
A table of contents for *Bibliotheca Sacra* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_bib-sacra_01.php

use of a book of Topics, to a pedantic, discursive and general style of remark, ill suited to the peculiar wants of his hearers; but he may also, if he be well educated and if he be judicious in the consultation of the book, derive from it a feeling of security that his mental processes have been correct, an enlargement and completeness of his views, and a general improvement of his mental character. Such a book will not supply natural deficiencies of talent, but may correct many faults arising from partial, one-sided conceptions of a particular subject, and an habitual contractedness and monotony of thought. Among modern treatises in this department, some of the most ingenious are found in C. F. Bahrdt's Versuch über die Beredsamkeit, and in Witting's Schrift über die Meditation eines Predigers; but the best is C. A. L. Kästner's Topik, oder Erfindungswissenschaft aufs neue erläutert.

ARTICLE III.

THE TRINITY.

[Translated by Rev. H. B. Smith, West Amesbury, Mass., from the Theological Lectures of Dr. A. D. C. Twesten, Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin.]

Introductory Note.

[The following Article has been translated, not only on account of its intrinsic excellence, but also because it presents a discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity upon somewhat different grounds from those ordinarily found in English and American systems of theology. Even if we do not agree with all the positions advanced nor think them conclusive, yet they may aid the mind to some new aspects of a doctrine which lies at the basis of the whole Christian scheme. This doctrine has always been discussed and illustrated differently by different minds, in different ages of the church; and that, too, without detriment to the general orthodoxy. Those who hold, and faithfully hold, to the same formula of doctrine will expound it differently, according to the influences under which their minds have been trained, to the objections made against their creed, and to the philosophical views prevailing around them. And such a discussion of this doctrine as is here presented, may lead us to a more thorough

conviction that it is not a mere abstract formula, but a living truth; a truth, not merely derived by a set of proof-texts from the Scriptures, but intimately inwrought into the whole scheme of Christianity; which can not only be shown to be unassailable by the principles of a common-sense philosophy, but can also be maintained in its most orthodox form in the midst of the severest critical discussions of the Scriptures, and against all the pretensions even of pantheistic and transcendental speculations.

Some parts of the discussion will be felt, in their full force, only by those somewhat acquainted with the later theological and philosophical systems of Germany. This is especially the case in the third and fourth sections, which exhibit the connection of this doctrine with the whole system of Christianity as experienced by the believer, or with the Christian consciousness; and in the attempts made to give a philosophical deduction of the Trinity. In both these portions of the Article the difficulty of translation has not been slight, and in many cases a free paraphrase has been thought absolutely necessary. But even with the most liberal translation, it may be doubted whether the exact sense of the original can be transferred into a language so different in its theological and philosophical phraseology, as is the English from the German. In the first section to which reference has just been made, for example, the phrase *Christian consciousness* frequently occurs; and it is a phrase of very distinct import in the school of Schleiermacher. It will not do to translate it by *Christian experience*, for that phrase is too subjective; it will not do to translate it by *the whole scheme of Christianity*, for that is too objective. A Christian believer is supposed to have new elements of consciousness, those viz. which are derived from the religion he has experienced. The word consciousness is here of course used in a somewhat broader sense than it bears in the English language. The phrase, *a conscious experience of the Christian faith*, may be a sufficiently accurate description of what is meant by Christian consciousness—it is the inward experience considered as embracing the whole of the objective revelation.

The fourth section, which gives a philosophical deduction of the Trinity, may appear to many to be superfluous if not unintelligible. The analysis of mental states is so different from that given or attempted in our English philosophy, that it may seem to be mystical or even imaginary. Dr. Twesten, it will be seen, expresses himself with much reserve as to the conclusiveness of any such speculations. They may be liable to another charge,

that of overstepping the bounds of human knowledge. The attempt to explain a mystery may be hazardous; yet it may not be hazardous for us to read such attempts. And they may, possibly, open to our minds some other aspects of a doctrine which we may wholly believe, though we understand it only in part.—Tr.]

We know that God in his nature or essence is one; that there is in him an absolute oneness of being. Yet so soon as we come to reflect upon God as he is himself, and as he is in his relations to the world, we are led to make definitions and statements, whereby that which is in itself one, this oneness or unity, is resolved into a multiplicity. God is not only one, but is also manifold. Now that which is manifold we can represent to ourselves in one of three forms; either as comprising several and distinct subjects, or several attributes, or diverse acts and modes of action. God is one; yet we speak of his attributes as many; of his operations or modes of action as many; and these two points comprise the second and third of these forms of conceiving of what is manifold; and we do this without detriment to the divine unity. We conceive of God as one identical subject having different and distinct attributes and modes of action. May there not also be that in the divine nature, which requires us to represent it as consisting of several and distinct subjects or persons as well as attributes? Are we not obliged to conceive of this complex of attributes and actions, or at least of attributes, in which our idea of the divine nature is fully expressed, in such a manner, or to reduce it to such statements, as involve the division of it into different and distinct subjects or persons?

In treating of the different relations and works and attributes of God, we are obliged to use great precaution in making our statements and definitions, lest the unity of the divine existence should seem to be infringed upon by the multiplicity and variety of these relations and attributes. These attributes are not indeed mere names; yet in God Himself they are not to be considered as wholly distinct either from one another or from the divine essence. They express the different relations in which the infinite God stands to what is finite, or rather in which finite existences stand to God; and they must always be so defined as to be consistent with the idea of the divine Unity.[1]. Yet we should

[1] Relationes divinae ab essentia divina nullatenus realiter sed ratione tantum distinguuntur, nec tamen distinctione rationis ratiocinantis, sed rationis ratiocinatae.

have only an imperfect conception of the true nature of this unity or simplicity of the divine existence, if, in comparison with it, we should think that the plurality of the divine works and attributes were of minor importance. Now, these precautions, which we are obliged to observe when treating of the divine attributes, are additionally necessary when we come to treat of the different subjects or persons in the Godhead; for here we seem to be threatened by a suspicious approximation to polytheism. But yet, as has been well remarked, we ought not to forget that there may be in polytheism an element of truth, something which is right and sound, although disfigured and misunderstood. On this account John of Damascus made his boast of Christianity, that it stood as it were in the centre between the abstract monotheism of the Jews and the idolatrous polytheism of the Greeks; that it completed what was wanting and corrected what was deficient in both. In his own words: "By the doctrine of the unity of the divine nature, the polytheism of the Greeks is clearly abolished; by the admission of the Logos and of the Spirit, the doctrine of the Jews is purified. That which is profitable in each conception remains. From the doctrine of the Jews we have the oneness of nature; from the Greeks the distinction in Hypostases alone.[1]

The Christian religion, then, we say, teaches us to adore One God in three persons; one and the same divine essence, or the totality of the same divine attributes, in three subjects, in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. This doctrine forms, as it were the key-stone of the Christian doctrine respecting God.

§ 1. *An Inadequate Conception of the Trinity.*

Before proceeding to our main discussion it may be well to notice one inadequate view of this doctrine which is adopted by some of our theologians, especially by De Wette in his Doctrinal Theology of the Lutheran Church.[2] Our conception of God, he says, must necessarily be threefold; and this was the primitive Christian view. We must consider him as the highest and absolutely independent being (the Father), as manifested or re-

natae, ubi occasio distinguendi et fundamentum aliquod distinctionis in re ipsa invenitur.—*Quenstedt.*

[1] Jo. Damasc. *de orthod. fide.* Conf. Basil M. *Homil.* XXIV. Opp. T. II. p. 139; Gregor. Nazianz. *orat.* XXXVII. p. 601. *orat.* XXIX. p. 400; Ambros. *de fide* i. 5; and others.

[2] De Wette, Dogmatik der Lutherischen Kirche § 41.

vealed in the world (the Son), and as ever acting in nature (the Spirit). But this view of the Godhead is one that exists only in our minds, and only serves to express the different relations which God sustains. The Church, however, under the influence of the mythological spirit which prevailed in ancient times, and in consequence of the limitation of human knowledge, has personified what was only a threefold conception of the Godhead, and affirms that it exists objectively in the divine nature itself; that it is not only a threefold way of regarding God, but that it designates real distinctions of subjects or persons in the very Godhead. The philosophical basis of this threefold way of conceiving of God may be given in some such statement as this. There are three modes in which, from the nature of our intellects, we may and are obliged to look at every object of knowledge. We may consider the object itself as a whole; we may consider the form which unites together the different parts of this whole; or we may consider the matter which is thus united, of which this whole is made up.[1] Thus the whole idea of God is expressed in this threefold relation. We conceive of him, in the first place, as the absolutely independent substance, the pure ideal of the reason; secondly, in relation to the world, we conceive of him as the being through whom the world exists, who has given to it existence and laws and form; and, in the third place, in relation to nature, (that is to the powers which are held together by this form, and to the phenomena which are caused by these laws,) we think of God as the source of all light and life. Thus we have a threefold view of the Godhead which contains all that is true in the doctrine of the Trinity. God as the absolutely independent substance is the Father; God as the author of the world and its laws is the Son; God as giving life to nature, as the living source of its manifold phenomena, is the Holy Ghost.[2] And the doctrine of the Trinity, as it exists in the church, is only a misapprehension or misapplication of this necessary and philosophical view of the Godhead.

To this statement we make three objections. In the first place, the distinction between the second and third mode of viewing the divine nature cannot be shown to be necessary or philo-

[1] These distinctions are expressed by Fries (whom De Wette follows), in his philosophy, under the term, *transcendental, formal and material apperception*.

[2] These distinctions may be expressed in another way. God as the absolute substance, *ens extramundanum;* as the author of the world, *ens supramundum;* as the immanent ground of all existence, *ens intramundum*.

sophical. Here is a broad distinction between God as he exists in himself, and God as the Creator of the world; not so broad is the distinction between God as the author of the world, and God as ever acting in the world. It may be well, in order to remove all dualistic notions, as though God and the world were entirely independent existences, to speak of him as immanent in nature, as not only the source of the powers and laws of nature, but as also ever acting in and through these powers. But, at the best, this expresses simply a distinction in the mode of the divine operations; it does not bring into view any new attributes or powers of the Godhead; nor does it present any wholly different view of the mode in which these attributes are manifested. Under the general notion of the relation of the world to God as its creator, we are obliged to bring *all* the attributes of God. And when we consider God as the cause of nature, we are also obliged to consider this causality as immanent in all his works. It may be a matter of convenience, it may assist us in forming some conception of the universality and omnipresence of the divine agency, if we make such a distinction; but it is not a matter of philosophical necessity.

