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ARTICLE II.

SCHOTT'S FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF RHETORIC AND HOMILETICS.

By Edwards A. Park, Professor at Andover.

[Henry Augustus Schott was born at Leipsic on the fifth of December, 1780. His father, Augustus Frederic Schott, was a Professor in the University of Leipsic, and died in 1792. The son was early distinguished for his philological and varied learning. In 1805 he was appointed Extraordinary Professor of Philology; and in 1808, Extraordinary Professor of Theology at Leipsic. In 1809 he was made Doctor and Professor of Theology at Wittenberg. He was called in 1812 to a Professorship of Theology at Jena, where he was Director of the Preacher's Seminary, and Privy Church-Councillor. While the first Professor at Jena, he died on the 29th of December, 1835, in the fifty-sixth year of his age. In his doctrinal opinions he was a supranaturalist. He published in 1806 a new version of the Greek Testament, which in 1825 had passed through three editions. In 1825 he published, in connection with J. F. Winzer, a Latin translation of the Pentateuch. In 1834 appeared his Commentary on the Epistles of the New Testament. In 1811 he published his Epitome of Dogmatic Christian Theology, which in 1822 had passed through two editions; in 1830, his Historico-critical Introduction to the Books of the New Testament; and in 1826 his Letters on Religion and the Christian Faith. In 1807 he published his Brief Sketch of a Theory of Eloquence with special application to the Eloquence of the Pulpit, and in 1813 a second edition of the same. In 1815 appeared his celebrated treatise, entitled, The Theory of Eloquence with special application to Sacred Eloquence in its whole extent, in three volumes. According to the principles detailed in this work he composed numerous essays and sermons, some of which he gave to the press. Among them are, Clerical Discourses and Homilies, with particular reference, in part, to the events of the day, 1815; Christian Religious Discourses on Texts belonging to the Pericope and on others freely chosen, in two volumes, 1814; a New Collection of Clerical Discourses and Homilies, 1822; a New Selection of Homilies, 1830; many occasional

sermons, and many homiletical essays, in three volumes of the Journal for Preachers, which he edited, in connection with Rehkopf, during 1811—12, and in Tzschirner's Memorabilia for the Preacher's Study, etc. The following Article is an abstract of the First Part, pp. 1—462, of his larger Theorie der Beredsamkeit, a work which is universally regarded as the standard German Treatise in the department of Homiletics. It is particularly valuable not only for the copious learning which it exhibits, but also for the high moral sentiment and evangelical piety which it everywhere breathes. The title of the First Part is, the Philosophical and Religious Fundamental Principles of Rhetoric and Homiletics].

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§ 1. *Origin of Language.*

There is in man a deeply seated desire of progress, of improving his condition, of enlarging his sphere of action, of rising higher and higher on the scale of being. He conceives no limit which he does not wish to transcend. He has an instinctive longing to place himself in a state of harmony with his own nature, and with all objects around him. The demand is constantly made upon his soul, Be one, be ever more and more one with thyself and with the world about thee. His desire of unity with himself and with the universe, is analogous to the tendency of all material objects toward one central point. It is a desire which finds its highest gratification in the service of God and in communion with him. It leads man to desire that others may participate in his own states of thinking, feeling and willing. He feels impelled to transfer the thoughts, affections and volitions of his own soul to the souls of other men, and thus to put his fellow beings in harmony with himself. His nature suggests to him a process for attaining this end.

He is instinctively prompted to utter certain sounds which are expressive of his sensations. The faculty of employing particular tones of the voice as representative of particular sensuous feelings, is common to man and the brutes. In man, however, the faculty is more highly developed than in the lower animals. A tune, when considered apart from the words to which it is applied, is the most exalted effort of this power of expression. The imitative sounds are also a peculiar exercise of the same faculty. At first, the power is employed without any conception of the object of that sensation which is felt and expressed. But this mere-

ly instinctive mode of expression cannot satisfy the wants of man. He desires a more extensive communication with his fellow beings. He finds by experience that certain sounds produce a certain impression upon him, and he is prompted to produce the same impression upon others by the employment of the same sounds. The more he attends to these intonations of the voice, so much the more readily does he form a conception of the object of the sensations which they indicate; and when he has once formed this conception, he has a desire to express it. He has this desire in consequence of that tendency of his nature, which has been already noticed, to place himself in sympathy and harmony with beings around him. He therefore feels impelled to designate by his voice the objects which he has conceived. He applies to some of them the sounds which he had previously used as signs of sensation; to others he applies sounds resembling these; for a third class he uses imitative sounds; for a fourth class he employs such utterances as are naturally suggestive, although not strictly imitative; and for still other classes of objects he forms vocal expressions by numerous changes and combinations of sounds, which he had previously assigned to things more easily designated. When he has once invented names for a certain number of objects, his progress in the extension of his vocabulary is obviously facilitated. The distinction, then, between sounds as composing language, and sounds as employed by man in his natural state and by brutes, is the following:—the former are made with an intelligent design, the latter are made under the impulse of a mere sensuous feeling; the former are expressive of conceptions, the latter of mere sensations; the former are articulate, the latter inarticulate. Language, therefore, is the intentional expression of human conceptions by means of articulate and significant sounds, by means of words.

But in process of time words are communicated not only to the ear but also to the eye. Language does not satisfy the desire of man for communion and harmony with the world around him, until it is written as well as oral. It must become a fixed and permanent expression of his states of mind, and thus facilitate the transactions which are necessary for the progress of society, for commerce, for the conduct of States, etc. Spoken language is the *immediate* expression of our conceptions; written language the *mediate*. The former suggests its meaning as soon as perceived by the sense; the latter must first be translated from the language of visible signs into that of audible sounds, before it can

be understood. The eye perceives the word, and suggests the sound of it, and then the signification of it is communicated to the soul. Thus the audible words are appreciated *directly;* the visible, *indirectly.* Hence the spoken language can produce upon the mind and heart a much more rapid and powerful impression, than can be produced by the written language. The former can also express a feeling or idea much more vividly than the latter by means of the variation of tone, which designates the slightest shading of sentiment and appeals at once to the heart. Still, the written language has in its turn some advantages over the oral. It is more favorable to calm, dispassionate thought, to the predominance of the judgment above the imagination and the feelings, to continuous and repeated views of the same proposition. It retains the expressed opinions of men for a longer time than they can be preserved by the most powerful oratory, and during thousands of years it continues to be a treasury of thoughts which, when uttered by the living voice, would be quickly efficacious and quickly forgotten.

§ 2. *The different Susceptibilities of the Soul originating different Forms of Language; the Origin of Prose, Poetry and Eloquence; the distinctive Character of each.*

The various susceptibilities of the soul may be divided into three classes. The first class may be comprehended under the cognitive or knowing faculty, and the following acts are referrible to it; first, perceptions; secondly, conceptions, acts of imagination; thirdly, notions, generalizations, (perceptions of the understanding); fourthly, judgments; fifthly, inferences, conclusions; and sixthly, ideas, (perceptions of the reason). To this general faculty therefore belong the subordinate powers of perception, conception, imagination, understanding, reason, memory. When all these powers act in unison with each other, they constitute the perfection of man's *intellectual* nature. The second class of susceptibilities may be comprehended under the sensitive faculty, and to it may be referred the sensations, and the inward feelings or affections. When all the feelings of man are in harmony with each other, he has reached the perfection of his *sensitive* being. The third class of susceptibilities may be comprehended under the appetitive faculty, or what is sometimes called, in its more general sense, the will. The will, in its more specific and limited meaning, chooses an object, when that object stands in a cer-

tain relation to some previous *inclination* of the soul. If the object be more distinctly perceived by the mind, and the inclination be intelligently directed to it, then is the inclination called *desire;* and if the desire be long continued, it is termed *disposition*, and if the disposition have a certain degree of strength, and a certain measure of excitement, it is denominated *passion*. When all the acts of the will are in unison with each other and with the reason and judgment, when the lower inclinations are kept subordinate to the higher, then is the *moral* nature of man in its state of perfection.

Of the different susceptibilities which have been mentioned, sometimes one, and sometimes another has the predominance in an individual, and characterizes his whole course of action. There is a state of calm contemplation and thoughtfulness; there is a state of animated feeling; there is a state of voluntary desire, and each of these states forms often the peculiarity by which one man is distinguished from another. The occupation of the soul with perceptions, conceptions, notions, judgments, inferences, ideas, does not altogether exclude the contemporaneous indulgence of feelings and affections, but it prevents such a degree of them as may give any other than a meditative character to the mind. So the occupation of the soul with lively feeling presupposes the exercise of the cognitive faculty, but precludes any such degree of the exercise as may in any way diminish the predominance of the sensitive, emotive character of the individual. The feelings are indeed often excited and heightened by the imagination. This power is peculiarly fitted to move the affections, by its presenting to the mind specific images of an object; also by its presenting images resembling and nearly related to the particular feelings which are to be excited; by its presenting images of the cause which precedes, or of the effect which follows the existing emotion; by its presenting images which are in contrast with the object of that emotion, and which therefore make the object so much the more vivid and affecting. As the imagination acts on the feelings, so the feelings reäct on the imagination, and thus a reciprocal influence is exerted by these distinct susceptibilities, which increases the intensity of each. Similar remarks may be applied to the appetitive part of our nature. The inclinations and desires are excited by the imagination; for the clear images of this faculty arouse the involuntary affections which are the precursors of voluntary acts. The will, in its turn, exerts a reflex influence on the fancy. Whenever we choose an

object we fix our attention upon it; the more attentively we view it, so much the deeper impression does it make on our involuntary feelings; and the more intensely our feelings are excited, so much the greater activity and vivacity are imparted to the imagination. Thus an act of the will vivifies both the affections and the fancy, and receives itself a stimulus from the powers which it reciprocally quickens. All our faculties act and react upon each other, and the man acquires a distinctive character by the preponderance of one or another of his several susceptibilities.

