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well paved with slabs of basalt. The walls are, in some places, almost perfect; and the form and extent of many of the ancient houses can be traced. I saw and copied a number of Greek inscriptions; and many more would, no doubt, be brought to light by a diligent and careful search. I estimated the extreme length of the ruins at above one mile, and the breadth nearly half a mile.

ARTICLE VI.

WORKS OF REV. AUGUSTUS TOPLADY.

By Rev. George N. ^{Nye} Boardman, Professor in Middlebury College.

AMONG the writers who undertake the defence of any of the Christian doctrines, none has a better claim to be heard than the pastor; and none should be more readily pardoned in case of intemperate zeal. We naturally suppose that he has found the truths he would vindicate effective in his public and private ministrations.

Augustus Toplady had possession of the vicarship of Broad Henbury, in Devonshire, from 1768 till his death in 1778. He was called to preach the gospel, as he thought, in evil times. Those of his works which were written for publication, were intended to check the progress of Arminianism and to defend the church of England from the charge of being Arminian in doctrine.

It was his love of the church that first called him out, in the year 1769, in a letter to Dr. Nowell. He says: "To vindicate the best of visible churches from the false charge of Arminianism, fastened on her by you, and to prove that the principles commonly (although perhaps not properly) termed Calvinistic, are plainly and repeatedly delivered in

the authentic declarations of her belief, were the reasons which chiefly induced me to resolve on the present undertaking." ¹

The earnestness with which he addresses himself to his labor will be seen in a remark to Dr. N. in the letter :— " You have been fighting against those very truths which, when you received ordination, you, on your knees, was solemnly commissioned to defend." To this he adds, as pertinent to the present argument, the expostulation of the great Dr. South : " To be impugned from without, and betrayed from within, is certainly the worst condition that either church or state can fall into ; and the best of churches, the church of England, has had experience of both." ²

Besides the letter just noticed, Mr. Toplady published, in 1774, the " Historic Proof of the Doctrinal Calvinism of the Church of England." His treatise is a condensed statement of the views of the eminent reformers and martyrs of the English church, from the time of Edward VI. to the Commonwealth. After establishing his position by abundant and superfluous evidence, he concludes with a " Humble Address to the Episcopal Bench," in which he says :

" Your Lordships lament the visible encroachments of Popery, — Arminianism is at once its root, its sunshine, and its vital sap. — Your Lordships see with concern the extending progress of infidelity ; — Arminianism has opened the hatches to this pernicious inundation." ³ " We have had, since that otherwise happy period [the Restoration], more than an hundred years' experience of the unsanctified effects which naturally result from the ideal system of free-will and universal redemption. What has that system done for us ? It has unbraced every nerve of virtue, and relaxed every rein of religious and social duty." ⁴

At the rise of Methodism, Mr. Toplady was one of the most conspicuous writers in the controversy between the Calvinists and the followers of Wesley. In the same year that he published the letter to Dr. Norwell, he published a tract in English from the Latin of Jerom Zanchius, with the

¹ Vol. V. page 11. The references in this Article are to an edition of Toplady's Works, in six volumes, published in London, 1794.

² V. 124.

³ II. 361.

⁴ II. 364.

title: "The Doctrine of Absolute Predestination stated and asserted; with a Preliminary Discourse on the Divine Attributes." Mr. Wesley attempted a refutation of the doctrine contained in this work; and closed with these words:

"The sum of all is this: one in twenty (suppose) of mankind are elected, nineteen in twenty are reprobated. The elect shall be saved, do what they will; the reprobate shall be damned, do what they can. Reader, believe this or be damned. Witness my hand, A—T—."¹

This naturally called out a reply, which was published as "A Letter to the Rev. Mr. John Wesley, relative to his pretended abridgment of Zanchius on Predestination." This paper was followed by others, such as "More Work for Mr. John Wesley," "An old fox tarred and feathered;" all written quite as much "for Mr. John Wesley," as for the truth.

But without noticing, at present, the manner of controversy, the main purpose of this Article will be to present the doctrinal views of Toplady as they are exhibited in his opposition to Arminianism.

He did not profess to contend for truth in the abstract, nor for the Bible as a book to be interpreted by each man; but for a creed.

"To say that the church would be sufficiently secured by subscribing to the Scriptures at large, is a mere pretence, far too thin to conceal the cloven foot which lurks beneath."² "The expedience, propriety, and even necessity of these [Articles of Faith] appear, among other considerations, from hence: that without some given model or determinate plan of doctrine, deduced from the sacred Scriptures, it will be impossible either for minister or people to form just and connected ideas of divine things."³

Nor is he disposed to be lenient towards those who maintain that "our faith should go no farther than the clearness of our ideas." He thought if all mysteries were to be expunged, we might as well "commence infidels and madmen at once." This point he illustrates, as had been done by Bishop Butler, from the analogy of nature.

Notwithstanding the rigid theology of our author, it sometimes requires patience to separate his arguments from the

¹ Southey's Life of Wesley, Vol. II. p. 169.

² III. 160.

³ III. 65.

rhetorical expressions in which they are involved. It is sometimes amusing to notice how readily *anything* is made an illustration of some doctrine or habit of the Arminians. He thinks "the grace in the believer's heart, according to the Arminians is like a text of Scripture written on a pane of glass, demolished by the first hand that flings a stone at it." He thinks, according to the Arminians, in conversion "God does little or nothing for men, but to give them a pull by the elbow to awake them from sleep." The Arminians seem to him to "make the Thirty-nine Articles like the newly-invented elastic garters." Arminian preachers, who "press men to help forward their own conversion, upon pain of damnation," make him think of nothing so much as "auctioneers, who, with the hammer in their hand, are always bawling out, 'Now is your time! now is your time! a-going! a-going! a-going!'" "Let me," he adds, "rather address the living God, and say, Awake and put on thy strength, O arm of the Lord, and breathe upon these slain that they may live." Though he is somewhat copious in arguments of this kind, yet it is not difficult to discover what was his main reliance for effectual opposition to the heresies of the day.

Divine Government.

The fundamental principle with which Toplady settles every question, is the government of God. He looked upon the Arminian view of human freedom as inconsistent with the Divine administration. As he was entirely satisfied of the reality of the latter, of course he rejected the former. He believed all things to be directed by the counsel of God. All things are certain and necessary, not contingent and accidental; he constantly assumes that contingent and accidental mean the same thing; that no contingent event can be certain. Whatever he might allow to second causes, still he held the will of God to be the efficient cause of each particular thing. The assertions of this fact are more abundant in reference to the salvation of men, but may be found in connection with other subjects.

“The absolute will of God is the original spring and efficient cause of his people’s salvation.”¹ “Whatsoever comes to pass, comes to pass by virtue of this absolute omnipotent will of God, which is the primary and supreme cause of all things.”² “We find every matter resolved, ultimately, into the mere sovereign pleasure of God, as the spring and occasion of whatsoever is done in heaven and earth.”³ Toplady does not mean, by the will of God, a purpose or decree simply; for he says, “God’s will is nothing else than God himself willing.”⁴ The same efficiency here noticed is recognized in the lives of good men.

“God’s preservation is the good man’s perseverance. He will keep the feet of his saints. Arminianism represents God’s Spirit as if he acted like the guard of a stage-coach, who sees the passengers safe out of town for a few miles; and then, making his bow, turns back and leaves them to pursue the rest of their journey by themselves. But divine grace does not thus leave God’s travellers. It accompanies them to their journey’s end and without end.”⁵

The question will arise, If God’s will is the real cause of all events, so that “whatsoever comes to pass, comes to pass necessarily,” and whatever is contingent (i. e. unexpected or seemingly accidental), is so only “with respect to second causes and us men;”⁶ Why is it that God’s plainly expressed will is so often defeated? To answer this, we must remember that “God’s will of precept may, in some instances, appear to thwart his will of determination.”

“Although the will of God, considered in itself, is simply one and the same; yet, in condescension to the present capacities of men, the Divine will is very properly distinguished into secret and revealed. Thus it was his revealed will that Pharaoh should let the Israelites go; that Abraham should sacrifice his son; that Peter should not deny Christ: but, as was proved by the event, it was his secret will that Pharaoh should not let Israel go; that Abraham should not sacrifice Isaac; and that Peter should deny his Lord.”⁷

It must not be inferred from this, that God’s will is ever contrary to itself. The secret will of God is, in reality, his

¹ V. 209.² V. 201.³ V. 202.⁴ V. 200.⁵ III. 190.⁶ V. 207.⁷ V. 198.

will; while that which is revealed has reference to the various circumstances of men. "The hidden will is peremptory and absolute." Whatever God wills, cannot fail of accomplishment. "This made Austin say, Evil men do many things contrary to God's revealed will; but so great is his wisdom, and so inviolable his truth, that he directs all things into those channels which he foreknew."¹ But with the secret will we are not concerned; while the revealed is intended for our guidance.

"The brief of the matter is this: secret things belong to God, and those that are revealed belong to us; therefore when we meet with a plain precept, we should endeavor to obey it, without tarrying to inquire into God's hidden purpose."¹

The will of God, as here presented, is not to be looked upon as limiting itself in order to leave some things for human agency. God does all things himself; his will is the motive power which causes all things in heaven and earth. In one place Toplady happened to illustrate a matter by Wolsey's expression: "The king and I;" which suggests to him the following as a note:

"Speaks not Arminianism the same audacious language? Does not the doctrine of free-will, as commonly understood and received, represent man as God's coadjutor, and even as a coefficient with his Maker? Let this stand as a sample: 'Thou art courted by Father, Son, and Spirit, thy fellow laborers for thy good. To glad all heaven, assert, rescue, ennoble, and, with bliss eternal, crown thyself; for, without thee, in the constituted order of things, Heaven is unable to do it.' I appeal to every reader whether Wolsey's mode of expression was not innocent and humble, when compared with Arminian phraseology of God and I."²

In another place he calls that the "grand error of the heart (for it is a heart error as well as a head error; deeply rooted in our corrupt nature, as well as perniciously pleasing to unassisted reason), which misrepresents justification as at all suspended on causes or conditions of human performance."⁴ Nor are we to confine this controlling power, which God exercises, to the matter of conversion alone. God always

¹ V. 201.² V. 200.³ III. 137.⁴ III. 15.

secretly moves the wills of men. He does not impose a sensible compulsion, "yet man acts, from the first to the last moment of his life in absolute subserviency (though he, perhaps, does not know it nor design it) to the purposes and decrees of God concerning him." God's people endeavor to do his will; but the unregenerate "resemble men rowing in a boat, who make toward the very place on which they turn their backs."¹

The views of Toplady, on the subject now under consideration, will be farther illustrated as we proceed to other topics. — It might seem proper to notice, after the general subject of the Divine government, the particular manifestations of it in the decrees of God; but Toplady has said but little of decrees in general. His sentiments will be sufficiently understood, except on Election and Reprobation, which will be noticed hereafter, if we examine his remark on that doctrine on which he most relied for the proof of decrees, viz.

