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ARTICLE I.

A SKETCH OF HINDU PHILOSOPHY.

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[Concluded from Vol. XVIII. p. 595.]

In a previous Article we endeavored to trace the history of philosophy in India from its origin in the speculative writings of the Vedic age until it assumed its earliest scientific form in the Sânkhya system, and a later and practical development in the Buddhistic reformation and the theistic Yoga philosophy. We recognized in the rationalistic Sânkhya philosophy a speculative reaction against the extreme ritualistic tendencies of the age in which it arose, and in Buddhism a moral reform, which was at bottom a bold protest against the arrogant pretensions of a favored class, and which sought to substitute a rigid moral code without a religion in the place of an effeminate superstition which enslaved the masses, while the Yoga philosophy found an explanation in considering it as an attempt to unite the deductions of reason with the received dogmas of religion, and thus restore the broken harmony between the priesthood

and the people. There is good reason to believe that the order in which we considered these developments was the order of history, reasoning mainly from internal affinities between them : but we come now to consider a system of philosophy, or pair of systems, whose position in history is a little more uncertain, but which we are justified in placing between the Sâmkhya and the latest system, the Vedânta.

These two systems are the Vaiseshika and Nyâya. The former of these has for its reputed author, Kanâda, and is distinctively a system of physics. The latter is attributed to one Gôtama, and frequently passes under the title of Hindu Logic. But this title of Logic is a misnomer, and has gained Gôtama a deal of undeserved condemnation, given under the impression that he preferred to give a complete exposition of the laws of thought. At the same time, the Nyâya does pay special attention to the principles of logic, and as a system enjoys a high repute in India, being the first system which engages the attention of the young student of philosophy.

These two systems are even more closely allied than are the Sâmkhya and Yoga, and we shall accordingly consider them together.

The original Sûtras of Gôtama are given us by Dr. Balantyne, together with an illustrative commentary.¹ He has also translated a succinct compendium embracing both the Nyâya and Vaiseshika systems,² and has published a synopsis of science based on the Nyâya, for use in the Benares college.³ Dr. Rœer, secretary of the oriental department of the Bengal Asiatic Society, has translated an independent treatise upon the Nyâya by the commentator upon the Sûtras, who flourished, according to Dr. Rœer, about two

¹ The Aphorisms of the Nyâya Philosophy. (Allahabad.)

² Lectures upon the Nyâya Philosophy, embracing the text of the Tarka Sangraha. This we have failed to obtain, but have procured a translation from a Hindî version, made by Fitz Edward Hall, an American scholar at Calcutta.

³ A Synopsis of Science, in Sanskrit and English, reconciled with the truths to be found in the Nyâya Philosophy. Also in Hindî and translated.

hundred years ago.¹ The treatise is celebrated throughout Bengal, every well-read pundit knowing it by heart. It is also accompanied by a further commentary. Besides these, we have the translations of Ward, and the analysis of Colebrooke, who is fuller upon this than upon any other system. We must add, that the best analytical statement of the two philosophies that we know of, is furnished us by Dr. Rœer in an introduction to his translation. A more accessible and quite lucid exposition is that by Max Müller, in an appendix to the work on logic by Mr. Thomson.² Barthelemy St. Hilaire has also presented us with a criticism of the system and a translation of the Sûtras.³ Many of his remarks are instructive, but his occasional misunderstanding of radical points in the system, make one cautious in perusing his essay. How much he relied on the assistance of the learned Burnouf in his translation (to whom he acknowledges himself indebted), we cannot say; but some of the aphorisms are an egregiously incorrect rendering of the text.

The Sûtras of Gôtama commence in true Hindu style. The first aphorism reads as follows: "From knowledge of the truth in regard to evidence, the ascertainable doubt, motive, example, dogma, confutation, ascertainment, disquisition, controversy, cavil, fallacy, perversion, futility, and occasion for rebuke, there is the attainment of the *summum bonum*." This compact statement is a complete summary of the whole system, which is again unfolded in Book First, and still more in detail in the remaining five books. So orderly and lucid is this synopsis, that Dr. Ballantyne is fully justified in taking earnest exception to Ritter's hasty condemnation of the system as "tedious, loose, and unmethodical."⁴

¹ Bhâsha Parricchêda, or Division of the Categories of the Nyâya Philosophy. Bibliotheca Indica, Nos. 33 and 35. We have failed also to procure the Aphorisms of the Vaiseshika, Part I. of which has been translated by Dr. Ballantyne.

² Outline of the Laws of Thought. London 1857, Appendix on Hindu Logic.

³ *Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences de l'Institut de France*, 1841.

⁴ Ritter. *Hist. of Anc. Phil.* Vol. IV. p. 366.

Each of the above-mentioned objects of knowledge Gôtama considers in turn, and the most important portion of his treatise is occupied in discussing the "ascertainable," which he divides as follows: "soul, body, sense, sense-object, knowledge, the mind, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain, and beatitude, are that regarding which we are to have right knowledge."

Instead, however, of following the Sûtras of Gôtama, we have thought it preferable to take the more compact *Tarka Sangraha*, which follows in the main the same method as the *Bhâsha Parricchêda*. The *Tarka Sangraha* starts in true Aristotelian fashion, by presenting us with seven "categories," under which all that is conceivable may be arranged. These are: "Substance, Quality, Action, Genus, Difference or Individuality, Co-inherence or Intimate Relation, and, though excluded by some, Non-Existence."

Substance is defined to be "the substrate of qualities, and to have substantiality." So the *Nyâya*, Kanâda adds "actions" to qualities. Qualities, it is said, "abide in substance, and are without qualities and actions." Their existence is known by perception, while by inference from them substance is proved to exist. This definition of substance and quality, as purely relative terms, expresses truthfully the only condition under which we are able to conceive them.¹ "Action produces motion." But Substance was defined as having also Substantiality, by which was intended the fourth category, Genus. Genus was by no means regarded as simply a conception of the mind, a condition under which it was possible to classify objects, but which had no correspondent reality in the world of existence; Gôtama and Kanâda were both thorough-going realists, and affirmed stoutly that Genus had actual, positive existence, independent of any mind that conceived it. It was asserted, also, to have a twofold character, to be eternal in eternal things, non-eternal in things transient.

Individuality resides in all substances in their eternal,

¹ Hamilton. *Discussions on Philosophy*, p. 580.

unperceived, atomic form. But Gôtama feels a difficulty. Having assumed his substances and given them qualities and actions, having also predicated genus and particularity of substance, quality, and action, the question arose: By what principle is this connection of substance with quality, etc., effected? To solve the difficulty, he contrives another category, and names it Co-Inherence or Intimate Relation, that relation which unites the above-mentioned categories. We at once inquire: "But what binds this Intimate Relation itself with substance on the one hand, and quality, etc., on the other?" Gôtama is silent, and of course at fault; yet it is certainly to his credit that he felt the necessity of meeting the difficulty, and made the attempt. The last category is Negation or Non-Existence, the contradictory of the six preceding.

Let us now return, and treat more in detail these categories. Substances are nine: "Earth, Water, Light, Air, Ether, Time, Place, Soul, Mind." The first five are the material elements, which find a place in every system of Hindu philosophy; but while other systems are content with a bare enumeration, or the briefest description of them, the Nyâya looks further, and inquires into their interior nature. The elements, except Ether, it affirms to be of two kinds—eternal and non-eternal. In the latter form they appear in perceptible, gross matter, and are cognizable in three aspects: as organism, organ, and inorganic matter. The Earth, for instance, is seen as organism in the body; as organ, it is the apprehender of smell; as inorganic, it is seen in stones, clods, etc. Considered as eternal, the elements are affirmed to be atomic. This theory of atoms, though accepted by Gôtama, would seem to be the distinctive property of Kanâda, who is specially engaged with physics. According to him, "an atom is what exists, has no cause, and is without commencement and end; an atom is contrary to what has a measure."¹ Gôtama defines it, more briefly, as "what is absolutely beyond being cut."² Their existence is argued upon the ground that otherwise

¹ Bhâsha Par. p. 14, note.

² Sûtras. Aph. 82.

there would be a "regressus in infinitum," which is the Hindu's special horror. As the Yoga argument for the being of God was that we must conceive of infinite magnitudes just as we do of an infinite parvitude, so here the same reasoning is applied in the reverse order. Moreover, it will not do, they tell us, to assume an infinite divisibility of matter, else there would be no difference between an elephant and a gnat, between a mustard-seed and Mount Meru. A single atom is invisible, and is not considered as a substance. The smallest substance is a compound of two atoms; the next of three double atoms: this is the smallest perceptible substance,¹ and of the size of a mote in the sunbeam.

We have, then, in India a theory of physics not unlike the Greek theory as held by Leucippus and Democritus. Both theories assume an atom as the ultimate substance; but the Indian is superior to the Greek, in that it is not so grossly material, nor so prominent an element of the general system. Democritus did not hesitate to assume motion as inherent in atoms, and to affirm the soul itself to be "a composite body of a finer species, similar to the particles in the sunbeam, and which, residing in the grosser body of animated beings, is the cause of their motions."² Kanâda is decidedly above him in both denying the atomic nature of the soul, and in referring all combination and activity of atoms to a superintending Deity. This will appear in the sequel.

The Elements are regarded as the sites of qualities. Thus earth has the quality of smell. Its site is in the forepart of the nose. The quality of water is savor, whose sense resides in the tip of the tongue. The quality of light is color, the sense of which, sight, resides in the forepart of the pupil of the eye. Air has tangibility, and the sense is found throughout the whole body. The fifth element, ether, whose presence in all the Hindu cosmogonies is constantly surprising us, differs in the Nyâya view from

¹ Coleb. *Essays*, p. 176.

² Ritter. *Hist. Anc. Phil.* Vol. I. p. 560.

the other four. Although eternal, it is not atomic, but is infinite, "filling out space, and can therefore be distinguished from space only by a less degree of density." According to Dr. Rœer, this notion of a sublimated essence was no essential ingredient of the Nyâya scheme, but was assumed "historically, or as a part of the views on matter which had been formed previously." He thinks the theory more ancient than the doctrine of the soul.¹ Ether has the quality of sound. The organ of hearing is ethereal, being a portion of the ether confined in the hollow of the ear, endued with a peculiar and unseen virtue. The argument for the existence of ether is based on the existence of sound; as sound cannot be apprehended by either of the other organs, or be an attribute of either of the above four elements, there must be assumed a special substratum, and that is ether. The question: Is sound eternal?—a pet subject of the Mîmânsâ—is here mooted, but we defer comment upon it until we consider the latter system.

Time and Space, the next following substances, are said to be each "one, all-pervading, and eternal." "Time is thought the producer of all that may be produced, and the support of the worlds. It is the cause of the knowledge of priority and posteriority; it has many names, as that of day, etc. Space is the cause of the notion of distance and proximity. It obtains various designations, as east, west, etc."² The Sûtras of Gôtama have a brief discussion of the possibility of time present. "There is no time present (says the sceptic), because of a thing falling we can demonstrate only the time through which it has fallen and that through which it has to fall." To this Gôtama replies: "Those two also (the past and future) would not be, if the present were not, because they are relative to it." The sceptic rejoins: That since the past and future are substantiated sufficiently by their relation each to the other, they have no necessary relation to any present. But the reply is that that would be a mere reasoning in a circle— from past

¹ Bhâsha Par. p. x.