When, therefore, he is in a state of calm, dispassionate thought, he has a desire of unity with himself; that is, of making his intellectual operations consistent with one another, and reducing them to one harmoniously connected train. He has also a desire of unison with others, that is, of making their perceptions and judgments one with his own. This leads him to adopt the language of instruction, and this kind of language is termed *prose*, in its restricted sense. When likewise he is in the state of excited feeling, he naturally inclines to a similar harmony with himself; that is, to a consistency, likeness and union between his affections. He wishes to feel as one man, and not as divided against his own nature. He will not freely express his emotions, unless they are congruous with one another and unite in one general character. He is also instinctively impelled to be in unison with his fellow men, and make his feelings their own. He therefore gives utterance to the feelings of his heart, in order to raise the same affections in the hearts of his fellow beings. His feelings have excited his imagination, and the language which he employs is that of the imagination and the affections united. This kind of language is termed *poetry*. Again, when he is in a state of voluntary desire, he feels the same impulse to be at one with himself; to have all his inclinations and volitions consistent with each other; and also to be at one with other men, to bring their wills into a state of harmony with his own. Hence he expresses himself in a peculiar species of language, called *eloquence*. As his voluntary emotions are excited by previous thoughts and feelings, so the style which he employs for communicating his acts of will contains the elements of the style for the operations of the intellect and of the heart. In other words, eloquence, although distinguished from prose and poetry, has many qualities in common with them both.

In distinguishing prose from eloquence, the word prose is used in a narrower acceptation than ordinary. It is employed to denote

the language of the intellect, and is thus distinct from eloquence, which is the language of the voluntary power. In a more general sense, however, the word prose includes eloquence, and denotes that species of language which is constructed with prominent reference to a particular definite effect upon the mind of the reader or hearer. Thus, the writer of prose, in its limited sense, aims to be didactic, to impart a certain degree of knowledge on a specific subject. He constructs his sentences with obvious reference to the facility and clearness of his communications. The eloquent writer aims to move the will; to awaken in his readers some particular inclination, or excite them to some definite purpose. But the writer of poetry has no such prominent reference in his composition to a specific effect upon his readers. He does not shape his verses with the prominent design of imparting definite instruction, nor of persuading the will to a particular act. He writes freely, and without the appearance of calculating consequences. When he begins to calculate, he has ceased to be inspired. True, he does instruct and does persuade, but never makes it his prominent aim to produce these effects. As a writer he does calculate, but as a poet he utters his feelings without constraint. After he has written, he considers the influence of his words on others; but while he is writing, he is borne onward by his own feelings. His object is to bring the feelings of others into a state of sympathy with his own, but this is a *general* object, and the prominent avowal of it would tend to convert his poetry into prose. He must not reduce this general design to any particular form, nor can he, as a poet, devise any specific plan for affecting others in correspondency with his main purpose. He must not select his images or his words with an obvious or primary reference to their effect on his readers, but must be influenced first of all by the spontaneous suggestions of his own feeling, and if he ever thinks of making a stanza useful to his fellow men, the thought must be an incidental one, secondary to the desire of giving vent to his own emotions, concealed from the view of others, and never so prominent as to interfere with his seeming, as well as his real inspiration. It must be, moreover, of a general nature, and must never assume that specific, definite form which characterizes the orator and the didactic prose writer.

Poetry has been defined, the language of the imagination and the feelings. This definition does not imply, that the language prompted by these susceptibilities is never used in simple didactic prose. It teaches, however, that the fancy and the affections

of the prosaic writer are less highly excited than are those of the poet, and his style is less distinctively influenced by them. The imagination is employed in prose for the purpose of illustrating the judgment expressed; it is checked as soon as it has reflected light upon the thought. It is regarded simply as a means subservient to a more important end. It is employed by the poet for the sake of its aesthetical worth, and of the pleasure imparted by it. The writer of prose expresses the convictions of his understanding; the poet expresses ideas of the reason. The objects presented by the former are therefore strictly defined, measured and limited; the favorite objects of the latter are immeasurable and illimitable. Ideas, however, are not presented by the poet in an abstract form; they are combined with some sensible representation. They are made tangible and invested with a living reality. The idea is converted into an ideal. The prose writer represents objects as he finds them, the poet makes new combinations of ideas, is in a sense a creator; hence he is called *ποιητής*. The writer of prose adheres, in the arrangement of his thoughts, to the logical order suggested by his subject. He endeavors to present his theme in its various divisions and subdivisions, and to accommodate all his statements to the capacities of his readers. But the poet so adjusts his ideas as to present a single pleasing image to the mind. He conforms to his own inspired emotions, rather than to the mental necessities of other men. In describing an historical event, he does not, like the prose writer, follow the order of time, and of cause and effect, but plunges at once *in mediam rem*, and details the essential circumstances of the history, wherever he can do it with the least constraint and stiffness; nor does he hesitate to beautify and to idealize the reality, whenever his feelings prompt him to deviate from literal exactness. He gives the general impression of the scene, without being particularly accurate in delineating its minute characteristics.

As all language is a transcript of the inner man, and as prose and poetry are prompted by very dissimilar states of the mind, so the words selected by the poet are different from those selected by the writer of prose. The former will prefer a figurative term to a literal one, where the latter will have an opposite preference. The former will choose bold expressions, new phrases, peculiar constructions, where the latter will adopt a more humble and familiar mode of speech. The poet delights in metre, in rhyme, while the orator is content with a certain *numerus* of style, and the prosaic essayist, historian or philosopher confines himself to

the easiest and simplest flow of language. The matter of a composition must determine the form of it, and as the object of the poet is to please, he must select such a class of words as will not appear hackneyed or tame or unmusical. His style must be free and unfettered, hence his license in the use of words. Poetry may be defined the representation, in language, of that which is adapted to gratify the taste. Now a writer must be, and appear to be himself pleased with an object, in order to make that object pleasing to others. Hence the rules relating to the poet's selection and arrangement of thoughts and words, are less objective and more subjective than are the rules for the prose writer and the orator.

§ 3. *Definition of Eloquence.*

The object of prose, in its more extensive acceptation, is to instruct the intellect or to move the will. When it is adapted to the former purpose, it is called prose, in the more proper and narrow meaning of the word; when it is adapted to the latter purpose it is called *eloquence.*[1] Eloquence implies, first, that a definite object be presented to the mind of the person addressed; secondly, that his inclination be excited to secure that object; thirdly, that he be convinced of the fitness of that object to gratify the excited inclination; and fourthly, that he be convinced of his ability to attain the end for which his desire has been aroused. In order to stimulate this desire, it is necessary to present the object vividly before the mind; and for this purpose to employ the imagination more than it is employed in the simple prosaic style. If we would move the will we must previously arouse the affections, and this also requires a more vigorous exercise of the imagination than is appropriate to the didactic prose. It requires, however, that the imagination be subsidiary to the excitement of volition, and that in eloquence it have a less predominant sway than it has in poetry. Simple prose being addressed to the intellect, and poetry being addressed to the imagination and feeling, eloquence is addressed to the three united, and that for the purpose of affecting a fourth power, the will. In prose the imagination is employed for the sake of illustration; in poetry for the sake of imparting pleasure and enlivening the feelings; in elo-

[1] The Romans often denominated a man *disertus*, who could speak perspicuously, and fluently, so as to satisfy common men; but they called the man *eloquens* who could captivate his hearers and influence their wills. The Germans make a similar distinction between *Wohlredenheit* and *Beredsamkeit*.