In the second place, we say, that when we make this constant presence of God in his works, this immanence of the Creator in the creation, to be the same thing as what is meant when we speak of the Holy Ghost, we are doing violence to Scriptural language and to the whole analogy of Christian faith. God as the source of all life and phenomena in nature is one thing; God as the Holy Ghost is an entirely different conception. In the Holy Ghost we have indeed the idea of the divine immanence expressed; but the specific idea is that of the dwelling of God in his children, it is the relation in which he stands to the regenerate. He who has been redeemed by Christ, and sanctified, and elevated to communion with God; of him it is said that God comes to him and dwells in him (John 14: 23); he is in God and God in him (John 17: 21); he is a temple of the Holy Ghost (1 Cor. 3: 16, 17). There are indeed passages of the Old Testament in which the operations of God in nature are described as the action of the Spirit of God; yet even there, especially in the prophetical parts, this phraseology is chiefly employed when some relation to the kingdom of God in the special sense is intended. In the New Testament, however, this word, the Spirit of God, is almost exclusively used to describe that principle of a higher life which is at work in believers. And it belongs to the

very genius of Christianity to make here a broad distinction. The whole peculiarity of our faith rests upon the contrast between what we designate as nature, and what we designate as grace. And precisely because we acknowledge the indwelling of the Spirit of God in the regenerate, we cannot acknowledge it in what is not regenerate. The two conceptions express things wholly diverse.

In the third place, we object to this philosophical statement, that it does not express the essential points in the doctrine of the Trinity, and especially in the *Christian* conception of the Trinity. Even if we should concede, contrary to what the church has always maintained and enforced with the clearest consciousness, that there is nothing in the nature of God to warrant this threefold distinction, that it has no objective value, but is only a philosophical way of thinking about God; if we should grant that this doctrine was derived from a principle foreign to Christianity, or even opposed to it, that is, from the mythologizing spirit of the ancient world; still we say, that in this doctrine as held by the church, we have very different conceptions and statements in respect to the Godhead, from those which are brought to view in this philosophical analysis. The relations are different; the subjects are different. According to this philosophy we should have the following scheme: The Father, or God considered in his absolute independence, is the infinite, eternal, unconditioned substance, beyond and above the world, self-satisfying; God, considered in his relation to the world, or the Son, is the omniscient, omnipotent, benevolent and holy creator, preserver and governor of the world; God, considered in his relation to nature, or the Spirit, is omnipresent, penetrating everything, coöperating in all and with all. But are these the distinguishing predicates by which Christianity represents the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost? The conceptions which lie at the foundation of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, are wholly diverse from any such philosophical divisions and statements. It is indeed true that we believe, as the Nicene creed expresses it, that everything was created by the Son; but the Father is also declared to be the almighty maker of the heavens and the earth. Nor can we say that the Son is precisely equivalent to God revealed in the world, nor the Holy Ghost to God acting in nature; but the Son is he who has redeemed us; the Holy Ghost is he who

sanctifies us.[1] In other words, we are to seek the foundation of the doctrine of the Trinity in that which constitutes the peculiarity of the Christian system, that it is a scheme of redemption. It is in our conscious experience of this redemption, considering this consciousness as connected with the whole Christian scheme, that we find the true basis for this doctrine. We cannot find it in the different relations which God sustains to the world, nor can we reach it by any philosophical division we may make of God's natural attributes, nor by any reflexion upon our natural and necessary conceptions of God. It is not in Natural Theology, it is not in the general relation of God to the world, that we are to seek the basis of the Trinity; it is found only in connection with the Christian system of redemption. In the course of our discussion we shall again recur to this point.

For a clearer view of the foundation and meaning of this doctrine, we must separately consider its biblical, its religious and its speculative aspects; or its biblical foundation, its connection with the whole Christian economy, including our experience of it, and the speculations which have been made upon it. We must always come back to the assertions of the Holy Scriptures, for without them the doctrine would not have originated, nor could it be maintained in the form in which the church has held it. We also may and must endeavor to point out its connection with the whole Christian scheme, and the foundation that there is for it in our conscious experience of this scheme; so that the doctrine shall not remain a dead letter, but shall be seen to be a necessary link in that chain of truths which constitute our Christian faith. And, finally, we ought not to overlook the attempts which philosophy has made in all periods of the church to unveil, or at least to make more clear, the mystery of the Trinity.

§ 2. *The Scriptural Basis of the Doctrine.*

In the first place, the Holy Scriptures reveal God to us not only as the wise and omnipotent Creator of the heaven and the earth, not only as the holy Lawgiver, the righteous Judge, who renders to every man according to his works, but also as a merci-

[1] As Luther in his Larger Catechism thus gives our Faith, "in the shortest way in so many words: I believe in God the Father who created me; I believe in God the Son who redeemed me; I believe in God the Holy Ghost who sanctifies me."

ful and gracious Father. As such, though man became apostate, and made himself unworthy and incapable of attaining the highest good, and was exposed to temporal and eternal death, God from the beginning determined to restore our fallen race; divers times he proclaimed this decree and prepared for its execution; and at last, when the fulness of the time was come, he sent his Son into the world, that this purpose might be accomplished.

In the second place, in this Son, sent to be a Mediator and a Saviour, the Bible teaches us to recognise not a mere man, but the Word which was in the beginning with God, and which was God; the brightness of his glory and the express image of his person; higher than the angels, since he upholds all things by the word of his power, and since by him and for him all things are created. He did indeed take upon himself the form of a servant, and became like to us in all things except sin, but he was again raised to the right hand of God, and glorified with the glory which he had with the Father before the beginning of the world, since to him all power is given in heaven and upon the earth. Therefore at his name every knee shall bow, of things in heaven and things in earth and things under the earth, that all men may honor the Son even as they honor the Father.[1]

But since no man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost (1 Cor 12: 3), whom Christ at his departure promised to his disciples, who animated, illuminated and guided the apostles, and who dwells in all believers as the source of their assurance and joyfulness, as the pledge of everlasting life; the Scriptures do therefore, in the third place, teach us to believe in the Holy Spirit, not as an excitation, a sentiment or a disposition of our own souls, not as a quality, an active or passive state of those in whom he dwells, but as a power from above, a higher and divine principle, which is not only distinguished from, but even opposed to human personality (Rom. 8: 16. Matt. 10: 20. 1 Pet. 1: 11). His relation to God is compared with that of the human spirit to man (1 Cor. 2: 11); and he is represented as of a truly divine nature, but at the same time distinguished from the Father and the Son, as an individual subject of divine attributes and acts (Matt. 28: 19. 1 Cor. 12: 4—6. 2 Cor. 13: 13. Titus 3: 4—6. 1 Pet. 1: 2).

The general result of the declarations of the Holy Scriptures is then this: 1. That not only the Father, but also the Son and the

[1] John 1: 1. Heb. 1: 3. Col. 1: 16. Phil. 2: 6. Heb. 4: 15. 12: 2. John 17: 5. Matt. 28: 18. Phil. 2: 9. John 5: 23.

Spirit have not a created, but a divine nature; 2. That the divinity of the Son and of the Spirit is not merely that of the Father, but that the Son is different from the Father, and the Holy Ghost from both; but yet, 3. That there is and remains only One God.

It does not come within our plan to investigate the objections urged against this result; this would be the province of Biblical Theology. To one point only can we allude. The Scriptures seldom or never speak of the divinity of the Son and of the Holy Ghost by themselves. In conformity with the whole character of the Bible, which is practical rather than strictly doctrinal, which is directed rather to the Christian life than to knowledge as such, it almost every where speaks of the Word in his human manifestation, and of the Spirit as acting in our minds; so that in its statements, the glory of the divinity (δόξα τῆς θειότητος) appears mitigated by the human form (σχῆμα ἀνθρωπίνον) in which it is exhibited. If Arian and Semi-arian conceptions thus seem to be favored, we must bear in mind that there cannot in truth be any middle term between God and a created being. If then we find that Christ and the Holy Spirit are spoken of in a way which raises them above the rank of creatures; if predicates are given to them, and a religious reverence paid to them, or sentiments and feelings expressed towards them, such as are befitting God only; we must then also regard them as having a truly divine nature.

The design of all the doctrinal statements and definitions which the church has made respecting the Trinity, is to hold fast the results which we have deduced from the Scriptures, and to exclude those views which either abandon the divinity of the Son and the Spirit, or look upon the difference between them as merely a difference in the mode of revealing or of understanding the same One God, or attribute to the Godhead three different divine natures. Hence these formulas are rather of a negative than a positive character, and, for the most part, only logical expositions of those fundamental relations which are referred to in the Scriptures.

We cannot be satisfied by a mere recital of these expositions. We must attempt to make them more clear by showing what religious truth is contained in them. This can only be done by an exhibition of the connection of the doctrine of Trinity with the fundamental characteristics of Christianity, considered as a matter of faith and of experience; in other words by showing the

connection between this doctrine and what we may call the *Christian consciousness*. This connection between the definitions that have been given of the doctrine of the Trinity and the whole sphere of Christian doctrine and experience, is not a superficial one; the two are interwoven, fast formed together in their very roots.

§ 3. *Connection of the Doctrine of the Trinity with the Christian Consciousness.*

The fundamental idea of Christianity, the one which lies at the basis of all Christian experience, is that of redemption and atonement by Jesus Christ. Two elements are involved in our experience of this redemption, the consciousness of sin or of opposition to God, and the conscious reception of grace, which is the doing away of the opposition, the return to communion with God. These two states, that of nature or sin and that of grace, are in such an antagonism as does not indeed exclude a transition from the one to the other, but as does exclude the possibility of comprehending the second as a mere development of the first. Otherwise redemption were either impossible or unnecessary. Both Manichaeism and Pelagianism, therefore, must be regarded as systems in direct opposition to the fundamental idea of Christianity.

From this it also follows, that in both these states we not only refer our life to God as its last ground, but that we must first of all make such a distinction in the mode of reference as will be conformable with the difference in the two states. We derive our natural life from God as our creator and preserver; but when we have done this we have not yet come to understand the ground of our higher life. Our natural relation to God, though it does not directly include, yet it does not exclude, a state of sin and of separation from him; and from this state the opposite one of grace and of union with God cannot of itself proceed. In order to understand this latter state, we must assume a mode of the divine agency different from that manifested in our creation and preservation, and one which shall be connected with our consciousness of redemption by Christ, in whom God became united with human nature; through whom he has become united with us, and will become united with the whole world.

