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servance of the law as a rule of duty, the essence of which is love, and whose requirement in this respect they would be enabled to fulfil by following the dictates of the Spirit, 5: 18—18. To enable them to judge whether they are actuated by the Spirit or an opposite principle, he enumerates, first, some of the works of the flesh, and then, the characteristic fruits of the Spirit, 5: 19—26.

He adds, in the last chapter, several general directions, such as relate, for example, to the spirit with which Christians should admonish those who fall into sin, the patience which they should exhibit towards each others' faults, the duty of providing for the wants of Christian teachers, and in short, performing unweariedly every good work with the assurance that in due time they should have their reward, 6: 1—10. He warns them once more against the sinister designs of those who were so earnest for circumcision, holds up to their view again the cross of Christ as that alone in which men should glory, and closes with a prayer for them as those whom he would still regard as brethren, 6: 11—18.

ARTICLE VI.

RECENT WORKS IN METAPHYSICAL SCIENCE.

By Noah Porter, Professor of Moral Philosophy and Metaphysics, Yale College.

An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the nineteenth century. By J. D. Morell, A. M. In 2 vols. 2nd edition, revised and enlarged. London: John Johnstone 26 Paternoster Row, and 15 Princes Street, Edinburgh. 1847.

The same Work. New York and Pittsburg: Robert Carter. 1847.

The Works of Thomas Reid, D. D. Now fully collected with selections from his unpublished Letters. Preface, notes and supplementary dissertations by Sir William Hamilton, Bart. Advocate, etc. Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. Text collated and revised; useful distinctions inserted; leading words and propositions marked out; allusions indicated; quotations filled up. Prefixed, Stewart's account of the Life and Writings of Reid; with Notes by the editor. Copious indices subjoined. 1 volume (incomplete), pp. 914. Edinburgh: Maclachlan, Stewart and Co. London: Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans. 1846.

Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques par une société de professeurs et de savants. (8 Livraisons 4 volumes grand in 8vo.) Paris Chez L. Hachette and Compagnie. 1846, 7.

THE three works of which we have given the titles, are all of them of great interest to students of metaphysical or 'speculative' science. The first two especially deserve notice, as marking a new point in the history of the sciences in Great Britain. For they are fitted to wipe away the double reproach which has rested upon English students up to the present time, that they either did not care to acquaint themselves with the speculations of the continental philosophers, or were incompetent to appreciate and criticise them. The publication of Morell's History and the favor with which it has been received effectually refutes the first reproach; and an attentive study of the second work will dissipate, if it does not demolish, the other. The third work is too valuable for the American student not to deserve a friendly recognition.

The history of Morell is published in two handsome 8vo. volumes. It has passed to its second edition, which has received additions important in their extent and value. The author, as we are informed, is yet a young man who has devoted the beginnings of his manhood principally to metaphysical studies, and hopes to make these studies the occupation of his life. He has studied in the schools of Scotland, of Germany and of France, and has had the means of fully acquainting himself with the philosophers of the continent, not merely by reading their writings, but by hearing them in their lecture-rooms, and by mingling in their circles. These advantages he seems to have used with great diligence, and with an honest and impartial spirit. His work shows him to be a candid and truth-loving man, who aims to be unbiassed by any prejudices except an honorable attachment to the truth as distinguished from error, to science as opposed to scepticism, and to faith in that which is immortal and spiritual as contrasted with that which is earthly and sensual. His mind is clear, comprehensive and just, and his style is natural, graceful and easy. If there be any defects worth naming, they are that his intellect though superior does not evince the highest vigor and acuteness, and that his style lacks closeness, energy and point.

