly expressible only by the terms *ὁμοούσιον* and *ἕτερούσιον*.

“Let us examine the very term ‘One in substance,’ in itself, by way of seeing whether we ought to use it all, and whether it be a proper term, and is suitable to apply to the Son. For you know yourselves, and no one can dispute, it that Like [*τὸ ὅμοιον*] is not predicated of substances, but of habits and qualities; for in the case of substances we speak not of likeness, but of identity [*ταυτότης, homogeneity*].¹ Man, for instance, is said to be like man, not in [according to] substance but according to habit and character; for in [according to] substance men are one in nature [*ὁμοφυνεῖς*]. And again, man is not said to be unlike dog, but to be other in nature [*ἕτεροφυνεῖς*]. [*Οὐκοῦν τὸ ὁμοφυνεῖς καὶ ὁμοούσιον, τὸ δὲ ἕτεροφυνεῖς καὶ ἕτερούσιον*. Wherefore the *one in nature* is also *one in substance*, and the *other in nature* also *other in substance*]² Therefore in speaking of Like according to substance we mean [speak of] like by participation [*μετουσία*]; (for likeness is a quality which may attach to substance), and this is proper to creatures, for they by partaking [*μετοχή*] are made like to God. For *when he shall appear*, says Scripture, *we shall be like him*; like, that is, not in substance but in sonship, which we shall partake from him. If then ye speak of the Son as being by participation [*μετουσία*], then indeed call Him Like in substance [*ὁμοιούσιον*]; but thus spoken of, He is not Truth, nor Light at all, nor in nature God. For things which are from participation are called like, not in reality, but from resemblance to reality; so that they may fail, or be taken from those who share them. And this, again, is proper to creatures and works. Therefore, if this be extravagant, he must be, not by participation, but in nature and truth Son, Light, Wisdom, God; and being by nature, and not by sharing, he would properly be called, not Like in substance, but One in substance. But what would not be asserted, even in the case of others (for the Like [*τὸ ὅμοιον*] has been shown to be inapplicable to

¹ That *homogeneity*, not *identity*, was the idea contemplated, is manifest from the context. Hereafter this meaning will always be bracketed when *ταυτότης* occurs.

² Strange to, say this sentence is omitted in the Oxford translation. It is, I believe, found in every Greek edition. The omission was supplied from Migne's *Patrologia*.

substance), is it not folly, not to say violence, to put forward in the case of the Son, instead of the 'One in substance.' § 54. This justifies the Nicene Council, which has laid down what it was becoming to express, that the Son begotten from the Father's substance is one in substance with him."¹

From this passage it is not only manifest that what Athanasius contemplated by the term homoousion is what we indicate by the term *homogeneity*, but also that he used *ταυτότης*, which the Oxford translators render *identity*, in the same sense.² It is proper here to remark that he cannot be regarded as absolutely condemning in all cases the affirmation of the *likeness in substance* of homogeneous objects. It will be evident from quotations hereafter made that he did himself affirm that the substance of the Son is like the substance of the Father. It was his design to show, in defence of the Nicene Council, and in support of the term they had set forth, that, in strictness of language, it was the proper term to employ. It is also proper here to remark that there is reason to believe that the idea of the inappropriateness of *ὁμοούσιον* to substances arose late in life in the mind of Athanasius. The Epistle De Synodis was one of the latest of his writings. Everywhere else did he without scruple affirm the *ὅμοιον* of substances; indeed we have instances of it in the earlier portions of this very epistle.

Passages will now be quoted corroborative of the fact manifested by the preceding extracts, namely, that Athanasius used the term *ὁμοούσιον* as indicative not of numerical, but of specific oneness. To quote everything that bears upon this point would be to reproduce a large portion of his writings; the more important passages, therefore, have been selected and classified for presentation.

I. The first class that will be cited are those which manifest that he recognized no such distinction in the Trinity as was subsequently, and is now, indicated in the variant use of the terms *substance* (*οὐσία*) and *person* or *hypostasis* (*ὑπόστασις*).

¹ De Synodis, §§ 53, 54, p. 155 sqq.

² See foot-note on p. 708.

In common with the great body of modern theologians Dr. Shedd declares :

“*Οὐσία*, or *Essence*, denotes that which is common to Father, Son, and Spirit. It denominates the substance, or constitutional being, of the Deity, which is possessed alike, and equally, by each of the personal distinctions. . . . *ὑπόστασις*, or *Hypostasis*, is a term that was more subtle in its meaning and use than *οὐσία*. It denotes, not that which is common to the Three in One, but that which is distinctive of and peculiar to them. The personal characteristic of the Hypostasis, or ‘subsistence’ in the Essence, was denoted by the Greek word *ιδιότης*,¹ and if we use our English word ‘individuality’ somewhat loosely, it will convey the idea sought to be attached to the Person in distinction from the Essence.”²

This distinction is vital to the now accepted system of the Trinity. But Athanasius recognizes no such distinction as denoted either by the variant use of *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*, or by any other allied terms.

The anathema of the Nicene Creed, directed against “those who pretend that the Son of God is from other *hypostasis* or *substance*” than the Father, implies that *ὑπόστασις* and *οὐσία* were regarded by the Council as synonymous. That they were so used by that body is distinctly admitted by Drs. Charles Hodge³ and Shedd.⁴ In manifest harmony with this fact Athanasius directly declared that these terms indicated one and the same object. The most important passage on this point is in the Epistle Ad Afros, in which he censures those who had declared that it was unscriptural to attribute either *οὐσία* or *ὑπόστασις* to God. He writes :

“Those who convened in Nicaea came not together as condemned, but also confessed that the Son is of the substance [*οὐσία*] of the Father; but these, being condemned once and again, and a third time in Ariminum itself, dared to write that it is not proper to affirm that God has substance

¹ In the same volume, on pp. 334 and 335, Dr. Shedd in an alleged quotation from Athanasius, twice introduces this term as employed by that father. In a subsequent portion of this article, p. 737, the quotation of Dr. Shedd is compared with the original, and it is shown that *ιδιότης* is, in both instances, introduced in the place of *ιδιότης*. The latter term is frequently used by Athanasius. I have been unable to discover a single instance of his use of the former.

² History of Christian Doctrine, Vol. i. p. 364.

³ Systematic Theology, Vol. i. p. 453.

⁴ History of Christian Doctrine, Vol. i. p. 367 sq.

[οὐσία] or hypostasis [ὑπόστασις]. But from the following passages it appears, brethren, that those of Nicaea breathed out the Scriptures. God himself saying in Exodus (iii. 14) ‘I am, ὁ ὢν.’ and through Jeremiah (xxiii. 18) ‘Who hath stood in the counsel (LXX, ὑποστήματι) of the Lord,’ and a little after (verse 22) ‘If they had stood in my counsel (LXX, ὑποστάσει).’ Hypostasis (ὑπόστασις) is substance (οὐσία), and has no other signification than being (τὸ ὄν) itself, which Jeremiah styles ὑπαρξίς, saying (ix. 10) ‘Neither can men hear the voice of the (LXX) ὑπάρξεως.’ Hypostasis and substance are existence (ὑπαρξίς), for it [ὑπόστασις] is and it exists [ἔστι γὰρ καὶ ὑπάρχει]. And thinking this, Paul wrote to the Hebrews [i. 3] ‘Who being the brightness of his glory, and the express image of his person [ὑπόστασις].’”¹

In exact accordance with the declarations of this passage, Athanasius uses the two terms as synonymous in the important passage from the Epistle De Synodis, first quoted in this article. He writes :

“Those, however, who accept everything else that was defined at Nicaea, and quarrel only about the One in substance [τὸ ὁμοούσιον] must not be received as enemies. . . . For, confessing that the Son is from the substance [οὐσία] and not from other subsistence [ὑπόστασις]. . . . they are not far from accepting even the phrase ‘One in substance.’”²

And again, in proof that Dionysius of Rome regarded the “Word of God” as “an offspring proper to [of] the Father’s *substance* and indivisible,” he quotes the following from that writer, in which the term ὑπόστασις alone occurs.

“Next, I reasonably turn to those who divide and cut into pieces and destroy that most sacred doctrine of the Church of God, the Divine Monarchy, making it certain three powers and partitive subsistences [μεμερισμένas ὑποστάσεις] and godheads three.”³

And again he proves that Origen believed “the everlasting co-existence of the Word with the Father, and that he is not of another *substance* or *subsistence*, but proper to [of] the Father’s” (italics mine), by the following quotation, in which also only ὑπόστασις occurs :

“If there be an Image of the invisible God, it is an invisible Image: nay, I will be bold to add that, as being the likeness of the Father, never

¹ Ad Afros (Translated from Migne’s ed.), § 4.

² De Synodis, § 41. p. 138 sq.

³ Nicen. Def., § 26. p. 45 sq. Quoted more extensively on p. 739 sq

was it not. For else was that God, who, according to John, is called Light (for *God is light*), without the radiance of his proper glory, that a man should presume to assert the Son's origin of existence, as if before he was not. But when was not that Image of the Father's Ineffable and Nameless and Unutterable *subsistence* [*ὑπόστασις*]," etc.¹

Not only does Athanasius use *substance* and *hypostasis* as synonymous, but the closest examination fails to discover that he ever used any allied terms in the peculiar senses in which these terms are now employed, or indeed to discover the slightest indication that an idea of the distinction that we now endeavor to set forth by the variant definitions of these terms had ever crossed his mind. Dr. Shedd, it is true, asserts that "the meaning attached to the *idea* [of *ὑπόστασις*] was uniform," and that "the distinction between *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*" was "made in fact by the first Trinitarians";² but, it is to be observed, he does not present a single quotation in proof of his assertion. He is constrained, it should further be remarked, to admit that "Athanasius employs the two terms as equivalents," and in proof of the fact he introduces quotations, as given above, from *De Synodis* and *Ad Afros*. He endeavors, however, to nullify the force of his own admission by the following :

"Athanasius continually denies that there are three *οὐσίαι*, so that his use of *ὑπόστασις* must be determined in each instance from the connection in which he employs it. His object in asserting that 'hypostasis is *substance*' was to deny that the personal distinction in the Godhead is merely an energy or effluence such as the Nominal Trinitarians maintained it to be."²

It will be perceived by the thoughtful reader that the entire force of Dr. Shedd's first sentence in the preceding paragraph rests upon the implication that Athanasius used *οὐσία* somewhat differently from *ὑπόστασις*. That is a matter for proof. Why is no proof given? Again, where is the proof that "Athanasius continually denies that there are three *οὐσίαι*"? It is true that he, in effect, denies that there are in the Godhead a plurality of *partitive* [*μεμερισμένας*] substances, even as he impliedly denied, when he quoted approvingly the

¹ Nicen. Def., § 27. p. 48 ² Hist of Christian Doctrine, Vol. i. pp. 366-369.
VOL. XLI. No. 164.

words of Dionysius of Rome (p. 712) "that there are three *partitive* subsistences [hypostases]." He however nowhere denies that there is an *οὐσία* of the Father and an *οὐσία* of the Son; but, on the contrary, he again and again affirms it, as will be seen. Still farther, the assertion of the second sentence is also unsupported by a single quotation or reference. It is manifest that in no one of the quotations given above was it "his object to deny that the personal distinction in the Godhead is merely an energy or effluence." I courteously challenge the production of a single passage that can support the assertion.

As corroborative of the position that Athanasius knew nothing of the now prevalent distinction between *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*,¹ — that he contemplated naught in God, naught in Father, but *οὐσία*, — the following quotations are made:

"If God be simple, as He is, it follows that in saying 'God,' and naming 'Father,' we name nothing as if about Him, but signify His substance itself. When then He says *I am that I am*, and *I am the Lord God*, or when Scripture says *God*, we understand nothing else by it but the intimation of His incomprehensible substance Itself, and that He Is who is spoken of. Therefore let no one be startled on hearing that the Son of God is from the substance of the Father; rather let him accept the explanation of the fathers, who in more explicit but equivalent language have for *from God* written 'of [from] the substance.' For they considered it the same thing to say that the word was *of* [from] God and 'of [from] the substance of God,' since the word 'God,' as I have already said, signifies nothing but the substance of Him Who Is."²

"If when you name the Father, or use the word 'God,' you do not signify substance, or understand Him according to substance, who is that He is, but signify something else about Him, not to say inferior, then you should not have written that the Son was from the Father, but from what is about Him or in Him; and so, shrinking from saying that God is truly

¹ Dr. Charles Hodge declares (Systematic Theology, Vol. i. p. 454): "To express the idea of a *suppositum intelligens*, or self-conscious agent [person] the Greeks first used the word *πρόσωπον*. But as that word properly means *the face, the aspect*, and as it was used by the Sabellians to express their doctrine of the threefold aspect under which the Godhead was revealed, it was rejected, and the word *ὑπόστασις* adopted." It is to be regretted that the venerated Professor did not state at what time, and by whom, *πρόσωπον* was so used. I have been unable to find that it was ever so employed by Athanasius.

² Nicen. Def. § 22. p. 38.

Father, and making Him compound who is simple, in a material way, you will be authors of a new blasphemy. And, with such ideas, do you [you do] of necessity consider the Word and the title 'Son' not as a substance, but as a name only; ¹ and in consequence the views ye have ye hold as far as names only, and your statements are not positive points of faith, but negative opinions. But this is more like the crime of the Sadducees, and of those among the Greeks who had the name of Atheists. It follows that you deny that creation too is the handiwork of God Himself; that is, at least, if 'Father' and 'God' do not signify the very substance of Him that is, but something else, which you imagine; which is irreligious, and most shocking even to think of. But if, when we hear it said, *I am that I am*, and *In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth*, and *Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord*, and *Thus saith the Lord Almighty*, we understand nothing else than the very simple and blessed and incomprehensible substance itself of Him that is (for though we be unable to master that He is, yet hearing 'Father,' and 'God,' and 'Almighty,' we understand nothing else to be meant than the very substance of Him that is); and if ye too have said that the Son is from God, it follows that you have said that he is from the 'substance' of the Father. And since the Scriptures precede you, which say that the Lord is Son of the Father, and the Father himself precedes them, who says, *This is my beloved Son*, and a Son is no other than the offspring from his father, is it not evident that the Fathers have suitably said that the Son is from the Father's substance? Considering that it is all one to say in an orthodox sense 'from God,' and to say 'from the substance.'"²

Is it conceivable that any man who held the now prevalent view of the distinction between *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* could thus have written? It seems to be simply impossible that if no more than the mere germ of the distinction had existed in the mind of Athanasius, it would not in one or the other of the foregoing connections have found expression.