² Ibid. 44—48.

to present, and from present to past. "Well," says the objector, "what were the loss if these two also did not exist?" To which the reply is: "Were there no present (as then there would not be), there would be no cognition of anything, because perception would be impossible."¹

The eighth substance is Soul. In their statements respecting this essential doctrine, Gôtama and Kanâda approach the most closely of all Hindu philosophers to the Christian dogma. They are *par excellence* the Theists of India. Says the Tarka Sangraha, concisely: "The substratum of knowledge they call Soul. It is of two kinds, the animal soul and the supreme soul. The supreme soul is God, the omniscient. He is One only, and devoid of joy or sorrow. And the animal soul is distributed to each body. It is all-pervading and eternal."²

The Nyâya agrees with the Sâmkhya philosophy in asserting the individuality and eternity of souls; it goes wholly beyond it in affirming with equal explicitness the existence of a Supreme Spirit. It agrees again with the Yoga in declaring this supreme soul to be omniscient; but it goes equally beyond it in declaring elsewhere that God is the ruler and prime mover of the universe. Creation out of nothing was never dreamed of, yet atoms, the material of creation, had in themselves no inherent energy nor plastic power; combination of atoms must be effected in order to creation, yet no combination could occur unless Deity interpose, unite, and cause motion. Again, mind, the instrument of soul's knowledge, could never act as that instrument unless Deity effect what was termed the union of soul and mind. Thus this conception of a God was no adventitious addition to the scheme; it was an essential element, and a striking feature of it. The argument in proof of his existence, as stated by the authorities of this school, is strictly and solely *à posteriori*: thus, one work states that "such productions as a water-jar are produced by a maker, and so also are the vegetable sprouts and the

¹ Sûtras. Aph. 39—44. See Hamilton. Discussions, etc. p. 518.

² Tark. Sang. p. 7.

earth, etc., and to make them is not possible for such as we are ; hence the existence of the Lord as the maker of these is demonstrated.”¹

In the Nyâya philosophy there is a decided advance upon the atheistic and vague dogmas of the Sâmkhya and Yoga schemes, and as infinite a superiority to the later pantheism of the Vedânta ; indeed, this spiritual conception of God as a free being, wholly distinct from nature, and also the sole former of the material world, strikes us with peculiar force, standing thus in solitary grandeur in the midst of such generally gross and crude notions as prevail in India ; where, indeed, outside of Christianity, will you find so pure and exalted theism ? The faulty conception of God as devoid of all emotion, the Nyâya shares in common with all Hindu theories ; in their view, it militates with his perfection.

The existence of the animal soul is argued in various ways. The general proof is as follows : “ Desire, Aversion, Volition, Pleasure, Pain, and Knowledge are the sign of the Soul.”² Its existence as separate from body is argued on the ground that sin remains after the body dies. But it is eternal, and the proof of this is also various. The fact that “ joy, fear, and grief arise to him that is born, through relation to his memory of things previously experienced,” proves its eternity ; also, “ because of the desire for milk caused by the practice of eating it, in one that has (been born after having) died.”³ The animal soul is said to be distributed to each body, and thus, as an individual, suffers the rewards of good and bad deeds, transmigrating until, by the attainment of supreme knowledge, it is released from connection with matter. It is also infinite, but only as genus and in quantity, the union of identity between the animal and supreme soul being clearly denied, and the literal individuality of the animal soul clearly affirmed.

The ninth and last in the list of substances is Mind. Soul was defined as “ the substratum of knowledge.” But the

¹ Ballantyne. *Christianity Contrasted with Hindu Philosophy*, p. 12.

² Sûtras. Aph. Book I. Aph. 10.

³ Ibid, Book III. Aph. 19—28.

soul can know only by virtue of its instrument ; this instrument is mind. Says the Tarka Saugraha : "The sense which is the cause of the perception of pleasure and pain, etc., they call the Mind. And it is innumerable—for this reason, that it remains with each soul. It is in the form of an atom, and is eternal."¹ There are innumerable minds, but only one in each body, "because," says the Sûtras, "cognitions are not simultaneous," which they might be, were there a plurality of minds to each body. Some one interposes and denies the correctness of his premiss; "we do perceive simultaneously several acts of cognition." But the answer is : "The apprehension thereof is in consequence of the rapid succession, as in seeing a circle in the case of a firebrand."² And for the same reason that the mind is one for each body, each mind is an atom, which only could prevent more than one thought at a time from crowding in upon the soul.³ This theory of the mental faculties, which considers the mind as the sole mediator between the soul and the external world, is perhaps less arbitrary, in our view, than that of the Sâṅkhya, which felt itself obliged to assume a separate organism for each mental act, adding to mind also intellect and self-consciousness. The relative position of Soul and Mind, according to the Nyâya, is well expressed by Dr. Ballantyne. "In the Hindu systems, the soul is the *self*, and the mind is the organ or faculty which, standing between the self and the deliverances of sense, prevents those deliverances from crowding in pell-mell." In the same connection he remarks, that "the English reader," he might have added, missionary, "who is accustomed to hear the words *soul* and *mind* employed interchangeably, must not carry this laxness of phraseology into any Indian dialect, if he desires to be understood."⁴

¹ Tark. Sang. p. 7.

² Sûtras, Book III. Aph. 129—132.

³ By a strange oversight, Ritter states it to be "a principle of the Nyâya, that the soul is an atom." A more thorough study of Colebrooke would have prevented such a misconception. Hist. Anc. Phil. Vol. IV. p. 376.

⁴ Christianity and Hindu Phil. p. xxiii.

Before concluding the consideration of Substance, it will be well to remark that the Nyâya occupies as high ground upon the question of the reality of the external world, as it does upon the doctrine of God. The doubt is raised in the Sûtras, whether *things* are anything other than *ideas*. They may, it is suggested, be "like the conceit of things in a dream, or like jugglery, or the city of the celestial quirksters, or the mirage." But Gôtama replies that the non-existence of the external cannot be proved, whether there be proof of the fact or not; for, if you say that there is such proof, then, by your own admission, that proof exists, and that is external; if you say there is no proof, then the lack of evidence of the non-existence of the external proves the contrary. Gôtama also combats the Mâdhyamika by name, who, it may be remembered, were a sect of Buddhists and denied not merely the existence of the external world, but also the thinking subject. Gôtama says that "as in the case of the external, so there is no reasonable denial of the existence of knowledge, because we are conscious of the reality of its cause.¹

We come next to the category of Quality.

Qualities, according to the Tarka Sangraha, are twenty-four in number. "Color, Savor, Odor, Tangibility, Number, Dimension, Severalty, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Weight, Fluidity, Viscidity, Sound, Understanding, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort, Merit and Demerit, Faculty."² Color is said to inhere in earth, water, and light; Savor, in earth and water; Odor, in earth; Tangibility, in earth, water, light, and air. In earth, these four qualities are said to be produced by maturation, and are then transient; in the other elements they are not thus produced, and are eternal in eternal things, transient in transient.

Omitting any notice of the intervening qualities, we proceed at once to the consideration of Understanding, under which the Nyâya develops its theory of knowledge. "Knowledge, which is the cause of every conception (that

¹ Sûtras, Book IV. Aph. 91—103.

² Tarka Sangraha, p. 3.

can be put in words), they call understanding. It is of two kinds — Remembrance and Notion. The knowledge which is produced only by its own antecedence, they call Remembrance; and knowledge which is different from that is called Notion. This is of two kinds — right and wrong. Right notion is of four kinds, according to the divisions of Perceptions, Inferences, Conclusions from similarity, and authoritative assertions understood.”¹

In this enumeration of the sources of knowledge, the Nyâya differs from all other schools; it differs from the Sâṅkhya, which reduces all to three heads — Perception, Inference, and Right Affirmation, including under the latter the verbal testimony and comparison of the Nyâya; it differs from the Vaiseshika even, it would seem,² which would exclude Comparison from a separate mention, including it in Inference; it differs from the Mîmâṃsâ, which would add Rumor, Conjecture, Probability and Non-Existence, Gôtama affirming that Rumor is nothing else than Testimony, and the other three, Inference; it differs, finally, from the materialist Chârvâka, who admits only Perception.³

The Tarka Sangraha, referring to the causes of Perception, etc., pauses to define a cause. “That which is invariably antecedent to some product, and is not otherwise constituted, is the cause.” “Cause is of three kinds, according to the distinction of intimate, non-intimate, and instrumental. That in which an effect intimately relative to it takes its rise, is an intimate cause (of that effect), as threads are of cloth, and the cloth itself of its own color. Where this intimate relation exists, that cause which is associated in one and the same object (as a necessarily immanent cause) with such effect or cause, is non-intimate. Thus the conjunction of the threads is the non-intimate cause of the cloth, and the color of the threads that of the color of the

¹ Tarka Sangraha, p. 10.

² The Tark. Sang. however agrees with the Sûtras.

³ Sûtras, Book II. Sections I—XI. See Sâṅkhya Kârikâ, p. 20. The mention in the text, by name or reference, of the Vaiseshika and Mîmâṃsâ, would indicate the priority of the Nyâya to these systems.

cloth. The cause which is distinct from both of these is the instrumental cause, as the weaver's brush, the loom, etc., are of cloth. Among these three kinds of causes, that only is called an instrumental cause which is not a universally concurrent cause or condition (of all effects, as God, time, place, etc., are)."¹

To return to the theory of the Understanding.

The first method of proof is Perception, or, as Dr. Ballantyne would prefer to call it, The Deliverance of Sense. It is thus defined: "The cause of the knowledge called Sensation is an organ of sense; knowledge produced by the conjunction of an organ of sense and its object is Sensation."² It is of two kinds: determinate, the perception of an object as a *certain* thing; or indeterminate, the perception of an object as a something not fully known. These organs of sense are five in number, and are asserted to arise from the five elements, in opposition to the Sâṅkhya theory, which produces them from Self-consciousness. From the above use of terms in the text, or rather in the *translation*, it might appear that Gôtama confounds Sensation with Perception; but that he in fact was aware of the distinction is evident from the method of his reply to an objector who asserted that the conjunction of a sense with its object was not the cause of Perception, because this union might exist and no perception follow. Gôtama replies that there would seem to be then no perception, because of the engrossing attention to some other object, thus asserting that perception always ensues upon sensation, but admitting the distinction between the two in consciousness. But what is this "conjunction of an organ of sense with its object?" Gôtama answers the question in a chapter upon the senses. He adduces sight as an illustration. Contrary to the Buddhist theory, that vision resides in the eye-ball, he affirms it to exist in the visual ray which proceeds from the eye-ball, and says that "it is by contact of the ray and the object that it is apprehended," which in his mind is simple sensation. Some

¹ Tarka Saṅgraha, p. 11.