In the preface to the first edition, the author has given some account of his own philosophical studies and of the history of his opinions, as the most ready explanation of his object in preparing the work, and also of the character of the work itself, as indicated by the purpose for which it was written. He tells us that at first he studied Locke with

interest but without entire satisfaction, that he next read Brown and became an enthusiastic admirer and disciple of his system; he then went to Glasgow, and then his admiration for Brown began to abate and his esteem for Reid to rise. He then studied Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" and some other works, but with the very common results of the student of German philosophy, of being unable to find a place for the "barbarous science" among the conclusions and methods of the philosophy with which he was already familiar. For the purpose of being relieved from this difficulty, or to find the clue by which the mystery of these writers could be explained, he very wisely went to Germany and there studied, as well as heard Fichte and Brandis [Braniss] lecture in the class-room. Here he was not entirely satisfied, for as it would seem he did not find the way to connect his new with his old philosophy, or to translate the new thoughts and phraseology to which he was introduced into those of the English and Scotch schools. He seems, however, to have mastered the principles and the nomenclature of the leading German systems and to have gathered the materials for future investigations. From Germany he went to France, and there he became acquainted with the principles of the eclectic school, which gave him more complete satisfaction than any other, and enabled him to understand the German and Scotch philosophies; as well as to find how far the same truths were recognized by both. It was in view of the field which he had been obliged to traverse without a guide, that he was induced to prepare the historical sketch which he has given in these two volumes; so that other students at the outset and during the progress of their inquiries might bear in their hands, a manual which should give them a general view of the various systems of recent philosophy, and should indicate their bearing upon the great matters and questions which make philosophy to be of any value. The work is not designed to be popular in any unworthy sense of the word. It is not a book designed for the people. It is not on the other hand designed to answer all the wants of philosophers. It does not so answer the questions, nor so discuss the problems, nor so thoroughly exhibit the system of any philosopher as to satisfy the inquirer who would investigate thoroughly for himself. It does however aim to give such an exhibition of the various systems of the nineteenth century, as to serve as an introduction to the study of any of them, or to the study of the history of all.

The work professes by its title to be a history of the philosophy of the nineteenth century. The author reasons, however, very justly, that the systems of this separate period cannot be understood, if considered by themselves alone. These systems begin where the philo-

sophy of the preceding century ended. For though Kant set off in a direction opposite to that of Hume, it is yet true that if it had not been for the philosophy of Hume, the philosophy of Kant would never have been produced, so that it is impossible fully to appreciate the one, without tracing its connections with the other. We cannot enter fully into the views of the later philosopher, and see under what influences and to establish what principles he wrote, unless we know the system against which he contended. In the same way we cannot comprehend Hume without studying Berkeley, nor can we fully understand Berkeley without having mastered Locke. As a writer of the history of the philosophy of the nineteenth century, he is almost of necessity forced to study that of the sources of these more recent systems. And as the entire system of modern philosophy is linked together in its several parts till we come to Descartes, who gave it its first movement, this historian of the nineteenth century becomes in fact the historian of modern philosophy. A very considerable portion of the first volume is taken up with an exhibition of the earlier modern philosophy under the title, "On the Proximate Sources of the Philosophy of the nineteenth century." This is the title of the first part of the entire work. The second part is "The Characteristics of the Philosophy of the nineteenth century." The third, which is the last and the briefest, is "The Tendencies of the Philosophy of the nineteenth century."

As an introduction to the discussion which is divided into these three parts, indicated under these heads, the author treats philosophy in general, in which in Sec. 1. he explains philosophy; in Sec. 2. he answers objections against it; in Sec. 3. he contends that its rise was inevitable; in Sec. 4. he exhibits the primary elements of human knowledge; after an exhibition of the categories of Aristotle, Kant and Cousin, he attempts to analyze our primary ideas; in Sec. 5. he divides all actual and possible systems of philosophy into sensationalism, idealism, skepticism, mysticism and eclecticism.

On these fourth and fifth sections we offer a word or two of criticism. The fourth section, though in its place it would be appropriate and necessary, yet seems to us altogether out of place in the introduction to a work like this. The reason is, that these generalizations, so baldly and briefly stated, with no illustrations, cannot be appreciated by any one of the class for which the work proposes to be particularly designed, if it indeed can be at all understood by such an one. It is the especial reproach of much of the philosophizing of the present day, that it is content with barren generalizations, which are repeated by those who do not comprehend the particulars for which they stand,

and whose scientific knowledge is but a jargon of empty sounds. This is eminently the fault of the exclusive devotees of the continental schools.

