
A table of contents for *Bibliotheca Sacra* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_bib-sacra_01.php

them can be perfectly well used for all three: since no one of them can be given to him, to whom all three do not belong; for that which is designated by each of them, has the closest affinity with what is denoted by the others.

ARTICLE V.

THE COLLOCATION OF WORDS IN THE GREEK AND LATIN LANGUAGES, EXAMINED IN RELATION TO THE LAWS OF THOUGHT.

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It has been common with those who have written on the nature of language to assert, that words are purely arbitrary signs of thought, that they have no natural relation with the things they signify, and that their propriety as expressions of thought is entirely the result of convention.

This assertion, if it is regarded only as a popular and general statement, may perhaps pass without criticism. It serves, with sufficient distinctness to separate the language of words from the language of signs, and of passionate cries. In a strict and scientific view, however, it cannot be regarded as any part of the definition of artificial language. To say, as is sometimes said in defence of this position, that the sound of a word has no resemblance to the object, or the thought, which it may be appropriated to express, amounts to nothing; for sounds have resemblance to nothing but sounds; and if this can prove their use in every sense arbitrary when applied to express other things than sounds, the argument would be equally valid against every sign in the whole range of natural language. The paleness of fear, the burning flush of insulted honor, the cold averted look, and the gently inclined attitude betokening invitation, would all be arbitrary signs, for they are not like the things they signify. In this way would all the objects in the realm of creation, that differ from each other, become isolated; and nature herself would no longer be one. Her domain would no longer be pervaded by a common spirit, but would be rather a *hortus siccus*, from which the common life had fled, and each thing was there for itself

alone. The position of which we are speaking, that language is purely arbitrary, would, if carried out rigorously to its results, evacuate all scientific inquiry of its significancy and its hope. It would be equally fatal to the arts which invite and reward the imagination. But these thoughts we cannot develop in this place.

If we examine analytically the point before us, we readily perceive the important limitation with which we must receive the popular statement, that language, in its materials and its structure, is an arbitrary invention.

It is not necessary here to entertain the inquiry whether language is a special gift from God, given to man in its perfected form, or is a product of man's inventive powers. The answer, whichever way it should be given, would not materially affect the present discussion. We shall speak of it, however, only in the latter of the two views, as a product of the human mind. Notwithstanding the imposing names of some of the advocates of the contrary hypothesis, they generally appear under the disadvantage of being possessed by some preconceived theory, necessitating them to their conclusions. Most unbiased inquirers will probably accept, as their own creed on this point, the plain and racy saying of Herder, that "God gave men faculties, and left them to find out language by the use of them."

If language then is the product of mind, we may expect to find in it the impress of mind, wherever such a trace is possible. It will be obvious that the most ready source of finding what we here seek, will be in the words which are employed to designate sound, for here is the possibility of more or less actual resemblance between the word and the thing it signifies. The illustrations here are too trite to justify dwelling on them at any length. We may say, however, even at the risk of repeating what is well known, that the comparison of such words as *slap* and *slam*, of *hit* and *hiss*, of *rattle* and *roar*, will show that, when the sound ends suddenly, the word employs a smooth mute, and when the sound is prolonged, the word expressing it employs a liquid.

To pass to a less obvious illustration, why do almost all languages employ, for a child's first expressions of endearment to its parent, words whose consonants are labials, or the lingual *t* or *d*; why but because these organs, the tongue and lips, have, by the appointment of nature, been called into use from the first day of the infant's life?

We might mention, as illustrations of this point, the fact that the simple past tense in most languages differs from the imperfect in the precise particular in which the action, as they respectively represent it, differs; the former employing a short, the latter an expanded form; that the past participle tends to take a mute for its final letter, while the present, indicating continuance of the action, closes with a liquid or nasal sound. We mention these only as examples, and not as a complete enumeration of the illustrations the subject affords. They might be extended indefinitely, showing the mind's adaptive power in the whole process of forming language. In the lexicons of different languages, the class of words in which a given letter performs the same office will be found to have a common idea at the basis, underlying the various significations which the catalogue presents. Let us not be here misunderstood. There has no doubt been misdirected effort on the science of philology. The subject has intrinsic difficulties; from the impossibility of having a fixed standard by which to compare the fleeting sounds of words in different ages, from organic peculiarities in different nations, from the influence of prescription; and, were all these difficulties removed, there would still remain the fact, that language, like every other instrument, is but an imperfect means for the accomplishment of its end.