Nor is this all. Not only does our consciousness lead us to

see a difference in the relations of our natural and of our higher life to God, but God himself is placed according to these relations in a different position with respect to us. By this is not meant that we do not recognize in both relations the same Being who worketh all in all; but we are obliged to form a different conception of this same Being, considered as the subject from whom the one agency proceeds, from that which we form of him as the source of the other agency. God the creator, and God the Redeemer are not ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο, but rather ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος. (That is, the difference is not such that we are led to attribute it to beings of entirely different or opposite natures; but it is such that we are naturally led to think of a difference in the personal agency employed.) There are those who acknowledge the difference of the two states of nature and of grace, but deny that the two can be referred to the same being; and they represent the Creator (the Demiurge), and that primal Deity who revealed himself in Christ (the just and merciful God), in complete opposition to one another; this is the fruit of a Manichaeising or dualistic principle. On the other hand, the denial of a different personal agency (of the ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος) has mostly been found in connection with Pelagian tendencies, with a denial of the radical distinction between the state of nature and the state of grace. Thus it would seem not to be a mere accident that Pelagianism when logically carried out (as, for example, among the Socinians) has also always led to Unitarianism.

However, clear as it is that a system which ignores the essential difference between the life of the natural man and of the regenerate, needs no other Saviour than one who acts by doctrine and example for the perfecting of our knowledge and our moral sentiments; and, hence, needs nothing more than a wise and holy man, or, at the very highest, only a man sent by God, endowed with higher powers and upheld by special grace; it may yet appear to be a matter of doubt whether it might not answer all the exigencies of the opposite evangelical system, to distinguish redemption as an act of God from the act of creation, in some such way as creation is distinguished from preservation, coöperation and government. For, then, it might be said, it would still remain true, as the Scripture declares (2 Cor. 5: 19), that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself. But this very comparision may teach us that the relation, in point of fact, is wholly different.

Creation, preservation and coöperation, the divine prescience and government[1] may all be referred to the same sphere, or to the same conception, that of the universal dependence of all things upon God. In these terms this whole sphere of the divine agency is fully comprehended and exhausted, so that there is no room left for any conception of God's natural agency, which is not included in them; there is no need of any additional conceptions to complete the idea of God which lies at the basis of all these. And, on the other hand, they all exhibit the same fundamental relation of God to creation, only in different modes; and hence they can all be referred back to one another or to one fundamental idea, and they must be so referred when we think upon God who is the common source of all these relations, the subject from which they proceed. Coöperation can be considered as included or given in preservation, and preservation in creation; God's government of the world must be regarded as involved in the idea of coöperation, and prescience is involved in creation. The difference between primary and secondary causes, regard to or abstraction from the proper causality of what is finite, must recede or vanish in our consciousness, in proportion as we sink ourselves wholly into that Being who is the last ground and end of all things and powers; in proportion as we view all things in their necessary and entire dependence upon him. Hence there is here no occasion to assume for all these different agencies, (creation, preservation, etc.,) more than one subject from whom they proceed; since in the single idea of God as a Creator there is not anything wanting to explain all creation, nor in the creation do we find any such differences of operation as make it necessary for us to add anything to this idea, or to divide it into any parts which may not be resolved into one another, or referred back to one single conception of the Deity.

Redemption, on the other hand, with the ideas connected with it, presents to us a wholly different sphere of dependence, which also, only in another point of view, comprises all that is finite; for, manifestly, the very possibility of redemption presupposes that every being, without exception, is as it were ordained in reference to it. On this account the Redeemer, no less than the Creator, is called the Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end (Rev. 1: 11; 22: 13;) without him was not anything made that was made (John 1: 3); without him, to

[1] [To these five heads Dr. Twesten reduces his discussion respecting the divine attributes.—Tr.]

whom all judgment has been committed (John 5: 22), and who in the fulness of times is to gather together all things which are in heaven and which are on the earth (Eph. 1: 10), the world cannot reach the end for which it was created. But this dependence can by no means be referred back to that general dependence which is found in nature; redemption cannot be put under the same head with creation, or be resolved into it, as can the preservation and government of the world. Much rather is it true, that when we reflect upon the author of creation and the author of redemption, there comes into our minds a decided contrast between him who, when he created all things, gave them over, as it were, to a separate and independent existence, and him who, in that he redeemed created beings from death and sin, called them back from the struggle they were making to live without God and for themselves alone, to a life of union with God, to a life which comes from God. And so, when we restrict our thoughts to the work of redemption alone, we feel and see a contrast between him to whom the world was to be reconciled, and him who made the reconciliation; between the Father who conceived the purpose of bringing back a sinful race to blessedness by means of the merits of his Son received by faith, and the Son, who was sent by the Father, and who by his life and doctrine, by his sufferings and work, by his death and resurrection, carried that purpose into effect and wrought out salvation for us.

Accordingly we say, that the religious consciousness of the Christian seems to demand, not only that we refer our redemption to God, but also that we make a distinction between God so far as we owe to him our redemption, and God so far as we consider him as the author of our natural existence. But at the same time we will not deny, that apart from the difficulty of exhibiting this view with a clearness corresponding to our inward perception of it, there might still remain such objections to it, as can only be set aside by the decisive declarations of the Holy Scriptures. The Scriptures, however, exclude every *modalistic* (or Sabellian) view of this doctrine, since they not only reveal to us in Christ, a being who is one with the Father, so that whoever sees him sees the Father also; but they likewise represent him as distinguished in the most precise manner from the Father, and that, too, not merely in his human or temporal manifestation, but as one who was before Abraham, who, even before the world was, had an eternal glory with the Father.

To come to a clear perception of the relation in which the fact of our redemption stands to God, of the new relation in which the Godhead is thus presented to us, is the first and necessary impulse of our minds when we begin to reflect upon the Christian scheme, and upon our conscious experience of that scheme; and the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ is the first fruit of such reflection.[1]

But as the Holy Scripture, to the confession of the Father and the Son, also adds that of the Holy Ghost, so likewise Christian reflection does not stop with the author of our redemption, but necessarily directs itself to the manner in which, and to the principle by which, we attain to the redemption made by Christ. The way and end, however, are already prescribed; the doctrine respecting the Holy Ghost, must shape itself after the analogy of the doctrine respecting the Son of God.

If our redemption is to be referred back to Christ, and in an especial manner to the indwelling of the eternal Word in him, then the indwelling of the Spirit in us is to be considered as a consequence of this, and as similar to it; here we find that union of the divine with the human, which was originally realized in Christ as the head, and is to pass over from him to the members. But although it is to be viewed as a consequence, it must also be viewed as a special and separate element, as a special divine agency, and is to be distinguished from the redeeming work of Christ; for, while the latter always remains the same, we both know that we ourselves have been in a state in which we had not yet attained to fellowship with him and through him with God, and we also see many around us who have not experienced that drawing of the Father without which no one comes to Christ (John 6: 44). But the Father draws us by the Spirit proceeding

[1] This view is confirmed by history. The doctrine of Christ's relation to the Father was a very early and earnest subject of doctrinal discussion, and even after this had been described and decided in definite formulas, the doctrine respecting the Holy Spirit was left for a time without any more definite description than was found in the declarations of the Scriptures or in the expressions of ordinary Christian experience; and then, yet without any struggle or opposition such as can be compared with those upon the Christology, was defined in a corresponding manner. And not only is this so in the history of the church, but in the Bible also, God and the Lord, the Father and the Son, are more frequently brought together as two, than the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost as three; so that the doctrine of the second person in the Godhead seem to be more clearly and undeniably contained in the Scriptures, than that of the third person.

from him, or who is sent from him through the mediation of Christ (John 15: 26). Here, then, we also find a relation of dependence from which no portion of the finite universe can be excluded. The agency of the Spirit is, first of all, connected with the existence and agency of the church—for the church is the body of Christ, and the Spirit is the soul of the church; it is also connected with the general susceptibility of the human race for divine influences, which differs somewhat according to the endowments, the position and the degree of religious development of different individuals and nations; and all this cannot be separated from the general direction and government of the universe. Accordingly it is stated, that as nothing has come into being without the Son, so likewise the Spirit of God in the beginning brooded upon the face of the waters. Some reference to that divine agency, whose chief end and central purpose is the communication of redemption to the hearts of the regenerate, may be found in the whole history of man. And since redemption cannot be considered as a single divine act, coördinate with creation, preservation and government, so it is with sanctification—which one word we may use to designate this new causality. God and his general relations to us are here again to be represented by new and peculiar statements, which make it necessary for us to maintain a distinction between the Father and the Spirit. And this, again, not as if there were here a difference of nature or essence (*ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο*); but because the Father and the Spirit are represented as different subjects or persons, performing the same divine acts (as *ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος*). But not merely must we here distinguish the Father and the Spirit, but also the Holy Spirit and the Son. Although the indwelling of the Spirit in us is analogous to the indwelling of the Word in Christ, yet we are forced to acknowledge an essential difference in the mode of the indwelling; what in Christ was original, is in us derived; what in him was complete and perfected, is in us incomplete and progressive; what in him was a personal indwelling, is in us merely as members of the body of Christ, of his church. Not only so, but that divine influence which dwells in us cannot possibly be considered as identical with the divinity which dwelt in him. To maintain this identity would, on the one hand, involve such a degradation of Christ and such an exaltation of ourselves, as would make it difficult to say which of the two were the more opposed to the Christian consciousness; whether our reverence for the Saviour, if we consider him so wholly like to us, or our

humility, if we consider ourselves as so many repeated incarnations of the Son of God, would be most impaired. And on the other hand, it would be wholly incompatible with belief in the personality of the Word manifested in Christ. For, should we assume that the principle which became personal in Christ, after his death passed over into the church, it would follow that the personality of this principle was a mere consequence of its union with human nature, and existed only during his earthly life; that the *theanthropic* personality of Christ is no longer anywhere present; and, consequently, that Jesus, if he continues to live as man, was, after his death, not exalted but humiliated. We need not stop to show, how inconsistent this would be, not merely with the declarations of Scripture, but also with our own consciousness of the relation by which we are bound for all times to our heavenly High Priest and King. Thus, as the personal preëxistence of the Son makes it necessary to distinguish him from the Father, so the personal existence of the God-man after his earthly life, makes it necessary to distinguish him from the Holy Spirit, whom he also describes as *another* Comforter or helper, whom God would send to his followers after his departure (John 14: 16).

With these hints upon the relation of the doctrine of the Trinity to the Christian consciousness, we must for the present content ourselves.[1] Since this doctrine is not the simple expression of one single act or state in the inward life of the Christian (as is, for example, that of Regeneration), but the result of very many and diverse elements and states; is not merely an expression of our direct Christian experience, but is also the result of our reflections upon this experience; it would be impracticable to follow out and lay open, one by one, all the threads by which it is connected with our whole Christian faith and with the whole sphere of Christian doctrine. With some attention we shall find ourselves brought to it by every movement of Christian life.[2]

[1] In systems of Doctrinal Theology, the doctrine of the Trinity is usually immediately connected with the doctrine respecting God's nature and attributes. This has originated from the custom of arranging dogmatical subjects in accordance with their apparently similar reference to certain objects, and not out of regard to their inward connections. It has not been without hurtful influence upon the right understanding of, and even upon belief in the Trinity, that in this way the Second and Third Persons of the Godhead were discussed, before the full doctrine respecting Christ and the Holy Spirit was introduced. These latter doctrines are more immediately connected with the facts of Christian experience and of the Christian consciousness; and here is the basis for the full development of the Trinity. [Vide p. 182 of Twesten's Lectures.]