Another objection is that the writer in this analysis not only gives the principles, but the technics of his own system: We expect of course that every writer will have his own system, and will use that system in his criticism. But the exhibition of it in form with its nomenclature in so brief an introduction, strikes us as quite premature, especially as the entire section in which he discusses Aristotle, Kant, Cousin and himself occupies less than fifteen pages, not closely printed.

We suggest, also, that the preliminary classification of all systems as sensational, idealistic, skeptical, mystical and eclectic, is exposed to grave objections. We do not dispute the applicability of the terms as general designations to particular writers and classes of writers. The use of them for certain purposes, is in the highest degree convenient and commendable. But the fact is, that there are very many distinguished philosophers to whom these terms will in no exclusive sense apply. They cannot be truly said to be nothing but sensationalists or idealists. Locke and Descartes may serve as examples. Locke is far from being a sensationalist, and nothing more. Descartes is not simply an idealist.

The author uses these epithets in the most objectionable form. For he carries them through his entire work, and classifies the philosophers of each period under these several heads. The effect of this is to affix unjust and odious names to those who do not wholly deserve them, and to create a prejudice against the memory of those who deserve the highest honor from their fellow men. The author does not design to do injustice to any, we fully believe. He attempts to qualify and limit the effect of his unfavorable classification so far as it lies in his power. The name however will still adhere, and the writer will be viewed by the man who receives his impression from the historian alone, as one to whom the term applies. If he reads him for himself, the biasing influences of these original impressions will remain with him still.

We extend therefore our criticisms from this classification, and apply it to the entire work. We venture to say, that it labors under the objection of hasty and vague generalization, involving in some cases an incorrect, and in others an obscure impression. We know that the brevity of such a work, seems to demand some general method like that which has been adopted. We are also aware that to go into a very minute detail and extended discussion in regard to partic-

ular opinions, is impossible. And yet it is true, that the effort to speak in the concrete rather than in the abstract, and in the particular rather than in the general, is greatly to be desired, and would have added to the interest and the authority of this volume. We cannot but think that the author has erred in this particular, from his deference to, or rather from his fondness for his continental favorites. Had he followed the sparkling homeliness of Reid, and the cautious exactness of Stewart, rather than the brilliant but sometimes obscure and sometimes hasty Cousin, he would have produced a work more congenial to the English tastes, and more in keeping with the ordinary tone of English literature.

The work will be most sought for, for its information in regard to the continental writers, particularly those of the German school. On no subject has the curiosity of Englishmen been more excited than upon this, and in respect to none has it been so difficult to satisfy this curiosity. The only full and critical accounts of these writers, have been accessible only through German and French writers, and these even are not common in this country; while a dry and formal exhibition of the technical terms in our own language, however useful to those who are masters of the system of which this is a synopsis, it will cast but little light on its true character, to one who appears as a first inquirer. The object of the author was to do more than give a dry detail of the principles and technics of these great German schools. It was to show how they have to do with the same problems of thought which have tried all philosophers from the first outset of their inquiries. To show also how one of these systems made way for the other, and to give an intelligible though brief account of the principles, in the language and by means of the terminology that is familiar to men of education. He does not indeed withhold the nomenclature peculiar to each individual philosopher. To do so would be absurd. But he does not confine himself to it with a dry and curt explanation, nor explain one term by another as dry and scholastic as itself.

If we are asked how far he has been successful in his aim to bring within the reach of his English readers an intelligible view of the German schools, we can answer thus far safely, that he has succeeded far better than any one who has preceded him, and in the case of some of them he has been highly successful. His exhibitions of the peculiarities of Fichte and Hegel are felicitous. Those of Kant and Schelling seemed to us not to be so thoroughly treated, though the difficulty is probably in the subject matter. It is however still a question whether any knowledge obtained from the most felicitous execution of a design, such as is contemplated by the author, can be relied

upon as being worth all that it seems to be, and whether one does not leave such an exhibition of the principles of any writer, thinking that he knows more than he does in fact. If he adopts his conclusions he will do it without knowing the grounds on which they rest, the processes by which the writer has been led to them, the objections which he has or has not successfully combated, and the relations which his opinion holds to other truths and other interests. Or as is more likely to be the case with the American student, who shall read the summaries by our author of the principles of the German schools, he will be repelled by a barbarous nomenclature, and be quite satisfied that a scheme of principles so uncouth, can never give them any valuable light or discipline. We desire above all things, whether we meet a man as a partisan or an antagonist of any system of philosophy or theology, that he may not have derived all his knowledge of the system from any sketch of the heads of its opinions.