II. The second class of passages that will be cited are those allied with the declaration of the Nicene Creed that the Son is "begotten from the Father that is, from the

¹ The inference from this is that when we name *Son*, we also "signify substance." A similar passage occurs in § 41 of this Epistle, immediately after the first classical, in which it is declared "Whom [the Word] the Father has declared to be his own Son, that hearing that he is Son, we may acknowledge him to be a living Word and a substantive [*ἐνούσιος*] Wisdom." The entire passage is quoted on p. 731 sq. of this article, and the above extract is specially considered in a foot-note.

² De Synodis, §§ 34, 35. p. 131 sq.

substance of the Father [γεννηθέντα ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς
 τούτέστιν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς].”

In this sentence of the Creed there are, in fact, three declarations, viz. (1) that the Son is “begotten from the Father”; (2) that he is “begotten from the substance of the Father”; (3) that the expressions *begotten from the Father* and *begotten from the substance of the Father* are equivalent.

Statements identical with the first two of these declarations are of frequent occurrence in the writings of Athanasius. Being, however, mere reproductions of the language of the Creed, it is unnecessary to make quotations or to give references. Allied with the first kind mentioned, we continually meet with the further declaration that the Son is “Offspring [γέννημα] from the Father,” and allied with the second, the exceedingly strong and significant expression, “*Offspring from the substance of the Father.*” This expression, with its cognate “Offspring of God’s substance,” occurs more than thirty times, as will be seen in the references given below.¹ Any one who consults the passages referred to will have before him a large portion of the entire number of passages contemplated in this article. The third declaration—namely, that the expressions *begotten from the Father* and *begotten from the substance of the Father* are equivalent—is reaffirmed by Athanasius not only in the passages last quoted under the preceding division, but also in the following, in which he explains the reason for the introduction into the Creed of the second clause, viz. “*that is, from the substance of the Father:*”

¹ Nicen. Def. § 3, p. 6; § 23, p. 40; § 26, p. 45; § 29, p. 54; § 31, p. 55. De Synodis, § 35, p. 133; § 39, p. 137; (§ 42, p. 141); § 45, p. 144; § 48, p. 148 (*thrice*). Discourse I. (§ 9, p. 191); § 15, p. 202; § 16, p. 204 (*bis*); § 17, p. 205; § 19, p. 208; § 28, p. 221; § 29, p. 222; (§ 29, p. 222); § 29, p. 223; § 39, p. 237; § 56, p. 262; § 58, p. 264. Discourse II. § 2, p. 284; § 22, p. 312; § 24, p. 314; § 31, p. 328; (§ 36, p. 362). Discourse III. § 5, p. 404 (*bis*); § 6, p. 406; § 12, p. 417. In the references enclosed in parentheses the Oxford translation reads, “offspring proper to the substance”; it should read, “of the substance,” the original is in the genitive. “Offspring of God’s substance”; Discourse III. § 63, p. 491; Discourse IV. § 4, p. 518.

“The Council, wishing to negative the irreligious phrases of the Arians, and to use instead the acknowledged words of the Scriptures, that the Son is not from nothing, but *from God*, and is *Word* and *Wisdom*, nor creature or work, but the proper offspring from the Father, the party of Eusebius, out of their inveterate heterodoxy, understood the phrase *from God* as belonging to us, as if in respect to it the Word of God differed nothing from us, and that because it is written, ‘*There is one God from whom are all things*’; and again, ‘*..... all things are from God*.’ But the fathers, perceiving their craft and the cunning of their irreligion, were forced to express more distinctly the sense of the words *from God*. Accordingly they wrote ‘from the substance [*οὐσία*] of God,’ in order that *from God* might not be considered common and equal in the Son and in things generate, but that all others might be acknowledged as creatures, and the Word alone as from the Father.”¹

The effect of the foregoing and allied declarations is, of course, not only to elevate all the declarations that the Son is “begotten from the Father,” that he is “Offspring from the Father,” into the category of “Begotten from the substance,” “Offspring of the substance,” but also to make it manifest that they cannot legitimately be interpreted as implying a generation from an Hypostasis, Father, as distinguished from the Substance, Father.

But not only have we the declaration that the Son is the *Offspring of the Father's substance*, but also the declaration the *Substance of the Son* is the Offspring of the Father, in which *Substance* is connected with Son. Athanasius writes:

“The present discussion has shown that the Son is not a work, but in *Substance* indeed the Father's Offspring.”

“The Lord knowing His own *Substance* to be the Only-begotten Wisdom and Offspring of the Father,” etc.

“If then Son, therefore not creature; if creature, not Son; for great is the difference between them, and Son and creature cannot be the same, unless his *substance* be considered to be at once from God, and external to God.”²

Now, it must be manifest to every one carefully considering the foregoing declarations — viz. first, that the Son is the Offspring of the Father's substance; secondly, that the Substance of the Son is the Offspring of the Father; thirdly,

¹ Nicen. Def. § 19, p. 32 sq.

² Discourse II. § 11, p. 296; § 47, p. 347. Nicen. Def., § 13, p. 21. Italics mine.

that "in saying 'God' and naming 'Father' we signify His substance itself"—it must be manifest, I repeat, that the logical inference is, that Athanasius contemplated the Son as a substance begotten from a substance. That this is not a matter of mere inference will abundantly appear from other passages that will be cited in the next division.

III. The third class of passages are those which speak of the substance of the Son in connection with the substance of the Father. Under the preceding head we considered the passages from which the logical inference is that Athanasius regarded the substance of the Son as generated from the substance of the Father; in the passages now to be considered such a generation is directly asserted.

The first of these is a passage in the Defence, embodying, with approbation, a quotation from Theognostus. This occurs in the same section with the extract from Dionysius quoted as one of the classical passages. Both these quotations, it should be observed, were made by Athanasius for the purpose of showing that the Nicene fathers taught no new doctrine; and consequently both must be regarded as setting forth his own views.

"This, then, is the sense in which the Fathers at Nicaea made use of these expressions; but next that they did not invent them for themselves (since this is one of their [the Arians'] excuses), but spoke what they had received from their predecessors, proceed we to prove this also, to cut off even this excuse from them. Know then, O Arians, foes of Christ, that Theognostus, a learned man, did not decline the phrase 'of the substance.' for in the second book of his Hypotyposes, he writes thus of the Son: 'The *substance of the Son* is not anything procured from without, nor accruing out of nothing, but it sprang from the *Father's substance*, as the radiance of light, as the vapour of water; for neither the radiance nor the vapour is the water itself or the sun itself, nor is it alien; but it is an effluence [*ἀπόρροια*]¹ of the Father's substance, which, however, suffers no partition [*μερισμὸν*]. For as the sun remains the same, and is not impaired by the rays poured forth by it, so neither does the Father's substance suffer change, though it has the Son as an Image of Itself.'"²

¹ Athanasius disclaims this word, § 11, p. 19 of this Epistle, and also Discourse i. § 21, p. 211.

² Nicen. Def., § 25, n. 43. Italics mine.

“Next, if the Son be not such from participation [*μερούσις*], but is in his substance the Father’s Word and Wisdom, and this substance is the offspring of the Father’s substance, and its likeness, as the radiance is of the light; and the Son says, *I and the Father are One*, and *he that hath seen me hath seen the Father*, how must we understand these words? Or how shall we so explain them as to preserve the oneness of the Father and the Son? Now as to its consisting in agreement of doctrines, and in the Son’s not disagreeing with the Father, as the Arians say, such an interpretation will not stand. But the Son being an offspring from the substance, is one in substance [*ὁμοούσιος*], Himself and the Father that begat him.”¹

“And if this be extravagant and irreligious, when the Father says, *This is my beloved Son*, and when the Son says that God is His own Father, it follows that what is partaken is not external, but from the substance of the Father. And as to this again, if it be other than the substance of the Son, an equal extravagance will meet us; there being in that case something between this that is from the Father and the substance of the Son, whatever that be.”²

“Scripture speaks of ‘Son’ in order to herald the offspring of His [the Father’s] substance, natural and true; and on the other hand, that none may think of the offspring humanly, while signifying His [the Son’s] substance, it calls Him Word, Wisdom, and Radiance.”³

“Whoso hears and beholds that what is said of the Father is also said of the Son, not as accruing to His [the Son’s] substance by grace or participation [*μετοχήν*], but because the very Being [*τὸ εἶναι*] of the Son is the proper offspring of the Father’s substance, will fitly understand the words, as I said before, *I in the Father and the Father in Me*, and *I and the Father are One*. For the Son is such as the Father is, because He has all that is the Father’s.”⁴

“The Word is from God; for the Word was God. And since Christ is God from God, and God’s Word, Wisdom, Son, and Power, therefore but One God is declared in the divine Scriptures. For the Word, being Son of the One God, is referred [*ἀναφέρεται*] to Him of whom also He is; so that Father and Son are two, yet the Unity [*Μονάς* = Monad] of the Godhead [Divinity] is indivisible and inseparable [*Μονάδα δὲ θεότητος ἀδιαιρέτων καὶ ἀσχωτων*]. And thus too we preserve One Origin [*Ἀρχή*] of Godhead [Divinity], and not two Origins, whence there is properly a divine Monarchy [*Μοναρχία*]. And of this very Origin the Word is by

¹ De Synodis, § 48, p. 148. Italics mine, except in the Scriptural quotations.

² Discourse 1. § 15, p. 203. Italics mine, except in Scriptural quotation. This quotation will again be referred to in considering the position of Neander.

³ Discourse 1. § 28, p. 221.

⁴ Discourse 111. § 6, p. 406.

nature Son, not as if another Origin, subsisting by Himself, nor having come into being externally to that Origin, lest from that diversity a Dyrarchy and Polyarchy should ensue; but of the one Origin He is proper Son, proper Wisdom, proper Word, existing from It. For, according to John, in that *Origin* [ἀρχή] was the Word, and the Word was with God, for the Origin [ἀρχή] was God; and since He is from It, therefore also the Word was God. And as there is one Origin and therefore one God, so one is the Substance and Subsistence [οὐσία καὶ ὑπόστασις] which indeed and truly and really is, and which said *I am that I am*, and not two, that there be not two Origins; and from the One a Son in nature and truth, is Its proper Word. Its Wisdom, Its Power, and inseparable from It. And as there is not another [ἄλλη] substance,¹ lest there be two Origins, so the Word which is from that One Substance has no dissolution [διαλελυμένος = parting asunder], nor is a sound significative, but is a substantial [οὐσιώδης] Word and substantial Wisdom, which is the true Son. For were he not substantial [οὐσιώδης], God would be speaking into the air, and having a body, in nothing differently [οὐδὲν πλέον] from men; but since He is not man, neither is His Word according to the infirmity of man. For as the Origin is one Substance, so Its Word is one, substantial and subsisting, and Its Wisdom. For as He is God from God, and Wisdom from the Wise, and Word from Rational, and Son from Father, so is He from Subsistence Subsistent [ἐξ ὑποστάσεως ὑπόστατος], and from Substance Substantial and Substantive [ἐξ οὐσίας οὐσιώδης καὶ ἐνούσιος], and Being from Being [ἐξ ὄντος ὄν]. § 2. Since were He not substantial Wisdom and substantive Word, and Son existing, but simply Wisdom and Word and Son in the Father, then the Father Himself would have a nature compounded of wisdom and reason. . . . Therefore He is an Offspring in a proper sense from the Father Himself, according to the illustration of light. For as there is light from fire, so from God there is a Word, and Wisdom from the Wise, and from the

¹ The term *substance* in both the above instances was introduced by the Oxford translator, — the term ἄλλη alone appears in the original. The object of Athanasius was, manifestly, to affirm that there is not another archaic (original) substance, and not to deny what he afterwards asserts, that there is another generated substance. Again and again he uses ἀλλοτριόσιος in the sense of *heterogeneous*, as in De Syn., § 50, p. 150. 'But if, since the Son is from the Father, all that is the Father's is the Son's as in an image and expression, let it be considered dispassionately, whether a substance foreign from the Father's substance admit of such attributes, and whether such a one be other in nature and alien in substance [ἀλλοτριόσιος], and not one in substance with the Father.' Again, he writes, Discourse 1. § 20, p. 209: 'How can a man consider that which is proper, as foreign and alien in substance [ἀλλοτριόσιου]? For other things according to the nature of things generate are without likeness in substance with the maker, but are external to him.'

Father a Son. For in this way the Unity [*Μονάς* = Monad] remains undivided and entire, and its Son and Word is not unsubstantive [*ἀνοούτος*], nor not subsisting, but substantial truly."¹

IV. A fourth class of passages bearing on this point are those which teach that the Son is *like in substance* to the Father, or the *image* of the Father's *substance*.

It will be perceived upon examination that the first passage cited under the preceding head (the one that embodies a quotation from Theognostus), belongs also to this class. Not only does it declare that "the substance of the Son sprang from the Father's substance"; but also, in the concluding sentence, that "the Father's substance has the Son as an Image of Itself."

From the great multitude of other passages teaching as indicated, the following have been selected. The first is from the encyclical letter of the Synod of Alexandria that first deposed Arius. This letter was signed by Athanasius. By many it is supposed to have been written by him. However that may be, it unquestionably presents his views. In the section which contains the recital of the errors of Arius is the following:

The Word of God was not always Neither is He like in substance [*ὁμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν*] to the Father."²

In the following section, which contains brief refutations of the enumerated points of heresy, we read as follows:

"Or again, how is He 'unlike in substance [*ἀνόμοιος τῇ οὐσίᾳ*] to the Father' seeing He is the perfect *Image* and *brightness* of the Father," etc."³

In exact harmony with these utterances are the writings of Athanasius:

"He is the *Expression* of the Father's *Person* [*ὑπόστασις*], and *Light from light*, and *Power*, and very *Image* of the Father's substance."³

It should be premised that the argument in the following passage is to prove the eternal generation of the Son.