² Ibid, p. 12.

one doubts the existence of this visual ray, because it is not perceptible. Gôtama replies that its invisibility is no proof of its non-existence; but asserts further that it is seen in some nocturnal animals, as cats and the like, which effectually silences that objector. But that this distinction between sensation and perception is understood by the Hindu philosophers in general, is further evident from the definition of what they term "a modification of the thinking principle." It may be remembered that, in the Yoga philosophy, concentration was defined as "the hindering modifications of the thinking principle," which we promised to explain in treating of the Nyâya. This we cannot do better than in the language of a Vedânta work quoted by Dr. Ballantyne, in which the distinction between these separate acts of the mind is, we think, plainly stated. Says this treatise, which, though belonging to another school, equally well represents this :

"As the water of a reservoir, having entered by a channel, tanks (designed for irrigation), becomes four-cornered or otherwise shaped just like these, so the manifesting internal organ (or mind) having gone through the sight or other channel to where there is an object, for instance, a jar, becomes modified by the form of the jar or other object. It is this altered state (of the mind), that is called its modification." "This manifesting internal organ," continues Dr. Ballantyne, "while it is regarded as moulding itself upon the object, is regarded as at the same time manifesting it as a mirror does. To a considerable extent this theory of the Understanding is analogous to the theory of vision entertained by those who regard the retina as reflecting to the intelligent principle those visible forms of which the retina itself is uncognizant; while the intelligent principle itself is cognizant of things visible only inasmuch as they are reflected to it by the retina. The 'modifications' are akin to Locke's 'ideas.'"¹

The second method of proof is Inference, or, as it is termed, "The Recognition of a sign." An inference is

Vedânta Sâra. Aph. 108. b. Aphorisms of the Yoga, Book I. Aph. 8. b.

further defined as "knowledge that results from syllogizing, and the following is given as the ordinary form of a syllogism :

1. The mountain is fiery
2. Because it smokes.
3. Whatever smokes is fiery, as a culinary hearth.
4. And this does so.
5. Therefore it is fiery, as aforesaid.

The five members of this syllogism are severally named :

1. The Proposition.
2. The Reason.
3. The Example.
4. The Application.
5. The Conclusion.

This five-membered syllogism has been the object at once of ridicule and extravagant laudation. Ritter, in his exposition of the Nyâya, founded upon Colebrooke, declares that the followers of this system "can lay but slight claim to accuracy of exposition, as is proved clearly enough from the form of their syllogism, which is made to consist of five instead of three parts. Two of these are manifestly superfluous, while by the introduction of an example in the third, the universality of the conclusion is vitiated."¹ Sir William Hamilton, also, while discussing the two possible forms of the syllogism, the analytic and synthetic, affirms that "the Aristotelic syllogism is exclusively synthetic, the Epicurean exclusively analytic, while the Hindu syllogism is merely a clumsy agglutination of these counter forms, being nothing but an operose repetition of the same reasoning enounced 1, analytically, 2, synthetically."²

The simple and satisfactory reply to the adverse criticisms of these Western philosophers is, that this five-membered syllogism is not laid down by Gôtama as a *logical*, but merely as a *rhetorical* form of argument. The misconception arises from the radical misunderstanding of the nature

¹ Hist. Anc. Phil. Vol. IV. p. 365. St. Hilaire pronounces like condemnation. Memoire sur le Nyâya.

² Discussions, etc. p. 616.

of the Nyâya scheme. This system does not profess to be an outline of the laws of thought; its author in its enunciation has in view solely the deliverance of the spirit from the entanglements of the flesh, and the best method for accomplishing that deliverance; this point he keeps steadily in his eye, and if he has occasion to state the process of reasoning, he discusses it, not as a bare fact of the mind, but in its bearing upon his main end; he has in mind an opponent whom he is seeking to overthrow, or a disciple whom he is endeavoring to persuade. That this is the true solution of the difficulty, the correct explanation of this syllogism has been abundantly shown by Dr. Ballantyne in an able and eloquent appendix to his work upon Christianity and Hinduism, and is placed beyond a doubt by the following passage in the *Tarka Sangraha*, which we quote entire :

“An induction is of two kinds, inasmuch as it may be employed for one’s self and for another. That which is for one’s self is the cause of a private conclusion in one’s own mind. For example: having repeatedly and personally observed, in the case of culinary hearths and the like, that where there is smoke there is fire; having gathered the invariable attendedness of smoke by fire; having gone near a mountain and being doubtful as to whether there is fire in it; having seen smoke on the mountain, a man recollects the invariable attendedness, viz., ‘where there is smoke there is fire.’ This is called the ‘pondering of a sign.’ Thence results the knowledge that ‘the mountain is fiery,’ which is the conclusion. This is the process of influence for one’s self.

“But after having, for one’s self inferred fire from smoke, when one makes use of the five-membered form of exposition, with a view to the information of another, then is the process one of ‘influence for the sake of another.’ For example: 1, The mountain has fire in it; 2, because it has smoke; 3, whatever has smoke has fire, as a culinary hearth; 4, and so this has; 5, therefore it is as aforesaid. By this exposition, in consequence of the sign (or token) here brought to his notice, the other also arrives at the knowledge that

there is fire.”¹ The criticism of Ritter that the presence of an example in the third member vitiates the conclusion, is answered in the last sentence of the above quotation, which asserts that this example is adduced, simply to remind the person of the fact of universality.

Hindu writers have also stated in so many words that a perfect syllogism need embrace but three members, thus in a Vedânta treatise, it is said: “Since no more than three members are required to set forth the general principle and its relevancy to the subject, the other two members are superfluous.”²

But Dr. Ballantyne, who is enthusiastic in his defence of the Hindu system, affirms that the Hindu form of the three-membered syllogism is even more closely conformed to the actual process in thought, than is the Aristotelic. “In thought” says Hamilton, “the syllogism is organically one; and it is only stated in an analytic and synthetic form, from the necessity of adopting the one order or the other, in accommodation to the vehicle of its expression — language.”³ Dr. Ballantyne takes up this statement, and avers that the Hindus have been the most successful in attempting “to embody *this organic unity of the syllogism in thought* in a linguistic unity of expression. When they discuss the laws of the mind syllogising ‘*for itself*,’ — *i. e.*, to use Sir William’s language, ‘*in thought*,’ — they notify the organic unity of the process by wrapping the two premises in one sentence so constructed (*viz.*, in the shape of a period), that, until the last word of the sentence is uttered, no demand is made — or, rather, no pretence exists — for either assent or dissent. In reference to the stock example above quoted, the premises ‘*in thought*’ are propounded, in their unity, by writers on the Nyâya, thus: ‘By smoke, invariably attended by fire, is attended this mountain.’”⁴

¹ Tarka Sangraha, p. 14. We quote the wording of Ballantyne: Christianity and Hinduism, p. 150.

² This, it should be stated, is later than the Nyâya.

³ Discussions, p. 616.

⁴ Christianity and Hindu Philosophy, p. 145. Müller vindicates the Hindu form in his appendix to Phornsdu’s Logic.

Before passing to the next method of proof, we must not forget to mention an interesting division of this "Recognition of a Sign," into three parts. "1, Having as a sign the *prior*; 2, having as a sign the *posterior*; 3, consisting in the *perception of homogeneousness*."¹ These terms, literally translated, correspond precisely with our inference "*à priori*," "*à posteriori*," and "from analogy."

After enumerating at some length various fallacies, the Tarka Sangraha defines the third method of proof. "Comparison, or the recognition of likeness, is the cause of an inference from similarity. Such an inference consists in the knowledge of the relation between a name and the thing so named;"² or, according to the Sûtras: "The recognition of likeness is the instrument in the ascertaining of that which is to be ascertained through its similarity to something previously well known."

"A man is told that the *gavaya*, or 'bos gavaeus,' is an animal like a cow. Going to the forest, he sees an animal like a cow. By means of the instrumental knowledge above described, he arrives at the conviction that 'this thing is what is meant by the word *gavaya*.'"³

The last method of proof, included by the Vaiseshika under Inference, is Verbal Evidence, or Words.

"A word is the speech of one worthy. One worthy is a speaker of the truth. A speech is a collection of significant sounds; as, for example, 'Bring the cow.' A significant sound is that which is possessed of power. The power is the appointment, in the shape of God's will, that such and such an import should be recognizable from such and such a significant sound." Note the strange conceit that in the order of nature, the *name* precedes the *object* named.

"Notion" was before stated to be divisible into two kinds: right notion and wrong notion. The four kinds of right notion we have now considered; the Tarka Sangraha concludes the discussion by defining and describing briefly the three forms of incorrect notion, — doubt, mistake, and such opinion as is open to *reductio ad absurdum*.

¹ Sûtras, Aph. 5.

² Sûtras, Aph. 6.

³ Tarka Sangraha, p. 19.

This theory of the Understanding, it will be remembered, we have been considering under the general category of Qualities, where the Nyâya classes it. After Understanding come some others. These with Understanding are said to be "distinctive of God alone." "Intellect, desire, and effect are of two kinds, eternal and transient; eternal in God, transient in mortals."

The remaining five categories, Action, Genus, Difference, Intimate Relation, and Non-existence, follow next in order of treatment; but nothing of importance can be added to the definitions already given.

The Tarka Sangraha, which we have followed in the main, is quite condensed toward the close, and throughout the treatise a single and straightforward course is pursued; the original Sûtras however, dwell at some length upon Pleasure, Pain, and the methods of Emancipation, affirming the Yoga doctrine to be praiseworthy, but enjoining a study of its own tenets as a practical aid in inducing the desired meditation. They also branch off frequently in curious discussions upon various topics, such as, "the nature of a doubt," "what is meant by wholes," "the force of a word," "the possibility of atoms," whether the world may not have originated from chance, "is everything eternal or uneternal?" "does the eternal exist?" etc., etc., to more than merely refer to which would draw us away too far from our general purpose. The very fact, however, that such themes were discussed, speaks not a little for the subtlety of the minds which were engaged about them.

We conclude this analysis of the two systems by presenting a comparison which Dr. Ballantyne draws between the Sâmkhya and the Nyâya :

"A noticeable distinction between Kapila's way of speaking of things and that of the Naiyâyikas presents itself in their respective choice of a fundamental verb. The language of the Nyâya is moulded upon the verb 'to be,' and that of the Sâmkhya upon the verb 'to make.' The Nyâya asks: 'What *is*?' the Sâmkhya asks: 'What *makes* it so?' The one presents us with a *compte rendu* of the Universe

as it stands; the other presents us with a cosmogony. As the one subdivides its subject-matter into the two exhaustive categories of Existence and Non-existence, the other exhibits everything (except Soul, the spectator of the phantasmagoria) under the two aspects of 'producer' and 'produced.'

The success of Bhuddhism, which, from a heretical sect grew to be a dominant political, as well as religious power about the third century before Christ, was the signal for the rise of numerous other heresies, even more bitterly opposed to the Brahmanical faith: the sway of the hierarchy once broken, nothing prevented any schismatic spirit from proposing a new method for the liberation of soul, or from propounding the most grossly material sentiments. For a period of at least two centuries both before and after Christ, India was in a state of religious ferment. We judge this, not from any monuments which remain to us, of these various schisms, but from the writings of the upholders of the established or traditional faith, which are filled with the opinions of the heretics, cited for confutation. Many of these tenets Colebrooke has collected and arranged,¹ as also Wilson, in his sketch of religious sects.²

One of these sects, the Jains, we considered in the previous Article. Another, and perhaps the most notorious of these sects, were the Chârvâkas.

The most peculiar tenets of this school are two; first, the restriction of the sources of knowledge to Perception; second, the denial of any distinction between the soul and the body. The following is a statement of this latter dogma, taken from the writings of an opponent:

"Seeing no soul but body, they maintain the non-existence of soul other than body; and arguing that intelligence or sensibility, though not seen in earth, water, fire, and air, whether simple or congregate, may nevertheless subsist in the same elements modified in a corporeal frame, they affirm that an organic body, endued with sensibility and thought, though formed of those elements, is the human person.