Besides the criticisms of Mr. Morell on the continental systems, both German and French, he has aimed to give a full notice of the English and Scotch. The leading philosophers from Bacon to the present time, all receive a share of his attention. They are of course criticised from his point of view, and judged by the standard of the eclectic school, and are classed according to the principles which we have indicated, but the spirit of the critic is always generous, and the tone is fair.

It would be gathered from a perusal of the contents and a glance at a few pages here and there, that this history is far more complete than any in the English language. Perhaps also it may be said to be more complete in its topics and in the extent of its range, than any other single history. It would be folly and ignorance to say or to think that in its notices of German philosophy it is as full as the work of Michelet, or that it gives so complete an exhibition of the French speculation as does Damiron; but it possesses the advantage of presenting the German, the French and the English philosophies side by side, and of showing to a certain extent the relations which they hold to each other.

The bibliographical value of the work, especially in the English portion of the history, is not inconsiderable. The manual of Tenne-man may indicate the names of very many writers who are less known, but it does not give us that satisfaction furnished by the fuller notices of Morell, brief as they are. His incidental notices too of living writers in England, and of movements under the surface, here and there reveal to us a kind of knowledge which is most rarely gained from books.

The attitude of the author towards religion is uniformly respectful and reverent. He shows indeed a less intimate knowledge with the great theological writers of England than we should expect, and seems to be less conversant with its best treatises on the great questions which have been raised in respect to the defence of Christianity. But that he is a believer in some sense in the supernatural origin of Christianity, is sufficiently obvious by plain but not obtrusive intimations. He is also deeply and justly sensible of the relation of philosophy to religion, and he argues the question with fairness yet with boldness. That he should be obliged to argue it as he does, is somewhat humiliating to the good name of our mother-land. Whatever may be the prejudices against philosophy, of the religious or theological world in this country, and though they may be narrow and unreasonable enough, and extend more widely than we could desire, we are quite thankful that no writer with us, would be oppressed as Mr. Morell seems to be with the extent of the prejudices against philosophy which prevail in the religious world, and with the hopelessness of making an impression upon it by the clearest and most obvious considerations. We are quite certain that there is a very large class of the truly educated and best minds of this country, with whom the principles on this subject, which Mr. Morell finds it so necessary to reiterate, are received as axioms. It is with great pleasure that we notice this first production of an author who in his work presents so many claims to our kind and respectful regard, and who we are assured by those who know him, is all as a man, that he seems to be in his writings. The work eminently deserves, and we are confident will receive, an extensive and increasing circulation in this country. We are not certain but it will be valued more highly here than it has been at home, though it would seem that the interest of the English thinkers in "Speculative Philosophy," is decidedly advancing.

Sir William Hamilton's edition of the works of Reid is a production of the highest value, and will be sought for with great eagerness by all students in mental science. Those who have learned to esteem the rare erudition and the mental force of the editor from his occasional contributions in the Edinburgh Review, could have no other than the highest expectations from a formal critique by him of the works of the father of the Scotch philosophy. They would easily anticipate that the opinions of Reid would present numerous points of interest which could not but suggest notices of the great writers of France and Germany, and invite a formal review of the entire field of modern philosophy. They will not be disappointed on an actual in-

spection of the work. The completion of this criticism will challenge their admiration. First of all the writer is seen to be fully acquainted with the field by actual and familiar study of all of the recent writers. Next it is obvious that he does not despise them, but understands the import, the extent and the difficulties of the questions which have occupied their attention. What is best of all, he will feel that he is not mastered by them, but is the master of them all, for while he does justice to their truths, he detects their errors, and in appreciating and acknowledging their strength, he discerns and exposes their weakness. He is not dazzled by their splendid generalizations, nor imposed on by the apparent continuity of their logic, nor does he defer to their judgment as founded on their rarer opportunities or more extended erudition. Nor again does he yield to the natural, but still weak fondness, by which truth in a foreign dress is taken to be newer or more important than the same truth in a domestic garb; or by which an error is judged less weak or dangerous for the same reason. But as a man who is in earnest for the truth, who is master of all distinctions which any man can make, and can follow in processes however refined, where any man can lead; he grapples with any and all of their philosophers, and shows himself their equal.