quence, for the sake, ultimately, of persuading to voluntary action. Eloquence presupposes the address to the intellect, to the imagination, and to the passions, but differs from prose and poetry in its ultimate aim; in making each and all of the above named faculties subordinate to that of voluntary action. It is, in its nature, intermediate between prose and poetry, and unites the perspicuity, the definiteness, the logical argument of the former, with the vividness, exuberance, and imaginative spirit of the latter. It combines these qualities in one harmonious whole, as means to a higher end. The definition of eloquence is therefore the following: "Such an exhibition, in connected discourse, of the orator's thoughts, as is adapted to determine the human will by means of a suitably proportioned, a symmetrical appeal to the understanding and the reason on the one hand, and to the imagination and the feeling on the other." There may be eloquence, it is true, in a dialogue, as well as in a connected oration, but the latter is the more usually selected as the form for appeals to the will, and is the better fitted for such a rapid and vigorous flow of sentiment as is essential to the deepest impression on the voluntary power. It is necessary to specify, that the thoughts are exhibited in *discourse;* thereby we may avoid the objection which Quintilian makes to Cicero's statement, that eloquence is the art of persuading; for men may be persuaded by other means than by speech, by other means than by eloquence. It is also necessary to state that the understanding and reason must be addressed by the orator in fitting proportion to the other powers; thereby we avoid another of Quintilian's objections to Cicero's definition: for if eloquence be the mere art of persuading, then the seducer appealing to the weak passions of his victim may be eloquent, and thus the noblest of all arts may be degraded to a level with the mere tricks of a debauchee. Eloquence has often been associated, if not confounded, with dishonest artifice, with the power of beguiling and over-persuading; but according to the definition given above, there can be no perfect eloquence which does not contain a well proportioned appeal to the judgment and conscience of man. It is also better to define eloquence as that which is *adapted* to persuade the will, than as that which does in fact accomplish this purpose. Quintilian says, that if eloquence be as Cicero denominates it, the art of persuading, then its character is determined by the event, and if the speech be not actually successful in moving the will, it is not an eloquent speech. But the success of an appeal may be prevented by adventitious circumstances, and

the consequences which result from it cannot change its intrinsic rhetorical character.

§ 4. *Relation of the several kinds of Eloquence to the several kinds of Poetry.*

In lyric poetry the subjective element is conspicuous, and involves the objective within itself. In dramatic poetry the objective element is predominant, and the subjective is merged into it. In epic poetry, the subjective and the objective are both noticeable; past events are rehearsed as if present, and the author is conspicuous in relating them. The lyric poet uses the language of feeling; his own emotion is expressed in view of an object, but the object is noticed only through the emotion. The dramatic poet, on the other hand, describes a series of past acts as though they were performed at present, and does not himself appear in the description; the reader is not reminded of the man whose drama he is perusing, but is absorbed in the facts which are dramatically represented. The epic poet takes an intermediate position in regard to the other two. He brings the past into our ideal presence, but he also *appears* to bring it. Himself is prominent as well as the object which he describes.

Now the orator, in order to move the will of his hearers or readers, must exhibit vividly his own feelings, and in this disclosure of excited emotion he resembles the lyric poet. Still, eloquence demands that the affections be only coördinate with the other susceptibilities of the soul, and in this respect differs from lyric poetry, which requires the affections to be predominant. Again, in order to induce his hearers to act, the orator must often appeal to the past. If he would excite a nation to deeds of heroism, he must bring into fresh remembrance the exploits of olden time, and present to the sons a glowing portraiture of the honor of their fathers. This vivid description of past scenes is the particular, in which eloquence resembles epic poetry. But the resemblance is not complete, for the orator's description is regulated by its subserviency to excite an emulous spirit among his hearers, while the poet's verses are free, and are designed merely to gratify the taste.

There is, also, one particular in which eloquence resembles dramatic poetry. The speaker acts on the hearers, and the hearers act on the speaker. He communicates to them his thoughts and feelings, and excites them to the same purposes which him-

self has formed. They hear his communications, and think, feel, will in correspondency with him. They doubt; he removes their scruples. They disbelieve; he convinces them. They resist; he overcomes their opposition. Their opinions and feelings are perceived by him; perhaps foreseen, perhaps detected in their countenances. These acts of the hearer have an effect upon the orator, and induce him to adopt a train of remark which he would otherwise omit. Thus the action is reciprocal between the two parties; that of the hearer is more silently but not always less evidently made known than that of the speaker. There is, as it were, a dialogue spoken between the orator and his audience; they determining him what arguments or motives to present, and he determining them what purposes to form. He and they are in a relative situation like that of the persons of a drama, and thus is eloquence in one respect similar to dramatic poetry. A lifeless, ineffective speech results from a want of this almost dramatic interest of the orator in his auditory. He must conduct an internal conversation with them, or he cannot speak to them with the appropriate power.

The ancient eloquence was more obviously and strikingly similar to poetic composition, than is the modern. Their judicial and deliberative orations were designed to produce an immediate effect, to persuade to an immediate act or purpose. This aim at instantaneous efficiency was itself exciting both to speakers and hearers, and led the former to make energetic appeals to the passions of the latter. The judicial and deliberative orations were, therefore, characterized by the display of imagination and warm emotion. The excited feelings of the orator were responded to by the audience, and thus arose a striking resemblance between these orations and dramatic poetry. The external circumstances in which the orations were delivered contributed much to increase this resemblance. The accused had his advocate (*patronus causæ*), and therefore the complainant was answered by an opposing orator, and thus ensued a contest which was often compared by the ancient rhetoricians to a battle, or to a gladiatorial encounter. The attack and the reply, the rejoinder and the surrejoinder possessed in themselves a dramatic interest, and the acquittal or condemnation of the accused was like the catastrophe of the drama. Sometimes also, the relatives of the man on trial presented themselves suddenly, and in the habiliments of deep mourning, before the judges. Sometimes the auditors expressed their gratification or their dissatisfaction with the speaker by tumultuous

noises. They went so far, in many instances, as to remove him by violence from the rostrum. During the first centuries of the christian era, the worshippers in christian temples were accustomed occasionally to make loud demonstrations of the pleasure or disgust with which their preacher affected them. But modern auditories do not make such emphatic expressions of their approbation or their dislike of the person, by whom they are addressed.

But besides the deliberative and the judicial orations of the Greeks and Romans, there was a third kind, the panegyrical. These were sometimes occupied with the praise of the gods, of departed heroes, of the fathers of the republic, and sometimes with important political discussions. After the downfall of republicanism, they were devoted to the adulation of the divinity who presides over some public game, or to the praise of the game itself, or of the regent of the State, or to some other inferior purpose. There were also panegyrical orations delivered in honor of brave citizens who died for their country; there were some too, delivered in honor of private men, and called *orationes funebres.* When the orator endeavored to excite his hearers to an imitation of the men whom he extolled, or to the practice of the virtues which he recommended, his style of address resembled that of the judicial and deliberative orator, and partook therefore of the dramatic element. When he indulged in merely laudatory effusions, his style was akin to that of the lyric poet. When he narrated the exploits of departed worthies, he introduced into his composition some distinctive features of epic poetry.

It is evident that discourses from a christian pulpit are often in some respects analogous to the epic poem; for they often detail the truly poetical scenes of evangelical history. They have also an analogy to the lyric poem; for they often contain the outpourings of excited feeling, and merge the objective element into a subjective form. They have more of the lyrical character than the judicial and deliberative orators of the ancients; for they are pervaded by a deeper and stronger emotion. They have, however, not so much of the lyrical character as many of the panegyrical orations; for they must necessarily have more of a practical object, and aim at a more definite influence on the will. This aim to affect the voluntary principle gives to the sermon a likeness to the deliberative and judicial orations, and accordingly, a resemblance to the dialogue of the drama. Still, its resemblance to the drama is less than has been already ascribed to those orations. For the aim of the sermon is not so often to produce an immediate effect

as a permanent one; not so often to influence the will at the instant, as to influence the whole character for all time. Hence it is not so exciting, and is not so passionate in its appeals, as those orations which are devoted to a single object, and which are of instantaneous interest. Moreover, the design of the preacher is not to be accomplished by a single discourse; he feels that he must produce his effect by a long series of sermons. This gives him more of a calm dispassionate air, than the orator can have whose whole success depends upon a single speech. An address from the pulpit, then, being less fervid than a deliberative or judicial oration of the ancients, produces a less obvious excitement among the hearers, and thus secures from them a less perceptible response. It is of course less decidedly analogous to the dialogue, but is not entirely devoid of this feature of dramatic poetry.[1]

§ 5. *Different degrees of attention paid by the Orator and the Poet, to the Subject-matter and to the Style of their compositions.*

The poet is inspired with the beauties of his subject. Being pleased himself, he expresses his pleasure with a genial freedom. He does not check his inspiration for the purpose of inquiring whether, or how far his readers will be interested in this or that figure of speech, but, if his own tastes are gratified with it, he uses it without hesitation. He writes as if he were independent of his fellow-men, and were actuated by some higher genius. He seems not to be constrained by this genius, but to be enlivened and inspired by it. There is no utilitarianism in his method of composition. Whenever and wherever he finds an object pleasing to the taste, he employs it; and does not, as a poet, inquire whether the object in its other relations be important or unimportant. It is very true that if a poem be written on a useful theme, the utility of the stanzas is associated in our minds with their beauty, and thus increases the pleasure which we derive from them. It also presents a new motive for the diligent study of the poem, and by our sharpened attention to it as a work of value, we may detect additional and otherwise hidden graces in it as a work of taste. Still the usefulness of the poem was not the chief and apparent design of its author. He regards, first of

[1] It may be needless to state, that Prof. Schott's views of sacred eloquence, and indeed of modern oratory in general, are derived from the tone and spirit of the German pulpit, and from the prevalent style of the orators under European despotisms.

all, the beautiful, or more properly the attractive, and makes every other consideration subordinate to that of taste. Hence the importance of the subject is with him secondary to the agreeableness of the delineation, and his own feelings, rather than those of other men, are the test of this agreeableness.