[2] Thus, e. g. Melancthon rightly calls attention to the fact that when we

§ 4. *Speculations upon the Trinity.*

The doctrine of the Trinity presents a third point of view, that is, the speculative. This is to be seen in its history, and it lies in the very nature of the case. For, it is a question appealing to and demanding reflection and thought, how that which is essentially one can be threefold, how what is threefold can yet be one. The notions which we need in order to hold fast difference in unity, and unity in difference, are of a metaphysical character. To this we may add, that speculation by itself seems to lead to similar distinctions and formulas. Hence we find, that not merely were those who had the chief influence upon the formation of this doctrine, influenced by ideas which belong to the sphere of speculation; but even the apostle John by the use of a term borrowed from the speculation or theosophy of his times, brought the Christology into connection with it. And it is impossible to understand a doctrine perfectly, without regard to what always has exercised and always will exercise so essential an influence upon it.

Yet, on the other hand, we ought not to give too much importance to the speculative element. The most of the evangelical, particularly of the Lutheran theologians, strongly inculcate the position, that the Trinity cannot and may not be proved by reason. Gerhard says: "the mystery of the Trinity neither can nor ought to be proved *a priori* by natural reason;" Quenstedt asserts: "from our natural cognitions we do not know, nor can we know,

find ourselves laid hold of by the word of the gospel, we thus come to know the Word who was in the beginning; thereby, too, we know the Father, who sends this Word, not once, but constantly, into the world; and we are at the same time filled with an assurance and joy which are the work of the Holy Ghost. Conf. *Pezel*, Argumenta et objectiones de praecipuis Articulis doctrinae Christianae cum Responsionibus Phil. Melanchthonis, 1580; (a very useful and well-arranged book for a knowledge of the theology of Melanchthon;) P. I. p. 381. "Augustine (IV. de trinit.) says, The Son is sent every day into the hearts of the faithful: and he adds, he is sent in one way to be man, in another way to be with man. Athanasius expressly says, whenever the Spirit is said to be in any one it is meant, that there is in him the Word giving the Spirit. In what order? I think thus; by the spoken word. The *Son* truly speaks the word in the heart, and thus he shows the *Father;* and at the same time the heart is sprinkled all over by the Holy Spirit, which is the cause of joy in God. *These things may be understood by experience.* With this agree many sayings of the Fathers. Thus Gregory Nazianzen says; 'from the light, the Father we receive the light, the Son, in the light, the Holy Ghost."

that God is one in essence and three in persons."[1] We could indeed have nothing against it, should any one succeed in transforming into a clear and well-proved philosophical theory what we believe on the testimony of Christ, and of his Spirit in the Scriptures and in Christian experience. But it is hazardous to find a philosophical proof in what has no other value than that of an explanation, or an analogy, or a ground of probability; and to build our faith upon such things. This is what has often happened in respect to this doctrine. As Calovius says, "it is one thing to illustrate a mystery by some similitude, especially if this be not foreign from Scripture; but another thing to seek to demonstrate a mystery either *a priori* or *a posteriori* from nature or the light of nature. The former course may be allowed, (as in a comparison of the divine nature with the intellectual nature of man,) in the way in which such comparisons are made by John of Damascus and others; but we can by no means concede the propriety of the latter, nor think it to be without danger, since it exposes our catholic faith to calumny and sarcasms."[2] Such a course is hazardous because it destroys our sense for what is really certain, and accustoms the mind in matters of faith to hold probabilities for evidence and shadows for substances; because it leads us to put into the back ground the proper and divine foundation of Christian belief; because it makes prudent men suspect a doctrine which is supported by so doubtful arguments. "He who endeavors," says Aquinas,[3] "to prove a Trinity of persons by natural reason derogates from our faith in a double way; first, in respect to the dignity of the faith itself, and, secondly, in his usefulness in drawing others to the faith; for when any one brings forward arguments for proving the faith which are not cogent, he gives it over to the decision of the unbelieving; since they think that we are convinced by such arguments and that our faith is founded on them." To this we must add, that the Trinity which philosophy or speculation espouses, is not, without anything further, the Trinity of Christianity. What we have said in the first section respecting the view of De Wette,

[1] Conf. *Jo. Gerhardi* exeges. loc. III. § 23—31; *Calovii* system. tom. III. art. I. cap. 1. quaest. 1; *Quenstedt* system. tom. 1. cap. VI. sct. II. qu. 3; *Musaeus* de usu princip. rationis (1644), especially in the appended disputatio I. against Keckermann; *Buddei* institutt. lib. II. cp. 1. §44; *Baumgarten's* Glaubenslehre, Th. I. S. 559 sq.

[2] Calovius ubi supra.

[3] Thomas Aquin. in summa, P. I. qu. XXXII. art. I.

that the idea of God in his relation to the world, is not coincident with the Christian idea of the Son of God, may be applied with less modification than might have been expected, considering the great differences in the fundamental philosophical views of other schools, to most of the speculative theories about the Trinity. It is the world, or the principle of the world, or the reason, or at any rate the race of man in general, in which these speculators see the second person of the Godhead (the θεὸς δεύτερος), and not Jesus Christ, born of the virgin Mary and crucified under Pontius Pilate, whom we confess in the creed. Among the later attempts to give a speculative development of this doctrine, that of Daub[1] was not only one of the first in the order of time, but is also among the first in its real significancy. According to his view, as the Father is *autor sui*, so is the Son *autor mundi*, and the Holy Spirit *autor rationis*. To the first is to be attributed absolute necessity, majesty and unity, and hence divinity; to the second, omnipotence, the highest obedience and omnipresence, and hence personality; to the third, beatitude, absolute simplicity and omniscience, and hence spirituality. But since the Father is himself Son and Spirit, and the Son is himself Father and Spirit, and the Spirit is himself Father and Son, each one of them has also the attributes of the others. Although Daub with the creating and upholding nature (natura creatrix et conservatrix), which he attributes to the Son also joins his reconciling nature (natura reconciliatrix), and thus tries to exhibit in its true connection the work of atonement and redemption which Christ performed, and so to bring speculation into such a union with positive faith as is demanded by the Christian consciousness, yet it may with good reason be doubted whether these positions are conformed to the doctrine of the Trinity as given in the Bible and held by the church. As with his view, so with the other philosophical constructions of the Trinity. Is it not to be feared, that in proportion as our interest is thrown upon the speculative side, those very points which are for the Christian of chief importance will be crowded out of sight?[2] And what, now, if the speculative

[1] Daub, Theologumena § 126, 127.

[2] It is hardly possible that any one who finds the marrow of the Christian faith in a speculative Christology, should avoid the consequences which Strauss has drawn out with such remarkable openness, keenness and clearness in the closing treatise to his "Life of Jesus," § 146 and 147. Such a one must look at the regard paid to the historical and positive parts of our faith, by those who hold to the biblical and ecclesiastical or orthodox system, as a kind of prejudice without any scientific basis, such as no man can continue in who has

theory have a character foreign to, even opposed to Christianity? Not a few of our contemporaries have laid so much stress upon the Trinity in particular, only because they found in it the expression of a pantheistic view of the universe, and so, a proof that what was the result of their speculations was also the veritable sense of the Christian doctrines and confessions. There are indeed, on the other hand, those who have found the certainty of God's personality and of his difference from the world in the philosophically developed doctrine of the Trinity. If the former give us ground to fear, that by giving ourselves up to their speculative theories we shall become estranged from the religion of the gospel, as it is presented to him who examines it on historical grounds, and as it has always been understood by the church; the latter must undermine all trust in a mode of discussion which allows such opposite results to be drawn from the same dogma, perhaps by disciples of the same philosophical school. As certain as it is that theism lies at the foundation of the declarations of Jesus and the apostles, so certain is it that they do not connect it with any speculations upon the Trinity.[1] Without, then, putting any arbitrary boundaries to such speculations, without denying or giving up the use they may have in guarding against a superficial rejection of our doctrine, in setting aside the

been elevated to the heights not merely of the philosophical but also of the critical stand-point of our times.

[1] The most significant declarations of Christ about his person and his relation to God, (as John 10: 30. 14: 9.) might indeed be easily interpreted by a pantheistic-mystical view of things. They are even surpassed by such as we find in the jubilee-song of Attar, in Tholuck's "*Blüthensammlung aus der morgenländischen Mystik*," p. 260; or in Lessing's half playful declarations, of which Jacobi speaks in his Works, (B. IV. Abth. 1. S. 74, 79). But such an interpretation of them lies too much on the surface, to fathom the depths of a relation, which was a secret to all but the Father and the Son, (Matt. 11: 27); such a union with God would be, in the way of mere logic, of much easier attainment, than even the moral union according to the interpretation of the common rationalism; and one would not need to learn first of the East Indians, that it was such a wonder that among us God had only once become man, in the person of Christ; as Schelling has it in his "Method of Academical Study," p. 194. ["The Christian missionaries that went to India thought they were telling the inhabitants something never before heard of, when they taught them that the God of the Christians had become man. But these heathen were not astonished by this doctrine, they did not at all contest the Incarnation of God in Christ; they only thought it strange, that among the Christians, that had happened only once, which among themselves had often come to pass, in constant repetition."] To this is to be added the contrariety of such an interpretation with the totality of the other declarations and doctrines of Christ,

common objections to its reasonableness, or leading us to some presentiment of its deep significancy, and thus bringing it, at least in one aspect, nearer to our understanding; yet, if true to the principles of the evangelical Theology, we must find our standard for judging it and the proper grounds of our assent to the representations of Scripture, weighed on all sides according to their sense and connection, livingly appropriated by the religious consciousness, and brought together in so definite statements as to ward off every kind of misinterpretation.

In making ourselves acquainted with these attempts to give a philosophical deduction or explanation of the Trinity, it is not our intention out of the great multitude and variety of them from the most ancient to the most recent times, to bring forward even the most noted ones in full detail; nor would it correspond with our purpose, excluding all the rest, to give only a single one of them; we will rather endeavor to bring out the fundamental ideas that recur in all of them under different forms and modifications. In doing this, we shall be compelled to give less prominence to the form itself than would be proper in a strictly philosophical or speculative discussion, where the form and the substance are not to be separated.