¹ Essays, p. 243.

² Asiat. Res. Vol. XVI., xvii.

“The faculty of thought results from a modification of the aggregate elements, in like manner as sugar with a ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor.

“So far there is a difference between animate body and inanimate substance. Thought, knowledge, recollection, etc., perceptible only where organic body is, are properties of an organized frame, not appertaining to exterior substances, or earth and other elements simple or aggregate, unless formed into such a frame. While there is body, there is thought, and sense of pleasure and pain; none where body is not; and hence, as well as from self-consciousness it is concluded that self and body are identical.”¹ Other sects are mentioned by Colebrooke and Wilson, but as being more religious than philosophical, they hardly call for special notice.

But the atheism and nihilism of the Buddhists and Jains and the materialism of the Chârvâkas never could have gained a footing in India, except as a reaction against an opposite extreme. The real sympathies of the Hindu had far more affinity with Brahminism, than they could possibly have with any system that offered them no God and a meagre ritual service. Hence the religious teachers of the people did not miscalculate their strength, when, after the first popular wave of revolution had begun to subside, they sought to reinstate themselves in favor. But they had learned wisdom by defeat. Conquered by an appeal to reason, they themselves adopted the weapons of their adversaries, and the first movement of the Brahmans to recover a footing was a philosophical movement. True, they grounded their authority upon the Vedas, and their leading and avowed purpose was to bring back the masses to allegiance to the faith of their ancestors, and yet throughout their writings there is apparent a manifest attempt to show that these teachings of the inspired word were not opposed to the genuine deductions of reason, but that in these ancient writings was in fact contained the only true philosophy.²

¹ Colebrooke. *Essays*, p. 259. The tenets of a large number of these sects may be found stated and commented upon by the Tamil writers in Rev. H. R. Hoisington's translations. *Jour. Am. Or. Soc.* Vol. IV.

² See Max Müller. *Hist. Sans. Liter.* p. 259.

The result of this wide-spread movement remains to us in the writings of what is termed the Mīmāṃsā school of philosophy. This school is divided into two branches, called Pūrvva Mīmāṃsā or "prior" Mīmāṃsā and Uttara Mīmāṃsā or "later" Mīmāṃsā. These terms "prior" and "later" do not refer, as Ritter supposed, to an earlier and later development of this philosophy. The word *mīmāṃsā* means "a seeking to understand" and the *pūrvva mīmāṃsā* is "a seeking to understand the 'prior' (or ritual portion of the Veda)" the Brāhmana portion, which stands first in order, and the *Uttara mīmāṃsā* is "a seeking to understand the 'later,' (or theological portion of the Veda)," the Upanishads, placed after the Brāhmanas. Of these two schools, the 'later' is the only one which has a claim to the title of philosophy. It is better known under the name of Vedānta, and is the prominent school of modern day. The "prior" school is known distinctly as the Mīmāṃsā. Its acknowledged aim is simply an explanation of the various rites enjoined in the Brāhmanas or ritual portion of the Vedic writings; it is occupied with tedious comments upon the meaning of words and phrases. It has not a little of interest to the student of Indian life, but it has slight bearing upon any philosophical doctrines which the Vedic writings may contain. One dogma however, which relates to the object of its discussions may deserve a passing notice. It is that of the Eternity of Sound.

We have no extended translation of any treatise of this school. Colebrooke¹ presents us with an analysis of the Sūtras of Jaimini, the reputed founder of the school, which comprise twelve lectures. The first chapter of the first lecture has been translated by Dr. Ballantyne. In his work upon Christianity and Hindu Philosophy,² he also gives an appendix, containing the most of this translation with valuable illustrative matter. Ward also gives an abridgment of different treatises.³

The famous discussion upon the eternity of sound is intro-

¹ Essays, p. 189.

² Aphorisms of the Mīmāṃsā Philosophy (Allahabad).

³ View, etc. Vol. II. p. 286.

duced at the very outset of the treatise. The first aphorism reads as follows: "Next, therefore (O student that has attained thus far), a desire to know Duty (is to be entertained by thee)." What is a duty? "A matter that is a duty is recognized by the instigatory character (of the passage of scripture in which it is mentioned)." The commentator adds, that what constitutes anything a matter fit to be urged in scripture as a duty, "is the fact of its not producing more pain than pleasure." A little by-play is worthy of notice. Jaimini, in the aphorism, had given the word 'duty' a wrong gender, according to received authorities in the commentator's day, and some had raised inquiry on the point. The commentator haughtily says: "If you ask why, then take as the reason thereof the fact that Jaimini is a great sanctified sage, and of course can give the word what gender he pleases." To prove that a text of scripture alone is sufficient authority for enjoining duty, the author shows that nothing *else* would be authority, as, for example, the senses.

"When a man's organs of sense are rightly applied to something *extant*, that birth of knowledge which then takes place is Perception, and this perception is *not* the cause of our recognizing Duty, because the organs of sense are adapted only to the apprehension of what is then and there existent." As sense cannot be the cause, so neither can Influence, or Analogy, or Conjecture, for all these "have their root in Perception." But, says an objector, language, the relation of words and meanings is merely conventional, devised by man; and just "as sense-knowledge wanders away from truth in respect of mother of pearl or the like, (when it mistakes such for silver), so language, dependent on man, inasmuch as it has reference to the knowledge of a connection which was devised by man, is liable to part company with veracity in matters of declaration, and so the *instigatory nature* of a passage (which is composed of words) cannot be the instrument of correct knowledge in respect of Duty." To this, Jaimini replies that the connection of a word with its sense is not conventional, but *natural*, that is, *eternal*, and therefore, "the intimation of scripture is unerring though

imperceptible." This is simply the Nyâya dogma that the connection of a word and its sense is in the shape of "power," or God's will, and therefore eternal.¹

This introduces the discussion upon Sound, which, Jaimini asserts, must be itself eternal, else words, which are formed of sound, could not have the property of eternity.

Our author, strong in his belief, enumerates first the doctrines of his opponents. They may be found also in the Nyâya Sûtras.² Sound is not eternal, says the objector, because, 1. We see an effort made in its production. 2. It is transitory. 3. We speak of *making* sound. 4. It may be present in different places at once. This is an argument based on the dogma of the Mîmânsâ, that the *eternity* of sound implies also its *unity*, and is directed against the latter notion. 5. Sounds assume different forms — a grammatical point. 6. "By a multitude of makers, there is an augmentation of it."

In reply, Jaimini first states the point on which all agree, viz., that the *perception* of sound is transitory. He then answers the objections in turn.

1. Sound always *exists*, but is not always *manifested*. A vibration of the air causes manifestation, and stillness of the air obstructs perception. 2. The expression "making," really means "employing." 3. Sound may be simultaneously *heard* in different places, and yet be but one, as in the case of the sun and sight. 4. This change of sounds is simply their modification. 5. Noise, not sound, is increased by a multitude of voices.³

He now betakes himself to positive arguments in proof of his theory. "Sound must be eternal, because its exhibition is for the sake of another." That is, explains the commentator, as the sound of a word spoken to a person must last *some* time after being uttered, else its sense could not be seized by the person addressed; it must be eternal, because you cannot assign any other instant at which it may be

¹ Sûtras, Aph. 1—6.

² Sûtras, Aph. 6—18.

³ Ibid.

proved to cease. Again : sound is eternal, because any number of hearers may at once recognize a sound, *e. g.*, "cow." Again : sound is eternal, because of the absence of number in the repetition of a word. For example, the word "cow," pronounced ten times, is always the same word, and not ten words of the form "cow." Again : sound is eternal, because we see no ground for anticipating its distinction. And, finally, sound is eternal, because a proof text of scripture says : "By language that alters not, eternal," etc.¹

So ends this celebrated dispute, which we have cited more as a "curiosity" of Hindu literature, than as of any philosophical value.

The chapter concludes by considering an objection against the eternity of the Vedas, which "some declare to be something recent, because there are the names of men in it," who must therefore have lived prior to its composition. Jaimini replies by saying, that the eternity of sound has already been proved ; that the names of men refer only to names of the readers of certain sections where the names occur ; and finally, by affirming that the terms in the text are common to other objects, and do not there designate men. Thus, in illustration of the last position, the word *Prāvahani*, the name of a man, really means here, the "wind which moves very fast ;" and the word *Babara*, also the name of a man, is here a word imitative of the sound of the wind,—"so that there is not even a *smell* of inconsistency."

We pass now to consider the *Uttara Mīmāṃsā*, or *Ve-dānta* philosophy, the last of the six schools into which Hindu Philosophy is divided. Inasmuch as this is the latest school, and the one whose fundamental doctrines underlie the whole structure of modern Hinduism, we should naturally anticipate less difficulty in reaching the exact sense of its teachings than we have found attending the examination of either of the foregoing systems. But the fact is far otherwise ; for although writings upon this scheme of philosophy

¹ *Sūtras*, Aph. 18—24.

abound, yet these writings cover so extensive a period, and embrace so wide a diversity of sentiment existing within the circle of the system, that the very abundance of material serves but to confuse. No school has, we believe, so large a body of adherents ; its doctrines are promulgated, not only in the classical Sanskrit, but in various vernacular dialects. in the South and West as well as in the North ; the philosophy itself, as the acknowledged champion of orthodoxy, the staunch defender of the Vedic doctrines against opposers of whatever stripe, is forced to discuss a wide range of topics, and constantly to shift its ground, in order to adapt itself to the various shades of doctrine which the Vedic writings themselves contain ; while in its position as the reconciler of both the words of the Veda and the teachings of philosophy with the fanciful creations of the popular faith, it finds ample occasion to test the elasticity of its principles and their fitness to meet the varying demands of the Hindu mind.

The chief difficulty, however, in the way of an English student, in the consideration of this system, lies in the fact that there is no complete translation of the original authority of this school. The father of this philosophy is known as Veda-vyâsa, a sage, who, if we credit all the legends respecting him, must have lived at least a thousand years. He flourished probably about the third century after Christ.¹ His writings remain under the title of Brahma Sûtras or Vedânta Sûtras. But of these we know scarcely anything except what Colebrooke presents in his analysis. Unfortunately for us, this analysis makes it certain that the original form of this philosophy differed essentially from the form in which it appears in the treatises to which we have access. It would have been an interesting task to become familiar with this early phase of the philosophy, and trace thence the several developments which have since appeared. As we should have expected, the philosophy of the founder of the school is a much simpler system of doctrines than the

¹ Weber places him A. D. 400—500.

exceedingly involved and mystical set of theories which his later followers have zealously propagated. We must, however, be content with what we have. Colebrooke's essay is too bare to afford us much light upon the original teachings of Vyâsa.¹ Ballantyne has translated but a brief portion;² we must therefore resort to a work which shall give us a synopsis of this philosophy in its later dress. For this purpose we have at hand a popular compendium of the Vedânta doctrines in the *Vedânta Sâra* or "Kernel of the Vedânta," translated by Dr. Ballantyne.³ Though advocating a system differing from that of the founder of the school, it is not an authority for the extreme school of modern Vedântism, but occupies a middle ground, as will appear in the sequel.

The word *Vedânta* is a compound term, *Ved-ânta* signifying "the end or scope of the Veda;" and accordingly, at the outset of his treatise, the author of the *Vedânta Sâra* refers us back to the Upanishads for authority for his doctrine. Several inquiries naturally arise in the mind of one who undertakes such a study as is now proposed, and these the author divides into four, which respect—1. The competent person; 2. The object-matter; 3. The relation; 4. The purpose.