The orator, on the contrary, is not so independent of his fellow beings. He must persuade them, and therefore adapt his style to them; and many an explanatory or qualifying or amplifying phrase does he introduce, not for his own sake, but for that of his hearers or readers. His style therefore is not so free as the poet's. He designs to interest others in his subject, and hence avoids all those ornaments of language which attract attention to themselves, rather than to the practical aim of the discourse. With him, therefore, the pleasing is secondary to the useful. He does not neglect the tastefulness of description, he knows that the style must be attractive in order to secure a prolonged regard to the thought; but he introduces the beauties of form only as means to an end, and makes pleasure subservient to utility. A figure of speech, remarks Sauer, is with the poet a beautiful flower entwined into a lovely wreath, and exposed to the view of all who seek to be pleased; but with the orator, it is a ring in the chain by which he means to bind all who hear him. The eloquent writer endeavors to make his representations clear and precise, and thus to excite an *intellectual* interest in his mode of imparting truth. He also endeavors to avoid all allusions which may offend the sensibility to right and wrong, and thus to excite a *moral* interest in his writings. He endeavors, in the third place, to gratify the taste, and captivate the imagination and affections, and thus to excite an *aesthetical* interest in his style. All this he does of set purpose, but only so far as the persuasive influence of his discourse requires. He differs, then, from the poet, in making the usefulness of his subject more important than the attractiveness of its form; in making the influence of his words upon his readers a matter of deliberate design, of prominent regard; and in making this influence of his style subservient merely to the practical impression of his leading thoughts.

§ 6. *Regard paid by the Orator and the Poet to their personal Character and Relations.*

As the object of the orator is to influence the will, he needs the confidence of his hearers. He cannot easily persuade them to

action, unless they are satisfied with his fitness to be their counsellor and monitor. Hence he must secure their respect for his talents and their trust in his virtue. The practical character of his address allows, and even requires him to pay this regard to his personal relations with his audience. But the poet has no such practical aim; he pours forth his emotions with actual and seeming freedom, and never concerns himself with questions in relation to his personal influence. His object being to gratify the taste, he is less dependent than the orator on the opinions which the community may entertain respecting him, and although he may, as a man, feel some solicitude for his good name, he must as a poet sacrifice this solicitude to the inspirations of his theme. One distinction, then, between eloquence and poetry is, that the one requires an author to shape his composition so as to recommend himself to his readers, as a man of talents and probity; while the other requires him to divest himself, while writing, of all references to the mode of ingratiating himself with the community.

It is necessary that an eloquent *writer* so construct his essay, as to win from those who peruse it a high esteem for his personal qualifications; for when we read a printed page, we instinctively associate the sentences and paragraphs with the character and even the person of their author. We imagine how he looks, speaks, and acts. It is still more necessary that one, who addresses us with the living voice, secure this confidence in his individual merits, especially when he endeavors to influence our will, and above all when he would persuade us to some important course of action. It is no light matter for a man to rise and claim our attention to his words, our belief in his statements, our compliance with his exhortations. He must possess and appear to possess many permanent excellences, or he cannot be entitled to make this demand upon our trains of thought, and upon our voluntary affections. He must appear to be capable of instructing us; else we shall look with distrust upon his reasonings. He must appear to be sincere and pure in his affections; else we shall guard ourselves against all sympathy with him. He must appear to be honest and benevolent in his purposes; else we shall not unite in his plans, nor conform to his solicitations.

But the query arises, how can the orator secure this deference for himself. In the first place, he sometimes finds that such deference is secured before he commences his address. By his whole intellectual and moral character, as it has been developed through-

out his previous life, he has gained the confidence of men so much, as to meet with no obstructions in introducing his own thoughts into their minds, his own purposes into their wills. But in the second place, where he has not already obtained the confidence of those whom he addresses, he may often secure it by the structure of his speech and by the mode of his delivery. Certain forms of expression may attract or repel his hearers; encourage them to yield him their confidence, or to view him with distrust. He is not allowed to introduce irrelevant beauties into his composition, for the sake of concealing the real deformities of his subject. He is not permitted to pay compliments to his hearers, to flatter them, to extol such of their opinions or practices as cannot be praised either justly or appropriately. He is not authorized to take any advantage of the weaknesses, still less of the foibles of his audience, for the purpose of commending a project which he cannot justify by sound argument. All such tricks of oratory are foreign from true eloquence. We have already defined eloquence, as a well proportioned address to the intellect, affections, and will. Therefore, if a project be recommended without an adequate appeal to the reason and judgment, if it be so presented as to enlist only the blind passions in its behalf, then there is no proper proportion in the address, and of course there is no pure eloquence. The nature of an oration requires, that the orator excite the interest of his hearers in himself, only so far as to increase their interest in his theme; that he appear to them, in the first place, worthy of addressing them in general, and, in the second place, worthy of addressing them on the particular truths to which his oration is devoted; that he appear to be a good and worthy organ of a good and worthy subject. He cannot be truly eloquent, unless his whole manner be in fact and in appearance designed for the welfare of man.

He may excite an *intellectual* interest in his character. If he be the master of his subject, and capable of presenting it in lucid diction, he will often manifest a noble confidence in himself, which will gain by sympathy the confidence of others. When he has not penetrated into the depths of his theme, and has obtained no vivid conceptions of it, he will often manifest a self-distrust and a painful misgiving, which will prevent his hearers from relying on his statements. He may also excite a *moral* interest in his character. He may do this by manifesting a keen sensibility to all the motives of virtue, a lively regard to the happiness of the race, a high veneration for justice and religion. His whole

address must be pervaded by a spirit of benevolence and true modesty. He should, indeed, exhibit a proper confidence in the truth and reasonableness of his assertions; but this confidence is radically distinct from vanity and arrogance; it is allied, and of the same nature with a modest estimate of his own worth. He must appear to be conscious of his own weakness as well as his strength; aware of the limits of the human faculties as well as of their real attainments, and penetrated with reverence for his superiors, as well as a fitting regard for his own convictions. He may also excite an *aesthetical* interest in his character. His style of writing and speaking should indicate his love of the beautiful. A good taste is combined, in many important particulars, with the moral disposition, and the tasteful orator is therefore associated in the popular mind with philanthropy and virtue. The oration must often introduce ideas which are grand, sublime or graceful; and if these ideas be presented in an inappropriate style, the hearer is disgusted with the very objects which might have fascinated him, and is repelled from the man with whom he might have been charmed.

It is not pretended, that the theory of eloquence will prescribe minute and specific rules for the orator's awakening a popular interest in himself as a man. It only prescribes, in general, that he educate himself so as to deserve and secure the confidence of his fellow men; that he cultivate his mental faculties so as to merit and therefore receive the intellectual homage of his audience; that he possess and exhibit such a philanthropic and self-denying and truly religious temper as to avoid all suspicion of dishonest artifice; that he obtain a profound and thorough knowledge of the subject which he discusses, and a minute acquaintance with the principles by which his hearers are actuated, so that he may wisely adapt his theme to the susceptibilities of those whom he wishes to influence; that he carefully avoid every expression and every mode of address by which a prejudice may be excited against his opinions, his motives or his projects. Unlettered men, he must remember, will often infer from his hesitating utterance, that he is destitute of ideas; or from his ungainly attitudes, that he has no delicacy of taste. Hence he must avoid not only the actual fault, but also those comparatively trivial appearances, which diminish the confidence of the community in his fitness to control their intellectual and their moral action. When it is said, that the orator should commend himself to his audience, it is by no means to be understood that he should be egotistical or

assuming. Just the opposite. The remarks of Marheinecke,[1] respecting the preacher, are just and important,—"He should strive for nothing more than this, to make his personal character in no way injurious to the cause which he wishes to promote; to divest himself of every thing which can offend the tastes or prejudices of his people, whatever may be the degree of their education; and also, yielding to the noble influences of his theme, to sink himself, where it is possible, entirely out of sight under the magnificence and irresistible power of the truth which he proclaims."