But obstacles scarcely less formidable than these lie in every path of historical inquiry. And even science exhibits the failures and errors of its votaries, as one of the elements of its progress. Philology is not more remarkable for the misdirected labor of its cultivators than is the science of chemistry. The one has united nations of men; it remains for the other to unite the kingdoms of nature.

In objecting to the position here assumed, that language in its last analysis is a natural expression of thought, it is not enough to present words in which no trace of their natural fitness to the thoughts they express can be discovered. The objector is bound to maintain, that words, in whose very form there is a manifest fitness to the thing they express, cannot be adduced in sufficient number to make it unreasonable to regard the fact as purely accidental. Will he then compare the words *lead* and *smite*, and say here is no adaptedness, or only an accidental one, of the word to the thought. Is the liquid flow breathed into one without any vital sympathy with the mind that is filled with the thought;

and is the sharp tension of the organs which give utterance to the other anything else but part and parcel of the feeling which clenches the hand and hardens the muscles for the blow? Have the words *soothe* and *gripe* no natural meaning at all of their own, aside from arbitrary convention? Does not the word *soothe* actually soothe, once and always, when spoken? and would the word *gripe* be a happy one to tell you how the mother smooths the pillow for the fevered child, charms away its pains, and lulls its weary heart to rest? Or does all the specific virtue there is in these words depend on convention, and, to support their claim, must they appeal to the record made for them in the respectable octavo dictionary? Words like the above are in truth the vocal embodiment of the thought for which they stand. They are fresh coins from the mint of the soul.

To deny the conclusion to which these indications would naturally lead us, because there are comparatively few words whose very sound seems thus instinct with their meaning, would be to forget the limitation to which, on a subject like that of language, we must necessarily be subjected. It would be more unreasonable than it would be to deny, when looking on the play of the ocean's billows, that the minute ripples that run athwart, and dance over the larger waves are the index of law, and the result of definite and exact forces.

The word that comes into the critic's hands for examination may be an ancient coin stamped in the earliest days. It has come down through eras of history, and, in its long service, the traces of its first impression have been worn quite away. So the real piece of coin with which you traffic, may by long use have lost all trace of the pillars, that are so useful in distinguishing it from the smaller coin, which it so much resembles. Yet this search for the pillars is thought to reward the closest scrutiny, if one may judge from the interest which it is sometimes seen to awaken. And we say further, that when found these marks on the coin have a value for other ends than those of traffic. These mementos of a Spanish monarch's power and aims, carry the enquiring mind back to former ages; and when interpreted, they open to his view a wide vista in the history of geography, of the political changes of Europe, and the civilization of the modern world.

If, then, language be a living product, and not a mechanical contrivance, we may expect to trace its relation with the laws of

mind in its structure and arrangement, not less than in its materials. It is the object of this essay to investigate the principles of collocation in reference to the Latin and the Greek.

These languages are selected for obvious reasons. For though the principles of collocation will be found, on a close analysis, to be essentially the same in all, yet in most other languages the application of them is restrained within the narrowest limits by the fixed form of the words, which are to a great extent indeclinable. An exception to this remark may be made in reference to the German. The Latin and Greek, however, were formed under the influence of the free spirit of art, seeking, as by instinct, the most varied and expressive forms of arrangement, and at the same time, by their full declension, removing the obstacles which in other languages obstruct the realization of this aim. The subject before us may, then, most fitly be discussed in reference to the two languages above named, since it is here alone that the principles of arrangement can be seen in their free development. We may be permitted to add also, that, as the Latin and Greek form the first and chief subjects for philological study in our system of liberal education, there may be a practical value to instructers and students in whatever may be appropriately said in the analysis we propose.

The leading fact that meets us, on comparing these languages with the modern, is the inversion of phrases and periods, placing them in an order, the opposite of modern usage, called the unnatural or artificial order. The question is, Is this order unnatural? Is it in violation of the laws of thought, or is it in conformity with them? In the first place, it would be not a little strange that languages, possessing, by their copious inflections, the power of adopting any arrangement whatever, should in fact have adopted one which violates, instead of conforming to, the natural laws of the thoughts they express. We should *a priori* conclude, that the most exact conformity to the thought would be expressed by languages which possessed the most varied powers of collocation, while it would be left for those languages which, by the inflexibility of their forms, have but a very limited power in this respect, to exhibit a defective arrangement.