First, who is the person competent to enter on the study? "He is that well-regulated person, who, by the perusal, as prescribed, of the Vedas and their dependent sciences, has attained to a rough notion of the sense of the whole Veda, — who, by renouncing, in this or in a former life, things desirable and things forbidden, and by observances of the constant and of the occasional ceremonies, of penances and of devotions, being freed from all sin, is thoroughly purified in his heart; and who is possessed of the quaternion of requisites."

¹ *Essays*, p. 208.

² *Aphorisms of the Vedânta Philosophy*, Part I. We have failed to procure even this.

³ *A Lecture on the Vedânta*, embracing the text of the *Vedânta Sâra*: Allahabad. Colebrooke cautions us against Ward's version of the work. *Essays*, p. 215.

The four requisites are stated to be : 1. The discrimination of the eternal substance from the transient ; 2. Disregard of the fruits of here and hereafter ; 3. The possession of tranquillity and self-restraint ; and, 4. The desire of liberation.

The "object-matter" "is the fact, to be known for certain, that the soul and God are one ; for this is the drift of all Vedânta treatises." The "Relation," is simply that "of information and informer ;" the "purpose" or end, "is the cessation of the *ignorance* which invades this identity which is to be known, and the attainment of that bliss which is his essence." That it is possible, by means of knowledge, to achieve liberation from the world, may be inferred from the scriptural text, that "He who knows what soul is, gets beyond grief ;" — and from the text that "He who knows God, becomes God."

"This qualified person," the Vedânta Sâra proceeds, "being burned by the fire of this world in the shape of birth, death, and the like, as one whose head is heated by the sun takes refuge in a body of water, having approached, with tribute in his hands, a teacher who knows the Vedas and who is intent on God, follows him — becomes his disciple." "The teacher, with the greatest kindness, instructs him by the method of 'the refutation of the erroneous imputation.'" "Erroneous imputation is the allegation that the Unreal is the Real." — "The Real ?" This is God (consisting of) existence, knowledge, and happiness — (the One) without a second. The Unreal is the whole aggregate of the senseless — beginning with ignorance."

It will be seen that, by the author of this treatise, the universe is divided into the Real and the Unreal ; that God is the first factor, and that all else is the second factor ; the phenomenal, and only phenomenal, originating in ignorance. This conceit we shall find running through the work ; we shall find it to be the fundamental idea, about and upon which all the philosophy is constructed. Now, it is important to remark, that not a syllable of this "philosophy of ignorance" is, as far as we can find, present in the Sûtras

which profess to be the original authority of this school. Dr. Ballantyne has translated only a brief portion,—and this we have not,—but Colebrooke gives an analysis of them, and we find in that analysis not the slightest allusion to any such conception as Ignorance as a cause of the world. According to his quotations, the Sûtras seem to unfold a pure and intelligible pantheism, a more definite and formal statement of the vague theosophizing of the Upanishads. Furthermore, Colebrooke, at the close of his essay, remarks: “The notion, that the versatile world is an illusion, that all which passes to the apprehension of the waking individual is but a phantasy presented to his imagination, and every seeming thing is unreal and is all visionary, does not appear to be the doctrine of the text of the Vidânta. I take it to be no tenet of the original Vêdântin philosophy, but of another branch, from which later writers have borrowed it, and have intermixed and confounded the two systems.”¹ It is a matter of real regret, therefore, that for the purposes of our investigation we have not access to these original Sûtras, but must content ourselves with a knowledge of a development of this earlier philosophy, such as is presented to us in the Vedânta Sâra.

Our author has before stated it to be the end of a knowledge of the Vedânta, to annihilate that ignorance which is regarded as the source of the unreal. What is this Ignorance, and whence arose the conception of it as the cause of the phenomenal world?

The first question is thus answered: “Ignorance is a somewhat that is not to be called positively either entity or non-entity—not a mere negation, but the opponent of knowledge,—consisting of the three fetters.” That there is such a

¹ Dr. Ballantyne seems to think that Colebrooke refers only to the last development, that of Mâyâ, or “Illusion” distinctively; but we think he is mistaken. See Vedânta Sâra, p. 16. It is not a little embarrassing to the student to find in the Sâkhya Sûtras, supposed to be one of the oldest authorities of the Sâkhya philosophy; quotations of doctrines, such as that of Ignorance, etc., regarded as late developments of a philosophy whose origin is placed no earlier than A. D. 300! See Aphorisms of the Sâkhya, 20. One comes to doubt whether it is possible to reach the original opinions of any school.

thing as Ignorance, the author states, is proved "from the judgment (of consciousness) that 'I am ignorant;'" and from scripture.

The origin of the conception it is more difficult to explain. Historically, we are absolutely in the dark; logically, we may account for its origin somewhat in the manner which Dr. Ballantyne suggests, which we present.

"God, infinite in power, omnipresent, omniscient, exists. The Sāṅkhyast would object, but the almost unanimous voice of India is opposed to him. There was a time, furthermore, the Vedāntin affirms, when nothing but God did exist. How could or did creation ensue? Not, by the assumption, from existing eternal matter, as qualities according to Kapila, or as atoms according to Kanāda; nor by sheer feat, out of nothing, — a notion wholly alien to the Hindu mind; there remained but one possible method, — by development from God himself. Spirits form a portion of this world; spirits, therefore, are a product of this unconditioned being, or rather *are* that being, in no proper sense separate from him; they too, therefore, know no condition. Here, however, Consciousness enters a caveat, and the Hindu, no more than the western philosopher, has a right to disregard it. "I am ignorant — I am limited." Here is a clear conflict. "I am God, and I do not recognize myself as God, but as different from him." Where is the escape? With even worse logic than that of the Cartesian, who would prove the *existence* of God from the existence of the *idea* of God, the Vedānta exalts his ignorance of the identity of soul and God — his erroneous conception of the actual existence of the phenomenal world — to the rank of Creator; Ignorance actually "projects the world!" What further phases this notion of Ignorance afterwards assumed, we shall see in the sequel.

Ignorance was defined as "consisting of the three fetters," and as thus binding the soul. The "three fetters" are nothing more, in the literal meaning of the term, than the "three qualities" which the Sāṅkhya philosophy adopts as summing up all possible qualities in the universe; *i. e.*, "goodness, passion, and darkness." But in this connection it is well to

remark that a double use of the term "quality" or "fetter," by the Vedânta, has led to no little confusion among foreign writers, and given rise to undeserved condemnation of the system. The term translated "quality" or "fettters," is "*guna*," literally "a cord," which is said to "fetter the soul." In the Sâṅkhya philosophy it is used to designate these three qualities which, in perfect harmony, constitute primal nature, and, in various combinations, form the several products of nature. In the Vedânta system, the "three-fold cord" is also said to be equivalent to developed matter,—the phenomenal in its view, — and thus identical with Ignorance.

The opposite of this phenomenal, this Ignorance, was God: consistency therefore required that he be also regarded as devoid of this "three-fold cord," which hampered soul, which was the essence of Ignorance. Hence, a common designation of God by the Vedânta, is "*nir-guna*," the "unfettered." But as the term rendered "fetter" is also rendered ordinarily "quality," some foreign writers have been misled, and have gone so far as to declare that the God of the Vedânta is devoid of all qualities, and consequently as good (or as bad), as a non-entity. This is simply unfair; as may be seen from an original Sâtra of Vyâsa, which affirms that "every attribute of a first cause exists in Brahma who is devoid of qualities," when the term "qualities" is clearly not identical with "attributes."

The Vedânta theory of God seems to have arisen in the desire to remove God as far as possible from man. He does not think, nor feel, nor act after the imperfect manner of man; but so far from being destitute of all attribute or quality, in one sense he is nothing *but* attribute, — the Vedântin conceiving no substratum necessary, but thinking of him, as we saw at the outset, as existing *as* sheer existence, thought, and joy, "in their identity as an ever-existing joy thought."¹

After defining Ignorance, the Vedânta Sâra proceeds to

¹ See the able discussion of Dr. Ballantyne. Christianity and Hindu Phil. p. 38. Vedânta Sâra, p. 14.

state in detail the process of creation by means of it. In giving an analysis of this most mystical portion of the treatise, we dare not flatter ourselves that we shall be understood; we may accomplish something if we convince the reader that the history of philosophy in India does not culminate in a philosophy of common sense.

Ignorance, we are told, may be viewed either collectively or distributively; collectively, as the ignorances of different persons, though the singular form of the word may be retained; distributively, as the ignorance which each individual possesses: at the same time, we are bid to remember, these two forms of ignorance are, in fact, the same. Again: "Of this Ignorance there are two powers—envelopment and projection." By the envelopment of ignorance, the soul gets the impression "that it is liable to mundane vicissitudes; that it is an agent, a patient, happy, grieved, and so forth." By the "projective power," "Ignorance raises up, on the soul enveloped by it, the appearance of a world, ether, etc." Mark now the process of creation.

Deity, who is usually called Intellect, in order to create must have a certain body; this body is Ignorance with its two powers, viewed collectively. Of Intellect, "located" in this aggregation of Ignorance, it is said, "being possessed of such qualities as omniscience, omnipotence, and superintendence over all, imperceptible, all-pervading, Maker of the world, Intellect is called the Lord."

Again: "Intellect, located in Ignorance with its two powers, is, in its own right, the instrumental cause (of creation); and in virtue of what it is located in, the substantial cause;—as the spider is personally the instrument, and, in virtue of its own body (in which the soul of the spider resides), the substance; in regard to its product, the thread." The original doctrine of the Vedânta was, undoubtedly, that the Supreme Being is immediately the material as well as efficient cause of the world.¹ In this later form of the philosophy, he is still held to be the efficient or instrumental

¹ Colebrooke, *Essays*, p. 223.

cause of all; but is the material or substantial cause, only indirectly, through the medium of Ignorance, the mystical body of Deity. Creation thus ensues: "From Intellect immersed in Ignorance, with the Projective power, there arises the Ether; from the Ether, Air; from Air, Fire; from Fire, Water; and from Water, Earth." The difference between this scheme and those of the Sânkhya and Nyâya, will be noticed.

From these five subtile elements are produced the subtile bodies and the gross elements. The subtile bodies correspond almost exactly to the "rudimental body" of the Sânkhya philosophy; they are the individual, viewed apart from his gross body of flesh. A subtile body consists of seventeen portions,—the set of five intellectual organs, Understanding (Intellect of the Sânkhya) and Mind, the set of five organs of action, and the set of five vital airs." This subtile body is divided into a "tria of sheaths," as follows: "This Understanding, being associated with the five intellectual organs, is the 'intelligent sheath.' But the mind, being associated with the organs of action, becomes the 'mental sheath.' The set of five vital airs (respiration, flatulence, circulation, pulsation of the throat and head, and assimilation), associated with the organs of action, becomes the 'vital sheath.'"

From the subtile elements the gross also arise, and after this fashion: Each gross element is compounded of one-half of the subtile element whose name it bears, and one-eighth of each of the other subtile elements, so that each shares in each others substance, yet is designated by the name of that which preponderates. From the gross elements arise the seven heavens, the seven hells, the egg of Brahma, with the four kinds of gross bodies, and their food and drink. The four kinds of bodies are the oviparous, viviparous, equivocally generated, and germinating, *e. g.*, as plants. So much for the development of the phenomena world, drawn by regular gradations from Ignorance viewed aggregately, as the abode of Intellect, the Maker of the world.