Foreknowledge.

Our author finds a little difficulty in the term foreknowledge. "When I speak of foreknowledge, as an attribute essential to Deity, I speak, as St. Paul says, after the manner of men. The simple term knowledge would be more intrinsically proper; but then it would not so readily aid the conceptions of ordinary persons."² Ideas of time are not to be connected with God: "there is no past nor future to him. All is present and unsuccessive." The same difficulty led, probably, to the following statements, of rather dubious consistency, in which the works and the attributes of God are considered relatively to each other. Which of the attributes has the precedence in calling forth acts of Divine power? There seems to be, in the following statement, a *desire* to remove the notion of time from the influence of motives on the Divine mind: "God's foreknowledge, taken abstractedly, is not the sole cause of beings and events; but his will and foreknowledge taken together. Hence we find (Acts 2: 23)

¹ III. 170.

² VI. 62.

that his determinate counsel and foreknowledge act in concert (but the idea of succession returns as soon as we forget it was banished), "the latter resulting from and being founded on the former."¹ The priority which is allowed in the last clause is again affirmed: "there are four links, which all the art of man can never separate, and which proceed in the following order, — Decree, Foreknowledge, Prophecy, Necessity."² Again: "a point of the utmost importance" is contained in this conclusion: "the knowledge of God is a cause of the things known, and not *vice versa*. Human knowledge is founded on its respective objects; but all the objects of the Divine knowledge are founded on the Divine knowledge itself."³ "If the Deity received any degree of intelligence from the beings he has made, he would cease to be a pure act; he would be passive in that reception. Whence it would follow, that he must be susceptible of change."⁴ These remarks, which are of the "utmost importance," are from his summary of the reasoning of Bradwardin, his favorite theologian, whom he calls the English Austin.⁵ He informs us afterwards that Bradwardin be-

¹ V. 197.² VI. 59.³ I. 196.⁴ I. 195.

⁵ L. 186. "It [Bradwardin's work 'De Causa Dei'] captivated the very muses; for Chaucer, the father of English poetry, who flourished a few years after the archbishop's decease, puts him in the same rank with St. Austin, in those lines so pleasingly remarkable for their antique simplicity of style:

"But what God afore wote, must needs bee,
After the opinion of certain clerkis.
Witness of him that any clerke is
That in schole is great alteration
In this matter, and great disputation,
And hath been of an hundred thousand men.
But I ne cannot boult it to the bren
As can the holy doctour Saincte Austin,
Or Boece, or the bishop Bradwardin."

Chaucer's lines have, perhaps, at present, little else besides their rust to recommend them. But Sir H. Savile's version of them into Latin, is highly elegant and classical:

Non ovenire non potest, quicquid Deus
Præscinit: ita fert crebra doctorum cohortes.
Hic literatum quem libet testem voco,
Quantis utrinque fluctibus lis hæc scholas
Trivit, teritque: penè inextricabili
Ingenia nodo centies mille implicans.
Excutere nudas hæc adusque furfures
(Quod ab Augustino præstitum, et Boethio,
Ac Bradwardino episcopo) non sum potis.

lieved the independency of the Divine foreknowledge to be founded on the eternal sovereignty of the Divine will.

It was to this attribute of God that he appealed in proof of predestination :

“The certainty and necessity of every future event, follow as strongly on the principle of God’s foreknowledge or omniscience, as they can possibly do on the hypothesis of the most adamant decree.”¹ Yet “the influence which the Divine foreknowledge has on the certain futurity of things foreknown, does not render the intervention of second causes needless, nor destroy the nature of things themselves.”²

This means that men do not feel as if any compulsion were applied to the will, though their future conduct is certain ; for God’s knowledge is infallible, and is the cause of the things which are known. It means that nature remains notwithstanding a half-unconscious conviction that the attributes of God ought to displace it. We must give Mr. Toplady the credit of admitting facts, yet we can hardly doubt that he felt inclined to make as little as possible of nature. Indeed, his philosophy seems to have tended to the destruction of all essences, even the essence of Deity. God is pure act. If there is an essence of which the Divine actions are products, that essence must be acted on, hence be passive, which is below the dignity of Divinity. Having made the all-absorbing energy of God’s attributes destroy his essence, it is kindly in him to assure us they have not destroyed nature. But might not this system, by something analogous to a chemical combination, be reduced to a simpler one,

“ Whose body Nature is, and God the soul ? ”

Election and Reprobation.

The predestination of each individual to eternal happiness or eternal misery, is a doctrine which in any age will excite opposition and anger. Toplady was assailed, on account of his belief of this doctrine, with ridicule and abuse. The particular view of it which he took, will next claim attention.

¹ I. 193.

² V. 196.

Election and Reprobation he held to be doctrines revealed in the Bible, and not otherwise discoverable. Yet his view of God's government was such as to compel him to say, that it would be casting imputation on the wisdom of God to suppose, if he saves any, that he saves them without a decree — Election and Reprobation thus become the most prominent themes in all his theological writings. It would be impossible to exaggerate his estimate of their importance. They exercised a kind of tyranny over his mind. Reprobation was an "awful" theme, on which he looked with trembling, but with composure ; for he was enabled, in the mean time, to hide himself, in the Divine election, as his "ark of refuge." The foreordination of God seemed to him to be God himself working in the world. To deny this was atheism. It was not simply denying the revealed word of God ; it was denying the decree, the plan, the will of God — God willing, planning, decreeing in the world ; which he considered a denial of God's existence. Election was, in his system of theology, what causes are in a philosophy of nature — "the bond which connects and keeps together the whole," without which it is a system of sand. Election seemed, to him, "so blended and woven with the entire scheme of gospel doctrine, that when the former is excluded, the latter bleeds to death."¹

In looking at his statements of these doctrines, it should be borne in mind that Toplady was a sub-lapsarian. The distinction between this view and that of the supra-lapsarians, he gives as follows :

"The Supra-lapsarians suppose that, in the decree of election and preterition, God did not consider mankind either as fallen or unfallen ; but chose some and rejected others merely as beings that should infallibly exist. The Sub-lapsarians suppose that the elect were chosen and the reprobate passed by, not merely as creatures, but complexly as sinners. Calvinism is the general name under which the partisans of both are comprehended. The Church-of-England system is formed on the Sub-lapsarian principle, though with such moderation as not to exclude the former."

He points out four different meanings of the term "elec-

¹ V. 280.

² I. 245.

tion," as used in the Bible; the following is the only one required here.

"The term *election* most commonly signifies that eternal, sovereign, unconditional, particular, and immutable act of God, where he selected some from among all mankind, and of every nation under heaven, to be redeemed and everlastingly saved by Christ."¹

Reprobation is :

"God's eternal preterition of some men, when he chose others to glory; and his predestination of them to fill up the measure of their iniquities, and then to receive the just punishment of their crimes, even destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power."²

The ground of election and of reprobation is the sovereign will of God :

"Those who were ordained unto eternal life, were not ordained on account of any worthiness foreseen in them, or of any good works to be wrought by them, nor yet for their future faith; but purely and solely of free, sovereign grace, and according to the mere pleasure of God. This is evident, among other considerations, from this: that faith, repentance, and holiness are no less the free gifts of God than eternal life itself."³

"As the future faith and good works of the elect were not the cause of their being chosen; so neither were the future sins of the reprobate the cause of their being passed by: but both the choice of the former and the decretive omission of the latter, were owing merely and entirely to the sovereign will and determining pleasure of God."⁴

The end to be attained by the salvation of the elect and the punishment of the non-elect is the same :

"The grand principal end proposed by the Deity to himself, in his formation of all things, and of mankind in particular, was the manifestation and display of his own glorious attributes. His ultimate scope, in the creation of the elect, is to evidence and make known, by their salvation, the unsearchable riches of his power and wisdom, mercy and love; and the creation of the non-elect is for the display of his justice, power, sovereignty, holiness, and truth. As, therefore, God himself is the sole author and efficient of all his own actions; so is he, likewise, the supreme end to which they lead and in which they terminate."⁵

In reference to subordinate ends: to the elect themselves, the end of election is eternal life; but the punishment of the

¹ V. 232.

² V. 234.

³ V. 249.

⁴ V. 264.

⁵ V. 268.

non-elect is for the purpose of treating men according to their desert.¹

Mr. Toplady was obliged to reply to many of the common objections to the doctrine of election. Some of these may be noticed :

God's justice is brought in question, by his election of some to life and his reprobation of others. This injustice is either a want of impartiality in his treatment of men, or his arbitrary act of condemning those who had simply done what he ordained they should do.

In the first case, the reply is :

“The justice of God's procedure herein is unquestionable, out of a corrupt mass, wherein one was not better than another, he might love and choose whom and as many as he pleased. It was likewise without a shadow of injustice whom and how many he would pass by.”²

In the second case, the reply is :

“The condemning of the non-elect is the fruit (not of their non-election, which was no fault of theirs, but) of their own positive transgression.”
 “Reprobation is, for the most part, a thing purely negative ; and consists in God's not choosing some to glory, and not calling them by grace. Even his resolving to let them fill up the measure of their iniquities, has, so far as God is concerned, more in it of negation than of positivity ; and is only tantamount to this, that the ungodly take advantage of the non-interference of grace, to follow the corrupt dictates of their own hearts, so far as they are not restrained by providence.”³

This reply is naturally followed by another question, which is perhaps more difficult for a sub-lapsarian to answer : How happens it, that men sin ? Was not the fall of man decreed, as well as his reprobation ; why divide a decree which is really one, and then make yourself the champion of that part which is easiest of defence ? The decree of reprobation implies a decree of sin ; and in this latter decree, the supposition of sin, as its ground would be absurd. Are men, then, compelled to be subjects of the decree of reprobation ? Mr. Toplady's opponents insist on knowing whether, taking into view the whole subject at once, men can avoid punish-

¹ V. 255 and 264.