The relations of Reid to Kant and his successors, as well as to Cousin and the other eclectics, are so intimate, we need not say, as very naturally to bring up their doctrines, for a distinct recognition and a constant reference and comparison. For Reid was as distinctly aware of the deficiencies in Locke as any of Locke's more recent opponents. His opposition to him, however, is quite unequal. At one time it is scientific; at another, it is only practical. On one occasion he subjects a doctrine to an acute and methodical analysis; on another, he arrests all analysis by a stubborn protest in behalf of a fact, leaving its elements unanalyzed and its methods unexplained. As a consequence, he has left much to do, for a disciple who follows him in the main principles of his philosophy. Besides, his reading was not so extensive, nor his analysis so exhausting, nor his method so logical, as not to leave much to be done, even in his own times, to develop fully and to vindicate entirely the principles of his system. And now that entire schools of philosophy have sprung up, exhausting in their reading, and logical even to excess in their methods of reasoning, it would seem that the expounder of a better system should be equal to them in learning, and equally skilled in the forms of logic. No one who has read Sir William Hamilton's criticism on Cousin can doubt the immense advantage which he can assert over every other critic of the French philosopher, in being the master of the same weapons with

the subject of his strictures. It is as obvious, that the great majority of English writers who have attempted to criticise the continental writers, show that they do not fully comprehend the subject of which they write, or at least do not comprehend the way in which these writers think they understand the subject. Hence, it has been almost universally true, that English criticisms are disregarded or despised on the continent, and an impassable gulf has seemed to be fixed between the schools of the continent and those of Great Britain. We say almost universally, for Hamilton is an illustrious exception. His critiques on Cousin as well as his other productions, have been felt and appreciated by Cousin and his disciples, and it is generally allowed by these latter, that he is in all points equal to their master, and worthy to stand at the head of a rival British school. His miscellaneous works have been translated into French and published at Paris. In addition to a familiar acquaintance with the modern schools, he has another advantage, of being equally at home with Aristotle. The Stagirite is his great master. A master whom he does not adore like the schoolmen, with a blind idolatry, but whom he honors by an intelligent appreciation. His references are frequent and natural. His commentators are also every day acquaintances, and the schoolmen no less familiar. Indeed we know not what writer gives more decided and marked indications of erudition, properly displayed, and yet turned to actual use in illustrating and enforcing principles that are profound and original, while yet they are clearly and strikingly stated. Of all this erudition, rare and massive as it is, he seems to be the master, and never to be over-burdened by its ponderous weight. Like Warburton, and unlike Parr, he wields the spear which is like a weaver's beam, as though it were a Parthian dart. It is true, the learning is sometimes a little disproportionate to the demand of the occasion, and the effect is a little laughable when the heavy spear is raised against a foe whom the dart would annihilate quite as certainly and far more gracefully. The style of the author we cannot compliment. It is cumbrous and awkward. His long familiarity with the peculiarly abstract terminology of logic, has made this as it would seem the most natural language by which to express his thoughts on all subjects; and to reduce everything to its most general and abstract conceptions, and to express them by the most attenuated phraseology, is as natural to him as it was with Dame Quickly, to speak of everything in the concrete. It requires a special training to feel at home with his language, and it assumes at times almost a barbarous aspect, which repels every one except the persevering inquirer. The earnest student will regard this, however, as of slight consequence, and will

cheerfully make all the effort that is required, in order to break through to the valuable thought that is concealed beneath the rough exterior.