In assuming that such is the fact, it is not necessary to claim for the Latin and the Greek an entire freedom from defect in this particular. No language is perfect; and allowance must be made, in discussing this topic, for the defects of the languages under review. A badly arranged phrase will sometimes escape a clas-

sic author; it will be taken up and repeated; pass into use, and thus become the "jus et norma loquendi." The whole literature of a language is in fact a record of adjudged cases respecting the use of words. The last will show, as do the highest prized records of law-courts, occasional deviations from the requisitions of perfect law. But it is not an unworthy pursuit in either case to discover the universal idea under the various forms, which, with more or less complete approximation, exhaust it. To do this fully in the case of any language, would be to write a Blackstone's Commentaries on the common law of the language.

The grammars of the Latin and of the Greek, have different degrees of merit, in regard to the topic now under review. In most of them whatever is said, is in the form of mere mechanical rules, without so much as the suggestion, that there is any mental law concerned in determining the arrangement. In some of the later grammars a better method has been adopted. In none, however, has the analysis been conducted with strict reference to the logic of the thought; and some important facts have been omitted, which are necessary to even a complete formal statement.

But we do not design to dwell on what others have not done. We propose to exhibit what we regard as the leading principles on the subject, with some rules and examples deduced from them.

A sentence, like a discourse, may be regarded in two points of view; either as designed to communicate mere thoughts; or, to utter with impressive emphasis such as are already in the mind, or are so familiar as to be awakened by a slight suggestion. These ends may indeed be both combined in a sentence, as in a discourse; but it will generally be found that the one or the other predominates. It is from an examination of a sentence with reference to these aims, that the principles which govern the collocation of its words must be discovered. So far as the end to be gained in a sentence, is the statement of new thought, the general principle of collocation is perhaps best expressed in the adage quoted by Campbell,[1] "Nearest the heart, nearest the mouth." The word forming the key to the thought, essential to connecting the thought with what goes before, must take an early position in the sentence.

When, however, the design is to give impressive utterance to thoughts already suggested, we remark two things. First, just in

[1] Rhetoric.

proportion as the general thought, of which the sentence under the writer's hand is a particular expression, has been suggested by the previous discourse, so that the reader or hearer may anticipate it, in that proportion may the particular word expressing it be postponed without loss to the clearness of the thought. Secondly, when it is designed to give the most effective expression to a thought already anticipated, it is not only admissible, but it is requisite, that the word or phrase, expressing this thought, be if possible the last to fill the ear. This is an indispensable requisite for impressive speaking, as necessary in a sentence as in a discourse. This law is obeyed by every rhetorician, consciously or unconsciously. The reasons on which it rests, are not difficult to understand; and we will state them, though we may have occasion to recur to them, and perhaps repeat them in another place. By postponing to the last the word designed to give strong utterance to a thought, already in some general form in the mind, opportunity is given to introduce, first, every explanatory idea, so that when the chief stroke is given, the whole ideal picture shall stand instantly complete before the mind. Further, by postponing the effective word to the last, the imagination is aroused, and kindles as the sentence progresses towards the culminating point. Finally, by having the expectation awakened, there is the possibility of an additional pleasure, when this executed expectation shall be satisfied, or surpassed by the happily chosen word which the author may select to close the period. This word is the peroration of the sentence.

Hence, we see there are two vital points in a sentence, the opening and the close; the first, the emphasis of thought; the second, the emphasis of feeling; and thought and feeling gather on these two points, like the opposing forces on the poles of a magnet.

From these leading statements, a few definite rules may be deduced, and illustrated by reference to the classic authors. These rules will relate first, to the relative position of the leading parts of a sentence—the subject, verb, and object; and then, to the position of each of them separately, in relation to the words which limit or modify them.

Rule I. The word most important for connecting the thought with what precedes, requires the earliest possible position.

This rule, it will be observed, regards sentences not as isolated expressions but as parts of a whole. This is regarded as an essential consideration. It has been common to give rules on this

subject, as if sentences were independent of each other. In this way, they can no more be fully understood, than men can be fully understood by studying them merely as individuals. It is but a counterpart of this rule, directly deducible from it, that words not essential to connecting the thought with what precedes may be postponed, and occupy a later position.