But this Supreme Intellect is regarded as located, not only in Ignorance as unmodified, but also in the same Ignorance when developed into "subtile bodies," and "gross bodies," in their aggregate form. Furthermore, a parallel is closely drawn throughout between the Lordly and the individual Intellect and Ignorance in the aggregate and in its distributive form. Let us follow this parallel. We saw that the aggregation of Intellect was regarded first as the body of "the Lord;" and the cause of all. Viewed distributively, on the other hand, Ignorance is said to be the abode and body of its Inferior, *i. e.*, the human soul. "Soul, located in this, having such qualities as want of knowledge and want of power, is called 'the very defective intelligence.'" This body is also said to be a cause, — the cause of the conceit of individuality and the like. Between these two Intellects there is really no more difference, we are told, than exists between a forest and the trees which compose it. Again: subtile bodies may be viewed in their totality, or in their individuality, and the aphorism which states the connection between Intellect and subtile bodies, is interesting as unfolding a connection between this Vedânta philosophy and the creations of mythology. Thus it is said: "Intellect, located in this collective totality of subtile bodies, is called 'Soul-thread' because it is passed like a thread through all, — and the 'embryo of light' (*hiranyagarbha*), because it is the superintendent of the intelligent sheath, and 'life,' because it is the superintendent of the 'vital sheath.'" This collective totality is the subtile body of *Hiranyagarbha*. This personage, whose name we will not again inflict upon the reader, figures largely in mythological writings, as the earlier Upanishads, in connection with the creation of the world. His appearance here is a mark of the attempt by the Vedânta school to reconcile philosophy with the popular religion. "Intellect located in the distributive arrangement of subtile bodies is called 'the resplendent.'" Once more: Intellect located in the collective aggregate of gross bodies, is called the "Spirit of Humanity," and this gross body is called the "nutrimentitious sheath." "Intellect located in the distributive

aggregate thereof is called the 'Pervader,' because, without abandoning the subtile body, it enters into gross bodies." It is next stated, that the collective aggregate of these three worlds is really but one great world, and that the Intellect in its correspondent forms, is really but one only.

Before quitting this cloud-land, another doctrine demands our notice. There are four conditions of the soul: 1, waking; 2, dreaming; 3, dreamless sleep; 4, "the fourth." When wide-awake, a man is as far as possible from bliss; he is encompassed with gross body, and in the full experience of sense. The next stage is the dreaming state; then a man is wrapped in the triad of sheaths, the subtile body knows nothing of the gross body or sensuous enjoyments, and dreams. The scene is called the "place of the dissolution of the totality of the gross;" forms seem to pass before him, but do not, and, to a dreamer, in the opinion of the Vedântin, the world really *is* not. The third scene is called "the place of the dissolution of both the gross and the subtile body." At that time, *i. e.*, in profound sleep, the Lord and the individual intelligence, enjoy blessedness by means of the very subtile modifications of Ignorance illuminated by Intellect. But even this height of felicity is not lofty enough for the aspiring soul; the developments of Ignorance have been got rid of; there still remains ignorance itself, in its "subtile modifications." This last stage is "the fourth," when the soul becomes identical with pure Intellect, the "Indivisible," consisting of existence, knowledge, and joy.

"Thus have we exhibited, under its generic aspect, the great error of clothing or investing the Real with the Unreal."

The Vedânta Sâra then specifies different objects with which men are liable to confound the soul, and proceeds to illustrate the true doctrine by an explanation of the "great sentence," "That art Thou." This sentence may be understood in two senses: when discrimination is not exercised, it is made to mean — That aggregate of the phenomenal art Thou; when understood clearly, it means — That Intellect apart from enwrapping Ignorance, art Thou; and then

resolves itself into the identical formula, Thou art Brahma, or God is God. And what is the result? "When the meaning of the Indivisible has thus been communicated, then does there occur to the competent student a modification of the understanding as moulded on the form of the Indivisible, and he says, 'I am the eternal, pure, knowing, free, true, self-existent, most blessed, infinite Brahma,—without a second.'" But this is not enough; this act of thought is itself different from the Indivisible, and therefore a relic of Ignorance, the other member of the duality, and itself must die;—all *object* must cease, and subject alone remain.

"What more need be said? This one, merely for the sustenance of his body acquiescing in the experience of these retributive fruits, in the shape of pleasure or pain, procured from desire or aversion on our own part or on another's, — on the cessation thereof, his life dissolving away into the Supreme Deity who is unmingled beatitude, on the destruction of Ignorance and the *vis inertiae* of its results, — abideth God — in absolute simplicity — unvarying felicity — free from every semblance of difference."¹

We have spoken of the Vedânta philosophy as an attempt to harmonize the dogmas of the schools with the popular superstitions. We have seen how the Vedânta Sâra bears evident marks of this endeavor in its introduction of the mythical personage of the Upanishads and later religious writings, and in its mention of Brahma's egg, with the general cosmogonic apparatus so familiar to modern Hinduism. Before leaving this philosophy, let us note still another point in which, in a later phase, this philosophy has met the popular religion. We refer to the identifying of Sakti, the female energy of the Gods, with Ignorance, and the exalting of Illusion, a synonym for Ignorance, with the wife of Brahmâ. The possible mode in which this personification took place may be thus explained. Ignorance, regarded as the cause of the world, would naturally be identified with the Nature

¹ Vedânta Sâra, 149.

or Prakriti of the Sâṅkhya philosophy. But as this world is the creation of God's will, according to the Nyâya system, the direct origin of the world, Ignorance or Prakriti, might with equal propriety, be called Sakti or the "power" or "energy" of God. Lastly, this world, if Ignorance alone cause it to exist for us, is in truth a sheer illusion, a mirage, and for Ignorance, why not substitute Mâyâ — deceit, illusion, jugglery?" However these fanciful conceptions arose, they are to-day the popular philosophy. Sakti is not the unconscious cause of all, nor is Mâyâ abstract illusion; Sakti is the personified energy, the ever-present consort of the deities, while Mâyâ has taken her seat in the Hindu pantheon, as the wife of Brahmâ.¹

The fall of Buddhism was coincident with the rise of Vedântism. For the first few centuries after Christ, Buddhism was actively propagated in the north and west of India. In the fourth century, Fa Hian, a Buddhist pilgrim from China, speaks of his faith as prevailing everywhere, though from his mention of its decline in the region of its birth, we gather that its aggressive movements were hardly more than struggles for life, if not the result of persecution; while in the seventh century, Hiouen-thsang, another Chinese pilgrim, who journeyed to India for the purpose of visiting the holy places of Buddhism and gathering original documents relating to the faith, laments over the decay which was apparent everywhere, — "in deserted monasteries, ruined temples, diminished number of mendicants, and augmented proportion of heretics." Buddhism from that time lingered along, until in the sixteenth century, the minister of the emperor Akber could find no one competent to give an intelligent account of its teachings.²

Various opinions have been offered as to the cause of its decline. Burnouf gives us what purports to be a prediction of sufferings which the Buddhists would in some future day

¹ Vedânta Sâra, p. 15. Vishnu Purâna, p. 655.

² See Müller: *Buddhism and Buddhist Pilgrims. A Review of Julien's 'Voyages des Pèlerins Bouddhistes.'* Wilson: *Essay on Buddhism.* J. R. A. S. Vol. xvi. Part 2.

undergo;— a passage, written doubtless when persecutions were threatening or actually in progress.¹ Current tradition in India traces the disappearance of Buddhists to a renowned teacher of Brahmanism, Kumârila Bhatta, who is said to have stirred up persecution against them, and been the means of expelling great numbers from the country. He lived about the seventh century of our era.² We think, however, that Wilson is most probably correct, in supposing that Buddhism died a natural death; or that if it owed its extinction to any pressure from without, that pressure was from the pen rather than from the sword,—the pen, whether of the kindred but antagonistic Jains, or the no less bitterly opposed Vedântists. Among the latter, perhaps the most widely celebrated was Sankara Âcharya; well known throughout India for his numerous commentaries upon the Upanishads and the Vedânta Sûtras. As a religionist, Sankara achieved special renown for his service in reviving or more extensively propagating the worship of Siva, in opposition to that of Vishnu, whose adherents were specially numerous in the north. Sankara's success was chiefly in the south, although one legend recounts his triumphs in Kashmiri.³ In his commentary upon the Vedânta Sûtras, he stands forth as the uncompromising defender of traditional Brahmanism against all heresies, and specially the Buddhist. "The whole doctrine" says he "when tried and sifted, crumbles like a well sunk in loose sand. The opinions advanced in it are contradictory and incompatible; they are severally untenable and incongruous. By teaching them to his disciples, Buddha has manifested either his own absurdity and incoherence, or his rooted enmity to mankind, whom he sought to delude."⁴

The style of these writings, we may remark, is not a little interesting. Thus, when we hear the atomists contemptuously nick-named by their adversaries, as "feeders upon lit-

¹ Lotus de la Bonne Loi, p. 165, and note p. 408.

² Colebrooke Essays, p. 190. Wilson: Religious Sects of the Hindus.

³ Ibid: "Dandis." Preface to Sanskrit Dict., First Ed.

⁴ Colebrooke Essays, p. 257.

tle," and other sects, as, "lovers of controversy," we seem to get quite a lively picture of the polemical life of the day.¹

But the Vedântic writings are not the only class of works which seek to construct a satisfactory philosophy of religion. Vedântism was aimed directly against such schools as the Sâmkhya and Vaiseshika; but this occasioned difficulty in the mind of many; Kapila, Kanâda, and Gôtama, though sometimes accounted heretical, yet professed to found their teachings upon the Veda, and supported their position by ample quotations; if then, all philosophies, whether called orthodox or not, were equally based upon the Veda, all were equally true: why were they at variance with each other? Again; if two sets of doctrines, so palpably opposed to each other found like countenance in the Veda, then the Veda itself must be self-contradictory and unreliable. The attempt to obviate this difficulty gave rise to a sort of eclectic philosophy, which sought to construct a common basis, upon which the various conflicting theories of the Vedas and the other schools of philosophy could stand. The two best representatives of such an attempt, which remain to us, are to be found in the doctrines of the Swêtâswatara Upanishad² and the Bhagavad Gîtâ.

The former of these originated some time after the Composition of the Vedânta Sûtras, and before the time of Sankara; as it mentions all the six schools by name, and is itself commented on by Sankara.³ That a writing, comparatively so modern, should be received as one of the Upanishads is

¹ A relic of Buddhism still exists, it is supposed, in the worship of the well-known Jagannath. Mr. Cunningham, known for his explorations of Buddhist mounds, thinks the triad of Jagannath, his brother and sister, to be nothing but a modified form of the Buddhist symbol of Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha, the result of a politic compromise on the part of the Brahmans. A confirmation of this plausible suggestion is the fact that caste is actually set aside within the precincts of this temple and on the festival in honor of the god. The only other case which has come to our knowledge, where caste is disregarded, is in the instance mentioned by Gangooly, in his "Life and Religion of the Hindoos," a little book which, as written by a native, contains much curious matter relating to the social and religious life of the people.

² Bibliotheca Indica, No. 41. Translated by Dr. Rœer. See Introduction.