The volume before us is, we regret to say, incomplete. It is abruptly closed at the 914th page, in the midst of an important note, and in the midst also of an unfinished sentence; the publisher we presume having become impatient of longer delay. The work is printed in double columns, in a style which is by no means equal to the merits of the work, and the proof reading is very carelessly done. These defects are hardly explained or justified by the cheapness of the work, and the desire to make it a text-book for classical use. Still less is the mechanical execution of the volume at all worthy of the value of its contents, and the deserved reputation of its editor. Surely the city and university of Edinburgh have too much reason to be proud of the name of their professor of logic, to say nothing of the honor of the founder of the Scottish school of philosophy, to be content with such an edition of the works of Reid, edited by the first of British metaphysicians.

The appearance of the volume is however of little consequence compared with the contents. These comprise first of all a full collection of the writings of Reid, with selections from his unpublished letters. Dugald Stewart's account of his life and writings is also prefixed. The contributions of the editor, consist first of all, of supplementary dissertations on distinct and important topics. These are appended to the writings of Reid, and they comprise nearly 200 closely printed pages. They are connected with Reid's writings by distinct and numerous references, and yet are an extended and complete discussion of separate and important topics. Note A is entitled, "On the philosophy of common sense; or, our primary beliefs considered as the ultimate criterion of truth." Note B is "Of presentative and representative knowledge." Note C is "On the various theories of external perception." Note D "Distinction of the primary and secondary qualities of body." D* "Perception proper and sensation proper." D** "Contribution towards a history of the doctrine of mental suggestion or association." D*** "Outline of a theory of mental reproduction, suggestion or association." In the midst of this note the volume terminates, and we are left to conjecture how many and what the remaining notes will be. It would seem, however, that they are to be a complete exhibition of the editor's views on the most important topics in psychology and metaphysics. These supplementary dissertations do not constitute the most important contributions of the editor. Equally interesting and valuable in our view, are the occa-

sional notes which appear on almost every page, of greater or less length. These are especially valuable from the fact, that they cast the light precisely on the spot where the light is needed, and also from the fact, that they are more happily conceived and expressed, than the more formal and extended dissertations at the end. We should be unwilling to spare either however, and we are disposed to complain only that the work is not finished. If it were complete, we should not hesitate to pronounce it one of the most important books of reference in the language, to the student in mental science. We trust it will not be long before the whole will be made accessible to the public. The appearance of such a book of itself constitutes an era in the history of British science, almost as remarkable and as worthy to be remembered, as that of Reid's original works. Certainly no work has appeared at any time since that period, which was fitted to make a stronger impression on the public mind, or to give a more decided direction to the habits of thinking, or to shape and fix the principles of scholars. We cannot but desire that this work shall be accessible to our American students. No writer in the English language, as we think, more richly deserves, and will more amply repay a thorough study, than Dr. Reid, by himself. Certainly Dr. Reid, as edited by Sir William Hamilton, is eminently worthy of the most faithful attention. The appearance of this work at this time is particularly auspicious. The dazzling influence which attended the first introduction of the French and German philosophers to our American scholars, has given way to a more sober desire, thoroughly and critically to scan their merits. The imposing effect, from novel phraseology and high-sounding nomenclature and lofty assumption, has been gradually losing its charms. The minds of the studious seem to be in a collapsed condition consequent to the excitement which attended the giving up an implicit attachment to their old favorites, and the disappointment at not being fully satisfied with the newer. A general desire and expectation seems to be cherished, of a system which shall be sober and rational, while yet it shall not be superficial nor sensual,—a system which shall neither creep on the earth, nor be lost in the clouds, but which shall stand firmly upon the one while yet its eye shall clearly gaze into the mysteries of the other, and so be true to man's nature, and the laws of man's being. No writer is better fitted to meet this desire, or to satisfy these longings than Reid, and none will be found to convey more truth in an unpretending way or to satisfy more questions and to solve more problems, without seeming to promise to do either. Whatever his deficiencies might have been, either in his

principles or their adaptation to modern readers, these are abundantly supplied by his accomplished editor.