We can look at the matter under a double point of view. We can either consider God in relation to the revelation he has made of himself,—meaning by this not so much his special revelation in Christianity, to start from which would be the first impulse of the Christian consciousness, as his revelation in the world in general, which, to be sure, includes the former; or, we can consider God as he is in himself. Both these must be coincident and connected, if that revelation is a true one, by which we know God as he is.[1]

Since the world does not exist of and for itself, but is in every respect absolutely dependent upon God, or has the ground and end of its existence in God, we can comprehend it only as a revelation of the divine nature or essence.[2] But we know that the

[1] *Urlsperger*, in his valuable "*Attempt at a more Exact Determination of the Mystery of God and of the Father and the Son*, (1769–74,) makes a similar distinction between the revealed and the essential Trinity, which last he holds to be unfathomable. The same thing lies in the distinctions of the church between the τρόπος ἀποκαλύψεως and ὑπάρξεως.

[2] The glory of God, and the attainment of the highest good (or revelation and communication), are not to be separated in considering the purpose of creation. God reveals himself in that he who is the highest good communicates himself to his creatures; and he communicates himself to his creatures by revealing

essence of God is infinite, perfect and necessary; or, in the terminology of our times, that he is the Absolute being, the opposite of all finite and conditioned existence. How can these two things exist together? How is it conceivable, that the world can have proceeded from, and can reveal, what is the opposite of it? For example, according to the ontological or metaphysical conception of him, God is pure reality, without parts, without antagonisms, without anything like juxtaposition, succession or division into distinct parts, such as we find in all that exists in space and time; the world or universe, on the other hand, is made of parts, is manifold, spread out in space and time. Whence, now, this manifoldness out of the unity? How can the antagonisms we every where find, be reduced to a pure identity? How can that which is thus separated into parts, each distinct from the others, in space and time, be referred back to what is eternally simple and uncompounded? We feel here the need of something to mediate between these extremes or opposites; and we find this mediation in the idea of a creative understanding, or notion (Begriff).[1] The human understanding is also a unity, which comprises in itself, and produces from itself what is varied and manifold; by means of a conception or notion we bring what is manifold into a unity, see separate things in their connection, follow out antagonisms to their coincidence, and raise ourselves above time and space and the forms of what is merely finite;—although our intellect is usually determined by external causes, to raise itself by reflection from what is individual to what is universal, and does not endeavor to do more than reproduce in itself by means of ideas a copy of the universe. It would not be able to do even this, at least we could not hope in this way to arrive at a true knowledge of the universe, if we could not presuppose as the ground of all

himself and his perfections through and for them, upon and in them. It is a matter of indifference whether we say with the older theologians, God wills his own glory, and in order to that, the blessedness of rational beings; or, with some later divines, God wills the accomplishment of the highest good, and from this his own glory follows. Conf. Twesten, p. 87—89.

[1] We hardly need say, that the difference we are accustomed to make between our active powers and the objects on which we exercise them, cannot be applied to God. As *Aquinas* says: "it is manifest that in God the intellect which understands and that which is understood, the intelligible idea and the understanding thereof, are wholly one and the same." (Summa, P. I. qu. XIV. art. IV.) It will also be unnecessary to justify ourselves for here using the word *understanding* and not *reason*. [Conf. *Schelling's Denkmal der Schrift von der göttlichen Dingen, u. s. w. S.* 140.]

created things, an *archetypal, creative understanding* (intellectus archetypum[1]), and so the possibility of a relation between our understanding (as intellectus ectypus), and this primitive understanding; for, without this, truth would be unattainable, even inconceivable by us.[2] Accordingly, the condition of all revelation of God in the world is the world-comprehending *thought of God*, which on the one hand is eternal in God and not different from God, and on the other hand, in order to reveal God, must proceed from him, become, as it were, external, by unfolding itself in the creature as the source of existence and truth, of light and life, (John 1: 4). Thus the thought which springs into being in the depths of the human soul is revealed by the spoken word. This *thought of God* or this Word, (the Greek language has the advantage of comprising both these things in the word λόγος,) considered as the prime condition of the revelation of God in the world, we must distinguish from God, as the original essence, enclosed in his absolute unity and self-sufficiency. We are the more led to do this, since it is impossible for us in the latter, considered by himself, to see any ground for any existence besides his own.[3] And yet we must hold fast the position, that this Word of God, this condition of his revelation of himself, cannot be anything else than the reflection of his glory and the image

[1] Conf. Kant's Kritik der Urtheilskraft, S. 346.

[2] Vide, Twesten's Logik § 307.

[3] Most persons, although some later philosophers think otherwise, will confess their inability of finding in the idea of the absolute, considered by itself alone, the necessity of its developing itself into the form of a world different from itself, into what is relative, opposed and finite. This inability has always been recognized by theologians in the position universally maintained, that "*God created the world, not from a necessity of his nature but of his own free will.*" (Quenst. P. I. cp. IX. sct. 1. Jes. 12.) Thomas Aquinas brought the doctrine of the Trinity into connection with the same idea, when he said: (Summa P. 1. qu. 32. art. 1;) "The knowledge of the divine persons is necessary to a right view of the creation of things; when we say, that God made all things by his word, we exclude the error of those who assert that God produced things from the necessity of his nature; when we say that there is in him a procession of love (processionem amoris), it is seen that God did not produce his creatures from any need of his own, but from the love of his own goodness." Aquinas finds in this the solution of the problem, how the manifoldness of things can proceed from what is absolutely one; "agens per naturam agit per formam per quam est, quae unius tantum est una, et ideo non agit nisi unum; agens autem voluntarium, quale est Deus, agit per formam intellectam; cum igitur Deum multa intelligere non repugnet unitati et simplicitati ipsius, relinquitur ut, licet sit unus, possit multa facere." (Summa P. I. qu. 46. art. 1.)

of his nature (Heb. 1: 3), is nothing other than God himself revealing himself.—But, further, no revelation can be conceived of except for a consciousness which perceives it. It is, then, not enough for the eternal and primitive ground of all things, merely to come out of the hidden depths of his secluded state, he must also be known and perceived when he thus manifests himself. But when we have got that principle which reveals what God is, we do not at the same time get that which perceives him who is revealed. Nature reveals God, without itself knowing anything of God; man also does not see God in his revelations, so long as his sense for such revelations is not yet opened. This can only be opened by God himself, or rather this sense must be given by God; only through God can we know God, as in other things like is known only by like. God, then, must impart himself to our consciousness, and so make us able to comprehend in his works that eternal idea which is mirrored in them, that thus we may arrive at the true conception of his invisible essence, of his eternal power and Godhead (Rom. 1: 20). Hence, as a condition of the true knowledge of God we must presuppose, not only a divine principle by which he is revealed, the Word, the Logos; but also a divine principle by which the revelation is imparted, the Spirit, *τὸ πνεῦμα*; which are to some extent related as objective and subjective, but which serve to exhibit the same being or essence, who reveals himself in the world, and knows himself in man as revealed.

As God reveals himself, so also is he, otherwise he were not revealed. Those elements, which we have been obliged to distinguish in finding what are the preliminary conditions of a revelation of God in the world, and of our attaining a knowledge of God from the world, must in some way or other be founded and contained in the idea of the divine nature, considered by itself. And it is necessary to give special attention to this point, when our thoughts take such a direction, (which should never be without that holy fear which springs from a consciousness of our limited knowledge,) since it is all-important for us to see in God not merely the primitive ground of all things, not merely an infinite being, but a self-conscious and intelligent nature, who is in truth God alone, the living God, the being who could say, "I am, that I am" (Exodus 3: 14).

How, then, are we to conceive of God as a personal and intelligent being? We might seek an answer in the way of philosophical analysis or investigation; but it will be clearer to most if

we appeal simply to the analogy of the human mind, which is indeed at an infinite remove from God, but yet created in his image. Because it is an intelligent spirit, although it be finite, yet it must exhibit to us what is essential to an intelligent and spiritual life. In ourselves, now, we see clearly, that the consciousness of our personal, individual existence, arises only when we make ourselves an object of thought to ourselves, when we create from ourselves a representation of ourselves, which although different from ourselves, as is a thought from that which thinks, is yet at the same time nothing other than ourselves. In the same way, in order to conceive of God as a personal, self-conscious intelligence, we must first think of him as finding himself, as it were, in the eternal thought (idea) of himself, which, though so far as generated it be different from that which generates, is yet identical with it. Our self-consciousness, however, is not completed when an objective representation of ourselves proceeds from us; we must also see that this is a conception or representation of what we are, we must recognize ourselves in it; a subject must again be contrasted with, be set over against this object, which subject will again be ourselves, though in another relation. This third element is neither that which creates the objective conception or representation of ourselves, nor is it this conception or representation created in us, but it is the vision or perception of this conception as something identical with ourselves. It is neither that which conceives, nor that which is conceived, but the perceiving that this conception of ourselves though different from ourselves is yet the same as ourselves. And it is this consciousness, which has first gone out from itself (become objective), and then returned back into itself (become subjective), and so comprehends and knows itself to be itself; this it is which makes us to be *self-conscious* individuals, personal and spiritual beings; and it is this self-conscious personality which is ever after the subject from which proceed our determinations of will, and all our acts directed to external objects.[1] In an analo-

[1] We may gain a clearer view of this matter, if we start from this last point and go backwards in the opposite way from the above. Let us try to bring before our minds what is necessary in order to the existence of a *will*, in the proper sense of the word; not a mere impulse or instinct or anything of that kind, but a true will, which is the source of those external acts which reveal what is within us. First of all, we must have a clear consciousness of our personal existence, and of that which constitutes or is included in our individuality. But how do we come to have this? It is only by making ourselves an object of our own observation, by ourselves becoming the object of our own intellec-

gous way, we must suppose that there exists in God, as a personal intelligence, not merely the eternal idea or thought of himself, but also a principle which as eternally perceives and knows this thought of himself, by means of which he also is a personal spirit; which principle can, however, be nothing else than the same God who produced that thought (or idea) of himself from himself, and is himself that which has thus become an object of thought. In the same manner, then, as we say, that we can distinguish in ourselves a threefold way of viewing our own personality (a threefold *me*); that which is hidden in the ground of our being, which comes out of this ground, and views itself as an object; this objective personality, in which we look at ourselves objectively; and, again, a subjective personality, a viewing of this second, objective personality, as being still identical with, or nothing other than ourselves; and as these three are yet one and the same person (the same *I*), only seen in different aspects or referred back to itself in different ways, in the same manner the divine nature presents itself to our consideration under three internal relations. Considered as generating the image (or idea) of itself, it is the Father; considered as existing in the eternal idea (a thought) of itself, it is the Logos, the Son; considered as having this thought of itself in distinct vision, or as returning back from it again into itself, it is the Spirit. But it returns back in order again to proceed forth in action, to unfold in the world the riches of the divine omnipotence, wisdom and love; for with the very thought of his infinite perfections, united as this must be with the highest complacency in them, we also conceive that there is connected the will or purpose of God, to bring these perfections into full view in the world, and to impart his own blessedness to his creatures.