"When then was God without Him who is proper to Him? or, how

¹ Discourse IV. §§ 1, 2, p. 512 sqq.

² Athanasius's Hist. Tracts, Appendix, p. 300 sq.

³ Discourse I. § 9, p. 192.

can a man consider that which is proper, as foreign and alien in substance? for other things, according to the nature of things generate, are without likeness in substance with the Maker; but are external to Him Let a person only dwell upon this thought, and he will discern how the perfection and the plenitude of the Father's substance is impaired by this heresy; however, he will see its extravagance still more clearly if he considers that the Son is the Image and Radiance of the Father, and Expression, and Truth. For if, when Light exists, there be withal its Image, viz. Radiance, and a subsistence [*ὑπόστασις*] existing, there be of it the entire expression, and a Father existing, there be His Truth viz. the Son; let them consider what depths of irreligion they fall into who make time the measure of the Image and Countenance of the God-head. For if the Son was not before his generation, Truth was not always in God, which it were a sin to say; for, since the Father was, there was ever in Him the Truth, which is the Son, who says, *I am the Truth*. And the subsistence [*ὑπόστασις*] existing, of course there was forthwith its expression and Image; for God's Image is not delineated from without, but God Himself hath begotten it; in which seeing Himself, He has delight, as the Son Himself says, *I was His delight*. When then did the Father not see Himself in his own Image? or when had He not delight, that a man should dare to say, 'The Image is out of nothing,' and 'The Father had not delight before the Image was generated'? and how should the Maker and Creator see Himself in a created and generated substance? for such as is the Father, such must be the Image. . . . The Father is eternal, immortal, powerful, light, King, Sovereign, God, Lord, Creator, and Maker. These attributes must be in the Image, to make it true that he *that hath seen the Son hath seen the Father*. If the Son be not all this, but as the Arians consider, a thing generate, and not eternal, this is not a true Image of the Father, unless indeed they give up shame, and go on to say, that the title of Image, given to the Son, is not a token of a similar substance [*ὁμοίας οὐσίας*], but His name only. But this, on the other hand, O ye Christ's enemies, is not an Image, nor is it an Expression."¹

"If the consecration [i.e. Baptism] is given to us into the Name of Father and Son, and they do not confess a true Father, because they deny what is from Him and like His Substance [*τό ἐξ αὐτοῦ ὁμοίον τῆς οὐσίας*], and deny also the true Son," etc.²

"The Son, who made free, has shown in truth that He is no creature, nor one of things generate, but the proper Word and Image of the Father's substance."³

"For what the Son has said as proper and suitable to a Son only, who is Word and Wisdom and Image of the Father's substance."⁴

¹ Discourse i. §§ 20, 21, p. 209 sq.

² Ibid., ii. § 42, p. 339.

³ Ibid., ii. § 67, p. 377.

⁴ Ibid., iii. § 2, p. 401.

"The likeness [*ὁμοίωσιν*] and the Oneness [*ἐνότητα*] must be referred to the very substance of the Son; for unless it be so taken, He will not be shown to have anything beyond things generate."¹

"They [the Arians] have utterly forgotten, like Samosatene, the Son's paternal Godhead [*πατρικῆς θεότητος*], and with arrogant and audacious tongue they say, 'How can the Son be from the Father by nature, and be like Him in substance [*ὁμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν*]?' "²

"For the Apostle proclaims the Son to be the proper Radiance and Expression [*χαρακτήρ*] not of the Father's will, but of His Substance [*οὐσία*] itself, saying, Who being the Radiance of His Glory and the Expression of His Subsistence [*ὑπόστασις*].³ But if, as we have said before, the Father's Substance and Subsistence be not from will, neither, as is very plain, is what is proper to the Father's Subsistence from will; for such as, and so as, that blessed Subsistence must also be the proper Offspring from it. . . . And as the Father is always good by nature, so He is always generative by nature; and to say 'The Father's good pleasure is the Son,' and 'The Word's good pleasure is the Father,' implies, not a precedent will, but genuineness of nature, and propriety and likeness of Substance" [*οὐσίας ἰδιότητα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν*].⁴

"And as, being the Word and Wisdom of the Father, He has all the attributes of the Father, His eternity and His unchangeableness, and is like Him in all respects and in all things, and is neither before nor after, but co-existent with the Father, and is the very form [*εἶδος*] of the Godhead [Divinity], and is the Creator, and is not created: (for since He is in substance like the Father [*ὁμοιος γὰρ ὦν κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ πατρὸς*] He cannot be a creature)."⁵

One of the most important passages belonging to this division is to be found in the Epistle De Synodis, in a section preceding those which contain the classical passages. But it also, and more appropriately, belongs to another division, in which passages are cited and considered which contain phrases having a most important bearing on the question at issue. This passage, which forms the concluding quotation in the following division on p. 727, may also be regarded as closing this portion of the present article.

V. The fifth class of passages are those which contain the

¹ Discourse III. § 11, p. 416.

² Ibid., III. § 26, p. 436.

³ This is one of the passages which incidentally manifest that Athanasius regarded *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις* as one and the same.

⁴ Discourse III. §§ 65, 66, p. 494 sq.

⁵ Epistle to Bishops of Egypt and Libya, § 16; Historical Tracts, p. 145.

declarations that the Son is, of the Father, the *Εἰκὼν ἀπαράλλακτος* and the *Εἰκὼν ἀπαράλλακτος τῆς οὐσίας*.

The adjective is rendered by the Oxford translator as *unvarying*, and correctly in one of the meanings of that English term, namely, *exactly, without variation from the original*.

The former of these expressions occurs in the Defence, in which Athanasius narrates the circumstances under which *ὁμοούσιος* was introduced into the Creed. He writes :

“ Again [i.e. after the declaration that the Word is *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*] when the Bishops said that the Word must be described as the True Power and *Image* [*εἰκόνα*] of the Father, *like* to the Father in all things and *unvarying* [*ὁμοίον τε καὶ ἀπαράλλακτον αὐτὸν κατὰ πάντα τῷ Πατρὶ*] and as unalterable, and as always, and as in Him without division [*ἀδιαίρετος*] (for never was the Word not, but He was always existing everlastingly with the Father, as the radiance of light), the party of Eusebius endured, indeed, as not the daring to contradict, being put to shame by the arguments which were urged against them; but withal they were caught whispering to each other and winking with their eyes, that ‘like’ [*τὸ ὅμοιον*] and ‘always,’ and ‘power,’ and ‘in Him,’ were, as before, common to us and the Son, and that it was no difficulty to agree to these. As to ‘like’ [*τὸ ὅμοιον*] they said that it is written of us, *Man is the image and glory of God*. . . . But the Bishops, discerning in this too their simulation . . . were again compelled on their part to concentrate the sense of the Scriptures, and to re-say and re-write what they had said before, more distinctly still, namely, that the Son is ‘one in substance’ [*ὁμοούσιον*] with the Father, by way of signifying that the Son was from the Father, and not merely like, but is *the same in likeness* [*ἵνα μὴ μόνον ὅμοιον τὸν Υἱὸν, ἀλλὰ ταῦτόν τῃ ὁμοιώσει ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς εἶναι σημαίνωσι*], and of showing that the Son’s likeness and unalterableness was different from such copy of the same as is ascribed to us, which we acquire from virtue on the ground of the observance of the commandments.”¹

From the foregoing extract the following facts are manifest: First, that the phrase “Image of the Father, like to the Father in all things and unvarying,” originated with the Orthodox; secondly, that it was disused by them, not because they regarded it as necessarily false, but as ambiguous, and liable to be used by the heterodox in its lower and false sense; thirdly, that the term *ὁμοούσιον* was employed by

¹ Nicen. Def., § 20, p. 34 sq. Italics mine, except in quotations from Scripture.

them to set forth what they intended to indicate by it. From this it follows as the light the sun that *ὁμοούσιον* must have been used in the sense of *homogeneous*, for only in that sense does it coincide with one of the possible meanings of the phrase for which it was used as a synonyme. The same is evident from the singular phrase “the same [ταύτων] in [or by] likeness.” The term *Same* may indicate either *numerical* or *specific* sameness; but *numerical sameness* and *likeness* are utterly incongruous — the one implies unity, the other plurality; it is only as the term indicates *specific sameness* that the phrase “the same in [or by] likeness” does not involve a contradiction. It is here proper to remark that even though other considerations did not forbid it, it would be impossible, for intrinsic reasons, to harmonize the phrase “the same in [or by] likeness” with the system which affirms *numerical sameness*. According to that system *sameness* and *likeness* are affirmed of the Father and the Son in different aspects — they are the *same* (numerically) in *οὐσία*, they are *like* in *ὑπόστασις*. But according to the Nicene phrase under consideration they are *the same* and *like* in one identical aspect; in the one aspect in which they are the *same*, they are *like*; but this requires that the sameness should be *specific*. In conclusion of the consideration of the preceding extract it may be said that in the sentence, “not merely *like*, but the same in likeness,” the phrase “merely *like*” is manifestly parallel with that portion of the first classical passage which treats of *mere similarity*, as where it is written “thus tin is only *like* to silver, a wolf to a dog,” etc., and the words “the same in likeness” correspond with *ὁμοούσιον* and *ὁμοούσιον* in the sense in which they coincide, namely, *homogeneity*.¹

¹ It may possibly be contended by some that the paragraph immediately following the preceding extract is inconsistent with the idea that mere specific oneness — such as exists between a human father and son — could have been, in the idea of Athanasius, the meaning of the term *ὁμοούσιος*. And it must be acknowledged that did that paragraph stand alone, it would naturally suggest the idea of a peculiarity in the relation of the divine Father and Son as implied by that term. In view, however, of the overwhelming weight of evidence on the

The phrase *Εἰκὼν ἰπαράλλακτος τῆς οὐσίας* seems to have originated with the Eusebians, as they were styled, or Homoioussians. Its first occurrence, so far as I have been able to discover, was in the second creed of the second Council of Antioch (A.D. 341), called also the Council of the Dedication. This creed, together with several others put forth by Arian and Semi-Arian Councils, is given in full by Athanasius in his Epistle De Synodis.¹ In it occurs the following (italics mine) :

“ We believe in One Lord Jesus Christ, *unvarying image* of the Godhead, *Substance*, Will, Power, and Glory of the Father.”

As has already been intimated, subsequent councils, representing substantially the same party, declared that neither *οὐσία* nor *ὑπόστασις* should be attributed to God. The Council at Isauria (A.D. 359) declared as follows :

“ We decline not to bring forward the authentic faith published at the dedication of Antioch, though certainly our fathers at that time met together for a particular subject under investigation. But since ‘One in substance’ [*ὁμοούσιον*] and ‘Like in Substance’ [*ὁμοιούσιον*], have

other side, we are compelled to limit what, at first glance, seems to be the force of the passage. The position of Athanasius on this point was so clearly set forth in numerous classical passages and illustrations, that it was not necessary for him carefully to guard every apparently discrepant utterance. Indeed, upon careful examination, it becomes manifest that the language may without undue straining, be regarded as involving, impliedly, the *a fortiori* statement—‘if human beings are *ὁμοούσιοι*, how much more the divine Father and Son who are inseparably united.’ The passage is as follows (italics mine): “ For *bodies* which are like each other may be separated and become at distances from each other, as are human sons relatively to their parents (as it is written concerning Adam and Seth, who was begotten of him, that he was like him after his own pattern [LXX, Gen. v. 3]); but since the generation of the Son from the Father is not according to the nature of men, and not only *like* [*ὅμοιος*] but also inseparable from [*ἀδιαίρετος*] the substance of the Father, and He and the Father are one, as he has said himself, and the Word is ever in the Father and the Father in the Word, as the radiance stands towards the light, (for this the phrase itself indicates); therefore, the Council, as understanding this, wrote suitably ‘one in substance’ [*ὁμοούσιον*], that they might both defeat the perverseness of the heretics, and shew that the Word was other than generated things. For, after thus writing, they at once added, ‘But they who say that the Son of God is from nothing, or created, or alterable, or a work, or from other substance, these the Holy Catholic Church anathematizes.’”

¹ De Synodis, § 23, p. 106.

troubled many persons in times past and up to this day, and since, moreover, some are said recently to have devised the Son's 'Unlikeness' [ἀνόμοιον] to the Father, on their account we reject 'One in substance' and 'Like in substance,' as alien to the Scriptures, but 'Unlike' we anathematize, and account all who profess it as aliens to the Church. And we distinctly confess the 'Likeness' [ὅμοιον] of the Son to the Father," etc.¹

Shortly after, in the same Epistle, Athanasius severely censures the course of the Councils in rejecting the specified terms, especially that of Isauria, which had declared its acceptance of the Creed of the Dedication. In his censure he uses language which impliedly recognizes the orthodoxy of the phrase, "unvarying image of the substance," — a phrase which, of course, was rejected with the rejection of the term οὐσία. He writes :

"Can we then any more account such men Christians? For if, O Acacius and Eudoxius, you 'do not decline the faith published at the Dedication,' and in it is written that the Son is 'Unvarying Image of God's substance [οὐσίας ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκὼν], why is it ye write in Isauria, 'we reject the Like in Substance [τὸ ὁμοιούσιον]?' for if the Son is not like the Father according to substance [κατ' οὐσίαν ὅμοιος] how is He 'unvarying image of the Substance'? But if you are dissatisfied at having written 'Unvarying Image of the Substance' how is it that ye 'anathematize those who say that the Son is Unlike?' for if He be not according to substance Like [ὅμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν], He is altogether Unlike; and the Unlike cannot be an Image. And if so, then it does not hold that *he that hath seen the Son hath seen the Father*, there being the greatest difference possible between Them, or rather the One being wholly Unlike the other. And Unlike cannot possibly be called Like. By what artifice then do ye call Unlike Like, and consider Like to be Unlike, and so pretend to say that the Son is the Father's Image? for if the Son be not *Like* the Father in substance [κατ' οὐσίαν ὅμοιος ὁ Υἱὸς τοῦ Πατρὸς] something is wanting to the Image, and it is not a complete Image, nor a perfect radiance."²

From this extract it is evident that Athanasius regarded ὁμοιούσιος, ὅμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν, and ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκὼν τῆς οὐσίας, as equivalent. Although for reasons given in the first classical passage the term ὁμοιούσιος was objectionable as ambiguous, nevertheless he recognized it in its higher signifi-

¹ De Synodis, § 29, p. 123 sq.