Should this work be given to the American public in a reprint, as we trust will be the case, we desire first of all to see it published in a form more convenient and attractive than is that of the Edinburgh edition. We hope also that it may be accompanied by a translation of the fragments of Royer Collard's lectures, collected and appended by Jouffroy to his translation of Reid's works. These lectures are so instructive a comment and expansion of Reid's system, that they ought not to be withheld from the mass of English readers. Perhaps also they should be accompanied by the preface of Jouffroy to the same edition of Reid. Both these would show how Reid was transplanted into France, and constituted the influence and began the impulses which have resulted in the better French philosophy of the present day. In this connection we ought not to omit to mention that the editor of the work has very appropriately dedicated it to Victor Cousin, "not only in token of the editor's admiration of the first philosopher of France, but, as a tribute due appropriately and preëminently to the statesman through whom Scotland has been again united intellectually to her old political ally, and the author's writings, (the best result of Scottish speculation) made the basis of academical instruction in philosophy, throughout the central nation of Europe."

The Dictionary of the Philosophical Sciences, is the last of the three works which we propose to notice. It is issued by an association of professors of philosophy, of the school of Cousin. The attention of the numerous disciples of this school has been of late much directed to historical and critical inquiries and the natural result of investigations of this sort, by a sufficient number of men of a common way of thinking, is the publication of an encyclopedia or critical dictionary. It is issued in numbers or *livraisons*, each containing more than 300 large and closely printed pages, which are sold in Paris at five francs. Two of these constitute a volume; and four volumes will complete the work. The initials of the writer are subjoined to each article, and a list of the writers' names in full accompanies each volume. The work is edited by Franck, a member of the institute and associate professor of philosophy, in the faculty of letters at Paris. The principles of the work are given at some length in the preface. They are in the main the principles of the eclectic school, though they are expressed in language and by terms to which the disciples of the English philosophy of common sense and of faith, would make little objection. This dictionary differs from the German encyclopaedia of Krug in being

more exclusively and appropriately metaphysical in its topics, and it also gives fuller notices of French and English writers and discussions. It has the advantage also of being free from the peculiar technology and nomenclature which the German writers always adopt, whether they criticise a German, a French, or an English writer. It brings down the knowledge of these sciences to a recent date. The several topics treated of are described in the preface, as the following: "1. Philosophy properly so called. 2. The history of philosophy with a criticism, or at least an impartial judgment, of all the opinions and systems which philosophy spreads out before us. 3. The biography of all the philosophers of any importance, confined within such limits, as to conduce to the knowledge of their opinions and to the general history of the science. We need not add that this portion of our labor does not concern the living. 4. Philosophical bibliography arranged in such a way, that at the conclusion of every article, there may be found a list of all the works which relate to that subject, or of all the writings of the philosopher whose life and opinions have been considered. 5. The definition of every philosophical term, to whatsoever system it may belong; whether or not it has been retained in use. Each of these definitions is in some sort, the history of the word of which it proposes to explain the signification. It takes it at its origin; it follows it through all the schools which have adopted it in succession, and have turned it to their own use. Thus it is that the history of words is inseparable from the history of ideas. This part of our work, though obviously the most humble, is not perhaps the least useful. It might contribute if prosecuted by hands more skilful than ours, to establish in philosophy at least a unity of language." The subjects are arranged in the alphabetic order. The titles under the letter B, are the following: Baader, Bacon (Roger and Francis), Barclay, Bardili, Bassus Aufidius, Baumeister, Baumgarten (A. G.), Bayer, Bayle, Beattie, Beautiful the idea of, Beausobre (Isaac and Louis), Beccaria, Beck, Becker (Balthazar and Rodolfus), Bede, Bendavid, Bentham, Bérard, Béranger (of Tours and of Poitiers) Berg, Berger (J. E. de. and J. G. E.), Bergier, Bérigard, Bergk, Berkeley, Bernard of Chartres, Bessarion, Bias, Bichat, Biel, The supreme good, (*Bien, Souverain Bien*), Bilfinger, Bion, Bodin or Bodinus, Boëoe or Boëthius, Boehme (Jacob and C. F.), Boëthius (Daniel), Boëthus, Bolingbroke, Bonald, Bonaventura St., Bonnet, Bonstetten, Born, Boscovich, Bossuet, Buddhism, Boulainvilliers, Boursier, Bouterweck, Bredenburg, Broussais, Brown (Peter and Thomas) Bruce, Brucker, Bruno, Bryson, Buddeus, Buffier, Buhle, Buonafede, Buridan, Burke, Barlamaqui, Burlingh, Butler. The letter B, we should not expect

would be one of the most promising, but it will be seen from these titles, that the plan of the dictionary is truly liberal.