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tual apprehension. Let us now confine ourselves to this simple fact, I observe myself, I have an intuition of myself. The very form in which we make this statement teaches us, that it rests upon a contrast between *I* as subject and *I* as object, both of which however are one and the same *I*, are identical. The perfect identity, however, (the subject-objectivity,) lies neither in the subjective nor in the objective *I*, but is a third element, presupposed by and necessary to both the others. We may call this an indifference of subject and object, lying at the basis, and which, in our intuition or observation of ourselves, (as expressed in the above formula,) is separated or disparted into subject and object, but is afterwards brought back again or reëstablished in the unity of our self-consciousness. And this process is the necessary condition not only of our self-consciousness, but also of the action of our wills, which are the means of exhibiting what we really are.

This leads us in conclusion, to consider the relation between the Trinity considered as belonging to the essence of God, which we have now viewed as the form which a spiritual personality takes, and the Trinity considered in reference to the revelation which God has made of himself, which we saw to be a condition of the true knowledge of God—between the essential and revealed Trinity. If we may so express ourselves, it is the same immanent process of self-consciousness, which we have just developed, in the very nature of God, which repeats and mirrors itself in the revelation he makes of himself in the world, as we have before considered it. That world-comprehending thought (or idea), which we were obliged to suppose as a mediation between God's absolute essence and his revelation in the world, and as the principle by which the latter is constituted, cannot be essentially different from that thought or idea, with which God thinks of himself. For, if it be the divine perfections which are exhibited in the world, then that vision of himself, as the most perfect being, which God thus has, must contain the original images, the archetypes, of all which he determined to produce by means of creation and to realize in the world. The bringing forth of these divine archetypes into the world, or in other words, the revelation of God in the world, is not only conditioned by, but corresponds to the mode in which we conceive, that in the divine understanding the idea of the perfections which repose in the hidden depths of his nature, comes to be, as it were, objective to himself, to stand in distinct vision over against his own mind. And as, again, this idea is perceived by the Spirit in God and seen to be his own essence, thus is it too with the copy thereof which is realized in the world. Only the Spirit given us by God sees in the copy also the archetype, in the stream also the original fountain; only through this Spirit are we brought into a state in which we may come to know what God is through the revelation he has made of himself in the world; through a notion of him corresponding to the mode in which he knows himself, and hence a true notion so far as it goes, though still inadequate. This analogy of the archetype and the copy, which presupposes a certain causal connection between them, is the utmost limit of every theistic speculation about the Trinity. The pantheistic view identifies the archetype and the copy, so that the generation of the Son and the creation of the world, the self-consciousness of God and the knowledge which created beings have of God, become coïncident, are considered in fact as

one and the same thing, and are distinguished from each other only in notion, but not in reality.

In what precedes we believe that we have given the substance of the attempts which have been made, down to the most recent times, including the views of our Lutheran theologians, to give a philosophical foundation to the doctrine of the Trinity as held by the church. If any one should think that the results are not accordant with the doctrine of the church, and that the deductions are far from being free from objections or entirely convincing; especially if the last defined limits of the theistic view, when seen from the stand-point of philosophy, should seem to him to be arbitrary, and that, by holding fast a total separation between what is manifested in this world and what lies beyond our experience in another sphere of existence, it seems to transfer the doctrine of the Trinity from the domain of what is intelligible into that which is incomprehensible and mysterious; after what we have remarked in the introduction to this section, we shall be far from contradicting him in these opinions. It is our own conviction, however much room we may allow to such discussions, that they need to be completed and adjusted, by what we have called the biblical and religious aspects of the doctrine. It is the Scriptures which make us firm in our conviction, that these limits, these distinctions between what is temporal and what is eternal, must not be abandoned; without the Bible, we should hardly hold ourselves justified in the assertion that the distinctions we were led to make by a consideration of the personal intelligence and of the revelation of God, were to be viewed as distinctions of three persons in the divine essence. Without scriptural proof and foundation, any one might well fear that he was overstepping the limits of man's power of investigation and research, if he should dare to attribute a real objective existence to the speculation about the internal economy of the divine nature and consciousness, when these speculations were made only by human reason relying upon itself, and made by a being like man, who has attained so little certainty even in his knowledge of himself. We need a higher assurance of truth, than can be found by holding our subjective forms of thought to be the only substance and source of human knowledge; we need more humility, than to believe that we can place ourselves upon the judgment-seat and decide in respect to infinite existence and absolute knowledge.

For the *Christian* view of the Trinity, it is not sufficient to see

in Christ and the Holy Spirit only the highest development and the centre of that revelation and knowledge of God, which are given us to some extent in a general way in the world and in man's reason. The point of chief importance is and remains the connection of Christ and the Holy Spirit with our redemption and sanctification. And in respect to this it may be said, that we may not only take for granted in a general way, that the highest revelation of the Word in the flesh would be coincident with redemption, and that the highest communication of the Spirit would be seen in the regeneration and sanctification of men, since only thus is a power brought into the world and received into the soul by which sin can be overcome, and a kingdom of righteousness and happiness established; but that we may go still farther, and, in the way of philosophical speculation attempt to show, that when we say that God becomes objective to himself and reveals himself, we have got all the elements necessary to the idea of redemption, and that in God's self-consciousness and in his imparting himself to others we have a foundation for the doctrine of sanctification also. Even our older theologians have not neglected to notice this.[1] Yet it may well be doubted, whether philosophy left to itself, would ever come in its own way to the notion of redemption and sanctification in their Christian sense.

These objections to the philosophical speculations upon this doctrine, may be just, when we regard the speculations as a means of proving and establishing the Trinity; but yet they do not destroy their value in leading us to some clearer understanding of the definitions and statements which the church has made respecting this doctrine. This will be manifest when we come to exhibit these statements more fully, which we will next proproceed to do.

Note. It may be well here to present a concise summary of the leading attempts to give a philosophical view of the Trinity. They may be divided into three classes; those connected with the Scholastic Theology; those which proceeded from the Mystic Theology; and those made by such as espoused the philosophical views of Leibnitz and Wolff.

1. The Scholastic theologians usually put at the basis of their

[1] Keckermann, Poiret and Reusch, each in his way, according to his fundamental views, endeavor to show this.

exhibition of the subject the double comparison, given by Augustin, of the divine Trinity with the essence and the essential powers or modes of action of the soul; namely, memory, understanding and will; or, the soul itself, knowledge and love.[1] [In making the first of these comparisons, Augustin, in order to illustrate the equality of the three persons and the entire divinity of each, goes on to say,—that in man, each one of these powers when it acts, involves also the action of all the others; since I not only remember my acts of memory, but also of knowledge and of will; and, just so, I know that I remember and will; and, again, will to know and to remember. Gregory of Nyssa and Scotus Erigena make use of almost the same comparison, when they speak of the soul, the reason and the power of life, as a Trinity immanent in man. The second comparison of Augustin is of a more speculative character; for here we have the mind, its notion of itself, produced from and equal to itself, and its love to itself equal to both of these as the image of the Trinity. In another place (de civit. Dei, VI. 24), he appeals in illustration to the logical relations of the notions of cause, means and end, or of the ὑφ' οὗ, the δι' οὗ, and δι' ὅ. Abelard (introduct. ad theol. II. 12), attempts a parallel illustration from the *grammatical* distinction of three persons. Anselm (Monol. 48), and Alexander of Hales (Summa, I. 42, 2), follow Augustin's hints respecting the soul as a subject-object: "Deum intelligere se, cum intelligere sit speciem rei intellectae gignere, non est aliud, quam generare suam imaginen et speciem in se ipso." Richard of St.

[1] [*Aug. de Trin.* X, 11: Haec tria, *memoria*, *intelligentia*, *voluntas*, quoniam non sunt tres vitae, sed una vita, nec tres mentes, sed una mens; consequenter utique nec tres substantiae sunt, sed una substantia. Memoria quippe quod vita et mens et substantia dicitur, ad seipsam dicitur; quod vero memoria dicitur, ad aliquid relative dicitur, etc. Voluntas etiam mea totam intelligentiam totamque memoriam meam capit, dum toto utor quod intelligo et memini. Quapropter quando invicem a singulis et tota omnia capiuntur, aequalia sunt tota singula totis singulis et tota singula simul omnibus totis, et haec tria unum, una vita, una essentia. Jam adscendendum est ad illam altissimam essentiam, cujus *impar imago* est humana mens, sed tamen *imago*.

Aug. de Trin. IX, 2: Nondum de supernis loquitur, nondum de Deo Patre et Filio et Spiritu S., sed de hac impari imagine, attamen imagine, id est homine. Cum aliquid amo, tria sunt; *ego*, et *quod* amo, et ipse *amor*. Non enim amo amorem, nisi amantem amem, nam non est amor, ubi nihil amatur. 12: Est quaedam imago Trinitatis ipsa mens et notitia ejus, quod est proles ejus se se de ipsa *verbum*, et *amor* tertius, et haec tria unum atque una substantia. Nec minor proles, dum tantam se novit mens, quanta est, nec minor amor, dum tantum se diligit, quantum novit et quanta est. Cited in *Hase, Dogmatik*, S. 637—8.]

Victor (de trin. i, 4), carries out Augustin's illustration drawn from the nature of love, as demanding a commensurate object—coming to the conclusion, "that the communion of perfect love cannot exist in less than three persons."[1] Peter the Lombard cites Augustin's views regarding them as an illustrating image or comparison, (Sentent. lib. I. dist. 3,) and investigating with acuteness the similarity and dissimilarity. Thomas Aquinas develops the whole doctrine of the Trinity, in a methodical way, from their comparisons, (Summa P. I. qu. 27). He shows how in God himself, corresponding with the two immanent active powers of the intellectual (or spiritual) nature, there is a twofold procession, "a procession of the word, following the operation of the understanding, and a procession of love following the action of the will;" and that, as a consequence of this, there must be four relations (*paternitas* and *filiatio* the result of the first, and *spiratio* and *processio*, the result of the second procession); and hence three persons.[2] The relation of these persons to the divine essence and to one another he proceeded to explain in congruity with these statements. Melanchthon adopted the same view, and frequently recurs to it in his doctrinal and exegetical writings.[3]

[1] [Conf. Strauss, Dogmatik, I, S. 462—466.]

[2] [Thomas P. I. Qu. 27. Art. 5: Processiones in divinis accipi non possunt nisi secundum actiones, quae in agendo manent. Hujusmodi actiones in natura intellectuali et divina non sunt nisi duae, *intelligere* et *velle*. Nam sentire quod etiam videtur esse operatio in sentiente, est extra naturam intellectualem, neque totaliter est remotum a genere actionum, quae sunt ad extra. Relinquitur igitur, quod nulla alia processio potest esse in Deo nisi *Verbi* et *Amoris*. Quoted in *Hase, Dogmatik*, S. 638.