³ Sankara flourished in the Eighth Century, A. D.

not strange in an unhistorical country like India, where an author could best gain currency for his sentiments by stamping them with the mark of antiquity. The treatise seeks apparently to harmonize the Sâṅkhya and the Vedânta theories. It admits the Prakṛiti of the former, but identifies it with the Mâyâ of the latter.¹ It accepts the definition of the soul as the thinking principle, common to the Sâṅkhya and Vedânta, but holds the Vedânta tenet that all souls are but one and the same great soul, and the Sâṅkhya tenet that soul is eternal. Creation, it asserts, could not come from a blind Nature, nor from a fallible human spirit; its cause must be an allwise and almighty being. It also borrows from the Yoga school, the theory of mortifications as an aid to liberation.²

We quote in illustration a single passage, in which the relation of the supreme to the individual soul is set forth :

“Two birds (these two souls) always united, of equal name, dwell upon one and the same tree (the body). The one of them (the individual) enjoys the sweet fruit of the fig-tree, the other looks round as a witness.

“Dwelling on the same tree (with the supreme soul) the deluded (individual) soul, immersed (in the relations of the world) is grieved by the want of power: but when it sees the other, — the long worshipped ruler as different (from all worldly relations), and his glory, then his grief ceases.”³

But the most striking attempt at harmonizing conflicting theories comes to us in a work which has obtained even an occidental celebrity; viz., the *Bhagavad Gîtâ*.

Sir Charles Wilkins was the first to present his countrymen with a translation of this work, — 1785. His English version was followed in 1823 by a Latin translation of A. W. von Schlegel, which was revised in 1846 by his pupil C. Lassen. In the same year Galanos, a Greek, published a translation of the work into that tongue which is the most

¹ This indicates that the conception of Mâyâ had currency before Sankara's day at least.

² See the interesting introduction of Dr. Rœer.

³ S. Upan. p. 58.

renowned of all the daughters of Sanskrit. Lastly, Mr. J. C. Thomson has published a choice English version, and accompanied it with copious notes and a lengthy introduction upon the history of philosophy in India. In his introduction, he brings forward a good deal of interesting matter, but it is to be regretted that he did not avail himself of the labors of scholars since Colebrooke. He contributes no facts which are not to be found in the latter author.

The Bhagavad Gîtâ is professedly a portion of the Mahâ-bhârata, one of the two great epics of India, but its connection with this work has sometimes been misunderstood. This epic is in fact, a vast collection of legendary matter relating chiefly to the early Aryan settlers in India; yet it by no means possesses any unity of plan throughout. The most connected portion of the work, about a fourth of the whole, is occupied with the recital of the strife between two kindred but rival lines, for the sovereignty of a kingdom in Upper India. The Bhagavad Gîtâ appears as an episode in this portion of the epic: it is a discussion between Arjuna, a leader of one of the hostile parties, and the god Krishna, who had come to befriend him. The opposing forces are drawn up in battle array, when Arjuna, dismayed at the sight of near relations in the ranks of the enemy, throws down his weapons, declaring that "it would be better to eat the bread of beggary in this world, than to slay these venerable men of great esteem." Thereupon, the god, to encourage him, entertains him on the spot with a lengthy harangue upon philosophy, proving conclusively that Arjuna's present duty was to fight. This episode is, however, universally regarded now as not an original portion of the story, but as an interpolation by a later hand, ingeniously woven into the plot of the epic, the result of an attempt, it will be seen, precisely similar to that which we last mentioned, to gain currency and authority for a philosophical theory by associating it with a work which already enjoyed a high repute.

¹ The Bhagavad Gîtâ: translated by J. Cockburn Thomson. Hertford, Eng. 1855. We shall refer to this edition.

Which of the two is the earlier, it is difficult to say. Mention is made in it of the "Vedânta" and of the "Brahma Sûtras,"¹ and there is throughout the work a general prevalence of Vedânta ideas; yet it does not refer to these so pointedly as to the Sâmkhya and Yoga. We feel disposed to refer the work to a period when the Vedânta philosophy was just rising into prominence, and to consider the treatise itself as designed to harmonize the Sâmkhya and Yoga doctrines, from a Vedânta point of view.

The Sâmkhya, we have seen, lays down knowledge without works as the road to bliss; the Yoga, works as a preparation, and, to a certain extent, a substitute for knowledge. The special doctrine of the Bhagavad Gîtâ is well expressed in the opening of the fifth chapter. "Renunciation of, and devotion through, works are both means of final emancipation; but of these two, devotion through works is more highly esteemed than renunciation of them. He who neither hates nor loves is to be considered a constant renouncer of actions. For he who is free from the influence of opposites, O strong armed one! is liberated from the bonds of action without any trouble. Boys, but not wise men, speak of the Sâmkhya and Yoga doctrines as different. For he who is devoted to one only, experiences the fruits of both. That place which is gained by the followers of the Sâmkhya, is also attained by those of the Yoga system. He who sees that the Sâmkhya and Yoga are one, sees indeed." The cardinal doctrine of the Gîtâ is, briefly, disinterested action,—action put forth with no reference to a reward. Says Krishna: "Let then the motive for action be in the action itself, never in its reward. Do not be incited to actions by (the hope of) reward only, nor yet indulge a propensity to inertness." This last clause seems to be aimed against the followers of the pure Yoga school, which counselled retreat from the world. Krishna is more Christian in

¹ Bhag. Gîtâ, p. 86, 101. Thomson tries unsuccessfully to explain away this fact.

² Ibid. p. 16.

enjoining upon his pupils to be in the world and yet not of it. The principle of entire indifference is forcibly laid down in the following passage.

“He who neither rejoices, nor hates, nor grieves, nor loves, who has no interest in good or bad, and is full of devotion, is dear to me. The man who is the same to a foe or a friend, in honor or ignominy, the same in cold or heat, pleasure or pain, and free from interests, alike in blame or praise, taciturn, and content with whatever may be, who has no home, who is steady-minded and full of devotion, is dear to me.”¹

According to this system, it is not actions themselves which entail evil, but merely actions associated with interest. Actions are, as in the Sâmkhya, necessitated; “For one can never, for a single moment, even exist without doing some action. For every one is forced, even against his will, to perform an action, by the qualities which spring from nature.”²

The theory of the poem respecting the bearing of devotion upon works, is interesting, especially when compared with the kindred doctrine of the Yoga. The latter system urges devotion as a help to renunciation of works, but attaches slight importance to worship of Deity in itself. The Gîtâ views devotion with reference to the same end, but makes far more prominent the idea of worship itself, and also identifies an individual Deity,—Krishna, with this supreme spirit. The work was evidently composed in the interest of a religious sect. The prominence of devotion will be seen from the following extracts :

“Renunciation of actions is difficult to obtain without devotion. The anchorite who practises devotion approaches the Supreme Spirit in no long time. The practiser of devotion, whose spirit is purified, who has subdued himself and vanquished his senses, whose soul participates in the souls of all creatures, is not polluted even by action.”³

¹ Bhag. Gîtâ, p. 84.

² Ibid. p. 22.

³ Ibid. p. 38. For an interesting view of devotion as a means of liberation, in the B. Gîtâ and Vedânta, see Burnouf: *Introd. to Bhâgavata Purâna*, p. cxi note 1.

“Those who worship me, placing their hearts on me with constant devotion, and gifted with the highest faith, are considered by me as the most devoted. But those who worship the indivisible, indemonstrable, unmanifested, omnipresent, difficult-to-contemplate, all-pervading, immovable, and firm, — if they restrain all the senses, and are equally minded towards everything, and rejoice in the good of all beings, also attain to me only. Their labor is greater, since their thoughts are directed to an object which has no manifest form. For the path which is not manifest is with difficulty attained by mortals. But if men renounce in me all their actions, intent on me, and meditating on me with exclusive devotion, worship me, — if their thoughts are directed towards me, I become ere long their extricator from the ocean of the world of mortality. Dispose thy heart towards me only, to me attach thy thoughts, without doubt thou wilt dwell within me on high after this life. But if thou art not able to compose thy thoughts immovably on me, strive then to reach me by assiduous devotion, O despiser of wealth! If thou art not capable even of assiduity, be intent on the performance of actions for me. If thou art unable to do even this, though filled with devotion to me, then abandon (regard for) the fruit of every action, being self-restrained. For knowledge is better than assiduity, contemplation is preferred to knowledge, the abandonment of self-interest in every action to contemplation; final emancipation results immediately from such abandonment.”¹

In its theory of God and the world, the Gîtâ partly harmonizes the doctrines of other schools, and partly propounds new views. It accepts the Prakriti of the Sâṅkhya, and asserts that all things emanated spontaneously from it; yet it associates with Prakriti one who is not merely, according to the Nyâya, a creator by will, but also the *material* cause of creation, and one with Prakriti, which is nothing less than original Vedântism. Thus Krishna says, identifying himself, as also throughout the poem, with the supreme Being:

¹ Bhag. Gîtâ, p. 82.

“I am the cause of the production and dissolution of the whole universe. On me is all the universe suspended, as numbers of pearls on a string. I am the savor in waters, the luminous principle in the moon and sun, the sound in the ether, the masculine essence in men, the sweet smell in the earth; and I am the brightness in the flame, the vitality in all beings, and the power of mortification in ascetics.”¹

But this Supreme Spirit, which, united with Nature, is the origin of all developed matter, is also the source of all individual spirits, which at liberation return to it, and lose their individual existence. But besides this Supreme Spirit, the double source of matter and separate spirits, the *Gîtâ* mentions a third spiritual essence, and differs in this from all other schools. It is thus described :

“These two spirits exist in the world, the divisible and also the indivisible. The divisible is every living being. The indivisible is said to be that which pervades all. But there is another, the highest spirit, designated by the name of the Supreme Soul, which, as the imperishable master, penetrates and sustains the triple world. Since I surpass the divisible, and am higher also than the indivisible, I am, therefore, celebrated in the world and in the Vedas as the highest Person. He who, not deluded, knows me to be thus the highest Person, knows all things, and worships me by every condition.”²

If we understand the poem, this third Being is the only true personality, and the highest object of worship; the indivisible is rather the impersonal creative energy, vitalizing both matter and individual souls.

The poem seems to be arranged in three divisions of six short chapters each. The first section treats mainly of practical Yoga, with the modifications accepted by the author; the second of theology; while the last develops specifically the metaphysical opinions of the writer, based chiefly upon the *Sânkhya*.

It would be admitted on all hands, that there occur

¹ *Bhag. Gîtâ*, p. 51.

² *Ibid.* p. 101.

throughout this poem, passages of peculiar force and beauty, and after dwelling upon them, one can easily imagine the control which they would exercise over a Hindu mind, and understand the high esteem in which the work has ever been held in India. In dismissing it, we would first quote a few of the more striking passages. The appeals to Arjuna to fight, notwithstanding relatives might fall by his hand, are exceedingly adroitly framed, as they appear even in the stiffness of a translation.