The tone of the dictionary is believing and elevated. Its influence is favorable to morality, to conservative yet liberal political views, and to religious faith. The relations of the eclectic school to Christianity and to Christian theology, are however somewhat singular, and it is worthy a serious consideration as illustrating the type of Christianity which prevails in France, and the almost necessary influence of the Romish church on the reflecting and inquiring minds among its men of education. The philosophers of the eclectic school as inquirers after truth, are serious and believing, and in some sense of the word, are religious. They are serious and believing, inasmuch as they recognize with distinct acknowledgement the moral and religious nature of man, and the moral administration of God as adapted to this nature. Christianity as a system of religious truth, and as breathing the spirit of duty and of love, they in some sense acknowledge to be divine. Many or most of them in their external profession, may be very good Catholics. But they find themselves in a perpetual warfare with the church. In this dictionary, the theological spirit is perpetually spoken of as a necessary antagonist of the philosophical. Christianity is recognized as being coincident with the indications and conclusions of philosophy, but the Christian theology of the church is never there recognized. It is never hinted, much less is it asserted, that the principles of theology ought to be as truly harmonious with the deductions of true science as the foundations of natural religion. Nay, the contrary seems to be continually implied. What harmony can there be between faith and science, if the only condition of this peace shall be a general armistice with no definite and well defined concord. What union between the thinking philosopher and believing Christian, if it be necessary that the philosopher when he thinks should forget the Christian when he believes, and the Christian just so far as he believes, must be untrue to the philosopher when he reflects. The cause of this disunion and weakness is too obvious to require an explanation. It is as clear as the sunlight that it lies in the attitude in which the Romish church teaches the truths of Christianity and the grounds on which it rests its claims. Its sad and disastrous consequence to the best minds of the nation, must continue so long as science and Christian theology shall maintain their present relative position. It is mournful to think, that while the philosophical spirit of the people is so hopeful, neither Romanism nor Protestantism seem to understand its condition nor to be able to meet its wants. It would seem that if a truly Christian philosophy could be grafted upon this promising stock, an entire change

might be effected in the thinking mind of the nation. But from whence this Christian philosophy is to come, is more than we can predict.

The difference between France and either Germany or England in this respect is striking, with all the monstrous errors of Germany. It is still a perpetual problem with the newest philosophy, to give a philosophical solution of the doctrines of Christianity. The solution may be more inexplicable than the difficulty left unsolved, but the attempt to make it, argues the conviction that scientific and Christian truth ought to be harmonious. In England, philosophy has endeavored to follow and to keep pace with theology, though it must be confessed it has too often been "*haud passibus sequis*." But in England it has always been believed that theology and philosophy should move with even pace in the same harmonious rounds, and should together manifest the glory of the God who is truth and love. That this ideal harmony should be fully realized, is the aim and effort of every truly Christian philosopher.

ARTICLE VII.

JEROME AND HIS TIMES.

By Rev. Samuel Osgood, Providence, R. I.

1. *Sancti Eusebii Hieronymi Stridonensis, Presbyteri Opera. Studio ac Labore Domini Johannis Martianay, Presbyteri et Monachi Ordinis S. Benedicti à Congregatione S. Mauri, Parisiis, MDCXIII—MDCCVI.*

Works of St. Eusebius Jerome of Stridon, Presbyter. Edited by John Martianay, Presbyter, and Monk of the Benedictine Order of the Congregation of St. Maur. In five Volumes, folio.

2. *Histoire de Saint Jerome, Perè de L'Eglise, au IV^e Siecle; Sa Vie, Ses Ecrits et Ses Doctrines, par F. Z. Collombet. Paris, 1844. History of St. Jerome, Father of the church in the Fourth Century; his Life; his Writings and his Doctrines. In two volumes, 8vo. By F. Z. Collombet.*

RICH as was the church of the fourth century in illustrious men who adorned imposing office with brilliant abilities; in princes like