The most common illustration of this rule is when the subject precedes the verb, as it does in all languages in the simplest form of unexcited narrative. Passing by instances of this form of arrangement as too common to require specification, we come to sentences in which the verb precedes the subject.

Cic. in Cat. I 2. *Decrevit* quondam Senatus ut L. Opimius consul videret, ne quid respublica detrimenti caperet; nox nulla intercessit; *interfectus est* propter quasdam seditionum suspiciones C. Gracchus, clarissimo patre, avo, majoribus; *occisus est* cum liberis M. Fulvius, consularis.

These examples from history are adduced to prove that the decree of the senate would be a sufficient warrant for the consuls, should they put Catiline to death. The connexion is between the idea of the decree and of the punishment. In the first sentence, the verb precedes the subject, because the orator had just spoken of a recent act of the senate; the general idea was already in the hearers' minds; he now speaks of a former act of that same senate, decrevit quondam; here the act is qualified, while the subject is unchanged. Hence the emphatic particular is the action, not the subject.

In the clause following, *interfectus est*, et cet., the object is to represent the punishment of death as following inevitably and quickly on the decree. The *person* who suffered death was of no importance to the argument; and moreover was well known to the hearers. The same reason controls the arrangement of the final clause, *occisus est*, et cet. So, "fuit, fuit, ista quondam in hac republica virtus," placing the emphasis on the assertion of the fact. So, Pro Lege Man. 13: Est haec divina atque incredibilis virtus imperatoris.

The same law of arrangement will be found to prevail in the Greek. Xen. Anab. 1. 1. 3: *Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐτελεύτησε Δαρεῖος.*—Here the verb is placed before the subject, because the latter is already in the reader's mind. Darius had just been spoken of as sick. This renders the new verb applied to the same subject, emphatic. Anab. 1. 1. 6: *τότε δ' ἀφεστήκεσαν πρὸς Κῦρον πᾶσαι, πλὴν Μιλήτου.* The preceding statement is, "The Ionian cities belonged to Tis-

saphernes formerly, having been given him by the king." The verb *ἀφεστήκεσαν*, is placed before the subject to bring their present state of revolt into distinct contrast with their former condition. The subject—cities—having just been mentioned, was already present to the mind. So Plat. Phaed. 1: *Τί οὖν δή ἐστιν ἅττα εἶπεν ὁ ἀνὴρ πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου.* "What said the man before his death." Every reader feels how exactly this arrangement fits the form of the thought.

The examples above given exhibit the verb preceding the subject. Not unfrequently the object precedes both verb and subject. We do not here allude to the commonly recognized case of inversion in which the finite verb closes the sentence. The majority of such cases follow a different law, as will be seen in its place. The case now in hand brings forward the object for the purpose of distinctive emphasis, and not for impressive emphasis. The following is an example. It well illustrates the power of the language, and its fitness will justify its length. Xen. Anab. 1. 4. 7: *Καὶ Ξενίας καὶ Πασίων ἐμβάντες εἰς το πλοῖον, καὶ τὰ πλείστου ἄξια ἐνθέμενοι, ἀπέπλευσαν, ὡς μὲν τοῖς πλείστοις ἐδόκουν, φιλοτιμηθέντες, ὅτι τοὺς στρατιώτας αὐτῶν, παρὰ Κλέαρχον ἀπελθόντας, ὡς ἀπιόντας εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα πάλιν καὶ οὐ πρὸς βασιλέα, εἶα Κῦρος τὸν Κλέαρχον ἔχειν.*

The English idiom will barely admit a translation in conformity with the arrangement of the original. "And Xenias and Pasion, embarking, and putting on board their most valuable effects, sailed away, as the greater number supposed, offended, because their soldiers, who had gone over to Clearchus, as if they were designing to depart for Greece, and not to go against the king, Cyrus permitted Clearchus to retain."

Here the object of the infinitive which closes the sentence is placed before the sentence on which it depends. But this arrangement, unusual as it seems, is necessary to give a just picture of the thought. It permits the introduction in close connexion with the word *φιλοτιμηθέντες* of the words which suggest the occasion of their resentment, and which also are necessary to fill up the picture, so that when the closing words, are uttered, the whole head and front of the offending is, at once, brought to view. Let the reader attempt the translation of the above by beginning with the subject and finite verb, dragging in the long train of circumstances afterwards, and ending without a close, and he may become aware of the beauties of what is sometimes called the natural or logical order.