² De Synodis, § 38, p. 135 sq.

cation as setting forth a truth. Still further; the expression *ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκὼν*, as we have just seen, had been supplied by the Nicene Council itself by the term *ὁμοούσιος* — had the expression *ἀπαράλλακτος εἰκὼν τῆς οὐσίας* meant aught else than this, it could not have been admitted by him as orthodox. And again; he distinctly recognizes that to be *like according to substance* [*ὅμοιος κατ' οὐσίαν*] was essential to the Son's being an Image of the Father. But 'likeness according to substance' and 'numerical oneness of substance' are utterly incongruous.

VI. The last class of passages that will be cited in corroboration are those in which Athanasius states and answers the objections to the term *ὁμοούσιον*.

By way of introduction it may be remarked that if by this term *numerical* oneness was contemplated, the apparent objection would have been that those who adopted it were Sabellianizing, that is, making the distinctions in the Godhead merely modal; if, however, *specific* oneness was intended the patent objections would have been that the term implied, first, division in the divine substance, and *secondly*, the existence of a plurality of Gods. Dr. Shedd manifestly contemplated the truth of this position, and therefore, immediately after his paragraph first quoted in this article, in which he stated, "The term *ὁμοούσιος* could not by any ingenuity be made to teach anything but that the essence of the Son is one and identical with that of the Father," we find the following:

"The two Eusebiuses, and many of the Oriental bishops, were Origenistic in their views upon this part of the doctrine. With some of this party, which was considerably numerous, and, as it afterward appeared, able to re-open the subject, and involve the church in another controversy, the difficulty was a speculative one, certainly to some extent. They were afraid of Sabellianism, and supposed that by affirming a unity and sameness of essence between the Father and the Son, they necessarily denied the distinction of persons between them. This portion, consisting of the more devout minds, who practically held very exalted views of the Person of Christ, were the true representatives of Origen in this council."¹

¹ Hist. of Christian Doctrine, Vol. i. p. 312 sqq. Hagenbach (Hist. of Doctrine, New York ed., Vol. i. p. 254 sq.) also writes: "The Semi-Arians, and with them Cyril of Jerusalem and Eusebius of Caesarea, endeavored to avoid the use of the term *ὁμοούσιος* lest they should fall into the Sabellian error."

The implication of this paragraph manifestly is that the great objection to the term was that it apparently favored Sabellianism. Now it may be remarked, in the first place, that Dr. Shedd adduces no proof that either of the Eusebiuses or the higher Homoiousians ever brought this objection against it. On the contrary, it is manifest that the difficulty in the mind of Eusebius of Caesarea as to the terms *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας* and *ὁμοούσιος* was that they implied division in the substance of the Father. In his "Letter to the People of his Diocese," presented in full by Athanasius in an Appendix to the Defence, he wrote as follows, immediately after his citation of the Nicene Creed :

"On their dictating this formula, we did not let it pass without inquiry in what sense they introduced 'of [from] the Substance of the Father,' and 'One in substance [*ὁμοούσιος*] with the Father.' Accordingly questions and explanations took place, and the meaning of the words underwent the scrutiny of reason. And they professed, that the phrase 'of [from] the substance' was indicative of the Son's being indeed from the Father, *yet without being as if a part of Him*. And with this understanding we thought good to assent to the sense of such religious doctrine, teaching, as it did, that the Son was from the Father, not however a part of his substance. On this account we assented to the sense ourselves, without declining even the term 'One in substance,' peace being the object which we set before us, and steadfastness in the orthodox view. . . . And so too on examination there are grounds for saying that the Son is 'One in substance with the Father'; not in the way of bodies, nor like mortal beings, for He is not such by division of substance, or by severance, no nor by any affection, or alteration, or changing of the Father's substance or power, (since from all such the ingenerate nature of the Father is alien), but because 'One in substance with the Father' suggests that the Son of God bears no resemblance to the generated creatures, but that to His Father alone who begat Him is He in every way assimilated, and that He is not of any other subsistence and substance, but from the Father."¹

The historian, Socrates, thus writes :

"This creed was recognized and acquiesced in by three hundred and eighteen Bishops; and being as Eusebius says, unanimous in expression and sentiment, they subscribed it. Five only would not receive it, objecting to the term *ὁμοούσιος*, of the same essence or consubstantial. These were Eusebius Bishop of Nicomedia, Theognis of Nice, Maris of

¹ Nicen. Def, App. p. 61 sq. Italics mine.

Chalcedon, Thomas of Marmorica, and Secundus of Ptolemais. 'For,' said they, 'that is *consubstantial* which is from another, either by partition, derivation, or germination; by germination, as a shoot from the roots; by derivation, as children from their parents; by division, as two or three vessels of gold from a mass.' But they contended that the Son is from the Father by neither of these modes: wherefore they declared themselves unable to assent to the Creed; and having scoffed at the word *consubstantial*, they would not subscribe it to the condemnation of Arius. . . . At the same time Eusebius . . . of Caesarea . . . who had withheld his assent in the Synod, after mature consideration whether he ought to receive this form of faith at length acquiesced in it and subscribed it."¹

In reference to the higher Homoiousians, of whom Dr. Shedd writes, as quoted above, that "they were afraid of Sabellianism," and in a foot-note on the same page, that they "finally passed over to Nicenism," it may be remarked that had he given the entire paragraph in English, instead of quoting a portion thereof in a foot-note in the original Greek, it would have been manifest that the difficulty contemplated by them was the same as that which troubled Eusebius of Caesarea and the other dissenters at the Council of Nicaea. The passage is the one that has been given *in extenso* on p. 705 sq., of this article as the first classical passage.

In the second place, as against the implication of the paragraph of Dr. Shedd, namely, that the great objection to the term *ὁμοούσιον* was that it favored Sabellianism, it may be confidently asserted that the only objections Athanasius alludes to are those which arise from regarding the term as indicating specific oneness. These objections, as will be seen, are: first, that the term implies division of the substance of the Father; and, secondly, that it implies a plurality of Gods.

Before citing passages in which these objections are mentioned and answered, it is proper further to remark that the nature of the answer would depend on the meaning attached by Athanasius to the term *ὁμοούσιος*. If he had held that it indicated *numerical* oneness, the patent answer to the objections that it implied *division of substance* and a *plurality of Gods* would have been, You misunderstand the force of the

¹ Bagster's Translation and Edition, p. 28 sq.

term. Such, however, was never his answer. On the contrary it was always one requiring, or at least consistent with, the idea that the term indicated specific oneness, as will be seen.

The objections mentioned, together with the answers, will now be presented. In these answers the truth of what was set forth in the introduction as the second point of the doctrine of Athanasius will appear; viz. That the begetting of the Divine Son implies no division of the Father's substance as in the begetting of a human son. The truth also of another remark made in the introduction will, it is believed, become manifest; viz. That the idea that Athanasius held the doctrine of the *numerical* oneness of the Divine substance is largely defended from a partial presentation of his declarations on this second point.

1. The first *objection* is, that the term *ὁμοούσιον* implies division in the substance of the Father. This is an objection that seems to have been constantly present to the mind of Athanasius. He answers it in all his writings against the Arians; sometimes he endeavors to forestall it in the very statement of his doctrine.

The first passage that will be cited occurs in immediate connection with what has been styled the first classical passage, which it follows in unbroken sequence. Fully to appreciate it we must have that passage, of which it is the sequel, in mind (see p. 705 sq.):

“ And is there any cause for fear, lest, because the offspring from men are one in substance [*ὁμοούσια*], the Son, by being called One in substance, be Himself considered as a human [*ἀνθρώπινον*] offspring too? Perish the thought! not so; but the explanation is easy. For the Son is the Father's Word and Wisdom; whence we learn the impassibility and indivisibility [*ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἀμέριστον*] of such a generation from the Father. For not even man's word is a part of him nor proceeds from him according to passion, much less God's Word; whom the Father hath declared to be His own Son, lest, on the other hand, if we merely heard (heard merely) of ‘Word,’ we should suppose Him, such as is the word of man, unsubstantial [*ἀνυπόστατον*]; but that hearing that He is Son, we may

acknowledge Him to be a living Word and substantive [ἐνοούσιον] Wisdom.¹ Accordingly as in saying 'Offspring' we have no human thoughts, and though we know God to be a Father, we entertain no *material* ideas concerning Him, but while we listen to these illustrations and terms, we think suitably of God, for He is not as man, so in like manner when we hear of 'One in substance,' we ought to transcend all sense, and according to the Proverb, *understand by the understanding that is set before us*; so as to know, that not by will, but in truth, is He genuine from the Father, as Life from Fountain, and Radiance from Light. Else why should we understand 'offspring' and 'Son' in no corporeal way, while we conceive of 'One in substance' as after the manner of bodies? especially since these terms are not here used about different subjects, but of whom 'offspring' is predicated, of Him is 'One in substance' also. And it is but consistent to attach the same sense to both expressions as applied to the Saviour, and not to interpret 'offspring,' as is fitting, and 'One in substance' otherwise; since to be consistent, ye who are thus minded, and who say that the Son is Word and Wisdom of the Father, should entertain a different view of these terms also, and understand in separate senses *Word*, and in distinct senses *Wisdom*. But as this would be extravagant (for the Son is the Father's Word and Wisdom, and the offspring from the Father is one and proper to His substance), so the sense of 'offspring' and 'one in substance' is one, and whoso considers the Son an *offspring*, rightly considers Him also as 'one in substance.' This is sufficient to show that the phrase of 'one in substance' is not foreign nor far from the meaning of these much loved persons"² [The reference here is to those higher Homoiousians, mentioned in the first classical passage, who admitted the ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, but denied the ὁμοούσιον].

The next passage, flowing on in unbroken sequence from the one just concluded, is of great importance in determining the views of Athanasius. Presenting, as it does, the objection of some to the use of the term ὁμοούσιον on the ground that

¹ This passage is of special importance in view of the fact that it has been claimed that their figuring of the divine Λόγος by the human, tends to prove that the Nicene fathers regarded the substance of the Trinity as numerically one. It will be perceived from this that whilst Athanasius used the illustration to set forth "the impassibility and indivisibility" of the generation of the divine Λόγος, he expressly affirmed this difference between the divine and the human word, namely, that the former is *substantial*. It is also important to notice that Athanasius regards the fact that the Divine Word is styled *Son*, as indicative of the fact that he is *subsistent* and *substantial*. It should be remembered that according to him οὐσία and ὑπόστασις are one and the same; and this is one of the passages in which he employs the terms as synonymous. A similar passage from § 34 of the same Epistle, was quoted on p. 714 sq. of this article, and specially referred to in a foot-note.

² De Synodis, § 41, p. 140 sq.

it had been condemned by the Council of Antioch in the case of Paul of Samosata, it afforded opportunity to Athanasius not only to answer the objection, but to set forth his opinion concerning the meaning that had been attributed to the term by the Council and the one properly attaching to it. It will be remembered that the implication of the paragraph first quoted from Dr. Shedd's History of Christian Doctrines is that Paul of Samosata had used the term *ὁμοούσιον* in a Sabellian sense, and for so doing had been condemned by the Council of Antioch. The following extract will show that this was not in accordance with the understanding of Athanasius :

“ But since, as they [the higher Homoiousians] allege (for I have not the epistle in question), the Bishops who condemned Samosatene have laid down in writing that the Son is not One in substance with the Father, and so it comes to pass that they, for reverence and honor toward the aforesaid, thus feel about that expression, it will be to the purpose reverently to argue with them this point also. Certainly, it is unbecoming to make the one company conflict with the other, for all are fathers. [After making certain historical statements, in which he introduces the passage from Dionysius of Alexandria already presented as the second classical passage, p. 707, he continues] If the Fathers of the two Councils made different mention of the One in substance, we ought not in any respect to differ from them, but to investigate their meaning ; and this will fully show us the meaning of both the Councils. For they who deposed Samosatene took One in substance in a bodily sense, because Paul [of Samosata] had attempted sophistry, and said, ‘ Unless Christ has of man become God, it follows that He is One in substance with the Father ; and if so, of necessity there are three substances, one the previous substance, and the other two from it ’ ; and therefore, guarding against this, they said with good reason that Christ was not One in substance. For the Son is not related to the Father as he imagined. But the Bishops who anathematized the Arian heresy understanding Paul's craft, and reflecting that the word ‘ One in substance ’ has not this meaning when used of things immaterial, and especially of God, and acknowledging that the Word was not a creature, but an offspring from the substance, and that the Father's substance was the origin and root and fountain of the Son, and that He was of very truth the Father's likeness, and not of different nature, as we are, and separate from the Father, but that as being from Him He exists as Son indivisible [*ἀδιαιρέτον*], as radiance is with respect of light, and knowing too the illustrations used in Dionysius's case, the ‘ fountain,’ and

the defence of 'One in substance,' and before this the Saviour's saying symbolical of unity [$\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\iota\delta\eta$]. *I and the Father are one*, and *He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father*, on these grounds reasonably asserted on their part that the Son was One in substance. . . . Yes, surely, each Council had a sufficient reason for its own language. . . . When the party of Eusebius and Arius said that though the Son was before time, yet was He made and one of the creatures, and as to the phrase 'from God,' they did not believe it in the sense of His being genuine Son from Father, but maintained it as it is said of the creatures, and as to the oneness of likeness [$\tau\acute{\eta}\nu\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \delta\omicron\mu\omicron\acute{\omega}\sigma\epsilon\omega\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\omicron}\tau\eta\tau\alpha$] between the Son and the Father, did not confess that the Son is like [$\delta\omicron\mu\omicron\iota\omicron\varsigma$] the Father according to substance [$\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \tau\acute{\eta}\nu\ \omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\acute{\alpha}\nu$], or according to nature, but because of their agreement of doctrines and of teaching; nay, when they drew a line and an utter distinction between the Son's substance and the Father, ascribing to Him an origin of being other than the Father, and degrading Him to the creatures, on this account the Bishops assembled at Nicaea, with a view to the craft of the parties so thinking, and as bringing together the sense from the Scriptures, cleared up the point by affirming the 'One in substance'; that both the true genuineness of the Son might thereby be known, and that things generated might be ascribed nothing in common with Him."¹