§ 7. *Regard paid by the Orator and the Poet to the Perfection of Man.*

It has been already observed, that man has an instinctive longing after a state of perfection. He cannot rest satisfied with any attainment which he has made, but every degree of excellence suggests to him a still higher degree that lies beyond. The poet has in his mind a perfect ideal, and he presents this in sensible images to his readers. The pastoral and elegiac strains express the feeling of pleasure in the destination of man to a state of uncorrupted excellence, and in the possibility of his making constant advances toward that state. The satirical poem expresses the feeling of dissatisfaction with the remoteness, at which man is actually found from this ideal perfection. The ode breathes forth the inspiration of one who contemplates the excellence of his race, as it is exhibited in the ideal standards of virtue, or in the exploits of particular worthies. When the poet is inspired with the thought of the approximations which are made toward the character of perfect rectitude and worth, or of the sad deviations from that character, or of the conflict between virtue and the outward world, or of the triumph of the one over the other, he pours forth his feelings, sometimes in the form of the tale, sometimes in that of the drama, now in the heroic, and again in the tragic verse. But he is always satisfied with the bare presentation of an ideal. He suggests no methods, and urges no motives for the attainment of this perfect excellence. In this respect he differs from the orator. Eloquence does not linger so long as poetry in the imaginative description of the faultless state; it presents a more exact analysis of the good desired, gives a more definite view of the necessity for struggling to reach it, and of the means and motives for overcoming the hindrances to its attainment. The

[1] Grundlegung der Homiletik, S. 80, 81.

poet simply aims at a vivid portraiture of ideal perfection; the orator strives to connect with this portraiture a realization of the imagined excellence. And eloquence is and does all that it can and should be and do, when it urges man onward in his endeavors to realize the perfectness of his being, to attain a complete harmony with himself and with the world out of himself. It must aim, therefore, at a complete illumination of the mind, at a purifying of the affections, at a proper stimulus of the will. He is not truly eloquent who endeavors to persuade men by any motives, or to any deeds which interfere, in any manner, with their intellectual or moral perfection. If the speeches, which are designed to cajole or delude men, contain some elements of genuine eloquence, they are still destitute of the higher elements; of the appropriate aim and spirit which impart an ennobling character to every sentence that is uttered. Unless the orator have a lofty ideal of virtue always prominent before his mind, his eloquence must be misapplied, abused, imperfect, impure, and therefore not entitled to the name which is given to it by inconsiderate men.

§ 8. *The place which Eloquence holds among the Arts.*

The term *art* is used, subjectively, to denote the power of producing that, which possesses a unity consisting in the adaptation of means to an end. It is also used, objectively, to denote the compass of the rules which are to be observed, for the production of the object containing this unity. Thus the poetic art is the system of rules for the harmonious and vivid representation, in words, of that which has formed in the poet's mind one beautiful and attractive whole. The art of rhetoric is the system of rules according to which discourses in prose are to be sketched, filled out, and (in the case of oral addresses) delivered for the purpose of instruction or of persuasion. The term art is more properly used to designate the subjective idea; and the objective is better expressed by the phrase, theory of the art.

The arts are divided into the useful and the aesthetic. The useful are sometimes termed mechanical; but this is an unfortunate designation; for it confines our view to their outward and physical advantages, and does not even imply their higher utility to the inward, the intellectual and moral nature. The distinction between the useful and the aesthetic arts is not, that the former are productive of good, and the latter of no good; nor that the latter please the taste, and the former impart no gratification.

The aesthetic arts are useful, but their utility is an attendant, not a primary excellence. It is not sought for and labored for, as essential to their very nature. On the other hand the useful arts gratify the taste, but their attractiveness is a subordinate excellence, and constitutes no part of their intrinsic character. The aesthetical arts are divided into the pleasant and the fine. The former are those which gratify the lower external senses, and also those which please us by awakening the consciousness of animal life. Thus the art of entertaining a company by the pleasures of the table, by a variety of social games, by wit and humor of discourse is one of the pleasant arts, giving us an agreeable sense of our physical existence. The fine arts are nobler than these, and gratify the higher, inner tastes. They do not disdain the aid of the merely pleasing arts, but are often united with them and receive a stimulus from them.

There are some of the aesthetical, and especially of the fine arts, which are intimately conjoined with the useful. The pleasing and the attractive elements are employed as means for increasing the utility of that, whose first and chief object is not to promote gratification but to do good. These are called the relatively aesthetic arts, and are thus distinguished from those which are primarily and chiefly designed to impart pleasure, and are therefore termed absolutely aesthetic. The attractiveness of the relatively aesthetic arts is called *adherent*, because it is not their principal or predominant quality. Thus the beauty of a temple is designed to be merely subservient to the worship of God; and if the fitness of the temple for religious exercises be sacrificed to its attractiveness as an object of the fine arts, if its adaptation to spiritual uses be considered secondary to its ornaments, the true idea of the temple is not realized.

Now eloquence is an art; for it is a system of means to an end, forming one united whole. It is an aesthetic art, combining the pleasant with the fine; for it is designed to gratify the inward and the outward tastes. It is a useful art; for it is intended and devised to promote the welfare of society. But its attractiveness is a means to an end. It is adherent, not predominant. It is introduced to increase the utility of that which is otherwise useful. Eloquence, therefore, is a relatively not an absolutely aesthetic art. It combines the pleasant, the free and the profitable, making the two former elements subsidiary to the latter.

§ 9. *The Moral Aspect of Eloquence.*

It is well known, that the ancient Spartans and Cretans forbade the practice of eloquence within their territories. It was condemned by the Spartan laws with especial severity after the time of Lycurgus. It was also frequently discountenanced by the Romans, in the early days of their Republic. It has likewise been opposed by modern writers, particularly by Kant. The great objection to it is, that its moral influence is bad. There would be some reason for this objection, if it were true either, first, that eloquence appeals to the imagination and passions merely, and thus influences the will without reference to the intellectual or moral judgment; or secondly, that it appeals to the imagination and the passions with so much power, as to interfere with the free and candid exercise of the reason and conscience. If eloquence were merely the art of persuading, and had an indiscriminate and unhesitating recourse to any principles whatever, by which persuasion could be effected, then it might often be employed for immoral purposes; and also, when directed to a worthy end, might accomplish it by dishonest means. Kant remarks, that eloquence is injurious even when it persuades men to that which is objectively right, for it even then corrupts the subjective sentiments. It urges men to the proper conduct on other grounds than the intrinsic propriety of that conduct, and secures goodness of action without encouraging goodness of motive. But all these objections emanate from an erroneous view of the nature of eloquence. It does not address the imagination and the feelings exclusively, but coördinately, and in such a degree as to quicken rather than to repress the exercise of the intellectual powers. It aims at an harmonious and a mutually beneficent action of the reason, the conscience, the fancy, and the affections, and it therefore presupposes that the object pursued, and the motives for pursuing it are conformed to the highest standard of morality. Eloquence may, indeed, sometimes accommodate itself to the errors of men, but never so as to sanction those errors. It may appeal to self-love, but never so as to make the regard for self paramount to the regard for others. It is right for men to consult their own interest, and when their moral principle is weak, they may be improved in their character by reflecting on the advantages of virtue. They may be led by their love of self, to secure that holiness which will promote their welfare.

And in proportion to the obtuseness of their religious sensibilities, must be the boldness of our appeal to their desire of the rewards which come from a religious life. It is true that eloquence has sometimes degenerated into the art of deceiving men by speech, into the taking advantage of their humors and caprices for the purpose of persuading to unreasonable acts. It has in fact sometimes been, as Kant describes it, the art of managing an affair of the intellect, as if it were a subject fit only for a play of the fancy. But when we consider that the original motive to eloquence is a desire to promote the perfection of man, and the nature of it is a symmetrical operation upon the mental and the moral susceptibilities, and the end of it is man's entire, his highest, of course his spiritual improvement, then we discover no possible ground for the charge that it blinds the intellect and misleads the affections. From the fact that its aims and tendencies are so high upward, it seems to be peculiarly fitted for the pulpit, although Kant condemns it as especially uncongenial with attempts to secure justice at court, or to promote religion in the church. Indeed the political condition of many European States is such, as to encourage no other form of public eloquence, than that of the sanctuary; they have no deliberative assemblies and no open judicial courts, like those in the ancient republics, and under several modern governments.

§ 10. *Christian character of Pulpit Eloquence.*

Every system of truth has some one leading idea. The scheme of doctrine and of duty revealed to us in the New Testament, has for its chief and governing thought, that of *the kingdom of God.* The kingdom of God embraces the earth and the heavens, the present and the future. It embraces the state and the company of those who have received in this life the knowledge, the peculiar spirit and the hopes of the Christian religion, see Matt. 12: 28. 13: 52. Col. 1: 13. 1 Cor. 4: 20. It embraces also the state and company of those who are glorified in the eternal world; see Matt. 5: 3, 10, 12. It is the kingdom of God, because he is its founder and preserver, its beginning and its end. It is the kingdom of heaven, because it has come down to us from heaven, and is perfected there. It is the kingdom of Jesus, because his atonement is the corner-stone on which it is established. The design of the whole Christian dispensation is to educate men for this blessed kingdom. They are to be excited and disciplined and

prepared for it, by means of instruction in sacred truth. But it is not sufficient that man merely know the doctrines of religion. He must also feel the possibility of his union with God. He instinctively aspires after such a union, for he has a natural longing after a universal harmony; but he sees that there must be some propitiating sacrifice before he can be one with the pure divinity. Christ has not only given man the needed instruction, but has also offered the essential sacrifice. He has offered it not for the purpose of making the Deity propitious, but of enabling men to see that he is so; for the purpose of imparting to them a vivid idea of the pure and incorruptible law, of the blending of justice with love; for the purpose of preparing the way and presenting the motives for transgressors to be at peace with their Maker. Nor has he merely given himself as a sacrifice; he has also exhibited an example by which we are enlightened with regard to our duty, and incited to a self-denying and devoted life. In one sense, his work is not finished. He has established a church, and in the church has appointed ministers, whose office it is to prosecute and perfect the system of benevolent action which he has begun. The duty of ministers is to preach that word, of which the kingdom of God is the central idea, and the atonement of Jesus the middle-point. They must be representatives of their Master in their deeds, as well as in their instructions. They must die to sin, as he died for it. They must sacrifice themselves to the service of God, as he made himself an offering for the divine glory. They must renounce every earthly attachment and abandon every pleasure and pursuit, which interfere with their highest usefulness, as their Master yielded up even his life for the cause of benevolence. They must be not only preachers but also priests.