The rule that has been given respecting the introductory member of a sentence, may be applied to determine the position of the remaining parts with respect to each other. It will be found that the member introducing what is new, precedes that which is designed to impress what has been already suggested; the word essential to perspicuity precedes the word designed for impression. This may not inaptly be called the emphasis of thought. The rule and the illustration that have been given will explain instances of inversion, only where the design is to give a perspicuous expression to thought. A large proportion of the cases of inversion have reference to a different object, and must be explained by a different law. This brings us to the mention of another rule.

Rule II. Expressions designed to give forcible utterance to thoughts already suggested, are placed last in their respective sentences.

It is not meant to imply that any phrases are used solely for the purpose of impressing what is already in the mind, without contributing in any degree to the thought. But a little examination will show, that in ordinary discourse only a small proportion of the ideas are so new, as not to have been in any degree suggested by the tenor of the preceding language.

The idea, anticipating the direct expression, may have been suggested by the mention of a related thought, by a word of contrast, or in any of the ways that bring it under the law of association; and the suggestion may vary to any extent in distinctness, from the most manifest and pointed reference, to the faintest allusion, concealed in the etymology, or peculiar use of a word which none but a scholar would detect.

Now, just in proportion as the idea is suggested before it is uttered, may the specific expression for it be postponed, while the mind gathers up all the particulars that shall give it completeness and power, and the billow of thought swells and rolls onward till it breaks on the shore.

That we may be fully understood on this point, we will refer to a well known passage from a celebrated American orator: "When my eyes shall be turned to behold, for the last time, the sun in heaven, may I not see him shining on the broken and dishonored fragments of a once glorious union; on states dissevered, discordant, belligerent; on a land rent with civil feuds, or drenched, it may be, with fraternal blood! Let their last feeble and lingering glance rather behold the gorgeous ensign of the re-

public, etc."—Who does not feel, that should he pause at this point, even in the first hearing of this passage, the key note of that patriotic anthem has been struck; and, though we may not anticipate all its varied and rich melodies as it winds to its close, still we are prepared for it. It is not strange; and as it falls on the ear it only elevates the hearer in the line of his own already excited thought.

To make the present point plain by reference to examples of a marked character, we quote the closing sentence of the first oration against Catiline.

Tum tu, Jupiter, qui iisdem, quibus haec urbs auspiciis a Romulo es constitutus; quem Statorem hujus urbis atque imperii vere nominamus; hunc et hujus socios . . . et omnes inimicos bonorum, hostes patriae, latrones Italiae, et cet.

The hearer is at this point in full possession of the general idea which is to close the period. A prayer to the gods against the enemies of the country and the robbers of Italy will surely end with nothing short of the idea of their extinction. The hearer might not anticipate the precise oratorical *finale*, eternis suppliciis vivos mortuosque mactabis; for it is the part of the speaker in such a case not to fall short of the expectation raised, but at once to fulfil and surpass it.

We are now prepared to examine the very frequent case of inversion in which the finite verb closes the sentence. Nothing can be more formal than the rules usually given in the grammars respecting this feature of the ancient languages. It has been laid down as a general law of position that the finite verb should stand last in the sentence, without the slightest recognition of a law of thought requiring such an arrangement. The rule is said to have numerous exceptions; and this is said without adding a word to lead the student to suppose that there is any difference in the form of the thought in the two cases, much less to understand what that difference is. It is sometimes said that a word, which in the natural order would occupy an early position in the sentence, is placed last for the sake of emphasis. How much will the student be enlightened by this, when the same set of rules shall tell him, that a word, that would naturally stand last, may be placed first for the sake of emphasis.

This confusion would have been avoided, if it had been shown, that the emphasis secured by these two opposite arrangements is entirely different in its nature. The one is the emphasis of thought; the other the emphasis of feeling.