¹ De Synodis, §§ 43-45, p. 141 sqq. There are but three of the Fathers who refer to the alleged deliverance of the Council of Antioch, namely, Athanasius, Basil of Caesarea, and Hilary of Poitiers. Basil, who agrees with Athanasius, thus writes, Ep. 300 (quoted from Bull's Defence, Ox. transl., p. 74 sq.): "The word $\delta\mu\omicron\upsilon\omicron\sigma\iota\omicron\varsigma$ having been used in a wrong sense by some, there are persons who have not yet accepted it. . . . For in truth, they who were assembled in the matter of Paul of Samosata, did give an ill name to this word, as not conveying a good meaning; for they said that the term $\delta\mu\omicron\upsilon\omicron\sigma\iota\omicron\varsigma$, 'of one substance,' suggests the idea of a substance, and the things which are formed from it, so as that the substance being divided into parts, gives the appellation 'of one substance' to the things into which it is divided. And this notion has some force in the case of metals, and the pieces of money made from it; but in the instance of God the Father and God the Son, there is not contemplated any substance elder than or overlaying both; for to think or assert this, were something beyond impiety." The Oxford translator of the "Treatises" of Athanasius thus writes in a foot-note (p. 144): "While S. Basil agrees with Athanasius in his account of the reason of the Council's rejection of the word, S. Hilary on the contrary reports that Paul himself accepted, i.e. in a Sabellian sense, and therefore the Council rejected it." The sole reason given by the translator for this statement is, the words of Hilary, "Male homoousion Samosatenus confessus est, sed numquid melius Arian negaverunt (De Synodis, § 86)." I must acknowledge my inability to see the force of the reason assigned. But however this may be, the concurrent opinions of Athanasius and Basil would more than countervail even the unmistakably expressed opinion of Hilary; and still further, the opinion

The next passage that will be cited follows an argument to prove the eternal generation of the Son. Special attention is called to it, as it will again be referred to in review of the position of Neander. Athanasius writes :

“ But if, on the other hand, while they acknowledge with us the name of ‘ Son,’ from an unwillingness to be publicly and generally condemned, they deny that the Son is the proper offspring of the Father’s substance, on the ground that this must imply parts and divisions ; what is this but to deny that He is very Son, and only in name to call Him Son at all ? And is it not a grievous error to have material thoughts about what is immaterial ; and because of the weakness of their proper nature to deny what is natural and proper to the Father ? It does but remain that they should deny Him also, because they understand not how God is, and what the Father is, now that, foolish men, they measure by themselves the Offspring of the Father. And persons in such a state of mind as to consider that there cannot be a Son of God demand our pity ; but they must be interrogated and exposed for the chance of bringing them to their senses.”¹

Again, in the same Discourse, he writes :

“ As we have said before, so now we repeat, that the divine generation must not be compared to the nature of men, nor the Son considered to be part of God, nor generation to imply any passion whatever ; God is not as man ; for men beget passibly, having a transitive nature, which waits for periods by reason of its weakness. But with God this cannot be ; for he is not composed of parts, but being impassible and simple He is impassibly [*ἀπαθῶς*] and indivisibly [*ἀμερίστως*] Father of the Son. This, again, is strongly evidenced and proved by divine Scripture. For the Word of God is His Son, and the Son is the Father’s Word and Wisdom ; and the Word and Wisdom is neither creature nor part of Him whose Word He is, nor an offspring passibly begotten. Uniting then the two titles [Word and Son], Scripture speaks of ‘ Son’ in order to herald the Offspring of His [the Father’s] substance natural and true ; and, on the other hand, that none may think of the Offspring humanly, while signifying His [the Son’s] substance, it also calls Him Word, Wisdom, and Radiance ; to teach us that the generation was impassible, and eternal, and worthy of God. What affection, then, or what part of the Father, is the Word and the Wisdom and the Radiance ? ”²

After having, in the Defence, set forth the two senses of the term Son, — namely, first, that in which he gives us power of Hilary has nothing to do with the special point at issue. What we are seeking is the opinion of Athanasius.

¹ Discourse I. § 15, p. 202.

² Ibid, I. § 28, p. 220 sq.

to become sons of God, and secondly, that of nature, in which Isaac was son of Abraham, — and after having proved that the Divine Son was not Son in the first sense, Athanasius writes :

“It remains then to say that the Son of God is so called according to the other sense, in which Isaac was called son of Abraham ; for what is naturally begotten from any one, and does not accrue to him from without, that in the nature of things is a *Son*, and that is what the name implies. Is then the Son’s generation one of human affection [*ἀνθρωποπαθής*] ? (for this perhaps, as their predecessors, they too will be ready to object in their ignorance) ; — in no wise ; for God is not as man, nor man as God. *Men* are created of matter, and that passible [*παθητικῆς*] ; but God is immaterial and incorporeal. As then men create not as God creates, as their being is not such as God’s being, so men’s generation is in one way, and the Son is from the Father in another. For the offspring of men are portions of their fathers, since the very nature of bodies is not uncompounded, but transitive and composed of parts ; and men lose their substance in begetting, and again they gain substance from the accession of food. And on this account men in their time become fathers of many children ; but God, being without parts, is Father of the Son without partition or passion ; for there is neither effluence [*ἀπορροή*] of the Immaterial, nor accession from without, as among men ; and being uncompounded in nature, He is Father of One Only Son.”¹

Again he writes, in the same epistle :

“Further, let every corporeal thought be banished on this subject ; and transcending every imagination of sense, let us, with the pure understanding and with mind alone, apprehend the Son’s genuine relation towards the Father, and the Word’s proper relation [*ιδιόσηρα*] towards God, and the unvarying likeness of the radiance towards the light ; for as the words ‘Offspring’ and ‘Son’ bear, and are meant to bear, no human sense, but one suitable to God, in like manner when we hear the phrase ‘One in substance’ let us not fall upon human senses, and imagine partitions and divisions of the Godhead, but as having our thoughts directed to things immaterial let us preserve undivided the oneness of nature and the identity [*ταυτόσηρα* = *homogeneity*]² of light ; for this is proper to the Son as regards the Father [*τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον Υἱοῦ πρὸς Πατέρα*], and in

¹ Nicen. Def., § 10, p. 16 sq. This passage, it will be perceived, is quoted by Dr. Shedd, with slight variations, manifestly from the Oxford translation. See *History of Doctrine*, Vol. i. p. 334.

² It is evident from the last quoted classical passage that this term was used by Athanasius in the sense of *homogeneity*. See foot-note on p. 709.

this is shown that God is truly the Father of the Word. Here again the illustration of light and its radiance is in point. Who will presume to say that the radiance is unlike and foreign from the sun? Rather who, thus considering the radiance relatively to the sun, and the identity of the light, would not say with confidence, 'Truly the light and the radiance are one, and the one is manifested in the other, and the radiance is in the sun, so that whoso sees this sees that also?' But such a oneness and natural possession [*ἰδιότηρα*] what should it be named by those who believe and see aright; but Offspring one in substance? And God's Offspring what should we fittingly and suitably consider but the Word and Wisdom and Power?"¹

The next passage that will be cited is from the beginning of the third Discourse. In the first paragraph Athanasius refers to the fact that the Arians had attacked the truth on the basis of scriptural expressions. He writes:

"The Ario-maniacs have next proceeded to disparage our Lord's words, *I in the Father, and the Father in Me*, saying, 'How can the One be contained in the Other and the Other in the One?' or 'How at all can the Father who is the greater be contained in the Son who is the less?' or 'What wonder if the Son is in the Father, considering it is written even of us, *In Him we live and move and have our being?*' And this state of mind is consistent with their perverseness who think God to be material, and understand not what is 'True Father' and 'True Son,' nor 'Light Invisible' and 'Eternal,' and Its 'Radiance Invisible,' nor 'Invisible Subsistence,' and 'Immaterial Expression' and 'Immaterial Image.' For had they known, they would not have dishonored and ridi-

¹ Nicen. Def., § 24, p. 40 sq. Dr. Shedd quotes also this passage (History of Christian Doctrine, Vol. i. p. 334 sq.), and manifestly, either directly or mediately, from the Oxford translation. There are, however, with two or three minor variations unnecessary to notice, several most important and illegitimate changes. The first of these is the alteration in the first part of the paragraph, of the Greek *ἰδιότηρα* into *ἰδιότηρα*, and a corresponding change of the English *proper relation* into *individuality*. A similar change of the Greek word appears near the close of the paragraph, and the English *natural possession* (*φυσικῆ ἰδιότηρα*) is altered into *personal peculiarity*! A third change is of the italicized sentence near the middle of the paragraph, "*for this is proper to the Son as regards the Father*"; this is altered into, "For this is the individuality, or *hypostatical* character of the Son in relation to the Father. A fourth change is the omission of the italicized clause near the end — "*and the one is manifested in the other.*" By these changes the idea of *hypostasis* or *person* as distinct from *substance* is illegitimately introduced into the paragraph. The term *ἰδιότης*, which is twice substituted for *ἰδιότης*, does not as before remarked, so far as I have been able to discover, once occur in the writings of Athanasius.

culed the Lord of glory, nor, interpreting things immaterial after a material manner, perverted good words. It were sufficient indeed, on hearing only [only hearing] words which are the Lord's at once to believe, since the faith of simplicity is better than an elaborate process of persuasion; but since they have endeavored to make even this passage level with their own heresy, it becomes necessary to expose their perverseness and to show the mind of the truth, at least for the security of the faithful. For when it is said,¹ *I in the Father and the Father in Me*, they are not therefore, as these suppose, discharged into each other, filling the One the Other, as in the case of empty vessels, so that the Son fills the emptiness of the Father, and the Father that of the Son, and Each of Them by Himself is not complete and perfect (for this is proper to bodies, and therefore the mere assertion of it is full of irreligion), for the Father is full and perfect, and the Son is the Fulness of Godhead. Nor again, as God by coming into [*γινόμενος ἐν*] the saints strengthens them, thus is He also in the Son. For He is Himself the Father's Power and Wisdom, and by partaking [*μεροχῆ*] of him things generate are sanctified in the Spirit; but the Son Himself is not Son by participation [*μερουργία*], but is the Father's proper Offspring. Nor, again, is the Son in the Father in the sense of the passage, *In Him we live and move and have our being*; for He as being from the Fount of the Father is the Life in which all things are both quickened and consist; for the Life does not live in life, else it would not be Life, but rather He gives life to all things."²

¹ Dr. Shedd's quotation, reproduced in the following foot-note, begins at this point.

² Discourse III. § 1, p. 398 sq. A portion of this passage, beginning at the point indicated in the preceding foot-note, forms the first of a series of so-called quotations from the third Discourse of Athanasius against the Arians. This series immediately follows the quotation reproduced on p. 736 sq., and begins with the words: "Similar arguments and illustrations are also set forth by Athanasius in his singularly logical and powerful 'Orations against the Arians.'" The succeeding extracts will be presented in the latter portion of this article, compared in parallel columns with the Oxford translation. This one is here presented, as, for obvious reasons, it is desirable that the connection of the extract as given by Dr. Shedd with that which precedes it should be made manifest. Special attention is called to the unauthorized introduction of the idea of *personality* as connected with *substance*, in the use of the words italicized by me in the latter part of the extract. Dr. Shedd writes (History of Doctrine, Vol. i. p. 135 sq.): "'We must not understand,' he says, 'those words, *I am in the Father, and the Father in me*, as if the Father and the Son were two distinct essences or natures, bleended or inlaid into one another; as if they had that property which philosophers call penetration of parts; that is to say, as if they were a vessel, supposed to be capable of being doubly filled at once; as if the Father occupied the same quantity or region of space with the Son, and the Son the same as the Father. The Father's *personality* is infinitely perfect and complete, and the Son's *personality*

2. The second objection to the Nicene doctrine mentioned and answered by Athanasius was, that it involved the idea of a plurality of Gods. This objection was not mentioned by him, as an objection to his doctrine, as frequently as the one that has just been considered ; yet he considered it, and there can be no doubt, after a careful examination of what he wrote on the subject, that he answered it not from the standpoint of the *numerical oneness* of the Divine substance, but from that of the old doctrine of the *Monarchy*, that is, that the Divine unity is to be found in the Father as the 'Αρχή, the Fountain, of the Trinity.

This was the idea set forth in the passage from Discourse iv., quoted on p. 719 sqq. of this article in proof that Athanasius recognized a plurality of substance. One of the objects of the section quoted manifestly was to answer the objection that the orthodox doctrine implied a plurality of Gods. The special sentence to which attention is called is the following ; the whole passage, however, should be re-read in this connection :

“ For the Word, being Son of the One God, is referred [*ἀναφέρεται*] to Him of whom also He is ; so that Father and Son are two, yet the Unity [*Μονάδα* = Monad] of the Godhead [Divinity] is indivisible and inseparable [*ἰσδιαιρέτων καὶ ἀσχωστων*]. And thus too we preserve one Origin [*Ἀρχή*] of Godhead, and not two Origins, whence there is properly a Divine Monarchy.”¹

The same doctrine of the *Monarchy* as the foundation of the Divine unity is set forth in the approved extract from Dionysius of Rome, presented by Athanasius in the Defence, the first portion of which was quoted in this article on p. 707. The entire passage, so far as germane to the point under discussion, is as follows :

“ Next, I reasonably turn to those who divide and cut into pieces and destroy that most sacred doctrine of the Church of God, the Divine Monarchy, making it certain three powers and partitive subsistences

is the plenitude of his Father's *substance*. The Son has not his Sonship derived or communicated to him by any sort of intervention or mediation. No ; it is of the Son's very nature, of the Father's substance and immediate from the Father.”

¹ Discourse iv. § 1, p. 512 sq.