Summa, I, 27, 3: Hujusmodi actio (immanens) in intellectuali natura est actio intellectus et actio voluntatis. Processio autem verbi attenditur secundum actionem intelligibilem. Secundum autem operationem voluntatis invenitur in nobis quaedam alia processio, scilicet processio amoris, secundum quam amatum est in amante, sicut per conceptionem verbi res dicta vel intellecta est in intelligente. Unde et praeter processionem verbi ponitur alia processio in divinis, quae est processio amoris. And this is so, quia de ratione amoris est, quod non procedat, nisi a conceptione intellectus, habet ordinis distinctionem processio amoris a processione verbi in divinis. Quoted in *Strauss, Dogmatik*, I, 466.]

[3] In his *Loci theol.*, his Examen Ordinandorum, in the *Interpretation of the Nicene Creed*, the work against Servetus, the Notes to the Gospel of John and to the Epistle to the Colossians. [The passage from the Loci is given in *Strauss's Dogmatik*, S. 466. "Filius dicitur imago et λόγος. Est igitur imago cogitatione patris genita, quod ut aliquo modo considerari possit, a nostra mente exempla capiamus. Voluit enim Deus in homine conspici vestigia sua.—Mens humana cogitando mox pingit imaginem rei cogitatae; sed nos non transfundimus nostram essentiam in illas imagines, suntque cogitationes illae subitae et

Pezel, in the work of which we have already spoken (P. I. de spir. sancto arg. 5), brings together his different statements in the following manner: "If the nature of man were not corrupt, a consideration of it would have given us more instruction respecting God; but we may still to some extent take our examples from this nature. There are two chief powers belonging to the soul, the understanding and the will. The understanding generates images by thinking; the will has impulses, as when the heart generates emotions (spiritus), feels love, joy, and other affections. From these examples the exposition is taken. Since the Son may be called the Logos (λόγος), he is generated as it were by the act of thinking; but thought is the image of the thing thought; the Logos therefore is called Son, because the Son is the image of the Father. (Melanchthon states this more definitely in his *Refutatio Erroris Serveti;* The eternal Father is, as it were, the mind; he looking upon and perfectly knowing himself, by this thought generates an image of himself, not evanescent but ὑφισταμένην καὶ ὁμοούσιον, (subsistent and consubstantial). But the Holy Spirit is said to *proceed*, because love is of the will. The Father therefore looking upon the Son wills and loves him; and the Son in turn looking upon the Father wills and loves him; from this mutual love, which belongs only to the will, proceeds the Holy Spirit, who is that which excites motion (agitator); from the eternal Father and Son, in the coëternal image of the Father. As therefore to the understanding faculty we attribute *generation*, thus we say that *procession* is from the will, because the will is the seat of love and emotion (agitationis). In us however the essence is not transposed into any image of the intellect, or into any love or impulse of the will; although even our nature is vehemently carried away by love or joy, and as it were, migrates into the loved object. But the image of the eternal Father, which is the Son, is from the substance of the eternal Father; and the essence of the Father and the Son is communicated to the Holy Spirit." The opposition of the adversaries of Melanchthon (the Antiphilippists), Flacius, Wigand and others, had the effect of preventing the Lutheran theologians from pursuing these speculations any farther; and even when

evanescentes actiones. At pater aeternus sese intuens gignit cogitationem sui, quae est imago ipsius, non evanescens, sed subsistens, communicata ipsi essentia. Haec igitur imago est secunda persona.—Ut autem filius nascitur cogitatione, ita spiritus S. procedit a voluntate patris et filii. Voluntatis enim est agitare, diligere: sicut et cor humanum non imagines sed spiritus seu halitus gignit.]

they conceded to these hints the value of a figurative explanation, they did not go into any more definite details or dogmatical development of them.[1] In the Reformed or Calvinistic church, on the contrary, *Mornay* and *Keckermann*[2] endeavored to give them the form of scientific proof, and not without real speculative talent. Even Hugo Grotius, despite his Arminian tendencies, took interest enough in them, to express the leading thought in his "Silvae Sacrae," in the following lines:

> Aeterna tua mens, hoc quod est intelligens,
> Sapientiam progenuit aequalem sibi,
> Se mensa, quanta est, compari imagine,
> Ac hinc, videntem colligans visumque, amor
> Processit, in se vim repercutiens suam,
> Unumque tria sunt; nam quod es, scis, vis, idem est.

What Lessing, too, regards as the rational truth,[3] to which

[1] Conf. Hutter, loc. comm. de trinitate person. prop. VII. p. 106—108.

[2] Mornay, De la verité de la religion Chrétienne ch. V: *Keckermann*, Systema sacrosanctae theologiae, L. I, cp. II;—to this book, the judgment of Bayle, that K. had more method than mind, would be very unjustly applied.

[3] *Lessing*, *Erziehung des Menschengeschlechts*, § 173, and *Das Christenthum der Vernunft*, § 1—12, (Werke, Theol. Schriften, Thl. I. and III). [The paragraphs in the *Christianity of Reason* are remarkable, and concise. "1. The one only and most perfect being could not have employed himself from eternity with the consideration of anything but that which is most perfect. 2. That which is most perfect is himself; God then from eternity could have thought only of himself. 3. To think, to will and to create, are with God one. We may then say, that all which God conceives or represents to himself, he also creates. 4. God can think of himself only in two ways; either he thinks of all his perfections at once, and of himself as containing them all; or, he thinks of his perfections as divided, one separated from the other, and each from himself, according to its degree. 5. God thought himself from eternity in all his perfection; that is, God from eternity created a being, who was wanting in no perfection which he himself possessed. 6. This being the Scripture calls the *Son of God*, or, which would be still better the *Son God;* a *God*, since none of the attributes which belong to God are wanting in him; a Son, because according to our notions that which thinks of or represents to itself something seems to have a certain priority to the thought or the representation. 7. This being is God himself and is not to be distinguished from God, since we think it so soon as we think of God, and cannot think it without God; that is, since we cannot conceive of God without God, or since that would be no God, from which we should take away the thought of himself. 8. This being may be called the image of God, but it is an identical image. 9. The more two things have in common with one another, the greater is the harmony between them. The greatest harmony, then, must be between two things, which have all in common with one another, that is, between two things which are together only one. 10. Two such things are God and the Son God, or the identical image of God; and this harmony which is between

God would lead man by the New Testament doctrine of the Father, Son and Spirit, is accordant with this view, although he does not seem to have recollected it. For that which might seem a deviation, that he conceives of the Holy Ghost, as the harmony between God and his identical image, is in truth nothing but the Scholastic view of the Holy Ghost, as the "substantial love" of the Father and the Son. If it should be thought that this representation, which expresses only a relation, does not well correspond with the doctrine that the Holy Spirit is a person, this is also no less true of the more common comparison with the will, which is but a mode of spiritual action. In both these we must go back to the first element or the subject from which the operations proceed, and lay the stress not upon the notions of love, of harmony and of will, but upon that element of self-consciousness or of spiritual personality which is presupposed by, or expressed in these operations. Of the scholastic view, which follows the analogy of the human soul, it may in general be said, that it was too much influenced by the current psychological distinctions and gives them an unreal prominence.[1]

2. In this point of view, the mystic view can be considered as an advance upon the scholastic. Thus Jacob Boehmen usually puts at the basis of all his speculations on this subject the notion of will or of power—a sure sign that he did not concern himself with the difference of the will from the intellect. He describes[2] the Father as the will which has not in itself a real existence

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them the Scripture calls the *Spirit, who proceeds from the Father and the Son.* 11. In this harmony is all which is in the Father, and hence also all which is in the Son; this harmony then is God. 12. But this harmony is God in such a way, that it would not be God, if the Father were not God, and the Son were not God, and that both could not be God, if this harmony were not; that is—all three are one." In the other essay of Lessing to which reference is made, *The Education of the Human Race*, he gives a hint which may serve to meet the objection, that God might have a conception of himself, and yet this conception not have a real existence. He asks, "Would all be found in this conception, which there is in God himself, if it contained only a mere notion, a mere possibility of his *necessary efficiency*, as well as of his other attributes? This possibility exhausts the essence of his other attributes; but does it exhaust the essence of his necessary and actual existence? It seems to me not. —Consequently, either God can have no perfect conception of himself; or this perfect conception is as necessarily really existing, as he himself is."]

[1] These are justly rejected by Quenstedt, de trin. sct. II. qu. IX.

[2] E. g. in his *Morgenröthe*, C. III. 32 seq.; VII, 25—27; XXIII, 61—73; in his Mysterium magnum, C. VII. 5—11; and in many other parts of his writings.

(*den Willen des Urgrundes*), or the divine all-power, (or possibility of all things), from which all created things proceed; this will has in itself a desire to reveal itself, and this desire, the Father's exerted power, his heart and his light, that which enlightens all his powers, his abode and centre of life, the first beginning in the will's agency and his eternal form, is the Son. By virtue of this internal energy, the will is manifested as an out-breathing or a revelation, and this out-going of the will is the Spirit of the Deity, the executor of the will in God, a former and creator of all things. As Boehmen recognises the threefold God in the eternal generation everywhere else, so also in man, but in a different way. He compares the Father with the life-power in the heart, the blood-vessels and the brain; the Son with the light issuing forth from thence, by which we understand and know what we must do; the Spirit with the power and reason proceeding from both, circulating in the body and governing it, (Morgenröthe III. 37, 38). Since his efforts were chiefly directed to the explanation of the procession of all things from the eternal unity, the immanent, or what we have called the internal and essential Trinity is not so prominent in his exhibition of the subject. Yet it is clear enough that he also makes the reflexive movement of the divine life, by which it as it were returns back into itself, the chief thing. Thus he speaks of that movement of the divine life, by which God, "eternally brings together the power of colors and the virtue of the will into a centre of life, or heart, for his abode; and out of this state as out of his eternal form again and ever speaks; and yet also again eternally combines all together into his heart's centre," (Myster. mag. VII. 9); or "whereby the divine will leads itself into an eternal union of itself," (Gnadenwahl I, 5). The views of Poiret are more clearly expressed. Though this author generally has more susceptibility for the mystic vision of things than originality or independence in developing his views, (as might be inferred from the way in which he gave himself up to the reading of, and converse with the other mystics,) he is yet by his philosophical culture the most adapted to be a kind of mediator between the later mysticism and philosophy. His exhibition of the doctrine of the Trinity[1] is among the most attractive, clear and fruitful things

[1] In the second edition of his Cogitationes rationales de Deo, anima et malo, 1685, especially in the continuation of the eighth chapter of the third book, de Deo uno et trino; and in his Oeconomie divine, l'oeconomie de la creation chap. II. and XIV.