In the instance when the finite verb closes the sentence, the example adduced from Cicero will show in a strong light the law of thought that requires such an arrangement. In most such cases the thought expressed by the verb has either been suggested with sufficient clearness to relieve the hearer's mind from the necessity of its early utterance in the sentence, or, it is of such a character, that the mind can easily remain in suspense till the close. We say in most cases; for there are instances in which the closing finite verb is not designed to give impressive utterance to a thought, but only to serve for the grammatical completion of the sentence. The following is an instance. Cic. Pro Lege Man. 2: Genus est belli ejusmodi, quod maxime vestros animos excitare atque inflammare ad studium persequendi debeat. Here the sonorous and exciting words that form the body of the sentence, must have accomplished its object before coming to the close, leaving to the last word little to do, except to secure the point of grammatical propriety.

It would be superfluous to multiply illustrations of the position above laid down, when every page in the classical languages will furnish them for the reader's examination.

It may be proper, here, to anticipate an objection that may be made to the course here pursued of regarding both the languages, now under consideration, as governed by the same laws of arrangement. It must be admitted, that the Latin exhibits a more uniform and rigid adherence to the system of inversion than the Greek. This, however, we think, should be regarded rather as marking a feature of the Roman mind and literature, than as indicating a necessary law of the Latin tongue. The character of a people determines the peculiarities of its language. The rigorous and staid formality that marks the Latin language, was only a reflexion of the same traits in the national mind. Even literature was with them hardly a spontaneous growth. It was kept up by constant importations. There was nothing that we may call *abandon*, in the Roman mind. Their writers seem almost painfully conscious that they were writing. The character of the people, prompting them unceasingly to the work of conquest, was not favorable to the spirit of art. If we do not accept the somewhat harsh *dictum* of Herder, who characterized Rome by calling her "a wolf that worried the world a thousand years," we must admit that her long labor of extending the iron net-work of her municipal law over the nations, was not fitted to foster the first development of thought and language.

In comparing this character with the Greek, we should expect to find in the languages themselves traces of the respective national peculiarities. But the same spirit seeks for expression in both. In the one, it found a material pliant to its slightest plastic impress; in the other, the material had begun to grow rigid before the forming power had pervaded it. We need then make no specific distinction, for the purposes of this discussion between the Latin and the Greek. While the Latin shows a more uniform observance of the method of inversion, it is still free to adopt a different order whenever the form of the thought requires it. If any one supposes that such examples of what is called the natural order, when they occur in the Latin, might be changed to the inverted order he has yet to learn the genius of the language. A single example may show that, in the one case as well as in the other, the order is essential to the thought.

In Cat. I. 1: "Notat et designat oculis ad caedem unumquemque nostrûm." The inverted arrangement would place the verbs last, but with the entire loss of the peculiar force of the sentence. The design of the orator is to state a new and startling fact in the *doings* of Catiline. He wishes to emphasize his assertion of Catiline's act. This would not be done by the inverted arrangement. That would only serve to emphasize the atrocity of the act. The inverted order would be appropriate, if this sentence were employed in a recapitulation of the acts of Catiline, after they had been separately treated of and established as matters of fact. The remark here made may serve as a criterion of different styles of writing. In proportion as a composition has the character of a recapitulation of acknowledged events or truths, it will tend to take the inverted form, placing the verb at the close of the sentence, while what is stated as new in act, naturally places the verb before its object. As the verb contains the copula, this last arrangement brings the sentence under the same general law with those quoted under the first rule, when the verb, est, fuit, introduced the sentence. There is in the 3d Oration against Catiline an example of a marked difference of style in the same narrative, arising from the different previous position of the hearer's minds with respect to the facts stated. In describing, to the assembled multitude, the course he had pursued in seizing the persons connected with the conspiracy, at the Mulvian bridge, the orator employs a style exhibiting frequent instances of inversion; when, however, he comes to describe the examination of the conspirators before the senate, and especially

of the letters they had written, a marked change is to be noticed. Here, where everything turned on apparently very slight and unobtrusive circumstances, there was no opportunity for a declamatory or emphatic arrangement. The case required the most distinct and exact statement of the facts just as they were. "Primum ostendimus Cethego signum: cognovit.... Introductus Statilius cognovit signum, et manum suam. Tum ostendi tabellas Lentulo: et quaesivi, cognosceretne signum? Annuit."