[*μμερισμένας ὑπόστασεις*] and godheads [*θεότηας*] three. I am told that some among you who are catechists and teachers of the Divine Word take the lead in this tenet, who are diametrically opposed, so to speak, to Sabellius's opinions; for he blasphemously says that the Son is the Father, and the Father the Son; but they in some sort preach three Gods as dividing the Holy Unity [*μονάδα*] into three subsistences foreign to each other and utterly separate. For it must needs be that with the God of the Universe the Divine Word is one [*ἡνωθῆαι*], and the Holy Ghost must repose and habitate in God; thus in one [*εἰς ἓνα*] as in a summit [*εἰς κορυφήν*], I mean the God of the Universe, must the Divine Trinity [*Τριάς*] be gathered up and brought together [*συγκεφαλαιούσθαι καὶ συναγεσθαι*]. For it is the doctrine of the presumptuous Marcion to sever and divide the Divine Monarchy into three Origins — a devil's teaching, not that of Christ's true disciples and lovers of the Saviour's lessons. For they well know that a Trinity [*Τριάς*] is preached by Divine Scripture, but that neither Old Testament nor New preaches three Gods. Neither then may we divide into three Godheads the wonderful and divine Unity [*μονάδα* = Monad], nor disparage with the name 'Work' the dignity and exceeding majesty of the Lord; but we must believe in God the Father Almighty, and in Jesus Christ His Son, and in the Holy Ghost, and hold that to the God of the Universe the Word is united. For *I*, says He, *and the Father are one*, and *I in the Father and the Father in Me*. For thus both the Divine Trinity [*Τριάς*], and the holy preaching of the Monarchy will be preserved."¹

In harmony with the doctrine embodied in the preceding extracts is the teaching in the following passages. The first of these is from the Epistle De Synodis. It occurs in the section intermediate between those which contain the third and last classical passages.

"Further, if, in confessing Father and Son, we spoke of two origins or two Gods, as Marcion and Valentinus, or said that the Son had any other mode of godhead [*ἢ ἕτερόν τινα τρόπον θεότητος ἔχειν τὸν Υἱόν*], and was not the Image [*εἰκόνα*] and Expression [*χαρακτῆρα*] of the Father, as being by nature born from Him, then He might be considered unlike [*ἀνόμοιος*]; for such substances are altogether unlike [*ξένοι*] each other. But if we acknowledge that the Father's Godhead [*θεότητα*] is one and sole, and that of Him the Son is the Word and Wisdom; and, as thus believing, are far from speaking of two Gods, but understand the oneness of the Son with the Father to be not in likeness of their teaching, but according to substance [*κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν*] and in truth, and hence speak

¹ Nicen. Def., § 26, p. 45 sqq.

not of two Gods but of one God; there being but one Face of Godhead [ἰ ὄντος εἰδους θεότητος], as the Light is one and the Radiance; this being so, wherefore scruple we to call Him one in substance who is one with the Father according to likeness and oneness of Godhead? Or let a man venture to make the distinction that the sun and the radiance are two lights or different [heterogeneous] substances [ἢ ἐτέραν τιὰ εἶναι οὐσίαν],¹ or to say that the radiance accrued to it over and above, and is not a single and uncompounded offspring from the sun, such that sun and radiance are two, but the light one, because the radiance is an offspring from the sun. But, whereas not more divisible, nay less divisible is the nature of the Son towards the Father, and the godhead not accruing to the Son, but the Father's godhead being in the Son, so that he that hath seen the Son hath seen the Father in Him; wherefore should not such an one be called One in substance?"²

Again he writes :

"And on hearing the attributes of the Father [τὰ τοῦ Πατρὸς] spoken of the Son, we shall thereby see the Father in the Son; and we shall contemplate the Son in the Father, when what is said of the Son is said of the Father also. And why are the attributes of the Father ascribed to the Son, except that the Son is an Offspring from Him? and why are the Son's attributes proper to the Father, except again because the Son is the proper Offspring of His substance? And the Son being the proper Offspring of the Father's substance, reasonably says that the Father's attributes are His own also; whence suitably and consistently with saying, *I and the Father are One*. He adds, *that ye may know that I am in the Father and the Father in Me*. Moreover, He has added this again, *He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father*; and there is one and the same sense in these three passages. For he who in this sense understands that the Son and the Father are one, knows that He is in the Father and the Father in the Son; for the Godhead of the Son is the Father's, and it is in the Son; and whoso enters into this is convinced that *He that hath seen the Son hath seen the Father*; for in the Son is contemplated the Father's Godhead. And we may perceive this at once from the illustration of the Emperor's image. For in the image is the face and form of the Emperor, and in the Emperor is that face which is in the image. For the likeness of the Emperor in the image is unvarying [ἀπαράλλακτος];³ so that a person who looks at the image sees in it the Emperor; and he again who sees the Emperor recognizes that it is he who is in the image. And from the likeness not differing, to one who after the image wished to view the Emperor, the image might say, 'I and the Emperor are one; for I am in him and he in me; and what thou seest in me that thou beholdest in him,

¹ Substances of different kinds — *heterogeneous*. ² De Synodis, § 52, p. 153 sq.

³ It is "unvarying" in form, but not κατ' οὐσίαν.

and what thou hast seen in him that thou beholdest in me.' Accordingly, he who worships the image, in it worships the Emperor also; for the image is his form [μορφῆ] and face. Since then the Son too is the Father's Image, it must necessarily be understood that the Godhead and propriety [ιδιότης] of the Father is the Being [τὸ εἶναι] of the Son. § 6. And this is what is said, *Who being in the form [ἐν μορφῆ] of God, and the Father in Me.* Nor is this Form [εἶδος] of the Godhead partial merely, but the fullness of the Father's Godhead is the Being [τὸ εἶναι] of the Son, and the Son is whole God."¹

And in the same Discourse, again, he writes :

"For divine Scripture wishing us thus to understand the matter, has given such illustrations, as we have said above, from which we are able both to press the traitorous Jews, and to refute the allegation of Gentiles who maintain and think, on account of the Trinity [τὴν Τριάδα], that we profess many gods. For, as the illustration shows, we do not introduce three Origins [ἀρχάς] or three Fathers, as the followers of Marcion and Manichæus; since we have not suggested the image of three suns, but sun and radiance. And one is the light from the sun in the radiance; and so we know of but one origin [ἀρχήν]; and the All-framing Word we profess to have no other manner of Godhead than that of the only God, because He is born from Him. . . . For there is but one Face [εἶδος] of Godhead, which is also in the Word; and one God, the Father, existing by Himself, according as He is above all, and appearing in the Son according as He pervades all things, and in the Spirit according as in Him He acts in all things through the Word. For thus we confess God to be one through the Trinity, and we say that it is much more religious than the godhead of the heretics with its many kinds [πολυειδούς] and many parts, to entertain a belief of the One Godhead in Trinity."²

The effort has been made to reproduce everything that legitimately bears upon the subject of the objections to his doctrine mentioned and answered by Athanasius. It is freely acknowledged that there are many expressions in these answers which, taken by themselves, are apparently consistent with the doctrine of the numerical oneness of the Divine substance. On the other hand, however, many are utterly inconsistent with that doctrine; all are consistent with the doctrine of specific oneness, and many require the hypothesis of such oneness. It is manifestly impossible, even upon these answers alone, to build up an hypothesis of

¹ Discourse 111. § 5, p. 404 sqq.

² Ibid., 111. § 15, p. 421 sq.

numerical unity. When, however, we consider that they are but answers to certain objections in connection with a vast system, which in a multitude of ways, direct and indirect, teaches the doctrine of specific oneness, it becomes evident that the attempt to build up a counter hypothesis upon a few expressions contained in these answers is like an attempt to establish the doctrine of Socinianism upon the declaration of the incarnate Lord, "My Father is greater than I."

There are, however, other passages in which it is claimed Athanasius teaches the doctrine of *numerical* oneness—amongst others, those declaratively quoted by Dr. Shedd on pages 334–338 of Volume I. of his History of Christian Doctrine. These quotations as they appear in the work mentioned, regularly enclosed in double quotation marks, and credited by sections to the different works of the great Patriarch, apparently teach that he made in direct terms the modern distinction between *substance* [ὐσία] and *person* [ὑπόστασις], and also that he declared in terms that the Father and the Son "are numerically one." If these quotations are correct, then, it must be admitted Athanasius was strangely inconsistent with himself. But are they correct? Three of these quotations have already been referred to on pages 736, 737, 738 of this article. The others will now be presented, contrasted in parallel columns with the Oxford translation. This translation is employed, not only because of its general correctness and acknowledged authority, but because the quotations of Dr. Shedd that have already been mentioned in this article were manifestly made from it either directly or mediately. The quotations that remain to be compared are from Discourse III. §§ iii., iv., vi. as they appear in the History of Christian Doctrine, Vol. I. p. 336 sqq.

DR. SHEDD'S QUOTATION.

OXFORD TRANSLATION.

§ 3.¹ "But if the Lord said this, His words would not rightly have been, *I in the Father and the Father in Me*, but rather, 'I too am in the Father and the Father is in Me too,'

¹ The entire section is quoted (Oxford transl.), p. 402 sq.

DR. SHEDD'S QUOTATION.

"There is an entire propriety and community of nature between the Son and the Father, in like manner as there is between brightness and light, between the stream and the fountain; and, consequently, he that sees the Son sees in him the Father, and cannot but know that the Son is in the Substance of the Father, as having his subsistence (*ὑπόστασις*)¹ communicated to him out of that substance (*οὐσία*); and, again, that the Father is in the Son as communicating his substance² to the Son, as the nature of the solar substance is in the rays, the intellectual faculty in the rational soul, and the very substance of the fountain in the waters of the river.

OXFORD TRANSLATION.

that He may have nothing proper and by prerogative, relatively to the Father, as a Son, but the same grace in common with all. But it is not so as they think; for not understanding that He is genuine Son from the Father, they belie Him who is such, whom only it befits to say, *I in the Father and the Father in Me.* For the Son is in the Father, as it is allowed us to know, because the whole Being [*σύμπαρ τὸ εἶναι*] of the Son is proper to the Father's substance, as radiance from light, and stream from fountain; so that whose sees the Son, sees what is proper to the Father, and knows that the Son's Being [*τὸ εἶναι*], because from the Father, is therefore in the Father. For the Father is in the Son, since the Son is what is from the Father and proper to Him, as in the radiance the sun, and in the word the thought, and in the stream the fountain; for whose thus contemplates the Son, contemplates what is proper to the Father's substance, and knows that the Father is in the Son. For whereas the Face and Godhead [*τοῦ εἶδους καὶ τῆς θεότητος*] of the Father is the Being of the Son, it follows that the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son. On this account and reasonably, having said before, *I and the Father are one*, He added, *I in the Father and the Father in Me*, by way

¹ The term *ὑπόστασις*, although thus introduced by Dr. Shedd, does not once occur in the section; nor is there anything in the original that can justify the apparent contrast between *ὑπόστασις* and *οὐσία*.

² There is nothing in the original that will bear the translation *communicating his substance*. This phrase is technical in the scheme that recognizes numerical oneness, and its use implies the idea of such oneness. That the idea of the *communication of substance*, with all that it implies, may be logically in the paragraph is a fair subject for argument, but it should not be assumed as true by the introduction of a technical term that is not a translation of any word or phrase in the original.

DR. SHEDD'S QUOTATION.

OXFORD TRANSLATION.

of shewing the identity [ταὐτότητι] of Godhead and the Unity of Substance."

§ 4.¹ For they are one, not as one thing divided into two parts, and these nothing but one, or as one thing twice named, so that the same [τὸν αὐτόν] becomes at one time Father, at another His own Son, for this Sabellius holding was judged an heretic. But They are two, because the Father is Father, and is not also Son, and the Son is Son and not also Father; but the nature [φύσις] is one; for the offspring is not unlike [ἀνόμοιον] its parent (for it is His image), and all that is the Father's is the Son's. Wherefore neither is the Son another God, for He was not procured from without, else were there many, if a godhead be procured foreign from the Father's; for if the Son be other, as an Offspring, still He is the Same [ταὐτόν] as God; and He and the Father are one in propriety and peculiarity [οἰκειότητα] of nature, and the identity of the one Godhead as has been said. For the radiance also is light, not second to the sun, nor a different light, nor from participation [μετουσία] of it, but a whole and proper offspring of it. And such an offspring is necessarily one light; and no one would say that they are two lights, but sun and radiance two, yet one the light from the sun enlightening in its radiance all things. So also the Godhead of the Son is the Father's; whence also it is indivisible; and thus there is one God and none other but He. And so, since they are one, and the Godhead [Divinity] itself one, the same

The Son cannot be otherwise than begotten of the Father, and consequently, cannot be the Father; yet as being (*sic*) begotten of the Father he cannot but be God; and as being God, he cannot but be one in essence with the Father; and therefore He and the Father are One,—one in propriety and community of nature, and one in unity of Godhead. Thus brightness is light; the splendor or radiance of the sun is coeval with the body of the sun. It is of its very substance. It is not a secondary flame kindled or borrowed from it, but it is the very offspring and issue of the sun's body. The sunbeams cannot be separated from that great fund of light. No man in his senses can suppose them subsisting after their communication with the planet is cut off. And yet, the sun and the brightness that flows from it are not one and the same thing. They are at once united, and yet indi-

¹ Oxford Translation, p. 403 sq. The entire section is reproduced with the exception of a few Scriptural quotations at the close.

DR. SHEDD'S QUOTATION.

vidual, in the substance of that total light and heat that cherishes the world and paints the face of nature. And this is an imperfect emblem of the all-glorious divinity of the Son of God, which is essentially one with that of the Father. *They are one numerical substance.*¹ They are one God, and there are no other Gods beside that one. And both being one in essence and divinity, it follows that whatever can be affirmed of the Father may as truly and properly be affirmed of the Son, *except only the relation of paternity.*

That the Son is co-eternal with the Father is evinced by the *very nature of the relation of Sonship.* For no one is father of a son, nor can in a physical sense be called so, until he has a son. The relationship of artist or workman does not necessarily imply a co-existence of mechanical works or productions with their maker; and therefore it does not follow that God could not be a Creator before the existence of his creatures. *But he could not be a Father before he had a Son of his very Substance; and therefore his Paternity must have been co-eternal with his Godhead.*

It is important, in order to the full discussion of this subject, that the following extract from the great History of Neander should be considered.