² V. 281.

³ V. 399.

ment, or must the reprobate be "damned, do what they can?" Toplady felt the full force of the objections which are here raised, and has replied to them more or less satisfactorily, in several places. His manner of stating the objection is this : "It is frequently objected to us, that, according to our view of predestination : 'God makes some persons on purpose to damn them.'"¹

We will first notice his sentiment in reference to this objection, and then his argument :

"This we never advanced ; nay, we utterly reject it, as equally unworthy of God to do, and of a rational being to suppose."² "To say that any shall be saved, do what they will ; and others be damned, do what they can : is, in the first instance, blasphemy against the holiness of God ; and, in the second, blasphemy against his goodness."³

To Wesley's charge, that his view of predestination made God the author of sin, and made it God's fault, not that of Judas, that Judas betrayed Christ ; he replies : "without the least heat or emotion, I plainly say, Mr. Wesley lies."⁴

The argument which he brings forward for the defence of his system is : first, "Reprobation denotes either God's eternal preterition of some men when he chose others to glory ; or, it may likewise signify God's forbearing to call, by his grace, those whom he had thus ordained to condemnation."⁵ But this is a defence of only a part of his doctrine of predestination — that relating to punishment, not that relating to sin. A second argument is drawn from the texts of the Scriptures where predestination is asserted. These passages he attempts to apply only to those who have already become sinners : "God condemns and punishes the non-elect, not merely as men, but as sinners."⁶ The remainder of the argument is what is contained in these words :

"John offers a query : 'Can they avoid it [i. e. can the reprobate avoid punishment] by anything they do ?' Let me also put a query to the querist : Can you prove, that any one of them ever did what he could to avoid it ? If this cannot be proved, it does not follow that 'the reprobate shall

¹ V. 267.

² V. 267.

³ V. 365.

⁴ V. 421.

⁵ V. 399.

⁶ V. 398—408.

be damned, do what they can.'¹ Can Mr. Wesley produce a single instance of any one man, who did all he could to be saved, and yet was lost? If he can, let him tell us who that man was, where he lived, when he died, what he did, and how it came to pass he labored in vain."²

This reply certainly meets the case, and may be applied to the objection in its broadest form. But it is not a defence evolved from his own doctrine of decrees. Nor has it any necessary reference to predestination at all. It is worth noticing, that an author who had said that God cannot be a tyrant, in the sense of acting contrary to law, "because the Supreme Governor of the universe can be bound by no exterior law,"³ should be driven at last to appeal, rather pettishly, to man's ability, in proof of the justice of God. But what does Mr. Toplady mean by this reply in the form of a question?—that the reprobate *can* break a decree of God, and crowd themselves into the number of Christ's followers? We shall hardly charge his opponents with stupidity for not so understanding him, at least before this resort to what a "man can do;" if we notice his doctrine of necessity; his frequent assertion, that "the decrees of election and reprobation are immutable and irreversible;" and such assertions as this: "Nor could the justice of God stand, if he was to condemn the elect, for whose sins he hath received ample satisfaction at the hand of Christ; or if he was to save the reprobate, who are not interested in Christ as the elect are."⁴

Another objection is, there is inconsistency between God's decree of electing a fixed and unalterable number to salvation, and the general offer: "Whosoever will, may take of the water of life freely."

The reply is: "In the first place, none can will or unfeignedly and spiritually desire a part in these privileges, but those whom God previously makes willing and desirous; and, secondly, he gives this will to, and excites this desire in, none but his own elect."⁵

The opponents of election say, the doctrine which teaches that men will be saved, "do what they will," leads to indo-

¹ V. 401.² V. 405.³ V. 270.⁴ V. 248.⁵ V. 228.

lence and vice. We have seen that Mr. Toplady resents any such representation of his doctrine. He also denies the effect here charged upon it. It is as impossible to be saved without personal holiness as without personal existence. But God decrees with salvation the means of salvation. "The same gratuitous predestination which ordained the existence of the elect as men, ordained their purification as saints." He denies that the doctrine tends to "carnal security," but to fortify the people of Christ against the attacks of unbelief, and the insults of spiritual enemies, to withdraw men from a dependence on themselves, or any creature, and to excite them to a love of God, from a confidence of his love to them.

On the other hand, he thought the legitimate tendency of Arminianism to be to licentiousness. He considered the foundation of Arminian doctrine to be : the assumption that every man has a claim to happiness "in right of involuntary creatureship."¹ God gave existence, therefore he is bound to make that existence happy. "Admit but this, and universal salvation comes in with a full tide."² We may securely say : "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die."

As reasons for publicly teaching the doctrine of predestination, Toplady gives, from Luther, the two following :

1. The humiliation of our pride and the manifestation of Divine grace.
2. The discipline of faith afforded, in believing this as one of "the things not seen."

To these he adds, as further reasons :

1. "Without it, we cannot form just and becoming ideas of God," as a being whose understanding is infinite ; whose care extends to the minutest things ; whose purposes are unchangeable ; who is omnipotent, for, if he is not the author of irreversible decrees, he is liable to be baffled and defeated by his own creatures ; and who exercises sovereign mercy and voluntary grace.

2. "Predestination is to be preached, because the grace of God cannot be maintained without it."

¹ V. 390.

² *Ibid.*

3. By this, "human pride is levelled, and the Divine glory shines untarnished, because unrivalled."

4. This doctrine is to be insisted on," in order to confirm and strengthen true believers, in the certainty and confidence of their salvation."

5. Without this doctrine, "we cannot enjoy a lively sight and experience of God's special love and mercy towards us in Jesus Christ."

6. "That from a sense of God's peculiar, eternal, and unalterable love to his people, their hearts may be inflamed to love him in return."

7. By it, "we shall be excited to the practice of universal godliness."

8. Without it, "we shall want one great inducement to the exercise of brotherly kindness and charity." Nothing will so effectually knit together the hearts of God's people, in time, as the belief of their having been written, by name, in one book of life, from everlasting."

9. Without it, "we shall want the surest and most powerful inducement to patience, resignation, and dependence upon God, under every spiritual and temporal affliction." "My afflictions were a part of his original plan, and are all ordered in number, weight, and measure."¹

Necessity.

Toplady advocated the scheme of necessity; he admitted, also, the freedom of the will. How he made these two positions consistent with each other, is the point to be noticed. Necessity he defined to be "that by which, whatever comes to pass, cannot but come to pass, and can come to pass in no other way or manner than it does; which coincides with Aristotle's definition of necessity. We call that necessary, which cannot be otherwise than it is."² Of the different kinds of necessity included in this definition, that of "compulsion" may be thrown out, as not applicable to the human will. The necessity of "infallible certainty," without any

¹ V. 387—407.

² VI. 19.

"compulsory force on the will of the agent," is that by which human actions come to pass."¹ This infallible certainty is consistent with freedom, as may be seen by an illustration :

"When Mr. Wesley is very hungry or very tired, he is necessarily, and yet freely, disposed to food or rest. He can no more help being so disposed, than a falling stone can help tending to the earth. And I will venture to affirm, what he himself cannot deny, that, necessarily biassed as he is to those mediums of recruit ; he has recourse to them as freely (i. e. as voluntarily, and with as much appetite, choice, desire, and relish) as if necessity was quite out of the case ; nay, and with abundantly greater freedom and choice, than if he was not so necessitated and impelled."²

The coincidence of thought in this last clause and that in a remark of Sir William Hamilton, is worth noting. Hamilton, speaking of the liberty of spontaneity, says : "The greatest spontaneity is, in fact, the greatest necessity."³ In evidence of this, he brings forward the same illustration as that above ; except that he supposes a hungry horse, in place of the Methodist divine. But the Scotch philosopher says, this liberty of spontaneity ought, in the question of the freedom of the will, "to be thrown altogether out of account."

If we neglect both of the points which have now been noticed, — compulsion from external force, and that kind of freedom which is common to men and brutes, — as irrelevant ; we may return to the question, What scheme of necessity did Mr. Toplady adopt, as consistent with freedom of the will ? Understanding freedom to be, as has just been noticed, acting with appetite, choice, desire, and relish, we may suppose at least two kinds of necessity, which would be consistent with it — necessitation by the efficient willing of the Deity, through the human will as an instrument ; and necessitation through final causes, or the necessary determination of the will by the strongest motive. Some passages appear to indicate one view ; some, the other ; and, at times, it would be difficult to determine which was in the mind of the writer, or whether both, for the latter *might* be true, either with or without the former. Indeed, Toplady's purpose in

¹ VI. 20.

² VI. 20.

³ Hamilton's edition of Reid, p. 601.

writing did not require him to distinguish, very accurately, between different schemes on this subject. He says :

“ The point in dispute between us and the Arminians is, not concerning the existence of free will, but concerning its powers. That man is naturally endued with a will, we never denied ; and that man’s will is naturally free to what is morally and spiritually evil, we always affirmed. The grand hinge, then, on which the debate turns, is whether free will be, or be not, a faculty of such sovereignty and power, as either to ratify or baffle the saving grace of God, according to its [i. e. according to the will’s] own independent pleasure and self-determination ? ”¹

But Toplady has been more definite than this ; and we may find statements indicative of his sentiments on both of the points last noticed. In relation to the power of motives, he is explicit.