Since the Reformation it has often been asserted, that ministers of the New Testament have no priestly character or office. The Catholics have so degraded the ministry by literal views of the Christian priesthood, that Protestants have denied the reality of such a priesthood altogether. Marheinecke, however, contends that the Christian minister may rightly be called a *priest*, and history proves that by refusing him that appellation, he has been often exposed to a loss of spirituality and true dignity. It is indeed true, as Loeffler has remarked, that Christ never expressly denominates himself a priest, but rather compares himself to the victim, which the priest offers in sacrifice; see Matt. 26: 28. Mark 14: 24. Luke 22: 20; see also 1 Cor. 5: 6—8, where he is called

the paschal lamb. But does he not also declare in Matt. 20: 28, John 6: 51, that he offered the sacrifice, and gave himself as a λύτρον? Is he not represented in Eph. 5: 2, as the performer of the oblation, and is he not styled throughout the Epistle to the Hebrews the true, perfect, eternal high priest? Does not the apostle Paul also denominate himself a priest in Rom. 15: 16, meaning that he was instrumental in converting souls to God and thus presenting them as sacrifices unto him? Does he not testify in 2 Cor. 4: 10, that he constantly exposes himself to death for the sake of the Gospel, and in Gal. 6: 14, that he is crucified to the world? See also Gal. 5: 24. Does he not speak in Phil. 2: 17, of his voluntary sacrifice of his own life in discharging his duty to his brethren, in presenting their faith as an offering to Jehovah, and in performing the duties of the Christian priesthood? It is indeed true, that private Christians are represented in 1 Pet. 2: 5, as invested with the priestly office. Still they are not thus honored, in the same degree with the constituted minister of the word. They give themselves as an offering to their Maker, they strive to present their neighbors likewise as an acceptable sacrifice to heaven, they live to some extent retired from the circles of fashion; but the consistent preacher devotes his whole time to direct efforts for the welfare of others, and consecrates himself in a peculiar manner to a life of self-denial. He walks emphatically as a pilgrim and stranger on the earth, and does not participate, as others do, in the pleasures of society. He may sympathize indeed with the innocent joys of others, but he must not exhibit the same festive spirit which is indulged by the laity. He should not appear morose, nor offensively peculiar, but he must avoid some modes of dress, some expressions of sentiment, some kinds of relaxation which are allowed to private Christians. He must preserve, so far as enlightened reason recommends, a professional peculiarity, and should seem to be, as well as really be, absorbed in a higher than earthly mission.

Nor is it simply in the measure of his consecration to God, and in the number of his efforts to make his fellow-men meet offerings to heaven, that he possesses more of a priestly character than belongs to laymen. He is also distinguished from them by his duties in the sanctuary. The office of a prophet or preacher was separated, under the Jewish economy, from the office of a priest or conductor of the services of the temple. But under the Christian dispensation, the duty of leading in the public worship of God is conjoined with that of proclaiming truth. The evangelical

pastor, whose words are instrumental in making many of his hearers an acceptable sacrifice unto Heaven, is also doubly a priest when he offers up the united prayers of his congregation, when he presents their children at the baptismal altar as an oblation to God, and when he dedicates his whole church to their Saviour in the sacrament of the bread and wine. He is not indeed a priest in the original and more proper sense, that of offering an outward propitiatory sacrifice to an offended Deity; but in the sense of offering his own heart and life, of offering, instrumentally, the souls and the influence of his hearers to God, in the sense of crucifying himself to the world, of sacrificing his earthly interests and pleasures for the divine glory, in the sense of conducting the services of public religious worship, he should habitually regard himself as set apart to the priesthood. Unless he do consider himself as thus anointed, he will be inclined to conform improperly to the usages of the world, and will be in danger of losing his rightful authority over the minds of laymen. The Protestant clergy have often undermined their influence by accommodating themselves to the standard of general society, and refusing not only to assert, but also to feel the true sacredness of their office.

The preceding train of remark suggests the leading idea of pulpit eloquence. It must consist in the preaching of Christian truth, especially in unfolding the influences of Christ's atonement. It is not *pulpit eloquence* if it be employed on mere philosophy, or ethics, or any theme which is not distinctively connected with evangelical doctrine. It must also unite with the clear statement of principles, the exhibition of a warm and earnest piety. It must explain not so much biblical truth in general, as the distinctive faith of the Christian scheme. It must urge not to the possession of a mere intellectual faith, but to the union of this with self-denying love. This union must not only be taught by the preacher's words; it must also be illustrated in his style of uttering those words. He should exhibit in his tones, gestures and whole mein the particular temper which he recommends. His sermon cannot be disjoined from his life; therefore, all his deeds must be a befitting commentary upon his teachings, and his daily example must add an eloquence to his pulpit addresses. It must be an example not merely of ethical, but also of evangelical virtue, of that benevolence which is inseparable from trust in the Redeemer. Unless he conjoin a Christian character with distinctively,

Christian discourses, he may be a secular orator, but he has not the true eloquence of the pulpit.

§ 11. *Moral and Evangelical Preaching.*

Since the prevalence of the Critical Philosophy, it has been fashionable to discourse from the pulpit on moral duties rather than on the Christian faith. That is indeed a useless faith, which is not a motive to the discharge of duty; but on the other hand, that is a transient and superficial virtue, which does not emanate from religious principle. A wise preacher, then, will endeavor so to communicate the truths of the Gospel as to show their influence on the moral life, and so to describe the practical virtues as to illustrate their indebtedness to the Christian faith. Schuderoff speaks of a *homiletic realism*, the prominent aim of which is to enforce the performance of our duty, but still it insists on religious feeling as an incentive to the virtue enjoined; and also of a *homiletic idealism*, the chief design of which is to inculcate faith in Christ and love to him, but still it urges the manifestation of these inward exercises in outward moral obedience. The former shows God in the life, the latter develops the life in God. Not every minister is qualified to preach in either one of these modes, with the same success as in the other; nor is every audience equally prepared for both methods of discourse. One preacher, therefore, is inclined to select as his uniform style, that which is most congenial with his own tastes or the wishes of his people. But he should intermingle the two modes, and thus harmonize the doctrines and the duties of religion. He should not allow the realism nor the idealism to be uniformly predominant; but should sometimes present an abstract truth in the foreground, as casting a radiance upon duty, and at other times should give a prominence to morals, as resulting from correct doctrine. By this interchange of modes, he imparts a freshness and vivacity to the entire course of his ministrations, and avoids the one-sided, incomplete, monotonous character, which so often deprives the pulpit of its interest and usefulness.

§ 12. *Conformity to the Scriptural Manner of Teaching.*

It has been already remarked, that the minister is called to carry forward the work which our Saviour began on the earth. He is to carry it forward in the true spirit of his Master, and with es-

pecial reference to the mental, moral and religious character of his contemporaries. Now the intellectual and the spiritual necessities of the present time, differ from those in the time of the inspired penmen. Consequently, the style of address for the modern pulpit, must be in some respects unlike that of the first preachers. Many passages of the Bible are of local and temporary application. Not only may we refuse to make them a pattern which is to be literally copied, but we may also introduce a new mode of address, which has no exact resemblance to any specific model in the Scriptures but is accommodated to our local and temporary peculiarities. Unless we be allowed to deviate thus from the biblical manner, we shall lose so much of our mental freedom that eloquence will be impossible. For example, when Jesus says of the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, that it cannot be forgiven, he alludes, first, to a class of men who saw his miracles, but still did not acknowledge the divine influence in their production, and secondly, to the views prevalent in his day with regard to the demoniacal operations to which his miracles were ascribed. His words, then, are not exactly applicable to those, who have not the above named views of the action of demons, nor the above named ocular evidence of his miraculous power. When Paul inveighs against the practice of requiring all Christians to obey the Jewish ceremonial law, and all heathen converts to be circumcised, and when in Col. 2: 18 he condemns those converts from the Essenes who rendered divine homage to the angels, he cannot be specifically imitated by his successors in the ministry, for they have no occasion for reiterating such reproofs. On the other hand, they are called to refute errors which the biblical writers had no necessity for canvassing, and to frown upon crimes which were not committed, and of course not rebuked in the days of the apostles. We have the same reason for discountenancing the now prevalent sin of neglecting the Lord's supper, which Paul had for reprimanding those abuses of the feasts of charity which occurred in his time. It is indeed to be borne in mind, that the Bible has given us general principles, which apply to our own as well as to every other period. It has prescribed universal rules, in which all our specific regulations are involved, and has issued certain interdicts, which enclose all the peculiar remonstrances that are needed for our times. The Bible is, in its essential features, a model for the whole world and for every age, but in some of its details it was precisely adapted to the men for whom it was originally written, and can-

not be minutely imitated by men, whose character, position and necessities are different from those of the ancient orientals. The character, too, of the biblical writers authorized them to adopt a method of address which we cannot make our own without irreverence and presumption. It may, however, be propounded as a rule, that the style of pulpit eloquence, as well as the substance of it, should be distinctively Christian; that although the modern preacher may write in a more systematic manner and may prepare himself more elaborately for his discourses than the sacred penmen chose to do, still he should make frequent use of their phrascology, and should present their doctrines in the form which was originally given them, so far as that form is congruous with the uninspired character of modern writing, and with the necessities of the present age. The votary of any science will prefer to express himself, if he can do so with perfect propriety, in the language of those who originated the science; for this language is apt to have an unequalled freshness, vivacity and pertinence.