which has been said upon it by this school. The fundamental idea he thus expresses:[1] "God is an infinitely perfect, incomprehensible and eternal mind, that is, such as at the same time possesses infinite realities wholly united in one act as in an undiscriminated point. But when this mind reflects upon itself more distinctly, and passes as it were beyond the consideration and undivided point of this undiscriminated eternity, it is then separated or distinguished into a certain adorable triplicity; this triplicity is embraced in its immense and most vivid affection to itself and its own perfections, in its luminous understanding and idea, and finally in its delight and love or infinite joy." In his *Economy of Creation* (p. 380), he describes God as "a most puissant and independent thought which longs for and represents itself to itself by its idea, in which it acquiesces and finds the source of its joy and its love." Here are many points of view for the distinction of the three persons from which we select the following as he has put them together in a tabular form in his *Cogitationes rationales*, (p. 235 and 236):

I. Pater.	II. Filius.	III. Spiritus S.
Deus a se.	Deus ex se.	Deus ad se refluens.
Cogitatio directa, se quaerens.	Cogitatio sui reflexa, se ipsam adepta.	Cogitatio se inventam sibi exponens et patefaciens.
Cogitatio infinitis virtutibus praedita.	Sui forma, idea, intelligentia, imago, repraesentatio, λόγος, verbum internum.	Intelligentia reflexa super sui intelligentiam; acquiescentia, amor impletus, voluntas regens.
Ens sine fundo; abyssus, tenebrae, cogitatio considerata sine sui idea, lumine, detectione.	Is qui in sinu (fundo) Patris videt Patrem; lux ipsa.	Is qui scrutatur profunditates Dei, et manifestat inventam lucem e tenebris.
Ignis (ens activissimum et vividissimum).	Lux (agentis ad se directio vel tendentia).	Calor, ardor, (ac gentis ad se reflexio).

The agreement of this with the explanation we have attempted, will be readily seen. We must pass by the peculiar way in which Poiret brings the distinction between nature and grace, and the whole economy of redemption, into union with his theory of the Trinity, that we may be able to give a short notice of the speculations of theologians of the school of Leibnitz and Wolf.

3. Leibnitz himself is also best pleased with the comparison with the process of reflection, which lies at the foundation of the

[1] In his work, de eruditione solida, superficiaria et falsa, L. I. P. I. § 4.

scholastic and mystic views. "I find nothing" he says,[1] "in created beings more fit to illustrate this subject than the process of mental reflection, when the same mind is its own immediate object, and acts upon itself in thinking of itself and of what it does. For the reduplication gives an image or shadow of two respective substances in one and the same absolute substance, that is, of that which understands and of that which is understood; each of these existences is substantial, each is a concrete individual; they differ in their mutual relations, but they are still only one and the same, one absolute individual substance."[2] Wolf did not give himself up to these speculations; and the most of the theologians of his school were satisfied with a formal application of his method and definitions to the explanation of the church doctrine.[3] Those who used the Leibnitz-Wolfian propositions to make a plurality that should be congruous with the unity of the divine nature either credible or conceivable (as Daries, Canz, Reusch and several others), did not gain any singular success, though they did not all encounter so violent an opposition as Daries.[4] They did not even bring about an agreement in their modes of teaching, and contributed less to the promotion of belief and understanding, than to a certain fondness for all sorts of attempts at explaining things. So long as faith in the Scriptures and in the scriptural character of this doctrine was firm, such attempts had the appearance of a vain over-curiousness, or exposed them to the suspicion of heterodoxy; but when faith in the Bible was sinking, they seemed more like a foolish endeavor to maintain what was untenable, and became, one might almost say, contemptible. As an example we may take that of Reusch,

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[1] Miscellan. IV. Remarque Sur le livre d'un Antitrinitaire. [In his Opp. I. p. 14, he describes the Father as the *intellectivum*, the Son as the *intelligibile*, the Spirit as the *intellectio*.—*Strauss*, I. 484.]

[2] ["In this comparison there is no personal independence of the individual elements; and, besides, here, as in many other attempts of the kind, the number of the elements is different from that in the doctrine of the Trinity as held by the church. Correctly carried out, the latter contains three elements which are united in a fourth, the divine essence; in the philosophical construction, on the other hand, the three are not one in a fourth, but two elements are united in a higher third element."—*Strauss*, p. 485.]

[3] Thus *Carpov* in his "Dissertatio S. S. Trinitatis mysterium methodo demonstrativa sistens."

[4] He was obliged by the Theological Faculty in Jena to recall his treatise, "in quo pluralitas personarum in Deitate ex solis rationis principiis demonstratur:" conf. Ludovici Historie der Wolf. Philos. Th. II. § 519.

one of the most acute, though not the most successful.[1] "According to the analogy of the human spirit," he says, "we must also find in God as the most perfect spirit, the faculties of thought and of will exhibited in three modes of action or three productions, which are connected together and suppose one another. From an infinite power of thought must proceed: 1. The most perfect conception of all that is possible, so to speak, the *materia idealis* of all possible worlds; 2. The most perfect conception of possible forms, or of the arrangement and combination of these possibilities into all possible systems of possible worlds; 3. The knowledge, springing from this comparison, of the best and most perfect world among all these systems. In a like way, in the idea of the most perfect will, the following things are involved: 1. The inclination to all possible good and perfection, the aversion to all possible evil and imperfection in itself considered—the *voluntas primitiva;* 2. The relation of this inclination and aversion to the possible combinations or systems of worlds as they exist in the idea of them, according to the degree of the perfections and imperfections conceived to be in them—the *voluntas media;* 3. The choice of that one of these worlds, in which, the least imperfection being allowed the highest perfection can be realized—the *voluntas finalis.* Analogous acts of the understanding and will are found in the finite spirit also, and in every one of them, this spirit, as their *suppositum intelligens,* is a person; but, in consequence of its finiteness, these acts come into being only in succession, one after another, and hence are accidental and changeable states, and always possible only on condition of being exchanged for one another. In the Infinite Spirit, however, these limitations must be considered as abolished, and hence these states must be conceived of as simultaneous, essential and eternally actual; or, we must say, that by means of them, that power of conceiving of or representing things which exists in God (vis repraesentativa Dei), that is the divine essence, has a triple subsistence, and hence that three persons in the divine essence are possible by means of these acts." It would be superfluous to go into a further examination of this theory; we will therefore only add that Le Clerc was in fact the first one who thought that he could comprehend the possibility of three persons in the divine nature from the position, that what in a finite being was not possible, might exist simultaneously in God as several

[1] Introductio in theol. revelatam, § 406—426.

distinct series of thoughts. "God," he says,[1] "although only one in number can at the same time form various series of thoughts. God, thinking in a certain way, is called the Father; in another way, the Son; in another, the Holy Spirit; and thus there are rightly said to be three persons in only one essence. A person is that which is neither a part nor an adjunct of any other thing. But the Deity thinking in a certain manner, which is called the Father, is neither a part nor an adjunct of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, but is constituted wholly by itself; and the same is to be said of the Son and the Holy Spirit." Reusch had only to complete this view by defining the difference of the series of thoughts possible in God according to the hypothesis which lies at the foundation of the *Theodicée* of Leibnitz.

From the Transcendental Idealism, and from the general impulse which speculative philosophy has received in later times, there might have been expected a more profound comprehension of the doctrine of the Trinity; but the relation of the declarations and deductions of the modern German philosophy to the doctrine of the church has as yet been brought out so inconsiderably, that we cannot enter into a closer examination of them. We must content ourselves then, in conclusion, with reference to a small work of Fr. Baader (*Ueber die Vierzahl des Lebens*, Berlin 1818), as one which is a sort of intermediate link between the older (especially the mystical), and the later attempts at the fathoming of our doctrine, throwing light upon both—although we do not fully agree with his positions. [Since the publication of this volume of Dr. Twesten, many works have been published in Germany which discuss this latter point more fully. Nitzsch and Weisse in the "*Studien und Kritiken*" have both presented able arguments for an Immanent Trinity in the Godhead; the former giving the Biblical, and the latter the philosophical foundation for this doctrine. Baur of Tübingen has published an elaborate History of the Trinity in 3 vols. 8vo; and Meier has given the first volume of a work on the same subject. The noted Dr. Friedrich Strauss has examined the whole matter of a philosophical construction of the Trinity with his usual acuteness and clearness in his system of Doctrinal Theology (1840). His conclusion seems to be that no philosophical Trinity is possible excepting a pantheistic in which the world is the second person. Both Schelling and Hegel concede a certain Trinity as necessary in a phil-

[1] In his "Epistolae Theologicae," Ep. II. and III, published under the name of Liberius de Sancto Amore," p. 103.

osophical construction of the universe.[1] The views of Schelling are now more accordant with the Christian system, than when he published his "Method of Academical Study." It is still a matter of controversy in the school of Hegel, whether this philosopher believed in a Trinity immanent in God, or only a Trinity developed in, and growing out of, the existence of a created universe. By some he is considered orthodox in this point; by others he is reputed pantheistic; by many, if not most, he is thought to be inconsistent with himself. His Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion were not published till after his death; and they have been published in two editions by different editors; and the different editions differ, as might be expected from the fact that they were compiled from the manuscript notes of several auditors in different years. Had his own belief been clear, or had he not been influenced by a desire to give his philosophy some currency among orthodox men, this inconsistency could hardly have been so great. And in general it may be said, that what is true of most of the attempts at a philosophical construction of this doctrine, is especially true of the speculations of the more recent German philosophers, that while they may serve to show, that even philosophy does not disown the necessity of making certain fundamental distinctions in the very Godhead, that the conception of God as only one does not fully satisfy the mind; yet they have signally failed in the endeavor to show, that these distinctions are necessarily the same as those for which the church has agreed to employ the word *persons*. This distinction is an inference from the declarations of the Scriptures, and not from any philosophical speculations about the Godhead.]

[1] [Conf. Schelling, Method. d. ak. Stud. S. 184, Philosophie u. Religion, S. 28. Hegel, Religions-philosophie, II. S. 185, 199, 230—238, 261. Encycl. § 567. Gesch. d. Phil. S, 8. Hase in his *Dogmatik* gives the most concise sketch of these various speculations, S. 638–9. "The logical form of thesis, antithesis and synthesis lies at the foundation of most of them. For the most part they transfer the mode in which human self-consciousness originates into the divine self-consciousness, either in the mode already presented in the systems of Reusch, De Wette, etc.; or in the higher forms of pantheism, (as held by Schelling and Hegel), by considering the Father as the original ground, who becomes revealed to himself in the world's history as the Son, and as the Holy Ghost takes back himself into himself; or, in another way of expressing it, the Father becomes himself *another* in the Son, and in this other knows himself as Spirit; or, as it is given by those who are striving to overcome the pantheistic view, (Weise, Günther and others), God in order to be a person must from all eternity have had in himself a distinction, must have "*specificated himself*," as a threefold personality, unity in manifoldness."]