“ Bradwardin believed that the human will, however free in its actings, is not altogether exempt from necessity. He supposed that what the understanding regards as good, the will must necessarily desire ; and what the understanding represents as evil, the will must necessarily disapprove. A remark this, not spun from the subtleties of metaphysics ; but founded in fact, and demonstrable from every man’s own hourly experience. The will, therefore, is no other than the practical echo of the understanding ; and is so far from being endued with a self-determining power, or with a freedom of indifference to this or that, that it closes in with the dictates of the intellect as naturally, as necessarily, and as implicitly, as an eastern slave accommodates his obedience to the commands of the grand seignor. As the understanding is thus the directress of the will ; so, ten thousand different circumstances concur to influence and direct the understanding ; which latter is altogether as passive in her receptions of impressions from without, as she is sometimes active in her subsequent contemplation and combination of them. It follows, that if the understanding (from which the will receives its bias) be thus liable to passive, subjective necessity ; the will itself, which is absolutely governed by a faculty so subject to necessitation, cannot possibly be possessed of that kind of freedom which the Arminian scheme supposes her to be.”² “ The finally predominant motive constantly and infallibly determines the will ; and the will, thus necessarily determined, as constantly and infallibly determines the actions of the willer. If motives did not so operate on the mind, actions and volitions would be uncaused effects ; than which ideas, it is impossible for anything to be more absurd and self-contradictory.”³

¹ I. 206.² I. 207.³ VL 41.

These quotations will leave no doubt as to his view of the power of motives. On the more difficult question of the efficiency of the Divine will, in the case of human volitions, the conclusion will not be so clear. He hesitates but does not deny, when this view is stated in its broadest sense.

“From the declaration of our Lord: ‘My Father worketh hitherto, and I work;’ and from that assertion of the Apostle: ‘In him we live, and are moved, and exist;’ the archbishop [Bradwardin] infers: 1. ‘that no thing whatever can put any other thing into motion, unless God himself, by his own proper influence, give motion to the thing so moved; 2. that no thing whatever can put any other thing into motion, without God’s being the immediate mover of it; yea, 3. that whatsoever is put in motion by anything else, is more immediately moved by God himself, than by the instrument which sets it in motion, be that instrument what it will.’ This is winding up matters to a very high standard. And yet, perhaps, the standard is no higher than philosophy itself can justify.”¹

Though Mr. Toplady seems to be dizzy for a moment when raised to this height; his own statements in reference to the power of motives, and the dependence of motives upon God as the source of their power, indicate a view not much below that of the archbishop. He maintained that the volitions were dependent on the ideas, the ideas on the sensations, the sensations upon “exterior beings (for all our sensations are but modes of motion), and every one of these exterior beings is dependent for existence, and for operation, on God Most High.”² Necessity, in his view, derives “its whole existence from the free will of God; and its whole effectuosity from his never-ceasing providence.”³ He does not distinguish between the rational determination of the will and fate; but held both to be true and the same with necessity. “And what is philosophical necessity, but predestination elicitā, or God’s determination drawn out into act? Necessity, i. e. fate or providence, is a straight line drawn from the point—God’s decree.”⁴ The execution of God’s decree is not the application of force to the will; for the Author of the decree gives man his freedom, and can easily present motives, so that man acts as if he was free, while yet

¹ I. 192.² VI. 30.³ VI. 43.⁴ VI. 46.

the "will of God is certain and unalterable and is the governess of ours."¹ He notices, in connection with this subject, the opinion of the old philosophers, in a way which shows his admiration, if not his assent.

"If we distinguish accurately, this seems to have been the order in which the most judicious of the ancients considered the whole matter: first, God; then, his will; then fate, or the solemn ratification of his will by passing and establishing it into an unchangeable decree; then, creation; then, necessity, i. e. such an indissoluble concatenation of secondary causes and effects, as has a native tendency to secure the certainty of all events (*sicut unda impelitur undâ*); then, providence, i. e. the omnipresent, omnivigilant, all-directing superintendency of Divine wisdom and power, carrying the whole preconcerted scheme into actual execution by the subservient mediation of second causes, which are created for that end."²

Almost any scheme of necessity may be adopted as consistent with merely the freedom which Mr. Toplady allows: he nowhere intimates that the freedom of spontaneity which has been noticed, is not sufficient for man's free agency. Passages have been already noticed which show that freedom is simply choice, or pleasure, or willingness, in action. If only a smile of satisfaction passes over the face of the man, when he sees what he is doing, he is free; let him be in any conceivable condition, as to motives or compulsion. In meeting objections to his views, Toplady denies any connection between morality and necessity. Things are good or bad of themselves, independently of their causes, "neither necessity nor non-necessity has anything to do with the morality of actions."³

"The modes of actions, called virtue and vice, do not cease to be moral, be those modes occasioned by what they may. Acts are, to all intents and purposes, as morally good or evil, if they flow from one source as from another. Light is light, darkness is darkness, flow they from the right hand or from the left."⁴

To the question, What influence can the means of grace have on human conduct, consistently with the scheme of necessity, this philosopher replies:

¹ V. 208.

² VI. 20.

³ VI. 39.

⁴ VI. 38.

“ These are not useless with regard to the elect, for they are the necessary means of bringing them to the knowledge of the truth. Nor are these vain with regard to the reprobate ; for precept, reproof, and exhortation may, if duly attended to, be a means of making them careful to adjust their moral, external conduct according to the rules of decency, justice, and regularity ; and thereby prevent much inconvenience to themselves and injury to society. And as for prayer, it is the duty of all, without exception. Every created being is, as such, dependent on the Creator for all things ; and if dependent, ought to have recourse to him, both in the way of supplication and thanksgiving.”¹

The propriety of preaching must certainly be consistent with the doctrine of necessity ; for it is proved, in a chapter devoted to that single purpose, that Christ himself was an absolute necessitarian ;² and Christ and his apostles “ preached to sinners, and enforced their ministry with proper rebukes, invitations, and exhortations, as occasion required.”³

Whatever plausible objections might be raised against the doctrine of necessity, this author relied on the doctrine of the foreknowledge of God as settling this question beyond all dispute. He dislikes the term foreknowledge, since it introduces time into the knowledge of God, with whom all duration is a “ philosophical now.” God’s knowledge is but the understanding of what he is himself doing, and is as much the guide of the decree or will of God, as his will is the cause of his knowledge. “ Let me just hint that if all things, without exception and without succession, are eternally present as an indivisible point to the uncreated view, necessity comes in with a full tide.”⁴

The little that our theologian has written on human ability, may be properly appended to this subject. He seems to have entertained an excessive desire to reduce his theological views to the simplest forms. For this purpose the power and government of God were the universal principles. He fancied that these principles could be made a test of theological disputes among Christian sects. He says : “ All disputes between us and the Arminians may be reduced to these two questions : Is God dependent on man ; or, is man

¹ V. 277.² VI. 56.³ V. 278.⁴ VI. 62.

dependent on God. Is man a debtor to God ; or, God a debtor to man ?”¹ On the subject of ability, the question of the debtor may be neglected ; and if any claim of ability on the part of men can be made, which their dependence on God does not set aside, then the Arminians are allowed to have the advantage in the contest. If human dependence is such that men have, within the smallest range, the power of so acting that we may say, their choice and not their dependence on God was the cause of such action, that the action was of such a quality—then Calvinism is overthrown.” However he intended this statement to be received, it exhibits the tenor of his belief. On the other hand he says, in reply to the objections of Mr. Wesley :

“ I believe and preach that they [the non-elect] will be condemned, not for doing what they can in a moral way, but for not doing what they can ; for not believing the gospel report ; and for not ordering their conversation according to it.”²

The general tendency of the writings before us, is quite different, however, from that of the passage just noticed. Probably the view which he would most readily have given out as his own, is that contained in a reply to the following question :

“ ‘But could they [the reprobate] ever repent, believe, and obey?’ I am not afraid to answer, with the word of God, that repentance, faith, and sanctification are God’s own gifts, which he is not bound to bestow on any man, and might have withheld from all men. Where these graces are given, rectitude and happiness follow ; where they are not given, sin and misery continue to reign. The unregenerate commit evil with desire, freedom, and consent, in consequence of that original depravation which God (for unfathomable reasons) was pleased to permit, and which nothing but his own grace can effectually supersede.”³

If this should not be thought to be answering rather with a commentary on the word of God, we may quote, as expressing his opinion, a passage from a creed prepared by John Clement, in the year 1556, of which Toplady says :

¹ IV. 278.² V. 338.³ V. 430.

“ Would to God that the same creed was as generally held in the days that are now.”

“ I doe confesse and beleve, that Adam, by his fall, lost from himself and all his posterity, all the freedome, choyce, and power of man's will to doo good ; so that it cannot once think a good thought, etc., untill suche tyme as the same (i. e. the will) be regenerate by the Holy Ghoste.”¹

If the “ power of contrary choice ” is made the test of human ability, the following remark will be considered a clear statement of our author's view.

“ That which is not certainly future, is not certainly foreknowable. God does not foreknow afterknow (i. e. he is never sure of a thing's coming to pass), if it be in the power of his creatures to determine themselves to a contrary point of the compass.”²

The Atonement.

The effect of the atonement, according to this writer, is to make men righteous. They are not so sanctified that they constantly do right; their actions are not all holy; but those who receive the benefit of the atonement are, in the judgment of God, righteous, having the merit of those who have kept the law in all points. This is his understanding of the term justification, which is not merely negative, but positive, “ and exalts us to a higher state of felicity than mere pardon would do.”³ In justifying us, God must both pardon our sins and reward us as if we had been always obedient. But how can God pardon the guilty? It is by punishing another, who is innocent, in their stead. “ The sword of vengeance having been already sheathed in the sinless human nature of Jehovah's Equal,” “ Divine justice has nothing to allege, has no penalty to inflict ” on such as “ trust in the cross of Christ.”⁴ In addition to pardon, there is a positive reward. Justification (i. e. God's acceptance of men as perfect fulfillers of the law) entitles to the kingdom of heaven, all those to whom Christ's righteousness is imputed, and who are pronounced just in consequence of that imputed righteousness.⁵

¹ II. 98.

² VI. 60.

³ III. 180.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ See III. 180, 181.

Christ is the sinner's substitute, in keeping the law, in the Divine judgment against sin, and in punishment.