¹ As will be seen, on careful examination, there is literally nothing in the original to which this sentence, italicized by the present writer, answers.

² The last quotation in the preceding division — the one concerning the Emperor's Image — follows this passage. See p. 741 sq.

³ Oxford Translation, p. 407. The quotation here begins at what is presumed to be Dr. Shedd's point of beginning. The portion of this paragraph immediately preceding the part here quoted, may be found on p. 719.

OXFORD TRANSLATION.

things are said of the Son which are said of the Father, except his being said to be Father; for instance, that He is God, *and the Word was God.* etc.³

§ 6.³ Wherefore also is He implied together with the Father. For, a son not being, one cannot say father; whereas, when we call God a Maker, we do not of necessity intimate the things which have come to be; for a maker is before His works. But when we call God Father, at once with the Father we signify the Son's existence [*ὑπαρξω*]. Therefore also he who believes in the Son believes also in the Father; for he believes in what is proper to the Father's Substance, and thus the faith is one in one God.

“If we consider the connection of thoughts and ideas in the doctrinal system of this father [Athanasius], we shall doubtless be led to see, that in contending for the Homoiousion he by no means contended for a mere speculative formula, standing in no manner of connection with what constitutes the essence of Christianity. . . . On the holding fast to the Homoiousion depended, in his view, the whole unity of the Christian consciousness of God, the completeness of the revelation of God in Christ, the reality of the redemption which Christ wrought, and of the communion with God restored by him to man.

“If Christ, so argued Athanasius, against the Arian doctrine, differed from other creatures simply as being the only creature immediately produced by God, his essence being wholly distinct from the essence of God, then he could not bring the creature into fellowship with God, since we must be constrained to conceive of something still, intermediate between him as a creature and the divine essence which differed from him, something whereby *he* might stand in communion with God, — and this intermediate being would be precisely the Son of God in the proper sense. In analyzing the conception of God communicated to the creature, it would be necessary to arrive at last at the conception of that which requires nothing intermediate in order to communion with God; — which does not participate in God’s essence as something foreign from itself, but which is itself the self-communicating essence of God. This is the only Son of God, the being who can be called so in the proper sense. *The expressions Son of God, and divine generation, are of a symbolical nature, and denote simply the communication of the divine essence.*¹ It is only on the supposition that Christ is, in this sense alone, the proper Son of God that he can make rational creatures children of God. It is the Logos who imparts himself to them, dwells within them, through whom they live in God — the Son of God within them, through the fellowship with whom they become themselves children of God.’”²

To one familiar with the writings of Athanasius, one who knows how the ideas of generation and “genuine” sonship pervade those writings, appearing in some form on almost every page and forming their very staple, the sentence italicized above is simply astounding. It must be acknowledged that the passage as it lies in the original is peculiar. Not only does it appear in one of the earliest of the controversial writings of Athanasius, but in it occurs a phraseology altogether unlike that which is elsewhere employed. Elsewhere

¹ Italics by the present writer.

² Neander, *History of the Christian Religion and Church* (Torrey’s transl.), Vol. ii. p. 380 sq.

he declares that the Son is not such from participation [*μετουσία*],¹ and indeed he declares the same in this passage, but he does say what he nowhere else says, namely, "What is partaken from the Father [*τὸ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς μετεχόμενον*] is the Son." The explanation of the use of this phraseology is to be found in the circumstances under which the passage was written. Athanasius was arguing against those who "deny that the Son is the proper offspring of the Father's substance, on the ground that this must imply parts and divisions."² That he might confute them he accepted for the sake of argument their phraseology. The passage professedly quoted by Neander follows immediately after the passage quoted on page 735, the latter part of which reads as follows:

"It does but remain that they should deny Him also, because they understand not how God is, and what the Father is, now that, foolish men, they measure by themselves the offspring of the Father. And persons in such a state of mind as to consider that there cannot be a Son of God, demand our pity; but they must be interrogated and exposed for the chance of bringing them to their senses."³

He then proceeds to interrogate and expose them. He writes:

"If then, as you say, 'the Son is from nothing,' and 'was not before His generation,' He, of course, as well as others, must be called Son, and God, and Wisdom only by participation [*μετουσία*]; for thus all other creatures consist, and by sanctification are glorified. You have to tell us, then, of what He is partaker. All other things partake the Spirit, but He, according to you, of what is He partaker? Of the Spirit? Nay, rather the Spirit Himself takes from the Son, as He Himself says; and it is, not reasonable to say that the latter is sanctified by the former. Therefore it is the Father that He partakes [*τοῦ Πατρὸς μετέχει*], for this only remains to say. But this which is participated [*τί τοῦτο*],⁴ what is it or whence? If it be something external provided by the Father, He will not now be partaker of the Father, but of what is external to Him; and no longer will He be even second after the Father, since He has before Him this other; nor can He be called Son of the Father, but of that,

¹ De Synodis, § 48, p. 148; § 51, p. 151; § 53, p. 156. Discourse III. § 1, p. 400; § 4, 404; § 6, p. 406; § 15, p. 422.

² Discourse I. § 15, p. 202.

³ Discourse I. §§ 15, 16, p. 202 sqq.

⁴ The words *which is participated* are introduced by the Oxford translator.

as partaking which He has been called Son and God. And if this be extravagant and irreligious, when the Father says, *This is my beloved Son*, and when the Son says that God is his own Father, it follows that what is partaken [τὸ μετεχόμενον] is not external, but from the Substance of the Father. And as to this again if it be other than the Substance of the Son, an equal extravagance will meet us; there being in that case something between this that is from the Father and the Substance of the Son, whatever that be. Such thoughts, then, being evidently extravagant and untrue, we are driven to say that what is from the Substance of the Father, and proper to Him, is entirely the Son; for it is all one to say that God is wholly participated [τὸ γὰρ ὅλως μετέχεσθαι τὸν Θεόν] and that he begets; and what does begetting signify but a Son? And thus of the Son Himself, all things partake according to the grace of the Spirit coming from Him; and this shows that the Son Himself partakes [μετέχει] of nothing, but what is partaken from the Father is the Son; for, as partaking of the Son Himself, we are said to partake of God; and this is what Peter said, *that ye may be partakers [κοινωνοί] in a divine nature* And beholding the Son, we see the Father; for the thought [ἐννοία] and comprehension of the Son, is knowledge concerning the Father, because He is His proper offspring from His substance. And since to be partaken [τὸ μετέχεσθαι] no one of us would ever call affection or division of God's substance, (for it has been shown and acknowledged that God is participated, and to be participated is the same thing as to beget); therefore that which is begotten is neither affection nor division of that blessed substance. Hence it is not incredible that God should have a Son, the Offspring of His own substance; nor do we imply affection or division of God's substance, when we speak of 'Son' and 'Offspring'; but rather, as acknowledging the genuine, and true, and Only-begotten of God, so we believe."

Now it must be acknowledged that the expressions τὸ ὅλως μετέχεσθαι τὸν Θεόν and τὸ ἐκ τοῦ Πατρὸς μετεχόμενον, considered in themselves, are *consistent* with what is understood by the phrase *communication of substance*; but they do not *require* the hypothesis of numerical oneness of substance necessarily involved in that phrase. They are consistent also with such an hypothesis of divine generation as we have seen, from an immense number of passages, was contemplated by Athanasius, namely, the eternal production, from the infinite and undivided Substance of the Father, of the infinite and indivisible Substance of the Son.

That the Nicene Council held the doctrine of numerical one-

ness was affirmed by Dr. Charles Hodge. This distinguished Professor entered into no historical discussion of the subject; he, however, presented, an argument thereon, which in order to the full discussion of this subject should be considered. He writes :

“ The word selected by the Nicene fathers to express the idea of community of Substance, was *ὁμοούσιος*. But this word, as we have already seen, may express either specific sameness, or numerical identity. In the former sense, all spirits, whether God, angels, or men are *ὁμοούσιοι*. They are similar in essence, *i.e.* they are rational intelligences. That the Council intended the word to be taken in the latter sense, as expressing numerical identity is plain.”¹

Before proceeding to consider the several reasons by which he endeavors to establish the conclusion set forth in the last sentence, it is important to call attention to what seems to be a grave error in this prefatory statement. After stating that the word *ὁμοούσιος* “ may express either specific sameness or numerical identity,” the writer proceeds to set forth his idea of *specific sameness*. He represents it as indicating *mere similarity* in essence, such similarity as exists between God, angels, and men, as rational intelligences. He altogether overlooks what I cannot but regard as the true idea of the phrase, namely *homogeneity*— such sameness as exists in the case of a progenitor and the members of a natural family proceeding from that progenitor. That this, namely *homogeneity*, was the idea affixed to the term by Athanasius, and that in his judgment it never had the force of *mere similarity*, seems to me to be manifest from every page of his writings, and to have been abundantly set forth in the preceding extracts. (See especially p. 705 sq.)

The five reasons given by Dr. Hodge for his conclusion will now be presented; each will be examined in the order of numeration before the next is quoted. Immediately after the prefatory statement quoted above he continues :

“(1). Because in its wider sense *ὁμοούσιος* does not differ from *ὁμοιούσιος*, which word the Council refused to adopt. The Arians were

¹ Systematic Theology, Vol. i. p. 460.

willing to admit that the Father, Son, and Spirit were *ὁμοιούσιοι*, but refused to admit that they were *ὁμοούσιοι*. This proves that the words were used in radically different senses."

It is manifest that the entire force of this reason depends on the assumption that *ὁμοιούσιος* has but one meaning, namely *mere similarity*, that which in the prefatory statement he had assumed to be one of the significations of *ὁμοούσιος*. As in the prefatory statement he did not present *homogeneity* as a meaning of *ὁμοούσιος*, so here he does not set it forth as one of the meanings of *ὁμοιούσιος*. That is to say, in the case of each of the terms he failed to set forth that meaning which was common to both — that meaning which the higher Homoiousians attached to *ὁμοιούσιος*, and in view of which attachment Athanasius recognized them as orthodox. It is evident from the writings of the great Patriarch, especially from the classical passages cited in the first part of this article, that the Council of Nicaea did not decline to adopt *ὁμοιούσιος* because it necessarily affirmed a heresy, but, in the first place, because being ambiguous it was used by heretics in its erroneous sense; and in the second place, possibly,¹ because it was regarded as inappropriate to express relation between *substances*; *ὁμοούσιος* being the appropriate term for such use.

"(2). Because the Council declares that the Son was eternal; that He was not created or made, but begotten *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς*, 'of the very essence of the Father.'"

The Council of Nicaea did indeed so declare, but it is difficult to see how the conclusion of *numerical oneness* follows from the premises as set forth. The idea naturally suggested by the terms "begotten" and *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς* is "offspring from the Father's substance," a phrase constantly occurring in the writings of Athanasius and manifestly used by him as a synonyme for the declaration of the Creed. But the ideas of *offspring from the substance of a progenitor* and *numerical oneness of substance with that progenitor* are ap-

¹ This reason is mentioned as problematical, because of the consideration set forth at the conclusion of the remarks on the last classical passage, p. 710.

parently incongruous. Most certainly they are not so allied that the attributing of the former to an individual logically implies the attributing of the latter; if so, all men are numerically one in substance with their progenitors. Nor does the fact that the generation of the Divine Son is from eternity necessarily imply a difference in this respect. It is difficult to conceive how the conclusion could have been connected in the mind of Dr. Hodge with such premises; unless, indeed, he tacitly assumed that the generation of *a substance* from the indivisible substance of the Father is an impossibility; or, in other words, that the generation of a substance from a substance necessarily implies division of the generating substance. Now, supposing that he made this assumption, he may have been right in so doing; nevertheless, be it observed, it is one of the two objections that Athanasius everywhere contemplated as made against the doctrine of the *ὁμοούσιον* advocated by him. This whole matter is discussed in Division VI. of this article; the objection as set forth by Athanasius and his answers thereto are given in his own language. The answers of Athanasius, which were from the standpoint of specific sameness, may or may not have been valid; that matters not to the present inquiry. We are searching, not after what the Nicene fathers ought to have believed, but what they did believe. The fact that the objection of division of the Divine substance can with plausibility be urged against the doctrine of *specific sameness*, whilst manifestly it cannot for an instant lie against that of *numerical identity*, carries with it the probability that the former was the doctrine advocated by Athanasius, a probability abundantly confirmed by a study of his answer to this very objection.

“(3) This [numerical oneness] is implied in the explanation of ‘eternal generation’ universally adopted by the Nicene fathers, as ‘the eternal communication of the same numerical essence whole and entire from the Father to the Son.’”

The last sentence is set forth as a quotation; there is no reference, however, to the author from whom it is quoted.

If by the term "Nicene fathers" was meant those fathers who in the judgment of the writer agreed in opinion with the members of the Council of Nicaea, then, doubtless, declarations to the effect set forth could readily be found. If, however, by "Nicene fathers" was meant members of the Nicene Council, then, with the highest respect for the venerated Professor, the accuracy of the statement may be questioned. Most certainly Athanasius knew nothing of the doctrine of "the eternal communication of the same numerical essence whole and entire from the Father to the Son." His whole system is utterly inconsistent with the one of which "the communication of the Divine Substance" forms an essential part, as must have been apparent to every reader of the preceding extracts, and as will clearly appear from the concluding summary.

"(4). If the term *ὁμοούσιος* be taken in the sense of specific sameness, then the Nicene Creed teaches Tritheism. The Father, Son, and Spirit are three Gods in the same sense that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are three men, for all men in that sense of the term are *ὁμοούσιοι*. It is the clear doctrine of these Councils that the same numerical, infinite, indivisible essence subsists in the three persons of the Trinity."

This is, probably, the most plausible objection against the view advocated in this article, and yet it is not in the least degree conclusive. A doctrine may logically involve a heresy and yet the Council of Nicaea may have held it. Councils are not infallible. The question at issue is what was the *expressed* doctrine of that Council? Now it is probable that Athanasius was as completely a representative of the Council of Nicaea as any one man ever was of any ecclesiastical body. That Athanasius held the doctrine of the specific oneness of the substance of the Son with that of the Father is manifest, as we have seen, not only from the general tenor of his writings, but from his remarks on this very subject of Tritheism. He recognized that the charge of this heresy had been brought against the doctrine of the *ὁμοούσιον*, and he answered it, not from the standpoint of numerical oneness of essence, but from that of homogeneity. His answer may not have been valid; nevertheless it was his answer, and its existence

manifests two things; first, that by *ὁμοούσιος* he intended to indicate homogeneity; and secondly, that he did not regard his doctrine as involving tritheism.