§ 13. *The design of a Sermon.*

It seems to be an opinion of many, that the object of *all* sermons is barely to impart instruction; the opinion of many more, that this is the sole object of *some* sermons. Now it is true, that a discourse from the pulpit must communicate knowledge; still it does not attain its legitimate end when it is merely didactic. It must present truth to the mind, but more; it must also recommend this truth to the heart; it must induce men not only to love it but likewise to act in obedience to it. The school is designed for instruction, the church for moral improvement. Pedagogues and professors teach; pulpit-orators persuade to the voluntary practice of the religion which is taught. The grand design of a sermon is to edify the hearers. Our Saviour compares a true Christian to a wise man building his house upon a rock, Matt. 7: 24—27; he speaks of his church as builded upon a rock, Matt. 16: 18; Paul describes the friends of Jesus as God's building, 1 Cor. 3, 9—17; and as the temple of the Holy Ghost, 1 Cor. 6: 19; as the temple of the living God, 2 Cor. 6: 16; as a holy temple and as a habitation of God, Eph. 2: 21, 22. He speaks of Christ as the foundation of this temple, 1 Cor. 3: 10 seq. Now it is evident that mere knowledge does not constitute man a fit habitation for the Holy Ghost; it is knowledge conjoined with love and obedience; it is faith, hope, charity, but the greatest of

these is charity. Edification, then, consists in the improvement of the whole man; in his intellectual, but more especially his moral advancement. To edify the soul is not merely to lay the foundations of a good character, not merely to raise the superstructure, but to improve the spiritual being in every excellence. The prophesying spoken of in the New Testament, was altogether distinct from simple teaching; see Acts 2: 17, 18. 1 Cor. 11: 4. 13: 9. 12: 28, 29. It was an impassioned religious address, and the design of it was to build up the intellect, heart and will, to the stature of a perfect man; especially to animate and strengthen the Christian virtues; see 1 Cor. xiv. If, then, the design of a sermon be not merely to impart instruction, but also to vivify the religious principle, it follows that a sermon is one-sided, ill-proportioned, imperfect if it do not exhibit the Christian faith in its union with Christian love, if it do not incline the heart to cherish the truth which is believed by the intellect, if it do not unite with the prayers and praises of the sanctuary to produce one effect, the symmetrical and harmonious development of the whole Christian character.

§ 14. *Eloquence essential to a Sermon.*

If the object of a preacher were merely to instruct, then he might adopt the style of simple prose. In the didactic parts of his discourse he does employ this style; but as in other parts he aims to influence the feelings and the will, he must also have recourse to the language of poetry and of eloquence. The advocates of the Philosophy of Identity have advanced the idea, that religion is in its nature the same with poetry and the fine arts in general, and that the only fit style of expressing religious truth is the poetic. Sauer has asserted, that all religious communications in the church should be made in song, rather than in speech. But although religion is, in some respects, identical with the fine arts, especially with poetry, it is in other respects essentially different from them. First, like them it springs from feeling, from a desire of harmony with one's self: but the union which is aimed at in religion is one of the intellect, affections and will; whereas the union aimed at in the poetic and other fine arts, is merely one of the imagination and the feelings. Secondly, the religious man is, during his devotional exercises, the subject of a kind of inspiration, like that of the poet and artist; but the enthusiasm of the former is regulated by the judgment and reason more than

that of the latter. Thirdly, religion resembles the fine arts in the fact that it looks above the sensuous world for its appropriate objects; but it looks higher than to the favorite sphere of those arts. It looks to that which is purely spiritual, whereas they are satisfied with mere refinements and ideal combinations of objects of sense. It looks also to that which is real, whereas poetry and the other fine arts are satisfied with what is imaginary. Religion is pervaded and governed by the truth; the poetic and similar arts, by the principles of taste. Hence religion, differing thus from poetic feeling, cannot be expressed in the language of simple poetry; in other words, this is not the distinctive and proper style of a sermon. Still, it is one element of that style. Religion exercises all the faculties of the soul. Originating from a desire of harmony with one's self and with God, it suggests at once certain definite ideas of truth, and thus it employs the reason. These truths are made more obvious and vivid by a connection with objects of sense, and they become connected with such objects by the imagination. When thus bodied forth they exert a lively influence upon the affections, and through the affections upon the will. In this way all the faculties, the intellect, imagination, feelings and will are interested in religious action; and we have already seen that the language of all those principles united is that of eloquence. The intellect employs simple prose. The imagination and the affections employ poetry. The will employs simple prose and poetry in a certain combination, for a certain end, and forms a new style, that of eloquence. This must be the style of a sermon; for the sermon teaches; it also invests its teachings in an attractive garb; it likewise rouses the affections; and with the aid of the intellectual, the imaginative and the pathetic, it appeals to the will, and persuades it to act in harmony with the laws of the universe. Thus it addresses the whole soul for the purpose of securing its voluntary union with God. It cannot, therefore, employ any other form of address, than that which aims to persuade the will by means of a symmetrical appeal to all the spiritual faculties. This form of address, is eloquence, as already defined. The preacher is under the influence of religious feeling, and has a religious motive; therefore he cannot be satisfied with the style of the mere prose writer, or of the mere poet. He must be more animated than the former, and must have a more definite aim than the latter. If his sole object were to teach theology, he might be satisfied with the simple prose. As, however, his object is to interest the feelings in theological truth, he

must combine with the prosaic element the poetic also. And further, as his ultimate design is to make the will harmonious with this truth, he must resort to a form of speech still higher and more comprehensive than that of poetry, to eloquence. If he intended simply to effect a change in the will, he need not be eloquent; but he must persuade to voluntary action by means of an impassioned interest in religious truth; and the definition of eloquence is the art of moving the will by an excitement of the feelings and the imagination in view of the objects of the intellect. To secure faith alone, or love alone, or works alone does not necessarily demand eloquence; but to secure the true faith, combined with the right love and thus leading to good works, requires the highest kind of eloquence; that of the pulpit. It has been already stated, that the sermon must be written in the spirit of the Bible, and this is the spirit of eloquence; in the style of the Bible also, so far as this style is congruous with our character and circumstances, and this is the style of eloquence, not indeed of scholastic, artificial, labored, but of simple, natural, artless, and so much the more effective eloquence. The sermon must be written in the benevolent temper of a practical Christian, and we know it to be an ancient adage, pectus est, quod disertum facit. It is said by Töllner, that a sermon must not be rhetorical but instructive and edifying. Now any address, that is religiously edifying must in its very nature be eloquent; for it must build up the soul in faith, love and obedience. Töllner and others regard eloquence as designed merely to play upon the feelings, and as distinct from poetical effusions in the bare fact of its having a smaller degree of ornament than they. But if eloquence be the art of employing all the faculties of the soul for the purpose of exciting right volitions and cherishing holy principles, then it is, in kind as well as degree, different from poetry, and has a far nobler object than mere passionate excitement; then it is more appropriate to a sermon than to any other kind of composition; it constitutes the very element of a pulpit discourse; and not only must the highest standard of eloquence be that of the preacher, but also there can be no proper and true preaching which is devoid of real eloquence, and even the most exalted form of it.

§ 15. *The Popular Style of Sacred Eloquence.*

The ancient Romans applied the term *popularitas* to that mode of conduct which was designed to please the people, (see Taci-

tus Ann. 3, 69), and denominated a man *homo popularis* who, either in fact or in pretence, labored for the pleasure or the benefit of the community, (see Cic. de off. 1, 25. Liv. 6, 20). Accordingly, that style of address was termed *popularis*, which was accommodated to the tastes and capabilities of the mass of men, (see Cic. de off. 2, 10).