"Next comes in the infinite merit of Christ's righteousness and atonement; for we were chosen to salvation in him as members of his mystic body; and that, through him as our surety and substitute, by whose vicarious obedience to the moral laws, and submission to the curse and penalty, all we whose names are in the book of life, should never incur the Divine hatred, or be punished for our sins, but continue to eternity, as we were from eternity, heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ."¹

It is not maintained by the advocates of this scheme of the atonement, that Christ's obedience is the same with the obedience of all his followers, so that no punishment is demanded; nor that the sufferings of Christ are the same with the sufferings of all his followers, so that punishment has been inflicted to the utmost; but by means of both, the ransom of the church is consummated. "Nothing but the all-perfect and everlasting merit, which is the complex result of his [Christ's] obedience and of his sacrifice, can exalt and retrieve us to the dignity and felicity of heaven."² It is not the view of this author that the amount of suffering on the part of Christ, with the sum of his meritorious deeds, is that which fixes the value of the atonement. The infinite merit and efficacy of Christ's righteousness is due to the "divinity of his person." "All created beings could not, by any sacrifice, present a single sinner blameless before the bar of God. Such power belongeth only to the righteousness of the God-man, Jehovah incarnate."³

Yet there is a transfer of good works from Christ to his people, and a transfer of punishment from the elect to Christ. "Jesus, the Son and the Lamb of God, sustained intensively that punishment for sin, which must otherwise have been levied extensively on sinners, to all eternity."⁴

Though Christ and the elect are spoken of as one mystical body, they are not so in any sense which destroys the separate individuality of each of the followers of Christ. They are by faith one with him, hence one with him in justifica-

¹ V. 210.² III. 231.³ III. 230.⁴ III. 80.

tion; but not one so as to have done the works of Christ with him, for these are imputed to them. "By imputation, I mean, God's graciously placing that to our account which we did not personally do. Whoever denies the imputation of Christ's sufferings to us men, is a Socinian in the essential import of the word."

The atonement is limited in its effect. It is not the will of God that all should be saved (for who hath resisted his will?), but all are saved for whom Christ died; hence, "though the blood of Christ, from its own intrinsic dignity, was sufficient for the redemption of all men; yet, in consequence of his Father's appointment, he shed it intentionally, and therefore effectually and immediately, for the elect only."¹ As God has not provided for the salvation of all, so he does not invite all :

"Now, if God invited all men to come to him, and then shut the door of mercy against any who were desirous of entering, his invitation would be a mockery and unworthy of himself; but we insist on it, that he does not invite all men to come to him in a saving way; and that every individual person who is, through his gracious influence on his heart, made willing to come to him, shall, sooner or later, be surely saved by him, and that with an everlasting salvation."²

Mr. Toplady did not admit that the Arminian scheme of a general atonement is more mild and merciful than that of the Calvinists. Both parties admit that the atonement does not, *in fact*, secure the salvation of all. Which scheme, then, has most of mercy in it, that which supposes all are invited, while some reject the invitation; or that which supposes the non-elect are never invited at all. This writer does not hesitate to say, the latter.

"Suppose God actually offers grace to one of the reprobate, nay, even draws him (i.e., according to the Arminian notion of divine traction, God solicits, propounds motives, excites, and would fain have him), to accept of it. But why this waste of Divine influence? Is it to add to iniquities already too great? and to seal destruction already too sure? Can God be in earnest in offering grace to one who, he infallibly knows beforehand, will infallibly refuse it? Can it be from a principle of loving kindness that the

¹ V. 205.

² V. 199.

Deity is supposed to tamper (for tampering it is) with this man, by an offer of grace, which the Omniscient Offerer knows will be ineffectual? Let those who plead for such grace as this, forbear to charge the asserters of special and efficacious vocation, with representing the Deity as unmerciful; and, for common decency's sake, cease to tax the doctrines we plead for, with tyranny and cruelty. Level your tragical exclamations about unmercifulness at your own scheme, which truly and properly deserves them."¹

An assertion which seemed unwarranted to the opponents of this theological system, was: "That the number of the elect is so fixed and determinate that it neither can be augmented nor diminished." But Mr. Toplady insists that the proposition must be true, and does "not scruple to hinge the whole weight of it on the certain and immutable knowledge of God." Christ says, he knows whom he has chosen; "but was the number fluctuating and precarious," he could only be said "to guess at them." So, again: "'I know my sheep.' But if the number was indeterminate, they could not be known: the sheep of to-day might degenerate into goats to-morrow; and the goats of yesterday might become sheep to-day, and be goats again before night. Nay, it might so happen that the Great Shepherd might, at the long run, not have a single sheep to know."² Though Toplady was rigid in his view of a partial atonement; no man could entertain a more grateful assurance that multitudes would be found to be the followers of Christ.

"The kingdom of glory will both be more largely and more variously peopled, than bigots of all denominations are either able to think, or willing to allow."

In a letter to Dr. Priestley, he asks:

"Why are Calvin's notions gloomy? Is it gloomy to believe that the far greater part of the human race are made for endless happiness? There can, I think, be no reasonable doubt entertained concerning the salvation of very young persons. If (as some, who have versed themselves in this kind of speculations, affirm) about one half of mankind die in infancy; and if, as indubitable observation proves, a very considerable number of the remaining half die in childhood; and if, as there is the strongest reason to think, many millions of those who live to maturer years, in every successive generation, have their names in the book of life; then what a very small portion,

¹ V. 434.

² V. 406.

comparatively, of the human species falls under the decree of preterition and non-redemption."¹

In proof of the salvation of infants, he refers to Matt. 18: 14 : " It is not the will of your Father which is in heaven, that one of these little ones should perish." Believing that it was the will of God that the non-elect should perish, he could of course deny " these little ones " to be of that number. Does, then, the will of God change concerning them, when they become adult ? Certainly not ; for Christ is not speaking of any who will arrive at adult age — as may be seen from verse 10th of the same chapter : ' I say unto you, that their angels do always behold the face of my Father which is in heaven. " Their angels," as he understands the passage, means their souls — the souls of such as die in infancy. He considers other interpretations of the text, — as whether these were not guardian-angels, — but thinks they would not, in that case, *always* behold the face of God ; but it might be asked, whether guardian-angels are " long-sighted " enough to see him while they are on earth, etc. ; but the result of all is, his own view is the most rational. The reader will be convinced, at least, that it was the most consonant with his feelings.²

Sin.

The depravity of men has different appearances, according as we view it in different relations. We may consider it as a perversion of character, as resulting in guilt and punishment, as requiring an atonement, as a means by which God manifests his glory ; and each view will leave an impression on the mind different from that produced by another.

It should seem that Toplady's favorite view was that which connected sin with the government of God. He believed that God could have prevented sin, that he therefore willed it, yet was not the author of it. Though God is the agent in all actions, sinfulness in acts is not the effect of his

¹ VI. 247 ; also V. 103.

² xliii.

agency, therefore sin is, for the most part, negative. This negative quality God permits effectively, and is the cause of, defectively.

“Very happily we have a fine definition of sin, given us by a logician who could not err. ‘Every man who committeth sin, doth also commit illegality; for sin is illegality,’ 1 John 3: 4. Whence I conclude that sin, strictly considered, has more of negation in it than of positivity; else it could not have been properly definable by a merely negative term. For illegality imports no more than a non-commensuration to the law as a rule, or measure of length and breadth.”¹

Sinfulness is a negative quality, belonging to actions when we consider them as the product of Divine power. God refuses to add a certain quality to the deeds of men, and they are therefore sinful. “Which actions [those of the non-elect], as neither issuing from faith, nor being wrought with a view to the Divine glory, nor done in the manner prescribed by the Divine word, are, on these accounts, properly denominated evil.”² When God actuates men by an influence which, beside producing actions, displaces this negative quality which has been spoken of, then we have good actions. “God is the author of the actions of the elect, both as actions and as *good* actions:” so is he the author of the actions of the wicked, but “not in a moral and compound sense, as they are sinful; but physically simply, and *sensu diviso*, as they are mere actions, abstractedly from all considerations of the goodness or the badness of them. We can easily conceive of an action, purely as such, without adverting to the quality of it; so that the distinction between an action and its denomination of good or evil, is very obvious and natural.” In the elect, God produces works both by his almighty power and by the influences of his Spirit; but, in the wicked, by his power alone, withholding his Spirit. He does not infuse iniquity into men, but powerfully excites them to action, and, in the reprobate, neglects to add that influence without which every act is necessarily evil. Sin is thus “a thing purely negative, can have no positive or efficient cause,

¹ VI. 100.

² V. 219.

but only a negative and deficient one.¹ God is, then, the deficient cause of sin. That is, he prompts the wicked to act and fails to add that influence by which alone the action can be made good. This is the same as to say, God is the "efficacious permitter"² of sin. He acts through wicked men by his power, and permits their vitiosity to alloy the act with the quality of sin.

Sinfulness is not so truly a negative quality of actions when we consider them the products of human power. Toplady infers from the passage quoted above, 1 John 3: 4, "that unless sin had something of positivity in it, the illegality of it could not be said to be commissible." Yet he does not clearly discern how that can be "without the assistance of Dr. Watts's distinction between actions themselves and the sinfulness of them."³ The sinfulness of actions is due to man's nature, "our own vitiosity is the cause of our acting amiss."⁴

Our sin is not, then, the product of our volitions, but is to be traced back to a source within us, from which the evil quality naturally and spontaneously flows.

"It is undeniably certain that we, who are now living, are in actual possession of an evil nature; which nature we brought with us into the world; it is not of our acquiring, but was 'cast and mingled with our very frame.'"⁵ "Whence proceed errors in judgment, and immoralities in practice? Evil tempers, evil desires, and evil words? Original sin answers all these questions in a moment. Adam's offence was the *peccatum peccans*, the sin that still goes on sinning, in all mankind; or, to use the just and emphatic words of Calvin: "The corruption of our nature is always operative, and constantly teeming with unholy fruits."⁶ "Neither the temptations of Satan, by which we are exercised; nor the bad examples of others, which we are so prone to imitate; are the causes of this spiritual and moral leprosy. They are but the occasions of stirring up and calling forth the latent corruptions within."⁷

Original sin is, according to Toplady, a punishment for preceding transgression. That transgression is the fall of Adam, which is imputed to us, and of which we are guilty.