In the preceding part of the narrative, describing the seizure at the bridge, no such careful shunning of emphatic forms of expression is seen. The reason is obvious. The separate particulars of the transaction at the bridge were not important as matters of evidence, as were the facts afterwards disclosed in the examination of the letters. Besides, the transaction was in a measure public. Numbers were engaged in it, and rumor had already spread it abroad; and what had not been told would gladly be supplied to curious inquirers by those who were engaged in the affair.

We may now examine a second class of inverted sentences, designed to give emphatic expression to what has been already suggested. We refer to cases where the subject is placed after the verb. The relative position of the words is here the same, it will be observed, as in the first examples under the first rule. The two classes of examples must, however, be kept entirely distinct. Under the first rule the attention was directed to the emphasis at the beginning of the sentence or phrase; here, the emphasis is on the close. There the emphasis was on the verb; here it is on the subject. In the former examples, the desire was to emphasize the assertion contained in the verb; in those that follow, it is to give impressive utterance to ideas already in possession of the mind.

In the 4th Oration against Catiline, Cicero is speaking of the danger he had incurred, of falling a victim to the rage of the desperate class whom he had provoked by his fidelity and firmness in suppressing the conspiracy. In allusion to his probable fate, he touches the sympathies of his hearers by mention of his mourning brother, and adds: "neque meam mentem non domum saepe revocat exanimata uxor, abjecta metu filia, et parvulus filius." How adroit and successful the appeal! and yet here is nothing new. The general subject was already in his hearers' minds. By the words, meam mentem — *domum* saepe revocat, he had suggested to the quick sympathy of his fellow-citizens all he

wished to say; and in the words that follow he but gives expression to thoughts already in their minds. In the Orat. pro Murena, the author is deploring the unhappy situation of his client in having for his accusers men so nearly connected with him as to give him the strongest claim on their kind offices. He then enumerates the accusers. "Accusat paternus amicus, Cn. Postumius, . . . accusat Ser. Sulpitius, . . . accusat M. Cato." Here he was giving no information. The court knew who the accusers were. They are enumerated merely for impression; and the verb, *accusat*, is placed first merely to have it out of the way, so as to leave the emphatic place in possession of its subject.

See, also, Pro Lege Manil. After speaking in general glowing terms of Pompey's military greatness, he names the countries where it had been displayed. Testis est Italia,—Testis est Sicilia,—Testis est Africa,—Testis est Gallia,—Testis est Hispania, etc.

Finally, as under the first rule, the so-called natural order may be essential to secure the emphasis there illustrated, so it may be necessary here, to render emphatic the closing word. See Pro Murena, 32: Ambitum, non innocentiam punivi.

Having treated of the relation of the leading parts of a sentence to each other, as determined by the kind of emphasis which the sentence is designed to exhibit; a few remarks may be made respecting the position of the qualifying words and phrases, in relation to the members of the sentence to which they respectively belong. It will be the less necessary to protract the discussion of this part of the subject, as the same laws which control the position of the leading members, determine that of the subordinate phrases.

The most frequent limitations of the substantive, are the adjective and the noun in the genitive case. We shall confine ourselves to these; for their solution will be a key to the solution of all other cases. In treating of the genitive, the inquiry that first arises is, what order of the words is required by the form of the thought? Should the limiting, or the limited word stand first? By expanding the expression, the logical form will appear. Spes fugae, or fugae spes, means the hope of obtaining safety by fleeing; *hope*, then, is first in the order of thought, and should stand first, on the same principle that requires in a logical definition, the general name first and the specific differences afterwards. So much for the rule laid down in the most widely circulated Latin grammar in the country, that "oblique cases precede the cases

upon which they depend." This rule, besides being perfectly formal, is utterly false, as a principle; for it is contrary to the logical form of the thought, which always determines the form of the expression, when no special reason intervenes to change it. On what principle then is it possible to justify the numerous exceptions to this rule?

First, the expression may be scarcely more than a periphrasis for the limiting word alone. Thus Nepos in Alcib.—flammae vim transiit. So Cic. 3d Cat: Superavit Cinna cum Mario . . . Ultus est hujus victoriae crudelitatem postea Sulla.

Second, the genitive, even when not designed to be especially emphatic, may, from the previous discourse have become more prominent in the reader's mind. Thus in Caesar: Ibi Orgetorigis filia, atque unus e filiis captus est. Here the interest of the narrative is attached entirely to the father, and the circumstance is named only as it would affect the relation of the Romans to him.