“Thou hast grieved for those who need not be grieved for, but thou utterest words of wisdom. The wise grieve not for dead or living. But never at any period did I, or thou, or these kings of men, not exist, nor shall any of us at any time henceforward cease to exist. . . . These finite bodies have been said to belong to an eternal, indestructible, and infinite Spirit. Therefore fight, O Bhârata! He who believes that this spirit can kill, and he who thinks that it can be killed, both of these are wrong in judgment. It neither kills nor is killed. It is not born, nor dies at any time. It has had no origin, nor will it ever have an origin. Unborn, changeless, eternal, both as to future and past time, it is not slain when the body is killed.¹

“How can that man who knows that it is indestructible, constant, unborn, and inexhaustible, cause the death of anybody, or kill anybody himself! As a man abandons worn out clothes and takes other new ones, so does the soul quit worn out bodies and enter other new ones. Weapons can-

¹ How admirably has Mr. Emerson seized the spirit of this passage in his rendering:—

“If the red slayer think he slays,
Or the slain think he is slain,
They know not well the subtle ways
I keep, and pass, and turn again;” etc.

This passage from our poem was adopted from the *Katha Upanishad*, where the English version approaches closely Mr. Emerson's language. “If the slayer thinks I slay, if the slain thinks I am slain, then both of them do not know well. It does not slay, nor is it slain.”—*Bibliotheca Indica*, No. 50, p. 105. Mr. Griffith has also versified this passage, “*Specimens of old Indian Poetry*.” London, 1852.

not cleave it; fire cannot burn it, nor can water wet it, nor can wind dry it. It is impenetrable, incombustible, incapable of moisture and also of drying. It is constant, capable of going everywhere, firm, immovable, and eternal. It is said to be invisible, incomprehensible, immutable. Therefore, knowing it to be such, thou art not right to grieve for it.”¹

We quote one more passage, in which the author attempts to describe the Infinite Spirit. Arjuna had besought Krishna to reveal to him his sovereign form. Krishna complies, and Arjuna exclaims:

“I behold all the gods in thy body, O god! and crowds of different beings, the lord Brahmâ on a throne of a lotus cup, and all the Rishis and celestial serpents. I see thee with many arms, stomachs, mouths, and eyes, everywhere of infinite form. I see neither end, nor middle, nor yet beginning of thee, O Lord of All! Of the form of All! Crowned with a diadem, bearing a club and a discus. I see thee, a mass of light, beaming everywhere, hard to look upon, bright as a kindled fire or the sun, on all sides, immeasurable. I believe thee to be the indivisible, the highest object of knowledge, the supreme receptacle of this universe, the imperishable preserver of eternal law, the everlasting person. Tell me who thou art, of awful form. Salutation to thee, O best of gods! Be merciful! I desire to know thee, the primeval one, for I cannot divine what thou art about.” Krishna replies: “I am Death, come hither to destroy mankind,” and bids Arjuna fight; whereupon he again addresses Krishna: “O infinite king of gods! habitation of the universe! thou art the one indivisible, the existing and not existing, that which is supreme. Thou art the first of the gods, the most ancient person. Thou art the supreme receptacle of this universe. Thou knowest all, and mayest be known, and art the supreme mansion. By thee is this universe caused to emanate, O thou of endless forms! Air, Yama, fire, Varuna, the moon, the progenitor, and the great grandfather (of the world) art thou. Hail! hail to thee! hail to thee a thousand

¹ Bhag. Gîtâ, p. 11.

times! and again, yet again, hail! hail to thee! Hail to thee from before! Hail to thee from behind! Hail to thee from all sides too! Thou All! of infinite power and immense might; thou comprehendest all; therefore thou art All. As I took thee merely for a friend, I beseech thee without measure to pardon whatever I may, in ignorance of this thy greatness, have said from negligence or affection, such as, O Krishna! O son of Yadu! O friend! and everything in which I may have treated thee in a joking manner, Eternal One."¹

Before concluding this sketch of Hindu philosophy, there remain to be noticed a few phases which it has assumed in modern days, the most important of which is represented to us in the Purānas. The eighteen Purānas close, if we may so speak, the canon of Hindu scriptures. They are a crude compound of mythology and philosophy, of ancient tradition and modern history, of geography and uranography, containing also minute directions for the social and religious life. They are written, each in the interest of some special deity, usually some form of Siva or Vishnu, and appear to have originated in that general religious awakening which occurred under the leadership of Sankara Ācharya and his rivals of the Vaishnavite school, about the seventh century of our era. Of these Purānas, the two most celebrated have been translated, one by Wilson into English,² and the other by Burnouf into French;³ both of these contain valuable introductions.

The philosophy in these Purānas can hardly be said to belong to any school, or be itself a separate system. It is rather a jumble of various theories, without much regard to

¹ Bhag. Gitā, p. 75.

² The Vishnu Purāna: a system of Hindu Mythology and Tradition; translated by H. H. Wilson, Oxford, 1840.

³ Bhāgavata Purāna: ou histoire poétique de Krishna; texte Sanscrit et traduction française, par Eug. Burnouf. 3 vol, Paris. This is a truly imperial work. M. Neve has also published interesting "études" upon the Purānas. Paris: 1852.

consistency of statement. Its chief alliance is with the Sâṅkhya, but it borrows largely from the Vedânta.¹

In the Vishnu Purâna, the impersonal Brahma is said to be source of all, and is of course identified with Vishnu himself. Brahma is said to exist in four forms, as Supreme Spirit, as Prakriti, or undeveloped matter, as developed matter, and as Time. "These four forms, in their due proportions, are the causes of the production of the phenomena of creation, preservation, and destruction. Vishnu, being thus discrete and undiscrete substance, spirit and time, sports like a playful boy."² At the dissolution of the universe, when, as in the Sâṅkhya system, spirit is said to be detached from all matter, the Deity as Time is held to abide alone, to sustain both matter and spirit, and to be the agent of their reunion after the lapse of a certain period.

The successive developments of matter, at creation, proceed much as in the earlier systems, but to account for the origin of living beings a theory is introduced which is a stranger to most of those systems, though unquestionably of ancient origin. It is that of a creative egg, which thus arose.

The several elements, with their respective properties, assumed, we are told, "the character of our mass of entire unity; and from the direction of spirit, with the acquiescence of the indiscrete principle, Intellect and the rest, to the gross elements inclusive, formed an egg, which gradually expanded, like a bubble of water. This vast egg, O Sage, compounded of the elements, and resting on the waters, was the excellent natural abode of Vishnu in the form of Brahmâ. Its womb, vast as the mountain Meru, was composed of the mountains; and the mighty oceans were the waters that filled its cavity. In that egg, O Brahman, were the continents and seas and mountains, the planets and divisions of the universe, the gods, the demons, and mankind." This egg was surrounded by seven envelopes, — the five elements,

¹ The Bhag. Purâna acknowledges Kapila as teacher. Book III. chap. 33.

² Vishnu Purâna, p. 9.

self-consciousness, Intellect, and Prakriti. Vishnu (= Brahma) in the form of Brahmâ, proceeds to *create* the universe. As Vishnu, he *preserves* it until the close of a period termed Kalpa. As Siva, he *destroys* it. "Having thus devoured all things, and converted the world into one vast ocean, the Supreme reposes upon his mighty serpent-couch (symbolical of Time), amidst the deep: he awakens after a season, and again, as Brahmâ, becomes the author of creation. Thus the one only god takes the designation of Brahmâ, Vishnu, and Siva, accordingly as he creates, preserves, or destroys."¹

The details of creation bear more upon mythology than philosophy, and need not occupy us. It is noticeable that while the ancient myth of a creative egg is so prominent in this Purâna, the conception of Mâyâ as the author of creation is "a doctrine foreign to most of the Purânas, and was first introduced among them apparently by the Bhâgavata."²

The notion of an egg is found in the Laws of Menu,³ a work of probably several centuries before Christ, and which also advocates a modified form of the Sâmkhya philosophy. According to this author, "the soul of all beings, having willed to produce various beings from his own divine substance, first, with a thought, created the waters, and placed in them a productive seed; that seed became an egg, bright as gold, blazing, like the luminary, with a thousand beams; and in that egg he was born himself, Brahmâ, the great forefather of all spirits."⁴ From this egg proceeded the several developments of Prakriti, in the order of the Sâmkhya philosophy, the reverse order of the Purânas.

Of the six schools of Hindu philosophy which we have now considered, the Nyâya and the Vedânta are the most popular in India at the present day. Vedântism finds its

¹ Vishnu Purâna, chap. II.

² Ibid. p. 8.

³ Institutes of Hindu Law, or the Ordinances of Menu; translated by Sir William Jones.

⁴ Ibid. chap. I.

advocates, not only in North India, nor only in the classical speech of the Brahmans ; it is cultivated in other parts of the continent, and in dialects deemed barbarous by the Sanskrit settlers of India. Tamil in the South, the most vigorous of all the indigenous languages has an extensive philosophical literature, only lately opened to us. Rev. H. R. Hoisington, late missionary in Jaffna, Ceylon, translated several treatises from the Tamil.¹ These contained a certain mystical element which seems to be the special offspring of the Tamil mind: indeed, it was the translator's opinion that there were not a few indications to be gathered from these works, that philosophy was independently cultivated by the Tamil speaking people previously to the Sanskrit colonization of southern India. How far he was correct in his opinion, we do not feel prepared to say: that the works themselves, as the most popular treatises of south India, are deserving of careful study, no one who reads them can fail to see. Two works upon the Vedânta philosophy in its most modern dress, have also been given us by Dr. C. Graul of the Lutheran Missionary Institution, Leipsig,² and Rev. Thomas Foulkes, Church Missionary at Madras.³

But Vedântism, with all pure Hindu speculation, is passing away; it is leaving the hands of the few, the "twice-born," and becoming the possession of all classes and professions. A native writer might lament over philosophy as one long ago did over poetry: "Now, old and decrepid, her beauty faded, and her unadorned feet slipping as she walks, in whose cottage does she disdain to take shelter?" but the ground for his lament we look upon as ground for rejoicing. This freedom to search the truth, the English conquest has procured for India, and while Kapila, Gôtama,

¹ Jour. Am. Orient. Soc. Vol. IV. On the Antiquity of Dravidian Literature. See the Introduction to Caldwell's Compar. Gram. of Dravidian Languages. London: 1856.

² Kaivaljanavanita (Fresh Butter of Eternal Bliss): a Vedânta Poem; translated by C. Graul, D. D. Leipsig: 1855.

³ The Elements of the Vedântic Philosophy; translated by Thos. Foulkes. Madras: 1860.

and Vyâsa are still revered and studied, the teachings of Plato, Bacon and Descartes find also many a zealous defender upon the banks of the sacred river. England has hitherto given India an education shorn of Christianity, and the consequence has been that the favorite school with "Young Bengal" is a school of Deism; but a brighter day is dawning: revolutions in opinion do not spring up suddenly in this oriental world; yet the time is coming, when the Gospel of Christ, having gained access to the spiritual convictions of the multitude of India, shall gather up and appropriate to itself those secret truths which Hinduism contains, and shall solve those serious problems of life and eternity with which the Hindu mind has been so long and fruitlessly engaged.

ARTICLE II.

THEORIES OF MESSIANIC PROPHECY.

BY REV. S. C. BARTLETT, PROFESSOR IN CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

THE subject of Messianic Prophecy is attended with great difficulties. Certain portions of the Old Testament are so direct in their reference to Christ and his Kingdom, and so distinctly appropriated by him and his apostles, as to secure a general recognition among all who believe in prophecy and inspiration. But around this circle of clear light — the direct prophecies — there is a broad penumbra of doubt and debate.

In regard to a large part of this debated ground, the question among evangelical expositors has often been more as to the mode than the fact of a Messianic reference. And their concurrent recognition of the fact has often been the more weighty and impressive by reason of their diverse theories concerning the mode. It is interesting also to