¹ V. 218, 219.

² III. 170.

³ VI. 100.

⁴ V. 220.

⁵ III. 359.

⁶ III. 358.

⁷ III. 349.

“So terrible a calamity as the universal infection of our whole species, is and must have been the consequence of some grand and primary transgression. Such a capital punishment would never have been inflicted on the human race, by the God of infinite justice, but for some adequate preceding offence.”¹ “Now the judgment of God is always according to truth. He would not deem us guilty, unless we were so. And guilty of our first parents’ offence we cannot be, but in a way of imputation.”²

As to the ground of imputation, Mr. Toplady has not expressed himself very fully. Yet it is, in general, that Adam acted as our representative.

“The first Adam acted in our names, and stood in our stead, and represented our persons, in the covenant of works.”³ When Adam fell, he fell not only as a private individual, but also as a public person; just as the Second Adam, Jesus Christ the Righteous, did afterward, in the fulness of time, obey and die, as the covenant-surety and representative of all his elect people.”⁴

There is a sense, then, in which we sinned in Adam. “It follows that they [those who have died in infancy] sinned representatively and implicitly in Adam.”⁵ But we must consider this expression, “sinned in Adam,” as of little value, except for the convenience of the term; for he denies that we sinned in him as individuals, present at the original transgression.

“Guilty of our first parents’ sin we cannot be, but by way of imputation.”⁶ “It is incontestibly clear that not any individual among the numberless millions who have died in infancy, was capable of committing actual sin.”⁷ “We were, therefore, in a state of severe moral punishment, as soon as we began to be; and yet it was impossible for us to have sinned in our own persons, antecedently to our actual existence.”⁸

Nor did our author hold that we sinned in Adam by being responsibly present, through a connection of our souls with his.

“Nor can I conceive how soul can generate soul, without supposing the soul to have *partes extra partes*; and if once we grant its divisiability, what becomes of its absolute immateriality, together with its essential incorruptibility, and its intrinsic immortality?” “Though not determined to either side of the question, I own myself inclinable to believe that souls are of God’s own immediate creation and infusion.”⁹

¹ III. 358.² III. 359.³ III. 356.⁴ Ibid.⁵ III. 360.⁶ III. 359.⁷ III. 360.⁸ III. 359.⁹ VI. 201.

Moreover, he allows a logical distinction between the sin of which we are guilty, and that of which Adam was guilty.

"They [the scholastic writers] very properly distinguish original sin into what they call 'peccatum originans' and 'peccatum originatum.' By 'peccatum originans,' they mean the 'ipsissimum,' or the very act itself, of Adam's offence in tasting the forbidden fruit. By the 'peccatum originatum,' they mean that act as transmitted to us."¹

This would be, at least, a needless complication of the affair, if we really committed the same act with Adam.

We must consider, therefore, Adam's relation to us only that of a representative. What he did in that capacity, we are held responsible for. "God's word expressly declares that, by the disobedience of one man, many were constituted sinners. They are, in the Divine estimation, considered as guilty of Adam's own personal breach of the prohibitory command."²

Our philosopher sees no injustice in such imputation. "Since his posterity would have partaken of all the benefits resulting from his continuance in a state of integrity, I see not the injustice of their bearing a part in the calamities consequent on his apostasy."³

This method of dealing with men is not contrary to human reason or common practice. "There is not a single nobleman or person of property, who does not act, or who has not acted, as the covenant-head of his posterity, supposing him to have any."⁴ In cases of treason also, "though the father only is in fault," his children and their children lose their peerage.

In the works before us, the question Why God permits sin, is answered, very summarily,

"Not for want of knowledge, to perceive it; nor for want of power, to hinder it; nor for want of wisdom, to counteract it; nor for want of goodness, to order all for the best: but because it was and is his unsearchable will (and the will of God is rectitude itself) to allow the entrance and the continuance of that seeming foil to the loveliness of his works."⁵

The clause in parenthesis, above, is also a sufficient reply

¹ III. 362.

² III. 359.

³ III. 356.

⁴ III. 361.

⁵ VI. 101.

to the objection that God, by willing sin, becomes the author of sin.

“ To say that he willet sin, doth not in the least detract from the holiness and rectitude of his nature ; because, whatever God wills, as well as whatever he does, cannot be eventually evil : materially evil it may be ; but, as was just said, it must ultimately be directed to some wise and just end, otherwise he could not will it ; for his will is righteous and good, and the sole rule of right and wrong.”¹

He also defends himself from the charge of making God the author of sin, by insisting that he makes him only the “ permitter ” of sin ; also by showing that God is a sovereign, who does as he will with his own.

“ It is essential to absolute sovereignty, that the sovereign have it in his power to dispose of those, over whom his jurisdiction extends, just as he pleases, without being accountable to any : and God, whose authority is unbounded (none being exempt from it), may, with the strictest holiness and justice, love or hate, elect or reprobate, save or destroy, any of his creatures, human or angelic, according to his own free pleasure and sovereign purpose.”²

The question may fairly be raised, whether it is not possible to make man so impotent as to extenuate his guilt. If he is mainly passive in sinning, he will unavoidably believe that his sin is his misfortune. A tendency to this feeling may, perhaps, be found in the works before us. Though the strongest language is used to express the heinousness of sin, and it is declared to be next to the worst thing in the world ; yet with some, the conviction of sin would lose a little of its poignancy by uniting with it such a sentiment as this : “ The omnipresent Reader of hearts, and Hearer of thoughts knows that, next after his own awful displeasure, I dread and deprecate sin, in all its forms, as the greatest of possible calamities.”³

This sentence suggests another inquiry, whether the happiness of man may not be considered a motive of so little account in the judgment of God, that whatever enjoyment does accrue to the race from the atonement, shall be con-

¹ V. 207.

² V. 225.

³ VI. 99.

sidered a kind of good luck. If man's highest happiness — his spiritual well-being, — is not a motive with God, then a baser kind of happiness, — mere existence without pain, — must become one of the most powerful motives with men for seeking the salvation of the soul.

Holiness.

The passage on God's sovereignty, just quoted, indicates very clearly this author's view of virtue. Goodness is a characteristic of the actions of a good being. The actions of men are good because God has first made their persons so.¹ The works of God are good, because they proceed from a being to whom the attribute of goodness belongs. To suppose that God is deficient in this attribute, is to suppose that he is not God.² Therefore, God's will is rectitude itself; and whatever he does is right because he does it. This position, however, is capable of two explanations: either, God is so good that he *would* not do wrong, so dependent on his goodness that a wrong act would degrade him to an inferior being; or, God and evil are incompatible ideas, — God is such a being that he *could* not do wrong, but the deed, *whatever* it might be, would be right — the Being sanctifies the deed. The latter is Toplady's view.

“Whatsoever things God wills, or does, are not willed or done by him because they were, in their own nature, and previously to his willing them, just and right; or because, from their intrinsic fitness he ought to will and do them; but they are therefore just, right, and proper, because he who is holiness itself wills and does them.”³ “The works of God himself cannot be brought to any test whatever; for, his will being the grand universal law, he himself cannot be, properly speaking, subject to, or obliged by, any law superior to that. Many things are done by him, which, if done by us, would be apparently unjust, inasmuch as they would not square with the revealed will of God. But when he does these and such like things, they cannot but be holy, equitable, and worthy of himself.”⁴

“The term *evil* is only of limited application. It has reference to our works in their relation to the revealed will of God.

¹ V. 218.

² V. 395.

³ V. 225.

⁴ *Ibid.*

But 'every action, as such, is undoubtedly good; it being an actual exertion of those operative powers given us by God for that very end.'¹ It is a first principle of the Bible and of sound reason, that 'whatever is, is right,' or will answer some great end (an end at present unknown) in its relation to the whole, and at the final result of things. I must ever, as a rational being, and much more as a Christian, repeat and continue to insist upon that celebrated maxim (under certain modifications)."²

Holiness in men is produced by the Spirit of God. God is the author of the actions of the elect, both as actions and as good actions. Their holiness, and the means of effecting and continuing it, are decreed together with their election. God first makes their persons good, then their deeds. Holiness has no connection with rules of action. "No works can be evangelically good and pleasing to God, which do not spring from his own grace in the heart. But this latter circumstance is entirely of spiritual consideration. It has nothing to do, off or on, with the mere morality of actions."

Besides this holiness which God produces in his elect, there is a virtue or morality of character, which is not judged of, like sin and holiness, by a reference to its source, but by its effect and its appearance. Morality is attributable to men in a twofold relation, "as creatures of God, and as members of society." "Acts of devotion, candor, justice, and beneficence, together with their opposites, are, to all intents and purposes, as morally good or evil, if they flow from one source, as from another."⁴ The morality which belongs to us as creatures of God, is religiously excellent, or religiously bad; that which belongs to us as members of society is socially beneficial, or socially injurious. But, absolutely, "Morality is, I think, usually and very justly defined to be that relation or proportion which actions bear to a given rule."⁵ The rule by which we are to be governed in religious morality, is the revealed will of God. "We all hold that God's revealed, not his secret will, is the rule of human action."⁶

¹ V. 219.² V. 441.³ VI. 38.⁴ VI. 38.⁵ VI. 39.⁶ V. 47.

This may be considered the rule of morality as well as holiness; for, "an action is constituted evil [sinful] three ways: by proceeding from a wrong principle, by being directed to a wrong end, and by being done in a wrong manner." In morality, only the third way need be regarded; for, virtue and vice—morals—have reference to our manners.¹ While holiness requires that, in addition to being virtuous, an action should "issue from faith and be wrought with a view to the Divine glory."²

We find no rule given for social morality; but it may be readily inferred from the adjectives applied to it. It is either "socially beneficial," or "socially injurious."

The prominent opinions of Mr. Toplady on systematic theology have now been presented. These, however, would not have formed the marked feature in his productions, had he not been driven, by his opponents, to speculate upon points in controversy between Calvinists and Arminians. Even in the present case, he attracts more attention from the superficial reader, by his language, temper, and ardent feelings, than by his philosophical statements of decrees and sin.