"(5).¹ This [numerical identity] is still farther evident from the inadequate illustrations of this great mystery which the early fathers sought for in nature; as of the light, heat, and splendor of the sun; the fountain and its streams; and especially from memory, intelligence, and will in man. In all these illustrations, however inadequate, the point of analogy was unity (numerical identity) of essence with triplicity."

That the point of analogy was *unity of essence with triplicity* is manifest; that by "unity of essence" was contemplated "numerical identity" may well be questioned. The illustrations most frequently employed by Athanasius are those of human sons, the radiance [*ἀπαύγασμα*] of light, the stream from fountain, and the human *λόγος* from the mind.

The most important of these illustrations is that of the relation of human offspring to the parent. This, as must have been apparent to the careful reader of the preceding pages, illustrates, in the view of Athanasius, the relation of the Divine Son to his Father save in two particulars; namely, first, the divine generation is eternal; and secondly, it is without division of substance. Now, to assume that this last particular implies what is now technically known as "communication of substance," and does not denote the generation of a perfect substance from a substance perfect and indivisible, is not only to set at naught the entire body of the teaching of the great Patriarch, but it is to overlook the very point of the illustration. It may be said that such a generation is inconceivable. Most certainly it is. But is it more inconceivable than "the communication of one, indivisible substance" by one "Hypostasis" to another?

The illustration of *radiance* [*ἀπαύγασμα*] to light [*φῶς*] or the sun [*ἥλιος*] occurs in the translated works of Athanasius more than fifty times. No argumentative use has been made of it in the preceding pages, since, as has already been

¹ The numeral (5) does not occur in the text. It is manifest, however, that this was regarded as the fifth reason.

remarked, it is as much a problem to determine what, in the view of Athanasius, is the relation of radiance to its source as it is to determine the relation of the Son to the Father. The term invariably employed in this illustration, save in one instance, to figure the Divine offspring is ἀπαύγασμα. Both Liddell and Scott (Am. ed. 1846), and Robinson (1836), define this term as *reflected light* (or *splendor*); the former note it as a word belonging to "LXX and New Test."¹ In each of these it occurs only once, viz. Wisd. vii. 26: "For she [Wisdom] is the brightness of the everlasting light [ἀπαύγασμα γάρ ἐστι φωτὸς αἰδίου], the unspotted mirror of the power of God, and the image of his goodness"; Heb. i. 3: "Who being the brightness [ἀπαύγασμα] of His glory."² Cremer (1872) writes concerning this word: "From ἀπαυγάω = *to radiate*, or also to *reflect* Hence ἀπαύγασμα = *what is radiated*, or = *brightness, reflection*." The first of these meanings — "what is radiated" *radiance*, — manifestly is more in accordance than the other with the derivation and with the requirements of the passages quoted from the LXX and the New Test. The thought of the illustration may have been suggested to the mind of Athanasius by the passage he quoted from Theognostus, which may be found in completeness on page 718 of this article. In that passage it is declared that "The substance of the Son sprang from the Father's substance as the radiance of light [τοῦ φωτὸς τὸ ἀπαύγασμα] it is an effluence of the Father's substance, which, however, suffers no partition. For as the sun remains the same, and is not impaired by the rays poured forth by it, so neither does the Father's substance suffer change, though it has the Son as an Image of itself." The idea here manifestly is

¹ The reference above is to early editions of the Lexicons mentioned. In the latest editions both these works agree with the first definition of Cremer. Thus in the Seventh edition of Liddell and Scott we have, "*radiance, effulgence, of light beaming from a luminous body.*" Robinson (ed. 1878) gives, "*a flashing forth, radiance, effulgence. . . . Others: reflected brightness; but against both the etymology and the usus loquendi.*"

² The only exception I have been able to find is in Discourse iv. § 2, p. 515, where we read of "light from fire."

that the ἀπαύγασμα is a luminous substance radiated from a luminous substance. This idea is required by the many declarations that the ἀπαύγασμα is the *offspring*,¹ and the *image* (or likeness²) of the sun, or light. To say that one thing is not only offspring but *image* of another is utterly inconsistent with the idea that those things are numerically one. Nor is the hypothesis, that Athanasius regarded the ἥλιος (or φώς) and the ἀπαύγασμα radiated from it, as two homogeneous and inseparably united substances, inconsistent with aught discoverable in his writings. This remark is made in full recognition of the fact that he again and again declared them to be one. The principal passages in which this is declared have all, with one exception, been quoted, and may be found in that division of the article which treats of the objections considered by Athanasius, and in the comparison of passages quoted by Dr. Shedd. They will be found in the order indicated below.³ Examination of these passages, in connection with my remarks on the answers to the objections, will, it is believed, show that they are all consistent with the idea of homogeneity. The excepted passage will be considered at the close of this special division of the article, as it has respect as well to the illustration of the λόγος as that of radiance.

The illustration of stream from fountain occurs but seldom in the writings of Athanasius. It needs no special discussion. One of the principal instances of its occurrence is at the close of the first classical passage, in which it appears in connection with the other figures; another occurrence is in the second classical passage. The illustration of the human λόγος is more important. One of the principal instances of its use is at the close of the section which includes the first classical passage. It forms the staple of his answer to the expressed fear that his doctrine of the ὁμοούσιον implied division of the substance of the Father. As such it

¹ De Synodis, § 52, p. 154 sq.; Discourse I. § 37, p. 234; Discourse II. § 33, p. 326 sq.; § 35, p. 329; Discourse III. § 4, p. 404; § 66, p. 495.

² Nicen. Def., § 24, p. 40 sq.; De Syn., § 48, p. 148; Disc. I. § 20, p. 209.

³ Nicen. Def., § 24, p. 40 sq.; De Syn., § 52, p. 153 sq.; Disc. III. § 15, p. 421 sq.; § 4, p. 403 sq.

was quoted first amongst the passages cited in Division VI., 1, of this article, and special attention was called to it in a footnote.¹ In it, it will be perceived upon examination, he illustrated the fact that the Divine *Λόγος* is generated without division of the Father's substance by the fact that the production of the human *λόγος* implies no division in man; but at the same time he notices this difference between the divine and the human, namely, that the former is "*substantive* [*ἐνούσιος*]." And still further, he declares that he is called "Son" in view of the fact that he is "substantive."

In the following passage both *ἀπαύγασμα* and *λόγος* occur. It follows a passage in which such Scriptures as the following had been quoted; viz. "Who being the brightness [*ἀπαύγασμα*] of his glory and the expression of his subsistence [*χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως*; A. V. *express image of his person*]" : "In the beginning was the Word [*Λόγος*]," etc. Athanasius wrote :

"For such illustrations and such images has Scripture proposed, that, considering the inability of human nature to comprehend God, we might be able to form ideas even from these, however poorly and dimly, as far as is attainable. . . . It is very mad . . . to ask in an heretical way, How can the Son be from eternity? or how can He be from the Father's substance, yet not a part? since what is said to be of another is a part of him, and what is divided is not whole. These are the evil sophistries of the heterodox; yet, though we have already shown their shallowness, the exact sense of these passages themselves and the force of these illustrations will serve to show the baseless nature of their loathsome tenet. For we see that reason [*τὸν λόγον*] is ever, and is from him and proper to [of] his substance [*τῆς οὐσίας ἰδίου*] whose reason it is, and does not admit a before and an after. So again we see that the radiance of the sun is proper to [of] it, and the sun's substance is not divided or impaired; but its substance is whole and its radiance perfect and whole, yet without impairing the substance of light, but as a true offspring from it. We understand in like manner that the Son is begotten not from without, but from the Father, and while the Father remains whole the expression of His subsistence [*χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως*] is ever and preserves the Father's likeness and unvarying Image, so that He who sees Him sees in Him the subsistence too of which He is the expression. And from the operation [*ἐνεργείας*] of the expression we understand the true godhead

¹ See p. 731 sq.

of the subsistence.¹ Therefore let this Christ-opposing heresy attempt first to divide [διελείν] the examples found in things generate, and say, 'Once the sun was without his radiance,' or, 'Radiance is not proper to the substance of light,' or, 'It is indeed proper, but it is a part of light by division'; and then let it divide reason, and pronounce that it is foreign to mind, or that once it was not, or that it is not proper to its substance. or that it is by division a part of mind. . . . For if in the case of these generate and irrational things offsprings are found which are not parts of the substances from which they are, nor subsist with passion, nor impair the substances of their originals, are they not mad again in seeking and conjecturing parts and passions in the instance of the immaterial and true God, and ascribing divisions to Him who is beyond passion and change, thereby to perplex the ears of the simple and to pervert them from the truth? For who hears of a son but conceives of that which is proper to the father's substance? Who heard, in his first catechizing, that God has a Son and has made all things by his proper Word, but understood it in that sense in which we now mean it? For what is sown in every soul from the beginning is that God has a Son, the Word, the Wisdom, the Power, that is, His Image and Radiance; from which at once follows that He is always; that He is from the Father; that He is like [τὸ ὅμοιον]; that He is the eternal Offspring of his Substance.² Such as is the parent, such of necessity is the offspring; and such as is the Word's Father, such must be also His Word. Now man, begotten in time, in time also himself begets the child; and whereas from nothing he came to be, therefore his word also is over [παύεται] and continues not. But God is not as man, as Scripture has said; but is existing [ὧν ἔστι] and is ever; therefore also His Word is existing [ὧν ἔστι] and is everlastingly with the Father, as radiance from light. . . . As radiance from light so is He perfect Offspring from perfect [γέννημα τέλειον ἐκ τελείου]."³

¹ At first glance it might seem to some as though there was a recognition here by Athanasius, of the distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις. It is to be observed, however, that this form of language, "Expression of his Subsistence [ὑπόστασις]" follows the quotation of Heb. i. 3, in which those words occur, and is used in reference thereto. It should also be remembered that in his Epistle *Ad Afros*, when setting forth that οὐσία and ὑπόστασις are one and the same, this is the New Testament passage to which he refers. The reference occurs in the last part of the passage, as quoted on p. 711 sq. of this Article. It cannot, of course, be supposed that Athanasius here quoted the language of a text to set forth a distinction, which distinction, in reference to that very text, he elsewhere declared did not exist.

² According to Migne in *Patrologia* — also the Benedictine — τὸ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς, τὸ ὅμοιον, τὸ ἀίδιον τοῦ γεννήματος τῆς οὐσίας.

³ Discourse II. §§ 32 sqq., p. 326 sqq.

In reference to this passage, it may be remarked, as was elsewhere remarked in reference to others, that whilst there are several expressions that in themselves might be interpreted in consistency with the hypothesis of numerical oneness, there is nothing to require that hypothesis. It may still further be remarked that in the light of the entire teaching of Athanasius all the expressions employed find their most natural and complete interpretation in the hypothesis of the specific oneness in substance of the Son with the Father.

In conclusion I shall be brief. The considerations on which is based the idea that the Nicene Council used the term *ὁμοούσιον* as indicative of *numerical oneness* are, first, *a priori* arguments as to what that Council must have intended in order to their being orthodox; secondly, declarations concerning the doctrines of the "Nicene fathers," without specification of any particular father and quotation from his writing; and thirdly, references to the writings of Nicene fathers—almost entirely to those of Athanasius. So far as the references to Athanasius are concerned, some have no foundation in fact, some are glossed, and almost all are extracts from passages which contain explanations and limitations of the doctrine held by him. Whilst it is acknowledged that some of these genuine extracts, when considered irrespective of their contexts, are consistent with the hypothesis of numerical oneness, it is claimed that none demand that hypothesis, that all are consistent with the hypothesis of specific oneness.

On the other hand, and as manifesting that Athanasius, the master spirit and great defender of the Council of Nicaea, regarded the term in controversy as indicating *specific oneness*, we have the following: The entire absence of all recognition of a distinction absolutely vital to the hypothesis of numerical oneness, namely, that between *οὐσία* and *ὑπόστασις*; the declaration that the term *ὁμοούσιος* is a term properly indicative of the relation between substances, as between man and man; that human parents and children are *ὁμοούσιοι*; that

the expression "Father" signifies the Substance of the Father, and (impliedly) that of "Son" the Substance of the Son; that the Son is the Offspring of the Substance of the Father; that the Substance of the Son is the Offspring of the Father; that the Substance of the Son is the Offspring of the Father's Substance; that the Son is of like Substance with the Father; that He is like the Father according to Substance; that He is the Image of the Father's Substance. We have also the defence of his system, not from the charge of Sabellianism which would have been the natural charge had he held the doctrine of numerical oneness of Substance, but from those charges which naturally lie against the doctrine of specific oneness, viz. on the one hand, that of holding the doctrine of division of the Divine Substance in generation; and on the other, that of holding the doctrine of Tritheism. We have also his answers against these charges not from the standpoint of the doctrine of numerical oneness, — namely, that his position had been misunderstood, — but from that of specific oneness; namely, as against the first charge, that division of substance is not implied in the generation of immaterial substances; and as against the second, that the generated Substance is to be regarded as referred back to that which generates, and so is to be counted one with it. And lastly, and to crown all, we have the declarations set forth in the first classical passage, that whilst the term *ὁμοούσιον* is ambiguous, and may be used in one of its senses to express a heresy, yet that it has an orthodox sense, so that one who at once believes in the *ὁμοούσιον*, and that the Son is *ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας* of the Father, does in fact embrace all that is intended to be set forth in the *ὁμοούσιον*, and is not to be rejected as a heretic, but to be embraced as a brother.

In my judgment, after a most extended and careful examination of the subject, the idea that Athanasius did not regard the term *ὁμοούσιον* as involving the doctrine of the numerical oneness of the Divine Substance, but that, on the contrary, he used it as designating specific oneness, is one of the most thoroughly demonstrable facts of history.