Third, the genitive may precede the case that it limits for the sake of distinctive emphasis. Thus in the Tusc. Quest.: Quidnam esse, Brute, causae putem, cur, quum constemus ex animo et corpore, corporis curandi tuendique causa quaesita sit ars ejusque utilitas, . . . animi autem medicina.

The above instances, it will be remarked, illustrate the kind of emphasis spoken of under the first Rule. Where the nature of the emphasis is different, it is obvious that an arrangement the reverse of this must follow.

As adjectives are only a substitute for the noun in the genitive case, they will be found to follow the same law of arrangement. Hence, the natural position of the adjective is after the noun. It expresses the specific difference of that of which the noun expresses the general idea. Performing, as it does, the office of the noun in the genitive, it follows the same influences, in the changes of position to which it is subjected.

It may be remarked here, that the difference between the ancient languages and the English, in relation to the position of the adjective, is all in favor of the former. The position of the adjective before the noun, as required by the idiom of the English, violates the natural law of thought. To obviate this difficulty, and place the word for the specific difference last, we are obliged to resort to the use of the noun and preposition *of*, equivalent to the genitive case. The resources and limitations of our own languages, in this respect, with the expedients it adopts for the dif-

ferent kinds of emphasis would form an interesting subject of remark. The most common word limiting the verb is the adverb. On this point, again, the grammars furnish us with a formal rule, but no principle; with a statement of exceptions, but nothing to show us when to expect them, or how to judge of them when they occur. The principles above laid down will explain the position of the adverb in relation to the verb.

With regard to more extended phrases limiting both the noun and the verb, as they are but phrases doing the office of single words, they may be regarded as longer adjectives or adverbs, and treated accordingly. When several limiting phrases occur as the limitations of the same verb, their order conforms to the common order of descriptive narrative. The time of the act is named before its place, the place before the manner, and this last before the feeling or passion.

We have only room to say, in closing, that we cannot but regard the study of the arrangement of the ancient languages in reference to the ultimate laws of thought, as an essential means for securing fully several of the most valuable ends of a classical education.

The first of the objects to which we refer, is a thorough knowledge of the languages themselves. This cannot be attained by formal rules. It is necessary, that, in connection with the diligent use of formal rules, the student be led gradually to a point, where he shall transcend them, and possess, instead, what we may call the instinct of the language. Without this he may be a pedant, a dogmatist, a prize-man. His memory may be loaded with specific rules, but the spirit of the language will not be incorporated into his mind. The student who is necessitated to change the form of thought as it meets him in a Latin or Greek author, into the form to which the idiom of his own tongue subjects it, is yet a stranger to those languages. He knows them, as one may be said to know a tree who has only eaten the bark.

Another important end of classical studies is the awakening of a love for the literature they contain, and through this as an initiatory discipline, to develop in the student the spirit of universal culture. This cannot be done, while he enters and remains in these realms of thought only as an alien. He must become naturalized, and make his abode in the ancient home of Grecian and Roman feeling. If he adheres to the English form of thought and of expression, while studying the ancient languages, he comes no nearer being a universal scholar than he was before.

He may, by the acquisition of details, become fitted to fulfil the requisition for entering a profession, but he will not have taken a step in the way of truly enlarged culture.

Again, a course of classical study should lead the student to an acquaintance with comparative philology, and with the ultimate laws of style. If each language, however, is studied in a formal spirit; if there is no transcending the specific rules, and apprehending the general law, under the various forms that permit, or impede its expression, the most multifarious acquisition will not make one a philologist, or give him a sure command of the laws of his own language. We are now in want of an analysis of the grammar and usages of the English language, based on enlarged comparative views. The want of such a high authority encourages the pretensions of a class of self-styled original authors on grammar, who are intolerant of all dissent in proportion to the narrowness of their own views.

In the midst of this discordant legislation, modest students are rendered timid, even when they are in the right, and the self-made dictators go unchastized. We need a work which shall embody the results of a thorough comparative analysis of the languages out of which the English has grown; and shall present to the student's view its present laws and usages, in the light of its history, and its materials. This would, at once, restrain the language from foolish appropriations of what is foreign, and guard it in its native rights. It would be a store-house for the instruction of the thorough student; while the small dictation that is now heard on points of grammar would cease.