We may therefore notice, briefly, a few of his characteristics as a man and a preacher. One is his love of the Bible. His chief arguments, in all his controversies, are drawn from this source. He is not so anxious to be consistent with himself as with that. Each man is predestinated, because it is so written in the Bible. The number of the elect cannot be increased, for Christ knows precisely who they are. But inviting men to accept of salvation is right and useful, because Christ and the apostles did it.

The opinions of such a man are worthy of attention, on points in dispute, concerning the interpretation of the sacred word. A few passages, on which he has commented, will be noticed.

Heb. 6: 4, 5, 6. "For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, etc., if they fall away, to renew them again unto repentance."

¹ VI. 38.

² V. 219.

“ In the primitive churches, were the following distributions of professors, into these different ranks of church-membership : 1. catechumens, those not yet baptized ; 2. the baptized, called also the enlightened (*πεφωτισμένοι*) and the perfect (*ἄρτιοι*).” Now “ they who were once ‘enlightened,’ or ‘baptized,’ might indeed make a total and final shipwreck of their profession : many of them actually did so. They were, as another apostle expresses it, ‘twice dead,’ i. e. naturally dead, or unregenerate, and professionally dead.”

To “have tasted the heavenly gift,” is to have partaken of the Lord’s Supper. To be “partakers of the Holy Ghost,” means to have received such gifts as qualified them for temporary usefulness in the church, and enabled them to preach the gospel with success.

He refers, finally, to Matt. 7: 22, 23, as the best commentary on the passage: “Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name? and in thy name cast out devils? and in thy name done many wonderful works? And then will I profess unto them, I never knew you.”¹

Another passage, of which he has attempted an explication, is Rom. 9: 3—“I could wish that myself were accursed from Christ, for my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh.”

“This seemingly difficult text is rendered perfectly easy and clear : 1. by inclosing part of it in a parenthesis ; and, 2. by attending to the tenor of the verb *εὐχόμενος*, mistakenly translated, I could wish.

“I have great heaviness and continual sorrow in my heart (for I myself did wish to be in a state of separation from Christ), on account of my brethren, my kinsmen according to the flesh.”²

The passage : “their angels do always behold the face of my Father which is in heaven,” has been noticed.

“Else what do they do, who were baptized for the dead;” means, “who were baptized for the benefit of those who had died without baptism—used as an argument *ad hominem*, not from approbation of the custom.”³

¹ III. 421.² III. 432.³ III. 433.

In reference to the close of the Christian dispensation, he says :

“ I am one of those old-fashioned people, who believe in the doctrine of the Millennium ; and that there will be two distinct resurrections of the dead : 1st, of the just ; and, 2dly, of the unjust ; which last resurrection, of the reprobate, will not commence till a thousand years after the resurrection of the elect. In this glorious interval of one thousand years, Christ will, I apprehend, reign in person over the kingdom of the just.”

“ I give it as my opinion that the reward of the saints, during the personal reign of Christ upon the earth, will be greater or less, in proportion to their respective labors, sufferings, and attainments. I am clearly of opinion that, in the state of ultimate glory, they will be on a perfectly equal footing with regard to final blessedness, both as to its nature and degree ; and, as the parable expresses it, ‘ receive every man a penny.’”¹

He remarks that, in the 24th of Matt. and 21st of Luke, the signs of the destruction of Jerusalem are so blended with those of Christ’s second coming, that he will not attempt to assign each to its proper place ; and proceeds to collect from other parts of the Scriptures a few of “ the approaching symptoms which will precede the general dissolution of nature.”

“ 1. The utter abolition and destruction of both the Eastern and the Western Anti-Christ. The people of God who shall be alive at that period, may, when they see the total extermination of Mahometanism and Popery, lift up their heads with joy, knowing that the Judge is at the door, and their redemption draweth nigh. 2. The calling of the Jews, when a nation shall be born in a day, and they shall unanimously believe in him whom their fathers have pierced. 3. The universal conversion of the whole Gentile world ; when Christ will take all the heathen as the right of his inheritance.”²

The author of the *Memoirs* connected with the present *Works*, informs us that Mr. Toplady was eminently distinguished as a public speaker.

“ Never did we see a man ascend the pulpit with a more serious air, conscious of the momentous work that he was engaged in. His discourses were extemporary, delivered in the strains of true unadulterated oratory. He had a great variety of talents, such as one seldom sees united in one person : his voice was melodious and affecting ; his manner of delivering and action were engaging, elegant, and easy, so as to captivate and fix the attention of every hearer. His explanations were distinct, and clear ; his arguments

¹ III. 474.

² III. 460.

strong and forcible ; and his exhortations warm and animating. He despised those rhetorical tricks that captivate and allure the multitude ; and yet so numerous have been his assemblies, that the churches where he preached in the metropolis, could not contain the hearers.”¹

It is obvious, from his diary and even from his controversial writings, that he expected good results from preaching, only in presenting the doctrines of grace. “ We have had long experience,” he says, “ of the sad effects that have attended that mere ethical way of preaching, which has been in fashion ever since the Restoration.”² We have but few of his sermons in these volumes. Those which are given us were taken down, by some one of his hearers, in short-hand ; and, in some cases at least, revised by himself. But they give evidence of being extemporaneous discourses. Every one brings up the doctrine of election and invincible grace, and is, indeed, a body of divinity. Perhaps we should consider his discourses for fast-days, or peculiar occasions, as partial exceptions to this remark. — His method of treating a subject is somewhat of the rambling and illustrative kind. A text in which he evidently delighted is, “ seen of angels.” This is the foundation of two sermons. He runs over the life of Christ on earth, and points out the occasions on which he was seen of angels. He had, as an introduction, said that he was seen of them at the creation ; he affirms, near the close, that he will be seen of them at his second coming ; and makes the application by asking when man shall see him. This he answers [metaphorically],—he may see him in this world ; and the effect will be : 1. to make him humble ; 2. to cause him to value and rest on the righteousness of Christ ; 3. to produce a life and conversation correspondent to the gospel ; 4. to make his affections heavenly and spiritual ; 5. to cause the love and the study of the holy word ; 6. to inspire the heart with genuine benevolence ; 7. let such rejoice in hope of the glory of God.

But such a collection of the bare topics of the discourse gives no idea of its bold expression and moving imagery.

¹ I. 88.² V. 155.

The hearer would not think of the plan of the sermon, when listening to a passage like the following :

“ My God! my God! why hast thou forsaken me? — Forsaken! cried the deserted Saviour. Angels caught the dismal accents. Forsaken! forsaken! the sad and astonished choir replied. Surely all heaven was, at that dreadful moment, emptied of its inhabitants. Surely, not angels only, but the spirits, likewise, of just men made perfect (who had been saved on the credit of that great sacrifice which was now offering up) started from their thrones and dropped their crowns; quitted, for a while, the abodes of bliss, and, with pensive admiration and drooping wings, hovered round the cross of their departing Lord.”¹

Toplady was, without doubt, a capable preacher, a faithful and useful minister. One passage, in which he gives his own experience in the preparation for the pulpit, ought not to be omitted. It is in the *Essay on the various Fears to which God's People are liable*.

“ There are seasons of personal dryness and darkness, when fear, like an armed man, assaults the faith and liveliness of God's ambassadors. They are, perhaps, at a loss even for a subject to preach from. All resources seem to be shut up. They flit, in their own minds, from text to text, and for a long time can fix on none. They cry, in secret: Lord, how can we spread the table for thy people, except thou bring the venison to our hands? Or, with the disciples of old: Whence shall we have bread for the multitude here in the wilderness? The dear people flock to the word, as doves to their windows; and we, alas! have little or nothing to feed them with. At such times of doubt and barrenness, cast yourself at large upon God, and distribute the word as you are enabled. In all probability, the fishes and the loaves will increase in your hands, and God will administer bread enough and to spare. To the glory of the Divine faithfulness, I say it, that for my own part, some of my happiest pulpit opportunities have been when I have gone up the stairs with trembling knees and a dejected spirit; nay (twice or thrice in my life-time), when I have been so far reduced as to be unable to fix on a text until the psalm or hymn was almost over. These are not desirable trials; but they redound, however, to the praise of him who hath said, Without me ye can do nothing.”²

He aimed, in his preaching, to produce immediate effect upon his hearers. This he expected to accomplish by presenting the doctrines of grace — leaving morality to follow as a result of a change of heart. He watched constantly for

¹ III. 82.

² III. 374.

the manifestation of true religious principle in the conduct of those committed to his care.

The evidence of a change of heart, he thought must necessarily be given in the lives and characters of those who were truly regenerate; and such evidence could generally be apprehended without mistake.

The prominent idea of the revival of 1740, in this country, has been said to be, that the new birth is an ascertainable change.¹ This idea was constantly in the mind of Mr. Toplady; he insists upon it largely; and had he lived in this country, would probably have witnessed in his own congregation a thorough revival of religion. He certainly would not have failed to preach the doctrines which Edwards preached; he would not have feared excitements, if we may judge from his admiration of the character and labors of Whitefield; and he would have made searching appeals to the consciences of his hearers, if he had enforced publicly such sentiments as the following: "The elect may, through the grace of God, attain to the knowledge and assurance of their predestination to life; and they ought to seek after it."² After enumerating several arguments in proof of election, he adds: "To all which frequently accedes the immediate testimony of the Divine Spirit, witnessing with the believer's conscience that he is a child of God."³ He says, again, that we may judge (with caution and charity) others as we judge ourselves.

In judging of his own religious condition, he says (after various arguments drawn from the Scriptures) that, with him, there is an immediate answer, stronger than demonstration. He refers to his acceptance with God, with such confidence that the passages, taken alone, might justly be considered arrogant; but, taken with the marks of humility in which the works abound, there is nothing offensive. His confidence arose from an impression which he considered the immediate suggestion of the Holy Spirit. Such impressions were not confined to his personal experience, as a redeemed sinner. He trusted them in his active Christian la-

¹ Tracy's "Great Awakening," Preface, page ix. ² V. 256. ³ Ibid.

bors. They seem almost to have been reduced to a system, as they arose in connection with his preparation for the pulpit. He calls them "Saturday-Assurances."