A sermon is sometimes called *popular* in the etymological sense, when it is adapted to the lower classes of society. These classes exercise their imagination more than their reason; they attend to the outward more than the inward; they regard phenomena more than the causes or laws of them; they are occupied with particular examples more than with general principles. Hence a sermon addressed to them must be figurative in its style, and its metaphors must be taken from external objects. It must avoid abstractions and generalizations; it must individualize, and give more prominence to the facts than to the reasons for them. The uneducated classes are characterized by strength of feeling, natural as well as religious; and therefore a sermon addressed to them must be highly animated. Their feeling is not delicate and refined; and hence they are not much affected by nicety of words or chasteness of imagery. They require indeed beauties of style, but not such as are particularly modest. They demand vivid conceptions, bold epithets, a strikingly imaginative character both of thought and language. They emphatically require a style of distinctive *eloquence*. He who preaches to them must draw his analogies from the tangible objects with which they are familiar, and must make frequent reference to the histories, and the parables of the inspired volume. He speaks under some disadvantages from which the ancient orators were free. They harangued the multitude on themes which were felt to be of more immediate importance than the preacher's; which were better understood, and were combined with a more frequent consideration of visible and tangible objects. But the preacher need not be discouraged; for although he is occupied with spiritual truths he also addresses spiritual beings, men who have by nature certain religious longings, and who are predisposed to be interested in the welfare of their immortal part. He must make a greater effort, however, than was made by the ancient orators, to arrest and preserve the attention of the multitude, to accommodate and recommend his statements to their peculiar tastes.

But not only is the term *popular* applied to that species of eloquence which is intended for the lower classes; it is also appro-

priated to the eloquence which is designed for the middling, and even for the educated portion of society. There is an order of men who have too much cultivation to belong to the populace, and too little to be classed among the learned, who require a style of preaching less imaginative than the common people, and less refined than the literary circles. It is a mistake, however, to imagine, that even the most intelligent congregations are edified by strictly learned discourses. They do not come into the sanctuary as students but as men; they seek not so much the reasonings of a logician as the persuasives of a religious monitor; they are not to be addressed as mere intellectual inquirers but rather as Christian worshippers. There is a popular style of eloquence for learned audiences; it is the style of general edification; of appeal to the whole nature, to the humanity rather than to the scholarship of the hearers, to their moral sensibilities no less than to their mental powers. The popular characteristic of the pulpit eloquence for learned assemblies is its *universality;* its fitness to man as man, to Christians as Christians, to the same susceptibilities which are recognized in all, even the humblest members of the human family. An address which is devoid of this popular element, this adaptation to the unsophisticated, unperverted principles of our common nature, is not an eloquent sermon, nor indeed any sermon at all. Popularity is essential to eloquence, especially to that of the pulpit; for the themes of the pulpit are Christian, and all that is Christian is well suited to the susceptibilities of man as man.

§ 16. *Simplicity of Pulpit Eloquence.*

That work of art is called *simple*, which does not suggest to him who examines it any suspicion of the labor which has been expended in its production. It seems to have been produced without pains taking, without a rigid application of rules. It appears to be as it is, because it could not have been otherwise. The seeming ease and naturalness of its construction make a way for it at once to the heart. A discourse is *simple*, when its propositions are so stated and proved as to ingratiate themselves at once into the belief; instead of being encumbered with such a parade of argument, as to occupy the mind with logical forms rather than the main and substantial truth. It is simple, when its arrangement is such as to disclose the whole subject easily to the view, instead of being disfigured with artificial divisions and sub-

divisions concealing the doctrine which is parcelled out thus unnecessarily. It is simple, when its sentences are formed as if they could not have been written in any other way, and its ornaments appear to spring spontaneously from the theme; and this noble simplicity is wanting when the style swells into pompous periods, and the metaphors seem not to have presented themselves of their own accord, but to have been sought out with care. A sermon which glides along in this simple course, enters at once into the hearer's mind. It is, in the etymological sense of the term, popular. It is not true, as Dahl asserts, that simplicity and popularity are convertible terms; neither is it true, as Prof. G. Schlegel supposes, that a discourse cannot be simple without being popular, but may be popular without being simple. The reverse is the fact. Popularity includes more than simplicity. The former implies, while the latter does not, a nice consultation of the peculiar wants of the people addressed; an accurate adjustment of the sentiment and style to the mental characteristics of an audience in some respects inferior to the speaker himself. A sermon may be simple while it is not popular, but cannot be suited to the common sensibility of the race without appearing easy, natural, free from the signs of preparatory toil. Schlegel has also asserted, that simplicity is ever calm and unimpassioned; whereas the outpouring of fresh, spontaneous emotion is the best method of avoiding those cumbersome, labored and unnatural constructions which are peculiar to the frigid writer. As the simple style insinuates itself at once into the heart, it is better adapted than any other to the purposes of eloquence. It is peculiarly congenial with sacred eloquence; for the spirit, the very nature of the Christian scheme is fitted to raise the sacred orator above all puerile affectation and love of display, and to make his style, like that of the earliest records of his faith, artless and therefore winning.

§ 17. *The Design, and the various Departments of Rhetoric.*

In its more general acceptation, Rhetoric is the system of rules according to which either a prosaic or an eloquent discourse is adapted to its end. In its more limited meaning, it is the theory of eloquence, or the system of rules according to which an oration should be written and orally delivered. In this narrow signification, it includes secular rhetoric, and sacred, or homiletics. It is true that eloquence was practised before the principles of rheto-

ric were recorded; and in ancient Greece and Rome it had even passed the state of its perfection, ere its rules were reduced to system. This only proves, that the spirit of those republics had vanished before rhetoricians appeared. It does not prove, that the science is productive of no advantage. The design of this science is not to create those qualities which are needful to an orator, but rather to describe them; to show, that a good physical organization, a cultivated taste, excitability of temperament, liveliness of fancy, rapidity in rising from particular to general ideas, in descending from generals to particulars, and in discovering the resemblance, the dissimilarities and the reciprocal influences of related conceptions; that a deep interest in the present state of man, and in his progress toward a perfect ideal; that pure virtue and even a Christian spirit are the necessary elements of an orator, especially of one who speaks on sacred themes. The design of rhetoric is to induce a man to inquire, ere he devote himself to the practice of eloquence, whether he possess the acuteness, the versatility, the power of easy expression, and all the other mental and moral qualities which are essential to his success; to induce him to cultivate those parts of his constitution that are most immediately serviceable to him, to stimulate those that have lain dormant, to correct those that have run wild, ever to keep in view the great object to which eloquence aspires, and ever to observe the rules which are prescribed for the attainment of that object. The design of rhetoric is further, to free the orator from the observance of artificial prescriptions, from all slavery to forms, from all forced compliance with the customs of society, from all unmanly imitation of models; to bring him back from the constraints of art to the freedom and ease of nature.

As no one can affect the minds of others without understanding their constitution, so rhetoric involves an exhibition of the laws of psychology. As an orator must make all his appeals in harmony with the principles of moral obligation, so rhetoric involves a statement of ethical science. As no man is able to convince another without complying with the rules of the reasoning power, or please another, without obeying the canons of taste, so rhetoric includes a delineation of the principles of logic, and likewise of aesthetics. As the oration is orally delivered, so rhetoric must add to its other departments the principles of elocution. Rhetorical science, then, is a branch of practical philosophy; and homiletics, as it prescribes the rules for Christian edification, is also a branch of philosophical and of practical theology.

An oration, being a work of art, has a unity in itself; it has some leading idea. This is called its theme. The first duty of the orator is to find his theme, the subject matter of his oration. Hence the first part of rhetoric is *inventio*, *εὕρεσις*. The next duty of the orator is, so to arrange his thoughts as to make them correspond with the nature of his theme and with the end which he aims to promote. Hence the second part of rhetoric is the *dispositio*, *collocatio*, *τάξις*. In expressing his ideas, the orator adopts a certain form of language accommodated to the genius of his subject, or to the peculiarities of his own mind. This form of language is called his style. The third duty of the orator, then, is his selection of words and phrases; and the third part of rhetoric is *elocutio*, *pronunciatio*, *λέξις*, *ἑρμηνεία*. The oral method of address being peculiarly appropriate to eloquence, the fourth part of rhetoric is devoted to the corporeal expression of ideas, and is called *pronunciatio*, *actio*, *προφορά*, *ὑπόκρισις*. The ancient rhetoricians added a fifth department, the *memoria*, *ars memoriae*, *μνήμη*; the art of calling to mind the various divisions of the discourse by associating them with certain images of the fancy, or certain rooms in a building, etc., *imagines* and *loci*. As our rhetoricians, however, prescribe that an oration be committed to memory previously to its being delivered, they dispense with this fifth department.

ARTICLE III.

CRITIQUE ON STRAUSS'S LIFE OF JESUS.

By Rev. H. B. Hackett, Professor of Biblical Literature in Newton Theological Institution.

Wissenschaftliche Kritik der Evangelischen Geschichte. Ein Compendium der gesammten Evangelienkritik mit Berücksichtigung der neusten Erscheinungen bearbeitet von Dr. A. Ebrard. 1842. pp. 1112.

No PORTION of the Bible, not excepting now even the Pentateuch, which had been so long the battle-field of the German critics, excites so much interest at the present moment in Germany as the four Gospels. This is owing to the new direction which the course of biblical criticism has taken in that country,