"Assurances they are, indeed: so clear, positive, and satisfactory, I never knew them once fail, or deceive my trust. I have often been dejected and fearful at the approach of a Sabbath on which I was to minister publicly; and God has frequently been better to me than my unbelieving fears; but, on those happy days when previous assurances have been given of his help and presence on the Sunday following, those assurances have always been made good. The Lord never once disappointed my hope, when he has said previously to my soul, "I will be with thee."¹

Speaking of suggestions of this character, he says:

"To many, all this would appear as the most palpable enthusiasm; and there was a time when I myself should have thought so too. But blessed be God, the Comforter, I know what it is to enjoy some degree of communion with the Father, and the Son by him and exclusive of this inward *κρυψος*, which is, to myself, equivalent in point of mental satisfaction to ten thousand demonstrations. My experience of this kind, considered even in the most rational view, cannot, I am persuaded, be justly counted enthusiastic, or the offspring of an heated imagination." The rational grounds of his confidence are "a powerful sweetness," "commanding weight," "satisfactory clearness," "perfect consistency with the promises of Scripture," the fact that his "mind is absolutely passive" on such occasions, as much as the body in hearing another speak; and the agreement of events with the assurances."²

As would be inferred from the passages just quoted, Toplady was a man of strong feelings. That susceptibility must have been lively which presented these impressions with so much of reality. His nervous excitability was greater than it would otherwise have been, because of constant ill health. His intellect was rapid and clear. He was, in his natural temper, unsuspecting, frank, and ingenuous. These characteristics will indicate something of his feelings as developed in different circumstances. Towards his Maker, he exercised a child-like confidence. In his judgment of himself, he was humble and modest; towards his friends, he was amiable and affectionate, yet, in case of provocation, he was haughty and contemptuous towards his opponents. This last trait

¹ I. 70, of the Memoirs.

² I. 54, of the Memoirs.

was exhibited, to a disgraceful extent, in his controversy with Wesley. He was impatient because others did not see as he saw; he was provoked, needlessly, by Wesley's representation of his views; he despised Wesley's followers, and all their movements. Wesley's ability he rather unwillingly admits.

It would be easy to quote pages of scurrilous and abusive language; but one or two specimens will be enough, if it be understood that the same *spirit* pervades most of his writings addressed to the Methodists. We should add, however, that such a temper is not displayed elsewhere. He says, himself, that Mr. Wesley is the only man he ever attempted to castigate as justice required, and then he fell somewhat short of the mark: he regrets he was not more severe. He regrets, then, the mildness of such language as this:

"I do not expect to be treated by Mr. John Wesley with the candor of a gentleman, or the meekness of a Christian; but I wish him, for his reputation's sake, to write and act with the honesty of an heathen."¹ "A tract (Toplady's, on Predestination) whose publication has raised the indignant quills of more than one Arminian porcupine. Among those enraged porcupines, none has hitherto bristled up so fiercely as the high and mighty Mr. John Wesley. He even dipped his quills in the ink of forgery on the occasion; as Indians tinge the points of their arrows with poison."

Wesley had compared God, as viewed by the Calvinists, to Tiberias. Toplady finds that Samuel Hoord, in 1633, did the same thing, and comments thus:

"Not content with assaulting the living, he [Wesley] even rifles the dead; and, rather than not rifle at all, robs them of their very blasphemics."²

The following soliloquy he puts into the mouth of Wesley:

"I have been in danger, myself, of believing that St. Paul says true, when he declares that God hath mercy on whom he will have mercy. How precious was the shilling, and above all how lucky was the throw,³ which convinced me of St. Paul's mistake!" He calls Wesley a liar, a "lying saint," "insidious," a teacher of doctrines which are, like the "necromantic

¹ V. 343.

² V. 428.

³ Wesley sometimes made use of the lot, to discover the will of God.

soup," out of which "witchcraft itself would strive in vain" to bring anything worth knowing.

The man who could conduct himself thus towards an opponent, seems to us guilty of meanness, ungenerous, and a stickler for little things. Yet it would not be just to say these were his traits of character; nor did he know that there was any want of refinement in his expressions. While saying that Mr. Wesley was "the lamest, the blindest, and the most self-contradictory waster of ink and paper," etc., he could say (in reference to Luther's language to the Pope), "I by no means approve of his violence and coarseness."¹

It is strange that a man of prudence and self-respect should allow himself to use such language; but observation will show that it is not so strange that the feelings here expressed should, in many cases, rise in men constitutionally irritable. If we remember that, in religious controversies, the zeal is holy, the severity conscientious, we shall see that it is an explicable fact that a man who could make use of language so harsh, should express himself, again, with a flow of devout and mellow feeling, worthy of being preserved as a manifestation of Christian experience, and of being sung as the united utterance of all the church on earth :

"When languor and disease invade
This trembling house of clay;
Tis sweet to look beyond our cage,
And long to fly away.

Sweet to look back and see my name
In Life's fair book set down;
Sweet to look forward, and behold
Eternal joys my own.

Sweet in the confidence of faith
To trust his firm decrees;
Sweet to lie passive in his hands
And have no will but his."²

The sentiment of the last stanza is a favorite one. He says, from our dependence on God, the natural inference is, that,

¹ I. 79.

² VI. 429.

with simple faith, we cast ourselves entirely as on the bosom of his providence, commit all our care and solicitude to his hand; praying, without hesitation or reserve, that his will be done in us, on us, by us; and that, in all his dealings with us, he may consult his own glory alone. This holy passiveness is the very apex of Christianity."¹

There are no hymns that have more of poetic feeling than Toplady's. The explanation of this will be seen from the following entry in his diary:

"Saturday, 23d [April, 1768]: I could hardly act faith at all. Had it not been for fear of exposing myself and disturbing the family, I should have roared for the disquietness of my heart. My heavenly Pilot disappeared; I seemed to have quite lost my hold on the Rock of Ages; I sunk in the deep mire; and the waves and storms went over me. Yet at last in prayer I was enabled, I know not how, to throw myself, absolutely and at large, on God, at all events, and for better, for worse; yet without comfort, and almost without hope. My horror and distress were unutterable."

"Sunday, 24th. After my return from public morning service, my consolations from above were inexpressible. Heaviness did, indeed, endure for a night, but joy came in the morning."

It would not be difficult to believe that the evening of this Sunday was the time of writing the hymn, now more familiar than any other he has written:

"Rock of ages, cleft for me,
Let me hide myself in thee;
Let the water and the blood,
From thy riven side which flowed,
Be of sin the double cure,
Cleanse me from its guilt and power."

A generous, manly temper characterized Mr. Toplady, notwithstanding his treatment of Wesley. He thought the doctrines of Calvinism to be of the utmost importance. He thought the opposition of the Methodists, though popular, to be despicable. Still there is no proof of settled hatred towards any man. Southey says, upon a report of Wesley's death, he would have stopped the publication of his bitter diatribes, for the purpose of expunging whatever reflected with asperity upon the dead."² And Toplady, in a letter,

¹ V. 222.

² See VI. 273.

says : " God is my witness, how earnestly I wish it may consist with the Divine will, to touch the heart and open the eyes of that unhappy man. I hold it as much my duty to pray for his conversion, as to expose the futility of his railings against the truths of the gospel."¹

This was intended for the eye of a friend, not for the public. There can be found no stronger evidence of love for Christ as a Saviour, as one who had chosen his followers from eternity, than that exhibited in the works under review. There is also evidence that the author enforced upon himself an affectionate regard for all those who were, with him, heirs of the grace of God. Doubtless the sincere feelings of his heart are expressed in " A Contemplation suggested by Rev. 7: 9—17," of which a few lines will be given.

" I saw, and lo a countless throng
Th' elect of ev'ry nation, name and tongue,
Assembled round the everlasting throne.
* * * * *
Happy the souls released from fear
And safely landed there !
Some of the shining number, once I knew,
And travelled with them here :
Nay, some (my elder brethren now)
Set later out for heaven ; my junior saints below
Long after me, they heard the call of grace
Which wak'd them unto righteousness.
How have they got beyond !
Converted last, yet first with glory crowned !
Little, once, I thought that these
Would first the summit gain,
And leave me far behind, slow journeying thro' the plain !
Loved, while on earth, nor less beloved, tho' gone ;
Think not I envy you your crown ;
No, if I could, I would not call you down.
Though slower is my pace,
To you I'll follow on,
Leaning on Jesus all the way
Who now and then lets fall a ray
Of comfort from his throne."²

As a general characteristic, Mr. Toplady was liberal in his feelings. Though he was in favor of confining the clergy

¹ VI. 160.

² VI. 403.

strictly to the clerical subscription, he advocated the fullest liberty in the State and in religious worship. The right of private judgment, in questions of duty, he considered the birth-right of every man. To deny the right of resistance to kings under all possible circumstances, he thought to be absurd. He was not a republican, yet he sympathized deeply with the English colonists in his own day, and strongly condemned the course of the Government towards the non-conformists of the previous century. He was not an agitator, yet he had no fear of the preaching that produced "soul-trouble," and was a firm friend of Whitefield as long as he lived. He considered him the greatest of modern Christian ministers, probably unequalled since the apostles. He congratulates his country on producing the greatest of men, Bradwardin, the prince of divines; Milton, prince of poets; Newton, prince of philosophers; Whitefield, prince of preachers.

ARTICLE VII.

TAYLOR'S MEMOIR OF JUDGE PHILLIPS.¹

By Edwards A. Park, Abbot Professor in Andover Theological Seminary.

THE author of the present Memoir of Judge Phillips, was called in 1839 from a Tutorship in Yale College to the pastoral care of the Old South Church in Andover, Mass. With this church Lieut. Gov. Phillips was formerly connected as an active member, and his grandfather Rev. Samuel Phillips, was its first pastor. In his ministry of thirteen years at Andover, Mr. Taylor was often reminded of the influence exerted in his parish by the two gentlemen just named. He felt this influence every day, and became well

¹ A Memoir of His Honor Samuel Phillips, LL. D. By Rev. John L. Taylor, Andover. Finis origine pendet. Published by the Congregational Board of Publication, Tremont Temple, Boston. pp. 402.